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AVIATION IN
PEACE AND WAR
BY
Major-General Sir F. H. SYKES
G.B.E., K.C.B., C.M.G.
LATE CHIEF OF THE AIR STAFF
AND
CONTROLLER-GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION
LONDON
EDWARD ARNOLD & CO.
1922
[_All rights reserved_]
Transcriber's Note:
Minor typographical errors have been corrected without note, whilst
more significant amendments have been listed at the end of the text.
The oe ligature is represented by [oe].
CONTENTS
PAGE
INTRODUCTION 7
CHAPTER I. PRE-WAR 9
Early Thoughts on Flight. The Invention of the Balloon.
First Experiments in Gliders and Aeroplanes. The Wright
Brothers and their Successors in Europe. The First
Airships. The Beginnings of Aviation in England. The
Inception and Development of Aircraft as Part of the
Forces of the Crown: the Balloon Factory; the Air
Battalion; the Royal Flying Corps, the Military Wing,
the Naval Wing. Tactics and the Machine. Conclusions.
CHAPTER II. WAR 44
General Remarks on War Development. Co-operation with
the Army: Reconnaissance; Photography; Wireless;
Bombing; Contact Patrol; Fighting. Co-operation with
the Navy: Coast Defence, Patrol and Convoy Work; Fleet
Assistance, Reconnaissance, Spotting for Ships' Guns;
Bombing; Torpedo Attack. Home Defence: Night Flying
and Night Fighting. The Machine and Engine. Tactics
and the Strategic Air Offensive. Organization.
CHAPTER III. PEACE 96
The Future of Aerial Defence. Civil Aviation: as a
Factor in National Security; as an Instrument of
Imperial Progress; Financial and Economic Problems;
Weather Conditions and Night Flying; Organization; the
Machine and Engine. Air Services: British, Continental
and Imperial.
CONCLUSION 131
INTRODUCTION
Since the earliest communities of human beings first struggled for
supremacy and protection, the principles of warfare have remained
unchanged. New methods have been evolved and adopted with the progress
of science, but no discovery, save perhaps that of gunpowder, has done
so much in so short a time to revolutionize the conduct of war as
aviation, the youngest, yet destined perhaps to be the most effective
fighting-arm. Yet to-day we are only on the threshold of our knowledge,
and, striking as was the impetus given to every branch of aeronautics
during the four years of war, its future power can only dimly be seen.
We may indeed feel anxious about this great addition of aviation to the
destructive power of modern scientific warfare. Bearing its terrors in
mind, we may even impotently seek to check its advance, but the appeal
of flying is too deep, its elimination is now impossible, and granted
that war is inevitable, it must be accepted for good or ill.
Fortunately, although with the other great scientific additions,
chemical warfare and the submarine, its potentialities for destruction
are very great, yet aircraft, unlike the submarine, can be utilized not
only in the conduct of war but in the interests of peace, and it is
here that we can guide and strengthen it for good. Just as the naval
supremacy of Britain was won because commercially we were the greatest
seafaring people in the world, so will air supremacy be achieved by that
country which, making aviation a part of its everyday life, becomes an
airfaring community.
Our nation as a whole has been educated, owing to its geographical
situation and by tradition, to interest itself in the broader aspects of
marine policy and development. It requires to take the same interest in
aviation, a comparatively new subject, unhampered to a great extent by
preconceived notions and therefore offering greater scope for individual
thought.
The following sketch[1] has been written in the hope that some of those
who read it may be inspired to study aviation in one or other of its
branches, whether from the historical, technical, strategical, or
commercial point of view. Any opinions expressed are, of course, my own
and not official.
[1] First written and delivered as the Lees-Knowles Lectures at
Cambridge University in February and March, 1921.
I propose first briefly to trace the history of aviation from its
beginnings to the outbreak of war; next to describe the evolution of
aircraft and of air strategy during the war; and last to estimate the
present position and to look into the future.
CHAPTER I
PRE-WAR
EARLY THOUGHTS ON FLIGHT.
The story of the growth of aviation may be likened to that of the
discovery and opening up of a new continent. A myth arises, whence no
one can tell, of the existence of a new land across the seas. Eventually
this land is found without any realization of the importance of the
discovery. Then comes the period of colonization and increasing
knowledge. But the interior remains unexplored. So, in the case of
aviation, man was long convinced, for no scientific reason, that flight
was possible. With the first ascent by balloon came the imagined mastery
of the air; later, the invention of flight that can be controlled at
will. To-day we are still in the stage of colonization. The future
resources of the air remain hidden from our view.
The Daedalean myth and the ancient conception of the winged angelic host
show how the human mind has long been fascinated by the idea of flight,
but the first design of an apparatus to lift man into the air, a
parachute-like contrivance, was only reached at the end of the fifteenth
century in one of Leonardo da Vinci's manuscripts. About the same time
lived the first of the long line of daring practical aviators, without
whom success would never have been achieved, one John Damian, a
physician of the Court of James IV of Scotland, who "took in hand to fly
with wings, and to that effect caused make a pair of wings of feathers,
which being fastened upon him, he flew off the castle wall of Stirling,
but shortly he fell to the ground and brake his thigh-bone."
Nearly 250 years later the aeronaut had not made much progress, for we
read of the Marquis de Bacqueville in 1742 attaching to his arms and
legs planes of his own design and launching himself from his house in
the attempt to fly across the Seine, into which, regrettably, he fell.
Meanwhile the seventeenth-century philosophers had been theorizing. In
1638 John Wilkins, the founder of the Royal Society, published a book
entitled _Daedalus, or Mechanical Motions_. A few years later John
Glanville wrote in _Scepsis Scientifica_ "to them that come after us it
may be as ordinary to buy a pair of wings to fly into remotest regions,
as now a pair of boots to ride a journey," the sceptic proving a truer
prophet than the enthusiast. By 1680 Giovanni Borelli had reached the
conclusion, in his book _De Volatu_, that it was impossible that man
should ever achieve flight by his own strength. Nor was he more likely
to do so in the first aerial ship, designed in 1670 by Francesco Lana,
which was to be buoyed up in the air by being suspended from four
globes, made of thin copper sheeting, each of them about 25 feet in
diameter. From these globes the air was to be exhausted, so that each,
being lighter than the atmosphere, would support the weight of two or
three men. A hundred years elapsed before Dr. Joseph Black of the
University of Edinburgh made the first practical suggestion, that a
balloon inflated with hydrogen would rise.
