1857
The fight at Cawnpore--Unexpected visitors--A long chase
--Unjur Tiwari--Bithur--Windham at Cawnpore
The time had now arrived to give the Gwalior troops a repetition of
the lesson taught them at Agra on the 10th October. They had had
it all their own way since then; and having proved too strong for
Windham, they misunderstood the Commander-in-Chief remaining for so
long on the defensive, and attributed his inaction to fear of their
superior prowess.
Sunday, the 6th December, was one of those glorious days in which the
European in northern India revels for a great part of the winter,
clear and cool, with a cloudless sky. I awoke refreshed after a good
night's rest, and in high spirits at the prospect before us of
a satisfactory day's work; for we hoped to drive the enemy from
Cawnpore, and to convince those who had witnessed, if not taken part
in, the horrible brutalities perpetrated there, that England's hour
had come at last.
The 42nd Highlanders, a battery of Royal Artillery, and detachments of
several different corps, had quite lately been added to the force,
so that the Commander-in-Chief had now at his disposal about 5,000
Infantry, 600 Cavalry, and 35 guns. The Infantry were divided into
four brigades, commanded respectively by Greathed, Adrian Hope,
Inglis, and Walpole.[1] The Cavalry brigade, consisting of the
same regiments which had come with us from Delhi, was commanded by
Brigadier Little, the Artillery[2] by Major-General Dupuis, and the
Engineers by Colonel Harness, General Windham being placed in charge
of the entrenchments.
Opposed to this force there were 25,000 men, with 40 guns, not
all disciplined soldiers, but all adepts in the use of arms, and
accustomed to fighting. They were divided into two distinct bodies,
one composed of the Gwalior Contingent, the Rani of Jhansi's
followers, and the mutinous regiments which had been stationed in
Bundelkand, Central India, and Rajputana, which occupied the right
of the enemy's position, covering their line of retreat by the Kalpi
road. The other consisted of the troops--regular and irregular--which
had attached themselves to the Nana, and held the city and the ground
which lay between it and the Ganges, their line of retreat being along
the Grand Trunk Road to Bithur. Tantia Topi was in command of the
whole force, while the Nana remained with his own people on the left
flank.
On the centre and left the enemy were very strongly posted, and could
only be approached through the city and by way of the difficult broken
ground, covered with ruined houses, stretching along the river bank.
While the men were eating their breakfasts, and the tents were being
struck, packed, and sent to the rear, Sir Colin carefully explained
his plan of operations to the Commanding officers and the staff; this
plan was, to make a feint on the enemy's left and centre, but to
direct the real attack on their right, hoping thus to be able to
dispose of this portion of Tantia Topi's force, before assistance
could be obtained from any other part of the line.
With this view Windham was ordered to open with every gun within
the entrenchment at 9 a.m.; while Greathed, supported by Walpole,
threatened the enemy's centre. Exactly at the hour named, the roar of
Windham's Artillery was heard, followed a few minutes later by the
rattle of Greathed's musketry along the bank of the canal. Meanwhile,
Adrian Hope's brigade was drawn up in fighting formation behind the
Cavalry stables on our side of the Trunk Road, and Inglis's brigade
behind the racecourse on the other side. At eleven o'clock the order
was given to advance. The Cavalry and Horse Artillery moved to the
left with instructions to cross the canal by a bridge about two miles
off, and to be ready to fall upon the enemy as they retreated along
the Kalpi road. Walpole's brigade, covered by Smith's Field battery,
crossed the canal by a bridge immediately to the left of Generalganj,
cleared the canal bank, and, by hugging the wall of the city,
effectually prevented reinforcements reaching the enemy's right.
Peel's and Longden's heavy guns, and Bourchier's and Middleton's Field
batteries, now opened on some brick-kilns and mounds which the enemy
were holding in strength on our side of the canal, and against which
Adrian Hope's and Inglis's brigades advanced in parallel lines,
covered by the 4th Punjab Infantry in skirmishing order.
It was a sight to be remembered, that advance, as we watched it from
our position on horseback, grouped round the Commander-in-Chief.
