[206] The use of the word in Epictetus is especially instructive: δόγματα

fill a large place in his philosophy. They are the inner judgments of the

mind (κρίματα ψυχῆς, _Diss._ 4. 11. 7) in regard to both intellectual

and moral phenomena. They are especially relative to the latter. They

are the convictions upon which men act, the moral maxims which form the

ultimate motives of action and the resolution to act or not act in a

particular case. They are the most personal and inalienable part of us.

See especially, _Diss._ 1. 11. 33, 35, 38; 17. 26; 29. 11, 12; 2. 1. 21,

32; 3. 2. 12; 9. 2; _Ench._ 45. Hence ἀπὸ δογμάτων λαλεῖν, “to speak from

conviction,” is opposed to ἀπὸ τῶν χειλῶν λαλεῖν, “to speak with the lip

only,” _Diss._ 3. 16. 7. If a man adopts the δόγμα of another person,

e.g. of a philosopher, so as to make it his own, he is said, δόγματι

συμπαθῆσαι, “to feel in unison with the conviction,” _Diss._ 1. 3. 1.

Sextus Empiricus, _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 13, distinguishes two philosophical

senses of δόγμα, (1) assent to facts of sensation, τὸ εὐδοκεῖν τινι

πράγματι, (2) assent to the inferences of the several sciences: in

either sense it is (_a_) a strictly personal feeling, and (_b_) a firm

conviction, not a mere vague impression: it was in the latter of the two

senses that the philosophers of research laid it down as their maxim, μὴ

δογματίζειν: they did away, not with τὰ φαινόμενα, but with assertions

about them, _ibid._ 1. 19, 22: their attitude in reference to τὰ ἄδηλα

was simply οὐχ ὁρίζω, “I abstain from giving a definition of them,”

_ibid._ 1. 197, 198.

[207] Sext. Empir. _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 1. 3.

[208] _Ibid._ 4, δογματική, ἀκαδημαϊκή, σκεπτική.

[209] For example, Sextus Empiricus, in spite of his constant formula,

οὐχ ὁρίζω, maintains the necessity of having definable conceptions, τῶν

ἐννοουμένων ἡμῖν πραγμάτων τὰς οὐσίας ἐπινοεῖν ὀφείλομεν, and he argues

that it is impossible for a man to have an ἔννοια of God because He has

no admitted οὐσία, _Pyrrh. Hypot._ 3. 2, 3.

[210] Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 44: see also the references given in Keim,

_Celsus’ wahres Wort_, pp. 11, 40.

[211] Origen, _c. Cels._ 1. 9.

[212] _Apol._ i. 20.

[213] _De testim. animæ_, 1.

[214] _Apol._ 46.

[215] _Apol._ 2. 13.

[216] _Octav._ 34.

[217] _Apol._ 47.

[218] _Strom._ 2. 1.

[219] Origen, _c. Cels._ 3. 16.

[220] Origen, _c. Cels._ 5. 65; 6. 1, 7, 15, 19: see also the references

in Keim, p. 77.

[221] _Ibid._ 7. 58. So Minucius Felix, in Keim, p. 157.

[222] The above slight sketch of some of the leading tendencies which

have been loosely grouped together under the name of Gnosticism has

been left unelaborated, because a fuller account, with the distinctions

which must necessarily be noted, would lead us too far from the main

track of the Lecture: some of the tendencies will re-appear in detail in

subsequent Lectures, and students will no doubt refer to the brilliant

exposition of Gnosticism in Harnack, _Dogmengeschichte_, i. pp. 186-226,

ed. 2.

[223] _Strom._ 1. 1: almost the whole of the first book is valuable as a

vindication of the place of culture in Christianity.

[224] _Adv. Prax._ 3.

[225] Quoted by Euseb. _H. E._ 5. 28. 13.

[226] _Orat. ad Græc._ 2.

[227] _Apol._ 46.

[228] _Refut. omn. hæres._ 5. 18.

[229] _H. E._ 5. 13.

[230] The evidence for the above statements has not yet been fully

gathered together, and is too long to be given even in outline here: the

statements are in full harmony with the view of the chief modern writer

on the subject, Friedländer, _Darstellungen aus der Sittengeschichte

Roms_, see especially Bd. iii. p. 676, 5te aufl.

[231] This is sufficiently shown by the fact, which is in other respects

to be regretted, that in most accounts of Stoicism the earlier and later

elements are viewed as constituting a homogeneous whole.