THE INVENTION OF THE BALLOON.
It was in 1783 that Montgolfier conceived the idea of utilizing the
lifting power of hot air and invited the Assembly of Vivarais to watch
an exhibition of his invention, when a balloon, 10 feet in
circumference, rose to a height of 6,000 feet in under ten minutes. This
was followed by a demonstration before Louis XVI at Versailles, when a
balloon carrying a sheep, a cock, and a duck, rose 1,500 feet and
descended safely. And on November 21st of the same year Pilatre de
Rozier, accompanied by the Marquis d'Arlande, made the first human
ascent, in the "Reveillon," travelling 5 miles over Paris in twenty
minutes.
England, it is not surprising to learn, was behind with the invention,
but on November 25th, 1783, Count Francesco Zambeccari sent up from
Moorfields a small oilskin hydrogen balloon which fell at Petworth; and
in August of 1784 James Tytler ascended at Edinburgh in a fire balloon,
thus achieving the first ascent in Great Britain. In the same year
Lunardi came to London and ballooning became the rage. It was an
Englishman, Dr. Jefferies, who accompanied Blanchard in the first
cross-Channel flight on January 7th, 1785. Fashionable society soon
turned to pursuits other than watching balloon ascents, however, and
the joys of the air were confined to a few adventurous spirits, such as
Green and Holland, who first substituted coal gas for hydrogen and in
1836 made a voyage of 500 miles from Vauxhall Gardens to Weilburg in
Nassau, and James Glaisher, who in the middle of the century began to
make meteorological observations from balloons, claiming on one
occasion, in 1862, to have reached the great height of 7 miles.
FIRST EXPERIMENTS IN GLIDERS AND AEROPLANES.
The world seemed content to have achieved the balloon, but there were a
few men who realized that the air had not been conquered, and who
believed that success could only be attained by the scientific study and
practice of gliding. Prominent among these, Sir George Cayley, in 1809,
published a paper on the Navigation of the Air, and forecasted the
modern aeroplane, and the action of the air on wings. In 1848 Henson and
Stringfellow, the latter being the inventive genius, designed and
produced a small model aeroplane--the first power-driven machine which
actually flew. It is now in the Smithsonian Institute at Washington. Of
greater practical value were the gliding experiments by Otto Lilienthal,
of Berlin, and Percy Pilcher, an Englishman, at the end of the last
century. Both these men met their death in the cause of aviation.
Another step forward was made by Laurence Hargrave, an Australian, who
invented the box and soaring kite and eighteen machines which flew.
From the theoretical point of view, Professor Langley, an American,
reached in his _Experiments in Aerodynamics_ the important conclusion
that weight could best be countered by speed. From theory Langley turned
to practice and in 1896 designed a steam-driven machine which flew
three-quarters of a mile without an operator. Seven years later, at the
end of 1903, he produced a new machine fitted with a 52 horse-power
engine weighing less than 5 lb. per horse-power; but this machine was
severely damaged ten days before Wilbur Wright made his first flight in
a controlled power-driven aeroplane.
THE WRIGHT BROTHERS AND THEIR SUCCESSORS IN EUROPE.
The Wright brothers directed their whole attention to aviation in 1899.
By 1902, as the result of many experiments, they had invented a glider
with a horizontal vane in front, a vertical vane behind, and a device
for "warping" the wings. Their longest glide was 622-1/4 feet. This was
followed by the construction of a machine weighing 600 lb., including
the operator and an 8 horse-power engine, which on December 17th, 1903,
realized the dreams of centuries.
After an increasing number of experiments, a machine built in 1905 flew
24-1/4 miles at a speed of 38 miles an hour. It is interesting to recall
that the new invention was refused once by the United States and three
times by the British Government.
It was not until September 13th, 1906, that Ellehammer, a Danish
engineer, made the first free flight in Europe, his machine flying 42
metres at a height of a metre and a half. About the same time reports
of the Wrights' successes began to reach Europe and were quickly
appreciated by the French.
Space forbids that I should enter into the achievements of the early
French aviators, among whom the names of Ferber, Bleriot and Farman will
always rank high in the story of human faith, courage and determination.
It is a record of rapid advance. Farman made a circuit flight of 1
kilometre in 1908, and flew from Chalons to Rheims, a distance of 27
kilometres, in twenty minutes. Bleriot crossed the Channel in a
monoplane of his own design in forty minutes. French designers improved
the control system, and French machines became famous. The records of
the Rheims meeting of 1909 serve to illustrate the progress made during
the first phase of aviation. Latham won the altitude prize by flying to
a height of over 500 feet. Farman the prize for the flight of longest
duration by remaining more than three hours in the air, and the
passenger carrying prize by carrying two passengers round a 10-kilometre
course in 10-1/2 minutes. The Gnome rotary engine was first used with
success at this meeting.
Before turning to the pioneer efforts in England and the pre-war
organization of our air forces, some account of the development of the
lighter-than-air dirigible is desirable.
THE FIRST AIRSHIPS.
The earliest conception of an airship is to be found in General
Meusnier's design in 1784 for an egg-shaped balloon driven by three
screw propellers, worked, of course, by hand. The chief interest in his
design, though it never materialized, lies in the fact that it provided
for a double envelope and was the precursor of the ballonet. The first
man-carrying airship was built by Henri Giffard in 1852. It had a
capacity of 87,000 cu. feet, a length of 144 feet, a 3 horse-power
engine, and a speed of 6 miles an hour. A gas engine was first used
twenty years later in an Austrian dirigible, giving a speed of 3 miles
an hour. About the same time much useful work was accomplished by Dupuy
de Lome, whose dirigible, with a propeller driven by man power, gave a
speed of 5-1/2 miles an hour. Twelve years later, in 1884, two French
Army officers, Captain Kubs and Captain Renard, constructed the first
successful power-driven lighter-than-air craft fitted with an 8-1/2
horse-power electric motor, which may be regarded as the progenitor of
all subsequent non-rigid airships. In 1901 Santos Dumont flew round the
Eiffel Tower, travelling 6-3/4 miles in 1-1/2 hours, and in 1903 the
flight of the "Lebaudy," covering a distance of 40 miles at a speed of
20 miles an hour, led the French military authorities to take up the
question of airships.
