THE FINAL ADVANCE
II. _The 1/4th Battalion in the Battle of Bapaume, 1918_
The extension northward of the battle line, which marked the opening of
the Battle of Bapaume on the 21st August 1918, involved Byng's Third
Army, comprising from right to left the V, IV and VI Corps. As we have
indicated in the preceding chapter, the object of the Third Army was to
conduct a vast enveloping movement which should turn the flank of the
German defence of the Somme line, and throw open the road to Cambrai
and St Quentin.
Already the enemy had shown signs of nervousness in the area of the
Somme-Scarpe salient and had withdrawn from his most advanced positions
at Serre; and it was clear, therefore, that any attack on this front
by the British must be prosecuted rapidly to avoid a repetition of the
skilful German retreat of February 1917. For an offensive in this area
the British troops were far more favourably placed in August 1918 than
they had been on the former occasion. They possessed the Bucquoy Ridge,
with the consequent advantages of observation which had formerly been
denied to them; and the terrain over which the battle would be fought,
though certainly devastated and a mass of trenches, did not present the
colossal system of inter-supporting fortresses which it had in 1916.
The time for a big attack had come, and G.H.Q. decided to strike. The
23rd August saw the Fourth and Third Armies advancing on a front of 33
miles from Lihons to Mercatel.
The suddenness of the German collapse in these latter days of the War
is probably unique in the annals of military history. At the beginning
of June their star was still in the ascendant. They were occupying
ground which they had never previously held during the whole War;
their successes of March and April had shaken the Allied defence to
its very foundations; and it seemed still doubtful whether they had
reached the limit of their capabilities of offence. Yet by the middle
of August the whole face of the War had changed. On a wide front
the Germans were in retreat; vast masses of material, thousands of
prisoners had fallen into our hands; the British morale had been proved
stronger than ever, while that of the enemy was giving indications of a
serious break.
Whether the High Command anticipated the completeness of this lightning
change we cannot say; that the vast bulk of regimental officers and
men scarcely contemplated it, is almost certain. Early in July General
Hull, in a conversation with Lieut.-Col. Marchment, expressed the
opinion that very little would be done in 1918 by way of retrieving the
losses suffered during the spring!
* * * * *
The 8th August found the 1/4th Londons at a strength of 42 officers and
892 other ranks withdrawn in Brigade reserve to billets at Arras. Here
a quite pleasant week was spent in which the routine of training was
varied by a Battalion sports meeting, and a most successful swimming
gala--a new feature of recreation--for which purpose the moat at the
Citadel formed a splendid bath.
Between the 16th and 18th August the 56th Division was relieved from
the Tilloy trenches and passed into Corps reserve, the 1/4th Londons
handing over their Brigade reserve billets to the 1/9th Royal Scots
and moving to Berneville on the 17th August. For a few days changes of
station followed on each others' heels with startling rapidity, and
after having been quartered successively at Houvin-Houvigneuil and
Magnicourt-sur-Canche, the Battalion reached Grand Rullecourt at 11.30
p.m. on the 20th August.
On the 19th orders had been issued to the Division to take part in an
attack with the XVII Corps in the area of the Scarpe, but these were
subsequently replaced on the 21st August by a transfer of the Division
to Haldane's VI Corps, and orders to join with it in the Third Army
attack.
A day of rest at Grand Rullecourt was occupied by the Battalion, in
the absence of attack orders, with speculations as to its chances
of soon being called upon to fight. Preliminary arrangements were
made to march into battle at short notice, and the same evening, the
21st August, the Battalion marched thirteen miles to Berles-au-Bois,
arriving at 2 a.m. on the 22nd.
