_UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II_
Pictorial Record
THE WAR AGAINST
GERMANY AND ITALY:
MEDITERRANEAN AND
ADJACENT AREAS
[Illustration: MILITARY INSTRVCTION]
CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY
UNITED STATES ARMY
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1988
First Printed 1951--C M H Pub 12-2
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office
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UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II
Kent Roberts Greenfield, General Editor
Advisory Committee
James P. Baxter
President, Williams College
Henry S. Commager
Columbia University
Douglas S. Freeman
Richmond News Leader
Pendleton Herring
Social Science Research Council
John D. Hicks
University of California
William T. Hutchinson
University of Chicago
S. L. A. Marshall
Detroit News
E. Dwight Salmon
Amherst College
Col. Thomas D. Stamps
United States Military Academy
Charles S. Sydnor
Duke University
Charles H. Taylor
Harvard University
Office of the Chief of Military History
Maj. Gen. Orlando Ward, Chief
Chief Historian Kent Roberts Greenfield
Chief, World War II Group Col. Allison R. Hartman
Editor-in-Chief Hugh Corbett
Chief, Pictorial Unit Lt. Col. John C. Hatlem, USAF
Assistant, Pictorial Unit Capt. Kenneth E. Hunter
Assistant, Pictorial Unit Miss Margaret E. Tackley
... to Those Who Served
Foreword
During World War II the photographers of the United States Army, Air
Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard created on film a pictorial
record of immeasurable value. Thousands of their pictures are preserved
in the photographic libraries of the armed services, little seen by the
public.
In the volumes of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II now being prepared
by the Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the
Army, it is possible to include only a limited number of pictures. A
subseries of pictorial volumes, of which this is one, has been planned
to supplement the other volumes of the series. The photographs have
been selected to show important terrain features, types of equipment
and weapons, living and weather conditions, military operations, and
various matters of human interest. These volumes will preserve and make
accessible for future reference some of the best pictures of World
War II. An appreciation not only of the terrain on which actions were
fought, but of its influence on the capabilities and limitations of
weapons, in the hands of both our troops and the enemy’s, can be gained
through a careful study of the pictures herein presented. Appreciation
of these factors is essential to a clear understanding of military
history.
This volume, compiled by Lt. Col. John C. Hatlem, USAF, and Capt.
Kenneth E. Hunter, with the assistance of Miss Margaret E. Tackley, and
edited by W. Brooks Phillips and Miss Mary Ann Bacon, deals with the
Mediterranean Theater of Operations and the Middle East. It is divided
into five sections: (1) North Africa and the Middle East; (2) Sicily,
Corsica, and Sardinia; (3) Italy: 9 September 1943–4 June 1944; (4)
Southern France; and (5) Italy: 5 June 1944-2 May 1945. Each section
is arranged in chronological order. The written text has been kept to
a minimum. Each section is preceded by a brief introduction recounting
the major events set down in detail in the individual narrative volumes
of UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. The appendices give information
as to the abbreviations used and the sources of the photographs.
Washington, D. C. ORLANDO WARD
1 November 1951 Maj. Gen., USA
Chief of Military History
Contents
Section Page
I. NORTH AFRICA AND THE MIDDLE EAST 1
II. SICILY, CORSICA, AND SARDINIA 105
III. ITALY: 9 SEPTEMBER 1943–4 JUNE 1944 171
IV. SOUTHERN FRANCE 303
V. ITALY: 5 JUNE 1944-2 MAY 1945 349
APPENDIX A: LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 455
APPENDIX B: ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 457
INDEX 459
NORTH AFRICA
AND
THE MIDDLE EAST
[Illustration: TUNISIA]
SECTION I
North Africa and the Middle East[1]
North Africa
The occupation of French North Africa by Allied troops was determined
in July 1942 when the American and British Governments agreed to
launch a Mediterranean operation in the fall of 1942. The invasion,
designated as TORCH, was to coincide with a British advance westward
from Egypt. Before American soldiers did any actual fighting in North
Africa, however, and before the United States was at war, civilian and
military observers had been informally attached in May 1941 to the U.
S. military attaché in Cairo. This group was the beginning of a force
whose primary function was to service and maintain lend-lease equipment
from the United States, instruct the British in its use, and report on
how it stood up under battle conditions. The U. S. Air Force also was
performing missions in Egypt several months before the Allied landings
in North Africa. All these activities contributed to the British
victory at El Alamein in October 1942.
Allied troops sailed for North Africa from ports in both the United
States and the United Kingdom. The U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy shared
in supplying transports and naval escort and were able to prevent any
serious losses through enemy submarine action. Vital air support was
at first provided from aircraft carriers of both Navies and later by
land-based planes of the Allied air forces utilizing recently captured
airfields.
The Allies hoped to avoid French resistance to the landings by
arranging for the assistance of patriotic Frenchmen ashore and by
the participation in the operation of Gen. Henri Giraud, a French
military leader and former Army commander of great prestige who had
escaped from France. These plans were only partly successful. The
landings on the early morning of 8 November at beaches near Algiers,
Oran, Casablanca, Port-Lyautey, Fedala, and Safi met resistance at all
objectives. The opposition at Algiers and Safi collapsed quickly. Oran
could be occupied only after considerable fighting. French forces,
especially naval elements, in the neighborhood of Casablanca resisted
strongly, but yielded on 11 November, a few minutes before the final
assault on the city itself was to start. After a brief period of
neutrality, most of the French forces in northwest Africa joined in the
war against the Axis.
The Axis reacted to the Allied invasion by rushing troops to Tunisia
by air and sea, and captured the local airfields and ports without
opposition. British, American, and French troops drove eastward and at
the end of November and in early December launched their attack against
the Axis bridgehead. The Allied advance, however, was stopped short of
Tunis. Air superiority for the moment lay with the Axis. Lack of means
to overcome the increased resistance, in addition to weather conditions
which interfered with transport and flying, forced the postponement
until 1943 of a renewed advance over the difficult terrain of northern
Tunisia.
Meanwhile, the British Eighth Army was pressing German and Italian
forces back from Egypt through Libya and reached the southern border
of Tunisia in January 1943. Plans could then be perfected for a
co-ordinated attack against the remaining Axis forces in North Africa
by the British Eighth Army in the south and the Allied troops in the
north consisting of the British First Army, the American II Corps,
the French XIX Corps, and Allied air forces. Attack by Axis forces
at points of their own selection repeatedly interfered with Allied
preparations. In February the enemy broke through Faïd Pass and in a
series of attacks advanced beyond Kasserine almost to the Algerian
border. These attacks were stopped on 21–22 February when the enemy
started his withdrawal, destroying bridges and mining the passes behind
him.