What the French initiated, the Germans, concentrating with
characteristic thoroughness on the development of the rigid as opposed
to the non-rigid airship, improved. In 1896 Wolfert's rigid airship
attained a speed of 9 miles an hour and in 1900 the first Zeppelin was
launched. Whatever we may think of the German methods of using their
airships during the war, we cannot but admire the courage and
determination of Count Zeppelin, who, in spite of many mishaps,
succeeded in producing the finest airships in the world and inspiring
the German people with a faith in the air which they have never lost.
From 1905 onwards development was rapid. In 1907 Zeppelin voyaged in
stages from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort, a distance of 200 miles in
7-1/2 hours. Popular enthusiasm is illustrated by the fact that within a
few months the same airship made four hundred trips, carrying 8,551
passengers and covering 29,430 miles. Other airships showed similar
records. Between 1909 and 1913 eighteen of the Parseval type were built,
and 1912 saw the construction of the first Schutte-Lanz, designed
expressly for naval and military purposes. If France at this period led
the world in aeroplane design, Germany was undeniably ahead in airship
development.
In Great Britain, in 1905, we had one very small airship, designed and
constructed by Willows.
THE BEGINNINGS OF AVIATION IN ENGLAND.
Though the names of Pilcher, Dunne, Howard Wright, and Rolls testify to
the fact that the science of aviation had its followers in England at
the beginning of this century, flying came comparatively late, and the
real interest of the movement centres round the early efforts of
military aviation from 1912 onwards. Nevertheless this country could ill
have dispensed with the experiments of that small and courageous band of
aviators, among whom Dickson and Cody were prominent. By 1908 Cody had
built an aeroplane and was making experimental flights at Aldershot. In
1907, A. V. Roe, working under great difficulties, constructed and flew
his first machine, a triplane fitted with an 8-10 horse-power twin
cylinder Jap bicycle engine, the first tractor type machine produced by
any country, and a very important contribution to the science of flight.
In 1910 and 1911 we find de Havilland, Frank Maclean and the Short
Brothers, Ogilvie, Professor Huntingdon, Sopwith and the Bristol
Company, starting on the design and construction of machines, of which
the names have since become famous. At the same time certain centres of
aviation came into existence, such as Brooklands, where I well remember
beginning to fly in August, 1910, Hendon, Larkhill and Eastchurch,
destined to be the centre of naval aviation. It is significant, however,
of the slow progress made that by November 1st, 1910, only twenty-two
pilot's certificates had been issued, and it was Conneau, a French naval
officer, who in 1911 won the so-called "Circuit of Britain," i.e. a
flight from Brooklands and back via Edinburgh, Glasgow, Exeter and
Brighton. Cody and Valentine were the only British competitors to
complete the full course.
In May 1911 a demonstration was organized by the owners of the Hendon
Aerodrome to which a large number of Cabinet Ministers, members of
parliament, and army and navy officers were invited. The War Office
co-operated by arranging for a small force of horse, foot and guns to be
secretly disposed in a specified area some miles distant and by
detailing two officers, of whom I was one, to test what could be done to
find and report them by air. I remember that I had a special map
prepared, the first used in this, and I think any country, for the
aeroplane reconnaissance of troops. After a sufficiently exciting trip,
and with the troops successfully marked on the map, Hubert, my French
pilot, and I, returned and made our report to General Murray, the
Director of Military Training. It was a very interesting flight; the
weather good; our height about 1,500 feet; the machine a 50 horse-power
Gnome "box-kite" Henri Farman, which at one period of our 35 mile an
hour return journey elected to point itself skywards for an unpleasant
second or two and fly "cabre"; I can see Hubert now anxiously forcing
his front elevator downwards and shouting to me to lean forward in order
to help to bring the nose to a more comfortable bearing!
Many pages could be filled with the difficulties and exploits of the
first British aviators, but enough has been said to show that, compared
with that of aeroplanes in France and of airships in Germany,
development in this country started late, progressed slowly and excited
little public interest. The work of the pioneers was, however, not in
vain, since it opened the eyes of our military authorities to the value
of aviation and led to the formation of that small but highly efficient
flying corps which during the war expanded into an organization without
rival. Let us now turn to the inception of the air forces of the Crown
and the position with regard to these and to air tactics at the outbreak
of war.
THE INCEPTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF AIRCRAFT AS PART OF THE FORCES OF THE
CROWN.
Nations have tended to regard flight as a prerogative of war. A balloon
school was formed in the early days of the French revolutionary wars;
the French victory at Fleurus in 1794 was ascribed to balloon
reconnaissance; balloons were used by the Federal Army in the American
Civil War, and during the Siege of Paris Gambetta effected his escape by
balloon in 1871.
_The Balloon Factory._
In England experiments were begun at Woolwich Arsenal in 1878, and in
1883 a Balloon Factory, a Depot and a School of Instruction were
established at Chatham. The expedition to Bechuanaland in 1884, under
the command of Sir Charles Warren, was accompanied by a detachment of
three balloons, and the following year balloons co-operated with the
Sudan Expeditionary Force, when Major Elsdale carried out some
photographic experiments from the air.
In 1890 a balloon section was introduced into the Army as a unit of the
Royal Engineers, and not long afterwards, the Balloon Factory was
established at South Farnborough, where in 1912 it was transformed into
the Royal Aircraft Factory. Four balloon sections took part in the South
African War and were used during the Siege of Ladysmith, at
Magersfontein and Paardeburg. Colonel Lynch, who served in the Boer
Army, stated at a lecture delivered in Paris after the war that "the
Boers took a dislike to balloons. All other instruments of war were at
their command; they had artillery superior for the most part to, and
better served than, that of the English; they had telegraphic and
heliographic apparatus; but the balloons were the symbol of a scientific
superiority of the English which seriously disquieted them."
