The activities of state governments in r_Railroads: Rates and Regulations

of powerful railroad commissions, with the added grist of drastic

independent statutes, have greatly emphasized the eternal conflict

of authority between the state and Federal governments, as well as

between the different states. Problems akin to those raised by the

diversity of our laws respecting marriage, labor, and bankruptcy have

been forced upon the attention of Congress and the Federal courts.

Reasonable coöperation might be counted upon to accomplish something;

but the course of events since 1905 points to the necessity of a

final settlement of this important issue as far as common carriers

are concerned, so authoritatively that a greater measure of political

and industrial peace may prevail in future. The situation respecting

railroads was well described by Justice McKenna of the United States

Supreme Court in an opinion annulling the North Carolina law requiring

railroads to receive goods for interstate transportation whether

they had published rates for the proposed shipment or not;--"if the

carrier obeys the state law, he incurs the penalty of the Federal

law; if he obeys the Federal law, he insures the penalty of the state

law. Manifestly, one authority must be paramount, and when it speaks,

the other must be silent." It may be added that in this recent case,

following the inevitable trend of events it was the state law upon

which the penalty of silence was visited.

The ultimate ramifications of a state law under the complexities of

modern railway rate adjustment and operation can never be foreseen.

It is not simply a question of avoiding conflict between distance

tariffs and classifications.[805] Oftentimes the most modest rules

and regulations may lead to results affecting commerce over a wide

area. The great increase in large cars throughout the West, by contrast

with other parts of the country, as traceable to the establishment by

Missouri of minimum carloads,[806] is a case in point. We have also

already observed how the revised milk laws of Massachusetts opened

up an issue covering all of New England.[807] And then there are the

various attempts of the railroad commissions, notably Texas[808] and

Minnesota, to set up schemes of rates which shall concentrate the

distributive business of the community in local cities as against

the competition of jobbers at a distance. The extreme confusion

introduced in matters of classification by conflicting authorities

has already reached a point where demand for the substitution of a

single uniform schedule for the United States has become wellnigh

irresistible.[809] There are also conflicts respecting laws regulating

service, illustrated by the Supreme Court decision in 1907, holding

that the attempt of North Carolina to require through fast mail

trains to stop at small way stations, was unconstitutional;[810] and

finally, some agreement as to division of accounts between interstate

and intrastate business will at once be recognized as an essential to

the determination of reasonable rates for through and local service

respectively.[811] From every side, in short, the need of a clear

separation of state and Federal powers is becoming more and more

insistent.

The conflict between general and local authority came to a head in

1907, resulting in a violent clash between the Federal and state

courts.[812] The worst complication arose in the South, particularly

in North Carolina and Alabama. Certain railroads brought suit in

the Federal courts to annul rates fixed by the state legislatures;

and temporary Federal injunctions were at once issued suspending the

statutes until determination of their constitutionality. Popular

feeling was much aroused, and local officials sought vigorously

to defend states' rights. Ticket agents collecting more than the

state-prescribed fare, were condemned to the chain gang and the

president of the railroad company was arrested. Federal judges promptly

released all parties by writs of _habeas corpus_. A truce was finally

patched up, pending determination of the matter at issue by the

Supreme Court of the United States. The final and inevitable outcome,

of course, was a decision by this tribunal, upholding the authority

of the general government.[813] Technically, the question in these

cases concerned the power of the Federal courts to issue temporary

injunctions suspending state laws; or, in other words, raising the

nice distinction as to whether a suit against a state officer was a

suit against the state or not. Various other legal technicalities were

involved both in North Carolina and Alabama. The main issue has been

dealt with for the future by a special clause of the Mann-Elkins law

of 1910. This provides that a petition for an injunction suspending a

state law, shall be heard by three Federal judges, one at least of a

superior court. Five days' notice is required; and there is a direct

appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States. But an injunction,

thus issued, is given clear precedence over any statute regarding

common carriers emanating from authority of an individual state.

The state of Missouri has had a trying experience. This occurred in

connection with a statute of 1907 reducing passenger rates from three

to two cents a mile. Federal judges promptly granted injunctions

against the enforcement of this statute. The state's Attorney-General

in the meantime cited the railroads into the state courts to show cause

for failing to obey. The compromise in this case took the form of an

agreement to give the new law a trial of several months in order to

test the financial effect of the reduction in fares. Then followed an

interchange of injunctions, quite characteristic of the old days of the

Erie Railroad, save for the integrity of the judges concerned. To this

there then succeeded a decision by the Federal Circuit Court that the

rates were confiscatory; although for some reason the two-cent fares

and other reduced charges remained practically in effect. Controversies

similar to this have arisen since 1907 in some seven different states.

