CHAPTER IX

Gunnery Results: The 12-pounder Q.-F. Naval gun -- Its mounting,

sighting, and methods of firing -- The Creusot 3" gun and its

improvements -- Shrapnel fire and the poor results obtained by

the Boers -- Use of the Clinometer and Mekometer -- How to

emplace a Q.-F. gun, etc., etc.

A word or two now as to what we with the guns have learnt during the

campaign, although I feel that this may be rather a dull, professional

sort of chapter except to those interested in guns and gunnery, and

that the subject as treated by myself may be open to criticism from

others similarly engaged. I may certainly say that it was not for at

least three months after our opening fire at the first battle of

Colenso (December 15th, 1899) that I personally felt myself as "fairly

well up" to the constantly varying conditions of gun positions, gun

platforms, enemy's positions, and the ever-changing "light and shade"

of the South African climate, against all of which one had to fight to

get correct shooting; the last-named of these, viz., "light and

shade," being perhaps our greatest bugbear, often throwing one many

thousand yards out in judging a range by eye, which gift is, I think,

the best a gunner can possess!

Then, too, the Naval guns as they were sent up (owing to the work

being pushed at the last moment), some on high wheels and some on low

ones, some with drag-shoes opened out and others which wouldn't take

the wheels, some with the wires from them to trail plate handles the

right length and others much too long, caused (I am talking of the

12-pounders) these guns, instead of forming a level shooting battery,

to be each one a study in itself as regarded its shooting powers; and

we constantly found one gun shooting, say, three or four hundred yards

harder or further than the one next to it although laid to the same

range on the sights. This at first sight was rather mystifying, but

all these small but important matters above mentioned were not long in

being put to rights. On any future occasion such defects will, of

course, be avoided from the start by the guns being altogether more

strongly mounted on broad-tyred wheels and broad axles of similar

height, size and pattern, and, above all, with a strong and uniform

system for checking the recoil of the carriage, of which the

drag-shoe, as it was fitted and sent up to us, was certainly not

capable.

[Illustration: _Photo by Symonds, Portsmouth._

Captain Percy Scott, C.B., R.N.]

I am rather keen on this question of the best means of checking the

recoil of a field carriage. A very strongly made drag-shoe fitted with

chains to the centre of gun trail will do very well; and these were,

later on in the campaign, fitted by the Ordnance authorities at

Maritzburg to new "Percy Scott" carriages, which they sent up to us to

replace the original "Percy Scott" carriages, which, as I remarked

before, were not strongly enough built, particularly as regards the

wheels, to stand any very bad country or a lengthened campaign, in

both of which we found ourselves involved. In these remarks, please

let no one think that I am running down the 12-pounder carriage for a

purpose; not so. I simply wish to point out details that, if more time

had been available, would certainly have been avoided in them by their

very clever designer, Captain Percy Scott, R.N., to whom the

service in general (and I personally) owe a debt of gratitude; for

assuredly not a Q.-F. gun, or a single one of us with the batteries,

would ever have been landed unless it had been for him and his brains

and his determination to have the Royal Navy represented in the

campaign, as was their due--being on the spot with what was most

wanted, namely, heavy guns.

Here I wish to distinctly state my own opinion, and that also of the

many officials and gunners, Naval and Military, with whom I have

talked over the matter, _i.e._, that not only did the Naval guns save

Ladysmith, but they also in a great measure helped to save the

campaign outside for its relief, and with it Natal. And my opinion

now, when the war is nearly over, is only strengthened and confirmed

by what I have heard the Boers say of the guns, viz., that they are

the only things when using shrapnel that have shaken them much during

the fighting, and, considering the country, naturally so. That it was

to the Navy and not to the garrison gunners that the original credit

has gone, was simply because we were here and they were at home at the

start. One is, as regards their gunnery powers, as good as the other,

and the garrison gunners earned their laurels later on. Still, I have

a great hankering after a gun's crew of "handy men" to beat any crew

in this world for all-round service and quick shooting, and I am ready

to back my opinion heavily.

Returning from this digression to the subject of recoil, we found that

sandbags placed at a certain distance in rear of each wheel not only

effectually checked the carriage, but also (a great consideration) ran

it out again. This system was used both by the 4.7's and ourselves at

the end of the war; and seeing that the guns had only half crews, it

was a _most_ important saving to men who had perhaps marched ten

miles, loaded and off-loaded ammunition, and then had perhaps to

fight the guns under a hot sun for hours. To fill and carry the bags,

however, is a nuisance, and some better system on the same principle

is needed, such as the inclined wedges that I saw by photos the Boers

were using in rear of wheels; and I should very much like to see some

such system substituted for our present one. I have not seen the

hydraulic spade used, perhaps that is the _best_.

To put it briefly, the hastily improvised gun-carriage of the

12-pounders had, on account of this very haste, the following

defects:--

(1.) Too weak generally in all parts, particularly wheels and

axles, for any long campaign.

(2.) Wheels and axles being a scratch lot, none in any of the

batteries were interchangeable, which caused many times later in

the campaign when wheels began to give out, much anxiety. Several

times we only had guns ready for action or trekking by the "skin

of one's teeth," and it must be borne in mind that any new wheels

wired-for sometimes took two months to arrive on the very

overcrowded railway--a single line.

(3.) The system of checking the recoil of the field carriage was

a bad one.

(4.) All the 12-pounders except two were in the first instance

sent up without limbers, and therefore had to be limbered up to

wagons. This for practical purposes in the country we had to trek

over was absolutely useless and caused endless delays. Eventually

we all got limbers built at Maritzburg, and equivalent gun-oxen

to drag the guns separately from the wagons.

(5.) The trail of the gun consisted of a solid block of wood some

12 feet long; so that if one laid the gun to any long range (in

most over 7,000 yards, I think) the oil cylinder under the gun,

on trying to elevate it, would bring-up against this trail and

prevent laying. This therefore necessitated digging pits for

trails to shoot much over 7,000 yards, which in bad ground often

took some considerable time. To obviate this defect would of

course be very easy with a steel trail of two side plates, and

space for gun and the cylinder between the sides.

(6.) The general idea of all the mountings I saw was narrow axles

and high wheels, whereas, for all trekking purposes, it should be

broad space between the wheels and low wheels. This was amply

proved to us by the number of times the high-wheeled narrow

mountings upset on rocky ground, whilst the broad low type went

along steadily. The 12-pounder gun itself did its work

beautifully, shooting hard and lasting well, and owing to the dry

climate of Africa we had no trouble at all to keep the guns clean

and all gear in good order.

(7.) Perhaps the most troublesome defect of all was that the

gun-carriage had no brake fitted. The gunnery drill-book system

of "lash gun wheels" may be at once erased from the book for all

practical purposes over any rocky or bad country; it simply, as

we soon found, tears the wheels to pieces, and chokes the whole

mounting up. An ordinary military Scotch cart brake, or a brake

fitted as the trek wagons here have, under the muzzle of the gun

on the forepart of the wheels, acts very well, and my

bluejackets, although not carpenters, fitted these for me. They

are screw-up brakes.

The sighting of the gun (drum and bar system) cannot be beaten, I

think. Perhaps a V-shaped notch to give one the centre of the H, or

hind sight, might be an improvement, as here personal error often

occurs. Lieutenant, now Commander, Ogilvy, R.N., always made his men

correct their final sighting of the gun for elevation from about six

paces in rear of the trail, and my experience is that this is a small

but important matter, especially for fine shooting say at a trench at

5,000 yards, which merely appears to one as a line on the ground. One

invariably finds that the gun, with the eye of a man laying close up

to the hind sight, is laid slightly short of the object; so this

should be noticed in the gunnery drill-book as regards field guns.

_Telescopic_ sights, the patent, I believe, of Lieutenant-Colonel L.

K. Scott, R.E., were sent out and used by us with the 12-pounders to

fire on the trenches at Spion Kop and Brakfontein, when fine shooting

was required. These sights had the cross wires much too thick, so we

substituted cobwebs picked off the bushes and stuck on with torpedo

composition, and these did admirably. Still this sight was not

altogether a success. The power of the telescope, especially in the

rays of the sun, was poor, and it took a man a long time to lay his

gun with it, thus further reducing the quick-firing power of the

12-pounder reduced already by the recoiling field carriage. As to the

4.7's, it was found that the ordinary Naval small telescope, fitted on

a bar and with light cross wires, could not be beaten as a sight for

ranges they had to fire at. It is a very good useful glass, and it

was, I believe, used both in Natal and elsewhere right through the

campaign, and I unhesitatingly give it the palm.

As to the system of firing and gear used, electric firing was very

successful as long as one had the gear for refitting and repairing and

an armourer attached to one's guns; this, of course, as the guns

became split up into pairs was impossible, and I may say that carting

electric batteries (which of necessity for quickness have to be kept

charged) in wagons or limbers over rocks and bad roads, and with

continual loading and off-loading, becomes a trouble and anxiety to

one. So for active service I should certainly recommend that

percussion firing should be regarded as the first and principal method

to be used with guns on the move, carrying also the electric gear for

use if guns are left for any time at fixed spots as guns of position.

I may here remark that when firing with electricity from a field

carriage the battery has to be placed on the ground, clear of recoil,

and therefore the wire leads must be adjusted in length accordingly. I

am uncertain whether our other 12-pounders used mostly electric or

percussion, but I think on the whole, percussion; and, speaking for

myself, I certainly did so after experiencing the disappointments

which miss-fires often gave one, when trying to get in a quick shot,

say from the line of march, with the electric gear. These "miss-fires"

are, moreover, often unavoidable under active service conditions, such

as we had with our semi-mobile guns. The guns and connections get

sometimes an inch thick in mud or dust and require time to clean, when

one has no time to spare: the use of percussion tubes avoids all this.

