The general notion of the inner life formed the point from which we
started in this attempt to portray the whole spiritual man. I
maintained, you will remember, that the philosophy of life proceeds on
the simple assumption of this inner life. Now, in the preceding
discourses it has been my endeavor to unfold this general idea into a
more fully-developed and more definite conception of human
consciousness, both in its several principles and total coherence. And
this almost completes the first division of our whole sketch. For fully
to complete a knowledge of ourselves, and of life in general, a few
particulars only remain to be added, and a comprehensive review of the
whole once more to be taken. And this, in the natural order of this
simple development of thought, forms the next subject of our labors. By
reason of the close vital connection which subsists between thought and
speech, language served in the first instance for an external basis of
comparison, which in the next place art enabled me to carry still
farther, inasmuch as the latter may also be regarded as an inner
language. For, however fragmentary and incomplete may be our collection
of languages and the science thereof, notwithstanding all the
enlargement it has received from modern observation and research, it is
still possible, by a rigorous distinction of the derivatory and mixed
offshoots from the more ancient and purer branches, to gain at least an
insight into the history and progress of language, and thence to trace
the probable course of its development, even while its origin, no less
than the equally incomprehensible phenomenon of its first exercise,
remains veiled in impenetrable obscurity. And when we called art a
language, we did not mean this merely in the same sense that poetry has
been styled--and indeed has even herself assumed the title of--a divine
language, on account of the ornamental figures of its external form;
neither was it because of the allegorical shapes and allusions, nor of
the symbolical garb which plastic art so often puts on. The so
transiently advanced metaphor was intended to convey the idea that art
in general, not merely in its outward form, but in its inmost essence,
and in all of its forms and species alike, is a language of nature of a
higher and spiritual kind, or, if the term be preferred, an inward
hieroglyphical writing and original speech of the soul, which is
immediately intelligible to all susceptible natures, and to every one
whose sensibilities a taste for any form of art has rendered open and
accessible to its appeal. For the key to it lies not in any arbitrarily
established principle, as is the case with that ingenious and beautiful,
but still merely conventional invention of the East--the symbolical
language of flowers, but in the feeling and the soul itself. For the
eternal and fundamental feelings of the soul are awakened, or, rather,
reawakened, in these inner-soul words of true art, which, in the same
sense that we speak of the riddle of life or of the world, making its
solution the object and aim of philosophy, we may likewise term a riddle
of hope--of that hope, in truth, which is eternal and divine. But high
art, like life and the world, remains a riddle, and must ever appear to
us as such, simply because in reality, or at least for the greater part,
it is only a few detached notes, without the full and coherent air, that
it allows to reach us.
There is, then, an intrinsic connection between thought and speech,
between language and consciousness. Moreover man, to judge of him by the
collective sum of his characteristic and essential properties, is
nothing else than the _created word_, the faint echo and very imperfect
copy of the uncreated and eternal, and stands amid the rest of creation,
midway between the world of nature and that of spirits. For these
reasons, then, in the further exposition of his inner life I shall
invariably make use of the idea of language, and even many of its
characteristic properties or peculiarities, as the external basis of a
comparison calculated to throw light upon much that in the inward
thought of man it is otherwise difficult to express and to make clear by
words. For, indeed, generally, living thought and the science thereof,
can not well or easily be separated from the philosophy of language.
The general idea of the inner life was, I said, the basis of all the
previous development of ideas, and this was the only hypothesis which a
philosophy of life stands in need of, or can venture to assume. An
objection may, it is true, be here started. In the various digressions
into which, in the further development of this one fundamental thought,
I have been led by my wish to expand it to a full and complete idea of
the consciousness, it may be said that much besides has been supposed or
taken for granted, if not expressly, yet tacitly; not indeed
arbitrarily, but still as the result of a merely personal conviction,
however positive and deliberate. To this objection, so naturally to be
expected, I can only reply, that if occasionally I may not have
expressed myself hypothetically enough, it was, nevertheless, my
intention so to do. Consequently all hypothetical positions, with the
exception of the fundamental one of the inner thought and life, hitherto
assumed by me, are to be regarded here simply in such a light. They are
advanced only for the nonce, and provisionally, until they can receive a
further and completer analysis, without in anywise anticipating the
proof, nor, by a hasty decision, assuming the truth, as if it were
independent of argument.
Now, since doubt is a necessary and inevitable property and an essential
principle of the whole man in his present state, we are brought by the
regular course of our analysis to the problem which is furnished by the
thought at issue with itself. To this subject, which now forces itself
immediately on our attention, we must devote an entire section of our
labors. The object of the first portion was to advance the simple and
general thought of the inner life (as being in this simple generality
too vague and undefined), or to raise it, step by step, to a full,
complete, and comprehensive, but at the same time rightly divided
conception of the human mind. In the same way, in the next division of
my speculations, the essential subject and proper aim will be to carry
that feeling, call it as we will, whether of pure love, or inner life,
or higher truth, whose existence we have, we think, clearly established,
through the crisis of doubt, to a determinate judgment of profound
certainty and unwavering conviction, or at least to a rigorous
distinction between that which is certain and that which must forever
remain uncertain.