Oregon and West Virginia took issue as to the validity of two-cent

passenger fare laws. In the latter case, the state supreme court held

that the statute was not confiscatory. In Oregon the lower Federal

court upheld the state law. The contest from Kentucky involved the

constitutionality of a state railroad commission act, already held

unconstitutional in the United States Circuit Court. The Arkansas

appeal had mainly to do with maximum rate laws in relation to physical

valuation of property; and in Ohio, the validity of a state rate on

coal to Lake Erie was in dispute. The railroad contended that the

traffic was interstate commerce, a contention denied by the state

authorities.[814] The Minnesota case,--perhaps the most voluminous in

its record of all,--had primarily to do with the confiscatory nature

of reductions of intrastate rates: and this in turn hinged upon the

mode of separating accounts.[815] A distinct affirmation of Federal

supremacy has also been had by a Circuit Court opinion in 1911. All

these cases are at this writing (1912) before the Supreme Court of

the United States for decision. The main issue is pooled by agreement

between the governors of the seven commonwealths concerned. The outcome

cannot fail to be of the utmost importance,--far-reaching in its effect

not only upon the regulation of railways but throughout the entire

field of constitutional law. Such decisions as the Supreme Court has

already rendered in connection with these matters having been entirely

favorable to Federal authority, undoubtedly in this instance induced

the joint action of the state executives for mutual protection and

support. There can be no doubt that a sweeping decision, upholding

Federal authority, will go far to solidify control by the Interstate

Commerce Commission. It will also clear the air and greatly simplify

the problem of operation by the managements of the railroads, not only

in these seven states but all over the United States as well.

The delicate balance between state and Federal authority over

commerce is also in a way to be tested in what promises to become an

historic case before the Interstate Commerce Commission,--historic

in the sense that its final adjudication by the Supreme Court of the

United States will add a positive contribution to the body of our

fundamental law.[816] It may best be understood by first gaining

a clear idea of the nature of the economic grievance. Shreveport,

Louisiana, is situated on the Red river, an important tributary of

the Mississippi, some 190 miles distant from Dallas and 231 miles

from Houston,--both of the latter being important and ambitious

provincial distributing points in Texas. Shreveport, enjoying the

benefits of water competition,--probably more keen historically than

at present,--was granted correspondingly low carload rates by rail

on merchandise from the north and east. These favorable rates were

not extended to the two Texas cities, inasmuch as water competition

was entirely absent. Naturally, therefore, an advantage was given

to the Louisiana city in competition for distributive business in

all the intermediate territory and even over in the _Hinterland_ in

Texas. In pursuance of a long-standing policy of encouraging the

growth of provincial jobbing points within its own borders,[817] the

Texas Railroad Commission proceeded to overcome this disability by

prescribing relatively low rates out of Dallas and Houston as compared

with the rates from Shreveport to the same points. It seems even to

have gone further and to have interposed positive barriers against the

competition of Shreveport jobbers in Texas territory, by somewhat more

than compensating for the low water rates at Shreveport. The disparity

thus set up may be best illustrated by the following table of charges

for approximately equal distances.

_Rates in cents per hundredweight_

CLASS

1 E

------

From Dallas to Big Sandy, Texas 101 miles 44 13

From Shreveport, La., to Crow, Texas. 100 miles 95 18

From Houston to Renova, Texas 103 miles 45 14

From Shreveport, La., to Angeline, Texas 104 miles 68 15

Stated in another way, sixty cents would carry one hundred pounds of

first-class traffic some 160 miles out of Dallas into eastern Texas;

while an equal rate out of Shreveport into the same Texas territory,

west bound, was exacted for a haul of only fifty-five miles,--about

one-third the distance.

