ÆSTHETIC
_As science of expression and general linguistic_
BY
BENEDETTO CROCE
_translated, from the Italian by_ DOUGLAS AINSLIE
THE NOONDAY PRESS
_A division of_
FARRAR, STRAUS, AND COMPANY
1920
THE
ÆSTHETIC
IS DEDICATED BY THE AUTHOR TO THE MEMORY OF HIS PARENTS
PASQUALE AND LUISA SIPARI
AND OF HIS SISTER
MARIA
CONTENTS
EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION xix
NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR xxv
AUTHOR'S PREFACE xxvii
I
THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC
I
INTUITION AND EXPRESSION
Intuitive knowledge--Its independence with respect to intellectual
knowledge--Intuition and perception--Intuition and the concepts
of space and time--Intuition and sensation--Intuition and
association--Intuition and representation--Intuition and
expression--Illusion as to their difference--Identity of intuition and
expression
II
INTUITION AND ART
Corollaries and explanations--Identity of art and intuitive
knowledge--No specific difference--No difference of intensity--The
difference is extensive and empirical--Artistic genius--Content and
form in Æsthetic--Criticism of the imitation of nature and of the
artistic illusion--Criticism of art conceived as a fact of feeling,
not a theoretical fact--Æsthetic appearance, and feeling--Criticism of
the theory of æsthetic senses--Unity and indivisibility of the work of
art--Art as liberator
III
ART AND PHILOSOPHY
Inseparability of intellectual from intuitive knowledge--Criticism
of the negations of this thesis--Art and science--Content and form:
another meaning--Prose and poetry--The relation of first and second
degree--Non-existence of other forms of cognition--Historicity--Its
identity with and difference from art--Historical criticism--Historical
scepticism--Philosophy as perfect science. The so-called natural
sciences, and their limits--The phenomenon and the noumenon
IV
HISTORICISM AND INTELLECTUALISM IN ÆSTHETIC
Criticism of the probable and of naturalism--Criticism of ideas in
art, of theses in art, and of the typical--Criticism of the symbol
and of the allegory--Criticism of the theory of artistic and literary
kinds--Errors derived from this theory in judgements on art--Empirical
sense of the divisions of kinds
V
ANALOGOUS ERRORS IN THE THEORY OF HISTORY AND IN LOGIC
Criticism of the philosophy of History--Æsthetic intrusions into
Logic--Logic in its essence--Distinction between logical and
non-logical judgements--Syllogistic--Logical falsehood and æsthetic
truth--Reformed logic--Note to the fourth Italian edition
VI
THE THEORETIC ACTIVITY AND THE PRACTICAL ACTIVITY
The will--The will as an ulterior stage in respect to
knowledge--Objections and explanations--Criticism of practical
judgements or judgements of value--Exclusion of the practical from the
æsthetic--Criticism of the theory of the end of art and of the choice
of content--Practical innocence of art--Independence of art--Criticism
of the saying: the style is the man--Criticism of the concept of
sincerity in art
VII
ANALOGY BETWEEN THE THEORETIC AND THE PRACTICAL
The two forms of the practical activity--The economically
useful--Distinction between the useful and the technical--Distinction
of the useful from the egoistic--Economic will and moral will--Pure
economicity--The economic side of morality--The merely economical and
the error of the morally indifferent--Criticism of utilitarianism and
the reform of Ethics and of Economics--Phenomenon and noumenon in
practical activity
VIII
EXCLUSION OF OTHER SPIRITUAL FORMS
The system of the spirit--The forms of genius--Non-existence of a
fifth form of activity--Law; sociability--Religion--Metaphysic--Mental
imagination and the intuitive intellect--Mystical Æsthetic--Mortality
and immortality of art
IX
INDIVISIBILITY OF EXPRESSION INTO MODES OR DEGREES AND CRITICISM OF
RHETORIC
The characters of art--Non-existence of modes of
expression--Impossibility of translations--Criticism of the rhetorical
categories--Empirical sense of the rhetorical categories--Their use as
synonyms of the æsthetic fact--Their use to indicate various æsthetic
imperfections--Their use in a sense transcending æsthetic, in the
service of science--Rhetoric in the schools--The resemblances of
expressions--The relative possibility of translations
X
ÆSTHETIC FEELINGS AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE BEAUTIFUL AND THE UGLY
Various significations of the word feeling--Feeling as activity
--Identification of feeling with economic activity--Criticism
of hedonism--Feeling as a concomitant of every form of activity
--Meaning of certain ordinary distinctions of feelings--Value
and disvalue: the contraries and their union--The beautiful as the
value of expression, or expression without qualification--The ugly,
and the elements of beauty which compose it--Illusion that there exist
expressions neither beautiful nor ugly--True æsthetic feelings and
concomitant and accidental feelings--Criticism of apparent feelings
XI
CRITICISM OF ÆSTHETIC HEDONISM
Criticism of the beautiful as that which pleases the higher
senses--Criticism of the theory of play--Criticism of the theory of
sexuality and of triumph--Criticism of the Æsthetic of the sympathetic:
meaning in it of content and form--Æsthetic hedonism and moralism--The
rigoristic negation, and the pedagogic justification of art--Criticism
of pure beauty
XII
THE ÆSTHETIC OF THE SYMPATHETIC AND PSEUDO-ÆSTHETIC CONCEPTS
Pseudo-æsthetic concepts, and the Æsthetic of the
sympathetic--Criticism of the theory of the ugly in art and
of the overcoming of it--Pseudo-æsthetic concepts belong to
Psychology--Impossibility of rigorous definitions of them--Examples:
definitions of the sublime, of the comic, of the humorous--Relation
between these concepts and æsthetic concepts
XIII
THE "PHYSICALLY BEAUTIFUL" IN NATURE AND IN ART