I went through a course in ballooning during leave from West Africa in
1904 and remember that partly owing to the energy of Colonel Capper,
partly to the impetus given by the South African War, and partly to the
growing interest in all things aeronautical throughout the civilized
world, it was noticeable that the activities of the Balloon Factory were
increasing in many directions. Although the spherical balloon had been
improved, its disabilities were recognized and experiments were made
with elongated balloons, man-flying kites, air photography, signalling
devices, observation of artillery fire, mechanical apparatus for hauling
down balloons, and petrol motors. A grant for a dirigible balloon was
obtained in 1903, though it was not until 1907, the year in which Cody
began the construction of his aeroplane at Farnborough, and Charles
Rolls his experiments, that the airship "Nulli Secundus" made her first
flight. She was about 120 feet long and 30 feet in diameter, and was
driven by a 40 horse-power engine at a speed of 30 miles an hour. On
October 5th this airship flew to London in an hour and a half, circled
round St. Paul's, man[oe]uvred over Buckingham Palace, and descended at
the Crystal Palace. In the same year, be it remembered, a Zeppelin had
made a trip of 200 miles from Friedrichshaven to Frankfort. The "Nulli
Secundus" was followed in 1910 by the "Beta" and the "Gamma."
Meanwhile an Advisory Committee for Aeronautics had been appointed, and
the National Physical Laboratory had organized a department at
Teddington for the investigation of aeronautical problems in
co-operation with the Balloon Factory.
_The Air Battalion._
In 1911 the authorities could no longer close their eyes, especially at
a time when rumours of war were rife, to the rapid development of
heavier-than-air craft on the Continent. So far, as we have seen, the
aeroplane had been regarded in England as little more than the plaything
of a few adventurous but foolhardy spirits. A certain amount of
experience in piloting and handling aeroplanes had been gained by a
handful of Army officers, but the machines used either belonged to the
officers themselves, to civilians, or to aviation firms. I was at that
time a general staff officer in the Directorate of Military Operations
under General Wilson, now Field Marshal and late Chief of the Imperial
General Staff, and was the only officer in the War Office who had
learned to fly. It appeared very important that a study of the military
possibilities of aviation should be made. The prime role of cavalry,
reconnaissance, seemed to have passed from it. In addition to my normal
duties, I visited France, Germany and Italy, collected information on
foreign activities, wrote reports, and tried to create a knowledge of
the possible effect of future military aeronautics and to urge the
formation of a flying corps.
In 1911 the Air Battalion of the Royal Engineers, consisting of
Headquarters, No. 1 Company (Airships) and No. 2 Company (Aeroplanes),
was formed and superseded the Balloon School. The creation of No. 2
Company, stationed at Larkhill, marked the first formation of a British
military unit composed entirely of heavier-than-air aircraft. The same
year witnessed the inception of the B.E., F.E. and S.E. type machines in
the Balloon Factory, but the total of our machines, both for naval and
military requirements, amounted to something less than twelve aeroplanes
and two small airships; and the mishaps suffered by the military
machines on their flight from Larkhill to Cambridge, to take part in
Army Man[oe]uvres, were significant of their unreliability.
_The Royal Flying Corps._
In view, therefore, of the reports received of the progress abroad, the
Air Battalion was clearly insufficient to meet the demands which might
be made upon it in the event of war; and at the end of 1911 the Prime
Minister instructed a standing Sub-Committee of the Committee of
Imperial Defence to consider the future development of air navigation
for naval and military purposes. As a result of their deliberations the
Committee recommended the creation of a British Air Service to be
regarded as one and designated the Royal Flying Corps; the division of
the Corps into a Naval Wing, a Military Wing, and a Central Flying
School; the maintenance of the closest possible collaboration between
the Corps, the Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and the Aircraft (late
Balloon) Factory; and the appointment of a permanent Consultative
Committee, named the Air Committee, to deal with all aeronautical
questions affecting both the Admiralty and the War Office.
Consequent upon these recommendations, a Technical Sub-Committee was
formed, consisting of Brig.-General Henderson, Major MacInnes of the
directorate of Military Training at the War Office, a splendid officer,
who died during the war, and myself, to draft the new scheme. The
objects kept in view in framing our peace organization were to suit it
to war conditions, as far as they could be foreseen, to base it on an
efficient self-contained unit, and, while allowing for the wide
differences between naval and military requirements, to ensure the
maximum co-operation between the two branches of the Service. Success
beyond expectation was achieved in the first two objects, but, as will
be seen, the naval and military branches tended for unforeseen but good
reasons to diverge, until they joined hands again in 1918 as the Royal
Air Force. The bases of the military organization were, a headquarters,
the squadron, and the flying depot. These proved their value during the
war and have remained the units of our air forces to this day. The
Military Wing was to form a single and complete organization and contain
a headquarters, seven aeroplane squadrons, each to consist of twelve
active machines and six in reserve, one airship and kite squadron, and a
flying depot. All pilots, whether of the Naval or the Military Wing,
were eventually to graduate at the Central Flying School, whence they
could join either the Naval Wing at Eastchurch or one of the Military
Squadrons. In time of war each branch of the Service was to form a
reserve for the other if required.
_The Military Wing._
In accordance with this scheme I received instructions to organize,
recruit, train and command the Military Wing of the Royal Flying Corps.
The functions of the Military Wing were quite clear: it was to meet the
air requirements of the Expeditionary Force primarily for reconnaissance
purposes, but its organization was framed so that it could easily be
expanded and the scope of its duties widened. Headquarters were
established at Farnborough on May 13th, 1912: Barrington-Kennett, an
officer of the Grenadier Guards who had been attached to the Air
Battalion, was appointed, and made the best of all possible adjutants;
and the nucleus of the Corps, consisting at first of the cadres of an
airship squadron under Edward Maitland, of two aeroplane squadrons under
Burke and Brooke-Popham, and a flying depot (later the aircraft park)
under Carden, who was a little later greatly assisted in the complex
matter of technical stores by Beatty, came into existence. At the same
time the construction of the Central Flying School was started at
Upavon, under Captain G. Payne, R.N. With regard to the other squadrons
provided for, the nucleus of No. 4 Squadron was formed the same year,
and that of No. 5 Squadron the following year, of Nos. 6 and 7
Squadrons in 1914, while No. 8 Squadron was not started until after the
outbreak of war.