The Commission decided upon the evidence by a bare majority that these

Texas tariffs were unduly preferential; and ordered them to be so

readjusted that the charges should be the same for equal distances

from all three cities regardless of state lines. Concerning the minor

point that it was lawful for a carrier to equalize conditions as

between two competing places by imposing high local rates upon one

point in order to offset the advantages as to inbound through rates

enjoyed by the other, the Commission merely re-affirmed its belief that

natural advantages of geographical location could not lawfully thus be

nullified.[818]

The opinion rendered in this case is remarkable, less in its economic

aspects, concerning which there seems not to have been any great

diversity of view, than as regards the divergent views expressed as to

the legal authority of the Commission to interfere in the matter at

all. Was undue preference and advantage in the eyes of the law,--the

decision being rendered under the third section of the act,--created by

the set of circumstances above described? At this point the Commission

divided, with no fewer than two concurring and two dissenting opinions

added to the majority view. According to this last, not only was

the power of Congress to legislate in such matters paramount, but

it was also held that this supreme power to put an end to all forms

of local discrimination,--even those created by the act of state

authorities,--had been delegated by Congress to the Interstate Commerce

Commission. And in such instances, wherein conflict arose between

Federal and state authority, the only rational and possible course, it

was held, was for the national government through its administrative

agent "to assume its constitutional right to lead."

The three separate dissenting opinions are of interest as expressing

the need of a definitive pronouncement upon this great question by the

Supreme Court of the United States. Not alone as to whether Congress

intended to delegate authority to the Commission to settle such issues,

but even the right of Congress itself to pass upon them under the

Federal constitution, were called in question by the members of this

administrative board. Two dissenters were content to submit the matter

to "the august tribunal of the people which is continually sitting"

to choose between submitting to such grievances as an alternative for

virtually legislating state authority out of existence. The third

dissentient view was more thoroughgoing. It not only discovered,

legally speaking, no undue discrimination in the circumstances. It

pointed out that on reducing the Shreveport local tariff "we fix

interstate rates by the Texas yardstick," whereby "the national

government therefore _leads_ by _following_." It concluded by affirming

that the Commission "should confine itself within the four corners of

the law of its creation, usurping neither the legislative function of

the Congress nor the judicial power of the courts." From all of which

it is clear, first, that the Supreme Court of the United States, having

once clearly defined the jurisdiction of the Federal government in such

matters, it may, in the second place, well be that further amendment of

the Act to Regulate Commerce will be in order.

* * * * *

In conclusion, it is pertinent, apropos of the approaching completion

of the Panama Canal and the intensified interest in a more complete

utilization of our internal waterways, to discuss briefly the relation

between railroads and carriers by boat. The most stupendous canal

projects are being brought forward, in the expectation that they will

not only provide for a vast amount of low-grade traffic in themselves,

but also that through the forces of competition they will bring about a

substantial lowering of charges by railway. The most ambitious of these

enterprises is the plan for a "Lakes to the Gulf" ship canal, even

comprehending the dream of a twenty-four foot channel down the course

of the Mississippi. Another and more modest proposition, probably

practicable, is the construction of a canal from Lake Erie to the Ohio

river. Altogether it has been credibly estimated[819] that the entire

scheme for internal improvements of this sort would call for an outlay

of not less than $2,000,000,000. Before engaging in any experiments

upon such a magnificent scale, it is certainly proper to enquire

whether the results will be in any way commensurate with their cost.

The cost of water carriage, like that of transportation by rail, should

at the outset be divided into two distinct parts; one of which varies

more or less in proportion to the volume of traffic, while the other,

concerned with fixed charges on the investment, maintenance and

depreciation, is constant. The latter in other words bears little or no

relation to the tonnage transported.[820] A careful distinction between

these two great groups of expenditures is of fundamental importance

in any comparison between rail and water carriage. The failure to

so distinguish is responsible for much of the fallacious reasoning

upon the subject both in and outside of the halls of Congress. It

is indisputable that mere operating expenses are very much less by

boat than by rail, especially when the economies of large craft can

be had. The phenomenal development of commerce upon the Great Lakes,

especially for the carriage of iron ore, coal and lumber, is due to

this fact.[821] But, on the other hand, it is equally clear that the

second great group of expenditures, particularly the fixed charges due

to the enormous first cost of construction, are very much greater by

artificial waterways than by rail. The balance between low operating

costs and heavy fixed charges, of course, will be struck according to

the nature of the particular enterprise. And canals, being entirely

artificial, offer the least advantageous opportunity for realization of

the economies incident to movement of freight by water.[822]

Improved riverways are economical by comparison with canals just in

proportion to their lessened first cost; but, on the other hand,

mere movement expenses, maintenance and depreciation are apt to be

higher according to the strength of the current. In each instance

everything depends upon first cost and the consequent burden of fixed

charges. This point is almost totally neglected in popular discussion

of the subject. Internal waterways being, without exception, public

enterprises, the burden of interest charges is generally put aside as

of no consequence. Naturally therefore, these being eliminated, the

apparent economy of carriage by water is mirrored forth with great

effect.[823]

The experience of Germany, so often adduced in favor of water carriage,

when examined in the light of the foregoing economic principles, is

peculiarly illuminating. Much traffic, to be sure, moves apparently

with greater cheapness than by rail upon both canals and rivers.

