suppose most people imagine that it is the special mission of science
to destroy all mystery. Many seem to think that superstition, or even
religion, is inseparably connected with ignorance and mystery, and
all must disappear together before the light of science. But not so.
There is only a gradual progressive change--an evolution in the form of
mystery as well as in the form of religion. To the savage everything is
a _separate_ mystery. The function of science is, indeed, to destroy
these separate mysteries, by explaining them; but, in doing so, it only
reduces them to fewer and grander mysteries, and these again to still
fewer and grander, until, in an ideally perfect science, all separate
and partial mysteries are swallowed up in the one all-embracing
infinite mystery--the mystery of existence. There is still mystery
in each object, but no longer a separate mystery--only a separate
manifestation of the one overwhelming mystery.
Or, again, and finally: The same change occurs in our ideas of
_creation_. At first every object is a separate creation--a
manufacture. With advancing science these separate, creative acts
become fewer and nobler, until now, at last, in evolution, all
are embraced and swallowed up in _one eternal_ act of creation--a
never-ceasing procession of the divine energy. Every object is still a
creation, but not a separate creation--only a separate manifestation of
the one continuous creative act.
Now, precisely the same change must take place in our conception of
design in Nature. To the uncultured there is a distinct and separate
design in every separate work of Nature. But, as science advances, all
these distinct, separate, petty, man-like designs are merged into fewer
and grander designs, until, finally, in evolution at last, we reach
the conception of the one infinite, all-embracing design, stretching
across infinite space, and continuing unchanged through infinite time,
which includes and predetermines and absorbs every possible separate
design. There is still design in everything, but no longer a separate
design--only a separate manifestation of the one infinite design.
Thus, then, our own self-consciousness and will and thought give rise,
necessarily, to the conception of an infinite self-consciousness, will,
and thought--i. e., God. The necessity to believe in self-conscious
spirit behind bodily phenomena compels us to believe also in an
infinite self-conscious spirit behind cosmic phenomena. Looking at the
operations of this ever-active spirit, whether in the one case or the
other, _from the outside_, it looks like unconscious energy inherent
in matter itself, and therefore like necessity, or fate. But, looked
at from the inside _in the one case_, the brain, we perceive only
self-conscious, free activity of spirit. Therefore, we are compelled
to acknowledge in the other case, the cosmos, also, the same source
of all activity, the same cause of all phenomena. We are compelled to
acknowledge an infinite immanent Deity behind phenomena, but manifested
to us on the outside as an all-pervasive energy. But some portion of
this all-pervasive energy again individuates itself more and more, and
therefore acquires more and more a kind of independent self-activity
which reaches its completeness in man as self-consciousness and
free-will. We said, “_a kind of_ independent self-activity.” How this
comports with the absoluteness of God we can not understand, any more
than we can understand how it comports with invariable law in Nature.
We simply accept them both as primary truths, even though we can never
hope to reconcile them completely, because we can not understand the
exact nature of the relation of spirit to matter. We can not look at
the outside and the inside at the same time. If we could understand
the relation of psychical phenomena to brain-changes, then might
we hope to understand far more perfectly than now the relation of
God to Nature. But as in the one case, the brain, although we can
not understand the _nature_ of the relation, yet we are sure of the
intimacy of the connection of the two series, psychical and physical,
term for term; so in the other case, the cosmos, although we can not
understand the exact _nature_, we are sure of the intimacy of the
connection, _term for term_--every material phenomenon and event with a
corresponding psychical phenomenon as its cause.
CHAPTER VII.
SOME LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IMMANENCY.
The doctrine of the Divine immanency carries with it the solution of
many vexed questions. In fact, in its light these questions simply pass
out of view as no longer having any significance. Several of these
questions have been alluded to in an indirect way in the previous
chapter and in Chapter III. We take them up distinctly here, and show
their relation to evolution.
Religious thought, like all else, is subject to a law of evolution,
and therefore passes through regular stages. Of these stages, three
are very distinct and even strongly contrasted. They correspond in
a general way to the three stages of Comte, which he has misnamed
the _theological_, the _metaphysical_, and the _positive_. We will
illustrate by many examples.
I. _Conception of God._
This, the most fundamental conception of all religion, has passed from
a gross anthropomorphism to a true spiritual theism, and the change
is largely due to science and especially to the theory of evolution.
There are three main stages in the history of this change: (1.) The
first is a _low_ anthropomorphism. God is altogether such a one as
ourselves, but larger and stronger. His action on Nature, like our
own, is _direct_; his will is wholly man-like, capricious and without
law. (2.) The second is still anthropomorphism, but of a nobler sort.
God is not _altogether_ like ourselves. He is man-like; yes, but
also _king-like_. He is _not_ present in Nature, but sits enthroned
above Nature in solitary majesty. He acts on Nature, not directly but
indirectly, through physical forces and natural laws. He is an absentee
landlord governing his estate by means of appointed agents, which are
the natural forces and laws established in the beginning. He interferes
personally and by direct action only occasionally, to initiate
something new or to rectify something going wrong. This idea culminated
and found the clearest expression in the eighteenth century, and was
the necessary result of the scientific ideas then prevalent, viz.,
ideas of pre-established _stability_ of cosmic order and _fixedness_ of
organic types. God was the great _artificer_, the great _architect_,
working, as it were, on foreign material and conditioned by its nature.
He established all things as they are in the beginning, and they have
continued so ever since.
This conception still lingers in the religious mind, and is in fact the
prevailing one now. It is a great advance on the preceding, but, alas!
it removes God beyond the reach of our love. He is the architect of
worlds, the artificer of the eye, the sovereign ruler of the universe,
but not our Father. We are his creatures, his subjects, but not his
children.
(3.) The third and last stage in this development is true spiritual
theism. God is immanent, resident in Nature. Nature is the house
of many mansions in which he ever dwells. The forces of Nature are
different forms of his energy acting directly at all times and in
all places. The laws of Nature are the modes of operation of the
omnipresent Divine energy, invariable because he is perfect. The
objects of Nature are objectified, externalized--materialized states
of Divine consciousness, or Divine thoughts objectified by the Divine
will. In this view we return again to _direct_ action, but in a nobler,
a spiritual, Godlike form. He is again brought very near to every one
of us and restored to our love, for in him we live and move and have
our being. In him all things consist, by him all things exist. This
view has been held by noble men in all times, especially by the early
Greek fathers, but is now verified and well-nigh demonstrated by the
theory of evolution. No other view is any longer tenable.
The idea of God is of course the most fundamental of all religious
ideas, and a change in this carries with it many other changes. Some of
these necessary outcomes, especially the nature, the origin, and the
destiny of the human spirit, and its relation to the Divine spirit, I
have already treated in previous chapters. But there are others which
flow so directly and obviously that they may be presented in brief
space.
