1857
Archdale Wilson assumes command--Enemy baffled in the Sabzi Mandi
--Efforts to exterminate the Feringhis
--A letter from General Havelock--News of Henry Lawrence's death
--Arrival of the Movable Column--The 61st Foot at Najafgarh
General Reed was succeeded by Brigadier Archdale Wilson, the officer
who commanded the Meerut column at the beginning of the campaign, and
who was so successful in the fights on the Hindun. Though a soldier of
moderate capacity, Wilson was quite the best of the senior officers
present, three of whom were superseded by his selection. Two of these,
Congreve, Acting-Adjutant-General of Queen's troops, and Graves, who
had been Brigadier at Delhi when the Mutiny broke out, left the camp
on being passed over; the third, Longfield, took Wilson's place as
Brigadier.
Wilson's succession to the command gave great relief to the troops on
account of the systematic manner in which he arranged for the various
duties, and the order and method he introduced. The comparative rest
to the troops, as well as the sanitary improvements he effected, did a
good deal for the health of the force. Wilson also took advantage of
the reinforcements we had received to strengthen our position. As far
as possible he put a stop to the practice of following up the enemy
close to the city walls when they were driven off after an attack (a
practice which had cost us many valuable lives), contenting himself
with preventing the rebels from remaining in the immediate vicinity of
our advanced posts.
The day after Reed's departure another sharp and prolonged attack was
made upon the Ridge batteries and Sabzi Mandi piquets, and in the
afternoon a column was sent to drive the enemy away. It consisted
of four Horse Artillery guns, 750 Infantry, and the Guides Cavalry.
Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th Rifles, commanded the column,
and, having gained experience from the lesson we had received on the
14th, he took care not to approach too near to the city walls, but
cleared the Sabzi Mandi, and took up a good position, where he
remained for some little time. This unusual procedure seemed to
disconcert the enemy, most of whom returned to the city, while those
who remained to fight did not come to such close quarters as on
previous occasions. Nevertheless, we had 1 officer and 12 men killed,
3 officers and 66 men wounded, and 2 men were missing.
The four following days passed without any serious attack being made,
but an unfortunate accident occurred about this time to a cousin of
mine, Captain Greensill, of the 24th Foot. He was attached to the
Engineer department, and was ordered to undertake some reconnoitring
duty after dark. On nearing the enemy's position he halted his escort,
in order not to attract attention, and proceeded alone to examine the
ground. The signal which he had arranged to give on his return was
apparently misunderstood, for as he approached the escort fired; he
was mortally wounded, and died in great agony the next morning.
The last severe contest took place in the Sabzi Mandi on the 18th,
for by this time the Engineers' incessant labour had resulted in the
clearing away of the old serais and walled gardens for some distance
round the posts held by our piquets in that suburb. The 'Sammy
House' piquet, to the right front of Hindu Rao's house, was greatly
strengthened, and cover was provided for the men occupying it--a very
necessary measure, exposed as the piquet was to the guns on the Burn
and Mori bastions, and within grape range of the latter, while the
enemy's Infantry were enabled to creep close up to it unperceived.
The improvements we had made in this part of our position were, no
doubt, carefully watched and noted by the rebels, who, finding
that all attempts to dislodge us on the right ended in their own
discomfiture, determined to try whether our left was not more
vulnerable than they had found it in the earlier days of the siege.
Accordingly early on the 23rd they sallied forth from the Kashmir
gate, and, occupying Ludlow Castle and its neighbourhood, shelled
Metcalfe House, the stable piquet, and the mosque piquet on the Ridge.
As all attempts to silence the enemy's guns with our Artillery proved
unavailing, and it was feared that if not dislodged they would
establish a battery at Ludlow Castle, a small column under Brigadier
Showers moved out by a cutting through the Ridge on our left, its
object being (in conjunction with the Metcalfe House piquets) to turn
the enemy's right and capture their guns.