Æsthetic activity and physical concepts--Expression in the æsthetic
sense, and expression in the naturalistic sense--Representations and
memory--The production of aids to memory--Physical beauty--Content and
form: another meaning--Natural beauty and artificial beauty--Mixed
beauty--Writings--Free and non-free beauty--Criticism of non-free
beauty--Stimulants of production
XIV
ERRORS ARISING FROM THE CONFUSION BETWEEN PHYSICS AND ÆSTHETIC
Criticism of æsthetic associationism--Criticism of æsthetic
Physics--Criticism of the theory of the beauty of the human
body--Criticism of the beauty of geometrical figures--Criticism of
another aspect of the imitation of nature--Criticism of the theory of
the elementary forms of the beautiful--Criticism of the search for the
objective conditions of the beautiful--The astrology of Æsthetic
XV
THE ACTIVITY OF EXTERNALIZATION. TECHNIQUE AND THE THEORY OF THE ARTS
The practical activity of externalization--The technique of
externalization--Technical theories of the different arts--Criticism of
æsthetic theories of particular arts--Criticism of the classification
of the arts--Criticism of the theory of the union of the arts--Relation
of the activity of externalization to utility and morality
XVI
TASTE AND THE REPRODUCTION OF ART
Æsthetic judgement: its identity with æsthetic
reproduction--Impossibility of divergences--Identity of taste
and genius--Analogy with other activities--Criticism of æsthetic
absolutism (intellectualism) and relativism--Criticism of relative
relativism--Objection founded on the variation of the stimulus and
of psychic disposition--Criticism of the distinction of signs into
natural and conventional--The surmounting of variety--Restorations and
historical interpretation
XVII
THE HISTORY OF LITERATURE AND OF ART
Historical criticism in literature and art: its importance--Literary
and artistic history: its distinction from historical criticism and
from the æsthetic judgement--The method of artistic and literary
history--Criticism of the problem of the origin of art--The criterion
of progress and history--Non-existence of a single line of progress
in artistic and literary history--Errors committed against this law--
Other meanings of the word "progress" in relation to Æsthetic
XVIII
CONCLUSION: IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC AND ÆSTHETIC
Summary of the study--Identity of Linguistic with Æsthetic--Æsthetic
formulation of linguistic problems--Nature of language--Origin
of language and its development--Relation between Grammar and
Logic--Grammatical kinds or parts of speech--The individuality of
speech and the classification of languages--Impossibility of a
normative Grammar--Didactic organisms--Elementary linguistic facts, or
roots--Æsthetic judgement and the model language--Conclusion
II
HISTORY OF ÆSTHETIC
I
ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN GRÆCO-ROMAN ANTIQUITY
Point of view of this History of Æsthetic--Mistaken tendencies, and
attempts towards an Æsthetic, in Græco-Roman antiquity--Origin of the
æsthetic problem in Greece--Plato's rigoristic negation--Æsthetic
hedonism and moralism--Mystical æsthetic in antiquity--Investigations
as to the Beautiful--Distinction between the theory of Art and the
theory of the Beautiful--Fusion of the two by Plotinus--The scientific
tendency: Aristotle--The concepts of imitation and of imagination after
Aristotle: Philostratus--Speculations on language
II
ÆSTHETIC IDEAS IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE
Middle Ages. Mysticism: Ideas on the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory
of art in the Middle Ages--Hints of an Æsthetic in scholastic
philosophy--Renaissance: Philography and philosophical and empirical
inquiries concerning the Beautiful--The pedagogic theory of art and
the Poetics of Aristotle--The "Poetics of the Renaissance"--Dispute
concerning the universal and the probable in art--G. Fracastoro--L.
Castelvetro--Piccolomini and Pinciano--Fr. Patrizzi (Patricius)
III
FERMENTS OF THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
New words and new observations in the seventeenth
century--Wit--Taste--Various meanings of the word taste--Fancy or
imagination--Feeling--Tendency to unite these terms--Difficulties
and contradictions in their definition--Wit and intellect--Taste
and intellectual judgement--The "_je ne sais quoi_"--Imagination
and sensationalism: the corrective of imagination--Feeling and
sensationalism
IV
ÆSTHETIC IDEAS OF THE CARTESIAN AND LEIBNITIAN SCHOOLS, AND THE
"ÆSTHETIC" OF BAUMGARTEN
Cartesianism and imagination--Crousaz and André--The English:
Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and the Scottish School--Leibniz:
"_petites perceptions_" and confused knowledge--Intellectualism of
Leibniz--Speculations on language--J. C. Wolff--Demand for an organon
of inferior knowledge--Alexander Baumgarten: his "Æsthetic"--Æsthetic
as science of sensory consciousness--Criticism of judgements passed on
Baumgarten--Intellectualism of Baumgarten--New names and old meanings
V
GIAMBATTISTA VICO
Vico as inventor of æsthetic science--Poetry and philosophy:
imagination and intellect--Poetry and history--Poetry and
language--Inductive and formalistic logic--Vico opposed to all
former theories of poetry--Vico's judgements of the grammarians and
linguists who preceded him--Influence of seventeenth-century writers on
Vico--Æsthetic in the _Scienza Nuova_--Vico's mistakes--Progress still
to be achieved
VI
MINOR ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
The influence of Vico--Italian writers: A. Conti--Quadrio and
Zanotti--M. Cesarotti--Bettinelli and Pagano--German disciples of
Baumgarten: G. F. Meier--Confusions of Meier--M. Mendelssohn and other
followers of Baumgarten--Vogue of Æsthetic--Eberhard and Eschenburg--J.
