To sum up:
1. Until ten years ago, England's relations with you were good--indeed
more than good, as is shown, for instance, by the cession of
Heligoland. If, as you assert, hate and envy and ill-will, because of
Germany's phenomenal development, and of her increasing strength and
push as a competitor in the markets of the world, had been the moving
force in shaping England's attitude towards you, the motive for
hostile conduct would have existed at that time just as at present.
As a matter of fact, England's sentiment towards Germany changed only
with your aggressive programme of naval construction, and as a
consequence of the manifestation in word, in writing and in deed, of
certain alarming and menacing tendencies, to which, it is true, more
significance and importance probably were attached abroad than in
Germany itself--more, perhaps, than they deserved.
_That programme England came to consider, naturally, as directed
mainly against herself and as a serious menace_ to her most vital
interests and to the conditions of her very existence.
Would not Germany have become uneasy had Russia suddenly announced a
policy of concentrating an enormous fleet in the Baltic? (The
parallel, though, is far from perfect, in that for you, sea power is
not nearly as vital an element as it is and must be for England.)
Your naval policy, together with the arguments which the German
Government's spokesmen adduced for it, and the above-mentioned
manifestations and agitations, caused very serious and lasting
apprehensions in England. They gradually drove her to the Entente with
France, and through it, unfortunately perhaps, but necessarily, also
with Russia--not as an offensive, but as a defensive measure.
Let me say, in parenthesis, that in the interest of England and France
and of the peace of the world, I have always felt inclined to doubt
the wisdom of this grouping, however comprehensible and natural it was
under the circumstances. Likewise, I have always doubted the wisdom of
the creation of your enormous fleet--a view which was shared by some
of your best political thinkers and which appears to have been
justified by results.
2. The genesis of the war lay in the fixed idea by which Austria was
possessed, since her foreign Minister Aehrenthal succeeded in reaping
easy and questionable but profitable laurels some years ago, that she
could and ought to adopt a "dashing" policy. There is nothing more
dangerous than the foolish and reckless daring of feebleness, when, as
happens at times, it is suddenly seized with a mania for heroics.
In fact, as I gleaned from a letter received here within a few days of
the outbreak of the war and originating from a particularly
authoritative source in Vienna, Austria entirely failed to realize the
portentous significance and the inevitable consequences of her
unheard-of ultimatum to Serbia.
She believed that she would be left undisturbed to play the conqueror
at the expense of that poor little country. Unfortunately, Germany did
not see fit to put a stop to that extremely dangerous playing with
fire. On the contrary, the German Ambassador in Vienna seems to have
encouraged it, actively and deliberately.
3. When finally the crisis had come, with all its terrible meaning,
Austria's nerves, at the very last moment, began to give way. She
wavered in the face of a world catastrophe.
But your Junkers and other jingoes neither wavered nor hesitated. They
saw in their grasp the opportunity for which they had been plotting
these many years and they were not minded to let it escape them. They
considered the moment peculiarly propitious because of the internal
preoccupations of England and France.
And they succeeded in sweeping the German Government off its feet as
well as the sober and sensible thinking majority of the German people.
They succeeded in rushing your Government and people into the belief
that the Russian mobilization signified a menace dangerous to
Germany's very existence, and that every day of delay in meeting that
danger might mean disastrous consequences.
This was not the first time that an attempt had been made by that
party to bring the Kaiser and his people suddenly face to face with a
situation which they meant should spell war--a war which they felt
certain would end in a quick and decisive German victory. Of at least
one flagrant example of such manoeuvring I have personal knowledge.
That the jingo party, against what I believe to have been the
tendencies of the Kaiser's and the Chancellor's policies, thus
succeeded at last in their fateful and atrocious design--although the
manifest interests and, doubtless, the inclination of the masses of
your people were for the maintenance of peace--is explainable only by
the Germans' amazing lack of understanding for the deeper qualities,
sentiments, ideals, modes of thought and characteristics of other
nations as distinguished from their outward peculiarities, methods and
habits.
