THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF ARRAS, 1917
Reverting now to the 1/4th Battalion, we have the task of recording its
part in the great battles of April and May 1917 which developed after
the German retirement, some account of which has been attempted in the
preceding chapter.
On transfer from the First Army area the 1/4th Battalion was billeted
at Le Souich late on the evening of the 10th March 1917. The following
day was Sunday and was observed as far as possible as a rest, and this
day the Battalion was joined by a reinforcement of officers, 2/Lieuts.
J. F. Elders, T. Caudwell, S. Minear, C. J. Reid and E. C. Hayes, all
attached from the Queen's Westminsters. On the 12th the Battalion
marched in drenching rain to Ivergny, the next village to Le Souich,
but on arrival the billets were found to be already occupied, and
orders were received to move a mile further on to Beaudricourt, which
village was reached about 4.30 p.m.
At Beaudricourt the Battalion settled down to a steady course of
company training in preparation for active operations. According to
the Battalion custom, whenever possible, the day's work was started
by Commanding Officer's parade, and the strictest attention was paid
to all points of parade discipline; while the drums beat Retreat each
evening in the village street. The training included a good deal
of route marching to harden the troops after their long sojourn in
trenches, practice attacks from trench to trench, and "specialist"
training, in the course of which every man in the Battalion received
the rudiments of instruction in the Lewis gun. The opportunity was
also taken to reorganise the companies in accordance with the then
newly-evolved scheme, which had the object of rendering the platoon
a self-contained fighting unit comprising only fighting ranks.
The four sections of the platoon were definitely organised as one
of Lewis gunners, one of riflemen, one of rifle-grenadiers and one
of bombers; and all administrative details in the company, such as
cooks, stretcher-bearers and company runners, were collected into a
"headquarter" section under the immediate supervision of the company
second in command.
The advantages of the new platoon organisation were evidenced by
practical demonstrations to the officers of the division of methods
of employing the various sections in co-operation with each other in
operations such as the capture of a strong point. These demonstrations
were given by a selected platoon of the Rangers, and Gen. Hull took the
opportunity of announcing to the assembled officers the rôle which it
was expected the Division would play in the coming attack.
In the latter part of March the Battalion lost three officers,
2/Lieuts. S. P. Stotter and R. W. Chamberlain to hospital, and Capt. F.
C. Grimwade seconded to VII Corps School as Instructor.
* * * * *
The intention of G.H.Q. for the offensive of 1917 was to deliver a
heavy blow against the German positions in the Scarpe-Ancre Salient
(see Map No. 9); and in conjunction with this, and in order to secure
the left flank of the attack, to wrest from the enemy his commanding
positions on the Vimy Ridge, whence excellent observation could be
obtained over the Plains of Douai. This scheme underwent considerable
modifications before it was put into operation, firstly to secure
closer co-operation with the French offensive on the Aisne; and
secondly by reason of the German Retirement of March 1917, which
altered the rôle of the Fifth Army and compelled them to re-establish
themselves in fresh positions facing the Hindenburg line.
The Hindenburg line in the vicinity of its junction with the original
German trench lines south-east of Arras being the centre of the
Battalion's operations in April and May, a reference to the map will be
of assistance to the reader in appreciating what follows. It will be
seen that the old trench systems (_i.e._ those held by the enemy until
March) crossed the valley of the Scarpe running southwards through the
eastern suburbs of Arras, as far as the Arras-Cambrai Road, and then
swinging south-westward followed the valley of the Crinchon River.
These trenches consisted of two main systems about 2000 yards apart,
the village of Beaurains being incorporated into the first system
and that of Tilloy-les-Mofflaines into the second, with Mercatel and
Neuville-Vitasse in rear of the second system. About three-quarters
of a mile south of Tilloy was Telegraph Hill, the line between being
strengthened by the enormously fortified redoubt known as The Harp.
From the southern extremity of The Harp the new Hindenburg line (or
rather system of trenches) struck off south-eastward, including
Neuville-Vitasse, crossing the valley of the Cojeul River between St
Martin and Heninel and passing thence between Croisilles and Fontaine.
Between the west side of the Cojeul valley and the Scarpe at Fampoux
was a "switch" line known as the Wancourt line, which crossed the
Cambrai Road just east of Feuchy Chapel.
The task originally allotted to the 56th Division was the capture of
Beaurains and Telegraph Hill.
* * * * *
The 169th Brigade which had left the Neuve Chapelle area in advance
of the remainder of the Division had been placed in line at Agny,
opposite Beaurains, and to this point the commanding officers of the
168th Brigade proceeded on the 17th March to make the preliminary
reconnaissance for the attack. But the following day it was found that
Beaurains was clear of enemy and was already occupied by the 169th
Brigade who were following up energetically. The reconnaissance being
no longer required the party returned to billets pending further orders.