Considering the tariffs which are based upon movement expenses

alone, excluding, that is to say, any adequate return upon the total

investment, such methods of transportation seem very economical

and highly effective. But when _total_ costs, rather than merely

partial ones, are considered, the picture is completely reversed. The

Dortmund-Ems canal, for instance, certainly the most important in

Germany, represents an investment per mile fifty per cent. greater

than the average for German railways.[824] For the single year 1905,

the contributions from the states and cities interested, amounted to

a subsidy of about $900,000. This financial burden, if distributed

over the total tonnage, would make the entire cost of operation nearly

one-fourth greater than the average by rail.

Rivers, as we have seen, possess certain advantages over canals, mainly

in proportion to the lessened first cost of their improvement. The

Rhine is often cited as an example of what the Mississippi should be

as a great channel of commerce; but again that fatal objection of the

first cost and, in the case of the Mississippi, of maintenance must

always be kept in mind. The Rhine like the Hudson river or the St.

Lawrence is, indeed, naturally adapted for carriage by water. Its firm

banks, gentle gradient and constancy of level, are all elements in its

favor. But it is certainly futile to anticipate similar results on the

Mississippi or its tributaries,--huge and inconstant leviathans as they

are, traversing a great alluvial plain devoid of solid foundations of

any sort. The fact that today with a nine foot channel, Pittsburg

makes no use of the Ohio river for its shipments of iron and steel,

but sends them to the Pacific coast by way of New York, certainly does

not augur well for the success of even an enlarged riverway in future,

except possibly as to coal. Of course, if the government is to write

off all the original investment, shifting the incidence to the general

taxpayers of the country, that is a different matter. But unless the

state thus chooses to subsidize the enterprise entirely, the total cost

of transportation by rail will continue to be in future as it has been

in the past, substantially lower than by the older and now antiquated

methods of transportation. If the end in view be the attainment of the

lowest possible rates, why not subsidize the railroads directly by this

same amount? or even buy them up and operate them for cost? The expense

to the taxpayers would be no more; and this plan would unquestionably

give far better results. Even the electrically-towed canal boat is not

to be compared for efficiency in reaching all parts of the country

without transhipment, with giant locomotives, low grades, heavy rails

and large train loads.

The ownership or control of water carriers by railroads constitutes a

troublesome feature of present day conditions. Peculiar prominence,

legislatively speaking, was given to it because of the attempt in 1912

to combine legislation dealing with this possible evil with the matter

of Panama Canal tolls and regulations. Such control of water lines in

competition with railways is matter of public record.[825] Much of

the coastwise traffic is thus tied up. The Long Island sound service

of the New Haven system, the Old Dominion Company, jointly owned by

eastern railroads, and the Morgan Line and Pacific Mail Company, both

parts of the Southern Pacific system, are notable instances. The same

thing is true upon the Great Lakes, where a practical monopoly of

eastbound transportation has been long held by the trunk lines. By

refusal to grant through routes and joint rates to the Lake lines at

Buffalo, these railroads have practically throttled the independent

water service.[826] Even on the lesser rivers this phenomenon of

neutralization of water competition occurs. Oftentimes where the bulk

of the tonnage, as in transcontinental business, moves by rail, the

water lines simply follow the railroads as to rates with a modest

differential dependent upon circumstances. But the fact of practical

elimination of competition by boat line is well recognized.

The concrete shape in which this matter arose in Congress was in

the form of amendments to the Panama Canal law of 1912. In the

House a bill providing for free passage of all American coastwise

vessels was passed by a vote of 206 to 61, this measure at the same

time prohibiting all railroads from owning stock in or otherwise

controlling directly or indirectly, any competing steamship lines. The

overwhelming non-partisan majority is significant of public sentiment

on the question. The Senate took a less radical stand in limiting the

prohibition of railroad ownership to vessels making use of the Panama

Canal. After prolonged discussion in the conference committee, the more

drastic measure was, fortunately, eliminated.

