CHAPTER XI

THE 1/4TH BATTALION IN THE BATTLES OF THE SOMME, 1916

II. _The Battles of September and October_

As we have pointed out in the preceding chapter, the 1st July was

a day of almost complete check to the British attack from Fricourt

northwards. Between Fricourt and the Somme, however, a certain measure

of success had been attained, while south of the river the French had

made a considerable advance.

This limited success was exploited to the fullest extent during the

first half of July, and by the 14th, after very fierce fighting, in

which eleven British Divisions were engaged, our lines were pressed

forward through the series of fortresses forming the first German

system of defence.

The Main Ridge of the Somme watershed runs east-south-east from

Thiepval, above the Ancre, across the Albert-Bapaume Road, towards the

Péronne-Bapaume Road. About a mile and a half west of the latter road

it is completely severed by a narrow and deep ravine in which lies

the small township of Combles; and about half way between Combles and

Thiepval it is deeply indented by a valley which separates the villages

of Bazentin-le-Grand and Bazentin-le-Petit, the head of this valley

being dominated by the high ground on which stands High Wood. The

ridge, therefore, divides itself into three sections, all on the same

general alignment, as follows: In the west, from Thiepval, astride the

Albert-Bapaume Road to High Wood; in the centre, from High Wood to the

Combles Valley; in the east, the high ground about Sailly Saillisel on

the Péronne-Albert Road.

The German second system of defences followed roughly the near side

of the crest of this Main Ridge, including the villages (from east to

west) of Maurepas, Guillemont, Longueval (with Delville Wood), the

Bazentins and Pozières. The third system lay on the further slope of

the ridge and included the villages of Morval, Lesbœufs, Flers and

Gueudecourt.

On the 14th July the British attacked the second system on a front from

Bazentin-le-Petit to Longueval. This attack, which was successful,

was pressed forward to High Wood, of which practically the whole

was captured, and thus secured for us a footing on the Main Ridge,

dividing the German forces on the west and centre portions of it. The

advance was consolidated and rounded off locally in the direction

of Guillemont; but the new positions formed an abrupt and narrow

salient in our line, and before a further advance to the German third

system could be contemplated it was necessary for the British hold on

the Main Ridge to be widened. It was considered by G.H.Q. that the

Pozières-Thiepval series of fortresses at the western extremity of the

ridge was too powerful to yield to frontal attack, and it was therefore

decided to extend the hold on the centre portion of the ridge. This

postulated the capture of Guillemont, Ginchy and Combles, and a

swinging-up of the British right flank which rested on the Combles

valley. The French were to co-operate on the right of the Combles

valley by the capture of Frégicourt and Rancourt. Combles itself,

immensely fortified and strongly garrisoned, was too formidable an

obstacle to be likely to fall into our hands by direct attack, except

at an appalling cost of life; and it was therefore to be enveloped, the

British advancing on the heights west of it and the French to its east.

It is with this great outflanking movement for the capture of Combles

and the securing of the Main Ridge immediately west of it that the 56th

Division and the l/4th Londons are concerned.

Guillemont was first attacked on the 23rd July, but it was not until

after repeated attempts that it finally fell into our hands on the 3rd

September. On that day the line was advanced to the outskirts of Ginchy

and to the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, Falfemont Farm falling to us on the

5th.

Meanwhile local improvements had been made in our positions in various

parts of the line, and the bitter fighting of August, though productive

of no very deep advance was of the greatest value. It not only widened

our hold on the ridge, but also by a series of unrelenting sledgehammer

blows had a cumulative effect on the German morale and thus paved the

way for the greater successes of September.

* * * * *

The 168th Brigade continued training in the St Riquier area until

the end of August, the 1/4th Londons retaining their billets at Le

Plessiel. The training was rendered peculiarly interesting by reason of

the first appearance of the "Heavy Section Machine-Gun Corps," better

known as Tanks. These engines of war, which were regarded at first by

the troops with a good deal of wonderment and not a little misgiving,

only arrived in France on the 25th August. No time was lost in testing

them and giving infantry troops an opportunity to co-operate with them

in practice prior to their employment in action.

The 56th Division received the compliment of being one of the units

selected by G.H.Q. to co-operate with Tanks on the occasion of their

first appearance in battle, and accordingly a series of practice

schemes was begun on the 26th August, the Brigades of the 56th Division

being employed in turn. Needless to say the interest aroused by the

strange appearance of these iron monsters was intense and speculation

was rife as to their potential value in action, not only among the

troops, but also among the many staff officers who were present at

the demonstrations. Unfortunately the time allowed for "tuning up"

the engines was inadequate, the result being that during the first

practices the Tanks showed a most undesirable predilection for breaking

down--a habit not calculated to inspire with confidence the infantry

who were expected to follow them. However, these difficulties were

largely overcome, and by the 2nd September, when the 168th Brigade's

turn for practising with them arrived, the Tanks were working well.