Now, to render in any degree complete that characteristic of the human
mind which it has been our object or endeavor in the previous Lectures
to sketch in detail, we were obliged to take in also those higher
elements which by many are called in question, and by some positively
denied to exist. And herein lay the natural ground and the occasion for
our introducing the mention of them, at least as facts of consciousness
generally acknowledged by the common-sense of mankind. Not that we
thereby meant to exclude them from a profounder investigation, or to
guard them against the intrusion of that doubt which knows no limits to
its skepticism. We only reserved them to their appropriate place in the
natural course of our development of living thought. Some there are, we
know, who hold even a higher and genuine sense of art to be a mere fancy
either of genius, devoted to and displaying its excellence therein, or
of the mere _dilettanti_. Others again, and even celebrated writers,
have explained conscience and its still, small voice, by the acquired or
instilled prejudice of education, or as the delusive effect of custom.
How far more numerous, then, must be the doubts which such a system of
abnegation of all that is good and exalted would raise against the
Platonic doctrine of a recollection of eternal love, or that idea which
I have labored to establish, of a pure longing after infinity! If,
again, many question the freedom of the will, they deny, in fact, the
will itself; for a will that is not free ceases to be will. If,
moreover, others refuse to recognize in all human thought, fictions, and
inventions, any thing creatively new and peculiarly original, seeing
therein nothing but repetition or fresh combinations of external
impressions, consequently denying to the human mind all power of
invention, then must fancy be denied to be one of the mind’s fundamental
powers. For, in truth, in such a case, it is nothing more than memory,
or, rather, it is memory fallen into delirium. Others, again, would
refer even reason itself and the essential rational character of man
simply to a more delicate sensuous organization than is possessed by the
most highly-endowed among the brute creation. All such special and
eccentric opinions form but so many subordinate chapters of our second
part, which has for its theme reason and doubt, and the state of doubt,
which are natural to man. To it, therefore, they must be reserved for
investigation. We can not anticipate the period of their discussion in
the present place, where our first object is, by a development of the
simple thought and the general ideas of the inner life, to sketch a
perfect outline of the human mind, which shall take in all its higher
elements and capacities, as well as the earthly and inferior ingredients
which are blended with them.
The thought or conception, as the general manifestation of the inner
life, is in its nature and form indefinite, but still a cogitation,
which even at this step is already referred to a particular object, and
so in its contents limited thereto. An idea or notion, however, is a
conception mathematically proportioned by number, measure, and weight;
_i.e._, according to the number of its several constituents it is
carefully divided, and its subordinate genera enumerated; measured
according to its extent, and according to its internal value and
comprehension, and also its relation to other kindred notions of a
higher or lower order carefully weighed and pondered; in short, a
conception complete and perfect in itself. Hitherto, therefore, it has
been properly but a single notion that has engaged our attention, and
formed the subject-matter of our whole speculation--the notion, viz., of
the human consciousness. For it is not merely philosophy to link
together in a never-ending chain its own self-derived and arbitrary
ideas, by some specious rule of necessary connection. The duty of
philosophy is rather originally to combine facts--and, in truth, all the
given facts of a certain kind, and within a certain range, in one clear,
intelligible, and perfectly vivid notion, and it has generally to do
with very few ideas. Two or three ideas, in short, such as that of
consciousness, of science, or of man himself, are quite sufficient for
its purpose of solving, if not fully and completely, yet at least to the
full extent of what is not merely possible and allowable, but also
wholesome and profitable, the three riddles of life, of the universe,
and of a divine hope, which lie before the whole human mind, and thereby
to arrive at some abiding conviction with regard to them.
Now, in concluding our development of the human mind, and adding to it
all that is still wanting to its completeness, I shall observe the same
method of exposition as I have hitherto followed. Leaving for the nonce
unmooted, the grave questions whether there be any such thing as
truth--and, if so, whether man is capable of recognizing and attaining
to it in any degree--and reserving them to their appropriate place where
they will naturally arise, I shall adopt into the outline of the general
notion of the consciousness all those facts of it which are acknowledged
by the common-sense of mankind. I shall, as such, allow them all and no
more than their due weight. Occasionally, however, when any such
phenomenon appears somewhat questionable, I shall add a word or two of
explanation, in order to guard against the possibility of misconception,
or an overhasty inference, setting down the facts purely as such, and
so far as they are already apprehended, for further investigation and
inquiry.
