CHAPTER IX.

PROOFS FROM VARIATION OF ORGANIC FORMS, ARTIFICIAL AND NATURAL.

As already stated, page 40, the use of the method of experiment in

the field of biology is, unfortunately, very limited. Nevertheless,

it is already beginning to be used more and more in the department

of physiology, and may be used also, to a limited extent, in the

department of morphology. It is true that direct _scientific_

experiments, for the express purpose of producing permanent

modifications of form, and thus testing the theory of evolution, are of

comparatively little value as yet, because the all-important element

of time is wanting. The steps of evolution are so slow, and the time

necessary to produce any sensible effect is usually so great, that, in

comparison, man’s individual lifetime is almost a vanishing quantity.

But, from time immemorial, experiments have been _unconsciously_

made by man on domestic animals and food-plants, which bear directly

on this subject. All domestic animals and food-plants, and many

ornamental flowering plants, have been subjected for ages to a process

of artificial selection acting upon natural variation of offspring.

As wild species are modified, we believe, indefinitely by divergent

variation and _natural_ selection, so domestic species are modifiable

certainly largely, perhaps indefinitely, by divergent variation

and _artificial_ selection by man. We all know the extraordinary

modifications which have thus been gradually brought about in domestic

animals, such as dogs, horses, sheep, pigeons, etc.; in food-plants,

as cereal grains, garden-vegetables, etc., and in ornamental plants,

as roses, dahlias, pinks, etc. We can only give very briefly the

principles of the process by which these extreme modifications are

produced, referring the reader to works specially devoted to this

subject for more complete accounts.

Let it be borne in mind, then (_a_), that inheritance is not only

from the immediate parents, but from the whole line of ancestry. The

inheritance from the immediate parents is, doubtless, usually greater

than from any other _one_ term of the ancestral series--the effect on

the offspring of any previous generation becomes, doubtless, less and

less as the distance from the offspring increases--yet the _sum_ of

the ancestral inheritance is far greater than the immediate parental.

Let it also be borne in mind (_b_) that true breeding from one form

for many generations creates a fund of heredity in that form, and thus

tends to produce fixity, rigidity, or permanence in that form.

[Illustration: FIG. 68.]

Now, the method of producing artificial breeds, sometimes consciously,

sometimes unconsciously, is, briefly, as follows: Suppose it be

desired to obtain a variety of an animal, say a dog, having a

certain character. We start from a common type, _a_ (Fig. 68). If

this type were allowed to breed naturally, the slight divergent

variation of offspring represented by the radiating lines would

neutralize one another by interbreeding, the individual differences

would be “_pooled_” in a common stock, and the species would remain

substantially constant. But if among all these slightly divergent

varieties we select one, _b_, which seems in the right direction, and

ruthlessly destroy all the others (indicated by crossing them out by

the circular line), and breed this variety, _b_, only, we shall get

again a number of divergent varieties. It may be that the larger number

of these will be backward, in the direction of the original type _a_,

on account of the ancestral heredity in that direction, but some will

again be in the desired direction. Let all the varieties other than

the desired one, but especially the backward-going or reverting ones,

be again destroyed, and the one kind only selected which seems to be

in the right direction, viz., _c_. As we push the form thus from

generation to generation in the desired direction, especially if we

attempt to hasten too much the process, the resistance to movement--if

I may use the expression--in that direction becomes greater and greater

(shown by the decreasing distances between the successive points of

divergence, _a_, _b_, _c_, _d_, etc.), and the tendency to reversion

becomes stronger (shown by the greater number and length of the

backward-going lines), until finally it is almost impossible to push

any farther. We will suppose that _x_ is such a limit. But if, now,

we breed true on the point _x_, destroying the reversions or backward

variations for many generations, we will gradually accumulate a fund

of ancestral heredity on this point which increases with every added

generation, until finally the tendency to reversion becomes small. The

variety _breeds true_ without further interference, or with only very

general superintendence. Such a permanent variety is called a _race_.

After a race is firmly established for a sufficient length of time,

and the tendency to reversion is lost, it may itself become a new

point of departure for the formation of new varieties or races, in the

same or other directions. Thus, during even the brief history of man,

have been formed races of the different domestic animals, and useful

and ornamental plants, differing so greatly from each other that, if

found in the wild state, they would unhesitatingly be called different

species, or even in some cases different genera.

Now, if art can vary form so greatly, and in so short time, why may

not Nature in limitless time? If art by artificial selection, why not

Nature by natural selection? Nature is as rigid in selection and as

ruthless in destruction: why may we not expect similar or even much

greater results? The process is similar in the two cases--i. e.,

selection among varieties in offspring, only that the selection

is natural instead of artificial, and the process is so slow that

there is little tendency to reversion in the latter case. Suppose,

then, we have a gradually changing physical environment, or climate.

Among the divergent varieties of any species in each generation,

those would be preserved which are most in accordance with the new

climate, and the others would perish. This is natural selection, or

survival of the fittest. Add to this the effect of the change in

the organic environment. All species are modified by the changing

physical environment; but these modified species again all affect

one another in the competitive struggle for life, and the strongest

or swiftest, or most cunning, survive (natural selection). Add to

this, again, the struggle among the males for possession of the

females--for reproductive opportunities--by which only the strongest

and most courageous, or the most beautiful and attractive, leave

progeny which inherit their peculiarities (sexual selection). Add to

these, finally, _migrations_, voluntary among higher and involuntary

dispersals among lower animals and plants, and the consequent mingling

of faunas and floras--the migrations subjecting them to great change

of environment, both physical and organic, and the mingling producing

fiercer struggle for life--and we have in powerful operation many

causes of modification. Add, I say, all these causes of modification

together, and then make the process slow and continuous through

unlimited time, and where is the limit to the degree of change?

Commencing in any species, from any point of departure, there are

formed first slight modifications which would be called varieties; then

these modifications, continuing in the same direction, form races;

these races by wider separation become species, and species in their

turn become genera, etc. Comparing, again, to a growing tree, varieties

are swelling buds; when they grow into twigs, they are species; when

they branch again into different species, the branching stem becomes a

genus, etc.

We have thus far spoken only of the various forms of one factor, viz.,

the Darwinian factor of selection, whether natural or artificial.

We have dwelt upon this one, because the natural and the artificial

processes are so similar, and the artificial is so controllable. But

there are other factors in operation, in art as well as in nature. We

have already spoken (p. 73) of other factors of natural change. We

have shown how changing physical environment affects _function_, and

function affects _form and structure_, and how these slight changes are

integrated by heredity through many generations. We have also shown how

_use_ or _disuse_ increases or diminishes the size and change the form

of parts, and these changes, also, however slight, are integrated by

heredity.

Now, these factors are operative also in domestication of animals

and cultivation of plants. No environment is so new and peculiar as

domestication and cultivation. The soil and temperature in plants,

food and housing of domesticated animals, tend to change form and

structure of the offspring, although in a way which it is difficult

intelligently to control, and thus are prolific of varieties from

which to select. In fact, they often give rise to great and unexpected

modifications, called sports, which form points of departure for new

varieties and races. Now, in nature, not only are all these causes

and factors of change in constant operation, but they act together in

a peculiarly complex way. All the members of a fauna and flora, and

the physical environment of any locality, constitute together a most

complex and delicately adjusted system of correlated parts. A change in

one part is propagated through the whole system; also, a change in one

factor affects all other factors. When we add to this the large amount

of time, in comparison with individual human life and observation,

necessary to produce visible change of form, we can easily understand

why the process is still imperfectly understood, although the _fact_ is

certain.

But it will be asked, Are there, then, no differences between the

artificially made extreme varieties equivalent, so far as difference

of form is concerned, to species, and real natural species? There

are. If there were not, there would never have been any doubt about

the derivative origin of natural species. But if it be asked, Are not

these differences fundamental, and therefore fatal to the argument for

evolution derived from this source? we answer, we think not. We will

deal frankly and fairly with these differences.

=First Difference, Reversion.=--The strong tendency of artificial

varieties to reversion, even during the process of formation, and

especially their complete reversion to the original type if the hand

of man be withdrawn--i. e., if left to themselves, or become wild--is

supposed to show an essential difference between such varieties,

however extreme, and true species--is supposed, in fact, to prove an

indestructible permanency of specific types. Nature disowns these

artificial forms, and as it were brands them with bastardy. Not only

so, she strives ever to destroy them. The supporting hand of man is

necessary to sustain them. Left to themselves and to Nature, they

quickly revert to the original type. If all the extreme varieties of

dogs, from the greyhound and Newfoundland, on the one hand, to the

terrier and lap-dog on the other, were turned loose on an isolated

island, uninhabited by man but full of other animals, and left there

to shift for themselves--and the island were visited again after a

lapse of a hundred or a thousand years--it is probable that a uniform

species, something like to, though perhaps not identical with, the

wolf, would be found. They would have reverted to the original or

nearly the original wild type from which they were produced by

domestication. All or nearly all that was done by man would have been

undone by Nature. This reversion is one test of species.