But the Allied forces were closing in. After attacking and turning the
Mareth position, the British Eighth Army defeated the enemy there and
pursued him along the coast as far as Enfidaville, less than fifty
miles from Tunis. Accelerated Allied air and naval attacks choked
off the enemy’s supply and weakened his resistance. At the same time
the American II Corps was shifted northwest to a new sector on the
left of the British First Army. Then after severe infantry fighting
the American II Corps made an armored thrust to Mateur, and after a
pause it pushed tank forces east to the sea, separating Bizerte from
Tunis. Farther south the British First Army drove directly toward
Tunis. On 7 May both Bizerte and Tunis were occupied and by 13 May
Axis capitulation was complete. The Allies had achieved their initial
objective of opening the Mediterranean route to the Middle East and
seizing bases in North Africa. At the same time they had inflicted a
major defeat on the Axis Powers.
Allied strength in French North Africa had been brought to a total of
about a million men. Much of this strength was not intended for the
Tunisia Campaign but for later operations against Sicily and southern
Italy. Elaborate training establishments were developed by the American
Fifth and Seventh Armies and vast supply depots established with a view
to future operations from the African base.
Persian Gulf Command
In June 1942 an American theater of operations called U. S. Army
Forces in the Middle East was established with headquarters at Cairo.
Under this command were merged various groups and military missions
that had been active in this area since the spring of 1941. American
responsibilities for moving supplies to the Soviet Union led ultimately
to a separation of the Persian Gulf activities of USAFIME and their
establishment under an organization that was known from December 1943
to October 1945 as the Persian Gulf Command, with headquarters at
Tehran, Iran.
From 1941 to 1945 the main business of the U. S. Army in the Middle
East was to facilitate the supply of lend-lease goods to British
and Soviet forces. This task involved the construction of docks,
warehouses, shops, and highways as well as the operation of ports, a
railroad, and a motor transport service in Iran. At the same time the
Army constructed numerous airfields and bases, stretching across Egypt,
the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, Eritrea, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Syria,
Iraq, and Iran.
[Illustration: EGYPT
THE PYRAMIDS NEAR CAIRO, EGYPT. For more than six months before
the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had recognized the
military importance of the Middle East. Lend-lease equipment was
poured into Egypt to aid the British in the western desert. The
type of transport plane shown above performed constant service
in the Middle East area. It was known familiarly as “the work
horse of the war.” (C-47 transport, Dakota.)]
[Illustration: EGYPT
BRITISH SOLDIERS receiving instructions on an American-made
engine at the U. S. Ordnance Repair Depot at Heliopolis near
Cairo.]
[Illustration: EGYPT
TANKS AT THE HELIOPOLIS U. S. ORDNANCE REPAIR DEPOT. On Black
Saturday, 13 June 1942, in a battle near Tobruk in Libya,
British armor suffered severe tank losses inflicted by German
88-mm. antitank guns. This defeat caused a withdrawal to the El
Alamein Line in Egypt. (General Grant M3.)]
[Illustration: EGYPT
ITALIAN ANTIAIRCRAFT GUN captured by the British in the western
desert of Egypt. Before the United States entered the war,
American technicians worked closely with the British in the
Middle East to obtain information on German and Italian weapons,
equipment, and methods of warfare. (Italian Ansaldo antiaircraft
gun, 75-mm.)]
[Illustration: EGYPT
INOCULATING EGYPTIAN WORKER WITH TYPHUS VACCINE. In June of 1942
a separate command was formed in Cairo, called the U. S. Army
Forces in the Middle East (USAFIME). Natives working with U. S.
personnel were usually under Army medical supervision. Those
handling food were subject to physical inspection and received
medical treatment and whatever immunization inoculations were
indicated for the locality. The use of preventive medicine
stopped the outbreak of epidemics.]
[Illustration: EGYPT
B-25’S OVER THE WESTERN DESERT IN EGYPT. The U. S. Air Forces
was active in the Middle East several months before the Allied
landings in North Africa. The first mission of these bombers was
against the enemy-occupied port of Matruh on the coast of Egypt
in July 1942. (Medium bombers, North American B-25 Mitchell.)]
[Illustration: EGYPT
SELF-PROPELLED HOWITZER nicknamed the Priest. The crisis which
developed when the British were forced to retreat to the El
Alamein Line threatened the Suez Canal as well as the Allied air
routes to Russia and India. Reinforcements and equipment were
rushed to Egypt from the United Kingdom and the United States.
The United States sent about 90 of the guns shown above, more
than 300 General Sherman M4’s, and a large number of trucks. By
October 1942, the situation had improved. The British Eighth
Army attacked at El Alamein and drove the enemy out of Egypt,
through Libya, and into Tunisia. (105-mm. howitzer, M7 howitzer
motor carriage.)]
[Illustration: ROMANIA
LIBERATORS BOMBING PLOESTI OIL FIELD installations in Romania.
The first U. S. air mission flown against any strategic target
in Europe was on the Ploesti oil fields, a twelve-bomber raid
by B-24’s from Egypt on 12 June 1942. The next raid on this
target, 1 August 1943, was a low-level attack by 177 Liberators
from Bengasi in Libya with the loss of 54 bombers. Refinery
production was interrupted by these raids from Africa, but was
not stopped until the spring of 1944 when continuous large-scale
attacks were carried out from bases in Italy. (Heavy bomber
Consolidated B-24 Liberator.)]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
CONVOY BOUND FOR NORTH AFRICA. Troops in the first landings
approached their destinations in several large convoys, escorted
by aircraft carriers and other warships. The convoy to Morocco
originated in several ports of the United States on 23 October
1942, and when near the African coast separated into three major
parts. The convoy steaming to the vicinity of Oran and Algiers
left the United Kingdom on 26 October. Before passing through
the Straits of Gibraltar it separated into two parts. Inside the
Mediterranean the two sections overtook slower cargo convoys and
continued on a course toward Malta until sundown of 7 November.