Before we leave the subject of guns the following description of the

French 3" Creusot gun by the _Revue d'Artillerie_ will be of interest,

viz.:--

_South Africa._--The Field Artillery of the Boers consists for

the most part of Creusot 3" rapid-firing guns made after the 1895

model. These guns were purchased by the South African Republic

during the year 1896.... The gun, which is constructed of forged

and tempered steel, has a 3" bore. Its total length is 8 feet and

its weight is 726 pounds. The body of the gun consists of three

elements:--1. A tube in which the breech piece is fixed. 2. A

sleeve covering the tube for a length of 3 feet 6 inches. 3. A

chase hoop. The chamber is provided with twenty-four grooves of

variable pitch which have a final inclination of 8 deg..

The system of breech closing is that of the interrupted screw,

which presents four sectors, two of them threaded and two plain,

so that the breech is opened or closed by a quarter revolution of

the screw. The mechanism is of the Schneider system, patented in

1895, and has the advantage of allowing the opening or closing of

the breech to be effected by the simple motion of a lever from

right to left, or _vice versa_.

The gun is fired by means of an automatically-cocked percussion

apparatus. A safety device prevents any shots from being fired

until after the breech is closed.

The carriage is provided with a hydraulic recoil-cylinder fitted

with a spring return. It is also furnished with a "spade," which

is placed under the stock at an equal distance from the trail and

the axle, and which is of the model that General Engelhardt has

adopted for the Russian Artillery.

During a march this spade is turned back and fastened to the

stock. The carriage is likewise provided with a road brake, which

is to be employed in firing only when the nature of the ground is

such that the spade cannot be used.

The gun is placed in a bronze sleeve that carries the brake

cylinders and the various other connecting pieces for the return

spring and the aiming apparatus.

The hydraulic recoil consists of two cylinders placed laterally

and at the height of the axis of the piece.

The axle has the peculiarity that in its centre there is a wide

opening in which are placed the cradle and the gun. It is

provided with two screw trunnions, around which the pivoting

necessary for lateral aiming is effected. This arrangement of the

gun with respect to the axle has the effect of greatly

diminishing the shocks that firing tends to produce.

Elevation and depression are accomplished by rotating the axle in

the wheels of the carriage. This is done by means of a crank

which, through an endless screw and pinion, controls a toothed

sector attached to the sleeve.

Pointing in direction is done by means of a lever known as a tail

piece. Mounted upon the axle there are two small sights, forming

a line of aim, that permit of bringing the carriage back in the

direction of the target as soon as a shot has been fired. All

that the gunner has to do is to give the piece a slight

displacement laterally with respect to the carriage by means of a

hand-wheel, which turns the gun 2 deg. to one side or the other.

The line of aim is found by a back and front sight arranged upon

the right side of the sleeve in which the gun is mounted. The

back side permits of aiming while the gun is being loaded. It

carries a small oscillating level that indicates the elevation of

the gun during rapid firing.

The weight of the carriage, without wheels, is 1,146 lbs. and

with wheels, 1,477 lbs.

The ammunition consists of cartridges containing charge and

projectile and having a total weight of 19 lbs. The powder

employed is of the smokeless kind, designated by the letters B.N.

The weight of the charge is 1-3/4 lbs. The projectiles are of

three kinds--ordinary shells, shrapnel shells, and case shot. The

weight of each is the same, say 14-1/4 lbs. The shrapnel shells

contain 234 balls, weighing 155.8 grains each, and an explosive

charge of 3.13 ozs.

As the gun can be pointed at a maximum angle of 20 deg., and the

initial velocity is 1,837 feet, the projectiles can be fired to a

distance of 26,248 feet.

The crew necessary to serve the gun consists of six men--a

gunner, a man to manoeuvre the breech-piece, a man to manoeuvre

the pointing lever, two men to pass the ammunition, and a man to

regulate the fuse. The rapidity of firing can easily be raised to

ten shots a minute.

The accuracy of the gun is most remarkable. Upon the occasion of

the trials made when the guns were received, the following firing

was done: a regulating shot, a first volley of six shots in

forty-two seconds, and a second volley of six shots in forty-six

seconds.

The fore carriage of the gun and that of the caisson are

identical. They carry a chest containing thirty-six cartridges,

and are capable of accommodating four men.

The back carriage of the caisson carries two chests like that of

the fore carriage.

The total weight of the gun and fore carriage loaded is 3,790

lbs., and that of the caisson 4,330 lbs.

On reading over this description of the French 3" Creusot gun, it

seems to me that the kind of axle used with it is first class and

should be used in our field carriages for quick-firing guns; it must

certainly take the strain of recoil off the centre of the axle, which

recoil we found cracked our axles as we used them (once in my own

guns) so badly that the whole thing had to be shifted and replaced.

Another advantage it has is to lower the whole gun and mounting, and

the centre of gravity of the weight of it and carriage, and therefore

the gun is much harder to upset on rocky ground or going up steep

precipices, as we had to do in Natal. This detail of wheels and axle

is, I think, the most important one almost in a field carriage. The

axle I mention is one bent down in its centre for about two-thirds of

its length.

In regard to the ammunition. The cordite charges in their brass

cylinders and zinc-lined boxes did admirably, and the amount of

knocking about which the cases and boxes out here stand is marvellous.

At one time early in the campaign before Colenso and Ladysmith, a

decided variation in shooting of our guns was noticed, and was put

down in many cases to the variation of the cordite itself, the brass

cases sometimes lying out, in fact, in a powerful sun for hours, while

the guns were waiting or in action, and often becoming then too hot to

touch. Now, however, I personally don't think that this theory was

right but am of opinion that the variation then noticed, and even

after in the shooting, was simply due to the varying recoil of guns on

different slopes of ground and with indifferent drag-shoes. Royal

Artillery officers confirm one in this opinion.

As for the shells, both common and shrapnel, they stood the knocking

about well, and I never saw or heard of a single common shell used

with 12-pounders not exploding on striking, which speaks well for the

base fuse. The shrapnel I am not quite so sure about; one noticed

often a great deal of damp collected in the threads of the fuse plug

and nose of the shell; owing, I presume, to condensation in their

shell boxes under the change of heat and cold. Still they did very

well and I think seldom failed to burst when set the right distance. I

say the right distance because this at first was a slight puzzle to

us, the subject of height in feet above the sea-level of course never

having before presented itself to us as altering very considerably the

setting of the time fuse; and I don't think that a table of correction

for this exists in the Naval Service; at any rate, I have never seen

one.

To illustrate this, we found at Spion Kop (about 3,500 feet above the

sea-level) that it was necessary to set the time fuse for any given

range some 500 yards short to get the shell to burst at all before

striking; and on the top of Van Wyk, fronting Botha's Pass (some 6,500

feet above sea-level) I had to allow the fuse 800 to 900 yards short

of the range, and similarly at Almond's Nek. This is, I take it, due

to the projectile travelling further against a reduced air pressure at

any height than it does for the same sighting of the gun at sea-level,

for which of course all guns are sighted. I should like to talk to

experts regarding this as we are not quite sure about it up here.[6]

[Footnote 6: I am since glad to hear from Lieutenant

Henderson of H.M.S. _Excellent_, that he is engaged in

working out a table of corrections, such as I mention, and is

also interesting himself in the question of "range-finders,"

and "filters," and other necessities for naval service.]

Of course this firing from a height gives one therefore some 1,000

yards longer range with shrapnel, say at 6,000 feet up, which is a

most important fact to remember in shore fighting, and was well

illustrated by the Boer 6" gun at Pougwana Mount (7,000 feet) over

Laing's Nek, killing several of our Infantry on Inkwelo (Mount

Prospect) at 10,000 yards range; of course this was helped by the

height they were up, as well as by their superior double-ringed time

fuse which we have picked up on their shrapnel, and which gives them

in shrapnel fire a great advantage over any of our guns, which have

not got these fuses at present. It is interesting to note that many

4.7 lyddite shells were picked up, or rather dug up, by our own men

and others, quite intact--this, of course, was always in soft ground,

noticeably near the river (Tugela), and shows that the "direct action

fuse" should have been screwed into the nose of the shell, instead of

the "delay action fuse" that it had in it for use against thin plates

of ships.

Before leaving this subject of the gun and its fittings (12-pounder),

I again wish to emphasise the fact of how important is the question of

recoil. At one time, in front of Brakfontein with the 8-gun 12-pounder

battery, we all dug trail pits and blocked the trails completely up in

rear to prevent the guns recoiling at all on the carriage. This most

certainly gave a gun thus blocked up over one allowed to recoil on the

level an advantage of several hundred yards at an ordinary range of

say 6,000 yards; but of course it threw on our weak makeshift wooden

trails an undue strain, and after a couple had been smashed had to be

given up. Still, although I would never advocate doing this to any

field gun (_i.e._, bringing a gun up short as it shakes the mounting

too much) the fact remains that the range or shooting power of the gun

may be varied with the recoil in a great degree, and that therefore

what I mention about a system to check recoil uniformly and with

certainty seems to me to be an important one with our Naval field

guns. This fact of increased range, got by blocking up a gun, is

useful to remember in many cases, especially in this war when the

Boers had the pull of our guns at first, and when it might have been

worth while just temporarily disabling one gun, and to get one shot

into them and so frighten them off.

The newspaper controversy, very hot at one time, as to whether the

Boer guns were better or not than ours, and the ridiculous statements

one both read and heard from persons who knew little about the matter,

were rather amusing and perhaps a little annoying. I unhesitatingly

state that on all occasions the British Naval guns inch for inch

outranged and outshot the Boer guns; and that the 4.7 Q.-F. even

outranged, by some 2,000 yards, the Boer 6" Creusot. This I saw amply

proved, at least to my own satisfaction, at Vaal Krantz, when the Boer

6" gun on about the same level as our 4.7 was, on Signal Hill, vainly

tried to reach it and couldn't, whilst our gun was all the time giving

them an awful hammering and blew up their magazine.