Records of the progress and growth of the Corps were left at Farnborough
when the Headquarters and four squadrons went to France in August, 1914,
and have been lost. This is particularly unfortunate because without
them it will be difficult for the historian of the Corps adequately to
describe the beginnings and to assess the value of the work then carried
out.
The task of forming the new service, which was to do much to assist the
Army in saving England, was begun. The time was very short. A great
energy had to be brought to the work. As with all things new, it had to
contend with apathy and opposition on all sides. There was no precedent
to help. The organization of the Corps to its smallest detail of
technical stores, supply and transport had to be thought out. The type
of machine required; the method of obtaining it from a struggling
industry; its use and maintenance; the personnel, its training and
equipment; these, and a thousand other aspects of the question, required
the employment of a large staff of experts. But the experts did not
exist and the duties were carried out almost entirely at Farnborough,
where in addition time had to be found to compile the official training
and other text books and regulations required for an entirely new arm.
In addition to the innumerable problems inherent in the organization,
growth and training of the Military Wing, the two years between its
inception and the outbreak of war were strenuously applied to solving
the problems of air tactics and strategy. Until the South African War
the British Army had been drilled under the influence of stereotyped
Prussian ideas. Perhaps the South African War led too far in an opposite
direction, but it taught us one thing, which was to prove of such
importance in 1914--the value of mobility; and we realized in aircraft
the advent of the most mobile arm the world has yet seen.
All was new. A new Corps. A new element in which to work. New conditions
in peace akin to those in war. And there had to be developed a new
spirit, combining the discipline of the old Army, the technical skill of
the Navy, and the initiative, energy and dash inseparable from flying.
There were the inevitable accidents, but training had to be done. We
existed for war and war alone would show whether we had thought and
worked without respite aright. We had to prove our value to the other
arms, many of the leaders of which, owing to a long period of peace,
found difficulty in differentiating between the normal usages of peace
and war and in understanding the right use of aircraft. Somehow or other
time was found during 1912, 1913 and 1914 to write to reviews, to
lecture at army and other centres of training, to attend Staff rides,
and to endeavour in every way possible to learn how best to work in with
the army commands and to teach those commands the usefulness and
limitations of aircraft.
As Ruskin wrote:
"Man is the engine whose motive power is the soul and the largest
quantity of work will not be done by this curious engine for pay,
or under pressure, or by the help of any kind of fuel which may be
supplied by the cauldron. It will be done only when the will or
spirit of the creature is brought to its own greatest strength by
its own proper fuel, namely the affection."
I was intensely proud of my command and often thought of the time when,
as I had been promised, I should, in the event of war, command it in the
field. We worked at white heat believing that war was coming soon;
believing that our efforts would have a real effect on the result; and
determined that the new arm should rank second to none among the forces
of the Crown. _Esprit de Corps_ was of vital importance, but as officers
and non-commissioned officers were drawn from every branch and every
regiment of the army this was no easy matter and was only achieved by
the splendid example and precept of such men as Herbert, Becke,
Longcroft, Chinnery and Barrington-Kennett. We selected our motto: "Per
Ardua ad Astra." It was in this atmosphere that the Military Wing grew
in peace. It was in this atmosphere that the soul was formed which later
under the great strain of war impelled our pilots forward cheerfully to
face every duty and every danger in the true spirit of manliness and
fearless confidence.
As in framing the original scheme on paper, so in giving it life it was
our aim to organize the Corps, so that, whatever its future strength, it
would be sound and efficient, and its continuity of growth effected
without even temporary dislocation or waste. The tactical unit of the
Military Wing--the squadron, consisting of three flights, each of four
machines with two in reserve--had the advantage that it was of
sufficient size to act independently, while it was not too unwieldy for
a single command. It was equally suitable for independent or
co-operative action, and the full complement of seven squadrons would,
in addition to a reserve, furnish one squadron for each division of an
Army Expeditionary force of the size then contemplated, though no
definite allotment of aeroplanes to the lower commands was at first
intended. The French and Germans, on the other hand, were building up
their organizations with smaller units, with the result that they found
even greater difficulties than ourselves in obtaining sufficient
experienced officers to command them. It is probable that the consequent
lack of concentration, knowledge and determination to stick to sound
principles of action was one of the causes underlying the non-success of
the German air service in the opening phases of the war.
According to the system employed squadrons were formed, organized,
equipped, and a certain amount of preliminary training carried out, at
Farnborough, when on completion the squadron moved to one of the
stations which I had established or was forming at Netheravon, Montrose,
Gosport, Dover, and Orfordness, Netheravon being the largest. This
dispersion of squadrons did not affect the entity and cohesion, under
Wing headquarters at Farnborough, of the Corps as a whole. No. 3
Squadron, one of the original two referred to, removed to Netheravon
from Larkhill in June.
Similarly, and in order to avoid congestion at Farnborough, to foster a
spirit of self-support and to enable air operations to be carried out
with troops in Scotland, No. 2 Squadron was sent to Montrose. Five of
its machines flew all the way, and it became one of the principles of
training that machines should fly whenever a move was ordered. Thus in
1913 six machines from this squadron were flown from Montrose to
Limerick--a great feat then--to take part in the Irish Command
man[oe]uvres, the crossing of the Irish Channel being successfully
carried out both ways by all machines. Another flight of an experimental
nature was made by Longcroft, with myself as passenger, from Farnborough
to Montrose in a single day with only one landing.
The unavoidable and never-relaxing strain inherent in the daily and
hourly use of an instrument, in the design, maintenance and improvement
of which we could only grope our way, was very great. In peace before
the war, as later in the war, the only variation to strain lay in
periods of increased strain.