Before us stretched a fine open grassy plain; to the right the dark
green of the Rifle Brigade battalions revealed where Walpole's brigade
was crossing the canal. Nearer to us, the 53rd Foot, and the 42nd and
93rd Highlanders in their bonnets and kilts, marched as on parade,
although the enemy's guns played upon them and every now and then a
round shot plunged through their ranks or ricocheted over their heads;
on they went without apparently being in the least disconcerted, and
without the slightest confusion.
As the brick-kilns were neared, the 4th Punjab Infantry, supported by
the 53rd Foot, charged the enemy in grand style, and drove them across
the canal. Here there occurred a slight check. The rebels, having been
reinforced, made a stand, and bringing guns to bear upon the bridge
within grape range, they must have done us great damage but for the
timely arrival of Peel and his sailors with a heavy gun. This put new
life into the attacking party; with a loud cheer they dashed across
the bridge, while Peel poured round after round from his 24-pounder on
the insurgents with most salutary effect. The enemy faced about and
retired with the utmost celerity, leaving a 9-pounder gun in our
possession.
The whole of Hope's brigade, followed by Inglis's, now arrived on the
scene and proceeded to cross the canal, some by the bridge, while
others waded through the water. Having got to the other side, both
brigades re-formed, and moved rapidly along the Kalpi road. We
(the Commander-in-Chief, Hope Grant, and their respective staffs)
accompanied this body of troops for about a mile and a half, when the
rebels' camp came in sight. A few rounds were fired into it, and then
it was rushed.
We were evidently unexpected visitors; wounded men were lying about in
all directions, and many sepoys were surprised calmly cooking their
frugal meal of unleavened bread. The tents were found to be full of
property plundered from the city and cantonment of Cawnpore--soldiers'
kits, bedding, clothing, and every description of miscellaneous
articles; but to us the most valuable acquisition was a quantity of
grain and a large number of fine bullocks, of which those best suited
for Ordnance purposes were kept, and the rest were made over to the
Commissariat.
That portion of the rebel force with which we had been engaged was now
in full retreat, and Sir Colin wished to follow it up at once; but
the Cavalry and Horse Artillery had not arrived, so that considerable
delay occurred; while we were waiting the Chief arranged to send
Mansfield with a small force[3] round to the north of Cawnpore, and,
by thus threatening the road along which the Nana's troops must
retreat, compel them to evacuate the city. The 23rd Royal Welsh
Fusiliers and a detachment of the 38th Foot were to be left to look
after the deserted camp, and Inglis's brigade was to move along the
Kalpi road in support of the Cavalry and Horse Artillery. But where
were the much-needed and anxiously-expected mounted troops? It was not
like them to be out of the way when their services were required; but
it was now nearly two o'clock, they had not appeared, and the days
were very short. What was to be done? The enemy could not be allowed
to carry off their guns and escape punishment. Suddenly the old Chief
announced that he had determined to follow them up himself with
Bourchier's battery and his own escort.
What a chase we had! We went at a gallop, only pulling up occasionally
for the battery to come into action, 'to clear our front and flanks.'
We came up with a goodly number of stragglers, and captured several
guns and carts laden with ammunition. But we were by this time
overtaking large bodies of the rebels, and they were becoming too
numerous for a single battery and a few staff officers to cope with.
We had outstripped the Commander-in-Chief, and Hope Grant decided to
halt, hoping that the missing Cavalry and Horse Artillery might soon
turn up. We had not to wait long. In about a quarter of an hour they
appeared among some trees to our left, even more put out than we were
at their not having been to the front at such a time. Their guide had
made too great a détour, but the sound of our guns showed them his
mistake, and they at once altered their course and pushed on in the
direction of the firing. Sir Colin had also come up, so off we started
again, and never drew rein until we reached the Pandu Naddi, fourteen
miles from Cawnpore. The rout was complete. Finding themselves
pressed, the sepoys scattered over the country, throwing away their
arms and divesting themselves of their uniform, that they might pass
for harmless peasants. Nineteen guns, some of them of large calibre,
were left in our hands. Our victory was particularly satisfactory in
that it was achieved with but slight loss to ourselves, the casualties
being 2 officers and 11 men killed, and 9 officers and 76 men wounded.
Hope Grant now desired me to hurry back to Cawnpore before it got too
dark, and select the ground for the night's bivouac. As there was some
risk in going alone, Augustus Anson volunteered to accompany me.