But the reason of this tendency to reversion is obvious: First, the

time was too short, the rate of change was too rapid, in the artificial

formation of these varieties. There was not time enough to accumulate

a fund of heredity on each successive stage of the change. Therefore

the form is unstable and the tendency to revert is strong. Compare the

fleeting days and the hurrying impatience of man with the infinite time

and the divine patience of Nature! But mere instability is not the

principal cause of reversion. Secondly, in the case of artificial forms

in a wild state, _natural selection compels reversion_. Every species

in a wild state must of course be in harmony with the environment. But

artificially made forms are in harmony with the artificial environment

of domestication, but not with the environment of nature. In nature

the fittest survive, but artificial breeds are not fit to survive in a

state of nature. They are therefore quickly destroyed in the struggle

for life, or must be modified. Nature immediately begins to select

the fittest, and gradually in the course of time produces one or more

uniform species, similar to that from which they came, or perhaps to

what they would have been by this time if left to the operation of

natural causes under the conditions supposed. But natural species, if

they are formed, as the derivationists suppose, by the operation of

natural causes, can not revert unless the conditions revert; for the

same causes which operated to produce, still continue to operate to

keep, the species. Take an example:

The form, the habits, and the instincts of the pointer have been made

by a slow process of artificial selection of divergent varieties of

offspring, and by training of individuals continued and its effects

accumulated through many generations. But this form and these habits

and instincts, so laboriously produced, would be quickly destroyed by

Nature. The pointer, left to himself, must either change or become

extinct, because not adapted to the wild state. Such instincts and

habits would not only be of no use, but would be incompatible with

success in the struggle for life. But suppose for a moment that these

habits and instincts were useful to the animal in a wild state;

evidently they would be instantly seized upon by natural selection,

and not only perpetuated but intensified until a very distinct species

would be produced. The same is true of all other races of dogs. If the

Newfoundland, the greyhound, and the pug were all turned loose in a

forest, and if each of these kinds were admirably adapted to some place

in the economy of Nature--for some special mode of food-getting without

corresponding disabilities in other directions (as must be the case

if made by natural selection)--there can be no doubt they would each

survive, and their characters intensified; intermediate forms would

disappear (for reasons which we shall see presently), and we would

soon have three distinct species, or perhaps we would even call them

distinct genera.

=Second Difference, Intermediate Forms.=--Natural species are

distinct--marked out with hard and fast lines--while artificially-made

races, even though in their typical forms they differ as much or more

than natural species, shade into one another by insensible gradations.

In answer and explanation of this difference we remark: If species or

modified forms of any kind, whether natural or artificial, are made by

natural causes, and not at once out of hand by supernatural creation,

then of course there must have been gradations in the process of

making. Now, in the artificial case, the whole process as well as the

result lies within the limits of observation, while in the natural case

only the final result. But it will be asked, Why are the gradations

not seen also in the final result? We answer, because the intermediate

forms are eliminated in the struggle for life, and not reproduced by

cross-breeding. If artificial races always bred true--i. e., without

crossing, as natural species do--they would probably soon be as

sharply demarked. Cross-breeding is the great cause of the shadings

between domestic races. This brings me to the third and most important

difference.

=Third Difference, Cross-Fertility.=--Artificially-made races breed

freely and without repugnance with one another, and the offspring

of such cross-breeding is indefinitely fertile. Natural species

will not usually unite with one another, being prevented by sexual

repugnance and other causes. Or, if they do sexually unite, there is

either no offspring, or else the offspring is sterile, and therefore

the intermediate form dies out in the first generation; or else the

offspring is imperfectly fertile, and therefore the intermediate form

is eliminated in a few generations, and the species remain distinct;

or else the offspring is more fertile with the parent stocks, and

therefore revert to the parent stocks, and still the species remain

distinct. Such infertile, or imperfectly fertile, offspring--the result

of crossing of species--are called hybrids.

This is regarded as a most important test of true species, as

contrasted with varieties or races. There are two bases on which

species may be founded. Species may be based on _form_, morphological

species; or they may be based on _reproductive functions_,

physiological species. By the one method a _certain amount of

difference_ of form, structure, and habit, _constitutes species_;

according to the other, if the two kinds breed freely with each other

and the offspring is indefinitely fertile, the kinds are called

varieties, but if they do not they are called species. The two tests,

however, do not always accord. Every now and then we find undoubted

morphological species which may be crossed and produce indefinitely

fertile offspring. Yet it is certainly true that species are usually

cross-sterile, while varieties, whether natural or artificial, are

cross-fertile.

In explanation of this important difference, let it be observed that

there are here two things which must be kept distinct in the mind,

although they are, doubtless, closely allied--viz., sexual repugnance

(psychological element) and cross-sterility (physiological element).

The former is found, of course, only in the higher animals, where

fertilization is _voluntary_. The latter is universal among all

living things. This latter, therefore, is the more fundamental and

essential element, and the former may be regarded as its psychical

sign in the higher animals. It is of this latter, therefore--i. e.,

cross-sterility--that we shall speak mainly.

Suppose, then, we have growing together in the same locality many

species of pines or oaks, or other anemophilous trees. The whole air

is filled with the pollen of many species, and every germ-cell must

receive many kinds of male cells, and yet there are no hybrids, but,

on the contrary, the species remain distinct. So also in case of

hermaphrodite animals, where the fertilization is involuntary; many

aquatic species are found together in the same locality, and the water

is filled with sperm-cells of many different species. Many kinds of

sperm-cells must fall on each germ-cell, and yet there are no hybrids;

the species remain distinct. In all such cases we must suppose that

there is, among the different kinds of male cells, a struggle for the

possession of the germ or female cell, or a sort of sexual selection by

the female cell among the competing male cells, and the fittest--the

most in accord; i. e., those of the same species--prevail. This is

universal. But in the higher animals, in addition to the prepotency

of male cells of the same species, and comparative infertility in

case of union of those of different species, sexual attraction and

sexual repugnance contribute to the same result, and species are thus

doubly separated. Thus sexual selection is of two kinds: selection of

individuals for union (psychical), and selection of sperm-cells for

fertilization (physiological). The one kind is usually the sign of the

other--attraction the sign of fertility, and repugnance of sterility.

But in the domestic state it is all otherwise. Free competition between

individuals or between cells is not allowed. Thus, for example, among

plants, crossings may be forced and hybrids made in gardens which would

never occur in Nature. The florist prevents fertilization in the same

kind and compels fertilization of a different kind. If male cells of

the same kind were allowed to compete, the result would be different.

Doubtless the same method would succeed in many lower animals. So also

in higher animals free competition and sexual selection for union are

often not allowed, and therefore animals of different species, such as

the horse and the ass, unite, which would not do so if they were free

to select as in the wild state. These two are widely distinct species,

sometimes even called genera, and therefore the offspring is infertile;

but two closely allied species, such as two species of wolf, or of the

fox, in a domestic state would probably not only unite but produce

indefinitely fertile offspring. In fact, it is almost certain that the

dog was made by a mixture of several species of wolf, most, perhaps

all, of them now extinct.[30] On the other hand, it is not at all

certain that the extreme varieties of dogs have not passed the limit

of greatest attraction, and therefore of greatest cross-fertility, and

that, if allowed free choice, as in Nature, they would not breed true,

or tend to breed true, with their own kind, and intermediate kinds die

out in the struggle for life.

=Law of Cross-breeding.=--Before going any further in this discussion,

it is necessary to bring out another point of extreme importance in the

formation of varieties, both natural and artificial--a point which I

believe throws light upon the very significance of sex itself--I refer

to the effect of cross-breeding.

It is a curious and most significant fact that different varieties,

both natural and artificial, are, up _to a certain limit_, not only

cross-fertile and cross-attractive, but even more so than individuals

of the same variety. Long experience has shown that very close breeding

of the same variety for a long time fixes the _kind_ but _weakens_ the

_stock_, especially in fertility, while judicious crossing of varieties

strengthens the stock, increasing its fertility, and especially

producing _plasticity_ or _variability_. Therefore breeders, if they

wish to preserve a valuable variety, breed close; but, if they wish to

make new varieties, cross-breed. But we have already seen that species

are usually cross-sterile. Therefore there must be some regular law of

increase to a maximum, and again decrease to zero. It is this law that

I now wish to investigate.