The four opposite poles or extremes of man’s divided and discordant
consciousness are, I said, its four fundamental faculties or powers,
understanding and will, and reason and fancy. With regard to the two
first, every one may, both from internal experience of his own self and
from observation of his fellow-men, easily arrive at a conviction that
they seldom work together in perfect harmony, and that the discord is
often the most violent when either one or both of these two faculties
possess more than ordinary strength. The marked opposition between
reason and fancy reveals itself but too plainly, both in private and
public life. The men of mere taste and imagination, artistic and
poetical natures (to which category, in a somewhat loose sense, very
many really belong, though the happy exceptions of true genius be indeed
rare), on the one hand; and on the other, the men of practical
reason--the utilitarians, who limit their views, more or less, to the
public advantage to be derived from this quality of practical reason,
and look with distrust to every higher flight of fancy or feeling, form
two hostile classes of men, who with difficulty comprehend each other.
At least they are seldom in a position to understand one another’s
feelings, and rightly and fairly to appreciate them. Still more rare are
the exceptions, where both these faculties and mental characters are
found united in one and the same individual.
After these four fundamental faculties of the first order, come certain
accessory functions of the second order, derived from or compounded of
the former. Of these, conscience and memory, and after them the
instincts and passions, have been described as movements of the will,
passing over into the illimitable region of the fancy, and consequently
holding an intermediate place between will and fancy. We have now to add
a word or two concerning the external senses, and therewith to complete
our sketch of the human consciousness in its present divided and
distracted condition. But previously to entering upon this topic, I
would, with reference to this last-mentioned characteristic of instinct,
call your attention to a particular species of it, which is not
unimportant, but rather belongs essentially to a complete picture of
this part of the human consciousness. It will, moreover, furnish a new
instance, to show how in nature herself there lies a cause, or at least
a first occasion for many parallels of comparative psychology, similar
to those which have already presented themselves. I am alluding to the
artistic instincts displayed by some of the more sagacious animals, and
especially some of the industrious members of the insect tribe. These
present a remarkable affinity to human art, in which all, at least, is
not the effect of teaching. In the lower but still beautiful degrees of
artistic talent, there is much that seems instinctive in its operation,
and, as it were, unconscious and innate. True and lofty genius of art
can not be here included. It belongs, on the contrary, to a different
sphere. For in it the unconscious creative faculty is not narrowly
restricted to one rigid path or definite form, but has rather for its
essential basis a productive power of imagination, of universal range
and fullness, and which, as it were, travails in birth with the
infinite.
Now this notion, thus borrowed from natural science, for the purposes of
a comparative psychology, seems well applicable to that pure feeling of
infinite longing which is the most exalted of all man’s aspirations.
According to that idea of it which I have labored to establish, we can
name this profound inward longing, which nothing earthly can ever
satisfy, man’s instinct of eternity--an instinct which often long
remains, and at the first always is perfectly unconscious of a higher
vocation and divine destiny.
The external senses are in one respect the faithful organs and
instruments of the understanding in the material world, with which it
makes its experience or observations therein, and draws therefrom its
experimental science. In another point of view, they may not improperly
be termed an applied or practical fancy, which for a definite direction
exercises itself on the individual phenomena of the material world, for
the copying and reproduction of external impressions on the organs, as,
_e.g._, of the visible form or reduced image in the eye, is in any case
nothing but an inferior species or a collateral branch of the general
faculty of productive imagination. But that new and spiritual sense of
higher potency, which in the purely material can only develop itself as
an exception, or may appear to be veiled therein--I mean the keen
appreciation by the ear of musical tones, and the eye for picturesque
beauty of form in the plastic art--can only be regarded as a
lightning-spark of fancy passing along and operating through this
external medium and conductor.
One remark seems of importance in connection with our whole subject; at
any rate it will not be superfluous, as confirming our assertion that
the threefold principle of human life in general is found repeated in
its single members; and though on a smaller scale, is still manifested
in the same relation. We observe, therefore, that whatever
physiological, or, it may be, anatomical reasons physiologists may have
for counting five senses--and they may be perfectly sufficient and
adequate for the requisitions of physical science, still,
psychologically, it is far more accurate and also simpler, in a
philosophical sense, to limit their number to three. No doubt, in the
sensation of taste, not only a mechanical contact occurs, but there is
also a chemical decomposition of the tasted matter, by which the
sensation of sweet or bitter is produced. So, too, in smell, although no
visible evaporation takes place, still it is a fact that aëriform
floating particles are thrown off from the sensible body, and actually
taken in by the sentient. Still these are far from being adequate
grounds for making of them two independent senses. Even in the inner
organic perception of one’s bodily health and ease, and in the opposite
case of pain, it is something more than the mere mechanical contact from
without that is therein sensuously perceived. But are we disposed on
this account to agree with those who propose to divide still further the
single sense of material touch, and increase the number of the senses?