G. Sulzer--K. H. Heydenreich--J. G. Herder--Philosophy of language
VII
OTHER ÆSTHETIC DOCTRINES OF THE SAME PERIOD
Other writers of the eighteenth century: Batteux--The English:
W. Hogarth--E. Burke--H. Home--Eclecticism and sensationalism:
E. Platner--Fr. Hemsterhuis--Neo-Platonism and mysticism:
Winckelmann--Beauty and lack of significance--Winckelmann's
contradictions and compromises--A. R. Mengs--G. E. Lessing--Theorists
of ideal Beauty--G. Spalletti and the characteristic--Beauty and the
characteristic: Hirt, Meyer, Goethe
VIII
IMMANUEL KANT
I. Kant--Kant and Vico--Identity of the concept of Art in Kant
and Baumgarten--Kant's "Lectures"--Art in the _Critique of
Judgment_--Imagination in Kant's system--The forms of intuition and the
Transcendental Æsthetic--Theory of Beauty distinguished by Kant from
that of Art--Mystical features in Kant's theory of Beauty
IX
THE ÆSTHETIC OF IDEALISM: SCHILLER, SCHELLING, SOLGER, HEGEL
The _Critique of Judgment_ and metaphysical idealism--F.
Schiller--Relations between Schiller and Kant--The æsthetic sphere as
the sphere of Play--Æsthetic education--Vagueness and lack of precision
in Schiller's Æsthetic--Schiller's caution and the rashness of the
Romanticists--Ideas on Art: J. P. Richter--Romantic Æsthetic and
idealistic Æsthetic--J. G. Fichte--Irony: Schlegel, Tieck, Novalis--F.
Schelling--Beauty and character--Art and Philosophy--Ideas and the
gods: Art and mythology--K. W. Solger--Fancy and imagination--Art,
practice and religion--G. W. F. Hegel--Art in the sphere of absolute
spirit--Beauty as sensible appearance of the Idea--Æsthetic in
metaphysical idealism and Baumgartenism--Mortality and decay of art in
Hegel's system
X
SCHOPENHAUER AND HERBART
Æsthetic mysticism in the opponents of idealism--A. Schopenhauer--Ideas
as the object of art--Æsthetic catharsis--Signs of a better theory in
Schopenhauer--J. F. Herbart--Pure Beauty and relations of form--Art as
sum of content and form--Herbart and Kantian thought
XI
FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER
Æsthetic of content and Æsthetic of form: meaning of the
contrast--Friedrich Schleiermacher--Wrong judgements concerning
him--Schleiermacher contrasted with his predecessors--Place assigned
to Æsthetic in his Ethics--Æsthetic activity as immanent and
individual--Artistic truth and intellectual truth--Difference of
artistic consciousness from feeling and religion--Dreams and art:
inspiration and deliberation--Art and the typical--Independence of
art--Art and language--Schleiermacher's defects--Schleiermacher's
services to Æsthetic
XII
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE: HUMBOLDT AND STEINTHAL
Progress of Linguistic--Linguistic speculation at the beginning
of the nineteenth century--Wilhelm von Humboldt: relics of
intellectualism--Language as activity: internal form--Language and
art in Humboldt--II. Steinthal: the linguistic function independent
of the logical--Identity of the problems of the origin and the nature
of language--Steinthal's mistaken ideas on art: his failure to unite
Linguistic and Æsthetic
XIII
MINOR GERMAN ÆSTHETICIANS
Minor æstheticians in the metaphysical school--Krause, Trahndorff,
Weisse and others--Fried. Theodor Vischer--Other tendencies--Theory
of the Beautiful in nature, and that of the Modifications of
Beauty--Development of the first theory: Herder--Schelling, Solger,
Hegel--Schleiermacher--Alexander von Humboldt--Vischer's "Æsthetic
Physics"--The theory of the Modifications of Beauty: from antiquity
to the eighteenth century--Kant and the post-Kantians--Culmination
of the development--Double form of the theory: the overcoming of the
ugly: Solger, Weisse and others--Passage from abstract to concrete:
Vischer--The "legend of Sir Purebeauty"
XIV
ÆSTHETIC IN FRANCE, ENGLAND AND ITALY DURING THE FIRST HALF OF THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
Æsthetic movement in France: Cousin, Jouffroy--English Æsthetic--
Italian Æsthetic--Rosmini and Gioberti--Italian Romantics. Dependence
of art
XV
FRANCESCO DE SANCTIS
F. de Sanctis: development of his thought--Influence of
Hegelism--Unconscious criticism of Hegelism--Criticisms of German
Æsthetic--Final rebellion against metaphysical Æsthetic--De Sanctis'
own theory--The concept of form--De Sanctis as art-critic--De Sanctis
as philosopher
XVI
ÆSTHETIC OF THE EPIGONI
Revival of Herbartian Æsthetic--Robert Zimmermann--Vischer _versus_
Zimmermann--Hermann Lotze--Efforts to reconcile Æsthetic of
form and Æsthetic of content--K. Köstlin--Æsthetic of content.