On the 18th Lieut.-Col. A. E. Maitland, M.C. (Essex Regiment), was
appointed to command the Battalion, and on the 23rd the Division moved
forward into a concentration area in rear of Arras, the Battalion
marching from Beaudricourt at 9.30 a.m. and arriving in billets at
Beaumetz-les-Loges at 4.30 p.m. At Beaumetz the Battalion resumed its
training programme though the whole Brigade was held at short notice
to move in view of the possible further development of the enemy's
withdrawal.
It is worth while pausing for a moment to consider the extraordinary
achievement of G.H.Q. in delivering the Arras-Vimy Ridge attack as it
did on the 9th April. The preparations were on similar lines to those
for the Somme offensive of the previous July, and were on an even
vaster scale owing to the increased number of the divisions which it
was proposed to employ and to the ever-growing strength and weight of
the British artillery. The preliminary work of forming reinforcement
and concentration camps, laying fresh and increasing the capacity of
existing railway lines, arranging for water supply, dumps of munitions
and _matériel_, establishment of hospitals and the hundred and one
other essential tasks had been steadily proceeding since the close of
the Somme offensive in November 1916.
Imagine, then, the inevitable dislocation of the scheme when, a
comparatively few days before the attack was to be delivered, the
enemy suddenly withdrew on part of the front from the positions it
had been intended to assault and betook himself within fortified
lines of enormous strength to the rear. Dumps, railheads, hospitals,
water-supply, concentration areas, guns, heavy siege and light, all
had to be pushed forward to fresh and rapidly selected positions in an
area which had been laid waste with all the fiendish skill of which a
resourceful enemy was capable, and all the consequent modifications of
objectives and orders effected at the shortest possible notice. Not
only was this achieved, but it was achieved with such efficiency as to
produce on the 9th April the most striking single-day success which had
crowned the British Armies since the outbreak of the War.
The Battalion was soon called on for its share in this "moving forward"
process of the preparations for battle, and on the 28th March it
marched with the remainder of the Brigade to positions in the old
British trench system opposite Beaurains, where for three days it
was engaged in supplying working parties. On the 1st April it was
withdrawn to Brigade reserve in Achicourt where it found comfortable
billets. A very large number of British heavy batteries were in action
here registering and wire-cutting for the coming battle, and the
continuous din of our own guns was trying. The shells of one battery of
60-pounders firing from just in rear of the Headquarters billet cleared
the roof of the house by about 18 inches.
In the meantime the pursuit of the Germans had been maintained by the
56th Division, which with the 21st and 30th on its right and the 14th
on its left comprised the VII Corps (D'Oyly Snow). A relief had been
effected on the 1st April, the 168th and 167th Brigades taking over the
Divisional sector from the 169th which was withdrawn to reserve. By the
2nd April, the Germans having reached the Hindenburg system, the line
became stabilised, and no further important alteration occurred until
the day of battle. When the Battalion took over the advanced trenches
from the Rangers on the 3rd, therefore, the positions which they
occupied formed practically the "start-line" for the 9th April.
The 56th Division occupied a salient of which the north-eastern face
was on the Beaurains-Neuville-Vitasse Road, and the south-eastern face
lay opposite the north-west corner of Neuville-Vitasse. On this side
the British positions had been pushed forward in the direction of
Neuville-Vitasse and posts were held in the old German communication
trenches leading back to the village.
This sector was held by the Battalion with three companies in the
front line and one in reserve in a system known as the Circular Work
south-east of Beaurains. It will be readily appreciated that as the
advanced British positions were outposts in different communication
trenches it was necessary in order to provide a good jumping-off line
for the battle to connect these up by continuous trenches to form a
front line, to supply that front line with support lines and feed it
with fresh communication trenches. Clearly a good deal of digging was
necessary in a very short space of time, and the Battalion was heavily
engaged in this work during its tour of duty, which lasted until
the 7th April. The principal trenches dug were Deodar, Poplar, Lime,
Elm and Skin in the front system, and Gun, How and New Battery as
communication trenches.
On the 4th April the British destructive bombardment began and
continued daily according to a prearranged programme until the day of
battle. This met with comparatively little retaliation.
On the 7th an inter-battalion relief was effected, the Battalion
vacating the line in favour of the Kensingtons and Rangers who were
respectively detailed as right and left assaulting battalions. The
London Scottish moved to the old British line at Agny while the 1/4th
Londons returned to dugouts in the railway cutting at Achicourt. The
following day battle positions were occupied, the London Scottish
moving forward to close support in rear of the Kensingtons, and the
1/4th Londons to Brigade reserve in the Circular Work.
The Division's objectives for the 9th April were as follows:
The 168th (left) and 167th (right) Brigades were to advance through
Neuville-Vitasse to the first objective which was an arbitrary line
(the Blue line) skirting the east edge of the village and facing the
Hindenburg system. (_Note._--The Hindenburg line between Telegraph Hill
and the Cojeul River was known as the Cojeul Switch.) This first phase
was entrusted in the 168th to the Kensingtons and Rangers, the latter
battalion on the left being prepared to adopt special measures and form
a defensive flank facing north should the 14th Division be checked at
Telegraph Hill.