The troops detailed for this duty consisted of six Horse Artillery
guns, 400 British Infantry, 360 of the 1st Punjab Infantry, and a
party of the Guides Cavalry, in addition to 250 men detached from the
Metcalfe House piquets. The advance of the column up the road leading
towards the Kashmir gate appeared to be unnoticed until it arrived
close to the enemy, who then opened with grape. Our troops pressed
on, and in their eagerness to capture the guns, which were being
withdrawn, got too near the city walls. Here Showers was wounded, and
the command devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, of the 60th, who
skilfully conducted the retirement. Our loss was 1 officer and 11 men
killed, 5 officers and 34 men wounded. Captain Law, one of my two
companions on the mail-cart from Umballa, was the officer killed.
The enemy were fairly quiet between the 23rd and 31st July, on which
date they moved out of the city in considerable strength, with the
intention of making a temporary bridge across the cut in the swampy
ground I have before described, and so threatening our rear. A column
under Coke was sent to the other side of the cut to intercept the
enemy should they succeed in getting across; this column was joined
at Alipur by the Kumaon battalion (composed of Gurkhas and hill-men),
about 400 strong, which had just arrived from the Punjab as escort
to a large store of ammunition. The services of these troops were,
however, not required, for the rain, which had been coming down in
torrents for some hours, had caused such a rush of water that the
bridge was carried away before it was completed. The enemy then
retired towards the city. On reaching the suburbs they were reinforced
by a large body of Infantry, and a most determined attack was made on
the right of our position. This occurred about sunset, and all night
the roar of musketry and artillery was kept up without a moment's
cessation.
The next day was the anniversary of a great Mahomedan festival, when
it was the custom for the King to pray and make sacrifice at the
Idgah, in commemoration of Abraham's intended offering up of
Ishmail.[1] On this particular occasion, however, the sacrifices were
to be dispensed with in deference to Hindu prejudices,[2] and in
their stead a tremendous united effort was to be made by Hindus and
Mussulmans to exterminate the Feringhis. All the morning of the
1st August mosques and Hindu temples were crowded with worshippers
offering up prayers for the success of the great attempt, and in the
afternoon the rebels, mad with excitement and fanaticism, issued
in countless numbers from the city gates, and, shouting the Moslem
battle-cry, advanced and threw themselves on our defences. They were
driven back by our deadly volleys, but only for a moment; they quickly
reformed and made a fresh attack, to be stopped again by our steady,
uncompromising fire. Time after time they rallied and hurled
themselves against our breastworks. All that night and well on into
the next day the fight continued, and it was past noon before the
devoted fanatics became convinced that their gods had deserted them,
that victory was not for them, and that no effort, however heroic on
their part, could drive us from the Ridge. The enemy's loss was heavy,
ours trifling, for our men were admirably steady, well protected by
breastworks, and never allowed to show themselves except when the
assailants came close up. We had only 1 officer and 9 men killed and
36 men wounded.
The officer was Lieutenant Eaton Travers, of the 1st Punjab Infantry.
He had been seven years with the regiment, and had been present
with it in nearly all the many frontier fights in which it had been
engaged. He was a bright, happy fellow, and a great friend of mine. As
Major Coke, his commanding officer, published in regimental orders:
'This gallant soldier and true-hearted gentleman was beloved and
respected by the officers and men of the regiment. His loss is an
irreparable one.'
The enemy were much depressed by the failure of the Bakhra Id attack,
from which they had expected great things. They began to despair of
being able to drive us from our position on the Ridge, which for seven
weeks had been so hotly contested. They heard that Nicholson with his
Movable Column was hastening to our assistance, and they felt that,
unless they could gain some signal victory before reinforcements
reached us, we should take our place as the besiegers, instead of
being, as hitherto, the besieged. Disaffection within the city walls
was on the increase; only the semblance of authority remained to the
old and well-nigh impotent King, while some of his sons, recognizing
their perilous position, endeavoured to open negotiations with us.