This lack of understanding, doubly amazing in a people so intelligent
and instructed and so successful in its commercial dealings with the
rest of the world, is strikingly exemplified in your complete
misjudgment as to the cohesive power of the British Empire and as to
the loyalty of its component parts and subject races; by your gross
underestimate of France _and by your general miscalculation as to how
the peoples challenged by you would react to the supreme test of war_.
That Austria and Russia, through their mobilizations and other
measures originating from a mixture of bluff and fear, managed to get
each other into an utterly unreasoning state of nerves, is entirely
comprehensible. They did not trust each other, and above all, they did
not trust themselves, their own strength and preparedness.
But Germany, in the knowledge of her powerful moral and military
superiority, and of her incomparable war machine, perfect and ready in
every detail, could have, and should have dominated the confusion and
danger of the situation with the sang-froid and self-confidence born
of strength, instead of allowing herself to be swept along by the
sinister currents leading to an ocean of blood.
And if Germany, with trembling Europe hanging on her words, had
proclaimed boldly "There shall be peace," and thus by her veto had
saved the world from the curse of this war, she would not only have
done a splendidly meritorious deed, unequalled in the world's history,
which would have brought her immortal fame and would have been greeted
by the joyous acclaim of all peoples, but she would have gained by
that very act the uncontested leadership amongst the nations. From
their gratitude for being freed from the nightmare of war's menace,
she would readily have obtained (as intimated by Sir Edward Grey in
his telegram) compliance with any reasonable demand she might have put
forward for the extension of the scope of her development and
influence.
4. Once the Entente existed it seems to me so obvious that England _in
an aggressive war waged by Germany and Austria_ against France and
Russia _was bound to throw in her lot with the latter country_, that I
was quite unable, at the time, to understand Germany's outburst of
surprise and fury against England. Alliance or Entente, call it what
you will--had England backed out in that crisis it would have been a
miserable breach of faith on her part, by which she would have
forfeited her place in the world's respect and which would have been
bitterly resented by her former friends and left her completely
isolated henceforth.
Moreover, apart from all moral obligations and the compelling force
of political considerations, she could have felt all the less tempted
to enter into a separate agreement with Germany at that critical
juncture and remain neutral, as the latter at that very moment had
demonstrated that she did not consider herself bound by any treaty,
when military interests seemed to her to make the breach of such
treaty advisable. In the face of Germany's violation of Belgian
neutrality, how could England have felt assured that, if an
arrangement between the two countries had been effected, it would be
respected by Germany, in case at any given moment it might appear to
the German Government to be requisite from the point of view of
military necessity, or even mere advantage, to ignore such agreement?
You call it a hideous crime and eternal shame that the English "called
to their aid" against you the Japanese and the Indians.
As far as Japanese military aid is concerned, it has been practically
limited to action in China, and thus has not to any material degree
influenced the European war.
And with regard to the relatively inconsiderable number of Indians
that England brought over, the simple fact is that these few brigades
or divisions form part of the small standing army that she
possessed--the very smallness of which is further proof of how little
she had contemplated war. In her critical situation, and with her
great lack of trained troops, she called in these detachments, which
were commanded by English officers.
I feel certain that an unprejudiced judgment can see neither crime nor
shame in that act. If there were, you would be no less subject to
reproach for accepting the military aid of Turks and Arabs.
5. When a country in so short a time has made such unexampled progress
as Germany, and through her own capacity and the favour of fate has
achieved so much of wealth, power and well-being for her people, she
can well afford to indulge in the luxury of modesty and a
conciliatory disposition.
A nation thus blessed ought to thank God that all is going so well
with her, and should recognize that such brilliant success is bound to
produce a certain amount of irritation and jealousy, just as it does
in the case of an eminently successful individual.
While rejoicing in her achievement, she ought carefully to refrain
from boasting or flaunting her superiority in the face of the world.
While unceasingly continuing to strive and build up, she ought to do
so tactfully and with all possible consideration for her less
successful neighbours.