[232] “How am I to eat?” said a man to Epictetus: “So as to please God,”

was the reply (_Diss._ 1. 13). The idea is further developed in Porphyry,

who says: “God wants nothing” (281. 15): the God who is ἐπὶ πᾶσιν is

ἄϋλος; hence all ἔνυλον is to Him ἀκάθαρτον, and should therefore not be

offered to Him, not even the spoken word (163. 15).

[233] M. Aurelius owed to Rusticus the idea that life required διόρθωσις

and θεραπεία (i. 7 and ii. 13).

[234] τὸ ὑλακτεῖν, Philostr. 587.

[235] The title of _Diss._ 3. 22, in which the ideal philosopher is

described, is περὶ Κυνισμοῦ.

[236] H. Schiller, _Geschichte der römischen Kaiserzeit_, Bd. i. 452.

[237] _Diss._ 1. 17. 4, ἐπείγει μᾶλλον θεραπεύειν, the interpolated

remark of a student when Epictetus has begun a lecture upon Logic: the

addition, καὶ τὰ ὅμοια, seems to show that the phrase was a customary one.

[238] _Diss._ 1. 4.

[239] Sext. Emp. iii. 239.

[240] The Stoics defined wisdom as θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων ἐπιστήμην, and

philosophy as ἄσκησιν ἐπιτηδείου τέχνης, Plutarch (Aetius), _plac. phil._

1. 2; Galen, _Hist. Phil._ 5; Diels, _Doxogr. Gr._ pp. 273, 602.

[241] _De Abraham._ 11 (ii. 9); _de Joseph._ 1 (ii. 41); _de prœm. et

pœn._ 8, 11 (ii. 416, 418). Philo is quoted because his writings are in

some respects as faithful a photograph of current scholastic methods as

those of Epictetus. It is also possible that some of the writings that

stand under Philo’s name belong to the same period.

[242] _Quod det. potior._ 12 (i. 198, 199): so _de congr. erud. caus._ 13

(i. 529); _de mut. nom._ 13 (i. 591).

[243] _De congr. erud. caus._ 28 (i. 542).

[244] _Leg. alleg._ 3. 6 (i. 91).

[245] _Quis rer. div. heres._ 51 (i. 509).

[246] M. Aurel. 1. 7.

[247] _Enchir._ 47: cf. _Diss._ 3. 14. 4. In _Diss._ 3. 12. 17, part of

the above is given as a quotation from Apollonius of Tyana.

[248] _Diss._ 2. 18. 27; cf. 3. 2. 1; 3. 12. 1; 4. 1. 81.

[249] _Nigrin._ 27.

[250] _Orat._ xx. vol. i. pp. 288 sqq. (Dind.), περὶ Ἀναχωρήσεως.

[251] Vol. ii. p 240.

[252] Vol. ii. p. 246.

[253] _Ench._ 4, 13, 30.

[254] The χρῆσις φαντασιῶν is an important element in the philosophy

of Epictetus. Every object that is presented to the mind by either the

senses or imagination tends to range itself in the ranks of either good

or evil, and thereby to call forth desire or undesire: in most men this

association of particular objects with the ideas of good or evil, and

the consequent stirring of desire, is unconscious, being the result of

education and habit: it is the task of the philosopher to learn to attach

the idea of good to what is really good, so that desire shall never go

forth to what is either undesirable or unattainable: this is the “right

dealing with ideas.” _Diss._ 1. 28. 11; 1. 30. 4; 2. 1. 4; 2. 8. 4; 2.

19. 32; 3. 21. 23; 3. 22. 20, 103.

[255] ἐφαρμογὴ τῶν προλήψεων τοῖς ἐπὶ μέρους, _Diss._ 1. 2. 6; 1. 22. 2,

7; 2. 11. 4, 7; 3. 17. 9, 12, 16; 4. 1. 41, 44: προλήψεις are the ideas

formed in the mind by association and blending.

[256] _Diss._ 1. 1. 31; 1. 4. 18; 1. 17. 21; and elsewhere.

[257] _Diss._ 1. 4. 23.

[258] The distinction between (1) ὄρεξις, ἔκκλισις, the desire to have or

not to have, and (2) ὁρμή, ἀφορμή, the effort to do or not to do, is of

some importance in the history of psychology. It probably runs back to

the Platonic distinction between τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν μέρος and τὸ θυμοειδὲς

μέρος.

[259] _Diss._ 2. 10.

[260] 1. 9. 6, 13.

[261] 1. 14. 6.

[262] 3. 13. 15.