At Headquarters, in addition to the normal duties of command and
co-ordination, and the supply of all technical stores to squadrons,
there was carried out all recruiting, and I also formed a specialized
flight for the study of technical problems, such as the use of wireless
from aircraft. The bulk of experimental work was originally undertaken
by the Royal Aircraft Factory, under the Superintendent, Mr. O'Gorman,
who always helped us in every way possible, but by 1913 I felt it
necessary to enlarge the duties of the special flight and an
Experimental Section was formed at Wing Headquarters at Farnborough
with an officer, Musgrave, in charge. In addition, for each squadron an
officer was appointed Squadron Officer for Experiments, thus ensuring
the diffusion of information throughout the Corps, and affording the
opportunity to each unit of carrying out the experiments best suited to
the material and apparatus at its command. Similarly other individual
officers were detailed in each squadron on a co-ordinated scheme, for
such duties as Officer-in-charge of Stores, Workshops, Mechanical
Transport, Meteorology, etc.
The formation at Farnborough of the Line of Communications R.F.C.
Workshop or Flying Depot--later known as the Aircraft Park--completed
the organization of the Military Wing.
I was very anxious as early as possible to prove the structure as a
unified self-supporting, mobile and easily handled flying corps as far
as it had gone, and in June, 1914, this was done by the concentration in
camp at Netheravon of the entire Military Wing, comprising Headquarters
and Headquarters Flight, the four completed squadrons and the nucleus of
No. 6 Squadron, the Aircraft Park and a detachment of the Kite Section.
Mobilization, a very difficult process when it came, would have been
almost impossible had the concentration not taken place. The object of
the camp was a month's combined training to test personnel, both in the
air and on the ground, and the handling of aircraft and transport both
by day and night. Endeavours were made to solve by means of lectures,
discussions and committees the problems connected with mobilization,
technical and military training, observation, wireless telegraphy,
signals, night flying, photography, bomb-dropping, workshops, stores,
meteorology, transport, shifting of camp and aerodrome, supply and
maintenance of units in the field, etc.--in fact the whole organization
essential to the efficiency and cohesion of a Flying Corps, under
conditions as similar as possible to those expected on active service.
Very valuable experience was obtained from the work carried out. The
necessarily wide gaps in our knowledge were brought home in more
concrete form. It was also evident that the force was very small. But
within three months it was proved under the strain of war that the
organization and training had been laid down on sound principles.
_The Naval Wing._
As in the case of the Army, it was to airships that the Navy first
turned its attention, and the birth of naval aviation may be said to
date from July 21st, 1908, when Admiral Bacon submitted proposals for
the construction of a rigid airship, the ill-fated "Mayfly" which was
destroyed on her preliminary trials. The Admiralty thereupon decided to
discontinue the construction of airships, the development of which was
left to the Army until May, 1914, when it was decided that all
airships--that is No. 1 Squadron of the Military Wing--should be taken
over by the Naval Wing. This was partly the result of a report by two
Naval Officers, who visited France, Austria and Germany, as was the
purchase of two vessels of the Parseval and Astra Torres types, and a
small non-rigid from Willows. The construction of a number of other
airships was ordered, but for various reasons was delayed or never
completed up to the outbreak of war.
Although at first sight the functions of the Naval Wing--coast defence
and work with the Fleet--seemed hardly more difficult to perform than
those of the Military Wing, in practice, as I was to find later from
personal experience when in command of the R.N.A.S. at Gallipoli, they
were more complicated, while the slowness of the Admiralty in evolving a
clear scheme of employment and a definite objective made itself felt.
Before the war the achievements of the Naval Wing were due rather to
individual effort than to a definite policy of organized expansion. It
was the pilot and the machine rather than the organization which
developed.
As already stated, Eastchurch was chosen by the Short Brothers for their
experiments in aeroplanes in 1909, but it was not until 1911 that the
Admiralty bought two machines and established the first Naval Flying
School at that place. The same year Commander O. Swann purchased from
Messrs. A. V. Roe a 35 horse-power biplane and began to carry out
experiments with different types of floats, as a result of which a
twin-float seaplane was produced--the first to rise off the water in
this country.
For some time seaplanes were in a very experimental stage and at best
could only rise from, and alight on, calm water, though it is
interesting to note that as far back as 1911 the employment of seaplanes
for torpedo attack, which I think will be one of the most important
developments of aircraft in the future, engaged the attention of the
Navy, and a Sopwith seaplane carrying a 14-inch torpedo made its first
flight at Calshot in 1913. For this reason, therefore, it appeared that
principally aeroplanes and airships would have to be employed from shore
bases for coast defence and that "carrier" ships would be necessary to
enable seaplanes to work with the Fleet.
The first stations set up were Eastchurch, Isle of Grain, Calshot,
Felixstowe, Yarmouth, Cromarty and Kingsnorth, from which at the
outbreak of war an organized coastal patrol was established.
From the outset the Naval Wing, assisted by its large percentage of
skilled technical personnel, paid great attention to experimental work
of all sorts. Thus in 1912 the detection of submarines by aircraft was
taken up, in 1913 valuable results were obtained from bomb-dropping, and
a large number of experiments in wireless, machine gunnery and fighting
carried out. In addition, efforts were made to extend the power, range
and capacity of engine and machine.
The second Naval problem, that of co-operation with the Fleet, involved
the flight of aircraft from ships and the design of aircraft carriers.
In 1911 an aeroplane for the first time took off successfully from the
deck of a cruiser at anchor, and the following year an aeroplane flew
from H.M.S. "Hibernia," while under weigh, but it was not until after
the outbreak of war that alighting on decks was successfully
accomplished. The first ship to be fitted up as a parent ship for
seaplanes was the "Hermes" in 1913.
These specialized technical requirements and developments explain why
the Naval Wing and the Royal Naval Air Service tended towards
individualism rather than cohesion. While the Military Wing, or Royal
Flying Corps, progressed further as an organized fighting force, the
Royal Naval Air Service, amongst the 100 odd aeroplanes and seaplanes on
charge which were mainly of the Short, Sopwith, Avro, Farman and Wright
types, possessed in 1914 the more powerful engines and a number of
aeroplanes fitted with wireless and machine guns, while their
bomb-dropping arrangements were also in a more advanced stage of
development.
An Air Department was formed at the Admiralty in 1912 to deal with all
questions relating to naval aircraft. Naval officers were trained from
the beginning at Eastchurch rather than at the Central Flying School,
and in 1913 the appointment of an Inspecting Captain for Aircraft, with
a Central Air Office at Sheerness as his headquarters, accentuated a
growing tendency for the Naval Wing to work on independent lines.