About 10 o'clock that morning Lieut.-Col. Marchment and the company
commanders were ordered to Humbercamp to receive battle orders, but
after an hour's fruitless waiting the company commanders returned to
prepare their companies for action, and the Colonel went to try and
get what orders he could at Brigade Headquarters. Here he was informed
that the attack would take place in sixteen hours' time--early on the
23rd August! The general idea of the Battalion's rôle was explained
to Lieut.-Col. Marchment to be the capture of the village of Boyelles
and the Marc system of trenches immediately north of it, the attack to
commence at 4.55 a.m. on the 23rd August, two companies in line, one in
support and one in reserve. Artillery support would be provided by 6
brigades of field guns firing an unregistered barrage, while 21 tanks
would take part in the attack. A section of the Divisional Machine-gun
Company would be attached to the Battalion. With this somewhat sketchy
information Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried back to the Battalion to set
it in motion, and by 5 p.m. it was on its way to the first assembly
position at Blairville. Here it occupied the old German trenches
exactly opposite the first trench sector ever held by the 2/4th
Battalion in February 1917.
The line facing Boyelles was at this time occupied by the 59th
Division, and the 168th Brigade was detailed to attack through them,
with the Guards Division opposite Hamelincourt on its right, and the
52nd Division north of the north branch of the Cojeul River on its
left. The Brigade order of battle from right to left was Kensingtons
(south of Boyelles); 1/4th Londons (Boyelles); and London Scottish
(Boiry-Becquerelle); the 1st Londons being attached in Brigade reserve
for the operation.
Leaving the Battalion on the march Lieut.-Col. Marchment hurried on to
Blairville by car to see the Brigadier of the brigade in line (59th
Division) and was at once faced by another difficulty in finding that
the 59th Division had themselves taken over the front trenches only
the preceding night! Clearly not much possibility of assistance from
them; but they arranged to provide guides to lead our platoons to the
positions of final assembly.
The sudden transfer of the 56th Division from the XVII to the VI Corps,
and the subsequent difficulty in obtaining orders must have been
caused by some reason of great importance: we are not aware what it
was. Certainly the effect was not to make things easier. Indeed, when
the Divisional attack order was issued by Gen. Hull at 3 p.m. on the
22nd August he had not received the written instructions of VI Corps.
But, starting under such inauspicious circumstances, all the more
credit is due to the battalions, and in particular to the commanding
officers, for the signal successes which were ultimately achieved.
Reconnaissance of the ground by officers and N.C.O.'s was obviously out
of the question, and Lieut.-Col. Marchment had to content himself with
explaining the situation to them while battle stores were issued to the
men.
At 10.30 p.m. the Battalion moved off by platoons in charge of the
59th Division guides, who, considering their own scanty acquaintance
with the ground, did well, for they brought almost the whole Battalion
to its assembly positions in Falcon Trench well on time, though one
platoon of A Company and the Headquarter details went sadly astray and
did not turn up till long after zero hour. The Padre believes he was
taken for a long walk somewhere round Albert! During the march up the
enemy was using gas shell freely, and masks had to be worn at times,
but little loss was caused.
The Battalion was drawn up as follows:
Right front--B Company, Capt. R. S. B. Simmonds.
Left front --D Company, Capt. C. W. Rowlands, M.C.
Support --C Company, Capt. H. A. T. Hewlett.
Reserve --A Company, Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.
The hour or two of darkness before zero was spent in cutting lanes
through our wire, and at 4.55 a.m. the barrage opened, intense and
well distributed. Lieut.-Col. Marchment describes it as the best and
most tremendous he had ever seen. The scene from Headquarters was
extraordinary: the intense shrapnel barrage and smoke on the German
front line, the medium howitzers firing on Boyelles village beyond, and
the heavies cutting up the distant landscape in dense black clouds; and
behind it all the sun just rising.
At 5.7 a.m. the companies moved forward. The right company (B) made
good use of the railway embankment, and following the line on its south
side advanced on a one-platoon frontage to Boyelles Station, while
three tanks entered the village. Here the railway was crossed and a
good deal of opposition was met with from enemy machine-guns, heavy
and light, firing from the eastern half of the village. These were,
however, skilfully outflanked and rounded up to the number of 3 heavy
and 8 light guns, after which the company pushed forward and caught up
the barrage.
Two platoons halted approximately on the Blue line (first objective) on
the eastern edge of Boyelles, while two pressed on to Boyelles Trench
500 yards further east. But few enemy were encountered in this advanced
position. B Company being now well distributed in depth, the work of
consolidation was put in hand. The right flank was not yet in touch
with the Kensingtons and was therefore rounded off by pushing two Lewis
gun sections and one subsection M.G.C. southwards towards the railway.