From several points of view absolute prohibition of financial

relationship between railway and water carriers seems unwise. A

practical objection is that it may seriously handicap American roads

in competition with Canadian carriers. The Grand Trunk, for example,

reaching tidewater on Long Island sound might lawfully operate a

boat line extending its service into New York; whereas the New Haven

Railroad would be forced to dispose of its water lines to the same

point, because they were in competition with its railroad service.

And it is indisputable that similar injustice to American railroads

might elsewhere be brought about. Moreover, the undoubted evil of

water competition thus neutralized by railroads, might be remedied

in other ways. One of these, embodied in recommendations of the Port

Directors of Boston in 1912, opposing the more drastic legislation

above mentioned, is the prevention of monopoly through public ownership

or control of docks and wharfs. For railway ownership or lease of

these, as at Philadelphia, San Francisco, Boston and elsewhere, is

one of the easiest methods of preventing water competition. The water

lines find it physically impossible to secure suitable terminals.

And then, finally, there is always the possibility under the now

amplified Interstate Commerce law, of enforcing both reasonable rates

and facilities for through shipments, part rail and part water,

as exemplified in the Flour City case above mentioned. It is not

improbable that further amplification of the law, as recommended by

the National Waterways Commission in 1912, may be necessary. Probably,

in the light of bitter Southern Pacific experience, it was wise to

restrict Panama Canal traffic to water lines not under railroad

control. But any attempt to go farther and absolutely to divorce

rail and water lines without provision, even, for the approval of

the Interstate Commerce Commission in exceptional cases, might be

productive of great harm both to the railroads and the public.

* * * * *

What will be the probable effect of the opening of the Panama Canal

upon the railroads of the United States? One must consider the nature

and volume of transcontinental traffic. The most important fact is that

nearly nine-tenths of all transcontinental business at the present time

moves by rail.[827] The tonnage by vessel west bound either around Cape

Horn or by the Isthmian routes has, to be sure, doubled within five

years to 1911. But by far the larger proportion of the business moves

by railroad direct. Secondly, it is important to note that a large part

of transcontinental traffic consists of an exchange of commodities

between the Middle West and the Pacific coast. Over one-half of the

rail shipments west bound to Pacific terminals comes from west of

Chicago. Less than one-quarter of the through traffic of one of the

principal transcontinental roads originated at Atlantic coast points.

And, inasmuch as water competition is still mainly confined to eastern

seaboard territory, the diversion of this middle western business from

the rail routes will not be disastrous in amount. In the opposite

direction probably an even higher proportion of business is carried

by rail, the principal reason being that much of the bulky freight of

the Pacific slope,--lumber for example,--is consumed throughout the

treeless Mississippi valley. None of this traffic naturally ever moves

by water. It is apparent, therefore, that the effect of opening the

Panama Canal, although great, will be for the most part localized as to

results.

Specifically stated, four distinct changes seem likely to be brought

about in the transcontinental situation. The first will probably be

a considerable stimulation to the merchants and cities along the

Atlantic seaboard throughout a zone extending inland, perhaps, as far

as Cleveland and Pittsburg. A substantial drop in steamship rates will

be followed, of course, by a corresponding reduction in through rates

to the Pacific coast. But, on the other hand, it must be borne in mind

that at best this tonnage is even today relatively unimportant to the

transcontinental railroads. More than two-thirds of their through

traffic, as we have just seen, now comes from the Middle West. These

railways will probably prefer to lose a portion of this Atlantic

seaboard business rather than to reduce their rates upon perhaps

four-fifths of the other traffic, as they would otherwise have to do

under the present system of postage stamp rates, from the Atlantic

seaboard to the west of the Missouri river.[828] The eastern trunk

lines, moreover, may probably be relied upon to extend the low seaboard

rates somewhat farther inland than at present, rather than to divide

low or even lower through all-rail rates from the Atlantic to the

Pacific.