II. _Question of First and Second Causes._
Among the most obvious of these is the question of first and second
causes. This distinction, I suppose, did not exist in early thought.
As a popular view, it was mainly due to the physical science of the
eighteenth century. It was a necessary corollary of the idea of God
as the great architect sitting outside of Nature and acting on Nature
as on foreign material. According to this view, God is the original
and primary cause of all things; but he _delegates_ his power to
_secondary_ forces, such as gravity, heat, electricity, etc., which
are therefore the immediate causes of phenomena. I believe that most
persons hold this view still. But it is now being displaced by the
idea of God immanent or resident in Nature as already explained. This
view is a complete _identification_ of first and second causes. All
causes are mere modes of the first cause. They seem to us secondary,
necessary, and unconscious only because they act according to
invariable law. But law itself is only the mode of operation of a
perfect will. Thus we have the same three stages of evolution here
also: (1.) First, all is first cause, direct, man-like, capricious,
lawless. (2.) Then the first cause acts king-like, indirectly by many
appointed agents subject to pre-enacted laws. These agents or secondary
causes directly determine all natural phenomena. (3.) Lastly, come the
complete combination and reconciliation of these two. All is by first
cause and direct action, like the first. All is by invariable law like
the second, the law being only the mode of operation of a perfect will.
III. _Question of General and Special Providence._
So also providence, general and special, is only another phase of the
same question and solved in the same way. At first all is _special_
providence--the result of caprice or favoritism and without law. Then
all or nearly all is general providence operating by invariable law;
but from time to time the general law is broken through for special
purposes when necessary. Is not this the prevailing view now? Lastly,
these two must be combined and reconciled in a third. All is alike
general and special: general--i. e., according to law; special--i. e.,
by direct action. There is no real distinction between the two. The
distinction vanishes in the light of a higher view.
IV. _The Natural and the Supernatural._
In precisely the same category falls the question of the natural and
the supernatural. The same three stages are evident here also, and the
same solution: 1. First all is supernatural and lawless, and Nature is
viewed with stupid wonder and abject fear. 2. Then Nature is reduced to
mechanical laws and made subject to man. Wonder and fear give place to
indifference and even perhaps to contempt. We practically live without
God in the world. It requires, now, _miracles_ or a violent breaking
through of law in order to startle us out of our stupidity and awaken
in us a sense of the Divine presence. 3. But we must come lastly to a
higher philosophy. We must recognize that all is natural and all is
supernatural according as we view it, but none more than another. All
is natural--i. e., according to law; but all is supernatural--i. e.,
above Nature, as we usually regard Nature, for all is permeated with
the immediate Divine presence. Wonder in the contemplation of Nature
returns, or rather exalted reverence and rational worship are given
in place of open-mouthed wonder and superstitious fear. Once clearly
conceive the idea of God permeating Nature and determining directly all
its phenomena according to law, and the distinction between the natural
and the supernatural disappears from view, and with it disappears also
the necessity of miracles as _we usually understand miracles_. In fact,
the word as we usually understand it has no longer any meaning.
I must stop a moment to explain, lest I be misunderstood; and to
enforce, lest it be thought I speak lightly.
Miracle, in the sense of violation of law, is simply impossible,
because law is the expression of the essential nature and perfection
of God. It is as impossible for God to perform a miracle in this sense
as it is for him to lie, and for the same reason, viz., that it is
contrary to his essential nature. In what sense, then, is a miracle
possible? I answer, only as an occurrence or a phenomenon _according to
a law higher than any we yet know_. If we define Nature as phenomena
governed by physical and chemical laws and forces, then life becomes
supernatural and miraculous--because higher than Nature as we define
it. If we reduce the phenomena of life to law and include these
also in our definition of Nature but limit it there, then the free,
self-determined phenomena of reason become supernatural because above
our definition of Nature. There may well be still other and higher
modes of Divine activity, the law of which we do not and may never
understand. These are above our present definition of Nature, and
therefore to us supernatural or miraculous. But, even if miracles in
the ordinary sense were possible, is it not evident that the ordinary
processes of Nature are far more wonderful, more truly Godlike, than
any such miracle?
V. _Question of Design in Nature._
So, again, the question of design or purpose or mind in Nature is
similarly solved. It has been said, it is continually now being
said, that evolution has destroyed forever the teleological view
of Nature--i. e., the idea of design in Nature. Yes, if we mean
the man-like, cabinet-making, watch-making design of Paley and
older writers--a separate petty design for each separate object. It
has indeed destroyed this, but only to replace it by a far nobler
conception--a truly Godlike design, a design embracing all space and
running through all time, including and absorbing all possible separate
designs and predetermining them by a universal law of evolution.
Or the same question may be put in another way as “Mind _vs._
Mechanics in Nature.” In the evolution of thought on this subject at
first all was _mind_, but lawless, capricious, like our own. Then
one department after another of Nature was reduced to mechanical,
physical, necessary law, until all have been or will be or conceivably
may be thus reduced, and mind seems driven out of Nature entirely.
The friends of religion in despair cry out for at least some small
corner left for mind. Thus I find in recent numbers of an English
scientific periodical, “Nature,” a discussion concerning mind as _one_
of the factors of evolution.[48] Is it not amusing, if it were not
so sad?--God the Divine mind as _one of the factors_ of evolution!
The true solution is very simple. All is mind or none; so also all
is mechanics or none. It _is all mind through mechanics_. It is all
mechanics from the outside; it is all mind from the inside. To science
all is mechanics; to theology all is mind. It is the duty of philosophy
to reconcile these two opposites by the higher view that mechanics is
but the mode of operation of the Divine mind. There is only one form of
evolution, viz., human progress, in which mind--but the _human_, not
the Divine mind--is _one_ of the factors of evolution. But to think and
speak thus of God in relation to Nature is to place him on the human
plane. It is gross anthropomorphism.[49]
VI. _Question of the Mode of Creation._
I might multiply examples almost without limit, of questions the
solution of which depends on this one of the relation of God to Nature.
I give one more--Creation.
The creation of the universe _at once_--in the beginning--out of
nothing--and then _rest ever since_. This old anthropomorphic idea is
now replaced by that of continuous creation--unhasting, unresting,
by an eternal process of evolution. For if the universal law of
gravitation is the Divine mode of sustentation of the universe, the no
less universal law of evolution is the Divine process of creation.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO THE IDEA OF THE CHRIST.