We had got about half-way, when we came across the dead body of
Lieutenant Salmond, who had been acting Aide-de-camp to my General,
and must have got separated from us in the pursuit. His throat was
cut, and he had a severe wound on the face. Soon after we met Inglis's
brigade, which, in accordance with my instructions, I turned back. On
reaching the Gwalior Contingent camp, we heard that an attempt had
been made to recapture it, which had been repulsed by the troops left
in charge.
It was dusk by the time we reached the junction of the Kalpi and Grand
Trunk roads, and we agreed that this would be a good place for a
bivouac, the city being about a mile in front, and Mansfield's column
less than two miles to the left. I marked out the ground, and showed
each corps as it came up the position it was to occupy. When all this
was over I was pretty well tired out and ravenously hungry; but food
there was none, so I had made up my mind to lie down, famished as I
was. Just then I came across some sleeping men, who to my joy turned
out to be Dighton Probyn and the officers of the 2nd Punjab Cavalry,
who were magnanimous enough to forgive the abrupt interruption to
their slumbers, and to supply me with some cold mutton, bread, and a
bottle of beer. Never was man more grateful for a meal, and never was
a meal more thoroughly enjoyed. I lay down beside my friends and was
soon fast asleep, in spite of the bitter cold and being much troubled
about my horse; neither for him nor myself was there a vestige of
covering to be found.
The next morning I was astir by cockcrow. Patrols who had been sent
forward to ascertain the truth of a rumour which had reached the
Commander-in-Chief the previous evening, to the effect that the city
had been evacuated, returned with confirmation of the report; but the
news in other respects was far from satisfactory. Mansfield's movement
had caused the enemy to retire, but they had got away without loss,
and had succeeded in carrying off all their guns; so that only one
half of Tantia Topi's force had really been dealt with; the other
half still remained to be disposed of, and to Hope Grant's great
satisfaction and my delight, the duty of following them up was
entrusted to him.
His orders were to go to Bithur, as it was thought likely that the
Nana's troops would retire on that place. But as the news was not
very reliable, Hope Grant was told to use his own discretion, and act
according to circumstances.
For several days I had been trying unsuccessfully to get hold of some
Natives upon whom I could rely to bring me trustworthy information as
to the enemy's movements. It is always of the utmost importance that a
Quartermaster-General on service should have the help of such men, and
I was now more than ever in need of reliable intelligence. In this
emergency I applied to Captain Bruce, the officer in charge of the
Intelligence Department which had been established at Cawnpore for the
purpose of tracing the whereabouts of those rebels who had taken
a prominent part in the atrocities. I was at once supplied with a
first-rate man, Unjur Tiwari by name,[4] who from that moment until
I left India for England in April, 1858, rendered me most valuable
service. He was a Brahmin by caste, and belonged to the 1st Native
Infantry. In a few words I explained what I required of him, and he
started at once for Bithur, promising to meet me the next day on the
line of march.
[Illustration: PLAN OF CAWNPORE. 1857.]
Early on the afternoon of the 8th we marched out of Cawnpore, and at
sunset Unjur Tiwari, true to his promise, made his appearance at the
point where the road turns off to Bithur. He told me that the Nana had
slept at that place the night before, but hearing of our approach, had
decamped with all his guns and most of his followers, and was now at a
ferry some miles up the river, trying to get across and make his way
to Oudh. We had come thirteen miles, and had as many more to go before
we could get to the ferry, and as there was nothing to be gained
by arriving there in the dark, a halt was ordered for rest and
refreshment. At midnight we started again, and reached Sheorajpur
(three miles from the ferry) at daybreak. Here we left our
impedimenta, and proceeded by a cross-country road. Presently a couple
of mounted men belonging to the enemy, not perceiving who we were,
galloped straight into the escort. On discovering their mistake, they
turned and tried to escape, but in vain; one was killed, the other
captured, and from him we learnt that the rebels were only a short
distance ahead. We pushed on, and soon came in sight of them and of
the river; crowds were collected on the banks, and boats were being
hurriedly laden, some of the guns having already been placed on board.