That night each section wheeled southward and separated further
to reach several landing points near Oran and Algiers. Other
convoys had already left both the United States and the United
Kingdom before the attacks began.]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
NAVY FIGHTER AIRCRAFT on flight deck of a carrier approaching
the coast of North Africa. In the background is a destroyer
escort. Two to four destroyers operated with each carrier,
providing antisubmarine protection, picking up personnel from
wrecked aircraft, and augmenting the antiaircraft screen around
their charge. (Grumman F4F Wildcat, single seater, carrier
fighters.)]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
OIL TANKER refueling aircraft carrier en route to North Africa.]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
GUNNERY PRACTICE ABOARD A TRANSPORT. Submarines were a danger
and gun crews were constantly on the alert. (Left, U. S. Navy
3-inch gun; right .50-caliber water-cooled Browning machine
gun.)]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
TROOPS ON TRANSPORT HEADED FOR FRENCH MOROCCO. Note rubber life
belts on most of the men. These could be inflated instantly by
means of gas cartridges in belts. In practice it was found that
a fully inflated belt was not capable of supporting a soldier
loaded down with his equipment. Men who found themselves in the
water could not readily get rid of their packs and ammunition
belts and several drownings occurred during the landings.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
CASABLANCA, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE on the Atlantic coast of Morocco.
The landings were made at Fedala, farther north, in order to
attack Casablanca overland partly because of its very strong
defenses and partly because of the necessity of capturing the
port in usable condition. Casablanca was a naval base. The U.
S. Navy had the mission of preventing French warships from
interfering with the landings. American ships came under the
fire of large coastal guns on El Hank Point (in the foreground,
top picture) and engaged in running battles off Casablanca.
Moored in the harbor was the battleship Jean Bart which also
fired heavy shells to drive the American ships from their
protective stations. After three days, when Casablanca was about
to be attacked by ground, air, and sea bombardment and occupied
by tanks and infantry, the city surrendered. The harbor was put
to almost immediate use.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
PORT-LYAUTEY AIRPORT on the Oued Sebou north of Casablanca. The
Kasba, an old walled fort, is on high ground between the lagoon
at upper left and the mouth of the river. Early on 8 November
1942, one landing was made on the north and two south of the
river mouth. Those between the lagoon and the river were opposed
by coastal defense guns and artillery from the Kasba. Hostile
aircraft strafed all beaches and fighting lasted more than two
days. Early on the 10th a naval party cut the cable across the
river mouth and a U. S. destroyer steamed up the river under
fire from the Kasba. Raiders and infantry occupied the airport
at 0800 and Army fighter planes from a carrier landed by noon
shortly after the Kasba surrendered.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
TWO OF THE ATLANTIC PORTS SELECTED FOR INVASION. The main
landings on the Atlantic coast took place in the vicinity of
Fedala (top). In the early afternoon on the day of invasion,
Fedala surrendered and the port was put to immediate use.
Two destroyer-transports entered the port of Safi (bottom),
130 miles south of Casablanca, at 0435 on 8 November. Their
troops secured the harbor and key points inland while the first
landings at the beaches were in progress. Shore batteries firing
on the destroyers were silenced within a few minutes. By late
afternoon the opposition in and around Safi came to an end.
The reason for invading Safi was to obtain port facilities for
unloading medium tanks.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
CURTISS SEAGULL SCOUT PLANE returning from observing and
directing naval gunfire on Casablanca. Soon after the action
started the radar on the large naval units was put out of
commission by the concussion of the high-caliber guns. Spotting
planes took over the task of directing fire and did an excellent
job in spite of the difficulties caused by smoke over the
port area. Battleships and cruisers had their own observation
planes, launched by catapults and picked up by cranes. These
planes assisted the infantry during the heavy fighting around
Port-Lyautey by dropping antisubmarine depth charges on tanks
and columns of vehicles. (Scout Observation-Curtiss SOC.)]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
NAVY DIVE BOMBER ON DECK OF A CARRIER. In the distance are two
Army cubs, artillery observation planes. Three of these were
brought across on a carrier for Army use and launched from the
carrier to land on the race track at Fedala. Army-Navy teamwork
was excellent during the invasion. Navy planes, on Army request,
broke up enemy formations, bombed and strafed road blocks and
strong points, often within an hour after the call had gone out
from the forces ashore. Also on Army call, naval guns shelled
points along the coast and some distance inland. (Grumman F4F
Wildcat.)]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
THE JEAN BART, THE LATEST BATTLESHIP OF THE FRENCH NAVY.
Although it was not finished at the time of the invasion and
only one turret of four 15-inch guns had been installed, it
opened fire on U. S. naval units at 0703 on D Day. The fire
was returned and her battery was silenced within 15 minutes;
five hits were made with 16-inch guns and the turret mechanism
of the Jean Bart was jammed. Her guns were again operative at
the end of D Day but did not fire until the 10th after which
a 10-plane formation of dive bombers scored three hits, with
1,000-pounders. Her guns were still able to fire. Plans to bomb
and shell the ship on the 11th were abandoned because of the
armistice.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
AERIAL VIEW OF INFANTRY LANDING FROM ASSAULT BOATS north of
Casablanca. Note heavy surf. Many of the landing craft were
damaged on the beaches for lack of facilities to remove craft
from the surf line and to repair or salvage them when stranded.
At Fedala, for instance, more than half of the boats were
unusable after the first landings. This slowed the follow-up
unloading and was a contributory cause of the torpedoing of the
transports waiting offshore to be discharged.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
INFANTRY LANDING ON THE BEACH NEAR FEDALA. The landing itself
was unopposed, but fighting developed just off the beach. (Left,
landing craft, vehicle, LCV.)]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
DIRECTING LANDING-CRAFT TRAFFIC OFF FEDALA by means of semaphore
flags. The port was captured and put into operation on D Day,
but because of its limited capacity, freighters had to stand
offshore awaiting their turns to discharge cargo. In the
meantime unloading of ships went on with remaining assault
craft. On the evening of 11 November a transport was torpedoed
and sunk by submarine; a destroyer and tanker were damaged. The
next day three additional transports were torpedoed and sunk.
(Landing craft in picture: top center, LCV; middle left, landing
craft, mechanized, LCM(3); middle right and bottom, landing
craft, personnel (Ramp), LCP(R).)]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
UNLOADING EQUIPMENT IN FEDALA HARBOR. Waterproofed jeep coming
off LCV. Note LCM in upper left. (Craft, upper left: LCM (3);
upper right: LCV.)]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
LIGHT TANK IN CASABLANCA shortly after the surrender on 11
November. Only light tanks were brought ashore in assault craft;
the medium tanks were unloaded in the port of Safi until D plus
2 and headed north toward Casablanca.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
RADAR SETS NEAR CASABLANCA. This type of set was part of the
equipment of the invading forces. By the end of December 1942,
fifteen of these units were in operation as part of the air
warning system of Casablanca. The searchlight automatically
followed planes tracked by the radar. The city was almost at the
maximum range of enemy bombers and was the target for few raids.