After a pause on this objective of about four and a half hours the
London Scottish (168th) and 1st Londons (167th) were to "leapfrog"
through the leading troops and carry the Cojeul Switch, the Scottish
objectives being Back, Card and Telegraph Hill trenches (north of
the Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road). Here a further pause was to be
made, after which the third phase of the battle would be taken up by
the 167th Brigade, who would advance, covering the whole Divisional
frontage on to the Wancourt line (Brown line).
To return to the 1/4th Battalion. The day spent in Achicourt prior to
manning battle positions produced the first serious German retaliation
to our bombardment. As already remarked Achicourt was "stiff" with
batteries and also contained a very extensive and important ammunition
dump. Doubtless the Bosche decided that the quickest way to silence
our guns was to destroy their supplies of shell, and from 11.30 a.m.
until 5 p.m. he bombarded the village, causing a good many casualties
in the Battalion and firing several houses which formed part of the
dump. The village square, moreover, was packed with lorries loaded
with shell waiting to move forward with the batteries, and unluckily
the enemy obtained some direct hits on these. For some time the flying
fragments rendered the place remarkably unhealthy. Excellent work was
done in saving two lorries by Major H. Campbell of the Kensingtons. He
well earned his D.S.O. by driving two of the blazing lorries out of the
square into a place of safety.
The battle positions occupied that night by the Battalion were as
follows:
A Company (Lorden)--New Battery Trench.
C " (Bowater)--Southend and Margate Trenches.
D " (Spiers)--Astride the Neuville-Vitasse Road in
Battery and New Battery Trenches.
Battalion Headquarters--In North End (Circular Work).
B Company (Stanbridge)--Attached as "moppers-up" to the
Kensingtons.
The role of the Battalion was laid down to provide for various
eventualities that might arise according to the degree of success
achieved by the assaulting battalions, and it was therefore held in
readiness either to assist the Rangers in forming a defensive flank in
case of failure by the division on the left, or to lend weight to the
Scottish attack on the Cojeul Switch.
At 5.30 a.m. on the 9th April, after a hurricane bombardment of the
German lines, the British barrage lifted and the attack began. The
advance of the 56th Division was deferred until two hours later to
allow the 14th Division, whose start-line was less advanced, to come
into line, and accordingly at 7.30 a.m. the Rangers and Kensingtons
moved to the assault, followed by B Company of the 1/4th Londons who
were equipped with Stokes mortar shells for dealing with deep dugouts.
B Company's job in mopping-up proved easier than had been expected, for
the German trench garrisons had been confined to their deep dugouts
for some days by the intensity of our bombardment, and the resultant
difficulties with which they had been faced in getting their rations
and water up from the rear made them on the whole not undisposed to
surrender; and in a short time the Battalion, in Brigade reserve, was
cheered by the sight of bodies of German prisoners marching in fours
down the road to Beaurains in a dazed and exhausted condition.
By 9.30 a.m. the Blue line on the whole of the Brigade front was in our
hands, and its consolidation was at once put in hand by the assaulting
troops with assistance from the 512th Company R.E. and a company of the
Cheshire Pioneers. At 11.20 a.m. the Scottish moved forward on a three
company front to attack the Cojeul Switch. Their advance was met with
heavy machine-gun fire, and although one company succeeded in gaining
Back Trench, the furthest of the three lines forming the Cojeul Switch,
and in pushing patrols beyond it, the battalion was forced ultimately
to fall back to Telegraph Hill Trench, the front line of the Switch
System and that nearest to Neuville-Vitasse.
At 12.30 p.m. the 1/4th Londons were ordered to advance to fresh
positions on the western edge of Neuville-Vitasse, where they came
under the orders of the 167th Brigade. The move was completed by 4 p.m.
with A Company in Tree, C in Leaf and D in Pine; B Company (still under
the orders of the Kensingtons) having by now withdrawn to reorganise in
Deodar Lane after their fight.
As reports of the attack on the Cojeul Switch came in it became clear
that a gap existed between the London Scottish and the 7th Middlesex,
who had advanced to the assistance of the 1st Londons on their right,
and at 5 p.m. Brigade ordered the Battalion forward to fill this gap.
The three available companies moved forward at once, but on emerging
from Neuville-Vitasse it was found that touch had been regained by
the Scottish and the Middlesex, and the companies therefore took up a
position on the eastern edge of the village in support to the Middlesex.
In the meantime the third phase of the attack, namely, the advance of
the 167th Brigade to the Wancourt line, had been definitely checked
by machine-gun fire, as had also that of the 14th Division on the
left; so that the day's fighting ended with the 14th Division in
possession of Telegraph Hill and The Harp, and the northern end of
the Cojeul Switch; the 56th occupying the Cojeul Switch astride the
Neuville-Vitasse-Wancourt Road; and the 30th on the right approaching
the Wancourt line in the vicinity of the Neuville-Vitasse-Henin Road--a
very substantial advance for the day.