In one way, and one only, the Boer guns had the advantage over us in

shooting, that is, with their shrapnel shell, many of which were

fitted with a special long range time fuse (double-ringed); here they

certainly overshot us, but failed to make much use of the advantage,

as they invariably burst their shrapnel, through incorrect setting of

fuse, either too high up in the air to hurt much or else on striking

the ground. Another great advantage the Boer guns as a rule possessed

was the heights at which they were placed, generally firing down upon

our guns and troops. Notwithstanding all this, I say again, that their

guns inch for inch were not in the hunt with ours as regards shooting

power, nor was this likely or possible seeing the great length of the

Naval Q.-F. gun and its much heavier charge.

It must be remembered that Naval guns are solely designed and built

for use at sea, or in forts, or against armour; and so to get the

necessary muzzle energy, velocity, and penetration, a long gun is

required; whereas the Boer gun was essentially a field or heavy land

service gun. Their guns up to the 6" being on proper field mountings,

and much lighter, shorter in the barrel, and consequently more mobile

than ours, while firing a lighter charge; and perhaps in this way only

it could be said that they were certainly better and handier than our

guns. On the march and trekking up mountains this must have helped

them a good deal, and from photos which I saw after the Boers had been

driven out of Natal I should certainly say that their heavy guns on

the march must have been much easier to move than ours.

To give an idea of the difference in weight between the heavier guns I

may quote the following figures; that of the Boer guns I take as I

read of them in Military Intelligence books:

_Weight._ _Weight._

British Naval 6" Q.-F. gun }

(wire) 7 tons 8 cwt. } Boer 6" Creusot gun,

British Naval 4.7 Q.-F. } 2 tons 10 cwt.

wire gun 2 tons 2 cwt. }

From these weights it may be at once noticed that inch for inch there

is no comparison between the Boer and British heavy gun as regards

range and power of gun itself, consequent on our heavier charges.

Taking their 3-1/2" Creusot Q.-F. guns (15 lbs.) and comparing them

with our Elswick Naval 12-pounders I should say that there is little

to choose between them, they having the advantage only in their long

range fuses for shrapnel shell, which fuses should be issued to ours

as soon as possible. One always heard these small French Q.-F. guns

alluded to with great awe as the "high velocity" gun of the enemy, but

I doubt much if they have one foot per second more mean velocity at

ordinary ranges than our Naval 12-pounder, although perhaps they may

have more at the muzzle, which is of little account.

To illustrate what small use the Boer gunner made of his advantage

over us in long range shrapnel, I should say that it was generally

noticed by all in the Natal Field Force how very high up they burst

their shell as a rule, and so doing much less damage than they might

have done; as Tommy described it, the bullets often came down like a

gentle shower of rain and could be caught in the hand and pocketed.

This of course, I should say, was the result of faulty setting of

their time fuse; probably they did not apply the necessary correction

for height above sea-level and so the shell either burst at too high a

period of its flight, or else on striking did little damage to us. The

front face of this kopje from where I am now writing (Grass Kop at

Sandspruit, and 6,000 feet high) is full of holes made by Boer

shrapnel shell, burst after striking in the hole dug by the shell

itself and leaving all their bullets and pieces buried in these holes.

There was no damage done by their heavy shrapnel fire at all when the

Dorsets took the hill, and solely because of this faulty setting of

the time fuse. We have dug up many of these shells here, and bullets

simply strew the ground.

The 12-pounder gun limber, especially made by our Ordnance people from

a design supplied by Lieutenant James, R.N., when at Maritzburg in

November, was afterwards supplied to all the guns, and none too soon;

but we did not get them till Ladysmith was relieved and they were

badly wanted all the time. These limbers were very well made and very

excellent, fitted to carry forty rounds complete of 12-pounder Q.-F.

ammunition which was invariably found by us as sufficient, as a first

or ready supply, giving eighty rounds to a pair of guns. More could,

however, have been carried if necessary, up to sixty rounds complete

on each limber; these limbers were strong, with very good wheels and

broad tyres (a great contrast to the wretched little gun wheels we had

to get along with at one time) and on them there was room also for

gun's crew's great-coats, leather gear, gun telescopes, and other

impedimenta, which was most convenient.

One fault in them, I think, might be corrected if again required;

_i.e._, the platform or floor of the limber instead of being built

only on the forepart of the axle should extend also behind or on rear

side of the axle; by this means the Q.-F. boxes of ammunition may be

distributed to balance the weight equally on each side of the axle,

and so bring the least weight possible on the necks of the oxen or

other draught animals drawing the limber and gun along. This, in a

hilly country, is important.

I would here note that when on the march with guns under any

conditions, one's men should always be allowed to march light,

slinging their rifles on the gun muzzles and putting leather gear with

S.A. ammunition, water bottles and days' provisions handy on top of

the limbers. The carrying of any of these things only exhausts the

men for no object, and when one remembers what heavy work they may

have to do on the march at any moment--bringing guns into action,

rapid firing and running out the guns, digging pits and trenches,

off-loading and loading the Q.-F. ammunition, and keeping up a supply

which in South Africa at any rate may be at the bottom of a steep

kopje with the gun at the top--one recognises the great advantage

gained in giving the men as much latitude as possible, and bringing

them into action after a march comparatively fresh. For these reasons

I would advocate that a gun limber should be made for any service gun,

with the object of allowing a certain amount of extra room for the

gun's crew's gear and stores.

In respect to range finding, the mekometer (range finder) as supplied

to the Royal Horse Artillery and Royal Artillery and also to every

company in a regiment (and which therefore was easy to borrow during

the campaign), proved most useful to us in getting ranges roughly. To

get a range over 5,000 yards one has to use the double base with this

instrument, and ranges may then be found up to 10,000 yards, and, with

practised observers, fairly correctly. At any rate it is most useful

to have something to start on when you get up into position. This

instrument is extremely small and portable and should be supplied to

Naval field batteries, and also a certain proportion to the rifle

companies for land service; it may be carried slung like a small Kodak

camera on one's back. Of course ranges can be very quickly found by

shooting one or two shots to find them out, and this was done by our

guns a good deal, and necessarily so when in action when one has no

time to waste and the objects are moving ones; but I strongly advise

anyone who gets his guns into a position where he is likely to stop,

such as in defence of a camp, or on top of a kopje defending a

railway line, or in position to bombard an enemy's fixed trenches and

lines, at once to find his ranges roughly all round to prominent

objects by the mekometer, as it gives one added confidence and is

invaluable when shooting over the heads of one's own men to cover

their attack, which is often a ticklish job and to be successful must

be continued up to the very last moment it can be, with safety.

This instrument, the mekometer, together with the clinometer, for

setting the gun for elevation independent of the sight arc, and an

ordinary spirit-level to place on gun trail to tell which way the

wheels or carriage of the gun are inclined on uneven ground (so

altering the deflection scale), might in my opinion be supplied to

every Naval field battery, heavy or light.[7]

[Footnote 7: Since writing this opinion I think, perhaps, it

will be well to pause till the results of Professor George

Forbes', F.R.S., experiments with a new stereoscopic

instrument in South Africa are to hand; he is there at

present by request of Lord Kitchener with his new invention.

For full report of this instrument I would refer to Professor

Forbes' paper read at the Society of Arts, December 18th,

1901. It is sufficient now to say that the instrument folds

up to 3 foot 6 inches in length, can be used by one observer

only standing, kneeling, or lying down, has great accuracy

and portability, and has received the support of Sir George

Clarke and other authorities.]

I may mention that the 4.7's and 6" Q.-F. were often fired at

elevations which did not even come on the graduated elevation arc, and

so the clinometer had to be borrowed from the military and used to lay

the guns; it is most useful.

For night firing on shore, as practised by us at Colenso and Spion

Kop, guns are laid for required distant object just before dusk. The

position of the wheels is accurately marked by pegs and lines, and

when the gun is laid the sight is lowered to some white object placed

fifty yards in front of gun, on which when dark a lantern may be

placed; the elevation is read off either on arc of sight or by

clinometer placed on the gun. To keep on firing at this distant object

when dark, the gun is run out to same wheel marks every time and laid

for same direction by the lantern on the near object, and elevation by

clinometer. The C.O.'s of regiments always most kindly put their

mekometer and trained observers at our disposal on escorting us up to

a position.

A plane table survey, using a mekometer to measure one's base, is

pretty easily made to get position of kopjes, trenches, well-defined

gun emplacements and their ranges, roughly, but it wants a certain

amount of time to do it.

As to the emplacing of a 12-pounder or other Q.-F. gun for attack or

defence, all hard and fast rules may, in my opinion, be at once

dismissed, the matter entirely depending on the nature of the ground

occupied and the direction and extent of fire required. Still I submit

the following points as being useful to remember:--

(1.) Carefully select the ground. If on a ridge, hill, or kopje,

the emplacement must be over the sky-line either on one slope or

the other; take a place where Nature helps you, if possible

screened by trees, free of rocks, and with soft ground, dongas,

or water round it, so that the enemy's shells will bury

themselves and not burst on striking. Of course in South Africa,

except on the flat, this could hardly ever be done.

(2.) The best form of emplacement is a gun pit about 1 foot 6

inches deep, according to our experience in Natal, the earth or

rock taken out forming a circular parapet 3 feet 6 inches high,

and as bulky or thick as ever you like on the front face, the

floor of the pit being levelled and a gradual slope made out of

it for guns to be moved easily in and out of the pit. The size of

the pit should be just enough to allow the gun trail to move

round on any arc of training when the gun muzzle is run out over

the front face or parapet, and to allow three feet more over and

above this for the recoil of the gun in the drag-shoes, so as not

to fetch the trail up sharp on recoiling.

A narrow ditch may be dug all round the inside of the parapet to allow

the crew to get into it for additional cover, and the ammunition boxes

may either be placed in this ditch or a magazine dug and sandbagged

over when plenty of time is available. A couple of drainage holes may

be required in heavy rains to empty the pits on each side. The

circular parapet can be built up any thickness, as just said; it

should then be sandbagged over till the required height. If in grassy

ground, instead of sandbags put large sods of grass to hide the

emplacement and to keep the dust from flying, as sandbags are

conspicuous. If neither grass nor sandbags are available, make your

Kaffirs or camp followers cow-dung the surface of your parapet

instead; this dries, and all dust under muzzle on firing is avoided. I

constantly tried this plan and found it very effective.