Many of the sepoys were reported to be going off to their homes, sick
and weary of a struggle the hopelessness of which they had begun to
realize.
Our work, however, was far from being finished. Notwithstanding losses
from death and desertion, the enemy still outnumbered us by about
eight or nine to one.
All this time our communication with the Punjab was maintained, and we
regularly received letters and newspapers from England by the northern
route; but for several weeks we had had no news from the south.
Rumours of disasters occasionally reached us, but it was not until the
second week in July that we heard of the fight at Agra, the retirement
of our troops, and the flight of all the residents into the fort.
These scraps of intelligence, for they were mere scraps, written often
in Greek character, some screwed into a quill, some sewn between the
double soles of a man's shoe, and some twisted up in the messenger's
hair, were eagerly looked for, and as eagerly deciphered when they
came. It was cheering to learn that Allahabad was safe, that Lucknow
was still holding out, that troops from Madras, Ceylon, and the
Mauritius had reached Calcutta, and that Lord Elgin, taking a
statesmanlike view of the situation, had diverted to India[3] the
force intended for the China expedition, and we fondly hoped that some
of the six British regiments reported by one messenger to have arrived
at Cawnpore would be sent to the assistance of the Delhi Force.
Strangely enough, we knew nothing of the death of Sir Henry Lawrence
or General Wheeler, and had not even heard for certain that Cawnpore
had fallen and that Lucknow was besieged, while there were constant
reports that Wheeler was marching up the Trunk Road. Being most
anxious to get some authentic intelligence, Norman[4] on the 15th July
wrote a letter in French addressed to General Wheeler at Cawnpore, or
whoever might be in command between that place and Delhi, giving an
account of our position at Delhi, and expressing a hope that troops
would soon march to our assistance. The letter was entrusted to two
sepoys of the Guides, who carried out their difficult task most
faithfully, and on the 3rd August returned with the following reply
from General Havelock, addressed to Major-General Reed:
'Cawnpore, left bank of the Ganges,
'_25th July, 1857._
'MY DEAR GENERAL,
'Yesterday I saw Captain Norman's letter of the 15th instant from
Delhi, addressed to Sir Hugh Wheeler. That gallant officer and the
whole of his force were destroyed on the 27th June by a base act
of treachery. Sir Henry Somerset is Commander-in-Chief in India
and Sir Patrick Grant in Bengal. Under the orders of the supreme
Government I have been sent to retrieve affairs here. I have
specific instructions from which I cannot depart. I have sent a
duplicate of your letter to Sir P. Grant. In truth, though most
anxious to march on Delhi, I have peremptory orders to relieve
Lucknow. I have, thank God, been very successful. I defeated the
enemy at Futtehpore on the 12th, and Pandu Naddi on the 15th, and
this place, which I recaptured on the 16th. On each occasion I
took all the guns. Immense reinforcements are coming from England
and China. Sir Patrick Grant will soon be in the field himself.
Lucknow holds out. Agra is free for the present. I am sorry to
hear you are not quite well. I beg that you will let me hear from
you continually.'
Two days afterwards another letter was received; this time from
Lieutenant-Colonel Fraser-Tytler, A.Q.M.G., with Havelock's force. It
was addressed to Captain Earle, A.Q.M.G., Meerut, and ran as follows:
'Cawnpore, _July 27th_.
'General Havelock has crossed the river to relieve Lucknow, which
will be effected four days hence. He has a strong force with him,
and he has already thrashed the Nana and completely dispersed his
force. We shall probably march to Delhi with four or five thousand
Europeans and a heavy Artillery, in number, not in weight. The
China force is in Calcutta, 5,000 men. More troops expected
immediately. We shall soon be with you.'
These sanguine expectations were never fulfilled! Instead of Lucknow
being relieved in four days, it was nearly four months before that
result was achieved, and instead of troops from Cawnpore coming to
help us at Delhi, the troops from Delhi formed the chief part of the
force which relieved Lucknow.