The 168th Brigade captures for the day amounted to 5 officers and
635 other ranks, all of the 163rd R. I. Regt., 9 machine-guns, 2
granatenwerfer, 1 minenwerfer, and 2 heavy trench mortars, together
with large quantities of small arms and ammunition.
In the evening the Battalion was rejoined by B Company, and Battalion
Headquarters advanced to a dugout in rear of the start-line for the
day. The night was marked by bombing operations in the Cojeul Switch
which had the wholesome effect of clearing out the few remaining
pockets of Bosche, and by 7.30 a.m. on the 10th touch had been gained
with the 14th Division on the left, while the 56th Division's right
had been extended further south and the London Scottish had possessed
themselves of the whole of the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill system.
A remarkable instance of initiative on the part of a private soldier,
which occurred on the night of the 9th April, is worth recording. Pte.
Turner, a runner of D Company, lost his company and strayed into the
German line. Finding a dugout entrance he began to descend the stairs,
when he heard voices; and as the owners of the voices were evidently
Huns he announced his arrival by throwing a Mills bomb down the dugout.
The occupants apparently thought they were outnumbered and promptly
gave themselves up to the number of 1 officer and 16 other ranks.
Turner marshalled his bag in a shell hole outside, and the next morning
was found with them, all apparently quite content to be under the
leadership of one British private, outside Neuville-Vitasse. Turner's
coolness was rewarded with the Military Medal.
Early on the 10th the weather, which had hitherto been cold and wet,
became yet worse and the landscape was soon white with snow, from which
trenches and shell holes gave no protection.
Immediate arrangements were made by VII Corps to complete the previous
day's objectives, and an attack on the Wancourt line was delivered at
noon, the 56th Division attack being entrusted to the 167th Brigade.
During this attack the 1/4th Londons remained in support and withdrew
to their former position in the trenches on the western edge of
Neuville-Vitasse.
The assault of the 10th April was only partly successful on the Corps
front, but the pressure was maintained on the 11th. By noon on that
day the 56th Division, whose advance had developed into a flank attack
along the Hindenburg line, had cleared the Cojeul Switch as far south
as the Cojeul River and occupied the villages of Wancourt and Heninel.
While these successes had been gained south of the Scarpe an equally
striking victory had been gained north of the river where the XVII
Corps (Fergusson) of the Third Army and the Canadians (Byng) and 1
Corps (Holland) of the First Army had swept the enemy from his long
established positions on the Vimy Ridge to the plain east of it, and
had sensibly tightened our grip on the mining area of Lens.
Preparations were at once made to follow up this very striking success,
and VII Corps issued orders for the advance to be resumed on the 14th
over the watershed dividing the Cojeul valley from that of the Sensée.
The 13th was therefore devoted to preparations for this attack, in
forming advanced dumps and moving forward batteries, and the 168th
Brigade was placed under orders to advance at short notice, though no
actual move occurred during the day.
On the 14th April the enemy barrage was much heavier than it had
been on the 9th, and under a murderous fire the 169th Brigade,
which attacked on the 56th Division's front, was forced after some
initial success back to its start-line. That night the 168th Brigade
was ordered forward to form a defensive flank in the Cojeul Switch
facing north-east, and accordingly the 1/4th Battalion moved after
dark from the Back-Card-Telegraph Hill area, which they had occupied
earlier in the day, to relieve the Queen's Westminsters on the right
of the advanced line, with the London Scottish on their left and the
Kensingtons and Rangers respectively in support and reserve.
The relief was completed by 4 a.m. on the 15th with the exception of an
advanced post pushed well down the forward slope of the valley towards
Heninel. This was allotted to two platoons of B Company, but owing to
the complete devastation of the area, and the absence of landmarks,
the guides detailed to these platoons failed to find the post, and its
relief had to be postponed until the following evening.
The Battalion now experienced another change of command, and
Lieut.-Col. Maitland having fallen sick it was taken over by Major H.
Campbell, D.S.O., attached from the Kensingtons to command with the
acting rank of Lieut.-Col. as from the 12th April.
The 15th proved to be a day of inaction, though the enemy's artillery
was continuously active over the whole Battalion area. No further
advance was attempted on the 16th and no action occurred during the
early hours of the day, with the exception of a local counter-attack
by the enemy, directed against the 50th Division on our left, in the
course of which he managed to re-establish himself on the ridge in the
vicinity of Wancourt Tower.