In the lowest animals and plants multiplication of individuals and

the continuance of the kind are independent of sex, and therefore

in such there may be no sex at all. The sexual elements are not yet

differentiated. An individual divides itself into two; each grows to

the original size and again divides into two, and so on, it may be

indefinitely. In this lowest form of reproduction the individual is

sacrificed to the kind, or else we may regard the kind as an extension

of the individual, and reproduction as a modification of growth. But

there are other sexless modes of reproduction, found in nearly all

plants and many lower animals, in which the individuality is not

sacrificed. The next step in the ascending scale is reproduction by

_budding_. In this case a bud is formed which grows into a perfect

individual, and may remain attached to the parent stalk, forming

together a compound individual, as in most plants and many lower

animals, such as the coral; or it may separate and assume independent

life, as in some plants and many lower animals. In still other animals,

as in many hydrozoa, the budding function is relegated to a special

part, which thus becomes a reproductive _organ_. The next step is the

placing of the budding organ, for greater safety, in an _interior

cavity_. This is the case with aphids. Now, why would not this be an

excellent mode of reproduction for all animals, man included? Why

was sex introduced at all? There are very sufficient reasons, of

many kinds, which may come up later; but the fundamental reason, in

connection with evolution, is _the funding of individual differences

in a common offspring, thereby giving to the offspring a tendency to

divergent variation_.

Now, _non-sexual_ reproduction is _absolute true breeding_. The law

of like producing like is absolute. Heredity is all-powerful, and

tendency to variation is _nil_. These modes of reproduction are in

fact but a modification of growth and an extension of the individual.

Evolution-changes in animals produced in this way only must be very

slow, since the most powerful factor of evolution, viz., natural

selection among divergent varieties of offspring, would be wanting.

In the earliest times, therefore, before sex was yet declared,

we may imagine that physical environment was the great and only

factor of change. Sexual reproduction introduces the new element of

variation of offspring from which Nature makes her selections; and

this element of variation is apparently the result of the union of

_diverse_ individuals, and the funding of these differences in a common

offspring, and thus a double inheritance of individual characteristics

from the parents and a multiple inheritance of the same from the

ancestry. See, then, with this end in view, the pains Nature has

taken to make the difference between the uniting individuals and the

diversity of inheritance by the offspring as great as possible, and

yet the gradual way in which she has accomplished it. As already said,

the lowest form of reproduction is that by _fission_. Next comes

budding in _any_ part indifferently. Next comes the relegation of the

budding function to a particular part. This is the first appearance

of a reproductive _organ_. Next comes the placing of this organ, for

greater safety, within. Thus far all is non-sexual reproduction--all

a modification of growth--an extension of the individual, like the

propagation of plants by cuttings and by buds. Then comes sexual

reproduction in its lowest forms.

It may be well to stop here, to show the entire difference between this

and non-sexual modes. The latter, we have seen, is only a modification

of growth, an extension of the individual. Now, sexual reproduction

is the opposite of all this. Growth is a constant multiplication of

cells. One cell is ever becoming two similar cells--or, if we call them

individuals, one individual is ever becoming two similar individuals.

But in sexual reproduction we have an exactly reverse process. Reduced

to its simplest terms, sexual reproduction is the fusion of _two

diverse_ cells, sperm-cell and the germ-cell, to form _one_ cell,

the ovule--literally, a diverse twain forming one flesh. In its

higher forms it is the union of diverse _individuals_ to bring about

the same result. Instead of one cell becoming two, it is two cells

becoming one; instead of one individual becoming two in the offspring,

it is two individuals becoming one in the offspring. But this great

change was not brought about at once, but only in the most gradual

manner. First, the sexual elements--sperm-cell and germ-cell--are

separated, but _in the same organ_. Then the organs--spermary and

ovary--are separated, but in the _same individual_. This is the

condition of self-fertilizing hermaphroditism so common among plants

and lower animals. Then comes cross-fertilizing hermaphroditism; and

Nature takes much pains and uses many ingenious devices to prevent

self-fertilization and insure cross-fertilization. Now, for the

first time, we have slight individual differences funded in a common

offspring. Then, in order to absolutely forbid self-fertilization, and

at the same time allow greater differences in the crossing individuals

than could be attained in hermaphroditic individuals, the sex organs

are separated in _different individuals_, and fertilization can

only take place by _voluntary union_. Then, to insure the union of

suitable individuals, and forbid the ban between unsuitable, there are

introduced sexual attraction and repulsion. Then, last of all, the

difference between the two sex-individuals becomes greater and greater

as we go up. It is conspicuous only in vertebrates and some insects,

and very conspicuous only in birds and mammals.

We see, then, as we go up the taxonomic, and undoubtedly also the

phylogenic series, that there is a cross-breeding of more and

more diverse individuals, a funding of more and more divergent

characteristics in a common offspring. Why is this? I answer, for the

sake of _better results in the offspring_. This is abundantly shown

by direct experiment. In hermaphroditic plants in which there may

be either self-fertilization or else cross-fertilization with other

individuals of the same species, the latter produces better results in

number and vigor of offspring. But there are other advantages, more

difficult to prove but none the less certain, and of the greatest

importance in evolution: First, as already stated, complexity of

inheritance, like complexity of composition in a chemical substance,

gives instability to the embryo, and thus liability to variation in the

offspring; and this in its turn furnishes the material for selection

of the fittest. Again, it seems to me that there is a direct tendency

to improve the offspring by a sort of struggle in the embryo among the

various qualities inherited from both sides, and a survival of the best

and strongest--a sort of pre-potency of strong qualities.

Can divergence of uniting individuals and the funding of diverse

characteristics go any further? It may. The differences of the uniting

individual may be still further increased, and the resulting offspring

still further improved by the cross-breeding of different varieties

of the same species, for we thus add varietal differences to sexual

differences in the uniting individuals. It is well known that too

close breeding, or consanguineous breeding, or breeding in and in, as

it is variously called, if continued long, has a bad effect on the

offspring, weakening the stock, while judicious crossing of varieties

within certain limits of difference has a good effect, strengthening

the stock and increasing its fertility. It probably does so in two

ways: one direct, by funding many diverse qualities from both sides,

and the survival in the offspring of the strongest and best; the other

indirect, by giving _plasticity_, instability to the embryo, and

variability to the offspring, and therefore abundant material for the

operation of selection, either by man or by Nature. We said, “within

certain limits of difference.” If the difference is extreme, as in

extreme varieties and races, then the effect becomes again bad, and

more and more so as the limit of specific difference is approached;

at which limit at last Nature shuts down and forbids the bans. Thus,

then, there is in cross-breeding a regular law of effect, increasing to

a maximum and again decreasing, which may be graphically represented

by a curve (Fig. 69). In this figure the horizontal line represents

the ordinary level of the type; distances on this line represent

differences, individual, varietal, or specific; ordinates above or

below represent the effect, good or bad, of crossing. Thus s s′

represent two species, and the line between represents their specific

differences; _r r′_ represent different races or permanent varieties;

_v v′_ two strong varieties; _d d′_ ordinary individual differences; _c

c′_ close resembling or consanguineous individuals. The undulating line

represents the effect of crossing these various kinds. It is seen that

“in-and-in breeding,” _c c′_, produces bad effect (negative ordinates);

breeding of ordinary individual differences, _d d′_, keeps the stock at

the ordinary level--in its typical form; crossing two strong varieties,

_v v′_, produces maximum good effect (positive ordinates); crossing

decided races produces again bad effects, which become infinitely bad

as we approach species, S S′.[31]

[Illustration: FIG. 69.]

It is generally admitted that long-continued very close breeding has a

bad effect. Even in plants, Darwin has shown that cross-fertilization

has better effect than self-fertilization, this last being of course

the closest possible breeding. But it is probable that the principal

bad effect is not on the stock but _on the process of evolution_. Very

close breeding weakens the stock, ordinary breeding of individual

differences maintains the stock at the ordinary level and fixes it.

Cross-breeding of varieties strengthens the stock, and also (and this

is its main advantage) produces plasticity in the stock, gives rise

to strong divergent variations, or even sports, and thus becomes a

main agent in evolution. It is probable, moreover, that the higher

the function the more sensitive is it to these effects of breeding.