Our troops were ordered to advance, but the ground along the river
bank was treacherous and very heavy. Notwithstanding, the Artillery
managed to struggle through, and when the batteries had got to within
1,000 yards of the ferry, the enemy appeared suddenly to discover
our presence, and opened upon us with their Artillery. Our batteries
galloped on, and got considerably nearer before they returned the
fire; after a few rounds the rebels broke and fled. The ground was so
unfavourable for pursuit, being full of holes and quicksands, that
nearly all escaped, except a few cut up by the Cavalry. Fifteen guns
were captured, with one single casualty on our side--the General
himself--who was hit on the foot by a spent grape-shot, without,
happily, being much hurt.
Hope Grant's successful management of this little expedition
considerably enhanced the high opinion the Commander-in-Chief had
already formed of his ability. He was next ordered to proceed to
Bithur and complete the destruction of that place, which had been
begun by Havelock in July. We found the palace in good order--there
was little evidence that it had been visited by an avenging force, and
in one of the rooms which had been occupied by the treacherous Azimula
Khan, I came across a number of letters, some unopened, and some
extremely interesting, to which I shall have to refer later on.
We left Adrian Hope's brigade at Bithur to search for treasure
reported to have been buried near the palace, and returned to
Cawnpore, where we remained for about ten days, not at all sorry for
the rest.
During this time of comparative idleness, I went over the ground where
the troops under Windham had been engaged for three days, and heard
many comments on the conduct of the operations. All spoke in high
terms of Windham's dash and courage, but as a Commander he was
generally considered to have failed.
Windham was without doubt placed in an extremely difficult position.
The relief of the garrison at Lucknow was of such paramount importance
that Sir Colin Campbell was obliged to take with him every available
man,[5] and found it necessary to order Windham to send all
reinforcements after him as soon as they arrived, although it was
recognized as probable that Tantia Topi, with the large force then
assembled near Kalpi, would advance on Cawnpore as soon as the
Commander-in-Chief was committed to his difficult undertaking.
Windham's orders were to improve the defences of the entrenchment; to
carefully watch the movements of the Gwalior army; and to make as much
display as possible of the troops at his command by encamping them in
a conspicuous position outside the city; but he was not on any account
to move out to attack, unless compelled to do so in order to prevent
the bombardment of the entrenchment. The safety of this entrenchment
was of great importance, for it contained a number of guns, quantities
of ammunition and other warlike stores, and it covered, as already
shown, the bridge of boats over the Ganges.
Windham loyally carried out his instructions, but he subsequently
asked for and obtained leave to detain any troops arriving at Cawnpore
after the 14th of November, as he did not feel himself strong enough,
with the force at his disposal, to resist the enemy if attacked. But
even after having received this sanction he twice despatched strong
reinforcements to Lucknow, thus weakening himself considerably in
order to give Sir Colin all possible help.
Windham eventually had at his disposal about 1,700 Infantry and eight
guns, the greater part of which were encamped as directed, outside the
city, close to the junction of the Delhi and Kalpi roads, while the
rest were posted in and around the entrenchment. Meanwhile the rebels
were slowly approaching Cawnpore in detachments, with the evident
intention of surrounding the place. On the 17th two bodies of troops
were pushed on to Shuli and Shirajpur, within fifteen miles of the
city, and a little less than that distance from each other. Windham
thought that if he could manage to surprise either of these, he could
prevent the enemy from concentrating, and he drew up a scheme for
giving effect to this plan, which he submitted for the approval of the
Commander-in-Chief. No reply came, and after waiting a week he gave up
all idea of attempting to surprise the detachments, and determined to
try and arrest the rebels' advance by attacking the main body, still
some distance off. Accordingly he broke up his camp, and marched six
miles along the Kalpi road, on the same day that the Gwalior force
moved some distance nearer to Cawnpore. The next morning, the 25th,
the enemy advanced to Pandu Naddi, within three miles of Windham's
camp.
Windham now found himself in a very critical position. With only 1,200
Infantry[6] and eight light guns, he was opposed to Tantia Topi with
an army of 25,000 men and forty guns. He had to choose whether he
would fight these enormous odds or retire: he decided that to fight
was the least of the two evils, and he was so far successful that
he drove back that portion of the opposing force immediately in
his front, and captured three guns; but being unable to press his
advantage on account of the paucity of men and the total absence of
Cavalry, he had perforce to fall back--a grievous necessity. He was
followed the whole way, insulted and jeered at, by the rebel horsemen.