During the afternoon the hostile shelling slackened considerably,
but at about 4.30 p.m. warning was received that he was preparing a
counter-attack in force, and at 7.30 a barrage of terrific intensity
fell on the Battalion's trenches. The front line companies in
accordance with the prearranged scheme of defence at once cleared the
advanced trenches and pushed forward Lewis gun sections about 60
yards into No Man's Land in order to smash up any attack that might be
delivered. By this time darkness was gathering and movement becoming
hard to detect. At about 8 o'clock, however, the enemy was observed
advancing in close formation to the attack. Our Lewis guns at once
opened fire and were magnificently supported by the artillery. The
attack was completely smashed and no German reached our lines. The
enemy barrage continued without abatement for about an hour, during
which the whole Battalion area was effectively searched and a great
many casualties caused. By 9 p.m., however, the bombardment slackened,
and after a few hours of desultory shelling died out altogether.
During the evening the sector held by the London Scottish was also
subjected to severe shelling but no infantry action occurred, and it
was evident that the whole weight of the attack had fallen on the 1/4th
Londons' sector. The heaps of German dead which were visible in No
Man's Land on the following day bore striking testimony to the accuracy
of the Battalion's Lewis gun fire.
During the attack excellent work was done under heavy fire by the
medical officer, Capt. Havard, R.A.M.C., and the medical orderlies.
The Aid Post was merely a corrugated iron shed built in the side of a
sunken road and afforded no cover from the shell splinters which were
flying in all directions.
The 17th April passed without incident on the Battalion's front, though
on the left the 50th Division recaptured Wancourt Tower, the possession
of which gave us complete command of the high ground between the Cojeul
and the Sensée. That evening an inter-battalion relief took place, the
Rangers relieving the 1/4th Londons and the Kensingtons taking over
from the London Scottish. The relief of A Company had, however, to be
postponed until the following night owing to the approach of daylight.
On relief the Battalion withdrew to deep dugouts in the Cojeul Switch
about 800 yards west of Heninel. These were large and well constructed,
and accommodated the whole Battalion underground without overcrowding.
The strength of the position was enormous, and it seemed a matter for
congratulation that the British attack had succeeded in dislodging the
former occupants with comparatively so little opposition. It pointed
to the fact that no well-defined earthwork defence is in the long-run
proof against an attack delivered by well-trained troops supported by
tanks and a sufficient weight of heavy artillery; and indeed, as will
be seen later, the capture of "pillboxes" and scattered shell hole
defences proved a greater obstacle in the third Battle of Ypres later
in the summer.
The 56th Division was now withdrawn to Corps reserve; and after
spending a day in the dugouts the Battalion was relieved on the
afternoon of the 19th by the 16th Manchesters (30th Division),
withdrawing after relief to billets in Arras.
Although the opening phases of the offensive involved the Battalion
in comparatively little fighting, it had been continuously engaged in
the general rough-and-tumble of shell holes and subjected to fairly
continuous shell fire since the opening of the battle. Its losses
during this period amounted in officers to: 2/Lieut. T. Siddall,
killed; 2/Lieuts. P. Pyne and L. W. N. Jones, wounded; Rev. S. F.
Leighton Green, C.F., wounded at duty.
The battle had now completely achieved its object as originally
conceived by G.H.Q. The enemy was dislodged from the high ground on a
wide front, and the resultant change of positions afforded our troops
advantages of observation and drier foothold; and had Sir Douglas Haig
been a free agent he would at once have transferred his intentions to
the northern area, where he was desirous of launching his Messines and
Ypres offensives. In deference to the needs of our Allies, however, it
was necessary to keep the Germans active without respite on the Arras
front to which they had already drawn large reserves, and this was the
more important in view of the ghastly collapse of the Russian Empire
and the consequent liberation of enemy troops for the Western Front.
Active operations were, therefore, pursued for some time longer on the
Arras front, though perhaps they should not strictly be regarded as
part of the Battle of Arras.
After the withdrawal of the 56th Division from the line, fighting broke
out again on a wide front both sides of the Scarpe on the 23rd April,
and continued with bitterness until the 26th though with comparatively
little success. Some progress was made on both sides of the Cojeul
River, and the village of Guémappe added to the British gains.
The 19th April was the occasion of the Battalion's first visit to
Arras, with which town it became so intimately connected in the later
stages of the War. At this date the town was not seriously damaged
although it had lain a short two miles from the German lines for
over two years, and with the exception of the railway station and
its immediate vicinity was still quite healthy for reserve billets.
The Battalion was accommodated in the barracks of the Citadel, which
formed a welcome change from sixteen days of shell holes and dugouts.
On the 21st the Battalion embussed for Bayencourt where it encamped
in the Coigneux valley. Two days were occupied here in resting and
reorganising, and advantage was taken by all ranks during leisure hours
of the opportunity to revisit the Battalion's old haunts at Hébuterne
and to cross unmolested to Gommecourt Park. On the 24th the Battalion
moved at short notice to Gouy-en-Artois, arriving in billets there at 8
p.m. While at Gouy the Battalion was inspected by the Brigadier-General.