(Radar set SCR 268.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: GIBRALTAR
WARSHIP PASSING THE ROCK OF GIBRALTAR. This fortress was
temporarily the Allied command post for TORCH. It was
the only area on the European mainland under Allied control.
Land-based aircraft did not take part in the beach assault
phase, but aircraft were staged at the Gibraltar airport for
take-off for Africa as soon as airfields there were captured. A
U. S. fighter group equipped with British Spitfires landed near
Oran about noon on D Day and aided in the fighting there; other
planes flew to Algiers.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
THE BEACH OF LES ANDALOUSES, west of Oran (top). The landings
here were unopposed. Eastern part of Oran harbor (bottom). Early
on 8 November two British ships (ex-U. S. Coast Guard cutters),
carrying about 400 U. S. soldiers, entered the port between the
moles shown in the distance. The ships came under point-blank
fire from French naval vessels in the harbor and from shore
batteries. They returned the fire but were sunk with great loss
of life. When resistance in Oran ceased at noon on 10 November
the port was cluttered with ships either sunk by British naval
gunfire or sabotaged. Port installations had received only minor
damage and were quickly put to use.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
SUPPLIES ON THE BEACH OF LES ANDALOUSES ON D DAY. Most of the
Allied supply problems, both on the Atlantic side and in the
Mediterranean, were caused by destruction of landing craft.
About 95 percent were used during initial landings leaving
few reserves for the build-up. The large seaworthy LST’s
(landing ship, tank), which were to play a decisive role in all
subsequent landings, were introduced by the British in the Oran
area to carry light American tanks for beach landings.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
UNLOADING SUPPLIES and laying prefabricated track on the beach
in the Golfe d’Arzeu east of Oran (top). Guarding French
and French colonial prisoners captured in the same vicinity
(bottom). The plan for the capture of Oran and near-by airfields
consisted of the frontal attack on the port itself and landings
on both sides of the city at Mersatbou Zedjar and Les Andalouses
west of Oran, and in the Golfe d’Arzeu east of Oran. Of the
beach landings, those at Arzeu were much the largest and
were made with little resistance. By afternoon of D Day all
opposition in the neighborhood had ceased. (Top picture: 3 LCM
(3)’s on beach; at center, offshore, is an LCM (1).)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
CAPTURED TRAIN AT SAINT-LEU ON THE GOLFE D’ARZEU. The railroad
from Casablanca to Tunis figured prominently in the planning of
the African invasion. If the forces on the Mediterranean coast
were to be cut off by sea, supplies could be carried by railroad
from Casablanca. During the fighting in Tunisia and the build-up
in Africa for the invasion of Europe, this railroad played an
important part. After its capture it was repaired and improved.
Locomotives and rolling stock were obtained from the United
States to speed delivery of supplies.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
TROOPS LOADING INTO ASSAULT CRAFT from transport prior to
landing near Algiers. With minor exceptions, the landing craft
were manned by Royal Navy personnel. Landings took place on
beaches on both sides of the city as well as in the port itself.
Although beach landings were not heavily opposed, one of the
two British destroyer-transports making a frontal attack on the
port had three boilers damaged by fire from shore but discharged
her load of U. S. troops on a dock at 0520, D Day. Some troops
were surrounded and taken to a French military prison, others
regained the ship before she was eventually driven off. The
hostilities here ceased the same day and the soldiers were set
free by the French. (On davits, center of photograph: LCP(R).)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
ALGIERS, THE MOST IMPORTANT OBJECT of the North African
invasion. The ultimate goals for the operation were Bizerte and
Tunis, but because of the land-based enemy aircraft in Sardinia,
Sicily, and southern Italy, it was decided to land no troops
farther east than Algiers until airports had been captured.
British-American elements at Algiers re-embarked for a movement
eastward to Bougie where they landed on 11 November. Bône was
captured the following day by British paratroopers dropped from
C-47’s and by seaborn forces from Bougie. From there the advance
toward Tunis started. Allied columns reached Djedeida, twelve
miles from Tunis, on 29 November 1942, but rapid enemy build-up
forced the Allies to abandon it on 13 December.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
ANTIAIRCRAFT DEFENSE OVER ALGIERS AT NIGHT. The city suffered
practically no damage during the invasion. On the first evening
of its surrender it was bombed by enemy planes. This attack was
followed by many others, mostly aimed at the concentration of
shipping in the harbor. Damage was surprisingly small. Algiers
became Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ).]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
FRENCH PRISONERS OF WAR CAPTURED DURING THE INVASION. The
prisoners were released shortly after the end of hostilities,
11 November, and from then on fought on the side of the Allies.
On 15 November orders were issued for the movement of French
troops, then at Algiers and Constantine, to protect the southern
flank of the American and British units advancing into Tunisia
along the northern coast. The French were reinforced by U.
S. troops, including tank destroyer units, and one of their
assigned missions was the protection of advanced airfields in
the Tébessa-Gafsa area.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
AVIATION ENGINEERS AT YOUKS-LES-BAINS lining up for mess. This
Algerian airfield near Tébessa and the Tunisian border was
occupied by U. S. paratroopers on 15 November 1942. It became
operational for P-38 fighter planes (Lockheed Lightnings)
shortly afterward. During the first few weeks there were no
provisions for landing after dark and on 21 November six P-38’s
crashed while trying to land in the evening. It was not an
improved field and there was no effective air-raid system. The
first warning of enemy aircraft was frequently the strafing
or bombing itself. When the rains started, operations were
drastically reduced by mud.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
U. S. TANKERS HEATING THEIR C RATIONS, Spam and beans, over an
improvised stove at Souk el Arba, Tunisia. The Souk el Arba
area was taken by British paratroopers on 16 November. When
the attempt to advance to Tunis was officially abandoned on 24
December, both sides started a race to build up strength for
the battle to come. The U. S. troops were at first committed
piecemeal in different sectors of the line as they arrived from
Algeria. Much of the Allied armor was obsolete and none of it
was on a par with the best German equipment. (General Grant tank
M3.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN TIGER TANK. This heavy tank was encountered early in the
campaign. The German High Command was particularly concerned
with the performance of the Tiger in the defense of Tunis. Its
high-velocity 88-mm. gun, equipped with a muzzle-brake, could
knock out Allied tanks before the latter could get within
effective range; and within range, Allied tank guns could not
penetrate its frontal armor. The Tiger sacrificed mobility for
armor and fire power. To avoid weak bridges, it was equipped
with telescopic air intake, exhaust extensions, and over-all
sealing that enabled it to cross rivers fifteen feet deep,
completely submerged on the bottom. The gun has a traverse of
360 degrees. Top picture is rear view of tank; bottom is front
view. (Tiger, Pz., Kpfw., gun 8.8-cm., Kw. K. 36.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN STUKA DIVE BOMBERS. These aircraft co-operated closely
with ground forces, bombing and strafing ahead of their own
advancing columns in addition to roaming behind the lines
disrupting traffic and creating confusion. The bombers could
operate successfully only where they had air superiority. In the
later stages of the Tunisia Campaign, as the Allies gained air
superiority, their effectiveness dwindled. The Germans turned a
number of these planes over to the Italians. Note Italian and
British markings in lower photograph. This Stuka was captured by
the British. (Dive bomber, German Stuka JU-87.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN FIGHTER PLANES. The primary mission of these planes was
to intercept and destroy bombers but they were also used for
strafing and fighter-bombing. The enemy used these types until
the end of the war. (Top, German Focke-Wulf 190; bottom, German
Messerschmitt 109.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
CAMOUFLAGING MEDIUM BOMBER at Youks-les-Bains airfield.