M. Schasler--Eduard von Hartmann--Hartmann and the theory of
modifications--Metaphysical Æsthetic in France: C. Levêque--In
England: J. Ruskin--Æsthetic in Italy--Antonio Tari and his
lectures--Æsthesigraphy
XVII
ÆSTHETIC POSITIVISM AND NATURALISM
Positivism and evolutionism--Æsthetic of H. Spencer--Physiologists of
Æsthetic: Grant Allen, Helmholtz and others--Method of the natural
sciences in Æsthetic--H. Taine's Æsthetic--Taine's metaphysic and
moralism--G. T. Fechner: inductive Æsthetic--Experiments--Trivial
nature of his ideas on Beauty and Art--Ernst Grosse: speculative
Æsthetic and the Science of Art--Sociological Æsthetic--Proudhon--J. M.
Guyau--M. Nordau--Naturalism: C. Lombroso--Decline of linguistic--Signs
of revival: H. Paul--The linguistic of Wundt
XVIII
ÆSTHETIC PSYCHOLOGISM AND OTHER RECENT TENDENCIES
Neo-criticism and empiricism--Kirchmann--Metaphysic translated into
Psychology: Vischer--Siebeck--M. Diez--Psychological tendency.
Teodor Lipps--K. Groos--The modifications of the Beautiful in Groos and
Lipps--E. Véron and the double form of Æsthetic--L. Tolstoy--F. Nietzsche
--An æsthetician of Music: E. Hanslick--Hanslick's concept of form
--Æstheticians of the figurative arts: C. Fiedler--Intuition and
expression--Narrow limits of these theories--H. Bergson--Attempts
to return to Baumgarten: C. Hermann--Eclecticism: B. Bosanquet
--Æsthetic of expression: present state
XIX
HISTORICAL SKETCHES OF SOME PARTICULAR DOCTRINES
Result of the history of Æsthetic--History of science and history of
the scientific criticism of particular errors
I. RHETORIC: OR THE THEORY OF ORNATE FORM.
Rhetoric in the ancient sense--Criticism from moral point of
view--Accumulation without system--Its fortunes in the Middle Ages
and Renaissance--Criticisms by Vives, Ramus and Patrizzi--Survival
into modern times--Modern signification of Rhetoric: theory of
literary form--Concept of ornament--Classes of ornament--The
concept of the Fitting--The theory of ornament in the Middle
Ages and Renaissance--_Reductio ad absurdum_ in the seventeenth
century--Polemic concerning the theory of ornament--Du Marsais and
metaphor--Psychological interpretation--Romanticism and Rhetoric:
present day
II. HISTORY OF ARTISTIC AND LITERARY KINDS
The kinds in antiquity: Aristotle--In the Middle Ages and
Renaissance--The doctrine of the three unities--Poetics of the kinds
and rules: Scaliger--Lessing--Compromises and extensions--Rebellion
against rules in general--G. Bruno, Guarini--Spanish critics--G.
B. Marino--G. V. Gravina--Fr. Montani--Critics of the eighteenth
century--Romanticism and the "strict kinds": Berchet, V. Hugo--Their
persistence in philosophical theories--Fr. Schelling--E. von
Hartmann--The kinds in the schools
III. THE THEORY OF THE LIMITS OF THE ARTS
The limits of the arts in Lessing--Arts of space and arts of
time--Limits and classifications of the arts in later philosophy:
Herder and Kant--Schelling, Solger--Schopenhauer, Herbart--Weisse,
Zeising, Vischer--M. Schasler--E. v. Hartmann--The supreme art:
Richard Wagner--Lotze's attack on classifications--Contradictions in
Lotze--Doubts in Schleiermacher
IV. OTHER PARTICULAR DOCTRINES
The Æsthetic theory of natural beauty--The theory of æsthetic
senses--The theory of kinds of style--The theory of grammatical forms
or parts of speech--Theory of æsthetic criticism--Distinction between
taste and genius--Concept of artistic and literary history--Conclusion
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL APPENDIX
INDEX
EXTRACT FROM INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION, 1909
I can lay no claim to having discovered an America, but I do claim to
have discovered a Columbus. His name is Benedetto Croce, and he dwells
on the shores of the Mediterranean, at Naples, city of the antique
Parthenope.
It was at Naples, in the winter of 1907, that I first saw the
Philosopher of Æsthetic. Benedetto Croce, although born in the Abruzzi,
Province of Aquila (1866), is essentially a Neapolitan, and rarely
remains long absent from the city, on the shore of that magical sea
where once Ulysses sailed, and where sometimes yet (near Amalfi) we
may hear the Syrens sing their song. But more wonderful than the song
of any Syren seems to me the Theory of Æsthetic as the Science of
Expression, and that is why I have overcome the obstacles that stood
between me and the giving of this theory, which in my belief is the
truth, to the English-speaking world.
. . . . . . . . . .
The solution of the problem of Æsthetic is not in the gift of the Muses.