What think ye of Christ? This is indeed in many ways a test-question,
and we ought frankly to meet it. I have feared heretofore to touch this
question. I now only throw out some brief suggestions--scatter some
seed-thoughts. Does Evolution have anything to say on this also? I
think it does. This I proceed to show:
As organic evolution reached its goal and completion in _man_, so human
evolution must reach its goal and completion in the _ideal man_--i. e.,
the Christ. According to this view, the Christ is the ideal man, and
therefore--(mark the necessary implication)--and therefore the Divine
man. We are all as men (as contradistinguished from brutes)--we are
_all_, I say, _sons of God_; the Christ is the well-beloved Son. We
are _all_ in the image of God; he is the express and _perfect image_.
We are all partakers in various degrees of the Divine nature; in him
the Divine nature is completely realized. It is not necessary that the
ideal man--the Christ--should be perfect in knowledge or in power; on
the contrary, he must grow in wisdom and in stature, like other men;
but he must be _perfect in character_. _Character is essential spirit._
All else, even knowledge, is only environment for its culture. In the
dazzling light of modern science we are apt to forget this. Character
is the _attitude_ of the human spirit toward the Divine Spirit. If I
should add anything to this definition, I would say it is spiritual
_attitude_ and spiritual _energy_. In the Christ this attitude must be
wholly right; the harmony--the union with the Divine--must be perfect.
This perfect union gives, of necessity, also fullness of spiritual
energy.
Now, I wish to show that, although the Christ as thus defined must
be human--yes, even more intensely human than any one of us--yet by
the law of evolution we ought to expect him to differ from us in an
inconceivable degree, and especially in a superhuman way. This I do by
a series of illustrations.
We have said that the Christ is the ideal and therefore the Divine
man--that he is the goal and completion of humanity. But in evolution
a goal is not only a completion of one stage, but also the beginning
of another and higher stage--on a higher plane of life with new and
higher capacities and powers _unimaginable from any lower plane_. Let
me illustrate:
1. As man is the ideal--the goal and completion of animal evolution,
and yet is he also a birth into a higher plane of life--the spiritual;
so the Christ, the ideal man, may be only the goal and completion of
human evolution, and yet is he also a birth into a new and higher
plane--_the Divine_.
2. As the human spirit pre-existed in embryo in animals, slowly
developing through all geological times, until it came to birth and
immortality in man, so the Divine spirit is in embryo in man in various
degrees of development, and comes to birth and completion of Divine
life in the Christ.
3. As animals reached, finally, _conscious relations_ with God in
man, even so man reaches _union_ with God in the Christ. As man, the
ideal animal, is a union of the _animal_ with the _spiritual_; so the
Christ, the ideal of human evolution, is a union of the _human_ and the
_Divine_.
4. Finally: As with the appearance of man there were introduced new
powers and properties unimaginable from the animal point of view, and
therefore from that point of view seemingly supernatural--i. e., above
their nature--so with the appearance of the Christ we ought to expect
new powers and properties unimaginable from the human point of view,
and therefore to us seemingly supernatural--i. e., _above our nature_.
The Christ as defined above--i. e., as the _ideal man_--is undoubtedly
a true object of rational worship. There are two and only two
fundamental moral principles, viz., love to God and love to man. Both
of these must be embodied in a rational worship. The one must be
embodied in the worship of an Infinite Spirit--God; the other in the
worship of the ideal man--the Christ.
But some one will object that, admitting all this, it is impossible
that the goal, the ideal, should appear until the _end of the course_
of evolution. To him I answer: This is indeed true of animal evolution,
but not of human evolution. We have already seen (see p. 88 _et seq._)
that there is an essential difference in this regard between these
two kinds of evolution. In addition to all the factors of organic
evolution, in human progress there is a new and higher factor added,
which immediately takes precedence of all others. This factor is _the
conscious voluntary co-operation of the human spirit in the work of its
own evolution_. The method of this new factor consists essentially in
the formation, and especially in the _voluntary pursuit, of ideals_. In
organic evolution _species_ are transformed by the _environment_. In
human evolution _character_ is transformed by _its own ideal_. Organic
evolution is by _necessary_ law--human evolution is by voluntary
effort, i. e., by _free_ law. Organic evolution is _pushed_ onward and
upward from behind and below. Human evolution is _drawn_ upward and
forward from above and in front by the attractive force of ideals. Thus
the ideal of organic evolution can not appear until the end; while the
attractive ideals of human evolution _must_ come--whether only in the
imagination or realized in the flesh--but must come somehow _in the
course_. The most powerfully attractive ideal ever presented to the
human mind, and, therefore, the most potent agent in the evolution of
human character, is _the Christ_. This ideal must come--whether in the
imagination or in the flesh I say not, but--must come somehow _in the
course_ and not at the end. At the end the whole human race, drawn
upward by this ideal, must reach the fullness of the stature of the
Christ.
But it will be again objected that all ideals are relative and
temporary; that we are in fact drawn onward and upward by many
successive ideals, one beyond another, in the course. Ideals are but
mile-stones which we put successively behind us while we press on to
another; they are successive rounds of an infinite ladder which we put
successively beneath us while we rise higher. This one also we shall
eventually put behind us and pass on.
To this I have two answers: Admitted that in many ways such is the
course of progress; but who has been able to reach this ideal and
conceive a higher? When this one is reached and completely realized in
our personal character, it will be time enough to propose another.
Again, it is true that in many ways we have advanced and are still
advancing by the use of partial ideals; but this use of partial and
relative ideals is itself in only a temporary stage of evolution. At
a certain stage we catch glimpses of the _absolute_ moral ideal. Then
our gaze becomes fixed, and we are thenceforward drawn upward forever.
The human race has already reached a point when the absolute ideal of
character is attractive. This Divine ideal can never again be lost to
humanity.
CHAPTER IX.
THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF EVIL.
The problem of evil has tasked the power and baffled the skill of the
greatest thinkers in every age. It would be folly in me to imagine that
I can solve it. Its complete solution is probably impossible in the
present state of science. Yet I can not doubt that on this, as on every
important question relating to man, the theory of evolution will throw
new and important light. All I can hope to do is to throw out some
brief suggestions on the subject.
If evolution be true, and especially if man be indeed a product of
evolution, then what we call evil is not a unique phenomenon confined
to man, and the result of an accident, but must be a great fact
pervading all nature, and a part of its very constitution. It must have
existed in all time in different forms, and subject like all else to
the law of evolution. Let us, then, trace rapidly some of the steps of
this evolution.
1. _External Physical Evil in the Animal Kingdom._--As already seen in
previous chapters, the necessary condition of evolution of the organic
kingdom is a _struggle_ for life--a conflict on every side, with a
seemingly _inimical_ environment and a survival of only the strongest,
the swiftest, or the most cunning--in a word, the fittest. Now, suppose
the course of organic evolution finished in the introduction of man,
and from this vantage-ground we look back over the course and consider
its result. Shall we call that evil which was the necessary condition
of the progressive elevation which culminated so gloriously? Evil
doubtless it seemed to the individual, struggling animal, but is this
worthy to be weighed in comparison with the evolution of the whole
organic kingdom until it culminated in man? Is it not rather a _good_
in disguise? I suppose human arrogance may be willing enough to admit
it in _this_ case, where animals only are sufferers.