While we were rejoicing at the prospect of being reinforced by a large
number of British soldiers, a gloom was cast over the whole camp by
the rumour that Sir Henry Lawrence was dead. As the first British
Ruler of the Punjab, Henry Lawrence was known by reputation to, and
respected by, every man belonging to the Delhi Force, and all realized
what a serious loss his death would be to the beleaguered garrison of
Lucknow. Much time, however, was not given us for lamentation, for at
the end of the first week in August another attempt was made to drive
us from the Metcalfe House piquets. Guns were again brought out
through the Kashmir gate, and posted at Ludlow Castle and the
Kudsiabagh; at the same time a number of Infantry skirmishers kept up
an almost constant fire from the jungle in front of our position. The
losses at the piquets themselves were not heavy, good cover having
been provided; but the communications between the piquets and our main
position were much exposed and extremely hazardous for the reliefs. It
was felt that the enemy could not be allowed to remain in such close
proximity to our outposts, and Showers (who had recovered from his
slight wound) was again ordered to drive them off, for which purpose
he was given a strong body of Infantry, composed of Europeans, Sikhs,
and Gurkhas, a troop of Horse Artillery, a squadron of the 9th
Lancers, and the Guides Cavalry. The result was a very brilliant
little affair. The orders on this occasion were to 'move up silently
and take the guns at Ludlow Castle.' The small column proceeded in the
deepest silence, and the first sound heard at dawn on the 12th August
was the challenge of the enemy's sentry, '_Ho come dar?_' (Who comes
there?). A bullet in his body was the reply. A volley of musketry
followed, and effectually awoke the sleeping foe, who succeeded in
letting off two of their guns as our men rushed on the battery.
An Irish soldier, named Reegan, springing forward, prevented the
discharge of the third gun. He bayoneted the gunner in the act of
applying the port-fire, and was himself severely wounded. The rebel
Artillerymen stood to their guns splendidly, and fought till they were
all killed. The enemy's loss was severe; some 250 men were killed, and
four guns were captured. On our side 1 officer and 19 men were killed,
7 officers and 85 men wounded, and 5 men missing. Amongst the wounded
was the gallant Commander of the column, and that fine soldier, Major
John Coke, the Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry. The return to
camp was a stirring sight: the captured guns were brought home in
triumph, pushed along by the soldiers, all madly cheering, and the
horses ridden by men carrying their muskets with bayonets fixed.
The following morning the Punjab Movable Column arrived. Nicholson had
preceded it by a few days, and from him I heard all about his fight
with the Sialkot mutineers at Trimmu Ghat and the various marches and
counter-marches which he had made since I left him at Philour.
The column was a most welcome addition to our force. It now consisted
of the 52nd Light Infantry, a wing of the 61st Foot, a Field Battery,
a wing of the 1st Baluch Regiment, and the 2nd Punjab Infantry, beside
200 newly-raised Multani Cavalry and 400 military police. This brought
up our effective force to about 8,000 rank and file of all arms.[5] A
more powerful siege-train than we had hitherto possessed was on its
way from Ferozepore, and three companies of the 8th Foot, detachments
of Artillery and the 60th Rifles, the 4th Punjab Infantry, and about
100 recruits for the 4th Sikhs were also marching towards Delhi. In
addition, a small contingent from Kashmir and a few of the Jhind
Raja's troops were shortly expected, after the arrival of which
nothing in the shape of reinforcements could be looked for from the
north.
Nor could we hope for any help from the south, for no definite news
had been received from Havelock since his letter of the 25th of July,
and rumours had reached us that, finding it impossible to force his
way to Lucknow, he had been obliged to retire upon Cawnpore. It was
felt, therefore, that if Delhi were to be taken at all, it must be
taken quickly, before our augmented numbers should be again diminished
by sickness and casualties.