This Philosophy of the Spirit is symptomatic of the happy reaction of
the twentieth century against the crude materialism of the second half
of the nineteenth. It is the spirit which gives to the work of art its
value, not this or that method of arrangement, this or that tint or
cadence, which can always be copied by skilful plagiarists: not so
the _spirit_ of the creator. In England we hear too much of (natural)
science, which has usurped the very name of Philosophy. The natural
sciences are very well in their place, but discoveries such as aviation
are of infinitely less importance to the race than the smallest
addition to the philosophy of the spirit. Empirical science, with the
collusion of positivism, has stolen the cloak of philosophy and must be
made to give it back.
. . . . . . . . . .
Yet though severe, the editor of _La Critica_ is uncompromisingly just,
and would never allow personal dislike or jealousy, or any extrinsic
consideration, to stand in the way of fair treatment to the writer
concerned. Many superficial English critics might benefit considerably
by attention to this quality in one who is in other respects also so
immeasurably their superior. A good instance of this impartiality is
his critique of Schopenhauer, with whose system he is in complete
disagreement, yet affords him full credit for what of truth is
contained in his voluminous writings.
. . . . . . . . . .
This thoroughness it is which gives such importance to the literary
and philosophical criticisms of _La Critica._ Croce's method is always
historical, and his object in approaching any work of art is to
classify the spirit of its author, as expressed in that work. There
are, he maintains, but two things to be considered in criticizing a
book. These are, _firstly,_ what is its _peculiarity,_ in what way is
it singular, how is it differentiated from other works? _Secondly,_
what is its degree of _purity_?--That is, to what extent has its author
kept himself free from all considerations alien to the perfection of
the work as an expression, as a lyrical intuition? With the answering
of these questions Croce is satisfied. He does not care to know if the
author keep a motor-car, like Mæterlinck; or prefer to walk on Putney
Heath, like Swinburne. This amounts to saying that all works of art
must be judged by their own standard. How far has the author succeeded
in doing what he intended?
. . . . . . . . . .
As regards Croce's general philosophical position, it is important to
understand that he is _not_ a Hegelian, in the sense of being a close
follower of that philosopher. One of his last works is that in which
he deals in a masterly manner with the philosophy of Hegel. The title
may be translated, "What is living and what is dead of the philosophy
of Hegel." Here he explains to us the Hegelian system more clearly
than that wondrous edifice was ever before explained, and we realize
at the same time that Croce is quite as independent of Hegel as of
Kant, of Vico as of Spinoza. Of course he has made use of the best of
Hegel, just as every thinker makes use of his predecessors and is in
his turn made use of by those that follow him. But it is incorrect
to accuse of Hegelianism the author of an anti-hegelian _Æsthetic,_
of a _Logic_ where Hegel is only half accepted, and of a _Philosophy
of the Practical_ which contains hardly a trace of Hegel. I give an
instance. If the great conquest of Hegel be the dialectic of opposites,
his great mistake lies in the confusion of opposites with things
which are distinct but not opposite. If, says Croce, we take as an
example the application of the Hegelian triad that formulates becoming
(affirmation, negation and synthesis), we find it applicable for those
opposites which are true and false, good and evil, being and not-being,
but _not applicable_ to things which are distinct but not opposite,
such as art and philosophy, beauty and truth, the useful and the moral.
These confusions led Hegel to talk of the death of art, to conceive as
possible a Philosophy of History, and to the application of the natural
sciences to the absurd task of constructing a Philosophy of Nature.
Croce has cleared away these difficulties by showing that if from the
meeting of opposites must arise a superior synthesis, such a synthesis
cannot arise from things which are distinct _but not opposite,_ since
the former are connected together as superior and inferior, and the
inferior can exist without the superior, but _not vice versa._ Thus we
see how philosophy cannot exist without art, while art, occupying the
lower place, can and does exist without philosophy. This brief example
reveals Croce's independence in dealing with Hegelian problems.
I know of no philosopher more generous than Croce in praise and
elucidation of other workers in the same field, past and present. For
instance, and apart from Hegel, _Kant_ has to thank him for drawing
attention to the marvellous excellence of the _Critique of Judgment,_
generally neglected in favour of the Critiques of _Pure Reason and of
Practical Judgment_; _Baumgarten_ for drawing the attention of the
world to his obscure name and for reprinting his Latin thesis in which
the word _Æsthetic_ occurs for the first time; and _Schleiermacher_ for
the tributes paid to his neglected genius in the History of Æsthetic.
_La Critica,_ too, is full of generous appreciation of contemporaries
by Croce and by that profound thinker, Gentile.
. . . . . . . . . .
There can be no doubt of the great value of Croce's work as an
_educative influence,_ and if we are to judge of a philosophical system
by its action on others, then we must place the _Philosophy of the
Spirit_ very high. It may be said with perfect truth that since the
death of the poet Carducci there has been no influence in Italy to
compare with that of Benedetto Croce.
. . . . . . . . . .
Of the popularity that his system and teaching have already attained
we may judge by the fact that the _Æsthetic,_ despite the difficulty of
the subject, is already in its third edition in Italy, where, owing to
its influence, philosophy sells better than fiction; while the French
and Germans, not to mention the Czechs, have long had translations
of the earlier editions. His _Logic_ is on the point of appearing
in its second edition, and I have no doubt that the _Philosophy of
the Practical_ will eventually equal these works in popularity. _The
importance and value of Italian thought have been too long neglected
in Great Britain._ Where, as in Benedetto Croce, we get the clarity
of vision of the Latin, joined to the thoroughness and erudition of
the best German tradition, we have a combination of rare power and
effectiveness, which can by no means be neglected.