2. _Physical Evil in Relation to Man._--But organic evolution,
completed in man, was immediately transferred to a higher plane, and
continued as social evolution; material evolution is transformed into
psychical evolution; unconscious evolution, according to _necessary_
law, to conscious voluntary progress toward a recognized goal, and
according to a _freer_ law. But in this transformation the fundamental
conditions of evolution do not change. Man also is surrounded on every
side with what at first seems to him an _evil environment_, against
which he must ever struggle or perish. Heat and cold, tempest and
flood, volcanoes and earthquakes, savage beasts and still more savage
men. What is the remedy--the only conceivable remedy? Knowledge of
the laws of Nature, and thereby acquisition of power over Nature. But
increasing knowledge and power are equivalent to progressive elevation
in the scale of psychical being. This conflict with what seems an evil
environment is, therefore, the necessary condition of such elevation.
It is not too much to say that, without this condition, except for this
necessity for struggle, man could never have emerged out of animality
into humanity, or, having thus emerged, would never have risen above
the lowest possible stage. Now suppose, again, this ideal to have been
attained--suppose knowledge of physical laws and power over physical
forces to be complete--suppose physical nature completely subdued,
put beneath our feet, and subject to our will, and, from the high
intellectual position thus attained, we look back over the whole ground
and consider the result. Shall that be called evil which was obviously
the necessary condition for attaining our then elevated position? Evil
it doubtless seemed to the individuals who fell, and still seems to us
who now suffer, by the way in the conflict; but is physical discomfort
or even physical death of the individual to be weighed in comparison
with the psychical elevation of the individual, and especially of the
race? Evidently, then, physical evil even in the case of man is only
_seeming_ evil, but _real_ good.
3. _Organic Evil--Disease._--But there is a more dreadful form of evil
than that which results from _external_ physical nature--an evil far
more subtle and difficult to understand, and therefore to conquer.
I mean _internal_ organic evil--disease in its diversified forms
and with its attendant weakness and suffering, inscrutable often in
its causes, insidious in its approaches, contagious, infectious,
spreading from house to house, carrying suffering and death in its
course, and leaving sorrow and desolation behind. Is there any remedy
which can transmute this evil into good? There is. It is again
knowledge--knowledge of the laws, and power over the forces, of
_organic nature_. Is it not evident that complete knowledge of the laws
of health and the causes of disease would put this evil also under our
feet? Is it not evident that a perfect knowledge of the laws of health,
and a perfect living according to these laws, would so entirely subdue
this evil that men would no longer die except by natural decay or by
accident? Is it not evident, also, that the race will not attain this
knowledge unless it be forced upon us by the necessity of avoiding the
dread evil of disease?
Now suppose, again, this ideal attained, suppose this dread evil
subdued by complete knowledge, and again from our elevated intellectual
position we look back over the ground. Shall we call that evil which
was the necessary condition of our intellectual elevation? Evil,
doubtless, it seems to us individuals who have suffered and are still
suffering through our ignorance; but is such individual suffering or
even individual death to be weighed against the psychical elevation of
the individual and evolution of the race? Ought not the individual to
be willing to suffer thus much vicariously for the race? Is not this
seeming evil also a _real_ good?
May we not, then, confidently generalize? May we not say that all
physical evil is good in its general effect--that every law of Nature
is beneficent in its general operation, and, if sometimes evil in
its specific operation, is so only through our ignorance? Partly
by survival of the fittest, and partly by intelligence, man, like
other animals, brings himself in accord with the laws of Nature, and
thus appropriates the good and avoids the evil, and Nature becomes
beneficent only. But, also unlike any other animal, man by rational
knowledge makes the laws of Nature his servants, and uses them for his
own purposes, thus increasing his power and elevating the plane of his
life.
4. _Moral Evil._--But there is still another form of evil, the most
dreadful of all. This one may be called _the_ evil, in some sense, _the
only evil_. It is that of which all other forms are but the shadows
cast backward and downward along the course of evolution and on lower
stages of existence. This consummation of all evil is _sin_--_moral
disease_--more dreadfully contagious and deadly than any organic
disease. What shall we say now? Is there any rational explanation of
this evil? Is there any possible-reason or excuse for an all-wise,
all-powerful Ruler afflicting man alone of all His creatures with this
greatest of all evils? In all other cases, the individual and the race
sacrifice themselves for a time _physically_ for the sake of final
spiritual elevation; but this _is spiritual debasement_. In all other
cases, there is a sacrifice in the _course_ in order to attain the
_goal_, but this is a missing of the goal itself. Is there any view
which mitigates this evil, any philosophic alchemy which can transmute
this evil into good? Age after age the human mind has prostrated
itself in helpless paralysis before this problem. Most thinkers have
been content to say, “Thou hast ordered it so. Thou art good. It must
be right.” But many, and among them some of the best minds, have
said, “Either God is not all-good, or else not all-wise, or else not
all-powerful, or else there is no God at all.” Does evolution shed any
light on this dread problem? I believe it does.
We have said that all other evils are but shadows of this one, cast
backward and downward on earlier stages of evolution and lower forms of
existence. But from the evolution point of view these earlier and lower
forms of evil are rather to be regarded as _fore_shadowings of the
reality to come. They are but earlier and lower stages of the evolution
of the _same thing_--embryonic conditions of the now full-grown evil.
If so, then the same law must apply here also, though, as we shall see,
with a difference. Here, also, the individual as well as the race finds
himself surrounded by what seems an evil environment, against which
he must struggle. The spirit of man is inclosed and conditioned by a
lower environment, which he must subdue or perish. Here, then, is again
a deadly conflict: “a law in the members warring against the law of
the spirit, and bringing it into captivity”; a law of selfism warring
against the law of love, and bringing it into subjection; solicitations
to debasement on the one hand, and solicitations to wrong others on the
other. How shall it be overcome? What is the remedy? Again I answer,
Knowledge of and conformity to the _laws of the moral world_. But, as
in other cases, so in this: this knowledge of and conformity to law,
which is the true goal of humanity, will not be attained unless it is
forced upon us by necessity and in self-defense--i. e., by evil.