[263] 1. 14. 6; 1. 17. 27; 2. 8. 11.

[264] 1. 14. 6.

[265] 2. 14. 11.

[266] 2. 8. 12-14.

[267] 1. 9. 5; 2. 8. 11.

[268] 1. 9. 4.

[269] 1. 3. 1.

[270] 2. 14. 13.

[271] 1. 6. 13: cf. 1. 29. 29.

[272] 1. 9. 4; 1. 17. 15; 1. 29. 46, 56; 2. 16. 33; 4. 7. 7.

[273] 3. 24. 2, 3.

[274] 3. 24. 3.

[275] 4. 1. 82, 90, 100.

[276] 2. 16. 13.

[277] 1. 24. 1, 2; 1. 29. 33, 36, 46; 3. 10. 7; 4. 4. 32.

[278] 1. 12. 5, 8; 1. 20. 15.

[279] ἕγογνωμονεῖν τῶ θεῷ, 2. 16. 42; 2. 19. 26.

[280] εὐαρεστεῖν τῇ θείᾳ διοικήσει, 1. 12. 8; 2. 23. 29, 42.

[281] 4. 1. 90, 98.

[282] 3. 24. 95.

[283] 1. 29. 18; 4. 4. 21.

[284] 2. 16. 42.

[285] _Enchir._ 52: _Diss._ 4. 1. 131; 4. 4. 34: a quotation from

Cleanthes.

[286] 2. 16. 46; 3. 11. 1; 3. 24. 42; 4. 4. 32.

[287] 1. 9. 16.

[288] 1. 29. 29.

[289] 2. 13. 14.

[290] 3. 24. 97; cf. 3. 5. 8-10, 4. 10. 14 sqq.

[291] 3. 24. 110-114.

[292] Καινὸς νόμος, _Barn._ 2. 6, and note, in Gebhardt and Harnack’s

edition.

[293] See especially Harnack, _die Apostellehre und die Jüdischen Beiden

Wege_, Leipzig, 1886.

[294] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 1. 4.

[295] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 2. 2-7.

[296] _Ibid._ 3. 6-8.

[297] _Ibid._ 4. 7, 8.

[298] _Const. Apost._ 1. 1, p. 1, ed. Lagarde. This may be supplemented

by the conception of Christianity as a new law in Barnabas ii. 6,

Justin _passim_, Clem. Alex. _E. T._ i 97, 120, 470: see Thomasius,

_Dogmengesch_, i. 110 sqq.

[299] _Const. Apost._ 2. 11, p. 22.

[300] _Ep. ad Diogn._ 5.

[301] Side by side with the average ethics were the Pauline ethics, which

had found a certain lodgment in some.

[302] _Teaching of the Apostles_, 6. 2.

[303] Of a type of Gnosticism, Harnack, _Dogmengesch_. 202.

[304] _Strom._ 7. 11.

[305] e.g. Euseb. _Dem. Ev._ 3. 6: “Not only old men under Jesus Christ

practise this mode of _philosophy_, but it would be hard to say how many

thousands of women throughout the whole world, priestesses, as it were,

of the God of the universe, having embraced the highest wisdom, rapt with

a passion for heavenly knowledge, have renounced the desire of children

according to the flesh, and giving their whole care to their soul, have

given themselves up wholly to the Supreme King and God of the universe,

to practise (ἀσκήσασθαι) perfect purity and virginity.” So also id. _de

Vit. Constant._ 4. 26, 29; Sozom. 6. 33, of the Syrian monks.

[306] ἀσκητήριον, Socrat. i. 11; distinguished from μοναστήριον, _ibid._

4. 23, as the smaller from the larger: φροντιστήριον, Evagr. i. 21.

[307] Clem. Alex. _Pædag._ 3. 11.

[308] P. Ewald, _der Einfluss der stoisch-ciceronianischen Moral auf ...

Ambrosius_, Leipzig, 1881; Dräseke in the _Rivista di filologia_, Ann. v.

1875-6.

[309] Theophrastus ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, _Doxographi

Græci_, P. 479).

[310] νόος ὁρῇ καὶ νόος ἀκούει· τἄλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά, quoted in Plut. _de

fort._ 3, p. 98, _de Alex. magn. fort._ 3, p. 336, and elsewhere: cf.

Lucret. 3. 36; Cic. _Tusc. Disp._ 1. 20.

[311] Pseudo-Arist. _de mundo_, 7, p. 401 _a_.

[312] _De Isid. et Osir._ 67, p. 378.