The Naval Wing grew rapidly and in the middle of 1914 was reorganized as
the Royal Naval Air Service, comprising the Air Department of the
Admiralty, the Central Air Office, the Royal Naval Flying School, the
Royal Naval Air Stations, and all aircraft, seaplane ships and balloons
employed for naval purposes. This placed the naval air force on a
self-supporting basis and the entity of the Royal Flying Corps as a
whole, as originally provided for, was lost.
TACTICS AND THE MACHINE.
The value of the application of flying to war requires little
demonstration. The most important attributes of generalship are quick
appreciation of a situation and quick decision. To the ordinary
Commander the absence of information is paralysing. In the nineteenth
century the mass of cavalry was the special instrument of information
and to obtain it contact with the enemy's main forces had to be
effected. It thus acted as a shield and also tried to provide the
information necessary to enable the infantry to take the offensive.
Aviation, by the wide field of observation it commands, by the speed
with which it can collect and transmit information, to a great extent
lifts the fog of war and enables a general to act on knowledge where
before he acted largely on deduction. Information once obtained, its
mobile and far-reaching offensive power introduces the element of
surprise, and permits of lightning strokes against the enemy's vital
points.
Before the war reconnaissance was regarded as the principal duty of the
aircraft of the Military Wing. This was due to two reasons, first, the
obvious one that aircraft possessed advantages shared by no other arm
for obtaining information quickly and over wide areas and reporting to
Headquarters, and second, that experiment had proved the difficulty of
loading aeroplanes with offensive weapons, such as bombs or machine
guns, without impairing speed and climb.
The following statement, which I drafted and which was issued by the
General Staff before the Army Man[oe]uvres of 1912, summarizes the
position:--
"As regards strategical reconnaissance," it says, "a General is
probably now justified in requiring a well-trained flyer, flying a
modern aeroplane, to reconnoitre some 70 miles out and return 70
miles. This would be done at a speed of, say, 60 miles an hour in
ordinary weather over ordinary country. Thus within four hours,
allowing a wide margin, a report as to the approximate strength,
formation and direction of movement of the enemy, if he is within a
70-mile radius, should be in the hands of the Commander."
To those imbued with a knowledge of military history this new method of
ascertaining the enemy's movements might well seem revolutionary.
Let us take two instances illustrating what aircraft, with a radius of
little over 100 miles, might have done in previous campaigns. For the
operations which terminated in the capitulation of Ulm in 1805 Napoleon
concentrated two army corps at Wuerzburg and five along the left bank of
the Rhine between Mannheim and Strasburg, his main body of cavalry under
Murat being at the latter place. The Austrian Army under Mack was behind
the Iller between Ulm and Memmingen, and expected the French to advance
through the defiles of the Black Forest, where Napoleon did actually
make a feint with his cavalry. Napoleon, however, crossing the Rhine on
September 26th, 1805, moved east, and it was not until October 2nd, when
the French Army had reached the line Ansbach, Langenburg, Hall and
Ludwigsburg, and his envelopment was far advanced, that Mack realized
that the main French advance was coming from the north. Aeroplanes of
the type we possessed in 1914 could have reconnoitred the whole of
Napoleon's preliminary position, could have detected his line of
advance, especially as it was concentrated on a very narrow front, and
could have brought back the information to the Austrian Headquarters
within a few hours.
Aircraft would have been of even greater value on August 16th, 1870, at
the Battle of Rezonville, where neither the French nor the Germans were
aware of the other's movements. On the 14th a battle had been fought
east of Metz which had resulted in the French retreat. On the morning of
the 16th Moltke thought the French had retired west by the Metz-Verdun
road and those to the north of it, and consequently he directed his left
wing due west towards the Meuse to head off the French, sending his
right army towards Rezonville to harass their rearguard. The French
retreat, however, had been slow and two corps were still at Rezonville,
while three corps and the reserve cavalry were within easy reach, some
130,000 men in all. At 9 in the morning the German 3rd Corps, unaided
and far from support, attacked a position within reach of the whole
French Army, believing it had to deal with a rearguard only. Bazaine, on
the other hand, thinking that he was faced by the German main army,
remained on the defensive, and lost the opportunity of defeating in
detail first the 3rd and then the 10th German Corps. A few aeroplanes
operating on a radius of 30 miles would have disclosed between daybreak
and 10 a.m. the true position to either commander. Neither the German
nor the French cavalry, though both were engaged, obtained any reliable
information.
The problem as to how far aircraft would reduce the value of cavalry was
widely discussed before the war. It was seen that by day aircraft could
obtain quicker and more accurate information, but that cavalry retained
their power of night reconnaissance, of mobile offensive action and of
pinning the enemy to his ground by fighting. This was found to be so
during the retreat, when, in addition to the direct value of aircraft
for long-distance reconnaissance, an indirect asset of great importance
lay in the release of the cavalry for battle action in assistance of the
infantry. The question has become more acute since the offensive action
of aircraft against ground targets has developed, but although we must
never forget the splendid work of the mounted arm during the Retreat
from Mons, and in March, 1918, factors have arisen tending to make the
use of cavalry a problem of extreme difficulty in European wars, and it
is possible that, in addition to their reconnaissance functions,
aircraft will supersede the shock tactics and delaying action of
cavalry, though this may be modified if, the sabre being a thing of the
past, cavalry are converted into mounted machine gunners.
Air tactics and training were, therefore, chiefly studied from the point
of view of reconnaissance. In addition to the possibility of being shot
at by other aircraft, an important consideration was vulnerability from
the ground. Before the war reconnaissances were carried out at heights
varying from 2,000 to 6,000 feet, but it was generally considered that
the aeroplane was safe from fire from the ground at heights above 3,000
feet.
Serious difficulties affecting the mobility of aircraft were the means
of providing a regular supply of fuel and the selection of landing
grounds when moving camp, which had to be close enough behind the front
line as not to entail waste of time in flying out and back over friendly
territory. This was later brought home to us in a very acute form during
the Retreat from Mons.
As machines improved, increasing attention was paid to bettering their
power of reconnaissance by air photography, their value in co-operation
with artillery by wireless equipment, their offensive action by bomb
dropping and their offence and defence by armament.