Camouflaging for hiding purposes in olive groves or on rough
terrain was relatively successful; however, camouflaging an
aircraft on a flat, featureless landing field for hiding
purposes was not practical. Camouflaging was often practiced
to the extent of deceiving the enemy about the type or
serviceability of planes. Note that the bomber above is minus
both of its engines. (Martin B-26 Marauder.)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
REMOVING FILM FROM FIGHTER PLANE after a reconnaissance flight.
This long-range plane was adapted for photographic work by
removing the armament and installing camera equipment instead.
(P-38.)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
LIGHT BOMBER, DOUGLAS A-20. This was a fast, versatile, and
heavily armed plane used for both bombing and strafing in
Tunisia, The American version was usually called the Havoc and
the British version, the Boston.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
HEAVY BOMBER, FLYING FORTRESS. This and the B-24 were the two
heavy U. S. four-engined bombers used in the Mediterranean area.
(Boeing B-17.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
FAÏD PASS. This opening in the eastern mountain chain was
taken from a weak French garrison and held against U. S. and
French counterattacks, 30 January-2 February 1943. Just before
daylight, 14 February, very strong German forces came through
Faïd Pass and others came from south of the pass to drive
the Americans from positions to the west. The enemy cut off
and isolated three groups, on Djebel Ksaira and Garet Hadid
southwest of the pass, and Djebel Lessouda northwest of it. On
15 February, an American armored counterattack to relieve the
troops was made in strength far inferior to that required. Most
of the troops were captured trying to escape. On 17 February,
the American base at Sbeitla and the airfields at Thelepte were
evacuated, as all troops were pulled back into the western
mountain chain. The enemy then decided to continue his attack
toward the northwest.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
THE GENERAL GRANT TANK. These medium tanks were of the riveted
hull type, later models having cast or welded armor, and were
equipped with either a short-barreled (top) or long-barreled
(bottom) 75-mm. gun. Principal armament was the 75-mm. cannon,
in a right-hand sponson, capable of being swung in an arc
of about 30 degrees. The entire tank would often have to be
turned to bring the gun to bear. In a hull-down position only
the secondary gun, the 37-mm. cannon in the turret, could be
fired. The silhouette of the M3 was much higher than that of
corresponding German tanks.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
CAPTURED GERMAN ARMOR. The Mark IV medium tank (top) was
equipped with a 75-mm. cannon of higher velocity and range
than any of the Allied tank guns then in use. It was generally
superior to Allied tanks and was probably the best tank the
enemy had until the Panther made its appearance in Italy, 1944.
The Mark IV was used until the end of the war. The eight-wheeled
armored car with a 75-mm. howitzer (bottom) was equipped with
quite thin armor which was so well angled that machine gun
bullets and small fragments were not effective against it. It
could be steered from both ends and had a speed of slightly more
than thirty miles an hour. (German medium tank Mark IV (Pz.
Kpfw. IV); German armored vehicle, 7.5-cm. howitzer.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
KASSERINE PASS AREA. The enemy broke out of the pass on 20
February 1943. On the 21st he headed toward Tébessa and Thala.
The attack on Tébessa was halted; the main attack toward Thala
made some progress. A British armored force, with heavy losses
in tanks and men, delayed the enemy until U. S. artillery
got into position. On the 22d the enemy pounded the defenses
of Tébessa and Thala unsuccessfully. Allied planes attacked
the enemy near Thala, and in the evening the Germans started
to withdraw. The Kasserine push was the high point of enemy
fortunes in Tunisia.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
LOADING A TOWED HOWITZER. This gun was designed to give close
support to the infantry. The picture was made during the
February fight in Kasserine Pass (105-mm. howitzer M2.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GENERAL SHERMAN TANK TOWING DISABLED HALF-TRACK at Sidi bou
Zid (top). This tank gradually replaced the M3 (General Grant)
in Tunisia. Its principal weapon was the 75-mm. cannon. Its
turret could traverse an arc of 360 degrees in contrast to the
sponson-mounted gun on the General Grant with a traverse of
about 30 degrees. Reconnaissance party at Kasserine Pass on the
Kasserine-Thala road (bottom). The enemy came up this road on
his attack through the pass and stopped just before reaching
Thala after indications of increasing Allied strength. (Medium
tank M4.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN ARMOR. The Mark III medium tank (top), the standard
German tank in Tunisia, had a high-velocity 50-mm. cannon which
could penetrate the frontal armor of U. S. light tanks at a
thousand yards and the frontal and side armor of the General
Grant at five hundred and one thousand yards respectively. The
75-mm. antitank and assault gun (bottom), mounted on the same
chassis as the Mark III tank, was encountered early in the
Tunisian campaign. Its high-velocity gun was more than a match
for any of the Allied tanks. Its low silhouette, characteristic
of most German armor, made it difficult to detect and hard to
hit. The prototypes of both these vehicles existed in Germany in
1936 and were used until the end of the war.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
ITALIAN MEDIUM TANKS LEFT BEHIND AT KASSERINE PASS. This model
was the backbone of the Italian armor in Tunisia. By Allied
standards it was inferior in practically every respect, but it
was the best the Italians had. (Italian medium tank M13/40 with
47-mm. cannon.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
U. S. LIGHT TANK, captured by the Germans. The main weapon of
this tank was the 37-mm. gun. Its armor was light and riveted
together as was the armor on the first models of the medium
tanks. A glancing shell could rip off the outside heads of the
rivets and send the rivets ricocheting through the interior of
the tank with the velocity of bullets. Note German markings on
this vehicle. (U. S. light tank M3.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