[313] Theophrast. ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, p. 476), πρῶτος

τοῦτο τοὔνομα κομίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς: so Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 6.

[314] Heraclit. ap. Clem. Alex. _Strom._ 5. 14, κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάντων

οὔτε τις θεῶν οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν· ἀλλ’ ἦν ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον,

ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ ἀποσβεννύμενον μέτρα.

[315] Lucan, _Phars._ 9. 579.

[316] ἀπόῤῥοια, M. Anton. 2. 4: ἀπόσπασμα, Epict. _Diss._ 1. 14. 6; 2.

8. 11; M. Anton. 5. 27: ἀποικία, Philo, _de mund. opif._ 46 (i. 32).

The co-ordination of these and cognate terms in Philo is especially

important in view of their use in Christian theology: _de mund. opif._

51 (i. 35), πᾶς ἄνθρωπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ᾠκείωται θείῳ λόγῳ, τῆς

μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς: he considers

the term ἐκμαγεῖον to be more appropriate to theology, τῆς τοῦ παντὸς

ψυχῆς ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ὅπερ ὁσιώτερον εἰπεῖν τοῖς κατὰ Μωυσῆν φιλοσοφοῦσιν,

εἰκόνος θείας ἐκμαγεῖον ἐμφερές, _de mutat. nom._ 39 (i. 612): and he is

careful to guard against an inference that ἀπόσπασμα implies a breach

of continuity between the divine and the human soul, ἀπόσπασμα ἦν οὐ

διαιρετόν· τέμνεται γὰρ οὐδὲν τοῦ θείου κατ’ ἀπάρτησιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον

ἐκτείνεται, _quod det. pot. insid._ 24 (i. 209).

[317] _Phileb._ 16, p. 28 _e_, νοῦν καὶ φρόνησίν τινα θαυμαστήν: in the

post-Platonic _Epinomis_, p. 986 _c_, λόγος ὁ πάντων θειότατος.

[318] The best account of Plato’s complex, because progressive, theory

of matter is that of Siebeck, _Plato’s Lehre von der Materie_, in his

_Untersuchungen der Philosophie der Griechen_, Freiburg im Breisg. 1888.

The conception of it which was current in the Platonist schools, and

which is therefore important in relation to Christian philosophy, is

given in the _Placita_ of Aetius, ap. Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 11 (Diels, p. 308),

and Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 19.

[319] Plat. _Tim._ p. 30, πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐκ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον

ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς καὶ ἀτάκτως εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς

ἀταξίας.

[320] In _Tim._ P. 41, the θεοὶ θεῶν are addressed at length by ὁ τόδε

τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας (= ὁ δημιουργός): the most pertinent words are, ἵν’ οὖν

θνητά τε ᾖ τό τε πᾶν ὄντως ἅπαν ᾖ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν

ζώων δημιουργίαν, μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐμὴν δύναμιν περὶ τὴν ὑμῶν γένεσιν. The

whole theory is summed up by Professor Jowett in the Introduction to his

translation of the _Timæus_ (Plato, vol. ii. p. 470): “The Creator is

like a human artist who frames in his mind a plan which he executes by

means of his servants. Thus the language of philosophy, which speaks of

first and second causes, is crossed by another sort of phraseology, ‘God

made the world because he was good, and the demons ministered to him.’”

[321] λόγοι σπερματικοί, frequently in Stoical writings, e.g. in the

definition of the πῦρ τεχνικὸν, which is the base of all things, as

given in the _Placita_ of Aetius, reproduced by Plutarch, Eusebius, and

Stobæus, Diels, p. 306, ἐμπεριειληφὸς πάντας τοὺς σπερματικοὺς λόγους

καθ’ οὕς ἕκαστα καθ’ εἱμαρμένην γίνεται. The best account of this

important element in later Stoicism is in Heinze, _die Lehre vom Logos in

der griechischen Philosophie_, 1872, pp. 110 sqq.

[322] Hence the definition which Aetius gives: ἰδέα ἐστὶν οὐσία ἀσώματος,

αὐτὴ μὲν ὑφεστῶσα καθ’ αὑτὴν _εἰκονίζουσα δὲ τὰς ἀμόρφους ὕλας_ καὶ αἰτία

γινομένη τῆς τούτων δείξεως, ap. Plut. _de plac. philos._ 1. 10; Euseb.

_præp. evang._ 15. 45; with additions and differences in Stob. _Ecl._ 1.

12 (Diels, p. 308).