D Company on the left met with more stubborn resistance in the Marc
system, and the leading platoons were temporarily held up in No Man's
Land by enemy firing from the Marc saps. Moreover, the tank allotted
to this part of the front failed to reach the Marc front system at
all, having apparently lost its way. The support company (C), however,
pushed a platoon forward into the sunken road leading northwards from
Boyelles, whence it was able to enfilade the Marc trenches, while the
right platoon of the London Scottish advancing on our left managed
to turn the position similarly from the north. Being practically
surrounded the enemy surrendered _en masse_, the bag amounting
to 2 officers and 80 other ranks. Little further opposition was
encountered, and D company continued the advance to Boyelles Trench,
where touch was gained with C Company on the right and the London
Scottish on the left. The dugouts in this line were energetically
mopped up and many Germans sent marching westward. Two patrols were
sent forward towards Boyelles Reserve.
In the meantime the support company mopped up the neighbourhood of
the cemetery and the sunken roads in its vicinity, while A Company in
reserve occupied the Marc system. This latter proved a very sound move
as our start-line was heavily shelled all the morning.
The first news of the attack at Battalion Headquarters was received
in the shape of Private Cohen, who appeared wounded but carrying a
German light machine-gun--a good omen of success! At about 9 a.m.
the lost platoons turned up and their arrival, including as they did
the Padre and the Medical Officer, was extremely welcome, for by now
the wounded were beginning to filter through, and the small band of
five under Lieut.-Col. Marchment were encumbered with some 200 Bosche
prisoners--not to speak of their duties of conducting the battle.
Communication by wire was rapidly established with brigade and also
forward to the companies, a report centre being formed north of
Boyelles.
At 9.15 a.m. 56th Division issued orders that the attack would be
pressed at 11.30 a.m. into Boyelles Reserve, but owing to temporary
dislocation of the signal service these orders did not reach the 1/4th
Londons until 11.15 a.m. To start at the scheduled hour was out of the
question, but arrangements were made at once for the further advance,
which ultimately began at about 5 p.m.
The advance was made by the left front and support companies, the
right front company extending to its left to cover the area vacated by
them. This second attack met with complete success. The two attacking
companies were led by a line of scouts followed by one platoon in
extended formation. The remaining platoons followed in artillery
formation by sections. Some resistance was offered by light machine-gun
teams in Boyelles Reserve, but the widely extended formation saved
the attackers from severe loss. The enemy artillery was also active
during the advance, but again the formation adopted enabled the rear
platoons to pick their way with but few casualties. The whole of the
allotted portion of Boyelles Reserve was captured, and patrols pushed
forward 500 yards to the east of it. The enemy shell fire now became
more intense, but a protective barrage was put down by our guns, and
no counter-attack developed. After a while activity on the whole area
subsided.
The same evening the 168th Brigade handed over the captured positions
to the 167th and passed into Divisional reserve, the 1/4th Londons
concentrating north of Hendecourt. By noon on that day the Battalion
was back at Blairville.
It is impossible to speak too highly of the men by whom this great
success had been gained. The long approach marches in exceptionally
hot weather brought the Battalion to the point of battle in an already
tired condition; the hurried orders and the total lack of previous
reconnaissance created difficulties which were surmounted by the
splendid response made by all ranks to the demands imposed on them.
The rapid appreciation of the situation by company commanders and the
careful dispositions of the commanding officer all contributed in full
measure to this important victory, while the skilful use of ground and
of suitable formations was the means of securing the gains at a minimum
of loss. The excellent work performed by signallers and runners, all
of whom had a hard day's work, were of incalculable value to Battalion
Headquarters, and enabled Lieut.-Col. Marchment at all times to keep a
firm grip of the situation of the moment.
The casualties of the Battalion were extremely light, only 18 being
killed, but by ill luck it lost three company commanders, Capts. C. W.
Rowlands, M.C., and H. A. T. Hewlett being killed, and Capt. R. S. B.
Simmonds, wounded. 2/Lieuts. A. W. Chignell, T. Yoxall and F. S. C.