U. S. TANK DESTROYERS. The combination truck and 37-mm. antitank
gun (top) could not stand up against any type of armor the enemy
had. The tank destroyer (bottom) was introduced in Tunisia
after the Kasserine fight. The chassis was that of the General
Sherman tank, the gun having a higher velocity than that of
comparable Allied tank guns. The first time it saw action was in
the vicinity of Maknassy during the middle of March 1943. The
village of Maknassy was occupied by U. S. forces on 22 March
1943.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
U. S. HALF-TRACK USED AS A MOBILE ANTIAIRCRAFT UNIT (top). AA
units like this cut down the effectiveness of the Stuka dive
bombers. Half-tracks proved practical for many purposes not
originally intended. First designed as a cavalry scout car, it
became, with modifications, a gun carriage mounting anything
from a 37-mm. cannon to a 105-mm. howitzer, a personnel carrier,
an ambulance, or just a truck. The standard half-track had armor
protecting the crew. Long Tom or 155-mm. rifle towed by standard
caterpillar (bottom). This was the heaviest piece of Allied
artillery used during the Tunisia Campaign. (Top: multiple-gun
motor carriage with 37-mm. cannon and .50-caliber water-cooled
Browning machine gun.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
U. S. ARMOR NEAR EL GUETTAR IN CENTRAL TUNISIA. In foreground is
a radio-equipped half-track personnel carrier, in background a
75-mm. gun motor carriage M3. The latter, lightly armored, was
an antitank vehicle with great mobility. The enemy developed
a healthy respect for the hit-and-run tactics of U. S. forces
using this weapon. The vehicle would wait until enemy armor came
within range, get off as many shells as possible, and withdraw.
U. S. forces pushed eastward from the Gafsa area to draw enemy
units from the Mareth Line then under attack by the British. On
23 March 1943 severe fighting broke out southeast of El Guettar
and a German armored division was repulsed by U. S. forces with
heavy tank losses to the enemy.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
LOADING A HOWITZER. This was the 1918 Schneider model equipped
with highspeed carriage. The action shown above took place
during the enemy counterattack starting on 23 March 1943 east of
El Guettar. Although the enemy attack was stopped, U. S. advance
toward the coast halted for several days. During this action
Allied fighters and light bombers accounted for much damage done
to enemy armor and other vehicles along the Gafsa-Gabès road
east of El Guettar. (155-mm. howitzer.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
INFANTRY NEAR EL GUETTAR. After the enemy attack in this area on
23 March, the front became almost stabilized until the British
Eighth Army broke through Oued el Akarit defenses along the
coast north of Gabès on the night of 6–7 April. The junction
between the forces fighting in Tunisia and the British Eighth
Army from the Middle East took place on the Gafsa-Gabès road on
7 April when a U. S. armored reconnaissance unit made contact
with elements of the British army. The British Eighth Army had
started its drive westward from El Alamein in Egypt on the
night of 23–24 October 1942 and when the junction was made had
traveled about 1,500 miles.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
THE FAMOUS GERMAN EIGHTY-EIGHT. The original weapon, an Austrian
88-mm. cannon, was used in World War I. Restrictions imposed
by the Allies after that war limited German experimentation on
conventional offensive artillery but not on defensive artillery
such as antiaircraft types (in photograph). With different
sets of aiming fire instruments this antiaircraft gun could be
used as an antitank gun or a conventional piece of artillery.
It was tested as an antiaircraft gun under battle conditions
during the Spanish Civil War in 1936. Encountered throughout the
war in increasing numbers, it was probably the most effective
all-around piece of artillery the Germans had. (Left: 8.8-cm.
Flak 36; right: 8.8-cm. Flak 18.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN ANTITANK GUNS. These guns, effective against Allied
armor, fired armor-piercing shells loaded with high-explosive
fillers designed to burst inside the armor and to set the
tank on fire. Antitank gun (top) could penetrate the armor of
any Allied tank, front, side, or rear. Both U. S. and British
armor-piercing shells were solid and did not fire the tanks;
thus the Germans were able to salvage damaged armored equipment
to a greater extent than were the Allies. It was not until well
into the Italian campaign that armor-piercing shells equipped
with fuzes and high-explosive fillers became available to Allied
forces. (Top: German antitank gun, 7.5-cm. Pak. 40; bottom:
German antitank gun, 5-cm. Pak. 38.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN SIX-BARRELED ROCKET LAUNCHER. This weapon fired
high-explosive, incendiary or smoke rockets and was light enough
to be moved with ease. The screaming sound of the rockets had
an adverse psychological effect on troops at the receiving end
and the rockets were nicknamed “screaming meemies.” Artillery
sound-ranging equipment could not locate the rocket launchers
because firing did not cause a report. The enemy used this type
of weapon until the end of the war. (15-cm. Nebelwerfer, 41.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
SHERMAN TANK WITH “SCORPION” ATTACHMENT, detonating mines during
a test. The Scorpion was a revolving drum with chains attached
(insert); when in motion it acted as a flail and could clear
a path through a mine field for infantry and other tanks to
follow. It was developed by the British and used extensively by
them in desert warfare.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
THE S-MINE. This German antipersonnel mine was used profusely
and very effectively in Tunisia. It was nicknamed the Bouncing
Betty because when stepped on it would bounce a few feet in the
air before a secondary fuze set off the main explosive charge
scattering some three hundred steel balls in all directions.
The suspected presence of these mines naturally retarded troop
movements during an advance. When retreating, the enemy would
frequently use this mine to booby-trap buildings, dugouts or
equipment left behind.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
DJEBEL TAHENT IN NORTHERN TUNISIA, known as Hill 609. The
British Eighth Army advancing northward along the coast replaced
the U. S. II Corps in the Gafsa-Gabès area in April 1943.