The 56th Division was now once more placed under orders for the line,
this time in the VI Corps area, the sector held by the 15th Division
being taken over by the 167th Brigade on the 29th April. The 168th
Brigade, being once again in Divisional reserve, moved from Gouy to
Simencourt on the 27th April, and on the following day into Arras,
where preparations for further active operations were made in billets.
The few days in Arras were much enlivened by the excellent show given
by the Bow Bells in Arras Theatre.
The impending operation was to be an attempt to break through the
enemy's defences on a large scale, the Fifth, Third and First Armies
all being employed on a front from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles through
Chérisy and St Rohart Factory to a point north of Plouvain. The VI
Corps, consisting of the 3rd and 56th Divisions in line, took up the
frontage from the Scarpe to the Cojeul River, the 56th Division's
objective being on a line running north and south between St Rohart
Factory on the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Bois du Vert.
The sector now held by the Division was about 1000 yards east of
Guémappe and Monchy-le-Preux and lay sidelong on the spurs and side
valleys descending to the Cojeul River. The enemy's defences were far
more difficult to cope with on this occasion than on the 9th April.
The Hindenburg and Wancourt lines had been passed; the Drocourt-Quéant
line was still far ahead; and the intervening area which was now
to be attacked was intersected in all directions by short isolated
trench lines in the siting of which the enemy had displayed his usual
skill in the use of ground. His defences, disposed in great depth,
were strengthened by large numbers of machine-guns cunningly placed
for mutual support in sunken roads and shell holes. It was known,
however, that the deep dugouts of the Hindenburg line did not exist in
this area, and it was hoped that a heavy and continuous bombardment
beforehand would sufficiently reduce his numbers and morale to give
success to the British infantry.
The 56th Division attack was to be carried out by the 167th and 169th
Brigades, the 168th being relegated to reserve, though available for
the assistance of either assaulting brigade as occasion might arise.
The Battalion remained in Arras until the 2nd May when, warning being
received that "zero" for the attack was fixed for 3.45 a.m., the
following day it moved at 4 p.m. to assembly in The Harp. In order to
secure close co-operation between the Brigades, 2/Lieut. O. D. Garratt
was attached to the 169th Headquarters as liaison officer.
The night of the 2nd May was fine and cold, though the early hours
were misty, and at 3.40 a.m. on the 3rd when our bombardment increased
to hurricane intensity it was still almost dark. At this hour the
Battalion stood to, and the vivid flashes of the guns and the streams
of S.O.S. signals from the enemy lines showed that inferno had broken
loose, and the attack had begun. The British barrage was good, but the
enemy was evidently expecting the attack as his counter-barrage was
quick and his machine-gun fire devastating in volume and accuracy.
The 3rd May was a day of great disappointment all along the line, and
comparatively little success was achieved. The 169th Brigade were
held up by a German strong post in Cavalry Farm and, after occupying
a precarious position between it and the river for some hours, were
forced back by a heavy counter-attack to their original line. The 167th
Brigade was also unable to progress.
It seems clear that zero hour was too early. In the darkness it was
impossible for the troops to see visual signals of command, and the
delay caused by having to pass messages down the line owing to the din
of the bombardment resulted in the attacking waves moving off zig-zag
in shape with officers at the advanced points. In such a formation they
became an easy target for the enemy machine-guns. Some greater success
might, moreover, have been achieved had the creeping barrage moved
forward more quickly, which would have been quite possible in view of
the comparatively unbroken state of the ground.
Early in the day the 1/4th Londons had moved forward to positions
in shell holes at Airy Corner, near Feuchy Chapel, and at 8.30 p.m.
the Battalion, now definitely at the disposal of the 169th Brigade,
received orders to advance to positions in the Wancourt line just
south of the Arras-Cambrai Road. This move was followed by another at
11 p.m., which brought the Battalion into close support of the front
line in Tank Trench, apparently in anticipation of a further German
counter-attack. The forward movement was made under a very heavy
gas shell bombardment, but gas helmets were worn and practically no
casualties were suffered. Shortly after arrival in the new position the
enemy shelling slackened, and as no further action appeared imminent
the Battalion was once more withdrawn to the Wancourt line, the move
again being made in gas helmets. A move of 8000 yards in the dark with
respirators is no easy matter to troops laden with battle equipment,
and the men were somewhat exhausted on regaining the reserve position.
A few hours' rest, however, put them to rights, and at 3 p.m. on the
4th the Battalion was again under orders to move forward. The losses
of the 167th and 169th Brigades on the previous day were so severe
that immediate relief was necessary for them, and the 168th Brigade
therefore took over the whole Divisional front; the Battalion relieving
the Queen Victorias and Queen's Westminsters in the subsector between
the Arras-Cambrai Road and the Cojeul River, with the London Scottish
on its left.