Therefore, the effect is greater in man than in any other animal. It is

true that many have doubted the bad effect of close breeding in man,

and have brought forward formidable statistics to substantiate their

position; but these doubtless take no account of the most important

function, the psychic, and especially the most important element in

every function, so far as evolution or progress is concerned, viz.,

_plasticity_ or capability of progressive improvement. The tendency

of consanguineous breeding, or even the breeding of persons of like

character and experiences, as in an isolated community, is, if not to

deteriorate the physique, at least to fix, stereotype the character,

and thus to check social progress. Contrarily, the crossing of

varieties of the same race seems not only to strengthen but, by the

diverse inheritance, to produce plasticity of character and capacity

for progress. But the difference between the primary races seems too

great for crossing with advantage. Some degree of sexual repugnance

which undoubtedly exists between the primary races is the psychical

sign of this fact.[32]

If, now, we go back to what we said before taking up this subject of

the effect of cross-breeding, we at once see that there is an apparent

flaw in all our reasonings. If close in-and-in breeding produced

better and more numerous offspring than cross-breeding between slight

varieties, then, indeed, such varieties would be preserved, and

increase in divergence from generation to generation until they became

species. Or, in any case, if, in any way, divergence could reach the

point of extreme varieties or races, or what are called sub-species,

then commencing cross-sterility would complete the separation, and thus

form true species. But how can the process of progressive divergence

begin, when slight varieties are even more fertile by cross-breeding

than by close breeding? Is it not evident that, with every generation,

the slight varieties would cross-breed with one another and with the

parent stock, and thus all varietal differences would be funded into

a common stock, and the type would be preserved unchanged? This, as

already pointed out (p. 76), has always been the chief difficulty

in the way of imagining how varieties can grow into species; and

the difficulty is _only increased_ by our discussion of the law of

cross-breeding. Now, just here, Dr. Romanes’s most important and

prolific idea comes to our help, and, as it seems to us, completely

solves the difficulty.

According to Dr. Romanes, no organ is so subject to variation as

the reproductive, and this in no respect so much as in degrees and

kinds of fertility--we might almost say so subject to freaks of

cross-sterility. Now, suppose we start with any well-defined species

in a state of nature. With every generation there are many slightly

divergent individual varieties, some greater and some less; but these

are all immediately swamped by crossing with one another and with the

parent stock, and the species remains unchanged. But suppose among

these divergent variations there arise, from time to time, some which

affect the reproductive organs in such wise that the variety, though

perfectly fertile with its own kind, is infertile, or imperfectly

fertile, with other varieties, and especially with the parent stock.

The change may be only in the _time_ of flowering in plants, or season

of heat in animals, or it may be actual infertility in sexual union.

Right here we have the beginning of a new species. The variety is

sexually isolated from the parent stock by cross-sterility, and

therefore all its peculiarities, however trivial, are preserved by

true breeding. Cross-breeding is necessary to make species, but true

breeding preserves them. Cross-breeding tends ever to make varieties,

but immediately destroys them again. This constant forming and

swamping, separating and again merging of varieties, like mixing of

dough, makes the whole mass (stock) more and more plastic and subject

to variety. This plasticity finally gives rise to varieties of the kind

which produces species by sexual isolation. By continued merging the

centrifugal forces continually increase, but are continually repressed

by crossing, until finally varieties break away to form species.

Now it is easy to see, from this point of view, why artificial

varieties are cross-fertile. It is because in artificial breeding we

are intent only on making varieties in form, size, color, etc., and not

at all on making any characterized by cross-sterility with the parent

stock. Cross-sterility with the parent stock, or with other varieties,

would be of no advantage, because we control the breeding, and can

breed true if we desire. Sexual isolation is not necessary, because

we can use physical isolation. On the contrary, such cross-sterility

would be a positive disadvantage to the breeder, by limiting the range

of his experiments just where they would be most prolific in making

new varieties. Hence, as might be expected, all domestic varieties are

cross-fertile, unless it be the extreme varieties, which may, in some

instances, have passed the limit of greatest fertility.

If this idea be true, then species which have originated in the same

locality ought to be always cross-sterile, but species which have

grown up apart, in widely separated geographical regions, ought to be

sometimes cross-fertile, because they were isolated by physical not by

sexual barriers. Such, Dr. Romanes thinks, is a fact. It is, however,

a very important point, which ought to be carefully investigated. We

say “_sometimes_.” It is probable that most geographical species also

are cross-sterile; for, although the isolation by cross-sterility of

slight varieties be the main cause of the origin of species, yet a

species formed by isolation of any other kind will gradually become

cross-sterile with other species. Although cross-sterility be the main

cause of divergence, yet divergence beyond a certain limit, however

caused, will bring about cross-sterility, because the reproductive

organs will partake of the general change going on in every part.

=Application.=--Suppose, then, a species breeding naturally in a wild

state. Individual varieties are constantly being formed and again

funded back into the common stock by cross-breeding. If the varieties

thus formed be decided, the cross-breeding will strengthen the stock,

and especially will preserve and increase its plasticity or tendency to

variation. Finally, among the widely divergent varieties there is one

affecting the reproductive organs of several individuals in such wise

that they are infertile, or imperfectly fertile, with the parent stock,

though perfectly fertile among themselves. These form a new species,

which continue to increase indefinitely.

=Objection answered.=--This view completes the answer to an objection

which is often made to evolution: “If natural species are formed by

transmutation, why is it we do not find intermediate links? Why is not

organic nature made up only of individual forms, shading insensibly

into each other in such wise that classification becomes a mere device

to handle more conveniently complex material? Why is it that groups,

especially species, are marked out with hard and fast lines?” We

have heretofore answered this by saying that intermediate forms are

eliminated. So they are, but how? Dr. Romanes’s idea of physiological

selection largely answers this. It is by the funding of _ordinary_

varieties into a common parental stock by crossing, and separating

_specific_ varieties by cross-sterility. Thus the organic field is

broken up into points about which variations oscillate. As every mass

of matter, when closely examined, is found to consist of aggregations

about centers of _cohesive_ attraction as discrete granules or

crystals, and only exceptionally do we find a homogeneous vitreous

structure; even so organic forms aggregate about points of _sexual_

attraction, and the whole mass consists of discrete species, and only

exceptionally--i. e., in domestication--do we find insensible shadings.

Now, species are the smallest aggregate of individuals, as granules

are of molecules. Species are more distinctly marked out by hard and

fast lines than are other taxonomic groups only because they are the

_last_, going downward, that are cross-sterile--because right here is

the change from cross-sterility to cross-fertility.

If this view be true, then in _the same locality_ species ought to be

always distinct and without shadings. If we find shadings at all, it

ought to be in intermediate geographical regions, where isolation is

not sexual but physical. Now, this is exactly what we find to be the

fact. _Innumerable examples of such intermediate forms in intermediate

geographical regions_ are now known, especially among birds and

reptiles, and examples have so increased in modern times, by closer

study, that naturalists, especially ornithologists, have been compelled

to resort to a trinomial nomenclature in order to designate these

geographical sub-species.[33]

If any further explanation is necessary, it will probably be found in

the following suggestions:

1. The number of individual varieties constantly being formed is

almost infinite, but the number of places in nature is very limited.

Now, among the infinite number of slight individual varieties formed

with every generation, the competitive struggle will be severest

between those most nearly alike, because they are competitors for the

_same_ place. Only one kind succeeds, viz., the fittest. Intermediate

forms are, therefore, exactly those which are eliminated in the most

wholesale way. 2. Add to this the fact that, as soon as divergence,

from whatsoever cause, reaches a certain point, sexual repugnance

or cross-sterility, or both, come in to perpetuate and increase the

separation already commenced. 3. Add to this, again, that migrations

in higher animals, and involuntary dispersals in lower animals and

in plants, and the mingling together of different faunas and floras,

produces a still fiercer struggle for life, especially between natives

and invaders, and thus great numbers of forms are destroyed; all but

the fittest are weeded out, and therefore the distinctness of the

remainder is greatly increased. Periods of great changes of physical

geography and of climate, and therefore of wide and general migrations,

are also periods of great weedings-out of unfit forms. Thus it

happens that existing faunas and floras are little else than isolated

_remnants_.

To illustrate, again, by a growing tree: If all the buds of a tree

lived and grew, they would soon become so numerous that they would

together form a solid hemispherical mass, like a coral-head, with no

room between for leaf or light or air. But ninety-nine one-hundredths

of buds die in the struggle for light and air, and therefore the

survivors are distinct growing points, widely separated from each

other. Species are such extreme, but separated, twiglets of the tree of

life.

=Objection.=--But it will be objected, again: The twig-_points_

are, indeed, separate, but the twigs themselves must meet somewhere

lower down, where they began to grow. Intermediate links may be

wanting _now_, but they must, of course, have existed once--i. e., in

previous geological times, and therefore ought to be found fossil. In

distribution in space or geographically, organic kinds may be marked

off by hard-and-fast lines, but, if their derivative origin be true,

in their distribution in _time_ or geologically, there ought to be

many examples of insensible shadings between them. In fact, if we

only had all the extinct forms, the organic kingdom, taken as a whole

and throughout all time, ought to consist not of species at all, but

simply of individual forms, shading insensibly into each other, like

the colors of the spectrum, and our classification ought to be a mere

matter of convenience, having no counterpart in nature. But this is

not the fact. On the contrary, the law of distribution in time is

apparently similar in this respect to the law of distribution in space,

already given (page 169). As in the case of _contiguous_ geographical

faunas, the change is apparently by _substitution_ of one species _for_

another, and not by _transmutation_ of one species _into_ another.