The corps then moved northward about 150 miles and went into
position from Béja to Cap Serrat. French forces along this
coast came under U. S. II Corps, which advanced in two groups,
a northern wing astride the Sedjenane road and a southern wing
along the Béja road, both converging on Mateur. The hill shown
above was a natural fortress blocking the approach to the plains
of Mateur. On 28 April 1943 artillery pounded enemy positions
and on the next day the infantry attack started. After a
three-day infantry fight, supported by tanks, the hill fell on 1
May.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
JEFNA AREA, LOOKING EAST TO THE PLAINS OF MATEUR. The Jefna
position, on the Sedjenane-Mateur road, was one of the strongest
German defenses in northern Tunisia and included two heavily
fortified hills commanding the road to Mateur: Djebel Azag
(Green Hill) on the north and Djebel el Ajred (Bald Hill) on the
south. On 13 April 1943, U. S. forces relieved the British and
took positions on both sides of the road and the mountains along
the valley. The fight for the two hills lasted until 3 May when
the Jefna positions were outflanked by U. S. and French forces
advancing toward Bizerte and the Mateur plain north of Jefna.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
INFANTRY AND ARMOR ADVANCING ON MATEUR. After the fall of Hill
609 the enemy pulled back leaving the road to Mateur open. This
small village in the middle of a plain was the center of enemy
road communications in the U. S. zone of attack. Its occupation
on 3 May opened the way for the advance on Bizerte, the main
objective of the U. S.-French drive. (Bottom: General Sherman
M4A1.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN SIEBEL FERRIES. These diesel-powered, ponton-raft ferries
were used to transport supplies from Italy and Sicily. They
usually traveled in convoys and were often heavily armed with
88-mm. antiaircraft guns when moving toward Tunisia as well as
with the lighter protection which they retained for the return
trip. Of shallow draft, they could unload directly onto the
beach, a factor which became especially important after the
Allies had gained control of the air and subjected the Tunisian
ports to severe bombing.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
GERMAN TRANSPORT PLANES, JU-52, under fire from Allied aircraft.
Toward the end of the Tunisia Campaign, the Germans received
reinforcements by air from southern Italy and Sicily, using
several hundred transports in daylight flights. The Allies
gradually built up a force of planes within striking distance of
the Sicilian straits and on 5 April the planned attack on the
aerial ferry service started. By the 22d the enemy had lost so
many planes that daylight operations were discontinued; however,
some key personnel and a limited amount of emergency supplies
were flown in by night. (Upper left: medium bomber B-25.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
LA GOULETTE WITH TUNIS IN DISTANCE. These two cities fell to the
British on 7 May. The port of Tunis had been heavily damaged
by Allied bombers, but damage in the city itself was small.
La Goulette, at the entrance to the channel leading to Tunis,
housed oil storage and general ship repair facilities which were
put to immediate use by the Allies.]
[Illustration: FRENCH MOROCCO
TRANSPORT TAKING OFF from a field in French Morocco for the
Middle East. After the conquest of most of North Africa a string
of airports became available. While the fighting in Tunisia
was still going on, regular flights between the west coast of
Africa, the Middle East, and India were being established.
(Douglas C-54.)]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
BIZERTE, THE MAIN OBJECTIVE of the French and U. S. forces of II
Corps, fell on 7 May. Bizerte’s harbor and the important naval
repair facilities at near-by Ferryville were to play important
parts in future operations in the Mediterranean. The enemy had
blocked the channel to the inner harbor by sinking ships at
the entrance and had destroyed most of the port facilities not
already wrecked by Allied bombings. The port, however, became
operational a few days after capture; ships and supplies were
assembled here for the invasion of Sicily. Insert shows some of
the ships a few days before that invasion.]
[Illustration: TUNISIA
ENEMY PRISONERS NEAR MATEUR. Allied troops took 252,415
prisoners, together with large quantities of equipment and
supplies, when the enemy surrendered in Tunisia on 13 May 1943.
Because of Allied air and naval superiority the enemy was unable
to evacuate his troops. Of those captured, the Germans were
among the finest and best trained troops the enemy had and he
could ill afford to lose them.]
[Illustration: EN ROUTE TO NORTH AFRICA
TROOP QUARTERS IN THE HOLD OF A TRANSPORT. After the fall of
French Morocco and Algeria and while the fighting in Tunisia
continued, men and supplies poured into the Mediterranean for
use in Tunisia and in the assaults on Sicily and Italy. Bunks
were placed in tiers everywhere possible in the transports. The
convoy traveled blacked out, with port holes closed. Because
of the overcrowded conditions, seasickness was practically
universal during the first few days out of port. The men spent
as much time as possible on deck.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
ARMY POST OFFICE AT ORAN. Mail from home was probably the most
important of all morale factors and usually had first priority
in spite of the fact that it occupied valuable shipping space
needed for materials of war. Cargo space was saved with the
V-Mail system by which letters were written on a special form,
photographed on 16-mm. film at certain centers in the country
of origin, then printed overseas. To encourage its use, V-Mail
was sent by the fastest means available. Letters from men in the
services, other than those by regular air mail, were sent free
of charge.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
INFANTRY MEN IN TRAINING NEAR ORAN. Training centers for all
arms were opened in French Morocco and Algeria soon after the
end of hostilities there in November 1942.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
PARACHUTE TROOPS CHECKING EQUIPMENT before boarding planes for
practice jump. These troops were essentially infantrymen and
were armed with infantry weapons. Their boots, higher than the
infantry shoes, were constructed to give ankles a maximum amount
of protection when landing.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
PARATROOPERS DURING TRAINING JUMP. Light artillery, food, and
light vehicles were dropped separately with different colored
parachutes, or came in by glider.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
DOUGLAS C-47 TRANSPORT TOWING GLIDER. The gliders carried
both men and equipment and could be landed in almost any flat
pasture. The C-47 aircraft--the work horse of the war--was
similar to the commercial DC-3, a standard type passenger
carrier in the United States for some years prior to the
war. The C-47, unarmed, was used during the war for carrying
personnel and cargo of all sorts, towing gliders, dropping
parachute troops, and parachuting supplies to isolated units and
equipment to partisans behind enemy lines. The British called it
the Dakota.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
AIRBORNE TROOPS loading a 75-mm. pack howitzer into a cargo
glider during training. Although this form of air transport was
not used during the hostilities in northwest Africa, it was
employed in subsequent operations based in North Africa.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
TESTING A WATERPROOFED SHERMAN TANK on an African beach. These
tanks were intended to go, during an assault, onto the beach
with the infantry whenever possible. The main body of tanks
would follow on LST’s as soon as the beachhead had been secured.