We feel at once that this would be superfluous, since all these proposed
divisions are, at least in a psychological point of view, to be regarded
simply as modifications--as branches or lower species of one and the
same sense. And by the same analogy, then, we may reckon all these
material senses for one. Thus, then, we have in all but three senses,
presenting in this smaller and meaner sphere an accurate correspondence
to the triple man, and the three elements which make up his whole
being--body, soul, and spirit.
Of the outer senses, the eye is incontestably the most spiritual. The
ear, whereby we are sentient of sounds, words, and voices, and melody,
and all music, corresponds to the soul; while the sense of material
feeling, which is also destined to be the ministering organ and guardian
of the health and welfare of the body, is corporeal, and corresponds to
the principle of organic life. After the loss both of sight and hearing,
the body may both be and long continue healthy and vigorous; whereas a
defect in the sense of feeling, so soon, at least, as it became general
and total, would be the commencement of death, or at least appear to be
so, since diseases temporarily take this form. However, this third and
corporeal sense of feeling is not always entirely external and grossly
material. It may develop itself, at least by way of exception (since the
sense of art in the eye and ear is not universal), as a sort of
intellectual perception, though still a physical feeling of kindred life
and of the inner light, which often gives rise to a peculiar and
remarkable immediate natural sense (not to call it an instinct) for the
invisible, which is enshrouded within the outward phenomena of life. And
though some would fain deny the reality of this capacity, still,
inasmuch as its existence is a matter of fact, adequately confirmed by
experience, as great, if not greater error may be committed in the
opposite direction. Because this acute natural sense does unquestionably
often arrive in a most wonderful manner at a just and right
conclusion--or this instinct make most remarkable divinations--we must
not, therefore, exalt it at once into a kind of invisible, infallible,
and, as it were, omniscient oracle. For such is not to be met with in
the path of psychology, nor in the whole circle of faculties which
belong to man as man, and least of all in that critical point of
transition out of the ordinary perception of consciousness into a
complete state of unconsciousness, and from this again into a clear and
bright consciousness; which point, even on this account, seeming to
stand midway between light and shade, exhibits here and there a strong
resemblance to the world of dreams. Such, in general, is the limitation
of the human intellect, that reason, as has been already often remarked,
can never be regarded as an unerring oracle and infallible organ of
truth; neither is the clearest understanding and the most experienced
artistic sense, even in its own peculiar sphere, always unerring. Still
less can either the will or the fancy make such a claim. Even the inner
voice of _conscience_, although its name alludes directly to an inward
_knowing_, and the _certainty_ thereof,[69] is not always and
universally recognized as such an infallible guide--otherwise many a
thinker and writer on the subject would not have set up, as necessary to
explain at least some cases, the idea of a mistaken conscience. It
appears, then, that this natural sense, even where it exists in the
greatest strength and clearness, must be always regarded as an entirely
individual and peculiar gift, and can only be understood and judged of
as such. This remark involves, perhaps, the most important
consideration, which, in judging of it, we must always keep in view.
Moreover, even where it really and decidedly exists, whether in a state
of complete or half-consciousness, or in full conscious wakefulness, it
always requires the closest observation and the most watchful care
before it can attain to its full perfection; for its development must be
extremely slow and gradual. In this respect it must resemble the
expansion of that high and spiritual sense of art which forms a bright
and luminous point within the material organ of the ear or eye--which
lies enshrouded in the external organ like a spiritual germ, or--as we
may justly term the artist’s vision as compared with that of other
men--an _eye within the eye_.
We have now taken a general view of the whole human mind, finding it to
comprise four great fundamental faculties of the first class, and then
certain secondary ones--viz., memory and conscience, with the appetites
and external senses, which, at least in the psychological point of view,
appear to be mixed forms or derivatives of the former. The four first
are occasionally found combined together in due proportion. When this
combination is the natural endowment of genius, they attain to their
noblest energy, and even by a lively and careful development, they often
attain to a most exquisite unity of operation. Mostly, however, we meet
with a decided preponderance and exclusive ascendency of some one, which
in its external effects is only limited and checked by the fact that it
is thus isolated. The four rarely co-operate together; and, for the most
part, by their dissension they prove checks and hindrances to each
other. But not merely in the individual and his personal life and
conduct do these four fundamental forces display such strength and vital
energy in the grand development of the whole human race; and in its
history we may also observe the same fact. Among the Greeks we
recognize, distinctly and clearly, a profound and ingenious intellect
predominating in life, no less than in art and science; in the Romans,
an irresistible and sovereign force of will, reducing the world to its
subjection, and often no less gloriously imposing laws on itself; in the
Christian middle ages, the lovely devices of fancy giving its bold
shapes to life itself as well as to art; and lastly, in modern times,
reason squaring every thing to the measure of its own mind and laws,
coupling often, and associating, or, by its middle terms, equating
together the remotest elements, and not less frequently exercising a
destructive energy against all, and even against itself. Thus this
ground-scheme of human consciousness, which formed the first result of
the psychological investigation of our own selves, meets us here also on
a grander scale as a part of the world’s history, and in the large
dimensions of successive ages and centuries, as the first striking
result in the history of man’s civilization during the twenty-five
centuries which, as lying nearest to our own times, we are best
acquainted with. Much as may be wanting to fill up, both in the
commencement and the middle--much, in short, as it would be necessary to
add or more closely to define, if it were our object to draw a universal
sketch of the four historical epochs and ages of the civilization of the
world within the limits best known to us, yet for our immediate object
these mere hints are sufficient; for they prove how, even in history, in
its place each of these four fundamental powers of man developed itself
in the most decided form and displayed a marvelous and uncontrollable
energy. Here, too, we see that an intrinsic equilibrium between these
several powers forms in general but the rare and happy exception, while
on the whole it is mostly wanting. Indeed the absence of a complete
vital union and co-operation is but too painfully felt and perceived in
the history of the world.