Taylor were wounded. The captures made by the Battalion amounted to 3
officers and 240 other ranks, of the 1st and 2nd Battalions 87th R.I.
Regiment, 24 light and 8 heavy machine-guns, 6 light, 1 medium and 1
heavy trench mortar.
After the relief of the 168th Brigade the offensive was continued by
the 167th, at first with considerable success, the Division being once
again attached to the XVII Corps. An advance in the northern area of
the Divisional front of some 2500 yards was made into Summit and Fooley
Trenches, but on the south flank the most strenuous efforts of the
56th and Guards Divisions failed to eject the enemy from Croisilles,
which was held in great force by machine-gunners. South of the Cojeul
River the enemy resistance was increasing, and information was obtained
from prisoners to the effect that three fresh German divisions had
been brought into the Bullecourt-Hendecourt area. North of the Cojeul,
however, the 52nd and Canadian Divisions had registered important
successes. The old Wancourt line fell to them on the 26th, and this
advance was rapidly followed up by the recapture of Monchy-le-Preux,
and a penetration into quite new ground at St Rohart Factory--hardly
fought for by the 56th Division in May 1917--and at Boiry Notre Dame.
By the evening of the 26th August the 52nd Division had cleared the
Hindenburg line from Henin to the Sensée River, and was reported to be
east of Fontaine-lez-Croisilles.
Croisilles, however, still held out and the Guards had been pressed
back slightly towards St Leger. The result of this fighting was to
swing the Corps line round facing roughly south-east astride the
Hindenburg line, with a strong pocket of most stubborn Bosche in the
ramification of trenches around Croisilles itself, and on both banks of
the Sensée River to the north-east.
The 169th Brigade which had now taken over the Divisional front was
getting worn by its constant fighting and losses, and reinforcement
was needed. After a few hours' rest at Blairville the 1/4th Londons
marched at 7.45 a.m. on the 25th August to trenches in front of
Boisleux St Marc, moving the following evening to the trenches east of
Boiry-Becquerelle, which had been captured by the London Scottish on
the 23rd.
A good deal of gas shelling occurred here during the night. A signaller
was killed and several men were wounded, among whom the Battalion was
unfortunate in losing Sergt. Johnson, the excellent orderly-room clerk,
and Corpl. Coates, M.M., of the Scouts.
On the afternoon of the 27th the Battalion moved forward in close
support to the 169th Brigade, and occupied Summit Trench immediately
north of its junction with Hill, and on the extreme left of the
Divisional sector.
It is rather curious to note that in these fights and marches the
1/4th Battalion was in an area which had been traversed by the 2/4th
Battalion during the actions of March 1917, while at the same time the
2/4th Battalion in the Fourth Army was bearing its share in recapturing
spots familiar to the 1/4th Battalion during the 1916 Somme battles!
The 1/4th Battalion had settled down in Summit Trench to make the best
of a very wet evening, when, after dark, orders were received to move
at once into the Hindenburg line and to concentrate at River Road, near
the banks of the Sensée River for an attack the following morning on
Bullecourt. It had been determined, owing to the prolonged resistance
of the enemy at Croisilles and the resultant holding back of the
right flank, to pursue the operation by an advance towards Bullecourt
straight down the Hindenburg line. This would have the effect of
completely enveloping and "squeezing-out" the pocket of Germans in the
Croisilles-Guardian Trench area.
The concentration of the Battalion was effected successfully, but not
altogether without difficulty. A and B Companies moved direct to the
point of assembly, while C, D and Headquarters proceeded by way of
the Henin-Fontaine Road, and then down the Hindenburg trenches. The
whole area was horribly congested. Two brigades of the 56th Division
(the 168th and 169th) were moving up for attack, while at the same
time a relief was proceeding on the left flank between the 52nd and
57th Divisions. For a time the confusion was rather distressing, and
Lieut.-Col. Marchment writes, "It seemed to me that the battalions
were forming up to attack north-east, south-east and south-west."
The plan of attack was as follows:--The advance was to be led over the
open by the 169th Brigade, the Queen's Westminsters in the van with the
line Queen's Lane-Jove Lane, as a first objective, and the trenches
south-east of Bullecourt as a final objective.