The philosopher feels that he has a great mission, which is nothing
less than the leading back of thought to belief in the spirit, deserted
by so many for crude empiricism and positivism. His view of philosophy
is that it sums up all the higher human activities, including religion,
and that in proper hands it is able to solve any problem. But there is
no finality about problems: the solution of one leads to the posing
of another, and so on. Man is the maker of life, and his spirit ever
proceeds from a lower to a higher perfection.
. . . . . . . . . .
I believe that Croce will one day be recognized as one of the very
few great teachers of humanity. At present he is not appreciated at
nearly his full value. One rises from a study of his philosophy with
a sense of having been all the time as it were in personal touch with
the truth, which is very far from the case after the perusal of certain
other philosophies.
Secure in his strength, Croce will often introduce a joke or some
amusing illustration from contemporary life, in the midst of a most
profound and serious argument. This spirit of mirth is a sign of
superiority. He who is not sure of himself can spare no energy for
the making of mirth. Croce loves to laugh at his enemies and with
his friends. So the philosopher of Naples sits by the blue gulf
and explains the universe to those who have ears to hear. "One can
philosophize anywhere," he says--but he remains significantly at Naples.
Thus I conclude these brief remarks upon the author of the _Æsthetic,_
confident that those who give time and attention to its study will be
grateful for having placed in their hands this pearl of great price
from the diadem of the antique Parthenope.
DOUGLAS AINSLIE.
THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL, _May_ 1909.
NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR
TO THE SECOND ENGLISH EDITION
This second edition of the _Æsthetic_ will be found to contain the
complete translation of the historical portion, which I was obliged to
summarize in the first edition. I have made a number of alterations and
some additions to the theoretical portion, following closely the fourth
(definitive) Italian edition, and in so doing have received much advice
and assistance of value from Mrs. Salusbury, to whom I beg to tender
my best thanks. I trust that this new edition will enable all those
desirous of studying the work to get into direct touch with the thought
of the author.
THE ATHENÆUM, PALL MALL, S.W.,
_November_ 1920.
AUTHOR'S PREFACE
This volume is composed of a theoretical and of a historical part,
which form two independent but complementary books.
The nucleus of the theoretical part is a memoir, bearing the title
_Fundamental Theses of an Æsthetic as Science of Expression and General
Linguistic,_ which was read at the Accademia Pontaniana of Naples
during the sessions of February 18 and May 6, 1900, and printed in vol.
xxx. of its _Acts._ The author has added few substantial variations,
but not a few additions and amplifications in rewriting it, also
following a somewhat different sequence with a view to rendering the
exposition more plain and easy. The first five chapters only of the
historical portion were inserted in the Neapolitan review _Flegrea_
(April 1901), under the title _Giambattista Vico, First Discoverer of
Æsthetic Science,_ and these also reappear amplified and brought into
harmony with the rest.
The author has dwelt, especially in the theoretical part, upon general
questions which are side-issues in respect to the theme that he has
treated. But this will not seem a digression to those who remember
that, strictly speaking, there are no particular philosophical
sciences, standing by themselves. Philosophy is unity, and when we
treat of Æsthetic or of Logic or of Ethics, we treat always of the
whole of philosophy, although illustrating for didactic purposes only
one side of that inseparable unity. In like manner, owing to this
intimate connexion of all the parts of philosophy, the uncertainty and
misunderstanding as to the æsthetic activity, the representative and
productive imagination, this firstborn of the spiritual activities,
mainstay of the others, generates everywhere else misunderstandings,
uncertainties and errors: in Psychology as in Logic, in History as
in the Philosophy of Practice. If language is the first spiritual
manifestation, and if the æsthetic form is language itself, taken in
all its true scientific extension, it is hopeless to try to understand
clearly the later and more complicated phases of the life of the
spirit, when their first and simplest moment is ill known, mutilated
and disfigured. From the explanation of the æsthetic activity is also
to be expected the correction of several concepts and the solution
of certain philosophic problems which generally seem to be almost
desperate. Such is precisely the spirit animating the present work. And
if the present attempt and the historical illustrations which accompany
it may be of use in winning friends to these studies, by levelling
obstacles and indicating paths to be followed; if this happen,
especially here in Italy, whose æsthetic traditions (as has been
demonstrated in its place) are very noble, the author will consider
that he has gained his end, and one of his keenest desires will have
been satisfied.
NAPLES, _December_ 1901.
In addition to a careful literary revision, (in which, as well as in
the revision of the notes, I have received valuable help from my friend
Fausto Nicolini) I have in this third edition made certain alterations
of theory, especially in Chapters X. and XI. of Part I., suggested by
further reflexion and self-criticism.
But I have refrained from introducing corrections or additions of such
a kind as to alter the original plan of the book, which was, or was
meant to be, a complete but brief æsthetic theory set in the framework
of a general sketch of a Philosophy of the Spirit.