Of all points this avoidance of dust is the most important, as, unless

prevented, it rises in a cloud under the muzzle of the gun at every

shot. At long ranges, used by the Boers and ourselves, it was almost

impossible to locate a gun firing cordite or other smokeless powder

except by this cloud dust. So avoid it at all costs. Make the colour

of your emplacement as much like that of the surrounding ground as

possible, including your sandbags, if used.

[Illustration: Naval 12-pounder emplaced.]

[Illustration: Boer Gun positions at Colenso.]

APPENDIX 1

HINTS ON EQUIPMENT AND CLOTHING FOR ACTIVE SERVICE.

As a few hints in regard to an officer's kit for active service may

not be unacceptable to some, I offer a few observations on the subject

so far as I am able to speak from my own experiences.

Good telescopes are most important articles to have in any land

company of soldiers or sailors; they were especially useful in South

Africa. The Naval Service long-telescope with its big field is very

good and powerful in any light where there is no haze (at or before

sunrise or when the sun is low for instance), but when the sun is well

up it becomes of little use; and then comes the turn of the smaller

telescope as used by all Naval officers on board ship. This is a

particularly useful glass, and I myself felt quite lost, late in the

campaign, when I unfortunately dropped the top of mine when riding. As

to binoculars, we found the Zeiss or Ross's very excellent, and all

military officers seemed to use them; but, in my humble opinion, they

are not to be compared with a good small telescope.

At the start of the campaign the want of good telescopes among the

military was most marked, and ours were generally in great request.

Many military officers with whom I have talked on the subject agree

with me in thinking that a certain proportion of small telescopes

should be supplied, say two for every company in a regiment, for the

use of those on outpost and look-out duties. It is astonishing to see

the added interest which any man placed on these duties shows when he

can really make out for himself advancing objects and enemy's

positions without being entirely dependent on their officers to tell

them. A good glass will render reports from these men reliable and

valuable, instead of, as they often are, mere guesswork. At Grass Kop,

where we had one Volunteer Company all armed with binoculars which

were presented to them on leaving England (with the South

Lancashires), the hill was always lined with look-out men on their own

account; so interested were they in the matter.

Our water supply, as at first run, with one water-cart to the whole

Naval Brigade, was inadequate; but later on each unit with guns got,

as they should have, their own water-cart, or else made them with a

cask fixed upon axle wheels, which we were obliged to do for a long

time. Transport for these was either mule or ox; the former, quickest

and best. A field filter for each unit should be supplied if

possible.[8]

[Footnote 8: The proper filtering of water for use in

water-bottles and indeed for all drinking purposes, is most

important, and especially so in hot weather, when men are

always wanting a drink at off times, and will have it of

course. Late in the war, the "Berkefeld Field Service Filter"

was supplied to us by the Ordnance Department, and is very

good; it packs up in what looks like a large-sized luncheon

basket, and is very portable; it is simple to look after, if

directions are followed, and will make about thirty-four

pints in ten minutes, or, enough to fill fifteen men's

water-bottles; consequently it can easily be used on the

march during short halts, and whenever water is passed to

fill up water-bottles, and it is quickly packed up again. For

any individual who wishes to carry a filter on his own

person, I would recommend a small "Berkefeld Cylinder or

porous candle" and small "Pasteur pump" with the necessary

rubber tubes; this makes a very small parcel; it would only

take up about one quarter of the Service haversack, and is

well worth taking I am sure. The "Berkefeld Filter" should be

supplied to ships in case of landing Brigades--one to every

unit of 100 is the proper proportion as recommended by the

firm.]

A few remarks may not here be out of place as to the best fighting kit

to have ready for an officer who wishes to be comfortable, and also

perhaps at certain times smart, when stationary in a standing camp for

some time or on lines of communication. Needless to say that when

actually marching or fighting one wears anything and everything that

first comes to hand. Khaki has certainly done us very well; twill at

first during the heat, and serge or cord later on when the cold came

on; but it is well to avoid khaki twill in cold weather as it becomes

clammy and uncomfortable. Personally I should say that a serge or

cord, thin for heat and thick for cold weather, is much the best for

general wear.

I started the campaign with two pairs of khaki twill riding breeches

and two serge tunics (thin); these supplemented by a thick pair of

khaki riding cord breeches that I got made at Durban when the cold

came on, lasted me well through the campaign. For camp wear one can

always use the ordinary twill or serge trousers, as served out from

time to time by the Ordnance to all hands if required. On one's legs

one should wear ordinary brown leather or canvas riding gaiters, only

_not_ the Naval Service gaiters, as they are of no use for hard work

or much riding. Many of us wore putties, and the men all did, but I

don't like them myself as they are too hot in hot weather and make

one's legs sore in cold.

Riding breeches should be strapped inside the knee and doubled, and

perhaps to lace up at the knee would be more comfortable than

buttoning. Here I should mention that all the Naval officers

commanding guns were mounted, and eventually all got mounts in some

way; so riding plays a great part and is absolutely necessary if one

wishes to be useful.

I also had two pairs of strong brown boots (an emphasis on the brown),

they are far the best; and the soles should be protected with small

nails carefully put in so as not to hurt one's feet. A pair of

rubber-soled shoes for scouting, sporting, or camp work, and a pair of

warm slippers to sleep in are indispensable. Long rubber or sea-boots,

on account of their weight and bulk, are a nuisance. When it rained in

South Africa it so quickly dried up that we found rubber shoes quite

good enough for everything.

It is useful to take three flannel shirts, and under-clothing in

proportion; cholera belts also become necessary to most of us I am

afraid, and are very important; it is also advisable to have plenty of

socks and to change them frequently. Light silk neck-scarves are most

useful and prevent sunburnt necks; and in the cold and bitter winds we

experienced, and when sleeping in the open at night with heavy frosts,

Balaclavas, woollen comforters, Tam-o'-shanters, and Jaeger gloves are

highly desirable. Thanks to our kind friends at home we were loaded

with these articles during the campaign and found them invaluable.

In the hat line our bluejackets' straw hats, smartly covered with

khaki twill and with cap ribbon, did very well for the sun and are

nice and shady; they also last a long time when covered well, or even

when painted khaki colour which stiffens and preserves them. I found

my helmet also useful till I lost it. It is as well to take one

Service cap with khaki covers, and a squash hat of gray or khaki;

these latter are most comfortable and everybody wore them in camp; but

I found that they don't keep out the sun enough during the day, they

stow very close however, and can always be worn if one loses or

smashes one's other hats.

As to bedclothes, this is a most important matter in the freezing

cold. I advise a Wolseley valise to be got at the Army and Navy

Stores, with mattress and pillow and Jaeger bag inside; one should

have over one at night the two Service blankets allowed, and one's

great-coat. Unless one sleeps on a stretcher, which can't be always

got, it is well to cut long grass and put it under the valise in the

cold weather, as it makes a wonderful difference on the frozen ground

and gives one a good night as a rule.

If there are means of transport, it is as well to carry a Wolseley kit

bag to hold one's clothes and boots, etc. I think that every officer

in this war had these two things, the kit bag and valise, although of

course a great deal may be rolled up and carried in the valise only

and the bag left behind if it comes to a pinch.

The following articles are most useful to carry always, viz.:--Service

telescope, and also binoculars as well if one can afford it (Zeiss or

Ross's); a knife with all implements (especially corkscrew); a light

tin cylinder to hold charts, plans, intelligence maps, and private

maps or sketches; also writing materials, diary and order books, can

be carried in a flat waterproof sponge bag case. As luxuries which can

be done without:--A collapsible india-rubber bath basin and waterproof

sheet, very compact as got at the Army and Navy Stores; a small

mincing machine (the only means of digesting a trek ox), and sparklet

bottle and sparklets are very handy. Such other luxuries as cigars,

cigarettes, pipes, etc., can always be stowed in some corner of the

valise or bag. Carry brown leather polish, dubbing, and laces.

Leather gear as carried on one's back should be a "Sam Brown Belt" of

the single cross strap kind, in preference to the Naval Service gear.

On this one can carry one's revolver, water-bottle, and haversack,

which with glasses slung over all and separately, complete all one

requires as a gunner. Swords were not carried during this war by

officers, as in cases where the rifle was substituted, they only

proved an incumbrance. A stick for the marching officer, like "Chinese

Gordon" had, cannot be beaten.

A hint as to food before we part. Don't go on the principle "because I

am campaigning I must resign myself to feed badly on what I can pick

up and on what my stomach is entirely unaccustomed to." There was

never a greater mistake. On the contrary, feed yourself and those

under you on the best, sparing no expense, and when you can get wine

instead of muddy water, drink it to keep you going and your blood in

good order. Do yourself as well as you can, is my advice and

experience, after perhaps rather thinking and going the other way at

first. It simply means that when others run down and go sick with

dysentery, fever and other ills, you are still going strong and fit

for work. Naturally advice on this point is entirely dependent on

means of transport; but when this exists, as it did with the Naval

Brigade who had ammunition wagons, a hundred pounds weight or so makes

little difference to them if not already overloaded. Take the best

advantage, therefore, of it that you can within reason, and up to a

certain extent, there being of course always a limit to all good

things.

Tents are a great and important feature in any long campaign. I don't

hesitate to say that the single canvas bell tent as supplied to the

British Forces, should be at once converted into double canvas tents.

In the many long sweltering days when the Natal Field Force before

Colenso, and later at Elandslaagte, were forced to lie doing nothing,

the heat of the sun coming through the tent was very bad; one was

always obliged to wear a helmet inside one's tent; and I think in the

men's tents (ours with, say, ten in them, and the military who had, I

am told, up to fifteen in one tent) the state of things was abominably

unhealthy under the blazing South African sun, and I am persuaded that

half the sickness among the forces was due to this insufficient

protection from the sun. The double canvas bell tent with air space in

between the two parts does very well, in both keeping heat and cold

off. The Indian tents, of khaki canvas, double and generally

square-shaped, are much the best ones we saw on the Natal side and

should be used generally in the Army; the extra expense would be saved

in the end by prevention of fever and sunstroke.