So also in _successive_ geological faunas, the change seems rather

by substitution than by transmutation. In both cases species seem to

come in suddenly, with all their specific characters perfect, remain

substantially unchanged as long as they last, and then die out and

are replaced by others. Certainly this looks much like immutability

of specific forms, and supernaturalism of specific origin. We have,

we believe, satisfactorily explained this in the case of geographical

distribution (page 201), but how can we explain it in the case of

geological distribution?

=Answer.=--1. The reason for this, given by Darwin and other

evolutionists, is the extremely fragmentary character of the geological

record. If the existing faunas and floras are but isolated remnants,

the rest having been _destroyed_ by migrations and conflicts, how

much more are fossil faunas and floras but fragmentary remnants, the

rest having been _lost_, partly because never preserved, and partly

by destruction of the record! If from this cause existing species are

widely separated, how much more ought we to expect to find fossil

species distinct and widely separated!

This is undoubtedly in most cases a true and sufficient answer, yet we

think the fragmentariness of the geological record has been overstated.

While it is true that there are many and wide gaps in the record; while

it is true, also, that even where the record is continuous many forms

may not have been preserved, yet there are some cases, especially

in the Tertiary fresh-water deposits, where the record is not only

continuous for hundreds of feet in thickness, but the abundance of

life was very great, and the conditions necessary for preservation

exceptionally good. In such cases the number of fossil species found

on each horizon seems to be as great as in existing faunas over equal

space. The record in these cases seems to be continuous and without

break, and crowded with fossil forms; and yet, although the species

change greatly, and perhaps many times, in passing from the lowest to

the highest strata, we do not usually, it must be acknowledged, find

the gradual transitions we would naturally expect, if the change were

effected by gradual transformations. The incompleteness of the record,

therefore, although a true and important cause, is not the whole cause.

In further and completer answer to this greatest of all objections, we

will throw out the following suggestions:

2. We must remember that considerable latitude is allowed by the

anti-derivationists to _variation of species;_ so much so, indeed, that

it is often difficult to draw the line between well-marked varieties

and closely-allied species. Now, according to the derivationist,

these strong varieties, breeding usually true, are naught else than

commencing species.

3. On every side and everywhere, both in existing faunas and in fossil

forms, but especially in the latter, we find innumerable examples of

transitions, or intermediate forms, between all the _higher groups_,

such as genera, families, orders, and classes. It is, in fact, by means

of these that the great law of differentiation from generalized types

has been established. It is, therefore, only between _species_ that

such intermediate forms are rare.

4. But even between species such intermediate forms, though rare, have

been pointed out, both in existing and in extinct faunas. But the

opposition contend that, in all such cases, the previously supposed

species are only varieties. We have already (page 61) spoken of the

obvious fallacy involved in this position. Species are first defined

as forms distinct and without intermediate links, and then we are

challenged to find such links; and when, with much labor, we find them,

they say the supposed species are not species, but only varieties.

But there are some cases in which this subterfuge will not do. There

are cases in which the transitions are between forms so extreme that

they can not, by any stretch of the term, be called varieties. We will

select and dwell upon but one striking example, viz., the fossil forms

of the Tertiary fresh-water deposits of Steinheim.

In Würtemberg, near the little village of Steinheim, are found certain

strata of sand and lime, which are evidently deposits from a small

lake of Tertiary times. The deposits are extremely rich in fossil

shells, especially of the different species of the genus _Planorbis_.

As the deposits seem to have been continuous for ages, and the fossil

shells very abundant, this seemed to be an excellent opportunity to

test the theory of derivation. With this end in view, they have been

made the subject of exhaustive study by Hilgendorf in 1866,[34] and by

Hyatt in 1880.[35] In passing from the lowest to the highest strata

the species change greatly and many times, the extreme forms being so

different that were it not for the intermediate forms they would be

called not only different species but different genera. And yet the

gradations are so insensible that the whole series is nothing less

than a demonstration, in this case at least, of origin of species by

derivation with modifications. The accompanying plate of successive

forms (Fig. 70), which we take from Prof. Hyatt’s admirable memoir,

will show this better than any mere verbal explanation. It will be

observed that, commencing with four slight varieties--probably sexually

isolated varieties--of one species, each series shows a gradual

transformation as we go upward in the strata--i. e., onward in time.

Series I branches into three sub-series, in two of which the change of

form is extreme. Series IV is remarkable for great increase in size

as well as change in form. In the plate we give only selected stages,

but in the fuller plates of the memoir, and still more in the shells

themselves, the subtilest gradations are found.

[Illustration: FIG. 70.--Transformations of Planorbis (after Hyatt).

_Series IV._ 1, Pl. levis: Undorf. 2, Pl. Steinheimensis;

3, tenuis-Steinheimensis; 4, tenuis; 5, discoideus; 6,

trochiformis-discoideus; 7, trochiformis: Steinheim.

_Series III._ 8, Pl. levis: Undorf. 9, Pl. oxystomus; 10, supremus;

11, supremus var. turrita: Steinheim.

_Series II._ 12, Pl. levis: Undorf. 13, Pl. crescens-parvus; 14, 15,

crescens: Steinheim.

_Series I._ _Sub-series 3._ 16, Pl. levis: Undorf. 17, Pl.

minutus-levis; 18, minutus; 19, 20, triquetrus: Steinheim.

_Sub-series 2._ 21, Pl. minutus; 22, 23, denudatus-minutus; 24,

denudatus var. distortus: Steinheim. _Sub-series 1._ 25, Pl.

costatus-minutus; 26, costatus; 27, 28, costatus var--: Steinheim.

The specimens from Undorf all belong to an older Tertiary period than

that at Steinheim.

]

This case is striking, partly because it is a very favorable one,

but mainly because it has been so carefully studied. There can be no

doubt that equally careful study would reveal the same transition

in many other cases. Nor are such transitions confined to the lower

forms of life, though they are probably more abundant there. According

to Cope, the nicest gradations may be traced between some of the

extinct mammalian species so abundant in the Tertiary deposits of the

West--especially between the species of the extinct generalized

family of _Oredontidæ_[36] The same is probably true of the many

extinct species of the horse family.

It is interesting to observe that the details of the process of change

in the forms of _Planorbis_ are in accord with Dr. Romanes’s views.

The change does not seem to have been uniform but somewhat paroxysmal.

The forms seem to remain stable for a long time, and then a few break

into several different forms, while the more rigid die out. It is as if

cross-breeding had kept the type true, but at the same time increased

its tendency to variation, until finally one or more varieties became

sexually isolated and thus formed new species.

5. But still the question remains: Why are transitional forms _rare_ in

all cases, especially between species--so rare that they are eagerly

sought and highly prized? I believe that the true reason of this is

that _the steps of evolution are not always uniform_.

Nearly all evolutionists have assumed and even insisted on uniformity,

as the opposite of catastrophism and of supernaturalism, and therefore

as essential to the idea of evolution. They say that the constancy of

the action of the forces of change necessitates the uniformity of the

rate of change. But, in fact, this is not always nor even usually true.

Causes or forces are constant, but phenomena everywhere and in every

department of Nature are _paroxysmal_. The forces producing storms

and lightning, and volcanoes and earthquakes, are or may be constant;

yet the phenomena are in the highest degree paroxysmal. Wherever in

nature we have a constant force and a strong resistance, we find more

or less paroxysmal action. For this reason the wind blows in puffs,

the friction of wind on water produces waves, water running in small

pipes issues in pulses. The reason is obvious, as may be seen by

the following examples: Suppose lifting forces within the earth are

resisted by crust-rigidity. The forces accumulate uniformly until the

resistance gives way, and suddenly we have an earthquake. Water running

with great resistance in small pipes is checked, but soon accumulates

additional force, which overcomes the resistance, only to be again

checked, and so on, and therefore runs in pulses. Now, the course of

evolution of the whole earth may be likened to such a current; there

are forces of movement and forces of resistance--progressive forces

and conservative forces. The progressive force is accumulative, the

resisting force is constant. Thus, in all evolution or history,

whether of the earth or of society, there are periods of comparative

quiet, during which the forces of change are gathering strength, and

periods of revolution or rapid change, during which these forces show

themselves in conspicuous effects.