Now suppose, once more, this knowledge and conformity be complete, and
the ideal of humanity be attained, and from this final and highest
position we look back over the whole ground. Shall that be called evil
which from the very nature of a moral being and the laws of evolution
was obviously the necessary condition of attaining the goal? Shall
we not from this final position call it a good in disguise? Evil,
doubtless, it seems to us who suffer and stumble and mayhap fall by the
way; but shall the mishap of the individual be weighed as an equivalent
against the evolution of the race and the attainment of its goal?
Ah! there is the rub. It is all well enough to talk of sacrificing
the _physical_ individual to the race, but not so the _spiritual_. If
we believe in the immortality of the human spirit, if we do indeed
stand related to God in the manner explained in Chapter IV, then
moral evil in the individual has an entirely peculiar and an eternal
significance--then the individual human spirit has an infinite worth
and can not be sacrificed to the race; for the evolution of the race
itself is only in order to the perfecting of individual human souls.
What shall we say now? I answer: The sacrifice is not necessary. There
is in the realm of morals _alone_ a way of escape--a saving element
which redeems the individual without violating the law. Let me explain.
It will, I think, be admitted by all that _innocence_ and _virtue_ are
two very different things. Innocence is a _pre-established_, virtue
a _self-established_, harmony of spiritual activities. The course of
human development, whether individual or racial, is from innocence
through more or less discord and conflict to virtue. And virtue
completed, regarded as a condition, is holiness, as an activity, is
spiritual freedom. Not happiness nor innocence but virtue is the goal
of humanity. Happiness will surely come in the train of virtue, but
if we seek primarily happiness we miss both. Two things must be borne
steadily in mind: virtue is the _goal of humanity_; virtue can not be
given, it must be _self-acquired_.
Now we have already seen that in all evil the remedy, which not
only cures it but transmutes it into good, is knowledge of law and
conformity of conduct thereto--a true science and a successful art--in
a word, knowledge of the laws of God and obedience to these laws. In
the physical world ignorance of these laws is necessarily fatal, but
not so in the moral world. Ignorance here is not necessarily fatal
though dangerous. By the very nature of a moral being, the essential
thing is not knowledge but _character_ or virtue--the _will_ to know
and the _effort_ to obey. In the physical realm, knowledge is the goal;
in the moral realm, knowledge is only in order to virtue. Therefore,
in the case of the individual struggling with moral evil within and
without, the victory is always in his power. If he fails, it is his
own fault. His utmost effort in this field must be successful, because
the result is not external, but internal and in the realm of moral
freedom. The spirit of man is self-acting and in some sense, though
not absolutely, self-existing, and can not be ruined except by its own
act. In the moral world, where the goal is not knowledge but character,
attainment must be in proportion to honest endeavor in the right spirit.
Evil, then, has its roots in the necessary law of evolution. It is a
necessary condition of all progress, and pre-eminently so of moral
progress. But some will ask, “Why could not man have been made a
perfectly pure, innocent, happy being, unplagued by evil and incapable
of sin?” I answer: The thing is impossible even to omnipotence, because
it is a contradiction in terms. Such a being would also be incapable of
virtue, would not be a moral being at all, would not in fact be man.
We can not even conceive of a moral being without freedom to choose.
We can not even conceive of virtue without successful conflict with
solicitations to debasement. But these solicitations are so strong and
so often overcome us, that we are prone to regard the solicitations
themselves as essential evil instead of our weak surrender to them.
All evolution, all progress, is from lower to higher plane. From a
philosophic point of view, things are not good and evil, but only
higher and lower. All things are good in their true places, each under
each, and all must work together for the good of the ideal man. Each
lower forms the basis and underlying condition of the higher; each
higher must subordinate the lower to its own higher uses, or else it
fails of its true end. The physical world forms the basis and condition
of the organic, yet the organism rises to a higher plane only by
ceaseless conflict with and adaptation to the physical environment,
which therefore seems in some sense evil. The organic world in its
turn underlies and conditions and _nourishes_ the rational moral
world. As the senses are the necessary feeders of the intellect, so
the appetites are the necessary feeders of the moral nature. Yes, even
the lowest sensual appetites are the necessary basis and nourishers
of our highest moral sentiments. And yet the struggle for mastery of
the higher spiritual with the lower animal is often so severe that the
latter seems to many as _essential evil_ to be extirpated, instead of
a useful _servant_ to be controlled. This view is asceticism. Now the
whole view of evil usually held is a kind of asceticism, and therefore,
like asceticism, must be only a transition phase of human thought. All
that we call evil both in the material and the spiritual world is good,
so long as we hold it in subjection as servants to the spirit, and only
becomes evil when we succumb. All evil consists in the dominance of the
lower over the higher; all good in the rational use of the lower by
the higher. Asceticism may, indeed, be the best philosophy for some.
If we can not subdue the lower nature, we must try to extirpate it,
and thus at any cost set free the higher from humiliating bondage. If
we can not practice the higher virtue of _temperance_ in _all_ things,
we must even try the lower virtue of _total abstinence_ in _some_
things. If our right eye offends, we must not hesitate to pluck it
out; but let us not imagine that one eye is better than two--let us
clearly understand that thereby our spiritual nature is sadly maimed,
and therefore that the highest virtue, which is spiritual beauty and
strength, can not thus be attained. True virtue consists, not in the
extirpation of the lower, but in its subjection to the higher. The
stronger the lower is, the better, _if only_ it be held in subjection.
For the higher is nourished and strengthened by its connection with the
more robust lower, and the lower is purified, refined, and glorified by
its connection with the diviner higher, and by this mutual action the
whole plane of being is elevated. It is only by action and reaction of
all parts of our complex nature that true virtue is attained.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] The term _Chorology_, used by Haeckel, nearly covers the ground.
[2] _Ontos-gennao_ (individual-making, or genesis of the individual).
[3] _Taxis, nomos_ (relating to science of arrangement).
[4] This statement is general; it will be modified hereafter.
[5] _Phule-gennao_ (kind-making); genesis of the race.
[6] This formulation of the laws of organic succession was given by
me in 1860, before I knew anything of either Darwin’s or Spencer’s
evolution. They were my own mode of formulating Agassiz’s views.
[7] Genesis without previous life--spontaneous generation.
[8] Fishes were first introduced in the later Silurian; but became
dominant in the Devonian.
[9] Amphibians were introduced in the Carboniferous, but true reptile
not until the Permian.
[10] Of course I mean downward in _social function_. Individually the
scavenger may be nobler than the statesman.
[11] Cope, “Science,” vol. ii, p. 274, 1883.
[12] Boston Society of Natural History--anniversary memoir, 1880. Also,
“American Naturalist,” June, 1882.
[13] “Archives des Sciences,” vol. liv, 1875.
[14] “Nature,” vol. xxxi, p. 4, 1884.
[15] See abstract of Dr. Romanes’s views, “Nature,” vol. xxxiv, pp.