My own experience (when I and three other officers lay in a field

hospital outside Ladysmith just after the relief, in a single bell

tent, and saw Tommies all around us crowded into these tents with

fever and dysentery, whereby all our cases, I am sure, were made much

worse by the torturing sun which poured in all day on our heads),

makes me very glad that the "Hospital Commission" is now sitting, and

I sincerely hope that such absurd mistakes will be noticed and

corrected by them for the good of the whole British Forces.

Regarding the Mauser rifle, as compared with the Lee-Metford, I

personally have little experience, but I can only say that the Mauser

to hold and carry is much the better balanced of the two, and that the

fine sighting is superior. Also some military officers seem to say it

is a better shooter at long ranges, and its magazine action is far

quicker and superior.[9] Revolvers, as far as I know, have had no test

at all in this war. The cavalry carbine, I believe, is universally

condemned by all cavalry officers out here, and is doomed to go I

hope, being, if used against foes with modern weapons, only waste

lumber.

[Footnote 9: Since writing this about the Mauser, Captain

Cowper of the Queen's tells me that on the whole he considers

the Lee-Metford superior, and that the Boers he has met have

told him they hold it to be a harder shooter at long ranges.

However, it seems to me that the better balance and magazine

of the Mauser counteract this and give it the preference.]

I believe that I am right in saying that pouches for carrying the

rifle ammunition are universally condemned in favour of a bandolier,

with flaps over every ten cartridges or so. In our Naval bandoliers

the want of these flaps was especially noticeable, and the wastage of

ammunition dropped out was, I am sure, excessive, besides leaving

loose ammunition lying about for Boer or Kaffir to pick up, as they

are reported to be doing. The web bandolier is lighter than the

leather, and better, so I recommend it, if fitted with flaps, to the

notice of the Naval authorities.

APPENDIX II

EXTRACTS FROM SOME OF THE DESPATCHES, REPORTS, AND TELEGRAMS,

REGARDING OPERATIONS MENTIONED IN THIS JOURNAL

[_London Gazette_, January 26th, 1900.]

_From General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B._

Chieveley Camp,

_December 17th, 1899._

[_Extract._]

I enclose a reconnaissance sketch of the Colenso position. All visible

defences had been shelled by eight naval guns on the 13th and 14th.

During all this time and throughout the day, the two 4.7 and four

12-pounder Naval guns of the Naval Brigade and Durban Naval

Volunteers, under Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., were being admirably

served, and succeeded in silencing every one of the enemy's guns they

could locate.

* * * * *

[_London Gazette_, March 30th, 1900.]

_From Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade._

Chieveley Camp,

_December 16th, 1899._

[_Extract._]

The whole force under Sir Redvers Buller advanced at 4 a.m. yesterday,

intending to take the positions of the enemy on the other side of the

Tugela. The Brigade under my command was disposed as follows:--Two 4.7

guns and four 12-pounders which were on the outpost line in a position

10,000 yards from the main works of the enemy, from which place we had

been shelling them on the previous day, advanced to a small rise about

5,000 yards from the entrenched hills across the Tugela. Six

12-pounders under Lieutenant Ogilvy with Lieutenant James of H.M.S.

_Tartar_ and Lieutenant Deas of _Philomel_ were attached to the Field

Artillery under Colonel Long. Two 12-pounders under Lieutenant Burne

held the kopje from which we advanced.

* * * * *

[_London Gazette_, March 12th, 1901.]

_From Captain Jones, R.N., Commanding Naval Brigade, Natal._

Naval Camp, Spearmans Hill,

_February 8th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

As to Vaal Krantz, the Naval guns were disposed as follows: ... Two

12-pounders with Lieutenant Burne on the plateau between this hill and

the river. At daylight on the 6th, Lieutenant Burne's two guns were

moved to a position at the east of Zwartz Kop.

February 18th, 1900. Lieutenant Burne with two 12-pounder guns was

left with General Warren at Spearmans and marched on the 10th to

Springfield Bridge where he remains under Colonel Burn-Murdoch.

From General Sir R. Buller to Admiral Sir R. Harris, March 5th, 1900.

"I much appreciate your congratulations. I can hardly tell you how

much of our successes are due to the Navy: their gunnery was

admirable."

* * * * *

Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N., February 16th, 1900, enclosed in

letter of March 28th, 1900, from the Commander-in-Chief, Cape of Good

Hope Station.

_Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N._

Springfield Camp,

_February 16th, 1900._

I have the honour to report as follows:--

Since being detached from Lieutenant Ogilvy's command I moved back

across the Tugela river from the advanced kopjes on February 1st. On

Sunday, February 4th, I learnt that I was attached to Sir Charles

Warren's Division, and received my orders from him personally on that

day on Gun Plateau, regarding the next day's operations; I also

interviewed yourself on that day in reply to signal received. On

Monday, 5th, my guns were shelling the enemy incessantly all day in

conjunction with the feint on the left, and in reply to a Boer 3"

Creusot and two Maxim Vickers 1-1/4 lbs. I received many directions

from both General Warren and General Talbot-Coke, as to points they

wished shelled, and at the end of the day had expended 250 common and

shrapnel shell. At 8 p.m. I received orders from General Warren to

march at daybreak on Tuesday, and join the Commander-in-Chief at the

fort of Zwartz Kop; this I did, and though delayed on the hill by

wagons and by the 7th Battery R.F.A. coming up, and later, by streams

of ambulance in the narrow road close to Zwartz Kop, I arrived and

reported my guns to General Buller about 8 a.m., at the foot of the

kopje. He told me to bring my guns into action, and help to silence

the Boer 6" Creusot, and, if possible, the 3" Creusot, which were

firing from Spion Kop (position 2) at our field batteries.

As I came into action, and was aiming my right gun at the Boer 6", a

shell from it struck twenty yards in front, and covering us with dirt,

jumped over our heads without exploding; the shell was plainly visible

in the air to me on coming down, and I saw it strike on its side and

the fuse break off. The shell was picked up intact at my wagons which

were just coming up, by Edward House, A.B., and we have it now. I

concentrated my fire on the 6" gun at 6,400 yards, and in an hour it

was silenced for the rest of the day; this, of course, was effected in

conjunction with the fire from the 5" guns just in front of me, and

from one 4.7 on Signal Hill.

During the day my guns also drove back at least two Boer field guns at

6,500 yards, which had been brought down into Vaal Krantz, and which

tried to find our range but just fell short; they shifted position,

but were finally driven over the sky-line. There was also a 1-1/4 lb.

Pom-pom in a donga in the valley, which we silenced many times, and at

the end of the day had fired some 230 rounds.

On Wednesday, February 7th, we commenced again at daylight; the 6"

opened a heavy fire on one pontoon (No. 3), and on the field batteries

in front of us, which had been pushed forward there before daybreak.

My fire was directed solely at the big gun; my No. 2 standing by and

firing directly he saw it appear. During the day my ammunition supply

was kept up by direct communication by orderly with the column under

Major Findlay. In the forenoon the Boer field guns were brought down

again in the valley, and shelled the pontoon, Krantz Kop, and us; they

were driven off in an hour or so, but recommenced again later.

In the afternoon, more field guns and Pom-poms on the burnt kopjes to

the left of us opened a heavy fire on Krantz Kop, but were driven off

by our guns, the howitzer battery (100 yards in our rear), and by the

Naval guns on Zwartz Kop.

About 5 p.m. the fire from the Boer 100-pounder was very heavy, and

came all round us, the Staff, and Infantry in reserve, and twice my

crews only escaped by lying down. Just at that moment I got the order

from Colonel Parsons, R.A., to withdraw my guns by moonlight, and

cover our retirement on Gun Plateau. This was done, but the steep hill

being jammed with traffic, I did not get up to my old position on Gun

Plateau till next morning, when I reported to General Warren.

Between February 8th and 9th, I assisted to cover the retirement of

our troops over the Tugela, and on the 9th was withdrawn at 11 a.m.,

and arrived at Springfield Bridge at 3 p.m.

On February 10th, by order of Colonel Burn-Murdoch (1st Dragoons) and

the Camp Commandant, I placed my guns in the entrenched camp half a

mile beyond the bridge, and up to 14th was employed in making gun

epaulements and pits, and finding the ranges.

On February 13th, the Boers appearing in force on the kopjes to our

left at 9,000 yards, I rode out with Colonel Burn-Murdoch and other

Commanding Officers, to reconnoitre, and find gun positions. They

sniped at us at 1,600 to 2,000 yards, and at the advanced Cavalry

pickets all night, but next morning, the 14th, after "A" Battery Royal

Horse Artillery and my guns had been pushed forward, they were found

to have retreated altogether, and we surmised them to be a commando of

Free State Boers returning to the Free State.

To-day, the 16th, we received news of General French's relief of

Kimberley. All quiet in this neighbourhood.

At present I have 500 rounds of ammunition with me, and 300, in

reserve, in charge of the officer of the ammunition column here.

I will conclude by saying that I have nothing but praise for the

conduct and hard work performed by my men during the last ten days,

especially when under fire; their spirit is now excellent. I should

specially mention my captains of guns, T. Mitchell, 1st class P.O.,

and J. Mullis, 1st class P.O., for their hard work, the latter the

best and quickest shot of the two. I must recommend E. A. Harvey,

P.O., 2nd class, and leading shipwright, as rendering me most useful

and clever work on the gun mountings, etc., and for further designs.