Now, that there have been such periods of rapid revolutionary change

in the history of the earth, there can be no doubt. The history of the

earth is marked by periods of comparative quiet, during which life was

exceptionally abundant and prosperous, and change of organic forms

slow and uniform--separated by periods of disturbance, revolution,

rapid changes of physical geography and climate, and consequently of

comparatively rapid and sweeping changes in organic forms. These form

the division-lines between great eras of the earth’s history, and

are always marked by extensive unconformity of the strata, showing

the changes of physical geography above spoken of, and by apparently

sudden and sweeping change in life-forms, showing the great changes of

climate and other physical conditions. Unfortunately, in all cases of

unconformity of strata, there is, of course, a break in the continuity

of the record; and when the unconformity is very general a portion of

the record may be irrecoverably lost. The consequence is, that there is

an apparent break also in the continuity of life-forms. It looks, at

first sight, like wholesale extermination of old and recreation of new

forms. But undoubtedly the break in the continuity of life is apparent

only, as is shown by the loss in the record. If we could recover the

whole record, as indeed we sometimes do, we should find in all cases

that there is no break in the continuity of evolution, but only more

rapid rate of change at these times. But to this cause of rapid rate

of progress--i. e., change of physical environment--we must add change

of organic environment induced by the physical. We have already seen

(p. 179) that extensive changes in physical geography and climate are

always accompanied by wide migrations and dispersals of species, the

mingling of faunas and floras, and the severer struggle for life,

and the sweeping weeding-out of all but the fittest, and the change

of these latter, making them still fitter. These two causes of rapid

change, viz., change of climate and migrations, together with the loss

of record, we believe completely account for those sweeping changes,

not only of species but even of genera, families, and orders which

characterize the passage from one great era to another.

But this does not yet explain the apparent discontinuity between

_consecutive_ species in the same locality in continuous, conformable

strata, or the rarity of transitional forms when one species takes the

place of another in an apparently continuous record. In such continuous

deposits the successive faunas do indeed gradate insensibly into one

another, but apparently as in contiguous geographical regions (p. 200)

by substitution, not by transmutation. How shall we explain this?

On this point I throw out some suggestions: 1. In the modification of

species, too, as well as in other progressive changes, we may imagine

two forces operating, one progressive, the other conservative--the

one external, the other internal. The external progressive force

consists of all the factors of change already mentioned, the internal

conservative is the law of heredity, of like producing like. A changing

environment tends continually and increasingly to change of organisms,

but change is resisted by heredity, which tends to adhere, within

narrow limits, to the same form. But since the external force or

tendency to change increases constantly--since the discord between the

environment and the organism becomes ever greater, there must come a

time when either the species is destroyed, or else the resistance of

heredity gives way, and rapid change takes place. The alternative is

presented to the species to transform or perish; and in one or perhaps

in two or three generations we have an amount of change which, under

other circumstances, might take a hundred generations to accomplish.

These rapid changes are in fact exactly what in artificial varieties

we call sports. We do not know all the conditions which determine

sports in domestication, and still less what determines large and

widely-divergent variations, and therefore rapid origin of many

divergent species, in geological history. But one thing seems probable,

viz., that, when a species begins to change, it continues to change

easily and in many directions. When resistance gives way it takes some

time, many generations, for heredity to gather force again. Hence,

young species are plastic, fluent, because heredity, on any one point,

has not yet accumulated. But as soon as a stable form is again reached,

then, by accumulating a fund of heredity, the form tends to become more

and more rigid, until often it becomes too rigid to yield to modifying

influences, and therefore becomes extinct. By far the greater number

of species do thus become extinct and leave no progeny, while the few

more plastic forms are modified in several directions, and the number

of forms may, after a little time, be undiminished or even increased.

2. As to the _cause_ of rapid changes of form during revolutionary

or critical periods in the earth’s history, Brooks has introduced

an idea which is very suggestive, and deserves serious attention.

We have above spoken of the progressive element as external. Brooks

regards both elements as internal, and represented by the two sexes.

The male represents the progressive, the female the conservative

element. The one tends to divergent variation, the other to fixity

of type by heredity. I think we will all admit that, as a general

rule, in man (and probably all the higher animals) the male is more

highly differentiated into many divergent forms--the female is more

like the type-form of the species. In man, the male is certainly more

diversified in form, in expression, and in character. If they have the

keenest ear for musical pitch, they are also most often music-deaf;

if they have the sharpest perception of color, they are also most

often color-blind; if among them we find the brightest intellects, we

also find the dullest and most stupid; if there are among them more

geniuses, so, also, there are more cranks. The same is also, probably,

true of other animals, in proportion to their grade of organization.

The operation of these two equally necessary elements is well shown

in every advancing society. The initiative of every movement, in all

directions, good or bad, is determined by the male; the conservation

of whatever balance of good there may be, seems to be mainly by the

female. The male tries all things, the female holds fast that which

is good. By the one society gains a little in each generation; by the

other the gain is conserved and made a new point of departure. The one

is ever building hastily a scaffolding and platform; the other ever

consolidating into a permanent structure. Now, according to Brooks,

what is true in the plane of social progress is true also in the lower

plane of organic evolution. In sexual union, and in the resulting

offspring, the sperm-cell is the element which tends to divergent

variation, and the germ-cell to fixity of type, through heredity. In

artificial breeding, then, we ought to make new varieties by proper use

of the sire; we ought to preserve them true by proper management of the

dam.

But, again, it is believed that in many lower animals, especially

insects, the high-feeding of the mother, and consequent good condition

of the ovum, tends to the production of female offspring. It seems

almost certain that, in butterflies, the sex is not yet declared

in the caterpillar stage. According to the careful experiments of

Mrs. Treat,[37] if the caterpillars be well fed, they become female

butterflies; but, if poorly fed, they make males. One purpose of this

provision of Nature is, doubtless, to provide for the greater draught

on the vitality of the female in reproduction.

Now for the application. In good times in the history of a species,

when everything is prosperous, external conditions are favorable, and

food is abundant, females are in excess, and individuals are greatly

multiplied. Under these conditions, evolution would be slow and

uniform. But in _bad_ times in the history of a species, when external

conditions were unfavorable, not only would there be excess of males,

but these, through the influence of the changing environment, as well

as through the dominance of the male element, would be more than

usually varied in character. Among the strongly divergent varieties

thus formed, the fittest--i. e., those most in accord with the changing

environment--would survive and leave offspring partaking of their

character. We have already repeatedly said that the severer pressure of

a rapidly-changing environment determines correspondingly rapid changes

in organic forms. It may do so in many ways; but, according to Brooks,

one of the most important ways is by determining an excess of the male

element.

In brief, then, the causes of rarity of transitional forms among

fossils are--1. The change being, for the reasons given, comparatively

rapid, the _number of generations_ between consecutive species are

few, perhaps only one. 2. Times of rapid change are also times of

unfavorable conditions, and therefore the number of _individuals_

in each generation is small, and all the smaller--in Brooks’s

view--because of the fewness of females. When we remember that fossils

are but a small fraction of the actual faunas and floras of the

time, surely these two causes go far toward explaining the rarity of

links between _species_. 3. Add to these the existence of periods of

wide-spread changes in physical geography and climate, and consequent

wide migrations and dispersals of species, and we sufficiently account

for those sweeping changes in species, genera, families, and orders,

which mark the limits of the great eras, and which are made still more

abrupt, and apparently supernatural, by the loss of record at these

times.[38]

=Objection.=--There is still one more objection which will be made. We

have drawings of plants, animals, and men, by Egyptian artists, who

lived at least three thousand years ago, and the species of the one and

the races of the other are still the same. Still better, we have among

the wrappings of Egyptian mummies the very plants themselves, leaves

and flowers perfectly preserved, and even colors almost perfect. Yet

the species are exactly the same as grow in Egypt to-day. If species

are made by gradual transmutation, surely there ought to have been some

change in three thousand years.

=Answer=.--It may be well to note that this apparent permanence is true

of _races_ of men as well as of _species_ of animals and plants. But

the very men who insist on permanence of species are equally insistent

on the variability of varieties and races. The objection, therefore,

proves too much. We shall not insist on this, however, because as

derivationists we regard races as naught else than commencing species,

and therefore subject to the same laws. We are not striving for triumph

in debate, but only for truth. The true answer will, we believe, be

found among the following suggestions:

1. Three thousand years seems a long time in human history, but in

geological history it is but a day. This, the usual answer, is no doubt

a true one, but hardly, we think, sufficient. When we remember the

enormous change which has taken place in faunas and floras since the

end of the Tertiary, if change still continues at the same rate, surely

it ought to be distinctly perceptible in three thousand years.

2. But we must remember that such changes are usually more or less

paroxysmal; not, indeed, so sudden as to break the continuity of life,

but far more rapid at some times than at others. The last critical

or revolutionary period of rapid change was the Glacial epoch. Since

that time--i. e., during the human period--a new equilibrium has been

established, and the changes in organic forms have been very slow.

