The apprehending of a real object in thought, unquestionably involves an
act of knowing, so long, at least, as it is no empty thought, but has a
real subject-matter. It is a piece of knowledge, even though it may be
as yet very incomplete, both as regards its external connection with
others and its inward development, and though it be highly defective
also in form and expression. It is, moreover, possible that
subsequently, by an incorrect analysis or other erroneous treatment of
it, its usefulness may be destroyed, itself dissolved into naught, and
stripped of true vital significance. And thus by our own fault, the
thought, which originally possessed a true and real object, is reduced
into a mere wordy formula, conveying actually no meaning at all. In
order, then, to indicate the real distinction between the two, and at
the same time to guard against all possible misconception, we would
define as follows the intrinsic essence of knowledge: to know is the
living thought of something real. The general indefinite term, thought,
which we have here employed, is the right one and the most appropriate
in this place, for it comprises every kind of perceiving and
understanding, of judging and comprehending, of cognition and
recognition, and serves to indicate the several elements and relations
or differing degrees of knowledge, and of that intuitive inward
certainty which is combined and associated with it. It would be far less
accurate to say that knowledge is the correct thought, instead of the
_living_ thought of a real object; although, indeed, the former is
involved in and inseparable from the latter. When a thought which in any
degree apprehends or comprehends a real object, is said to be incorrect,
this is as much as to say that it comprises much that is not found in
the object itself, and consequently does not coincide with it. But that
which is not contained in the object itself is, so far as it is
concerned, unreal and does not belong to it. And all such is necessarily
excluded from the notion of the thought of a real object, since
otherwise it would be a thinking of what is unreal. The expression, too,
of an incorrect thinking of what is real, would, no doubt, point to and
indicate the same fact in every case where such thinking is a thoroughly
defective and incomplete knowing, if, for instance, much that is
essential and is really found in the particular object were not
comprised in the thought or were wanting in it. This expression,
consequently, is perfectly applicable, and indeed appropriate, when we
wish to speak of a complete and perfect knowledge, and to distinguish it
from one that is faulty and defective. But such knowledge slowly and
gradually develops itself; the notion of knowing in general must precede
that of perfect knowledge. The living thought of a real object, however
imperfect and incomplete it may be, contains, nevertheless, the first
beginning and germ of a knowing. It is only out of a dead thought that a
true knowing can never arise; properly, indeed, when it is but a mere
formula, it is not even a true thinking. Knowledge, therefore, in
general is the living thought of some real object; but perfect and
complete knowledge is the full and correct development of this thought,
by means of which it becomes perfectly defined, both outwardly and
inwardly. But a real object is invariably the first foundation and
beginning, from which all knowledge springs up, and to which all thought
must be immediately directed and also closely attach itself.
In an older form of philosophy, the supreme, or--as it was called, not
very appropriately, if all its various relations be considered--necessary
Being, was usually declared to be that of which the reality was at once
given in its possibility, so that the proof of its actual existence
would immediately follow from the mere idea of its perfection. This,
however, is but one of the many forms of expression for the absolute
unity of being and knowledge. We have already expressed ourselves
sufficiently at large on the general topic, and we have only adduced
this particular instance to serve as a passage to our exposition of
another view, in the hope of throwing out the latter more distinctly
and definitely by means of the contrast.
In that method of philosophy which takes its rise in no dead and
abstract thinking, but rather in life itself and the living thought,
reality, together with the immediate feeling of whatever is thus real
and actual in the inward perception, as well as in external experience,
and also in the revelation from above, forms the first beginning out of
which all is developed. This is the fixed, stable point to which all
that follows attaches itself. The necessary, which comes first after
this reality, is simply the inner essential and complete connection of
this first data. But the possible, which is not any mere arbitrary
conception and chimerical invention, but something truly, and we might
almost say _really_ possible, forms the conclusion, as that which by a
natural development results from the two former--the initiatory fact and
its intrinsic essentiality. This simple series or natural progression in
living thought forms and constitutes in the next place the different
degrees of understanding, and even the internal grades of certainty and
clearness in a continuously advancing development. The foundation of the
whole is formed by the feeling of a reality, the perception of a fact,
existing somewhere within the limits of that triple experience which
takes in an inner and an outer and also a higher world. Now, the first
step in this progressive intellectual development is formed by the
notion or general term, which, as I formerly explained it, is a thought
or conception that is mathematically determined and precisely limited,
both inwardly and outwardly, according to the three dimensions of
number, measure, and weight. In it all the several elements which, taken
together, form the original thought or conception of the real object,
are first of all duly separated and arranged, and then again united as
organic members into a regular whole, or, after the manner of geometry,
brought into a _construction_. But this act of comprising into a general
notion [_Begreifen_] is by no means a perfect explanation of the matter.
It is not, as it were, an analysis carried out fully and completely, so
that nothing still remains to be explained. For even according to the
ordinary usage of speech, we may very easily form and have a notion of
any system, whether purely ideal or experimental, philosophical or
unphilosophical, or belonging to any other domain of science, and even
of a work of art, at the same time that we are forced to admit that
there is much in it that we do not understand, or which appears to us
inexplicable and unintelligible. This comprehending, which externally
consists in the correct marking out of the whole circumference of an
object, and inwardly, in the clear division and arrangement of its
several organic members, is not the complete act of understanding; it is
only its first step. As such, however, it may afterward attain to an
internal confirmation, and become thereby the second degree in the
approach to completeness of understanding. And this it does as soon as a
cognition of the error which may either possibly rise up in, about, or
together with itself, or is actually combined with it, is attained, and
when, consequently, a clearer recognition of the opposing truth advances
the mere feeling of a something real into an intelligent feeling or
judgment of inward certainty. And this is the very essence of knowing.
The third step in the further development or enhancement of the first
living thought, or of its progressive approach toward completeness of
understanding, is formed by the idea. The idea is distinct from the
notion, even in its form. Unlike the latter, it does not set forth all
that, under the given conditions, necessarily and essentially belongs
together. In other words, it does not give the full and complete extent
of the reality which was taken up by the original feeling and
perception. It rather propounds the thought of a possibility, which, in
a certain and definite view or direction, appears attainable. For
instance, in our present development of the inner and higher life, the
notion of the consciousness was followed by the idea of science, and the
question how far it is possible and within the reach of man. Even in
ordinary language this distinction is observed. How often do we hear it
observed, that this or that scheme is a mere idea, signifying that it is
a thought whose object is a something possible, but of which the reality
or realization appears at the time highly problematical. On the other
hand, by the term notion, strictly taken, it is usual to understand a
thought which has for its subject-matter something relatively true at
least, since, otherwise there would be nothing that we could have a
notion of or comprehend. And simply on this account it is not possible
that the idea should contain a perfectly definite and organically
articulated construction of its object. For, in fact, an idea is merely
the indication, the standard, and the rule of the possible. It is simply
designed to show what is to be, and in what way it can be, attained, and
perhaps, also, in what law of progression its attainment will be
actually realized.
However, a truly scientific and scientifically useful idea is before all
things closely and essentially dependent on the foundation of an inward
certainty, or a feeling and conviction that the object which forms its
problem, or the problem which is its object, is really and actually
attainable. Consequently, it intimately depends on the intelligent
feeling or judgment as to this inward certainty and truth in
knowledge.