The reader who desires a complete statement of the general or
collateral doctrines or a more particular exposition of the other parts
of philosophy (_e.g._ the lyrical nature of art) is now referred to the
volumes on _Logic_ and the _Philosophy of Practice,_ which together
with the present work compose the _Philosophy of the Spirit_ which in
the author's opinion exhausts the entire field of Philosophy. The three
volumes were not conceived and written simultaneously; if they had
been, some details would have been differently arranged. When I wrote
the first I had no idea of giving it, as I have now done, two such
companions; and I therefore designed it to be, as I say, complete in
itself. In the second place, the present state of the study of Æsthetic
made it desirable to append to the theoretical exposition a somewhat
full history of the science, whereas for the other parts of Philosophy
I was able to restrict myself to brief historical notes merely designed
to show how, from my point of view, such a history would best be
composed. Lastly, there are many things which now, after a systematic
exposition of the various philosophical sciences, I see in closer
connexions and in a clearer, or at least a different, light; a certain
hesitation and even some doctrinal errors visible here and there in the
_Æsthetic,_ especially where subjects foreign to Æsthetic itself are
being treated, would now no longer be justified. For all these reasons
the three volumes, in spite of their substantial unity of spirit and of
aim, have each its own physiognomy, and show marks of the different
periods of life at which they were written, so as to group themselves,
and to demand interpretation, as a progressive series according to
their dates of publication.
With what may be called the minor problems of Æsthetic, and the
objections which have been or might be brought against my theory, I
have dealt and am continuing to deal in special essays, of which I
shall shortly publish a first collection which will form a kind of
explanatory and polemical appendix to the present volume.
_November_ 1907.
In revising this book once more for a fourth edition, I take the
opportunity of announcing that the supplementary volume of essays
promised above was published in 1910 under the title _Problems of
Æsthetic and Contributions to the History of Æsthetic in Italy._
B. C.
_May_ 1911.
THEORY OF ÆSTHETIC
I
INTUITION AND EXPRESSION
[Sidenote: _Intuitive knowledge._]
Knowledge has two forms: it is either _intuitive_ knowledge or
_logical_ knowledge; knowledge obtained through the _imagination_
or knowledge obtained through the _intellect_; knowledge of the
_individual_ or knowledge of the _universal_; of _individual things_ or
of the _relations_ between them: it is, in fact, productive either of
_images_ or of _concepts._
In ordinary life, constant appeal is made to intuitive knowledge. It is
said that we cannot give definitions of certain truths; that they are
not demonstrable by syllogisms; that they must be learnt intuitively.
The politician finds fault with the abstract reasoner, who possesses no
lively intuition of actual conditions; the educational theorist insists
upon the necessity of developing the intuitive faculty in the pupil
before everything else; the critic in judging a work of art makes it
a point of honour to set aside theory and abstractions, and to judge
it by direct intuition; the practical man professes to live rather by
intuition than by reason.
But this ample acknowledgment granted to intuitive knowledge
in ordinary life, does not correspond to an equal and adequate
acknowledgment in the field of theory and of philosophy. There exists a
very ancient science of intellectual knowledge, admitted by all without
discussion, namely, Logic; but a science of intuitive knowledge is
timidly and with difficulty asserted by but a few. Logical knowledge
has appropriated the lion's share; and if she does not slay and devour
her companion outright, yet yields to her but grudgingly the humble
place of maid-servant or doorkeeper.--What can intuitive knowledge be
without the light of intellectual knowledge? It is a servant without
a master; and though a master find a servant useful, the master is a
necessity to the servant, since he enables him to gain his livelihood.
Intuition is blind; intellect lends her eyes.
[Sidenote: _Its independence with respect to intellectual knowledge._]
Now, the first point to be firmly fixed in the mind is that intuitive
knowledge has no need of a master, nor to lean upon any one; she does
not need to borrow the eyes of others, for she has excellent eyes
of her own. Doubtless it is possible to find concepts mingled with
intuitions. But in many other intuitions there is no trace of such
a mixture, which proves that it is not necessary. The impression of
a moonlight scene by a painter; the outline of a country drawn by a
cartographer; a musical motive, tender or energetic; the words of
a sighing lyric, or those with which we ask, command and lament in
ordinary life, may well all be intuitive facts without a shadow of
intellectual relation. But, think what one may of these instances,
and admitting further the contention that the greater part of the
intuitions of civilized man are impregnated with concepts, there yet
remains to be observed something more important and more conclusive.
Those concepts which are found mingled and fused with the intuitions
are no longer concepts, in so far as they are really mingled and
fused, for they have lost all independence and autonomy. They have
been concepts, but have now become simple elements of intuition.
The philosophical maxims placed in the mouth of a personage of
tragedy or of comedy, perform there the function, not of concepts,
but of characteristics of such personage; in the same way as the
red in a painted face does not there represent the red colour of
the physicists, but is a characteristic element of the portrait.
The whole is that which determines the quality of the parts. A work
of art may be full of philosophical concepts; it may contain them
in greater abundance and they may there be even more profound than
in a philosophical dissertation, which in its turn may be rich to
overflowing with descriptions and intuitions. But notwithstanding all
these concepts the total effect of the work of art is an intuition;
and notwithstanding all those intuitions, the total effect of the
philosophical dissertation is a concept. The _Promessi Sposi_ contains
copious ethical observations and distinctions, but does not for that
reason lose as a whole its character of simple story or intuition. In
like manner the anecdotes and satirical effusions to be found in the
works of a philosopher like Schopenhauer do not deprive those works
of their character of intellectual treatises. The difference between
a scientific work and a work of art, that is, between an intellectual
fact and an intuitive fact, lies in the difference of the total effect
aimed at by their respective authors. This it is that determines and
rules over the several parts of each not these parts separated and
considered abstractly in themselves.