[323] The three ἀρχαί are expressed by varying but identical terms: God,

Matter, and the Form (ἰδέα), or the By Whom, From What, In view of What

(ὑφ’ οὗ, ἐξ οὗ, πρὸς ὅ), in the _Placita_ of Aetius, 1. 3. 21, ap. Plut.

_de placit. phil._ 1. 3, Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 10 (Diels, p. 288), and in

Timæus Locrus, _de an. mundi_ 2 (Mullach F P G 2. 38): God, Matter, and

the Pattern (παράδειγμα), Hippol. _Philosoph._ 1. 19, Herm. _Irris. Gent.

Phil._ 11: the Active (τὸ ποιοῦν), Matter, and the Pattern, Alexand.

Aphrod. ap. Simplic. _in phys._ f. 6 (Diels, p. 485), where Simplicius

contrasts this with Plato’s own strict dualism.

[324] _De mundi opif._ 5 (i. 5): cf. Plat. _Tim._ p. 30 (of God), ἀγαθὸς

ἦν ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος· τούτου δ’

ἐκτὸς ὤν πάντα ὁτιμάλιστα ἐβουλήθη γενέσθαι παραπλήσια αὑτῷ.

[325] _De cherub._ 9 (i. 144): cf. _ib._ 35 (i. 162).

[326] The most frequent word is δημιουργός, but several others are

used, e.g. πλάστης, _de confus. ling._ 38 (i. 434); τεχνίτης, _ibid._;

κοσμοπλάστης, _de plant Noe_, 1 (i. 329); κοσμοποιός, _ibid._ 31 (i.

348), οὐ τεχνίτης μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ πατὴρ τῶν γιγνομένων, _Leg. alleg._ 1. 8

(i. 47). The distinctions which became important in later controversies

do not appear in the writings which are probably Philo’s own, but are

found in those which probably belong to his school: the most explicit

recognition of them is _de somn._ 1. 13 (i. 632), ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα

γεννήσας οὐ μόνον εἰς τὸ ἐμφανὲς ἤγαγεν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἃ πρότερον οὐκ ἦν

ἐποίησεν, οὐ δημιουργὸς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κτίστης αὐτὸς ὤν: cf. also _de

monarch._ 3 (ii. 216), θεὸς εἷς ἐστι καὶ κτίστης καὶ ποιητὴς τῶν ὅλων.

[327] _De somn._ 2. 37 (i. 691).

[328] _De mundi opif._ 46 (i. 32): cf. _ib._ 51 (i. 35): _quod deus

immut._ 10 (i. 279), and elsewhere.

[329] _Quod det. pot. ins._ 24 (i. 208, 209).

[330] _De profug._ 36 (i. 575).

[331] _De mundi opif._ 5 (i. 5): this is the most explicit expression of

his theory of the nature of matter. It may be supplemented by _de plant

Noe_, 1 (i. 329), τὴν οὐσίαν ἄτακτον καὶ συγκεχυμένην οὖσαν ἐξ αὑτῆς

εἰς τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας καὶ ἐκ συγχύσεως εἰς διάκρισιν ἄγων ὁ κοσμοπλάστης

μορφοῦν ἤρξατο: _quis rer. div. her._ 27 (i. 492): _de somn._ 2. 6 (i.

665): οὐσία is the more usual word, but ὕλη is sometimes found, e.g.

_de plant Noe_, 2 (i. 330): the conception underlying either word is

more Stoical than Platonic, i.e. it is rather that of matter having

the property of resistance than that of potential matter or empty

space: hence in _de profug._ 2 (i. 547), τὴν ἄποιον καὶ ἀνείδεον καὶ

ἀσχημάτιστον οὐσίαν is contrasted, in strictly Stoical phraseology, with

τὸ κινοῦν αἴτιον.

[332] _De sacrif._ 13 (ii. 261).