The follow-up tanks, landed from the ship via ponton piers
directly to shore, were not normally waterproofed. (Sherman tank
M4A1.)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
LEND-LEASE EQUIPMENT FOR THE FRENCH ARMY. Lockheed fighter plane
(top) and Sherman tank (bottom). In January 1943, it was agreed
that the United States would equip the French divisions formed
from units then in North Africa, but comparatively little modern
equipment became available for them in Tunisia until the summer
of 1943. (P-38; Sherman tank M4.)]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
FRENCH TROOPS RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS ON U. S. EQUIPMENT, in this
case on the 105-mm. high-explosive shell. During the summer of
1943 shipments of arms and equipment for the French arrived
in North African ports in increasing volume. Training was
accelerated and by the end of the year two fully equipped French
divisions were fighting side by side with the Americans and
British in Italy. As more equipment became available, additional
French divisions were sent to the front.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
QUARTERMASTER DUMP AT ORAN. Foodstuffs, stored in the open
sometimes for months, suffered very little in spite of the hot
African sun.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
FREIGHTER BURNING IN THE HARBOR OF ALGIERS. The cause of the
fire was not determined. While air raids on Algiers caused
little damage to shipping and military installations, serious
accidents and fires, some of which aroused suspicion of
sabotage, were not infrequent.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
WAACS WITH FULL FIELD EQUIPMENT arriving at a North African
port. The bill establishing the Women’s Army Auxiliary Corps
(WAAC) became effective on 14 May 1942 and on 1 July 1943 a
bill changing the status of the corps from an auxiliary serving
with the Army to a component of the Army, Women’s Army Corps
(WAC), became law. Most WAC duties in North Africa were of an
administrative nature in offices of the various headquarters.
Members of the Corps also worked in communications or other
activities that could be handled as efficiently by women as by
men.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
AIR FORCE MEN AT BREAKFAST IN THE DESERT. The mornings were
often cold even in the summer and the men wore their heavy
leather jackets.]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
REPAIRING MOTOR OF A HEAVY BOMBER, the Boeing Flying Fortress.
The sand and dust of the desert were hard on engines of all
kinds. On the nose of the plane, swastikas indicate number
of enemy aircraft shot down and bombs show number of bombing
missions flown. (B-17.)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
CREW OF A HEAVY BOMBER before taking off on a mission. During
the first few months after the landings, the Allied air forces
were handicapped in their operations from North African bases
through lack of suitable airfields. The lack of all-weather
facilities such as hard-surfaced runways, taxiways, and
hard-stands was particularly serious in the rainy winter season
of 1942–43. In the area from the Atlantic coast of Morocco
to the Tunisian border, there were only four air bases with
any kind of hard-surfaced runways: Port-Lyautey, north of
Casablanca; Tafaraoui, near Oran; Maison Blanche at Algiers; and
the Bone airfield on the coast near the Tunisian border. (B-24.)]
[Illustration: ALGERIA
DIGGING OUT A MIRED FLYING FORTRESS from the mud of a North
African bomber base.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: ITALY
BOMBING THE RAILROAD YARDS IN ROME on 19 July 1943. Note bombs
bursting in railroad area at top of picture. More than 500 heavy
and medium bombers from bases in North Africa took part in the
first bombing of Rome. The heavy bombers concentrated on the
yards in the city and suburbs while the medium bombers attacked
airfields on the outskirts. Every precaution was taken to bomb
only targets of military significance. The crews had been
especially selected and carefully briefed and trained for this
mission, with the result that few bombs fell outside the target
area.]
[Illustration: IRAN
THE PORT OF KHORRAMSHAHR, one of two Iranian ports operated by
the United States, the other being Bandar Shahpur. These ports
served for entry of lend-lease supplies en route to the USSR.
By the fall of 1942, ports, highways, and railroads in Iran
were sufficiently ready to handle increased traffic over the
route through the Persian Gulf. The U. S. Army also operated the
lighterage port of the Cheybassi in Iraq.]
[Illustration: IRAN
THE PORT OF BANDAR SHAHPUR on the Persian Gulf. The voyage from
New York around South Africa to the Persian Gulf ports averaged
70 days. When the Mediterranean route became available in 1943,
the time was shortened to 42 days. This port, built on swampy
land where the river Jarrahi empties into the gulf, has a
semitropical climate. Both here and at Khorramshahr much of the
work was done at night, and even then the temperature was around
a hundred degrees Fahrenheit from March until October. The area
is subject to torrential rains in winter. Docking space at both
ports was often insufficient to accommodate all ships waiting to
be unloaded, which necessitated the use of lighters.]
[Illustration: IRAN
TRUCK CONVOYS WITH SUPPLIES FOR RUSSIA. From the ports on the
Persian Gulf, shipments went to Kazvin and Tehran by road
and rail. From these points movements were regulated by the
Russians. During the entire period of active operations, from
August 1942 to May 1945, more than 5,000,000 long tons of
lend-lease cargo were moved through the Persian Corridor to
Russia. The greatest monthly movement of freight through the
corridor took place in July 1944, when approximately 282,000
long tons were delivered. The bulk of this total was moved by
rail, the rest by truck and air.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: IRAN
THE MAIN RAILROAD STATION AT TEHRAN (top) and freight train
loaded with tanks bound for Tehran (bottom). U. S. troops
from early 1943 operated the southern sector of the Iranian
State Railway and the two Iranian ports. They constructed
additional roads, docks, and other installations, and continued
operation of aircraft and motor vehicle assembly plants. Diesel
locomotives and rolling stock were brought in from the United
States in large numbers.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: IRAN
DELOUSING NATIVE WORKERS with DDT powder at Camp Atterbury,
Tehran. At the peak as many as 40,000 native workers were
employed by the U. S. Army, the majority as unskilled labor.
American responsibility for moving supplies to the USSR led to
the separation of the Persian Gulf activities of the U. S. Army
Forces in the Middle East and the establishment of a separate
organization called the Persian Gulf Command.]
[Illustration: IRAN
QUALEH MORGEH AIRPORT AT TEHRAN. This was jointly occupied by
U. S. and Russian air forces. Top picture shows a Douglas C-47
transport and a B-24 bomber. Bottom picture shows a detachment
of Russian soldiers marching past U. S. transport planes.]
[Illustration]
[Illustration: IRAN
RUSSIAN PILOTS arriving at Abadan Airport, Iran. This airport,
on an island in the Shatt al Arab near the head of the Persian
Gulf, was the main assembly field for U. S. planes going to the
Soviet Union through the Persian Corridor.]
SICILY, CORSICA, AND SARDINIA
[Illustration: SICILY]