314, 336, 362. Also, discussions of the same by Meldola, Galton,
Wallace, etc., in immediately subsequent numbers.
[16] This subject is more fully treated in chapter IX, p. 240 _et seq._
[17] See an article entitled “Genesis of Sex,” “Popular Science
Monthly,” 1879, vol. xvi, p. 167.
[18] Mr. Wallace has recently, in his work on “Darwinism,” taken
strong ground against this Darwinian factor. He thinks, for example,
that sexual vigor is the cause of both the splendor of color and the
pertinacity which secures the female. We see little difference in this
way of putting it. Our object, however, is not to argue the question of
what are true factors, but simply to give the most accepted, and, as it
seems to us, also the most probable view.
[19] By _reason_ I mean the faculty of dealing with the phenomena of
the _inner world of consciousness and ideas_. Animals live in one
world--the outer world of _sense_; man in two--the outer world of
sense, like animals, but also in an inner and higher world of _ideas_.
All that is characteristic of man comes of this capacity of dealing
with the inner world. In default of a better word I call it reason. If
any one can suggest a better word, I will gladly adopt it.
[20] While all comparative anatomists agree that the lung is a
diverticulum from the œsophagus, like the air-bladder of the gar-fish,
some think that it is a _different_ diverticulum, which is seen first
in the dipnoi.
[21] Undoubtedly the true principle on which primary groups ought to be
made is, _identity of general plan of structure_, or _traceableness of
homology throughout_. For these groups are the great primary branches
of the tree of life, and classification ought to represent degrees of
genetic relationship. This was Agassiz’s principle, although he did not
admit the genetic relation. This principle has been, it seems to us,
too much neglected by later systematists.
[22] The Amphioxus, the lowest of all vertebrates--if vertebrate it may
be called--is an exception to 2 and 3. In this animal the vertebrate
type is not yet fully declared.
[23] This is only one example under a general law which it may be
well to stop a moment to illustrate. A repetition of similar parts
performing the same function is always an evidence of low organization,
and as we rise in the scale of organization such parts usually become
fewer and more efficient. Thus, to give one example, myriapods, as
their name indicates, have hundreds of locomotive organs--lower
crustaceans perhaps thirty or forty. As we go up, they are reduced to
fourteen (tetradecapods), then to ten (decapods), then in spiders to
eight, in insects to six, in vertebrates to four, and in man to two.
A similar reduction in number, but increase in efficiency, is found
in toes, _when they are used for support and locomotion only_. In man
we find the normal number of five (1), because his hands are used for
grasping and the functions of the fingers are not the same; and (2),
because man’s development was almost wholly _brainward_. In other
respects his structure is far less specialized than most other mammals.
He can not compete with carnivores in strength and ferocity, nor with
herbivores in fleetness. In the struggle for life, therefore, there
was nothing left for him but increase in intelligence. Probably four
is the smallest number of locomotive organs consistent with highest
efficiency. In retaining but two legs for locomotion, man has lost in
locomotive efficiency, but by the sacrifice he liberates two limbs for
higher functions.
[24] “Proceedings of American Academy of Arts and Sciences,” vol. xiv,
May, 1878.
[25] Fol., “Archives des Sciences,” vol. xiv, p. 84, 1885; “Science,”
vol. vi, p. 92, 1885.
[26] Of course, this is a purely imaginary case. The conditions of
development of the eggs of higher animals forbid continuous watching
the process. Yet we do observe in different individuals all these
stages in mammals as well as other animals.
[27] These baleen plates are not modifications of teeth, as might at
first be supposed, but rather of the transverse gum-ridges found on the
roof of the mouth of many mammals, and conspicuous in the horse.
[28] “Proceedings of the California Academy of Science,” vol. v, p.
152. 1873.
[29] For fuller discussion of this subject, see “Bulletin of the
California Academy of Science,” No. 8, 1887, and “American Journal of
Science,” for Dec., 1887.
[30] “Origin of Races of the Dog.” “Annals and Magazine of Natural
History,” vol. xvii, p. 295. 1886.
[31] Mr. Galton (“Nature,” August 26, 1886) has used a diagram similar
to the above (which I first used in 1879) to illustrate the law of
sexual attraction and repugnance.
[32] This subject is more fully discussed by the author in an article
entitled “Genesis of Sex,” in “The Popular Science Monthly,” vol. xvi,
p. 167, 1879.
[33] For examples of this the reader is referred to Cope, “Bulletin
of the National Museum,” No. 1; and to Coues’s “Key to North American
Birds,” last edition.
[34] “Monatsbericht d. k. Preuss. Akademie d. Wissenschaft zu Berlin,”
for July, 1866.
[35] “Genesis of Tertiary Species of Planorbis at Steinheim.” A. Hyatt,
Anniversary Memoir of the Boston Society of Natural History, 1880.
[36] In a letter to the author, dated February 13, 1887, Prof. Cope
says: “Such transitions of species are clearly indicated in the
_Oreodontidæ_, where such different forms as _O. gracilis_ and _O.
Culbertsoni_ are connected by intergradations.”
[37] “American Naturalist,” 1873; “Popular Science Monthly,” June, 1873.
[38] For a fuller development of this subject the reader is referred to
an article by the author, entitled “Critical Periods in the History of,
and their Relation to, Evolution” (“American Journal of Science,” vol.
xiv, p. 99, 1877).
[39] “Reflex Action and Theism,” William James, “Unitarian Review” for
November, 1881.
[40] See an article by the author on this subject, “American Journal of
Science,” series ii, vol. xxviii, p. 305, 1859, and in “Popular Science
Monthly,” vol. iv, p. 156, 1873.
[41] All chemical compounds are dissociated by sufficient heat.
[42] The origin of vital from chemical force in the green leaves of
plants can not be doubted; but this does not, of course, explain the
mystery of the _first origin of life on the earth_, for one condition
of the change _now_ is the _contact of living matter_.
[43] I know it is the fashion to ridicule the use of the terms
vitality, vital force, as a remnant of an old superstition; and yet the
same men who do so use the terms gravity, electricity, chemical force,
etc. Vital force is indeed _correlated_ with other forces of Nature,
but is none the less a distinct _form_ of force, far more distinct
than any other unless it be the still higher form of psychical, and
therefore it better deserves a distinct name than any lower form. Each
form of force gives rise to a peculiar group of phenomena, and the
study of these to a special department of science. Now, the group of
phenomena called vital is more peculiar, more different from other
groups than these are from each other, and the science of physiology
is a more distinct department than either physics or chemistry, and
therefore the form of force, which determines these phenomena, is more
distinct and better entitled to a name than any physical or chemical
force.
[44] “Princeton Review” for May, 1884.