The value of a correct initiative and the aeroplane's role as an
offensive weapon were fully appreciated and brought out in the Training
Manual of the Royal Flying Corps which we compiled at Farnborough, and
which was published early in 1914 by the War Office. It says:--
"It is probable that one phase of the struggle for the command of
the air will resolve itself into a series of combats between
individual aeroplanes, or pairs of aeroplanes. If the pilots of one
side can succeed in obtaining victory in a succession of such
combats, they will establish a moral ascendancy over the surviving
pilots of the enemy, and be left free to carry out their duties of
reconnaissance. The actual tactics must depend on the types of the
aeroplanes engaged, the object of the pilot being to obtain for his
passenger the free use of his own weapon while denying to the enemy
the use of his. To disable the pilot of the opposing aeroplane will
be the first object. In the case of fast reconnaissance aeroplanes
it will often be advisable to avoid fighting, in order to carry out
a mission or to deliver information; but it must be borne in mind
that this will be sometimes impossible, and that, as in every other
class of fighting, a fixed determination to attack and win will be
the surest road to victory."
Speaking generally, the evolution of the machine, as apart from the
engine, which hung behind, followed upon the evolution of air tactics.
As soon as experience, often hard won at the cost of a valuable life,
opened up new fields of activity for aircraft, the designer and
constructor evolved new designs to meet the new requirements. It was no
small achievement in this period to have solved the problem of inherent
stability, both in theory and practice, so successfully, that from the
aerodynamic standpoint our machines in 1914 compare favourably with
those in use at the end of the war.
In dealing with the evolution of the machine during the three years
prior to the war there are three landmarks: in the autumn of 1911 the
few machines belonging to the Air Battalion failed to reach their
destination for Army Man[oe]uvres; in May, 1912, the Royal Flying Corps
was formed and experiments with a view to meeting military requirements
were for the first time energetically and methodically prosecuted; and
in August, 1914, four squadrons flew to France with machines which had
attained a high degree of stability and were not inferior to any of
those possessed by other countries. When it is remembered in what a
short time these machines were evolved, it is not surprising that
attention had been chiefly confined to the problem of the 'plane and
stability, the engine and speed and reliability. Wireless, bombing,
photography, night flying and machine gunnery had been discussed and
experimented with, but no progress was made comparable to that effected
under war conditions.
Machines and engines before the war were chiefly French. It is
interesting to note those with which No. 3 Squadron, one of the first to
be formed, commenced its career in May, 1912. They consisted of one 50
horse-power Gnome Nieuport, one Deperdussin, which by the way was
privately owned, one Gnome Bristol, two Gnome Bleriot monoplanes, one
Avro and one Bristol box-kite biplane. By September, 1912, the Squadron
possessed fourteen monoplanes, but in that month, owing to the number of
accidents incurred by them, the use of monoplanes was temporarily
forbidden, and it was not until April, 1913, that the Squadron was fully
equipped with B.E. and Maurice Farman biplanes organized in flights.
These types formed the backbone of the Military Wing, which also
included Codys, Breguets, Avros, and, later, Sopwiths. The B.E.2c was
produced by the Royal Aircraft Factory in the autumn of 1913 and
demonstrated its high degree of stability by flying from Aldershot to
Froyle and from Froyle to Fleet, distances of 6-3/4 and 8 miles
respectively, without the use of ailerons or elevators. The progress
made is illustrated by the fact that at the Army Man[oe]uvres of 1913
twelve machines covered 4,545 miles on reconnaissance and 3,210 miles on
other flights, accurate observations being made from a height of 6,000
feet, without serious mishap.
In 1913 I recommended the gradual substitution of B.E.'s for Farmans on
the ground of the all-round efficiency and superior fighting qualities
of the former, and to secure the advantage of standardization, but it
was objected by the War Office that the Farmans were the only machines
that could mount weapons in front--an objection which was not met until
firing through the airscrew was introduced--and that the slower Farmans
offered greater advantages for observation, an idea which was long
prevalent. As a result, a compromise was effected, and two squadrons
were equipped with B.E.'s and two with homogeneous flights of Farmans,
Bleriots and Avros.
At the outbreak of war the most successful machines possessed by the
Military Wing were the B.E.2 tractor with a 70 horse-power Renault
engine, a speed of 73 miles an hour, and a climb of 3,000 feet in nine
minutes; and a Henri Farman pusher with a speed of 60 miles an hour, and
a climb of 3,000 feet in fourteen minutes. A special study was being
made in 1914 of the best methods of ensuring clear observation of the
ground, and partly in this connection staggered planes were introduced,
culminating in the B.E.2c's, which were not, however, available for
service in any numbers until 1915.
To sum up, the technical development of aircraft has taken place, and
will continue side by side with the evolution of the uses to which
aircraft can be put. While due attention was paid to problems connected
with the anticipated duties of aircraft ancillary to that of
reconnaissance, owing to the short space of time between the formation
of the Royal Flying Corps and the outbreak of war, to the difficulties
connected with the engine, and to causes inseparable from peace
conditions, development had been more or less confined to evolving a
stable and reliable machine with a good field of view.
CONCLUSIONS.
The foregoing outline of the development of aviation from the earliest
times up to the war--a story of human endeavour and achievement in the
air with its attendant dangers and difficulties--is not without value in
endeavouring to assess that which has since occurred.
At the beginning of the year 1912 the Royal Flying Corps did not exist.
At the beginning of the Great War, in 1914, England found herself with
an air service which, though much smaller than those of Germany or
France, was so excellently manned and organized, trained and equipped,
that it placed her at a bound in the front rank of aviation.
The machine was stable, but the engine still unequal to the tasks laid
upon it. Civil Aviation practically did not exist.
I shall now describe the extension of air duties under war conditions;
the increasing value of aircraft for general action and air tactics and
their development and far-reaching effect as the right hand of strategy.
This resulted in the expansion of our flying corps from a total of 1,844
officers and men, and seven squadrons with some 150 machines fit for war
use, to a total of nearly 300,000 officers and men, and 201 squadrons
and 22,000 machines in use at the end of the war, and in the evolution
of the machine to a point where we can regard it, not only as a weapon
of war, but as a new method of transport for commercial purposes in
peace.