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[Illustration: HERBERT SPENCER.]
THE DATA OF ETHICS
by
HERBERT SPENCER
Author of "First Principles," "Education," etc.
[Illustration]
A. L. Burt Company,
Publishers, New York
AUTHOR'S PREFACE.
A reference to the programme of the "System of Synthetic Philosophy"
will show that the chapters herewith issued constitute the first
division of the work on the _Principles of Morality_, with which the
System ends. As the second and third volumes of the _Principles of
Sociology_ are as yet unpublished, this installment of the succeeding
work appears out of its place.
I have been led thus to deviate from the order originally set down by
the fear that persistence in conforming to it might result in leaving
the final work of the series unexecuted. Hints, repeated of late years
with increasing frequency and distinctness, have shown me that health
may permanently fail, even if life does not end, before I reach the
last part of the task I have marked out for myself. This last part of
the task it is to which I regard all the preceding parts as subsidiary.
Written as far back as 1842, my first essay, consisting of letters on
The _Proper Sphere of Government_, vaguely indicated what I conceived
to be certain general principles of right and wrong in political
conduct, and from that time onward my ultimate purpose, lying behind
all proximate purposes, has been that of finding for the principles
of right and wrong, in conduct at large, a scientific basis. To leave
this purpose unfulfilled, after making so extensive a preparation for
fulfilling it, would be a failure the probability of which I do not
like to contemplate, and I am anxious to preclude it, if not wholly,
still partially. Hence the step I now take. Though this first division
of the work terminating the Synthetic Philosophy, cannot, of course,
contain the specific conclusions to be set forth in the entire work,
yet it implies them in such wise that, definitely to formulate them
requires nothing beyond logical deduction.
I am the more anxious to indicate in outline, if I cannot complete,
this final work, because the establishment of rules of right conduct
on a scientific basis is a pressing need. Now, that moral injunctions
are losing the authority given by their supposed sacred origin, the
secularization of morals is becoming imperative. Few things can happen
more disastrous than the decay and death of a regulative system no
longer fit, before another and fitter regulative system has grown
up to replace it. Most of those who reject the current creed appear
to assume that the controlling agency furnished by it may safely be
thrown aside, and the vacancy left unfilled by any other controlling
agency. Meanwhile, those who defend the current creed allege that in
the absence of the guidance it yields, no guidance can exist: divine
commandments they think the only possible guides. Thus, between these
extreme opponents, there is a certain community. The one holds that
the gap left by disappearance of the code of supernatural ethics need
not be filled by a code of natural ethics, and the other holds that it
cannot be so filled. Both contemplate a vacuum, which the one wishes
and the other fears. As the change which promises or threatens to
bring about this state, desired or dreaded, is rapidly progressing,
those who believe that the vacuum can be filled, and that it must be
filled, are called on to do something in pursuance of their belief.
To this more special reason I may add a more general reason. Great
mischief has been done by the repellent aspect habitually given
to moral rule by its expositors, and immense benefits are to be
anticipated from presenting moral rule under that attractive aspect
which it has when undistorted by superstition and asceticism. If a
father, sternly enforcing numerous commands, some needful and some
needless, adds to his severe control a behavior wholly unsympathetic;
if his children have to take their pleasures by stealth, or, when
timidly looking up from their play, ever meet a cold glance or more
frequently a frown, his government will inevitably be disliked, if
not hated, and the aim will be to evade it as much as possible.
Contrariwise, a father who, equally firm in maintaining restraints
needful for the well-being of his children or the well-being of other
persons, not only avoids needless restraints, but, giving his sanction
to all legitimate gratifications and providing the means for them,
looks on at their gambols with an approving smile, can scarcely fail
to gain an influence which, no less efficient for the time being,
will also be permanently efficient. The controls of such two fathers
symbolize the controls of Morality as it is and Morality as it should
be.
Nor does mischief result only from this undue severity of the ethical
doctrine bequeathed us by the harsh past. Further mischief results from
the impracticability of its ideal. In violent reaction against the
utter selfishness of life as carried on in barbarous societies, it has
insisted on a life utterly unselfish. But just as the rampant egoism of
a brutal militancy was not to be remedied by attempts at the absolute
subjection of the ego in convents and monasteries, so neither is the
misconduct of ordinary humanity, as now existing, to be remedied by
upholding a standard of abnegation beyond human achievement. Rather
the effect is to produce a despairing abandonment of all attempts at
a higher life. And not only does an effort to achieve the impossible
end in this way, but it simultaneously discredits the possible. By
association with rules that cannot be obeyed, rules that can be obeyed
lose their authority.
Much adverse comment will, I doubt not, be passed on the theory of
right conduct which the following pages shadow forth. Critics of a
certain class, far from rejoicing that ethical principles otherwise
derived by them, coincide with ethical principles scientifically
derived, are offended by the coincidence. Instead of recognizing
essential likeness they enlarge on superficial difference. Since the
days of persecution, a curious change has taken place in the behavior
of so-called orthodoxy toward so-called heterodoxy. The time was
when a heretic, forced by torture to recant, satisfied authority by
external conformity: apparent agreement sufficed, however profound
continued to be the real disagreement. But now that the heretic can
no longer be coerced into professing the ordinary belief, his belief
is made to appear as much opposed to the ordinary as possible. Does
he diverge from established theological dogma? Then he shall be an
atheist; however inadmissible he considers the term. Does he think
spiritualistic interpretations of phenomena not valid? Then he shall be
classed as a materialist; indignantly though he repudiates the name.
And in like manner, what differences exist between natural morality
and supernatural morality, it has become the policy to exaggerate
into fundamental antagonisms. In pursuance of this policy, there will
probably be singled out for reprobation from this volume, doctrines
which, taken by themselves, may readily be made to seem utterly wrong.
With a view to clearness, I have treated separately some correlative
aspects of conduct, drawing conclusions either of which becomes untrue
if divorced from the other; and have thus given abundant opportunity
for misrepresentation.
The relations of this work to works preceding it in the series are such
as to involve frequent reference. Containing, as it does, the outcome
of principles set forth in each of them, I have found it impracticable
to dispense with re-statements of those principles. Further, the
presentation of them in their relations to different ethical theories,
has made it needful, in every case, briefly to remind the reader what
they are, and how they are derived. Hence an amount of repetition which
to some will probably appear tedious. I do not, however, much regret
this almost unavoidable result; for only by varied iteration can alien
conceptions be forced on reluctant minds.
_June_, 1879.
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I. PAGE.
Conduct in General 1