3. Remember, again, that in evolution _all_ species do not change. On

the contrary, most become rigid, and either remain unchanged, almost

indefinitely, or else die out and leave no descendants. Only the more

plastic forms change into other species, but usually into several

other species, and thus the number of forms may be undiminished, even

though the larger number of old forms leave no descendants. It is true,

therefore, of this as well as of other epochs, that the greater number

of species are permanent.

4. It is not impossible--indeed, it is in exact accordance with the

laws of evolution--that organic forms are more permanent now than

ever before. Evolution is a growth; the forces of growth must exhaust

themselves. Evolution proceeds by constant differentiation and

specialization, but extreme specialization always arrests evolution.

In ontogenic evolution, for example, cell-structure becomes more

and more specialized, but also thereby more and more rigid, and,

when specialization is complete, evolution stops, and cell-forms are

permanent. It is this which limits the cycle of every evolution. So is

it precisely with evolution of the organic kingdom, except that the

cycle is much longer. Here, also, every step is by specialization, and

yet specialization fixes the form, and finally arrests the advance on

that line. Thus, throughout the whole geological history of the earth,

the larger number of forms, by specialization, become rigid and perish,

while the fewer, more generalized, and more plastic forms take up the

march and carry it forward a step, only to be themselves specialized

and fixed. If we compare, again, to a tree: each twig finishes its

growth, flowers, fruits, and dies; other buds take up the growth and

carry it forward. By specialization the highest condition of a certain

form of life is attained, but other possibilities are shut off. Extreme

specialization is the flowering and fruiting--the end and completion

of twig-life. Now, obviously, this specialization and respecialization

can not go on forever. When it is complete in every direction it must

cease, and forms become permanent, or else perish. When it flowers it

must die.

Now, is not the advent of man in many ways a sign of the completeness

of organic evolution? Certain it is that with man there begins an

entirely new form of evolution. Certain it is that with man evolution

is transferred from the organic to the social plane, from the material

to the psychical. Certain it is that the forces, the conditions

and results of this evolution, are wholly different from those of

the other. In organic evolution the organism must conform to the

environment; in human evolution the environment is made to conform to

the wants of the organism. The one is unconscious and involuntary,

passive under the dominating laws of Nature; the other is conscious,

voluntary progress toward an ideal, _by the use_, among other means,

of the laws of Nature. The one is by change of external form--i. e.,

change of species--the other by change of brain-structure. Now, does

not the commencing of the cycle of this new evolution imply the

closing of that of the old? The two may overlap somewhat now, but it

is evident that, when the cycle of human evolution culminates, when

highly civilized man shall have taken possession of the whole earth,

the whole organic kingdom must be readjusted to his wants. All organic

forms must be either domesticated or destroyed. Organic forms will no

longer be modified by natural but wholly by artificial selection.

* * * * *

There are many other supposed objections which have been urged, but

these are mostly not objections to evolution, but only to some _special

theory_ of evolution--Darwinian, Spencerian, Lamarckian, or other.

=Origin of Beauty=.--For example, it has been urged that natural

selection can only account for _useful_ structures; but _beauty_ is

as universal and as conspicuous in nature as _use_. In many cases

Darwin has shown that beauty is useful, and in such cases it is, of

course, seized upon by selection and intensified. Thus, the gorgeous

coloring of birds and insects is largely due to sexual selection.

Beauty is attractive, and therefore the most beautiful prevail in

securing reproductive opportunities. This character is, therefore,

perpetuated in the offspring, and intensified from generation to

generation. But, of course, this can apply only to higher animals,

in which the sexes are separate and sexual union voluntary. It can

not apply to self-fertilizing hermaphrodites; and yet in these, also,

we often find the most gorgeous coloring. Again, Darwin has very

ingeniously and successfully explained the case of the beauty and

fragrance of flowers of hermaphroditic plants by another principle,

viz., that of _insect-selection_. Insects are attracted by the most

showy and fragrant flowers, and thus become the means of carrying

pollen from flower to flower, insuring fertilization, and especially

cross-fertilization. The most beautiful and fragrant flowers are most

certain to be fertilized, and thus beauty and fragrance become useful

to the plant, and therefore are selected and intensified.

These and many other cases of beauty may doubtless be explained by

showing that it is useful; but beauty which is without any use can

not be explained by natural selection. Now, as already said, the

most gorgeous beauty is lavishly distributed even among the lowest

animals, such as marine shells and polyps, where no such explanation

is possible. The process by which such beauty is originated and

intensified is wholly unknown to us.

=Incipient Organs=.--Again, Mivart has drawn attention to another

difficulty in the way of natural selection as an explanation even of

useful organs. Darwin does not, of course, attempt to account for the

_origin_ of varieties. As we have already seen, he assumes divergent

variation of offspring as the necessary material on which natural

selection operates. He who shall explain the origin of varieties will

have made another great step in completing the theory of evolution. But

not only does not natural selection explain the _origin_ of varieties,

but neither can it explain the _first steps_ of advance toward

usefulness. An organ must be already useful before natural selection

can take hold of it to improve it. It can not make it useful, but only

_more useful_. For example, if fins commenced as buds from the trunk,

it is difficult to see how they could be of any use, and therefore

how they could be improved by natural selection until they were of

considerable size, and especially until muscles were developed to move

them. Until that time they would seem to be a hindrance to be removed

by natural selection, instead of a use to be preserved and improved. It

would seem that many organs must have passed through this _incipient

stage_, in which their use was prospective.

Much that is very interesting might be said on these and similar points

of difficulty, but all this lies entirely aside from the scope of

this work. As already said, these are not objections to evolution or

derivation, but only to _Darwinism_, or any other special theory, as a

_sufficient explanation_ of the process of evolution. They only show

that we do not yet fully understand this process; that there are still

other and perhaps greater factors of evolution than is yet dreamed of

in our philosophy.

In the foregoing chapters on special evidences, and especially in the

last two, the reader will observe many points of doubt, discussion, and

difference of opinion. Let it not be concluded on that account that the

_law of evolution_ is still in the region of uncertainty. It can not be

too strongly insisted on that the fact of evolution as a universal law

must be kept distinct from the causes, the factors, the conditions, the

processes, of evolution. The former is certain, the latter are still

imperfectly understood.

PART III.

_THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO RELIGIOUS THOUGHT._

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

From what has preceded, the reader will perceive that we regard the

law of evolution as thoroughly established. In its most general

sense, i. e., as a law of continuity, it is a necessary condition of

rational thought. In this sense it is naught else than the universal

law of necessary causation applied to forms instead of phenomena. It

is not only as certain as--it is far more certain than--the law of

gravitation, for it is not a contingent, but a necessary truth like the

axioms of geometry. It is only necessary to conceive it clearly, to

accept it unhesitatingly. The consensus of scientific and philosophical

opinion is already well-nigh, if not wholly, complete. If there are

still lingering cases of dissent among thinking men, it is only because

such do not yet conceive it clearly--they confound it with some special

form of explanation of evolution which they, perhaps justly, think not

yet fully established. We have sometimes in the preceding pages used

the words evolutionist or derivationist; they ought not to be used any

longer. The day is past when evolution might be regarded as a school

of thought. We might as well talk of gravitationist as of evolutionist.

If, then, evolution as a law be certain, if, moreover, it is a law

affecting not only one part of Nature--the organic kingdom--and one

department of science--biology--but the whole realm of Nature and every

department of science, yea, every department of thought, changing our

whole view of Nature and modifying our whole philosophy, the question

presses upon us, “What will be its effect on religious belief, and

therefore on moral conduct?” This is a question of gravest import.

To answer it, however imperfectly, is the chief object of this work.

Except for this, it would probably never have been undertaken. All that

goes before is subsidiary to this.

But I will doubtless be met at the very threshold by an objection

from the scientific side. Some will say--because it is the fashion

now to say--that as simple, honest truth-seekers, we have nothing to

do with its effect on religion and on life. They say we must follow

Truth wherever she leads, utterly regardless of what may seem to us

moral consequences. This I believe is a grave mistake, the result of a

reaction, and on the whole a wholesome and noble reaction, against the

far more common mistake of sacrificing truth to a supposed good. But

the reaction, as in most other cases, has gone much too far. There is

a true _philosophic_ ground of justification for the reluctance with

which even honest truth-seekers accept a doctrine which seems harmful

to society. Effect on life is, and ought to be, an important element

in _our estimate of the truth of any doctrine_. It is necessary for me

to show this, in order to justify this part of my work.