The 168th Brigade was to follow the 169th in the order 1/4th Londons,
Kensingtons and London Scottish, advancing by bounds at a distance of
about 1000 yards in rear of the rear battalion of the 169th Brigade.
The particular duties of the 168th Brigade were to support the 169th
and mop up in rear of their advance, and to protect the right flank
should Croisilles remain untaken--a rather difficult and quite
unsatisfactory job.
The 1/4th Londons were disposed as follows:--
D Company (2/Lieut. J. L. Backhouse) on the right--to advance
over the area west of the Hindenburg line by way of Sensée
Avenue, Nelly Avenue and Queen's Lane.
B Company (2/Lieut. G. G. Lewis) to advance down Burg Support,
the old Hindenburg front trench.
A Company (Capt. H. N. Williams, M.C.) and C Company (Capt. J.
W. Price), Headquarters and 1 section M.G.C. attached, to
advance down Tunnel Trench, the old Hindenburg support trench.
The attack was to be launched at 12.30 p.m. on the 24th August under a
creeping barrage.
The fight throughout the day proved a laborious and confused affair.
Trouble developed which doubtless originated on the previous evening
when the Queen's Westminsters, relieved by the London Scottish in the
Summit area, had moved forward to assembly. This gallant regiment
had been fighting already for a couple of days and was getting
worn--Lieut.-Col. Savill describes his men as "dead beat"--and it had
to move up to assembly positions in Burg Support, where it occupied
a trench at right angles to the line of its advance. A change of
front during an advance had been proved on the Somme in 1916 to be an
operation extremely difficult of accomplishment, and so it proved here.
True, the attack did not start till 12.30 p.m., but even the hours
of morning daylight gave little chance to the Queen's Westminsters
to get their bearings. Our map shows the villages of Bullecourt and
Hendecourt, but it must be borne in mind that the whole terrain was
actually a featureless waste. The ground everywhere was "crumped" to
pieces and covered with high grass and rank weeds, while the existence
of a village was not suspected till one found oneself stumbling
among the heaps of bricks which had formerly been its cottages. As a
consequence of all this, two companies of the Queen's Westminsters,
followed by a part of the 1/2nd Londons, went hopelessly astray and
became entangled in the 57th Division troops near Hendecourt. To add
to the confusion the company commander sent back word to 169th Brigade
that he was in Bullecourt.
Meanwhile, Lieut.-Col. Savill of the Queen's Westminsters advanced
along the Hindenburg line, and having fallen in with the Headquarters
of the 1/2nd Londons and the London Rifle Brigade, soon came in touch
with strong enemy forces, believing that his companies were ahead of
him, and that mopping-up had not been well done. The weak force at his
disposal was unable to shift the stubborn Germans opposed to him, and
the attack was held up.
The 1/4th Londons moved off from assembly as ordered in rear of the
169th Brigade.
On the right D Company was held up badly at Nelly Avenue where it
closed on to a party of the London Rifle Brigade. Several efforts
to shift the enemy proved abortive, and it was not until about 7.30
p.m. that, with the help of two Stokes Mortars brought up by the
Kensingtons, further progress could be made. By this hour, however,
the opposition was overcome, and, with 40 prisoners and 4 light
machine-guns to its credit, the company pursued the advance after dark
to Queen's Lane.
B Company in Burg Support overtook the Headquarters of the three 169th
Brigade battalions, held up as already described, about 200 yards short
of the Hump, and a platoon was at once placed at Lieut.-Col. Savill's
disposal to help clear the trench. We must remark parenthetically that
B Company's fight began almost precisely in the sector of trench which
had been first captured by A Company of the 2/4th Battalion on the 15th
June 1917: how often, we wonder, has such a coincidence occurred?
The Germans in Burg Support were of a remarkably obstinate variety
and progress by bombing was slow. The trench was very full of men,
and the congestion was later increased by the arrival from nowhere in
particular of a company of the Royal Munster Fusiliers (57th Division),
who had quite lost their direction. By 6.30 p.m. the enemy's resistance
was overcome by hard fighting, and B Company advanced down Burg Support
to the Knuckle, where it established itself in touch with D Company on
its right.