[333] The terms λόγοι and ἰδέαι are common. Instances of the other terms

are the following: angels, _de confus. ling._ 8 (1. 408), τῶν θείων

ἔργων καὶ λόγων οὓς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους: _de somn._ i. 19 (i. 638),

ἀθανάτοις λόγοις οὓς καλεῖν ἔθος ἀγγέλους: _Leg. alleg._ 3. 62 (i. 122),

τοὺς ἀγγέλους καὶ λόγους αὐτοῦ: δαίμονες, _de gigant._ 2. 2 (i. 263),

οὓς ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι δαίμονας, ἀγγέλους Μωϋσῆς εἴωθεν ὀνομάζειν: so, in

identical words, _de somn._ 1. 22 (i. 642): ἀριθμοὶ and μέτρα, _quis rer.

div. heres._ 31 (i. 495), πᾶσιν ἀριθμοῖς καὶ πάσαις ταῖς πρὸς τελειότητα

ἰδέαις καταχρησαμένου τοῦ πεποιηκότος: _de mund. opif._ 9 (i. 7), ἰδέαι

καὶ μέτρα καὶ τύποι καὶ σφραγῖδες: cf. _de monarch._ 6 (ii. 219), τὰ

ἄπειρα καὶ ἀόριστα καὶ ἀσχημάτιστα περατοῦσαι καὶ περιορίζουσαι καὶ

σχηματίζουσαι.

[334] The clearest instance of the identification is probably in _de

monarch._ 6 (ii. 218, 219), where God tells Moses that so far from

Himself being cognizable, not even the powers that minister to Him are

cognizable in their essence; but that as seals are known from their

impressions, τοιαύτας ὑποληπτέον καὶ τὰς περὶ ἐμὲ δυνάμεις ἀποίοις

ποιότητας καὶ μορφὰς ἀμόρφοις καὶ μηδὲν τῆς ἀϊδίου φύσεως μεταλλομένας

μήτι μειουμένας.

[335] _De mund. opif._ 6 (i. 5), οὐδὲν ἂν ἕτερον εἴποι τὸν νοητὸν εἶναι

κόσμον ἢ θεοῦ λόγον ἤδη κοσμοποιοῦντος: _vit. Mos._ 3. 13 (ii. 154),

τῶν ἀσωμάτων καὶ παραδειγματικῶν ἰδεῶν ἐξ ὧν ὁ νοητὸς ἐπάγη κόσμος: so

_de confus. ling._ 34 (i. 431): cf. the Stoical definition of λόγος in

Epictet. _Diss._ 1. 20. 5, as σύστημα ἐκ ποιῶν φαντασιῶν.

[336] _De mund. opif._ 4 (i. 4): the same conception is expressed in less

figurative language in _Leg. alleg._ 1. 9 (i. 47), πρὶν ἀνατεῖλαι κατὰ

μέρος αἰσθητὰ ἦν τὸ γενικὸν αἰσθητὸν προμηθείᾳ τοῦ πεποιηκότος.

[337] δύναμις κοσμοποιητική, _de mund. οpif._ 5 (i. 5); δύναμις ποιητική

_de profug._ 18 (i. 560).

[338] _Leg. alleg._ 1. 9 (i. 47), τῷ γὰρ περιφανεστάτῳ καὶ τηλαυγεστάτῳ

λόγῳ, ῥήματι, ὁ θεὸς ἀμφότερα (i.e. both heaven and earth) ποιεῖ: _quod

deus immut._ 12 (i. 281), λόγῳ χρώμενος ὑπηρέτῃ δωρεῶν ᾧ καὶ τὸν κόσμον

εἰργάζετο: more expressly, it is the instrument, ὄργανον, _Leg. alleg._

3. 31 (i. 106), _de cherub_. 35 (i. 162).

[339] _De somn._ 2. 37 (i. 691).

[340] _De profug._ 20 (i. 562), _de migrat. Abr._ 18 (i. 452): cf.

Wisdom, 18. 24.

[341] _De profug._ 19 (i. 561).

[342] ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατήρ, _de migrat. Abrah._ 9 (i. 443); ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα

γεννήσας, _de somn._ 1. 13 (i. 632), and elsewhere.

[343] _De ebriet._ 8 (i. 361).

[344] 1 Clem. Rom. 33. 3, 4: but it is a noteworthy instance of the

contrast between this simple early belief and the developed theology

which had grown up in less than a century later, that Irenæus, _lib._ 4,

_præf._ _c._ 4, explains the ‘hands’ to mean the Son and Spirit: “homo

... per manus ejus plasmatus est, hoc est per Filium et Spiritum quibus

et dixit Faciamus hominem.”

[345] Derivatio: Iren. 1. 24. 3, of Basilides (or rather one of the

schools of Basilidians).

[346] This is probably the metaphor involved in the common word προβολή,

e.g. Hippol. 6. 38, of Epiphanes.

[347] The conception of the double nature of God, male and female, is

found as early as Xenocrates, Aetius ap. Stob. _Ecl._ 1. 2. 29 (Diels,

p. 304); and commonly among the Stoics, e.g. in the verses of Valerius

Soranus, which are quoted by Varro, and after him by S. Augustine, _de

civit. Dei_, 7. 9:

Jupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse deusque

Progenitor genitrixque deum, deus unus et omnia.