Of the rest P. Treherne, A.B.; D. Shepherd, A.B., S.G.T.; Henry House,

A.B.; W. Jones, A.B., S.G.T.; Fred Tuck, O.S.; C. Patton, signalman;

and W. Dunetal, stoker, deserve special mention. Mr. White,

midshipman, has rendered me useful assistance. Mr. Freeman, conductor,

has done very well; and the white drivers, McPheeson and Blewitt,

excellently. I find the gun teams of eight oxen under the two latter

are very useful.

* * * * *

[_The Times_, Thursday, March 1st, 1900.]

The following despatch from General Buller has been received at the

War Office:--

Headquarters, Hlangwane Plain,

_February 28th_, 8.5 a.m.

Finding that the passage of Langewachte Spruit was commanded by strong

entrenchments, I reconnoitred for another passage of the Tugela. One

was found for me below the cataract by Colonel Sandbach, Royal

Engineers.

On the 25th we commenced making an approach to it, and on the 26th,

finding that I could make a practicable approach, I crossed guns and

baggage back to the south side of the Tugela, took up the pontoon

bridge on the night of the 26th, and relaid it at the new site, which

is just below the point marked "cataract."

During all the time the troops had been scattered, crouching under

hastily-constructed small stone shelters, and exposed to a galling

shell and rifle fire, and throughout maintained the most excellent

spirit.

On the 27th General Barton, with two Battalions 6th Brigade and the

Royal Dublin Fusiliers, crept about one and a half miles down the

banks of river, and, ascending an almost precipitous cliff of about

500 feet, assaulted and carried the top of Pieters Hill.

This hill to a certain extent turned the enemy's left, and the 4th

Brigade, under Colonel Norcott, and the 11th Brigade, under Colonel

Kitchener, the whole under General Warren, assailed the enemy's main

position, which was magnificently carried by the South Lancashire

Regiment about sunset.

We took about sixty prisoners and scattered the enemy in all

directions.

There seems to be still a considerable body of them left on and under

Bulwana Mountain.

Our losses, I hope, are not large. They certainly are much less than

they would have been were it not for the admirable manner in which the

artillery was served, especially the guns manned by the Royal Navy and

the Natal Naval Volunteers.

* * * * *

[_The Times_, Thursday, March 8th, 1900.]

_From our Special Correspondent._

Ladysmith,

_March 5th._

The following special Army Order has been issued:--

"The relief of Ladysmith unites two forces which have striven with

conspicuous gallantry and splendid determination to maintain the

honour of their Queen and country. The garrison of Ladysmith for four

months held the position against every attack with complete success

and endured its privations with admirable fortitude. The relieving

force had to make its way through unknown country, across unfordable

rivers, and over almost inaccessible heights in the face of a

fully-prepared, well-armed tenacious enemy. By the exhibition of the

truest courage, which burns steadily besides flashing brilliantly, it

accomplished its object, and added a glorious page to our history.

Sailors, soldiers, Colonials, and the home-bred have done this, united

by one desire, and inspired by one patriotism.

"The General Commanding congratulates both forces on their martial

qualities, and thanks them for their determined efforts. He desires to

offer his sincere sympathy to the relatives and friends of the good

soldiers and gallant comrades who have fallen in the fight.

"BULLER."

* * * * *

_From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade._

Ladysmith,

_March 10th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

I enclose reports sent in to me by Lieutenants Ogilvy and Burne, who

were mostly detached from me.

* * * * *

_Enclosure from Lieutenant Burne, R.N._

Colenso,

_March 7th, 1900._

Since my last letter dated from Springfield Bridge, I have the honour

to report that I left Springfield on February 23rd, marching with the

York and Lancaster Regiment to rejoin the main column. We reached

Chieveley Camp on the 24th, and I pitched camp on Gun Hill, where I

found Lieutenant Drummond and the 6" gun. We remained here till a

telegram and written orders were handed me on the night of the 26th,

from Lieutenant Drummond, to march at daybreak with the York and

Lancaster Regiment to join the 10th Brigade. We marched at 6 a.m. on

the 27th, with the Regiment, by Hussar Hill round Hlangwane. Here we

found the Commander-in-Chief, who told me, on my reporting the guns,

that the 10th Brigade were in Colenso; he added that it was no fault

of mine that we had come out of the way, as the orders had not been

clear, but told me to cross the Tugela by the Pont as quickly as

possible, the pontoon bridge having been removed. At the Pont I had to

off-load all my wagons, as the drift below was impassable; and after

having got one gun and ox team safely across, the Pont was upset in

the middle of the river, and all the work was jammed. During this time

there was a heavy shell fire on Colenso Station from a Boer 3" gun,

but we were not touched. I had the Pont righted, and my men baled it

out before daylight on the 28th, and I took my other gun and two

wagons and loads of ammunition across, and hurried on to join General

Coke. On the morning of March 1st a body of men rode in from

Ladysmith. They proved to be Ladysmith scouts, and brought General

Coke his first intimation of the relief of Ladysmith on the previous

evening. My guns were in position, and we bivouacked with the troops

for some days, but I have now pitched camp and withdrawn the guns.

Hearing many rumours here that the Naval men are to return to their

ships, I should like to bring to your notice the very excellent

service which has been rendered me by my captains of guns, R.

Mitchell, P.O., 1st class, and especially G. Mullis, P.O., 1st class,

and the clever and hard work of F. Harvey, P.O., 2nd class (leading

shipwright), and to mention the following names not before

mentioned:--H. House, A.B., F. Long, O.S. (bugler), S. Ratcliffe,

O.S., and to state my appreciation of the work done by all.

* * * * *

[_The Times_ of April 16th, 1900.]

_Extract from "Times" Natal Military Correspondent, dated March 22nd,

1900._

The Naval contingent of the _Powerful_ left Ladysmith for England on

the 7th, and that of the _Terrible_ left to rejoin their ship on the

11th. The 4.7 guns remain in the hands of the Naval gunners of the

_Forte_, _Philomel_, and _Tartar_, under Captain Jones of the _Forte_,

but most of the 12-pounders have now been handed over to the 4th

Mountain Battery. It seems a great pity that the Naval gunners of the

_Terrible_ could not have been spared to finish the campaign. Three

months' practice ashore has made them nearly perfect in the management

of their guns, and they themselves would be the first to admit that,

at any rate in that part of the gunnery that was not learnt on board

ship, such as rapidity of fire under their present altered conditions

and mobility, they have improved twofold since they first landed.

Their rapidity of fire was wonderful when it is remembered that their

carriages are fitted with none of the automatic appliances for

returning the gun to the firing position, but have to be dragged back

every time by hand, and then carefully adjusted with the wheels at

exactly the same level. As regards mobility, they have on at least one

occasion--namely Zwartz Kop--taken their guns up a place condemned by

the Royal Artillery as impossible. All this experience is now to be

made no further use of, and the guns pass into the hands of men who

will have to learn it afresh. A great advantage the Naval gunners had

over the Royal Artillery was their use of the glass. Besides the

telescopic sights used with the big guns, they were provided with a

large telescope on a tripod, at which an officer was always seated

watching the effect of the shells, and, in the case of an advance the

movements of our Infantry as well, and they were never guilty, as the

Royal Artillery have been more than once, of firing on our own men. On

January 24th, whilst the fighting on the top of Spion Kop was taking

place, the Naval guns on Mount Alice were able at a distance of rather

over four miles clearly to distinguish our men from the Boers, and

shell the latter. Compare this with one instance that came under my

personal observation on February 27th. An officer in command of a

battery was totally unable to distinguish, with a pair of the

field-glasses supplied by Government, at a distance of a little over

one mile, between our Infantry charging and the Boers running away. I

see that your Cape correspondent has already said that in this

campaign, where we are perpetually fighting against an invisible foe,

good glasses are of paramount importance to the rifle. They are even

more essential to the gunners than to the other branches of the

service, and they are in this respect most inadequately supplied.

* * * * *

_Speech of the First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Goschen) at Royal

Academy Banquet, May 5th, 1900._

"I do not propose to dilate on the courage or resourcefulness, or

other great qualities of the Naval Brigades. The nation has acclaimed

them. The Sovereign with her own lips has testified to their deeds....

"The ships' companies of the _Powerful_ and _Terrible_ would be sorry

if they were to monopolise the public eye, clouding the performances

of men from other ships. Many other ships have sent contingents to the

front--the _Monarch_, the _Doris_, the _Philomel_, the _Tartar_, the

_Forte_--all these ships have sent men who have taken their part in

those gallant combats of which we read."

* * * * *

_Again at Reception of Naval Brigade (H.M.S. "Powerful") in London,

May 7th, 1900._

"With your comrades in other forces of the Queen, by the defence and

the relief of Ladysmith you have saved the country from such a

disaster as has never fallen the British arms. The defence and relief

of Ladysmith will never be forgotten in British history."

* * * * *

[_London Gazette_, March 12th, 1901.]

_From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade._

De Wet's Farm,

_June 5th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

"On May 14th, two more 12-pounders under Lieutenant Steele (Lieutenant

Burne having had a severe fall from his horse, and being

incapacitated) occupied another hill across the river....

"Lieutenant Burne has quite recovered from his injuries and has

returned to duty at Glencoe."

* * * * *

_From Captain Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade._

Volksrust,

_June 14th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

"It became apparent that the hill (Van Wyk) must be held. General

Hildyard was out there and decided to hold it, sending back for the

rest of the Brigade.

"I arrived back in camp at 4 p.m. and was ordered to start after

dark--as the route was exposed to the enemy's fire--and, if possible,

to get two 12-pounders (Lieutenant Burne's) up the hill by daylight,

and the 4.7's to the bottom. This we did after a most difficult march,

arriving at the bottom at 4 a.m. I halted the 4.7's and pushed the

12-pounders up to the top. One arrived at daylight, the other broke a

wheel and did not get up to the top till we were able later to get

another pair of wheels from a limber and adapt them."