=Relation of the True and the Good.=--There is a necessary and

indissoluble connection between truth and usefulness. We all at once

admit this connection in one direction. We all admit that a truth must

eventually have its useful application. It may not be _now_, nor in ten

years, nor in a century, nor even in a millennium, but some time in the

future it will vindicate its usefulness. No truth is trivial or useless

in its relation to human life, for man is a part of Nature, and his

life must be in accordance with the laws of Nature. Every one admits

this, but not every one admits the converse proposition, viz., that

whatever doctrine or belief, in the long run and throughout the history

of human advancement, has tended to the betterment of our race, must

have in it an element of truth by virtue of which it has been useful;

for man’s good can not be in conflict with the laws of Nature. Also,

whatever in the long run and in the final outcome tends to the bad in

human conduct, ought to be received, even by the honest truth-seeker,

with distrust as containing essential error. The reason of this will

now be further explained.

=Relation of Philosophy to Life.=--There are three primary divisions

of our psychical nature, viz., sensuous, intellectual, and volitional

or moral. There are three corresponding primary processes necessary

to make a complete rational and satisfactory philosophy: (1) There

is first the _instreaming_ of the external world through the senses,

as impressions. These we call facts or phenomena. (2) The elaboration

of these facts within, by the _intellect_, into a compact, consistent

structure. This we call knowledge. (3) The outgoing of this knowledge

by the _will_ into the world as right or wise conduct. Now these three

are all equally necessary. All these three portions of our complex

nature are equally urgent to be satisfied.[39] But, unfortunately,

scientific workers are too apt to think only 1 and 2 necessary--that

true facts elaborated into consistent theory are all we need care for.

Theologians and metaphysicians, on the other hand, seem to think only 2

and 3 necessary. They elaborate a theory consistent in all its parts,

exquisitely woven in beautiful and delicate pattern, and apparently

satisfactory in its application to the right conduct of life, but are

less careful to inquire whether it is in harmony with facts derived

from the senses. But, we repeat, all three are equally necessary. The

first gathers the materials, the second constructs the edifice, the

third, by _use_, by practical application, _tests_ whether it be a fit

building to live in, whether it is constructed on sound architectural

principles. The tendency of the olden time was to neglect the first,

the tendency of the present time is to neglect the third. But we repeat

with stronger emphasis that this third element is equally necessary.

All admit that successful application in art is the surest test of

the truth of science. Now, social conduct is the art corresponding to

our philosophy of life, and therefore is the sure test of its truth.

It follows, therefore, that unless all these three primary divisions

of our nature are satisfied by any doctrine, there must result an

ineradicable confusion and discord in our psychical nature, and

cordial acceptance is not only impossible but irrational. We insist

upon this the more because it has become the fashion in these latter

days of dominance of science, to say that to inquire into effects on

society is inconsistent with the scientific spirit, and unworthy of the

honest truth-seeker. But, observe, I am speaking of effects on society

only as a _test of truth_. I would not swerve a hair’s breadth from

absolute devotion to truth. It is necessary, indeed, to inquire into

effects on society, but we must inquire only in the patient spirit

characteristic of the truth-seeker. Whatever is really true will surely

vindicate itself by its beneficence, if we will only wait patiently for

final results. Evolution is no exception to this universal truth. It

will surely vindicate its beneficence, but we must wait yet a little

while--not very long.

So much it was necessary to say in justification of the inquiry which

constitutes this third part of our work. But, after this justification,

the question returns with additional emphasis, “What will be the effect

of the universal acceptance of the law of evolution on religious

thought, and through this on the right conduct of life?”

There can be no doubt that evolution, as a law affecting all science

and every department of Nature, must fundamentally affect the whole

realm of thought, and profoundly modify our traditional views of

Nature, of God, and of man. There can be no doubt that we are now on

the eve of a great revolution. But, as in all great revolutions, so

in this, the first fears as to its effects are greatly exaggerated.

To many, both friends and foes of Christianity, evolution seems to

sweep away the whole foundation, not only of Christianity, but of all

religion and morals, by demonstrating a universal materialism. Many are

ready to cry out in anguish, “Ye have taken away our gods, what have we

more? Ye have destroyed our dearest hopes and noblest aspirations, what

more is left worth living for?” But I think all who are at all familiar

with the history of the so-called conflict between religion and science

will admit this is not the first time this cry has been raised against

science. They have heard this danger-cry so often that they begin

to regard it as little more than a wolf-cry--scientific wolf in the

religious fold. It may not be amiss, then, to stop a moment to trace

rapidly the main points of this conflict--to discuss the various forms

of this scientific wolf.

First, then, it came in the form of the _heliocentric theory of

the planetary system_. We once thought the earth the center of the

universe, and so firm that it can not be moved. But science shows that

it moves about the sun, and spins unceasingly on its axis. Every one

has heard of the terror of the sheep produced by this discovery, and

the nearly tragic results to the bold scientist. But now we look back

with wonder that there should have been any trouble at all. Would any

Christian now consent to give up the grand conceptions of Nature and

of God thus opened to the human mind--the idea of infinite space full

of worlds, of which our earth is one, moving in silent harmony as in a

mystic dance? Verily, this wolf has proved itself a harmless, nay, a

very noble beast, and lies down in peace with the lambs.

Next, it came in the shape of the _law of gravitation_, as sustentation

of the cosmos by law and resident forces. The effect of this on

religious thought was even more profound, though less visible on the

surface, because only perceived by the most intelligent. It seemed

at that time to remove God from the course of Nature. This was the

real ground of the skepticism of the last century, and also the real

motive of Voltaire’s ardent advocacy of Newton’s views before these

were generally accepted in France. But now, who would give up this

grand idea--this conception of law pervading infinite space--the same

law which controls the falling of a stone guiding also the planetary

orbs in their fiery courses? This is indeed the divine spheral music,

inaudible but to the ear of science, accompanying the celestial dance.

Next, it came in the form of the _antiquity of the earth_ and of the

cosmos. The earth which we had fondly thought made specially for us

about six thousand years ago; sun, moon, and stars, which we had vainly

imagined shone only for our behoof--these, science tells us, existed

and each performed its due course inconceivable ages before there was a

man to till the ground or contemplate the heavens. Some of my readers

may still remember the horror, the angry dispute which followed the

promulgation of these facts. But now, who would consent to give up the

noble conception of infinite time thus opened to the human mind and

become forever the heritage of man?

Next, it came in the form of the _antiquity of man_. It is probable,

nay, certain, that man has inhabited the earth far longer than we had

previously supposed we had warrant for believing. The controversy on

this question and the dread of its result has indeed not yet entirely

subsided. Some timid people still look askance at this wolf, but I

think all intelligent people accept it and find it harmless.

Next, and last, it comes now in the form of _evolution_--of the origin

of all things, even of organic forms, by _derivation_--of _creation

by law_. We are even now in the midst of the terror created by this

doctrine. But what is evolution but law throughout infinite time? The

same law which now controls the development of an egg has presided

over the creation of worlds. Infinite space and the universal law

of gravitation; infinite time and the universal law of evolution.

These two are the grandest ideas in the realm of thought. The one is

universal sustentation, the other universal creation, by law. There is

one law and one energy pervading all space and stretching through all

time. Our religious philosophy has long ago accepted the one, but has

not yet had time to readjust itself completely to the other. A few more

years, and Christians will not only accept, but love and cherish this

also for the noble conceptions it gives of Nature and of God.

But some will exclaim, “Noble conceptions of God, say you! Why, it

utterly obliterates the idea of God from the mind. All other conflicts

were for outworks--this strikes at the citadel. All others required

only readjustment of claims, rectification of boundaries betwixt

science and religion--this requires nothing less than unconditional

surrender. Evolution is absolute materialism, and materialism is

incompatible with belief in God, and therefore with religion of any

kind whatsoever!” Before proceeding any further, it becomes necessary

to remove this difficulty out of the way.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELATION OF EVOLUTION TO MATERIALISM.

It is seen in the sketch given in the previous chapter that, after

every struggle between theology and science, there has been a

readjustment of some beliefs, a giving up of some notions which really

had nothing to do with religion in a proper sense, but which had

become so _associated_ with religious belief as be to confounded with

the latter--a giving up of some line of defense which ought never to

have been held because not within the rightful domain of theology at

all. Until the present the whole difficulty has been the result of

misconception, and Christianity has emerged from every struggle only

strengthened and purified, by casting off an obstructing shell which

hindered its growth. But the present struggle seems to many an entirely

different and far more serious matter. To many it seems no longer

a struggle of theology, but of essential religion itself--a deadly

life-and-death struggle between religion and materialism. To many,

both skeptics and Christians, evolution seems to be synonymous with

blank materialism, and therefore cuts up by the roots every form of

religion by denying the existence of God and the fact of immortality.

That the enemies of religion, if there be any such, should assume and

insist on this identity, and thus carry over the whole accumulated

evidence of evolution as a demonstration of materialism, although

wholly unwarranted, is not so surprising; but what shall we say of the

incredible folly of her friends in admitting the same identity!

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