She should know how to restrain herself and wisely to keep her
ambitions within bounds; to live and let live; to regard, without
jealousy or envy, possessions which are the heritage of others less
efficient than herself; and to leave it to time, slowly but surely, to
do its work in rewarding merit and punishing inefficiency and sloth.
Have you thought and acted thus?
Have you not, on the contrary, in the justified consciousness of your
greater efficiency and more strenuous effort, allowed the fact of the
great inherited advantages possessed by others to become a thorn in
the flesh, and an ever-rankling bitter grievance, which dimmed your
contentment and soured the joy at your achievements?
Have you not estranged and affronted and antagonized other
nations--not by success in open competition with them, which I grant
was far from pleasing them, but to which in the end they had come to
accommodate themselves as to an unavoidable evil--but by the manner
and matter of your writing, speaking and acting? Have you not made
such nations your enemies by thrusting before them aims and visions of
the future, calculated to arouse in them most serious alarm and
apprehension, and thus eventually caused them to unite against
you--not, as you think, through envy or hate, but through the much
more powerful motives of self-preservation, and of fear of your aims
and intentions?
In this letter, which, I am sorry to say, has assumed formidable
proportions, I have tried, next to expressing my own convictions, to
represent to you, as I see them, what are at this time the predominant
and controlling views and sentiments among the American people. I have
met with much the same ideas among the great majority of neutrals with
whom I have discussed the subject--neutrals from many countries whom I
have met here in the last six months.
If I have expressed myself freely, in some respects even bluntly, I
hope you will make allowance for the honest and deep anger and grief
that move me when I see how, through a needless war wantonly started,
Germany and England-France, the three countries of Europe whom the
world most needs, the three races from whom humanity has most to
expect, are engaged in tearing one another to pieces in senseless
fury.
I have welcomed with hope certain signs in the last few weeks which
seem to indicate that more moderate, fairer and calmer sentiments, a
more correct understanding, and more far-sighted views are beginning
to get a foothold in certain circles in Germany.
You have so incontestably vindicated the prowess of your arms, and so
impressively demonstrated the power, courage, self-sacrificing
patriotism and high ability of your nation, that no possible suspicion
can attach to you of yielding under compulsion, should you rise to the
moral heroism of taking the first step towards dispelling the dreadful
misery which weighs upon Europe through this appalling war.
What is done, is done. The guilt will be adjudged by history. Eleven
months ago it was you who spoke the fateful word that meant war. Will
it now be you to first speak the redeeming word that shall bring hope
of peace?
Whether such a word from you--a word, not of victorious peace, but of
righteous peace, a word of human feeling and of political moderation,
of conciliation, aye, and of atonement where due--would now be
listened to by your opponents, in view of their bitterness at your
actions and their mistrust of your intentions, and would actually
bring peace, I do not know.
But of this I am sure: that such a step would be welcomed with
gratitude, gladness and sympathy by all at least of the non-combatant
nations, and that it would be set down as a moral asset for you in the
ledger both of history and of contemporary opinion. Nor can I doubt
that, even regarded merely from the point of view of politics, it
would be wise, well-judged and timely.
Yours sincerely,
(Sgd.) OTTO H. KAHN.
* * * * *
NOTE.--To this letter a short note merely of acknowledgment
was received, containing the intimation that, in view of the
wide divergence of views between the writer and the
recipient, no useful purpose could be served by continuing
the correspondence.
Printed in Great Britain by Richard Clay & Sons, Limited,
BRUNSWICK ST., STAMFORD ST., S.E. 1, AND BUNGAY, SUFFOLK.
* * * * *
Transcriber's note:
1. The words manoeuvres, manoeuvred & manoeuvring use an "oe" ligature
in the original.
2. The following misprints have been corrected:
"publc" corrected to "public" (page 13)
"neans" corrected to "means" (page 35)
3. Other than the corrections listed above, printer's inconsistencies
in spelling, punctuation, hyphenation, and ligature usage have been
retained.