* * * * *

_From General Sir Redvers Buller, V.C., G.C.B._

Laing's Nek, Natal,

_June 19th, 1900._

[_Extract._]

"On June 5th I directed General Hildyard, who with the 5th Division

was encamped at De Wet's farm, to occupy on the 6th the height south

of the Botha's Pass Road, marked on the map as Van Wyk.... The ascent

of the hill was very difficult, and it was due to the energy of

Captain Jones, R.N., and the officers and men of the Naval Brigade

that one 12-pounder (Lieutenant Burne) was in position at Van Wyk at

daylight. The other 12-pounder lost a wheel in the bad ground.... The

Naval guns and the 10th Brigade were brought down from Van Wyk during

the night. I may here remark that hard and well as Captain Jones and

the men of the Naval Brigade worked during this war, I do not believe

they ever had harder work to do or did it more willingly than in

getting their guns up and down Van Wyk. They had to work continuously

for thirty-six hours...."

* * * * *

_From Field-Marshal Lord Roberts, V.C., G.C.B._

Pretoria,

_July 10th, 1900._

"I have much pleasure in supporting the recommendations put forward by

Sir Redvers Buller on behalf of the Officers and Petty Officers of the

Royal Navy."

* * * * *

_Report from Lieutenant Burne, R.N._

H.M.S. _Monarch's_ (late H.M.S. _Tartar's_) 12-pounder Q.-F. Battery,

Grass Kop, Sandspruit.

_October 24th, 1900._

On withdrawal from the front, I wish to forward for the favourable

consideration of the Commander-in-Chief, Admiral Sir Robert Harris,

K.C.M.G., a short report on detachment of H.M.S. _Monarch's_ (late

_Tartar's_) men now under my command, and who have served on shore

with the Natal Army for over a year. Since my last report to Captain

Jones, R.N., the Officer commanding Naval Brigade, on June 16th, after

the victory of Almond's Nek, this battery has taken part in the march

on Wakkerstroom and its occupation, the defence of Sandspruit and

action four miles north of it, with Cavalry and other Artillery, under

General Brocklehurst, M.V.O., which was a spirited little affair, and

where the battery earned the commendation of the General on the

shooting; later, the attack on Grass Kop and its occupation by the

Dorsets was covered by these guns and other artillery on July 24th,

and drew a heavy shell fire from four Boer Creusot guns in its

defence, this battery at that time being led by Lieutenant

Clutterbuck, R.N., when I was ill with jaundice, but whom I again

relieved on July 27th, and have continued since that date in the

defence of Grass Kop. My guns from here covered the right flank of two

separate attacks in force on Comersfoort, the first under General

Hildyard on July 30th, and the second under Sir Redvers Buller on

August 7th, when the town was taken. We have also covered many

reconnaissances, and have come into action at long ranges several

times against marauding Boers on the plain at the foot of this hill,

but hitherto they have not attacked us, as the hill is magnificently

entrenched and has been held in turn by the Dorsets, the South

Lancashires, and now the Queen's Regiment. The whole of the

intelligence from Grass Kop as to movements of the enemy since July

24th up to this date, has been furnished by my look-outs with our long

telescope; and this I need scarcely say has been a considerable and

arduous duty for the men under the conditions of violent winds, rain,

mist, and storms which prevailed up here (a height of 6,500 feet),

since we occupied the hill. These wind-storms have destroyed our tents

once, sometimes continuing for days, and have caused much discomfort

both to ourselves and the troops, and I have lost a good many oxen by

exposure and lung sickness. Orders having come for the withdrawal of

the Naval Brigade, I can only say I have been well and faithfully

served by the Officers and men of the detachment under my command; and

during these months have formed a high opinion of their excellence as

a battery, under the varying conditions of climate, heights, and

positions, they have gone through in Natal, the Orange Colony, and

the Transvaal. All these men, in spite of much sickness at times, have

stuck to their work with the Natal Army for a year now, and

consequently I think, fully deserve any advancement or reward it is

possible to give them, and I am sure H.M.S. _Tartar_ may be proud of

the men representing her during the war. I wish to bring this general

opinion of the men of the detachment, which I hold, to the favourable

notice of the Commander-in-Chief, and to specially recommend the

following for good service rendered with the guns:

A. L. Munro, C.P.O. and torpedo instructor (late of H.M.S.

_Tartar_).

G. H. Epsley, P.O., 2nd class and captain 1st gun (late of H.M.S.

_Tartar_).

E. Cheeseman, A.B., S.G., and acting captain 2nd gun (late of

H.M.S. _Tartar_).

D. Smith, A.B., S.G.T., gun crew (late of H.M.S. _Tartar_).

J. Macdonald, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. _Tartar_).

G. Baldwin, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. _Tartar_).

J. Sawyer, A.B., S.G., gun crew (late of H.M.S. _Tartar_).

H. Wright, A.B., T.M., gun crew (late of H.M.S. _Tartar_).

For his good services as armourer and work drawing ordnance and

transport, stores, money, and in charge of commissariat, I

particularly recommend O. A. Hart, armourer's mate, H.M.S. _Tartar_

(late), a man thoroughly reliable.

As regards the Officer and six men of H.M.S. _Philomel_ attached to my

command, three of whom have since been invalided, I must strongly

recommend Mr. W. R. Ledgard, midshipman, who since July 28th I have

detached, as ordered by G.O.C. 5th Division, in independent command of

one gun, first at Opperman's Kraal, and then at Paardekop; he has

carried out this duty with ability and success, and for a young

officer I know it has been a trying one.

I also recommend T. Payne, A.B., S.G., H.M.S. _Philomel_, for good

service with the guns.

Expressing my gratification at having had the opportunity to command

H.M.S. _Tartar's_ (now _Monarch's_) Detachment, I have, etc.

APPENDIX III

DIARY OF THE BOER WAR UP TO OCTOBER 25TH, 1900.

1899.

Oct. 11.--Time fixed by the Boers for compliance with "ultimatum"

expired at 5 p.m.

Oct. 14.--Boers march on Kimberley and Mafeking.

Oct. 15.--KIMBERLEY ISOLATED.

Oct. 20.--Boer position on TALANA HILL captured by the British under

Symons.

Oct. 21.--White moves out force under French to eject Boers from

ELANDSLAAGTE. Boers routed.

Oct. 22.--Yule retires from Dundee on Ladysmith _via_ Beith.

Oct. 23.--Death of General Symons at Dundee.

Oct. 30.--General sortie from Ladysmith. Naval guns silence Boer siege

artillery.

Surrender of part of two battalions and a Mountain Battery at

Nicholson's Nek.

Oct. 31.--General Sir Redvers Buller lands at Capetown.

Nov. 1.--Boers invade Cape Colony.

Nov. 2.--LADYSMITH ISOLATED.

Nov. 9.--General attack on Ladysmith repulsed with heavy loss to

Boers.

Nov. 15.--Armoured train wrecked by Boers near Chieveley. Over 100

British troops captured.

Nov. 19.--Lord Methuen's column for the relief of Kimberley

concentrated at Orange River.

Nov. 23.--Methuen attacks Boers at BELMONT with Guards' Brigade and

9th Brigade. Boers driven from their position.

Nov. 25.--Methuen attacks Boers in position at Enslin and dislodges

them.

General Sir Redvers Buller arrives in Natal.

Nov. 28.--Methuen engages 11,000 Boers at MODDER RIVER. Battle lasting

all day. Boers evacuate position.

Nov. 30.--Sixth Division for South Africa notified.

Dec. 1.--Australian and Canadian Contingents leave Capetown for the

front.

Dec. 10.--Gatacre attempts night attack on STORMBERG, but is surprised

and driven back with heavy loss.

Dec. 11.--Methuen attacks Boer position at MAGERSFONTEIN and is

repulsed with heavy loss. General Wauchope killed.

Dec. 15.--Buller advances from Chieveley against Boer positions near

COLENSO. British Force repulsed on Tugela with 1,100 casualties and

loss of 12 guns.

Mobilization of 7th Division ordered.

Dec. 18.--Lord Roberts appointed Commander-in-Chief in South Africa,

with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff.

Dec. 19.--Regulations issued for employment of Yeomanry and Volunteers

in South Africa.

Dec. 20.--Formation of City of London Volunteer Corps for South Africa

announced.

1900

Jan. 6.--Suffolk Regiment loses heavily near Rensburg, over 100

prisoners taken.

BOER ATTACK ON LADYSMITH REPULSED.

Jan. 10.--LORD ROBERTS AND LORD KITCHENER ARRIVE AT CAPETOWN.

Jan. 10.--Forward movement for relief of Ladysmith resumed.

Jan. 11.--Dundonald seizes pont on Tugela at Potgieter's Drift.

Jan. 18.--Buller makes SECOND ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith. Dundonald

having crossed Tugela engages Boers near Acton Homes.

Crossing of Tugela by Warren and Lyttelton concluded.

Jan. 21.--Warren attacks Boers' right flank.

Jan. 23-4.--SPION KOP captured and held during 24th, but evacuated on

the night of Jan. 24-25. General Woodgate fatally wounded.

Jan. 26-7.--Buller's force recrosses the Tugela.

Feb. 3.--Macdonald with Highland Brigade marches out from Modder

River.

Feb. 5.--Buller's THIRD ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith commenced.

Lyttelton crosses Tugela, and delivers attack on VAAL KRANTZ, which he

captures and occupies.

Feb. 7.--Vaal Krantz evacuated and British Force withdrawn across the

Tugela.

Feb. 9.--Lord Roberts arrives at Modder River.

Feb. 11.--French, having been summoned from Southern Frontier, leaves

Modder River with Cavalry Division and Horse Artillery.

Feb. 13.--Lord Roberts at Dekiel's Drift.

Feb. 15.--Lord Roberts at Jacobsdal.

RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY.

Feb. 17.--Rearguard action between Kelly-Kenny and Cronje _en route_

to Bloemfontein.

FOURTH ATTEMPT to relieve Ladysmith.

Buller presses advance on Monte Christo Hill.

Feb. 19.--Buller takes Hlangwane Hill.

Feb. 20.--Boers under Cronje, having laagered near Paardeberg, are

bombarded by Lord Roberts.