[45] “Popular Science Monthly,” December, 1873.
[46] For a fuller statement of this antithesis, see an article by the
author entitled “Evolution in Relation to Materialism,” “Princeton
Review,” for March, 1881.
[47] Johnstone Stoney, “Nature,” vol. xxxi, p. 422.
[48] “Nature,” vol. xxxiv, p. 385. 1886.
[49] So, again, see a book recently published (“Nature,” vol. xliii, p.
460, 1891), entitled “Whence comes Man, from Nature or from God?” The
answer is plain. From both--from God through Nature. Evolution is the
method of creation.
INDEX
Acceleration, law of, 178.
African fauna explained, 204.
Agassiz, his greatest result, 29, 43;
relation to evolution, 32, 37, 43;
relation to Darwin, 46;
compared with Kepler, 47.
Ages of geological history, 16.
Alpine species explained, 215.
Amphibians, development of, 150.
Analogy and homology, 99.
_Anima_ of animals, 313, 317.
Animal architecture, styles of, 209.
Animal kingdom, primary divisions of, 107.
Animals, relation of man to, 311;
spirit embryonic in, 311.
Antiquity of man, religion and, 282;
of the earth, religion and, 281.
Aortic arches, proofs of evolution from, 151.
Arthropods, 132.
Artificial production of varieties, 222.
Australia, fauna and flora of, explained, 200;
when isolated, 202.
Barriers limit faunal and floral regions, 188.
Beauty, origin of, 269.
Birds’ tails, changes of, 174.
Brain, vertebrate, proofs of evolution from, 162;
vertebrate, changes of, in phylogenic series, 168;
relation to mind, 327, 338.
Brain-physiology as a basis for materialism, 306.
Branching tree illustrates evolution, 13-15, 18, 110, 250.
Brooks, W. K., on the cause of variations, 262.
Californian coast-islands, fauna and flora of, 211.
Causation, idea of, from within, 342.
Cause, first and second, 354.
Cells, somatic and germ, 93.
Centers of creation, specific, 194.
Cephalization, 171.
Chambers, his views on evolution, 34.
Changes slow at present, 266.
Christ, the, 359;
relation of evolution to, 359;
as an agent in human progress, 363.
Close-breeding, effects of, 236, 243.
Coast-islands of California, fauna and flora of, 211.
Comparison, method of, 41.
Conflict between religion and science, 280.
Continental faunas and floras, 188.
Continental island life, 208.
Continuity, law of, 53;
law of, applied to inorganic forms, 54;
to organic forms, 56.
Cope’s law of acceleration, 178.
Creation, special, 30, 69;
specific centers of, 194;
changes in our notions of, 348;
question of mode, 358.
Cross-breeding, law of, 236.
Cross-fertility of artificial varieties, 232.
Cross-sterility, 77, 234.
Cyclical movement, law of, 16, 22.
Darwin, relation to Agassiz, 46;
compared with Newton, 48;
factors of evolution discovered by, 74;
objections to his theory of evolution, 76.
Derivation, origin of inorganic forms by, 54;
origin of organic forms by, 56.
Design, idea of, from within, 345;
argument from, not destroyed by evolution, 346;
changes in our ideas of, 348;
in Nature, question of, 357.
Differentiation, law of, 11, 19;
law of, in embryonic development, 19;
law of, illustrated, 144;
of the animal kingdom illustrated, 176.
Disease, necessity of, 367.
Divine energy, forms of, 318.
Divisions of the animal kingdom, 117.
Dogmatism, theological and scientific, 293.
Domestication, changes produced by, 222.
Egg, development of, 3, 19.
Egyptian species unchanged in three thousand years, 265.
Embryology, proofs of evolution from, 148.
Environment, physical, 73.
Evil, problem of, relation of evolution to, 365;
physical, necessity of, 366;
a condition of progress, 366, 373;
organic, necessity of, 367;
moral, necessity of, 369.
Evolution, what is, 3, 8;
scope of, 3;
type of, 3, 8;
examples of, 5;
popularly limited to the organic kingdom, 7;
progressive change in, 9;
laws of, 11;
illustrated by branching tree, 13-15, 18, 90, 250;
misconception of, 14;
produced by resident forces, 27;
germs of the idea, 32;
relation of Agassiz to, 32, 37, 43;
Lamarck’s views on, 33;
Chambers’s views on, 34;
obstacle to, removed, 35;
confliction with religion imaginary, 45;
how related to gravitation, 49;
general evidences of, 53;
artificial, 60;
observed, 62;
certainty of, 65;
special proofs of, 67;
factors of, 73, 81;
human contrasted with organic, 88;
monotypal and polytypal, 85;
proofs of, from the vertebrate skeleton, 111;
from the articulate skeleton, 132;
from embryology, 148;
from development of amphibians, 150;
from aortic arches, 151;
from vertebrate brain, 162;
from rudimentary organs, 179;
from geographical distribution of organisms, 183;
explains geographical diversity, 195;
objection to this view, 217;
answer, 219;
proofs of, from artificial modifications, 222;
factors of, operative in domestication, 228;
paroxysmal, 257;
material, nearly completed, 267;
thoroughly established, 275;
relation to religion, 276, 282;
relation to materialism, 284;
necessitates great change in religious thought, 295;
of forces, 315;
relation to revelation, 331;
pantheistic objection answered, 335;
relation to problem of evil, 365.
Experimental method largely fails on plane of life, 40.
Factors of evolution, 73;
their grades and order of introduction, 81;
Lamarckian, 81;
selection, 82-85;
Darwinian, 83;
rational, 86.
Faculties, evolution of, 23.
Faunas and floras, geographical, 183;
continental, 188;
marine, 192;
special cases of distinct, 192;
of Australia, 200;
of Africa, 204;
of Madagascar, 205;
of continental islands, 208;
of the coast-islands of California, 211;
of oceanic islands, 213;
of lofty mountains, 215.
Fish-tails, changes of, in development, 172;
in evolution, 174.
Fishes, age of, 17.
Floras and faunas, geographical, 183.
Force, vital, correlation of, 36;
planes of, 314;
evolution of, 315;
idea of, from within, 342.
Forces, resident, evolution by, 27;
of Nature are forms of Divine energy, 317;
different planes of, 314.
Fore-limbs, vertebrate, homologies of, 113.
Generation, spontaneous, 15.
Geographical faunas and floras, 183;
diversity, theory of, 193;
diversity explained by evolution, 195;
present diversity determined by Glacial epoch, 198;
objection to this view, 217;
answer, 219.
Geological record, imperfection of, 252.
Glacial epoch determined distribution of species, 195, 198, 215;
changes during, in America, 198;
in Europe, 199.