Quite different, however, is the case with the mixed and mediate
faculties of the second rank, which are derived from the former. To
these may be applied the remark we lately made on the American tribes
and languages, in relation to that degradation of the human race so
especially noticeable in them, and its still advancing degeneracy and
dismemberment. The external senses, whose meager powers of cognition are
but a sorry make-shift for man’s mind, which in its thirst of knowledge
would embrace all existence, the Godhead, and the universe, are narrowly
restricted to the material world immediately around him. From such
slight and unpromising beginnings, science is no doubt occasionally able
to evolve many a great and noble truth. And even in the external senses
themselves a feeling of art or a clear and pure sense of nature gleams
forth at times, like a little spark of purer light. Still even here many
and great impediments affect them and their sure application. Memory,
too, is on the whole little more than a mechanical readiness, with
difficulty acquired, and soon weakened and blunted. The appetites or
instincts are liable to numberless aberrations and passionate excesses.
As to conscience, there is but too much reason to fear that it is for
the most part in a state of weakness and apathy, dwarfed and mutilated
in its powers and operations. At least, the remark is no very strange
one that conscience, which has an ear as well as a small, still voice,
does not always hear very quickly, and often fails to hear very much
that it might and would do well to listen to. Whether there are not men
who in this respect may be considered perfectly deaf, is a question
which can only be answered by an accurate and specific history of human
crimes, or by those whose calling it is to study this sad and gloomy
side of the picture of human life. Such complete moral deadness as this,
however, which happily forms a rare exception in humanity, may, perhaps,
be rightly regarded as a kind of moral imbecility for all higher and
moral sentiments, even though it is frequently accompanied with great
clearness of intellect and a high degree of instinctive shrewdness or
cunning. On the other hand, the cases are probably rare, where the
delicate moral sensibility or inward perception of right and wrong among
nobler natures, is developed in such purity and strength, and carried to
such a height of perfection and stability, as the musical ear and
artistic delicacy is by great musicians and amateurs of the art.
Probably, too, it is more suitable, and also more profitable, for human
nature in its present degraded state, that its higher senses and organs
for the invisible should not manifest themselves in us in all their
extreme and overpowering energy, and for the most part should but shine
with a subdued light, or, as it were, gleam through some shrouding
envelope. Even of the conscience this is true. At least, it admits not
of denial that a few moments’ brief enjoyment of a truly bright and
clear-sighted conscience would be enough to tear the soul forever from
its present indifference, and to plunge it into an abyss of unspeakable
grief, for which earthly language possesses no adequate expression, and
for which the human bosom has no suitable notes of lamentation and
mourning. It is, therefore, only the greater proof of beneficence if the
invisible world, and the mysteries of eternal woe which await the lost
spirit--in comparison with which every earthly pain and all earthly
suffering are as nothing--is in mercy shrouded with a veil, which only
seldom and on rare occasions may lawfully be lifted. Now, generally, it
is at the uttermost confines of error, in the very depths of
degradation, and the lowest level of narrow-mindedness, that the first
higher impulse and beginning of happier times exalts itself, opening out
the way of return to a newer and better life. The same probably may be
the case in our present shackled and distracted consciousness. Those
very gross mistakes and aberrations to which the limited and discordant
faculties are liable, may furnish the common basis for the growth of
another vitally complete and harmonious co-operating consciousness.