Feb. 21.--Fifth Division crosses Tugela.

Feb. 23.--Buller unsuccessfully attacks Railway Hill.

Feb. 26.--Buller makes fresh passage of Tugela.

Feb. 27.--CRONJE SURRENDERS AT PAARDEBERG.

PIETERS HILL, the main Boer position between Ladysmith and the

Tugela, carried by Hildyard.

Feb. 28.--RELIEF OF LADYSMITH.

Clements occupies Colesberg.

Mar. 5.--Gatacre occupies Stormberg.

Brabant again defeats and pursues Boers.

Overtures of peace made by Boer Presidents.

Mar. 6.--Field Force arrives at Carnarvon to quell rising in

North-West.

Mar. 7.--Lord Roberts routs a large force of Boers at Poplar Grove.

Mar. 10.--Lord Roberts defeats Boers at Driefontein.

Mar. 11.--Overtures of peace rejected by Lord Salisbury.

Mar. 13.--Lord Roberts, without further fighting, takes possession of

BLOEMFONTEIN. Boers retire on Kroonstad.

Mar. 27.--DEATH OF GENERAL JOUBERT.

Mar. 31.--Broadwood attacked at Waterworks. During retirement R.H.A.

and convoy entrapped at Koorn Spruit. Six guns lost, 350 casualties.

April 3.--Detachment of Royal Irish Rifles and Mounted Infantry

surrounded near Reddersburg.

April 7.--Colonel Dalgety isolated near Wepener.

April 15.--Chermside leaves Reddersburg to relieve Wepener.

April 25.--Dalgety relieved. Boers retreat northwards, under Botha.

May 10.--Zand River crossed, Boers rapidly retreating before Lord

Roberts's advance.

May 12.--Lord Roberts enters KROONSTAD without opposition, President

Steyn having retired to Heilbron, which he proclaims his new capital.

Attack on Mafeking repulsed, 108 Boer prisoners, including

Commandant Eloff, taken.

May 13.--Mahon with Mafeking Relief Column repulses attack at

Koodoosrand.

May 15.--Buller occupies Dundee and Glencoe, having driven the Boers

from the Biggarsberg.

Plumer, reinforced by Canadians and Queenslanders from Carrington's

Division, joins hands with Mahon.

May 17-18.--RELIEF OF MAFEKING.

May 24.--Advance portion of Lord Roberts's force crosses the Vaal near

Parys.

May 28.--ANNEXATION OF ORANGE FREE STATE under name of Orange River

Colony formally proclaimed at Bloemfontein.

May 30.--FLIGHT OF PRESIDENT KRUGER FROM PRETORIA.

May 31.--BRITISH FLAG HOISTED AT JOHANNESBURG.

Surrender of 500 Yeomanry at Lindley.

June 2-4.--Futile negotiations between Buller and Christian Botha for

armistice.

June 5.--OCCUPATION OF PRETORIA.

June 8.--Hildyard takes Botha's Pass.

Surrender of 4th Derbyshires at Roodeval.

June 11.--Stubborn fight at Almond's Nek. Heavy Boer losses.

June 12.--Boers evacuate Laing's Nek.

Roberts defeats Botha at DIAMOND HILL, east of Pretoria.

June 14.--Boer attack on Zand River repulsed.

July 4.--Roberts and Buller join hands at Vlakfontein.

Railway to Natal clear.

July 11.--Surrender of Scots Greys and Lincolns at Uitval Nek.

July 21.--Advance eastwards towards Komati Poort begins.

July 30.--SURRENDER OF PRINSLOO and 3,000 Boers to Hunter in

Brandwater basin.

Aug. 16.--Elands River garrison relieved.

Aug. 25.--Execution of Cordua for conspiracy to kidnap Lord Roberts.

Aug. 26-7.--Fighting at DALMANUTHA.

Aug. 30.--British occupy Nooitgedacht and release 2,000 prisoners.

Sept. 6.--Buller occupies Lydenburg.

Sept. 11.--KRUGER, FLYING FROM THE TRANSVAAL, takes refuge at Lorenzo

Marques.

Sept. 13.--Proclamation issued by Roberts calling on burghers to

surrender.

French occupies Barberton.

Sept. 25.--British Force occupies Komati Poort. Many Boers cross

Portuguese frontier and surrender to Portuguese.

Oct. 9.--De Wet driven across the Vaal out of Orange River Colony.

Oct. 19.--Kruger sails from Lorenzo Marques for Marseilles on Dutch

man-of-war.

Oct. 24.--Buller sails from Capetown for England.

Oct. 25.--FORMAL ANNEXATION OF SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC, to be styled

Transvaal Colony.

APPENDIX IV

THE NAVY AND THE WAR.

A RESUME OF OFFICERS AND MEN MENTIONED IN DESPATCHES FOR THE

OPERATIONS IN NATAL.

_Extract from "Natal Advertiser."_

GENERAL SIR REDVERS BULLER, in his despatches which have just been

published with reference to the operations in Natal, calls attention

to a number of officers, non-commissioned officers, and men whose

services deserve "special mention." He gives thanks to Sir W.

Hely-Hutchinson, the Governor of Natal; to Colonel the Hon. A. H.

Hime, Prime Minister, and all the members of the Government of the

colony. Rear-Admiral Sir R. H. Harris, K.C.M.G., had also been most

helpful. Then follows the list of men "especially worthy of

consideration":--

Captain Percy Scott, C.B., H.M.S. _Terrible_, has discharged the

difficult duties of Commandant of Durban with the greatest tact and

ability, and has been most helpful in every way.

Captain E. P. Jones, H.M.S. _Forte_, as senior officer of the Naval

Brigade, has earned my most heartfelt thanks. The assistance they have

rendered to me has been invaluable; the spirit of their leader was

reflected in the men, and at any time, day or night, they were always

ready, and their work was excellent.

Commander A. H. Limpus and Lieutenant F. C. A. Ogilvy, H.M.S.

_Terrible_, and Lieutenant H. W. James, H.M.S. _Tartar_. These three

Officers were indefatigable. There never was a moment in the day that

they were not working hard and well to advance the work in hand.

The names of the following officers, warrant officers,

non-commissioned officers, and men of the Naval Brigade, Sir Redvers

Buller adds, have been brought to his notice for gallant or

meritorious services by general officers and officers commanding

units:--

OFFICERS--NAVAL BRIGADE.

Lieutenant C. P. Hunt, H.M.S. _Forte_.

Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

Staff-Surgeon F. J. Lilly, H.M.S. _Forte_.

Surgeon C. C. Macmillan, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Surgeon E. C. Lomas, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Acting-Gunner J. Wright, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Midshipman R. B. Hutchinson, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Midshipman H. S. Boldero, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Midshipman G. L. Hodson, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Clerk W. T. Hollin, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

[Illustration: _Photo by Debenham, Southsea._

Captain E. P. JONES, R.N.]

WARRANT, NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, AND MEN.

Chief Petty Officer T. Baldwin, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Chief Petty Officer W. Bate, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Chief Petty Officer B. Stephens, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

First-Class Petty Officer P. Cashman, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

Second-Class Petty Officer C. Challoner, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Second-Class Petty Officer J. J. Frennett, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

Master-at-Arms G. Crowe, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

Armourer Ellis, H.M.S. _Terrible_.

F. Moore, A.B., H.M.S. _Forte_.

THE NAVAL BRIGADE.

General Sir Redvers Buller, in a despatch dated Laing's Nek, June

19th, 1900, says: "I desire to bring to notice the following

officer:--

"Captain E. P. Jones, R.N., Naval Brigade.

"It was due to the energy and perseverance of the officers and men

alike, following the excellent example set them by their Commander,

Captain Jones, that it was possible to place the Naval guns in

position on the 8th, and get them forward subsequently in time to

accompany the advance on the 10th. The excellent marksmanship of the

Naval Brigade, and the skilful distribution of their fire, contributed

materially to the successful result of the attack on Allemann's Nek on

June 11th."

The following names are mentioned by Commanders as having performed

good services, in addition to those previously mentioned:--

Lieutenant G. P. Hunt, H.M.S. _Forte_.

Lieutenant F. W. Melvill, H.M.S. _Forte_.

Lieutenant C. R. N. Burne, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

Lieutenant A. Halsey, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

Midshipman W. R. Ledgard, H.M.S. _Philomel_.

John Restal, chief armourer, H.M.S. _Tartar_.

Alexander Monro, C.P.O., H.M.S. _Tartar_.

J. Weatherhead, P.O., H.M.S. _Philomel_.

E. Waring, yeoman of signals.

Referring to the work at the base and on the lines of communication,

General Buller, in the despatch dated ss. _Dunvegan Castle_, November

9th, says:--

"The Naval transport work at Durban has been throughout under the

charge of Captain Van Koughnet, R.N. I desire to take this opportunity

of bringing to notice the excellent service which he has rendered.

Owing to his tact and ability, the difficult and ofttimes very heavy

work of embarkations and disembarkations has passed smoothly and well.

"Commander G. E. Holland, D.S.O., Indian Marine, has also been

employed at Durban throughout. His genius for organisation, and his

knowledge of transport requirements, is, I should say, unrivalled. He

undertook the alteration of the transports which were fitted at Durban

as hospital ships, and the result of his work has been universally

admitted to have been a conspicuous success. I strongly recommend him

to your consideration.

"Warrant Officer Carpenter S. J. Lacey, R.N., has rendered valuable

service in supervising the fitting of hospital ships and in transport

work generally. I recommend him to your favourable notice.

"The following officers acted as my aides-de-camp, and I submit their

names for your favourable consideration. Each and all of them are

thoroughly capable and deserving officers, and rendered me great

assistance:--

"Commander Edgar Lees, Royal Navy (and others).

"Lieutenant A. Halsey, R.N., H.M.S. _Philomel_, commanded the last

detachment of the Naval Brigade which was left with the Natal Field

Force, and, like all the rest of the Brigade, their services were most

valuable."

[Illustration: Map.]