[Sidenote: _Intuition and perception._]
But to admit the independence of intuition as regards concept does
not suffice to give a true and precise idea of intuition. Another
error arises among those who recognize this, or who at any rate do not
explicitly make intuition dependent upon the intellect, to obscure
and confuse the real nature of intuition. By intuition is frequently
understood _perception,_ or the knowledge of actual reality, the
apprehension of something as _real._
Certainly perception is intuition: the perceptions of the room in
which I am writing, of the ink-bottle and paper that are before me,
of the pen I am using, of the objects that I touch and make use of as
instruments of my person, which, if it write, therefore exists;--these
are all intuitions. But the image that is now passing through my brain
of a me writing in another room, in another town, with different paper,
pen and ink, is also an intuition. This means that the distinction
between reality and non-reality is extraneous, secondary, to the true
nature of intuition. If we imagine a human mind having intuitions
for the first time, it would seem that it could have intuitions of
actual reality only, that is to say, that it could have perceptions
of nothing but the real. But since knowledge of reality is based upon
the distinction between real images and unreal images, and since this
distinction does not at the first moment exist, these intuitions
would in truth not be intuitions either of the real or of the unreal,
not perceptions, but pure intuitions. Where all is real, nothing is
real. The child, with its difficulty of distinguishing true from
false, history from fable, which are all one to childhood, can furnish
us with a sort of very vague and only remotely approximate idea of
this ingenuous state. Intuition is the undifferentiated unity of the
perception of the real and of the simple image of the possible. In our
intuitions we do not oppose ourselves as empirical beings to external
reality, but we simply objectify our impressions, whatever they be.
[Sidenote: _Intuition and the concepts of space and time._]
Those, therefore, who look upon intuition as sensation formed and
arranged simply according to the categories of space and time, would
seem to approximate more nearly to the truth. Space and time (they
say) are the forms of intuition; to have an intuition is to place
it in space and in temporal sequence. Intuitive activity would then
consist in this double and concurrent function of spatiality and
temporality. But for these two categories must be repeated what was
said of intellectual distinctions, when found mingled with intuitions.
We have intuitions without space and without time: the colour of a
sky, the colour of a feeling, a cry of pain and an effort of will,
objectified in consciousness: these are intuitions which we possess,
and with their making space and time have nothing to do. In some
intuitions, spatiality may be found without temporality, in others,
_vice versa_; and even where both are found, they are perceived by
later reflexion: they can be fused with the intuition in like manner
with all its other elements: that is, they are in it _materialiter_
and not _formaliter,_ as ingredients and not as arrangement. Who,
without an act of reflexion which for a moment breaks in upon his
contemplation, can think of space while looking at a drawing or a
view? Who is conscious of temporal sequence while listening to a story
or a piece of music without breaking into it with a similar act of
reflexion? What intuition reveals in a work of art is not space and
time, but _character, individual physiognomy._ The view here maintained
is confirmed in several quarters of modern philosophy. Space and time,
far from being simple and primitive functions, are nowadays conceived
as intellectual constructions of great complexity. And further, even
in some of those who do not altogether deny to space and time the
quality of formative principles, categories and functions, one observes
an effort to unite them and to regard them in a different manner from
that in which these categories are generally conceived. Some limit
intuition to the sole category of spatiality, maintaining that even
time can only be intuited in terms of space. Others abandon the three
dimensions of space as not philosophically necessary, and conceive the
function of spatiality as void of all particular spatial determination.
But what could such a spatial function be, a simple arrangement that
should arrange even time? It represents, surely, all that criticism
and refutation have left standing--the bare demand for the affirmation
of some intuitive activity in general. And is not this activity
truly determined, when one single function is attributed to it, not
spatializing nor temporalizing, but characterizing? Or rather, when it
is conceived as itself a category or function which gives us knowledge
of things in their concreteness and individuality?
[Sidenote: _Intuition and sensation._]
Having thus freed intuitive knowledge from any suggestion of
intellectualism and from every later and external addition, we must
now explain it and determine its limits from another side and defend
it from a different kind of invasion and confusion. On the hither side
of the lower limit is sensation, formless matter, which the spirit can
never apprehend in itself as simple matter. This it can only possess
with form and in form, but postulates the notion of it as a mere limit.
Matter, in its abstraction, is mechanism, passivity; it is what the
spirit of man suffers, but does not produce. Without it no human
knowledge or activity is possible; but mere matter produces animality,
whatever is brutal and impulsive in man, not the spiritual dominion,
which is humanity. How often we strive to understand clearly what is
passing within us! We do catch a glimpse of something, but this does
not appear to the mind as objectified and formed. It is in such moments
as these that we best perceive the profound difference between matter
and form. These are not two acts of ours, opposed to one another; but
the one is outside us and assaults and sweeps us off our feet, while
the other inside us tends to absorb and identify itself with that
which is outside. Matter, clothed and conquered by form, produces
concrete form. It is the matter, the content, which differentiates one
of our intuitions from another: the form is constant: it is spiritual
activity, while matter is changeable. Without matter spiritual
activity would not forsake its abstractness to become concrete and
real activity, this or that spiritual content, this or that definite
intuition.