So Philodemus, _de piet._ 16, ed. Gomp. p. 83 (Diels, p. 549), quotes

Ζεὺς ἄρρην, Ζεὺς θῆλυς; and Eusebius, _præp. Evang._ 3. 9, p. 100_b_,

quotes the Orphic verse:

Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἔπλετο νύμφη.

[348] The Valentinians in, e.g., Hippol. 6. 29; 10. 13: so of Simon

Magus, _ib._ 6. 12, γεγονέναι δὲ τὰς ῥίζας φησὶ _κατὰ συζυγίας_ ἀπὸ τοῦ

πυρὸς.

[349] Hippol. 6. 43 (of Marcus), τὰ δὲ ὀνόματα τῶν στοιχείων τὰ κοινὰ καὶ

ῥητὰ _αἰῶνας_ καὶ _λόγους_ καὶ _ῥίζας_ καὶ _σπέρματα_ καὶ _πληρώματα_ καὶ

_καρποὺς_ ὠνόμασε.

[350] Hippol. 5. 19 (of the Sethiani), πᾶν ὅ τι νοήσει ἐπινοεῖς ἢ καὶ

παραλείπεις μὴ νοηθέν, τοῦτο ἑκάστη τῶν ἀρχῶν πέφυκε γενέσθαι ὡς ἐν

ἀνθρωπίνῃ ψυχῇ πᾶσα ἡτισοῦν διδασκομένη τέχνη.

[351] Hippol. 8. 8 (of the Docetæ), θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πρῶτον οἱονεὶ σπέρμα

συκῆς μεγέθει μὲν ἐλάχιστον παντελῶς δυνάμει δὲ ἄπειρον: _ibid._ c. 9,

τὸ δὲ πρῶτον σπέρμα ἐκεῖνο, ὅθεν γέγονεν ἡ συκῆ, ἐστὶν ἀγέννητον. A

similar metaphor was used by the Simonians, Hippol. 6. 9 sqq., but it is

complicated with the metaphor of invisible and visible fire (heat and

flame). It is adopted by Peter in the Clementines, _Hom._ 2. 4, where God

is the ῥίζα, man the καρπός.

[352] _Ibid._ 8. 8, ... ὁ καρπὸς ἐν ᾧ τὸ ἄπειρον καὶ τὸ ἀνεξαρίθμητον

θησαυριζόμενον φυλάσσεται σπέρμα συκῆς.

[353] The chief authorities for this theory, which was expressed in

language that readily lent itself to caricature, are the first seven

chapters of the first book of Irenæus, and Hippolytus 6. 32 sqq.

[354] This was especially the view of the Peratæ, Hippol. 5. 13.

[355] Notably by Plotinus, _Enn._ ii. 9. 2-5.

[356] The conception appears in Justin Martyr, _Apol._ i 10, πάντα τὴν

ἀρχὴν ἀγαθὸν ὄντα _δημιουργῆσαι_ αὐτὸν ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης: _ib._ c. 59, ὕλην

ἄμορφον οὖσαν στρέψαντα τὸν θεὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι: but Justin, though he

avowedly adopts the conception from Plato, claims that Plato adopted it

from Moses.

[357] Plutarch, _de anim. procreat._ 5. 3, οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἡ

γένεσις ἀλλ’ ἐκ τοῦ μὴ καλῶς μηδ’ ἱκανῶς ἔχοντος: _ibid._ ἀκοσμία γὰρ ἦν

τὰ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου γενέσεως: cf. Möller, _Kosmologie_, p. 39.

[358] Wisdom, 11. 18, κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης: Justin M.

_Apol._ 1. 10. 59 (quoted in note, p. 194): Athenag. _Legat_. 15, ὡς γὰρ

ὁ κεραμεὺς καὶ ὁ πηλός, ὕλη μὲν ὁ πηλός, τεχνίτης δὲ ὁ κεραμεύς, καὶ ὁ

θεὸς δημιουργός, ὑπακούουσα δὲ αὐτῷ ἡ ὕλη πρὸς τὴν τέχνην.

[359] Hippol. 7. 22 (of Basilides), τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ σπέρμα ὃ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ

πᾶσαν τὴν πανσπερμίαν ὃ φησιν Ἀριστοτέλης γένος εἶναι εἰς ἀπείρους

τεμνόμενον ἰδέας ὡς τέμνομεν ἀπὸ τοῦ ζῴου βοῦν, ἵππον, ἄνθρωπον ὅπερ

ἐστὶν οὐκ ὄν. Cf. _ib._ 10. 14.