The enemy knew our position as well as we did, and appreciating the
great value the siege-train would be to us, they decided on making a
supreme effort to intercept it. A few days before they had been foiled
by Hodson in an attempt to cut off our communication with the Punjab,
and were determined to ensure success on this occasion by employing a
really formidable force. This force left Delhi on the 24th August, and
proceeded in the direction of the Najafgarh _jhil_.
At daybreak the following morning Nicholson started with sixteen Horse
Artillery guns, 1,600 Infantry and 450 Cavalry, his orders being to
overtake the enemy and bring them to action. I hoped to have been of
the party, but Nicholson's request to have me as his staff officer
was refused, as I had not been taken off the sick-list, though I
considered my wound was practically healed.
It proved a most difficult march. The rain fell in torrents, and the
roads were mere quagmires. In the first nine miles two swamps had to
be got through, on crossing which Nicholson heard that the insurgents
were at Najafgarh, twelve miles further off. He determined to push on,
and at 4 p.m. he found them occupying a strong position about a mile
and three-quarters in length. In front was an old serai which was held
in force with four guns, and on either side and in rear of the serai
was a village equally strongly held; while running round the enemy's
right and rear was a huge drainage cut, swollen by the heavy rain.
This cut, or nulla, was crossed by a bridge immediately behind the
rebels' position. Nicholson advanced from a side-road, which brought
him on their right with the nulla flowing between him and them. Even
at the ford the water was breast-high, and it was with much difficulty
and not without a good deal of delay that our troops crossed under a
heavy fire from the serai. It was getting late, and Nicholson had only
time to make a hasty reconnaissance. He decided to attack the serai,
drive out the mutineers, and then, changing front to the left, to
sweep down their line and get possession of the bridge.
As the Infantry were about to advance, Nicholson thus addressed
them: 'Men of the 61st, remember what Sir Colin Campbell said at
Chilianwala, and you have heard that he said the same to his gallant
Highland Brigade at the Alma. I have the same request to make of you
and the men of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers. Hold your fire until within
twenty or thirty yards, then fire and charge, and the serai is yours.'
Our brave soldiers followed these directions to the letter, and, under
cover of Artillery fire, carried the serai. Front was then changed to
the left as had been arranged, and the line swept along the enemy's
defences, the rebels flying before them over the bridge. They
confessed to a loss of more than 800 men, and they left in our hands
thirteen field-pieces and a large quantity of ammunition, besides all
their camp equipage, stores, camels, and horses. Our casualties were 2
officers and 23 men killed, and 3 officers and 68 men wounded--two of
the officers mortally, the third dangerously.
The enemy in the city, imagining from the size of the force sent with
Nicholson that we could not have many troops left in camp, attacked us
in great strength on the following morning (26th), but were beaten off
with a loss on our side of only 8 killed and 13 wounded.
[Footnote 1: According to the religion of Islam, Ishmail, not Isaac,
was to have been offered up by Abraham.]
[Footnote 2: Forrest's 'The Indian Mutiny.']
[Footnote 3: Since writing the above it has been brought to my notice
that the promptitude with which the troops were diverted to India
was due in a great measure to the foresight of Sir George Grey, the
Governor of the Cape, who, on hearing of the serious state of affairs
in India, immediately ordered all transports which touched at the Cape
on their way to take part in the China Expeditionary Force, to proceed
directly to Calcutta instead of to Singapore. He also despatched as
many of the Cape garrison as he could spare, with stores, etc., to
India. It is right, therefore, that he should share with Lord Elgin
the credit of having so quickly grasped the magnitude of the crisis
through which India was passing.]
[Footnote 4: Owing to Brigadier-General Chamberlain having been placed
_hors de combat_ by the severe wound he received the previous day,
Norman was carrying on the duties of Adjutant-General.]
[Footnote 5: There were besides in camp at this time 1,535 sick and
wounded, notwithstanding that several hundred men had been sent away.]
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