God, relation of, to Nature, 297;
immanence of, in Nature, 300;
relation of, to man, 326;
personality of, 332;
necessary belief in, 344;
different forms of conception, 351.
Good and the true, relation of, 277.
Grasshopper, external anatomy of, 143.
Gravitation, relation of, to evolution, 49;
and religion, 281.
Gyroscope, 288.
Heliocentric theory and religion, 280.
Hind-limbs, vertebrate, homologies of, 121.
Horse, genesis of, 126.
Homologies of vertebrate skeleton, 111;
of vertebrate fore-limbs, 113;
of vertebrate hind-limbs, 121;
of articulate skeleton, 132.
Homology and analogy, 99;
only within primary divisions, 108.
Hyatt, A., on Planorbis, 254.
Ideal, relative and absolute, 364.
Idealism, true and false, 301.
Immortality in accord with law, 316.
Individuality, organic, 325;
spiritual, 325.
Innocence and virtue compared, 372.
Inorganic forms, law of continuity applied to, 54.
Intermediate forms between artificial varieties, 232.
Islands, continental and oceanic, 207.
Kepler compared with Agassiz, 47.
Lamarck, evolutionary views of, 33, 74.
Law of differentiation, 11, 19;
of progress of the whole, 13, 22;
of cyclical movement, 16, 22;
of continuity, 53;
of continuity applied to inorganic forms, 54;
to organic forms, 56;
of differentiation illustrated, 144;
of acceleration, 178;
of cross-breeding, 218, 236.
Laws of evolution, 11, 19.
Lepidosiren, 101.
Life, nature of, 35;
imperfectly subject to experiment, 40;
relation of, to philosophy, 277.
Limbs, vertebrate, homology of, 113.
Links, connecting, 12, 57, 145;
connecting, elimination of, 248;
connecting, usually absent from geological faunas, 251.
Liquidambar, 218, 220.
Lobster, external anatomy of, 136.
Lungs, formation of, 100.
Madagascan fauna explained, 205.
Mammals, age of, 17.
Man, age of, 18;
relation of, to Nature, 304;
relation of, to animals, 311;
spirit of, in relation to the forces of Nature, 313, 316;
relation of God to, 331.
Marsupials, 201.
Materialism, relation of, to evolution, 284;
basis for, in brain-physiology, 306;
basis for, in evolution, 311.
Methods, scientific, 38.
Migration favors diversification, 77.
Mind, relation of, to brain, 327, 338;
_versus_ mechanics in Nature, 340.
Miracles, question of, 356.
Mollusks, age of, 16.
Monotremes, 201.
Mystery, changes in our sense of, 347.
Nature, relation of God to, 297;
immanence of God in, 300;
relation of man to, 304;
has no meaning without spirit, 329;
mind _versus_ mechanics in, 340.
Natural and supernatural, 355.
Neo-Darwinism, 93;
relation of, to human progress, 97.
Newton compared with Darwin, 48.
Nominalism and realism reconciled, 329.
Obstacle to evolution removed, 35.
Oceanic island life, 213.
Ontogenic series, 9, 40.
Organic forms, views of origin of, 29, 68, 72, 292;
law of continuity applied to, 56.
Organs, incipient, 270.
Origin of varieties unexplained, 270.
Pantheism, true and false, 302, 335.
Paroxysmal evolution, 257.
Personality behind Nature, 338.
Personality of God, 337, 341.
Philosophy and life, relations of, 277.
Phylogenic series, 10, 41.
Planorbis of Steinheim, 254.
Primal animals, 145.
Progress of the whole, law of, 13, 22.
Progressive change in evolution, 9.
Providence, question of general and special, 355.
Ranges of organic forms, 186.
Realism and nominalism reconciled, 329.
Record, geological, imperfection of, 252.
Religion, so-called conflict of, with evolution, 45, 280.
Religious thought to be reconstructed, 295.
Reproduction, methods of, 237.
Reptiles, age of, 17.
Revelation, relation of evolution to, 331;
not inconsistent with the laws of Nature, 332;
nature of, 333.
Reversion of artificial forms, 229.
Romanes, G. J., his idea of physiological selection, 76, 84;
the idea applied, 245.
Rudimentary organs, proofs of evolution from, 179;
organs in man, 181.
Selection, sexual, 74, 85;
natural, 74, 79, 83;
physiological, 75, 79, 84;
natural, compared with artificial, 225;
physiological, applied, 245.
Self-consciousness the sign of spirit-individuality, 325.
Sequoia, 219, 220.
Sexes, characters of, compared, 262.
Shrimp, external anatomy of, 134.
Sin a condition of moral evolution, 350.
Skeleton, vertebrate, homologies of, 111;
articulate, homologies of, 132;
articulate, general structure of, 134.
Society, progress of, 25.
Space and time the two fundamental conditions of material
existence, 48.
Species, natural, more permanent than artificial varieties, 229;
more distinct, 232;
cross-sterile, 232.
Spirit embryonic in animals, 311;
of man related to _anima_ of animals, 313;
to forces of Nature, 313, 316;
origin of illustrated, 320-322;
Plato’s view, 326;
orthodox view, 326;
no meaning in Nature without, 329.
Steinheim, Planorbis of, 254.
Supernatural and the natural, 355.
Taxonomic series, 9, 40.
Temperature-regions, 184.
Tread, plantigrade and digitigrade, 123.
True and the good, relation of, 277.
Truth tested by effect on life, 277;
not compromise, 291.
Types, generalized, 13.
Use and disuse of organs, 73.
Useless structures, how produced, 76.
Variation depends on sexual reproduction, 238;
caused by unfavorable conditions, 264.
Varieties, artificial production of, 222, 235;
artificial production of, illustrated, 224;
natural and artificial, compared, 228;
origin of, unexplained, 270.
“Vestiges of Creation,” 34.
Virtue and innocence compared, 372.
Vital principle, 328.
Voluntary social progress, 26.
Weismann’s views, 93.
Whales, rudimentary organs of, 180.
THE END.
Transcribers’ Notes:
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made consistent when a
predominant preference was found in this book; otherwise they were not
changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; occasional unbalanced
quotation marks retained.
Ambiguous hyphens at the ends of lines were retained.
Subscripts in chemical formulas are represented here as simple numbers,
such as H2O and NH3.
Illustrations were printed mid-paragraph but have been moved between
paragraphs, usually near to text that references them.
Footnotes have been collected and repositioned just before the Index.
Some in-line paragraph headings are in boldface and some are in
italics; this emphasis has been retained.
Index not checked for proper alphabetization or correct page references,
but a reference to page 274 was a typographical error and has been
changed to 174.
Page 155: Text refers to _c c′_ in Figs. 38-39, but neither figure
appears to contain a _c′_ label.