For now that we have, by the enumeration of these eight faculties, made
a complete sketch of the human consciousness, the question may arise,
naturally enough, “Which is the common center of this sphere, or what is
there found or demonstrable in this center?” It was with a view to this
question that I attempted to give a refined interpretation of the
Platonic idea of the _anamnesis_, taking it to mean the recollection of
a higher love, not so much in a former existence as of and from
eternity. We explained it, consequently, to be a species of
transcendental memory. And in this sense we justified it, demonstrating
at the same time, in that other region which is formed of man’s instinct
and desires, the existence of the pure idea of infinite longing as the
highest effort of the human soul. The sense of art, and profound feeling
of natural beauty, which belong to true artistic genius, are recognized
as being in their sphere extraordinary endowments. In the same way no
one will wish to deny that the moral feeling, as the natural expression
of the inner voice of conscience, constitutes in social life the
fundamental condition and the surest foundation for all lofty and noble
sentiments. Thus feeling is that center which we were in search of, of
the otherwise divided and distracted consciousness. I might call it the
moral feeling, only then it would not be of so universal an application
as it really is. For the moral aspect constitutes only a single view and
energy of the whole, since the feeling of art, and every other kind of
higher sentiment, belongs equally to it. With much greater propriety I
might term it the inner, by way of distinction from the external and
material sense of feeling. Less clear than the understanding, and not so
decided or definite as the will, with more vitality and life than the
reason, but at the same time more narrowly limited than the fancy, the
immediate sphere of individual existence--feeling, occupies the central
space between the four fundamental faculties, as well as between the
four intermediate faculties of the second order. It is the apparently
indifferent, but in truth the full and living center of consciousness,
where every vibration of all the other isolated powers meet and cross,
either neutralizing each other, or combining together into new life and
harmonious co-operation It admits, indeed, of the most various degrees
of development and of every kind of progression, from the simplest,
almost indifferent, and passive sense of mere existence, up to the
highest and self-sacrificing enthusiasm, which heeds no form or phase of
death, or up to that highest state of rapture which loses itself on the
very verge of unconsciousness. In this respect we might well say, with
the poet, “Feeling is all.” It is the center of life, and the heart of
the whole, each single and individual faculty, in and by itself, being,
as compared with it, but “noise, powder, and smoke,” “shrouding the
bright empyrean.” And yet this center of the consciousness is not,
however, such as to be able, by its inherent force and activity, to
organize and regulate the whole, holding in union all those otherwise
isolated powers and states of the human mind. In this respect it is, on
the whole, passive. Indeed, viewed in a more accurate light, feeling is
not so much an individual and peculiar faculty as an entirely formless
and indefinite, but still vitally moved and frequently excited,
condition of the consciousness, which is to form the point of transition
from its present state of fourfold division, into the living, perfect,
and harmonious co-operation of its triple state. When reason and fancy
have ceased to be divided, being restored to oneness by the living
feeling, but are blended together in the thinking and loving soul, we
have the basis on which a restoration of the consciousness to harmony
and perfection must in every case be commenced. When the great faculty
of the understanding no longer stands aloof by itself, coldly inactive;
when the strong will ceases, by its blind obstinacy, to impede its own
efforts; when the two have now grown together into an effectual potency
of the life-enlightened spirit, in which every thought is at once an
act, and every word a power (a state which is only possible and
attainable in this center of a higher love)--we have then the second
step on the path of return to the original perfection of the
consciousness.
But before I attempt to add to this scale of progression the last term
which is yet wanting, I must episodically introduce and discuss another
question. It relates to the phenomenon of judgment, which as yet has not
had its place assigned to it in the consciousness. Is it to be
considered as an independent faculty of the soul, and in what relation
does it stand to the other mental powers? Now, by judgment, in the
merely logical sense, nothing more is understood than the connecting of
a predicate with a subject. For instance, in the complete syllogism,
“All men are mortal: Caius is a man, therefore Caius is mortal,” the
minor premise, where the middle or general term is specially applied,
and, consequently, predicted of an individual, alone forms such a
judgment. Now, since it is the reason that logically connects thoughts
together, it is not easy to see why this one act, by which the predicate
and subject are connected, should be separated from all others and set
up and regarded as an independent and especial faculty. For by so doing
nothing is explained, and an unnecessary addition is made to the
subdivisions (already too numerous) of the human mind and its thinking
powers. Quite otherwise, however, is it with another class of judgments,
which, in fact, are highly deserving the name. For these in their proper
sphere actually decide. And their decisions are generally regarded as
authoritative because they are based on natural talents, a practiced
eye, a multifarious and extensive experience, a long study of the
matters they are concerned about, which in practice render them more or
less certain and trustworthy. In this case the act of judgment is no
simple function of the thinking faculty. It is, rather, the sum of the
manifold elements and spiritual perceptions on which it exercises
itself, and which it presupposes. For the most part it is the highly
complicated and composite result of many fundamental premises. We can
not, however, reckon this higher function of judgment in any particular
sphere as a peculiar mental faculty, since in such a case a special one
must needs be assumed for every one; for a right discrimination in any
one sphere does not by any means imply equal certainty in another.