A and C Companies on the left, in the Hindenburg Support line, also
overtook the 169th Brigade, the remnants of the 1/2nd Londons being
held up about Juno Lane. The enemy was in strength in this trench also.
At the time it was presumed that by zealous use of his dugouts he had
escaped the moppers-up of the leading battalion, but probably, owing
to the deflection of the greater part of the 1/2nd Londons, he had
not been previously attacked. Progress was slow and the 1/4th London
Companies pushed through and engaged the enemy. The resistance at Juno
was soon overcome, and the enemy retired leaving us a few prisoners and
two light machine-guns. A second check was experienced at the Hump but
the enemy was driven back, strenuously debating every inch of ground,
till at last by 9.30 p.m. the two 1/4th London Companies reached Jove
Lane and the remainder of the Battalion. Attempts were made to gain
touch with the 57th Division on the left but without success.
The stubbornness of the enemy resistance in the Hindenburg line this
day was remarkable, and we cannot deny a brave enemy an acknowledgment
of his valour. Croisilles had been reported vacant by 8 o'clock in the
morning but the occupants of the Guardian pocket put up a day-long
fight. It was not till late in the evening that the whole area was
cleared. Probably the need to the enemy of gradually evacuating this
area was the cause of the opposition offered to our advance down the
Hindenburg line.
This was a hard day's work for everyone. The 1/4th Londons had bombed
their way down about 2000 yards of the Hindenburg line, excellent
leadership to the bombing parties being provided by Lieut. V. R. Oldrey
and by Capts. H. N. Williams and J. W. Price. The great difficulty
throughout the day was for local commanders to get any sort of grip as
to what was going on, as so often occurs in trench fighting. The mass
of trenches, nearly all stubbornly defended, with which the whole area
was pitted, in effect broke up the brigade attack into a series of
numerous and more or less isolated scraps in which no one knew much of
how his neighbour was faring. And all the time Division believed that
the Hindenburg line was clear, and that Bullecourt was in our hands.
The night of the 28th and the morning of the 29th August were occupied
in clearing up the situation, and assembling the Brigades on the line
Pelican Avenue-Pelican Lane for a continuance of the attack, which was
pursued by the 168th Brigade on the right and the 169th on the left.
The 1/4th Londons remained on the 29th August in support with the 1st
Londons (attached), the attacking battalions being the Kensingtons
on the right and the London Scottish on the left. The Battalion
was disposed in Queen's Lane, Burg Support and Borderer Trench.
The objective allotted to the Brigade roughly coincided with the
Riencourt-Quéant Road, and the whole of the village of Bullecourt,
inclusive to the Brigade, was allotted to the London Scottish.
The attack, which was launched at 1 p.m. on the 29th August, met with
stubborn resistance, especially on the right where the Kensingtons were
held up at Bullecourt Station. After hard fighting the London Scottish
managed to capture the village, and by dusk the Divisional line
formed a sharp salient, with its horns on Bullecourt Station and the
high ground west of the Factory on the Hendecourt Road, and its apex
following Tower Reserve and Gordon Reserve Trenches.
[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME, 1918 (1/4TH BATTALION)]
The 1/4th Londons were not called upon as a Battalion, but D Company
was sent forward to reinforce the London Scottish, and later to fill
a gap in the forward positions between that Battalion and the 169th
Brigade on the left.
The enemy resistance this day was extremely stubborn and Tank Reserve
was strongly held by the enemy, who resisted effectually the most
gallant attempts of the Scottish to emerge from Gordon Reserve.
Late at night the 167th Brigade took over the whole Divisional front,
and the 1/4th Londons moved back at 5.30 a.m. to positions in Queen's
Lane, Knuckle Avenue, Stray Reserve and Burg Support, where they
remained throughout the 30th August. During the withdrawal to these
positions the whole area was intensely bombarded with high explosives
and gas shell, and it was no surprise to the Battalion to learn that
the enemy had delivered a sharp counter-attack in the early morning
and driven the 167th Brigade out of Bullecourt back to the Pelican
Avenue-Pelican Lane line. The posts north of the village stood firm.