Next to the Atlantic seaboard territory, the so-called Intermountain or

Rocky mountain region, may be expected to benefit substantially from

the opening of the canal. It will surely get lower direct rates than

at present on all its supplies from the East. Atlantic seaboard cities

will doubtless also seek to regain some of the business throughout

this region, which has been lost to them because of the growth of

manufactures in the Middle West. The transcontinental railroads will

seek to protect their clients in St. Louis and Chicago as against the

merchants in New York and Boston, who gain an entrance to Denver and

Spokane through the backdoor, so to say. Not only will lower rates

prevail, therefore, but there will also probably be a larger proportion

of supplies for these mountain states drawn directly from the eastern

seaboard.

The foregoing prognostication, at first glance, seems to indicate

that the Middle West is likely to profit less by the opening of

this great waterway than other parts of the country. But it should

be borne in mind that their hold upon west coast trade is now most

firmly established. A part, but certainly only a part, of Pacific

terminal business may be lost, but this will be more than offset by

the growth of intercourse with the intermountain states. Surely the

transcontinental railroads west from St. Paul, Chicago, and St. Louis

may be relied upon to protect the direct exchange of goods of their

constituents with the intermountain communities. Transcontinental

railway rates will, of course, be lowered somewhat. The railways

will, however, probably prefer to surrender the lesser portion of

their present traffic in order to maintain profitable charges upon

the major share of their tonnage. The profit of these railways will

doubtless for the moment be lessened; but there can be little question

that an enhancement of their prosperity will follow in the long run.

The opening of this great new avenue of commerce by sea is bound to

stimulate immensely the growth and prosperity of the entire country.

And it is beyond question that in any such large development in future,

they will all share to a large degree.

FOOTNOTES:

[798] On state commissions and the conflict with the Federal

government, consult as follows:

1900. Hendrick, F., Railway Control by Commissions.

1900. McLean, S. J., _Economic Journal_, pp. 22-42.

1903. Meyer, B. H., Railway Legislation in the United States.

1903. Railways in the United States in 1902, part II. United States

Interstate Commerce Commission.

1905. Dixon, F. H. _Political Science Quarterly_, XX, pp. 612-624.

1908. Huebner, G. G. _Annals Amer. Acad. Pol Sci._, pp. 138-155.

In a List of References on Railways, published by the Congressional

Library, 1907, special articles on experience by states, such as

Dixon on Nebraska, Meyer on Wisconsin, Million on Missouri, etc.,

will be found under the names of states. Even more comprehensive is

the collective catalogue prepared by the Bureau of Railway Economics,

Chicago, 1912.

[799] Financial regulation will be discussed in vol. II.

[800] P. 452, _supra_. Also chaps. XXIII _et seq._ in our Railway

Problems.

[801] Vol II, in connection with capitalization and stock-watering.

[802] On the new Pennsylvania commission consult the _Quarterly Journal

of Economics_, August, 1912.

[803] "The Wisconsin Idea," by Charles McCarthy, described by Van Hise

in "Concentration and Control," 1912, p. 236.

[804] Huebner, _op. cit._, p. 147 has carefully tabulated all these

laws.

[805] The effect of Missouri distance tariffs upon rates over a large

part of the Middle West is best instanced in the Missouri-Mississippi

rate scheme. _Cf._ p. 128, _supra_, and especially chap. XX in our

Railway Problems, rev. ed. _Cf._ also local and through tariffs at p.

394, _supra_; the Wabash decision, p. 451, _supra_; and the two-cent

fare laws, p. 429, _supra_.

[806] P. 335, _supra_.

[807] P. 329, _supra_.

[808] _Cf._ p. 394, _supra_, the Texarkana, I. C. C. case, May, 1900;

and 11 _Idem_, 180, for Arkansas. Also 13 _Idem_, 48; and 18 _Idem_,

415. For later cases, 22 _Idem_, 110; and 23 _Idem_, 404 and 688.

[809] _Cf._ p. 338, _supra_.

[810] 207 U. S., 328.

[811] P. 586, _supra_.

[812] _Economic Bulletin_, of the Amer. Econ. Ass., I; Annual Rep. I.

C. C., 1907, p. 93; and _Idem_, 1908, pp. 71 and 76.

[813] 209 U. S., 123, 205.

[814] The similar controversy in Minnesota regarding iron ore shipments

seems to have been settled by voluntary abandonment of the claim to

regulate by the state on Nov. 20, 1911. _Cf._ Minn. R. R. Com., Rep.

[815] Decision reprinted in our Railway Problems, rev. ed., chap. XXV.

The activities of state governments in recent years in the creation