[Illustration: CAVALRY FARM, MAY 1917]
The sector was occupied with two companies (C and D) in the front
line and two (A and B) in support, Headquarters occupying a dugout on
the hillside between Guémappe and Wancourt. The relief was completed
without incident at 2.30 a.m. on the 5th May. The enemy evidently
anticipated a renewal of our attack for throughout the day the lines
were subjected to heavy shelling. Some doubt existed as to whether the
enemy still remained in occupation of Cavalry Farm and of Tool Trench
to the north of it, and as no movement was visible two daylight patrols
were sent out in the afternoon to investigate. These patrols managed
to gain the edge of Cavalry Farm, where they drew sharp rifle fire
from the enemy which caused some loss; and their object being gained
the patrols withdrew bringing their casualties with them. At about
10 p.m. the enemy's bombardment increased to a heavy barrage, which
was especially severe on the sector held by the 14th Division on the
right of the river, and it seemed likely that an enemy attack was in
preparation. The 14th Division indeed called for artillery support, and
this was promptly supplied by our artillery, which opened a terrific
barrage on the enemy lines. After an artillery duel of about two hours
the shelling on both sides slackened. The 6th and 7th May were both
marked by heavy shelling, which on the part of the enemy seemed mostly
to be directed towards searching for our battery positions in rear,
though some loss was caused to the Battalion, and 2/Lieuts. Reid and
Caudwell were killed, and 2/Lieut. Hutchins wounded, with several
N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded by stray shells.
On the night of the 7th May the Battalion handed over its sector to the
Rangers and withdrew to the old German trench system north of Wancourt,
Headquarters being accommodated in Marlière Caves. In this position the
Battalion remained a couple of days, during which the enemy's shell
fire continued at intervals but without causing serious damage.
The attack of the 3rd May was the last general attack on the Arras
front, and subsequent operations were confined to local enterprises up
and down the line with the object of improving and rounding off the
positions gained. On the Divisional front a minor operation of this
sort was immediately necessary in clearing up the situation at Cavalry
Farm and Tool Trench, and the 1/4th Londons and London Scottish were
detailed to capture these positions.
The Battalion moved into the line for this attack on the evening of the
10th May.
The objectives allotted to it were Cavalry Farm and the trench
south-east of it, and Tool Trench for a frontage of 250 yards north of
the Cambrai Road; while the London Scottish were to extend the attack
on Tool Trench for a further 600 yards to the north and also capture
a small copse on the extreme left. The attack was to be made in each
battalion on a two company front, each company advancing in two waves
on a front of two platoons. One company of the Rangers was attached to
the 1/4th Londons and one of Kensingtons to the Scottish.
For two days previous to the 11th, which was fixed for the operation,
the Divisional artillery had been carrying out destructive bombardments
with 4·5-inch howitzers on the objectives as well as on the
communication trenches leading to the rear and on the portion of Tool
Trench outside the limits of attack. On the evening of the 10th a
practice 18-pr. barrage was placed on the objectives, but the enemy
reply was so efficient that it was decided to conduct the assault
without any increase in our normal artillery activity and to endeavour
to carry the operation through as a surprise.
At 8.30 p.m. on the 11th May the assaulting waves moved forward, the
1/4th Londons' attack led by D Company (H. N. Williams) on the right
of the road and A Company (Lorden) on the left, with B (Beeby) and C
(Rees) Companies in support. The surprise effect was excellent, and was
heightened by the fact that all the objectives except the Farm itself
were hidden from our trenches by a slight spur which here drops down to
the Cojeul River. The enemy had thus, in the absence of a barrage, no
warning of the attack, and in a few minutes the whole of the objectives
were captured. Few prisoners were taken, but a party of about fifty of
the enemy, fleeing from Cavalry Farm, were caught by our Lewis guns and
annihilated. Lewis gun posts were at once pushed forward into No Man's
Land, and the consolidation of the captured trench begun. So quickly
had all this happened that the enemy artillery opening in response
to an S.O.S. sent up from their lines was harmless to the leading
companies, though it inflicted some loss on the support companies which
were moving up to our vacated front line.
The consolidation of the captured position was aided by the Cheshire
Pioneers, who completed before dawn a communication trench connecting
Cavalry Trench with the new front line.
In the early hours of the 12th May the line was thinned out and only a
sufficient garrison left in the captured position to hold it against
counter-attack, the surplus platoons being withdrawn to the old
line. After some hours the German barrage subsided and we were left
in undisputed possession of our capture. This neat little operation
cost but few casualties considering the advantages gained, and the
completeness of the surprise is illustrated by an incident which
occurred early the following morning. One of our advanced Lewis gun
posts, hearing movement in front, challenged. A reply being received
in German, fire was opened. Two of the team went forward to collect
the bag and found a German officer shot dead and a Sergt.-Major badly
wounded. The maps which were taken from the officer's case showed some
of our battery positions accurately, and it appears that this luckless
pair were coming forward to Cavalry Farm to "spot" for a German
artillery shoot, ignorant of the fact that it was in our hands.
