It certainly was.—But, not to pursue this argument any further, let
me return to the main point I had in view, which was, “to account for
the growth of the regal power from the influence of the transferred
supremacy.” There is still another instance behind, which shews how
well our princes understood the advantage they had gained, and how
dextrously they improved it.
It seems prodigious, at first sight, that when the yoke of _Rome_ was
thrown off, the new church, erected in opposition to it, should still
continue to be governed by the laws of the old. The pretence was, that
this was only by way of interim, till a body of ecclesiastical laws
could be formed; and, to cover this pretence the better, some steps
were, in fact, taken towards the execution of such a design. But the
meaning of the crown certainly was, to uphold its darling supremacy,
even on the old footing of the CANON LAWS.
This conclusion seems probable, if one considers that those canons
proceeded from an absolute spiritual monarch, and had a perpetual
reference to his dominion; that they were formed upon the very genius,
and did acknowledge the authority of the civil laws, the proper issue,
as my Lord Commissioner has shewn us, of civil despotism. Whoever, I
say, considers all this, will be inclined to think that the crown
contrived this interim from the use the canon law was of to the
extension of the prerogative. Accordingly it is certain, that the
succeeding monarchs, ELIZABETH, JAMES, and CHARLES, would never suffer
us to have a body of ecclesiastical laws, from a sense of this utility
in the old ones; and a consciousness, if ever they should submit a body
of new laws to the legislature, that the parliament would form them
altogether in the genius of a free church and state[29]; and perhaps
would be for assuming a share in their darling supremacy itself.
With those canon laws, and for the same purpose, as was observed to us,
these princes retained a great affection for the interpreters of them,
the canon and civil lawyers; till the genius of liberty rising and
prevailing in the end, over all the attempts of civil despotism, both
the one and the other fell into gradual desuetude and contempt: and
as the canonists were little regarded, so their law is now considered
no further than as it is countenanced and supported by the law of
_England_.
But to see how convenient the doctrine of the canon law was for the
maintenance of an absolute supremacy, it needs only be observed to
you, that one of these canons is, “That it is not lawful for any man
to dispute of the pope’s power.” And to see how exactly our kings
were disposed to act upon it, one needs only recollect that immortal
apophthegm of the elder JAMES, already taken notice of, “That it is
sedition for the subject to dispute what a king may do in the height of
his power.”
And as the canon laws are the pope’s laws, so we are told, on the same
supreme authority, that the _English_ laws are the king’s. For thus
on another occasion his majesty expresses himself.—“Although a just
prince” (I believe I repeat his very words) “will not take the life of
any of his subjects without a clear law: yet the same laws, whereby
he taketh them, are made by himself, or his predecessors; and so the
power flows always from himself.”—And again, “Although a good king
will frame all his actions to be according to the law, yet is he not
bound thereto but of his good will, and for good example giving to his
subjects[30].”
Thus decreed that _great school-master of the whole land_ (to give his
majesty no harder a title than he was pleased to give himself); and it
is difficult to say whence his supremacy extracted this golden rule of
_free monarchies_, if not from the pope’s own code of imperial canons.
Thus it appears what misconceptions arose, and what strange conclusions
were drawn, from the king’s supremacy in spirituals. One might proceed
further in contemplation of this subject; but I have wearied you too
much already. You will see from these several particulars how it came
to pass that the REFORMATION, which was founded on the principles
of liberty and supported by them, was yet for some time the cause
of strengthening the power of the crown. For though the exercise of
private judgment, which was essential to Protestantism, could not but
tend to produce right notions of civil liberty, as well as of religious
faith and discipline, and so in the end was fated to bring about a
just form of free government (as after some struggles and commotions,
we see, it has happened), yet the translation of supremacy from the
pope to the civil magistrate brought with it a mighty accession
of authority, which had very sensible effects for several reigns
afterwards. The mysterious sacredness and almost divinity which had
lodged in the pope’s person, was now inshrined in the king’s; and it is
not wonderful that the people should find their imaginations strongly
affected by this notion. And with this general preparation, it followed
very naturally, that, in the several ways here recounted, the crown
should be disposed and enabled to extend its prerogative, till another
change in the government was required to limit and circumscribe it,
almost as great as that of the Reformation.