[360] _Orat. ad Græc._ 5 (following the text of Schwartz).

[361] _Suppl. pro Christ._ 4.

[362] _Ad Autol._ 2. 5 and 10; but in the former of these passages he

adds, τί δὲ μέγα εἰ ὁ θεὸς ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐποίει τὸν κόσμον.

[363] The most important passage is Hermas, _Mand._ 1, which is

expressed in strictly philosophical language, ὁ θεὸς ὁ τὰ πάντα κτίσας

καὶ καταρτίσας καὶ ποιήσας ἐκ _τοῦ μὴ ὄντος_ εἰς τὸ εἶναι τὰ πάντα (the

passage is quoted as Scripture by Irenæus, 4. 20. 2 = Eusebius, _H. E._

5. 8. 7: Origen, _de princip._ 1. 3. 3, vol. i. p. 61, 2. 1. 5, p. 79,

and elsewhere): this must be read by the light of the distinctions which

are clearly expressed by Athenagoras, _Legat._ 4 and 19, where τὸ ὂν =

τὸ νοητόν, which is ἀγένητον: τὸ οὐκ ὂν = τὸ αἰσθητόν, which is γενητόν,

ἀρχόμενον εἶναι καὶ παυόμενον: the meaning of τὸ μὴ ὂν appears from the

expression, τὸ ὂν οὐ γίνεται ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ ὄν, whence it is clear that τὸ

μὴ ὂν = τὸ δυνάμει ὄν, or potential being (see Möller, _Kosmologie_,

p. 123). In some of the other passages in which similar phrases occur,

it is not clear whether the conception is more than that of an artist

who, by impressing form on matter, causes things to exist which did not

exist before: 2 Maccab. 7. 28, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός: 2

Clem. i. 8, ἐκάλεσεν γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐκ ὄντας καὶ ἠθέλησεν ἐκ μὴ ὄντος εἶναι

ἡμᾶς: Clementin. _Hom._ 3, 32, τῷ τὰ μὴ ὄντα εἰς τὸ εἶναι συστησαμένῳ,

οὐρανὸν δημιουργήσαντι, γῆν πιλώσαντι, θάλασσαν περιορίσαντι, τὰ ἐν ᾅδῃ

ταμιεύσαντι καὶ τὰ πάντα ἀέρι πληρώσαντι: Hippolyt. in _Genes._ 1, τῇ

μὲν πρώτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ἐποίησεν ὁ θεὸς ὅσα ἐποίησεν ἐκ μὴ ὄντων ταῖς δὲ ἄλλαις

οὐκ ἐκ μὴ ὄντων. In Theophilus, these expressions are interchanged with

that of ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὕλη in such a way as to suggest their identity: 1.

4; 2. 10, ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν: 2. 4, τί δὲ μέγα εἰ ὁ θεὸς

ἐξ ὑποκειμένης ὕλης ἐποίει τὸν κόσμον ... ἵνα ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων τὰ πάντα

ἐποίησεν. In the later books of the Clementine Homilies, τὸ μὴ ὂν = void

space: the whole passage, 17. 8, gives a clear and interesting exposition.

[364] In Euseb. _Præp. Evang._ 7. 22, and elsewhere; reprinted in Routh,

_Reliquiæ Sacræ_, ii. 87.

[365] Justin M. _Tryph._ 62; Iren. 1. 24, 25; Hippol. 7. 16, 20: so

Philo. _de profug._ 13 (i. 556), where, after quoting the passage of

Genesis, he proceeds, following the Platonic theory, διαλέγεται μὲν οὖν ὁ

τῶν ὅλων πατὴρ ταῖς ἑαυτοῦ δυνάμεσιν αἷς τὸ θνητὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος

ἔδωκε διαπλάττειν, μιμουμέναις τὴν αὐτοῦ τέχνην.

[366] The Peratæ in Hippol. 5. 17.

[367] The Jew through whom Celsus sometimes speaks says, “If your _Logos_

is the Son of God, we also assent to the same.” Origen, _c. Cels._ 2. 31.

[368] Cf. Origen, _c. Cels._ 4. 54.

[369] Hippol. _c. Noet._ 11.

The influence of Greek ideas and usages upon the Christian church · 第 23 / 26 段