The Battalion continued to occupy its new line until the evening of
the 13th May, when the 168th Brigade was relieved by the 167th. The
Battalion handed over its sector to the 1/3rd Londons and withdrew to a
reserve position on the Cambrai Road near Tilloy, arriving there in the
early hours of the 14th May. The following day a further move was made
to billets in Arras.
After the Brigade's withdrawal from the line its gains were extended
on the 18th and 19th by successful local operations carried out by the
167th Brigade, who completed the captures of the north end of Tool
Trench and also parts of Hook and Long Trenches adjoining it.
On the 19th May the 168th Brigade moved still further back to rest
billets in Berneville, and two days later the whole Division was
withdrawn, with Divisional Headquarters at Warlus.
During May the Battalion received the following officer reinforcements:
Lieuts. E. P. M. Mosely and A. S. Ford.
2/Lieuts. L. W. Archer and H. T. Hannay (commissioned from the
ranks of the Battalion).
2/Lieut. F. Barnes (20th Londons).
2/Lieuts. H. V. Coombes, N. Nunns, H. E. Jackman and W. G. Port
(21st Londons).
2/Lieut. S. A. Gray (23rd Londons).
Capt. Maloney, R.A.M.C., vice Havard to London Field Ambulance.
During the same period 2/Lieut. Wreford was wounded and Lieut. P. F.
Smalley evacuated to hospital.
The Battalion remained in rest for about three weeks, which were
officially occupied in training and reorganisation. The actual training
was, however, reduced to the minimum, and the Battalion's really
serious duty became that of training for Battalion and Brigade sports,
and the relaxation which these provided combined with the determination
with which all ranks strove to gain physical fitness for the purpose
of the sports was undoubtedly quite as valuable as hours spent on the
parade ground. On the 23rd the Brigade was paraded for inspection by
Gen. Hull, who presented ribands to those who had been decorated in the
recent operations.
The following day the Battalion moved from Berneville to fresh billets
in Simencourt, where the routine of training and recreation proceeded.
Early in June the 56th Division returned to the line, the 168th Brigade
moving to Montenescourt on the 11th and to Achicourt on the following
day.
Eight days later the 168th Brigade relieved the 169th in the line, the
Battalion moving into left support positions at Wancourt, where it
relieved the 1/2nd Londons. Here the Battalion remained for five days
supplying working parties chiefly in connection with the construction
of new communication trenches to connect up the recently gained advance
posts with the front line, and in connecting up the posts themselves
to form a new front line. These days passed without incident beyond a
certain amount of enemy shelling and trench mortar fire, and on the
evening of the 26th June the Battalion moved forward to relieve the
Kensingtons in the front line system, its right flank resting on the
Cojeul River, where it joined the London Scottish, and its left flank
about 800 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road in Hook Trench. This
relief was completed by 1.30 a.m. on the 27th, and the sector was held
with three companies in front line and one in reserve.
This tour of duty passed without important incident though the enemy's
artillery exhibited some activity, principally against the back areas
in the neighbourhood of Wancourt. On the 1st July hostile aircraft
were especially active, making many unsuccessful attempts to pass the
barrage of the British anti-aircraft batteries. This unusual anxiety of
the German airmen to cross our lines was possibly due to the presence
in the Arras area of H.M. the King, who was then visiting the troops in
France and staying at Bavencourt Château on the Arras-Doullens Road.
That evening at 11 p.m. the 6th Queens of the 12th Division took over
the portion of the Battalion's sector lying to the north of the Cambrai
Road, and the following evening the remainder of the sector was handed
over to the 5th Borders of the 50th Division, the Battalion withdrawing
on relief to billets in Achicourt, which it reached at 5 a.m. on the
3rd July.
The part of the 56th Division in the Arras fighting was now finished,
and the Division was withdrawn into Corps reserve for a welcome rest.
The fighting on the Hindenburg line was practically over, though we
shall have further reference to make to it in connection with the 2/4th
Battalion in another chapter.
The weeks of battle had placed a great strain on the Battalion. Long
marches to and from the line, shell hole bivouacs, heavy working
parties, bad weather and severe shelling had all had their effect, and
a period of rest and reorganisation was needed.
At 9.30 a.m. on the 4th July the 168th Brigade embussed for the Le
Cauroy area, in which it had trained a year previously prior to
occupying the Hébuterne trenches. The Battalion was allotted billets in
Denier where it entered on a short period of rest and reorganisation
in which the training was interspersed with the various rounds of the
Brigade boxing competition, the finals of which were held on the 15th
July.
In June Lieut. H. Jones was seconded to VI Corps School as Instructor;
Capt. V. S. Bowater was evacuated to hospital; and 2/Lieut. C. W.
Denning joined the Battalion, being posted to the 168th L.T.M. Battery
early in July; 2/Lieuts. L. W. Wreford and A. C. Knight rejoined the
Battalion in July.
The Division was now warned of an impending move to another theatre of
activity, and this move occurred on the 23rd, when the Division left
the VII Corps to join the Fifth Army in the Ypres Salient.