This counter-attack was a big affair which affected the divisions right
and left, both of them being pushed back a certain distance.
The immediate recapture of Bullecourt was promptly ordered by XVII
Corps, and no one in the Battalion was especially delighted to learn
that the 1/4th Londons were detailed for the duty.
After a day spent in obtaining such rest as was possible, the Battalion
wearily crept off after dark to assembly in Pelican Lane and Borderer
Trench in readiness to assault Bullecourt at dawn on the 31st August.
The 168th Brigade was drawn up for battle with the London Scottish on
the right, the 1/4th Londons in the centre and the 7th Middlesex (167th
Brigade attached) on the left, each battalion having a section M.G.C.
and a section L.T.M. Battery at its disposal. The Kensingtons were in
Brigade reserve.
The morning of the 31st August was dark, and at 5 a.m. the assaulting
battalions moved forward under an excellent barrage to which the enemy
gave a quick and heavy reply.
On the right, C Company, on a two-platoon front, reached the
cross-roads at the extreme western edge of Bullecourt, but was here
held up for some time by machine-guns in the village. At the same time
D Company, on the left, advancing on the north side of the village
penetrated about half-way across it and almost reached the cross-roads
on the northern edge, but here they also were checked by machine-gun
fire, principally from their right flank.
The support company (B) now entered the village, or rather advanced
against the site of the village (for no single building was visible),
and began to mop up in the endeavour to form a link between the two
leading companies. Progress was slow owing to the overgrown nature
of the ground, but by 8.40 a.m. touch was gained between B and C
Companies, and together they slowly fought their way forward till C
Company was able to join hands with the 7th Middlesex on the Hendecourt
Road. In the course of this fighting B Company managed to take 15
prisoners and put 5 machine-guns out of action.
At about 9 a.m. the reserve company (A) was put into the fight to
endeavour to fill in the gap across the village between the leading
companies.
The right company was still held up on the southern fringe of
Bullecourt by two machine-guns mounted in a derelict tank east of the
village, and it was not until after noon that, with the aid of two
Stokes Mortars, progress was made by bombing up Tower Reserve as far
as a point level with the east edge of the village. Here all further
advance was definitely checked. Gordon Reserve was strongly held and
stubbornly defended, and, moreover, no touch could be gained with the
London Scottish on the right.
By 3.30 p.m. the village of Bullecourt was reported clear of the enemy
and a line of Lewis gun posts was established on its eastern fringe
from Tower Reserve to the Hendecourt Road on the left. During the
remainder of the day no material change in the situation occurred.
Three several attempts were made by the leading companies to get
into Gordon Reserve but the position was too strongly held, and, the
trenches leading to it having been flattened out by shell fire, an
advance by bombing was impracticable. Shortly after midday aerial
reports were received that the enemy was assembling in Tank Avenue and
Tank Support. All field guns and heavies at once turned on to this
target and the projected counter-attack was promptly broken up. The
activity of the enemy in this region continued till late at night, and
it was evident that any attempt at further advance would be strenuously
disputed.
After nightfall arrangements were made for one company of the
Kensingtons to rush Gordon Reserve under cover of Stokes Mortar fire,
but the situation remaining somewhat obscure the attempt was abandoned.
Very little progress was made anywhere this day. On the right the
London Scottish gained Bullecourt Avenue and the 7th Middlesex on the
left captured the factory on the Hendecourt Road. But all along the
line the enemy's resistance was stiffening, evidently in view of the
near approach of our positions to the junction of the Hindenburg line
with the Drocourt-Quéant Switch.
Moreover the country was difficult for the attackers; it had been
fought over many times and was utterly broken up, and the assaulting
companies were all tired. In the circumstances it was a good day's
work, and a day of peculiar satisfaction to the 4th London Regiment,
which has a special claim to association with the village of
Bullecourt. Here in 1917 the 2/4th Battalion occupied Gordon Reserve
in the successful defence of Bullecourt against a heavy German attack
after it had first fallen into British hands, and in August 1918 it
fell to the lot of the 1/4th Battalion, after the village had been
recaptured and again lost, to capture it for ever.
Casualties in officers this day were: Lieut. V. R. Oldrey and 2/Lieut.