The result of the day was to give confidence to the wily Mahratta
leader; he pushed on to Cawnpore, and attacked Windham with such
vehemence that by nightfall on the 28th the British troops were driven
inside the entrenchment, having had 315 men killed and wounded, and
having lost all their baggage and camp equipage.
Windham undoubtedly laid himself open to censure. His defence was
that, had he received the Commander-in-Chief's authority to carry out
his plan for surprising the rebels, he would certainly have broken up
their army, and the disaster could not have occurred. But surely when
he decided that circumstances had so changed since Sir Colin's orders
were given as to justify him in disregarding them, he should have
acted on his own responsibility, and taken such steps as appeared to
him best, instead of applying for sanction to a Commander far from
the scene of action, and so entirely ignorant of the conditions under
which the application was made, as to render it impossible for him to
decide whether such sanction should be given. The march which Windham
made towards the enemy on the 24th was quite as grave a disobedience
of orders as would have been the surprise movement he contemplated
on the 17th; but while the former placed him in a most dangerous
position, and one from which it was impossible to deal the enemy a
decisive blow, the latter, if successful, would have deserved, and
doubtless would have received, the highest praise.
[Footnote 1: Greathed's brigade consisted of the 8th and 64th Foot and
2nd Punjab Infantry. Adrian Hope's brigade consisted of the 53rd Foot,
42nd and 93rd Highlanders, and 4th Punjab Infantry. Inglis's brigade
consisted of the 23rd Fusiliers, 32nd and 82nd Foot. Walpole's brigade
consisted of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions Rifle Brigade and a detachment
of the 38th Foot.]
[Footnote 2: The Artillery consisted of Peel's Naval Brigade, Blunt's,
Bridge's and Remmington's troops of Horse Artillery, Bourchier's,
Middleton's, and Smith's Field batteries, and Longden's Heavy
battery.]
[Footnote 3: Mansfield was given the two Rifle Brigade battalions, the
93rd Highlanders, Longden's Heavy, and Middleton's Field battery.]
[Footnote 4: Unjur Tiwari's career was a very remarkable one. A sepoy
in the 1st Bengal Native Infantry, he was at Banda when the Mutiny
broke out, and during the disturbances at that place he aided
a European clerk and his wife to escape, and showed his
disinterestedness by refusing to take a gold ring, the only reward
they had to offer him. He then joined Havelock's force, and rendered
excellent service as a spy; and although taken prisoner more than
once, and on one occasion tortured, he never wavered in his loyalty to
us. Accompanying Outram to Lucknow, he volunteered to carry a letter
to Cawnpore, and after falling into the hands of the rebels, and
being cruelly ill-treated by them, he effected his escape, and safely
delivered Outram's message to Sir Colin Campbell. He then worked
for me most faithfully, procuring information which I could always
thoroughly rely upon; and I was much gratified when he was rewarded by
a grant of Rs. 3,000, presented with a sword of honour, and invested
with the Order of British India, with the title of Sirdar Bahadur. I
was proportionately distressed some years later to find that, owing to
misrepresentations of enemies when he was serving in the Oudh Military
Police, Unjur Tiwari had been deprived of his rewards, and learning he
was paralyzed and in want, I begged Lord Napier to interest himself in
the matter, the result being that the brave old man was given a yearly
pension of Rs. 1,200 for his life. He was alive when I left India,
and although he resided some distance from the railway he always had
himself carried to see me whenever I travelled in his direction.]
[Footnote 5: The garrison left at Cawnpore consisted of:
Four companies of the 64th Foot, and small
detachments of other regiments 450 men.
Sailors 47 men.
--------
Total 497
with a hastily organized bullock battery of four field guns, manned
partly by Europeans and partly by Sikhs.]
[Footnote 6: The force was composed of the 34th Foot, and portions of
the 82nd and 88th Foot, and 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade; with four
9-pounders, manned partly by Royal and Bengal gunners and partly by
Sikhs; and four 6-pounders, manned by Madras Native gunners.]
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