Moreover, the several species and branches of the general gift are found
to exist quite separately and distinct from each other. Since, then, the
general notion of an independent faculty does not afford a satisfactory
explanation of the phenomena of judgment, we must seek it in some other
direction. And here a few examples will greatly tend to illustrate the
whole matter. How much, for instance, is comprised in a genuine artistic
judgment! It is compounded of a multitude of observations, impressions,
reflections, and emotions. And yet the opinion resulting from all these
is simply one, and definitely comprised in one simple sentence. Suppose
the opinion pronounced to be, that this or that beautiful and ancient
painting is not from the master to whom it is commonly ascribed, but
belongs, rather, to this or that other school. Of course I am not
supposing the case where such an assertion can be proved historically by
documentary evidence. In such a case the decision would turn on a matter
of fact, and not on judgment--at least, not on true artistic judgment.
The judgment in question must principally, if not entirely, be drawn
from the work itself--from the style of the handling, and similar
indications, by a practiced and almost infallible tact. So various, in
short, and manifold are the observations on which such an artistic
judgment depends, that they often furnish matter for a whole book, or,
at least, for an essay. Whenever, however, it is really artistic
discernment, and not merely historical knowledge, that is involved, we
invariably meet with some one point or other which does not admit of
mathematical demonstration, and on which the ultimate decision must be
left to each man’s personal judgment, or that immediate perception which
forms a feeling of art. Most justly, therefore, does our language
closely connect the two expressions. For a true artistic judgment
[_Kunsturtheil_] is itself nothing else than this intuitive feeling of
art [_Kunstgefuhl_] applied to a special case or subject, and brought
out in perfect clearness and comprised in a definite shape. Just so it
is in the sphere of social life with regard to the judgment on what is
proper--the feeling, in short, of propriety. Here, for instance, it is
no uncommon question whether this or that word, spoken in some delicate
posture of affairs, was really necessary, exactly what was right to be
said and thoroughly suitable, or altogether ill-chosen and unseasonable.
Or with regard to some step still in contemplation, it may be disputed
whether such or such a method be the best and the most appropriate. How
many little niceties and delicate considerations are here involved,
which a fine feeling can alone enter into! What various and intricate
contingencies, for which it is often difficult to find words
sufficiently expressive, must such a judgment take into account, in its
deliberation on such matters! And in social converse on such instances,
is not the casting-voice generally left to the acute sensibilities and
quick tact of woman?
For in all such cases the decision invariably depends upon an immediate
feeling of propriety, which, though first called forth and developed by
the social intercourse of life, is in truth original and innate. Such,
indeed, it must ever be. For where it does not exist naturally, it can
never be learned nor artificially acquired. The original want of this
inward feeling can never be replaced by any varnish of external culture,
however brilliant. And the case is also the same even in the sphere of
science; for instance, in the shrewd, searching glance by which the
skillful physician takes his diagnosis of disease; or in the clear,
perspicacious sagacity which enables the judge, in some highly
complicated suit or doubtful criminal trial, to seize the right point on
which truth and justice hinge. For in judicial cases, with much that
admits of demonstrative proof, or which, as matter of fact, is
unquestioned, there is still more where nothing but this psychological
penetration, long practiced in such matters, and to which past
experience has given confidence in itself, can immediately see through
all the sophistical wiles not only of the pleadings and the skillful
advocate, but also of the litigant parties themselves, or of the crafty
criminal.
The same remark applies also to a sphere, apparently, indeed, related to
the one last mentioned, but, in fact, essentially different and widely
remote from it. I allude to the unerring tact of the experienced
statesman, by which he not only penetrates, through his knowledge of
mankind, the political designs of others, but is also enabled to read
the great events of the world and their tendencies, and infallibly to
seize the right moment for action.
In all these instances (and many others might easily be added) it is
upon an immediate perception or feeling of what is right that the
decision finally turns. And this fact is almost confessed by such
expressions as a “penetrating glance,” an “unerring tact,” and many
similar ones to be found in our own and other highly cultivated
languages. Such a judgment may, therefore, not inaptly be termed an
intellectual feeling; for it implies the existence of intellect. And
this not only as an inborn natural talent, for the special domain within
which the judgment is to be exercised, but, moreover, a certain
development of the understanding, strengthened by long practice, and
confirmed by varied experience in the particular province. But still,
with this intellectual element there is invariably mixed a feeling, or
immediate perception, of what is right and just. It is this, in short,
that properly decides and makes the opinion ultimately expressed to be a
judgment. On this account I can not attribute the act of judgment
exclusively to the understanding, for the former involves something more
than the simple intellection of a single object. It comprises, at the
same time, a rigorous distinction between two objects, or a decision
between yes and no. Perhaps, therefore, the best and most perfect
explanation of judgment would be to call it an intelligent feeling of a
correct discrimination, comprised and expressed, and also communicated
to others, in a general form. The last-mentioned quality, however, does
not always belong to the judgment, since it often remains merely
internal; at least, it does not form an essential or necessary part of
it.