R. T. Stevenson, killed; 2/Lieuts. W. G. Hook, A. Holloway and A.
F. Potter, wounded. 2/Lieut. E. H. Garner was killed on the night
27th/28th August, after having been ten days only with the Battalion.
In the ranks the total casualties for the period 23rd to 31st August
were 30 killed, 150 wounded and 12 missing. Having regard to the
enormous importance of the successes achieved and the depth of the
advances, these comparatively light figures are a matter for much
congratulation. One shudders to think of what the losses would have
been for equal results in the hard slogging of the Somme in 1916 or at
Ypres in 1917.
Late at night on the 31st August the 56th Division handed over its
positions to the 52nd and withdrew into Corps reserve, the 1/4th
Londons reaching the Boyelles Reserve area at Boiry-Becquerelle at 7
a.m. on the 1st September, with a strength of 32 officers and 710 other
ranks.
In view of the gallant share which the 1/4th Londons had borne in this
splendid series of victories we may perhaps be permitted to quote
an extract from an article on the subject of the 56th Division's
achievements which appeared in _The Times_ of the 16th September 1918:
" ... This year it was one of the divisions which beat off the German
attack towards Arras on March 28th when the enemy suffered one of the
bloodiest defeats of the whole War; so that with this fighting and that
at Cambrai to its credit it has probably killed as many Germans as any
division in the British Army. Now to this proud record is to be added
the splendid advance of which the Commander-in-Chief has told. The 56th
Division has proved itself a great fighting division."
The Divisional record in the Battle of Bapaume 1918 may be summarised
as advancing through 6 miles of very strongly fortified country in nine
days; meeting and defeating three German divisions, and capturing 29
officers, 1047 other ranks, 3 guns, 210 machine-guns and over 50 trench
mortars. Of this large booty the share of the 1/4th Londons amounted to
3 officers and 390 other ranks prisoners, 70 machine-guns and 10 trench
mortars--a very fair proportion of the whole!
With this action the share of the Battalion in the great envelopment of
the Somme line closes.
The following were decorated for services during the period 23rd-31st
August:
2/Lieuts. C. L. Henstridge and A. Holloway, the M.C.
Pte. E. Clark, the D.C.M.
Sergt. F. G. Udall, M.M., Bar to M.M.
Sergts. F. A. Dove, J. T. Norris, F. C. Nickless, Corpls. W. Frost,
F. Nash, C. Robbins, Lance-Corpls. J. T. Couchman, J. R.
Greenwood, Ptes. G. H. Andrews, G. A. Allen, W. W. Boulstridge,
A. C. Barnes, J. Eccles, A. E. Dickerson, G. J. Grant, W. H.
Hart, H. H. Mills and W. Ryan, the M.M.
* * * * *
This great battle as a whole resulted in the defeat by 23 British
divisions of 35 German divisions, and the capture of 34,000 prisoners
and 270 guns. Its importance lay in the ever-increasing signs of
the enemy's failing morale; while the captures bore witness to his
indiscriminate throwing-in of reserves.
The following day Péronne fell to troops of the Third Army, and two
days later the enemy's general retirement from the east bank of the
Somme began.
We have already alluded to extensive captures of ground made in
the area of the Scarpe at Monchy-le-Preux and other places. These
important victories constituted the Battle of the Scarpe, 1918, in
which, beginning on the 26th August, the battle front was still further
widened and the British First Army also became involved. By the 3rd
September the Canadian Corps of the First Army and the XVII Corps of
the Third Army had carried the battle line forward through the famous
Drocourt-Quéant line, and the enemy had fallen back to the general line
of the Canal du Nord from its junction with the Sensée River, east of
Lécluse to Péronne.
During this hasty retirement large numbers of prisoners and vast
quantities of stores fell into our hands. In the extreme south the
French armies also continued to advance, and by the 6th September had
regained the line of the Crozat Canal at La Fère.
In the meantime the gradual relinquishment by the enemy of his advanced
positions in the Lys salient had begun on the 18th August, and the
retirement rapidly becoming general, he had been driven back by the 6th
September to the line Givenchy-Neuve Chapelle-Ploegsteert.