Thus, then, this digression (though, in truth, it is not properly a
digression, since the question concerning the faculty of judgment, and
the position it occupies in the whole soul, is essentially connected
with the consideration of the latter) has again led us back to feeling,
as the living center of the entire consciousness, where all its extreme
tendencies converge and reunite. Here it is that the dull and
unpromising state of calm, contemplative indifference meets together
with the highest excitement of energetic activity, the lowest and most
insignificant states of consciousness being found there, as well as the
most exalted and most sublime--the enthusiasm that carries all before
it, no less than the clear self-possession in the spirit’s feeling of a
discernment of truth, or, as I called the judgment, an intelligent
perception of what is right and just. In this advance of feeling in the
mind or spirit [_geistigen_] up to that height of self-possession and
clearness at which it receives the name of judgment, the former bears
the same relation to the latter as the mere thought, in its first vague
generality, does to the notion which I have defined to be a thought
perfectly divided into its organic members, and mathematically measured
both inwardly and outwardly--both, _i.e._, as to extent and
comprehension.
Now, this inward feeling, taken in the full comprehensive sense of the
word, is the same as what I previously called sense, when I spoke of the
human consciousness as consisting of spirit, soul, and sense. In these
places, however, you will remember, I reserved to a future opportunity
the further and closer determination of the relation in which this
general sense stands to the other two elements of the mind. But inasmuch
as the notion of sense always carries us back to a special kind of
sensation, limited and only open to a special sphere of objects, the
expression of an inward feeling seems far more strictly appropriate to
the third element of the mind. For the term feeling, by its vague
generality, comprises all objects of consciousness, or, in other words,
all kinds and species of a higher sense. Now, this higher and
all-embracing internal feeling is the starting-point from which we must
set out if we would hope to arrive at the complete reunion and living
co-operation which marks the consciousness in its original threefold
state. It is not, however, the key-stone of consummation. It is simply
the foundation on which all the rest must be built, or it is the deep
fountain out of which rich nourishment springs up on all sides for the
other two elements of the mind, viz., the soul and the spirit. The
latter two, in fact, constitute the whole essence of the inner man. Now,
since the spirit is an active faculty, while the soul, though possessed
of a creative vitality, is on the whole mostly passive, their undivided
union and constant co-operation may, by way of figure, be designated as
an inner intellectual union or marriage in the consciousness. Indeed, we
might not inaptly explain man’s essence as consisting in the spirit
being wedded to its soul, and in the soul being thereupon clothed with
an organic body. But, to pursue the same metaphor: this marriage between
spirit and soul is not always a happy and harmonious union. Whenever the
soul, drawn off by every external impression and attraction, loses
itself in the manifold ways and by-ways of the material world, or
wanders to an unsafe distance with fancy, as she roams at liberty amid
the things of sense; whenever the spirit, trusting to its own inherent
powers, follows their dictates alone, and recognizes nothing above, and
disregards all that is without, itself, then this marriage is invariably
distracted by passionate discord and unquiet. Here, perhaps, as well as
in the external world, the words apply: “What God hath joined together,
let no man put asunder.” A complete and total divorce is indeed scarcely
conceivable, such is the coherence of the living consciousness. By death
alone is it possible to be brought about, or perhaps also by that
flaming sword of the Holy Word, which it is said pierces to the bone and
marrow, dividing soul and spirit. Where the first bond of union was
given by God, it must be maintained and continually strengthened by
recurring to this supreme center, if it is to be permanent and to look
finally for perfection. This is only possible where the spirit
recognizes a divine standard above itself, and where, in all its
thoughts, works, and deeds, it acts upon this exalted principle, and
where also the soul seeks before all things this eternal center of love,
and is ever reverting to it. In such a case both soul and spirit are
united in God, or at least are ever yearning for such a union. And, in
truth, nothing more is required of man than what has always and every
where been required of him, though, alas! this requisition has seldom
been fully realized. God, then, is the keystone which holds together the
whole human consciousness; and this is the point to which our
investigation has, step by step, been leading us. And now our notion of
the whole scheme and delineation of the human mind is complete.
Its general basis and outline, such as we find it within ourselves, is
formed by the four fundamental faculties first described, together with
four others of a lower and secondary order. Feeling--_i.e._, the inner
feeling, comprising every higher form thereof, is its center. It is that
by which we first are awakened to its present existence, and also at the
same time the point at which we pass into a higher state, wherein its
operation will be more vivid and its union more harmonious. But as to
the threefold life of the inner man, it consists in spirit, soul, and
God, as the third, in whom the first two are united, or at least must
seek their union.
In proportion, therefore, as this key-stone is removed from the human
mind, it falls a prey to discord and the isolation of its several
powers; nay more, the latter sink continually lower and lower, and fall
from one depth of degradation to another. And when occasionally, as in
the might and strength of genius, there occurs a preponderance of some
one faculty, it exercises for the most part a destructive tendency
against the harmony of the whole, checking, if not suppressing
altogether, the free developments of other powers as necessary and as
essential as itself.