In spite of the misgivings as to the tactical value of the Tanks which

presented themselves to the minds of those inclined to pessimism,

their arrival undoubtedly gave enormous encouragement to the troops

who were enabled at last to realise that the enemy were not always to

be first in the field with new inventions; and the anticipation of a

great surprise effect when the Tanks should first appear before the

enemy trenches brought all ranks to the tip-toe of expectation. The

strict injunction which was issued to avoid mention of the Tanks in

correspondence was most loyally obeyed.

On the 2nd September a warning order was received that the Division

would move forward to the battle area, and the following day the 168th

and 169th Brigades moved to the Corbie area. The Battalion left Le

Plessiel in the afternoon of the 3rd, marching to St Riquier, where

it entrained for Corbie, a town of some size at the confluence of

the Ancre and the Somme. Here the Battalion detrained at 11.15 p.m.,

marching, with the Rangers, to billets at Vaux-sur-Somme. The remainder

of the Brigade was accommodated a mile further forward at Sailly-le-Sec.

The Division now came under the orders of the XIV Corps (Cavan), the

extreme right of the British Army, consisting of the 5th, 16th and 20th

Divisions, which had this day been operating on the Guillemont front in

the action already alluded to.

On the morning of the 4th orders were received, without any previous

intimation that they might be coming, for the Battalion to move

forward at once. The whole Battalion, less personnel of the transport

and vehicles, marched out of Vaux-sur-Somme within one hour of the

receipt of these orders--a credit to the high state of organisation

to which the Battalion had been trained since leaving the Hébuterne

area. Boutall writes: "The march was a long and tedious one and I think

I am right in asserting that not a single man fell out on the way. I

distinctly remember Lieut.-Col. Wheatley congratulating himself on the

fact."

This march terminated at a large concentration camp known as the

Citadel about two miles north of Bray. At the Citadel the Battalion

was able to form a vague idea for the first time of the enormous

effort being put forth by the British in this already long drawn-out

struggle. The concentration camp covered an enormous area on the

rolling hillsides above the Somme and presented an astounding spectacle

of numbers of units from every arm of the Service--gunners, infantry,

engineers--besides vast stores of materials of all kinds. The roar

of the guns in the inferno of the battle line seemed to speak to the

troops of the great and yet increasing power of the British Armies,

and filled every heart with hope and confidence. To many of those who

remembered the lean days of 1915 when the British battle line was

starved for men and shells, this first contact with the reality of the

Empire's strength was almost overpowering.

On the 5th September the Division took the place in Corps Reserve of

the 20th Division, which had been withdrawn from the fighting line, and

in the evening of the same day the relief of the 5th Division in the

line began.

The front taken over from the 5th Division was the extreme right of the

line from its junction with the French, overlooking the Combles valley

to the left of Leuze Wood. The 169th Brigade (relieving the 15th)

took over the right sector and the 168th Brigade (relieving the 95th)

assumed responsibility in the left sector.

September had set in with steady rain which had already converted

all the roads, tracks and camping grounds into seas of liquid mud.

The Battalion, which since arrival at the Citadel had been held at

short notice to move, advanced during the afternoon of the 5th, in

full battle kit in the direction of the line. The state of the ground

made marching an impossibility, and after sliding along for some time

uncomfortably in the mud, orders were received for the Battalion to

return to the Citadel. The change of plan was, as usual, received with

philosophical resignation, and the men turned in to take advantage of

the short respite only to be roused again a few hours later the same

evening when the advance to the line began at 11.15 p.m.

At this hour the Battalion, which with the Rangers was in Brigade

support, left the Citadel, arriving in its allotted position in

Casement Trench at 5.30 a.m. on the 6th September. This trench was now

reduced to a series of shell holes which the bad weather had rendered

most uncomfortable, and was a part of the original German system

opposite Maricourt.

The departure from the Citadel was marked by a most unfortunate

accident. As the column began to move the explosion of a bomb which had

been left buried in the mud occurred at the head of D Company, and this

very seriously wounded Capt. A. L. Long, the company commander, and

2/Lieut. A. G. Sharp, and caused casualties to 19 N.C.O.'s and men.

With the advent of daylight the Battalion first came face to face with

the ghastly desolation of the Somme battlefield. In all directions

every sort of landmark seemed to be obliterated. A few torn stumps

marked what had been Bernafay and Trones Woods, the village of

Guillemont was practically effaced, and the only signs of life in the

neighbourhood of the Battalion were numerous batteries of artillery

in action. Here the nucleus personnel left the Battalion and returned

to the Citadel, where the Q.M. stores were established. At 2 p.m.

the Battalion changed its position to Chimpanzee Trench in the

neighbourhood of the Brickfield, south of Bernafay Wood, and here it

received a foretaste of the German barrage. After dark the forward

move was resumed, and the Battalion entered the support trenches in

rear of Leuze Wood, on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road, relieving the 4th

Gloucesters. This trench formed a "switch" in the second German system

which had fallen into our hands on the 3rd September.

_The Battle of Ginchy, 5th-10th September_

The disposition of the Brigade was now as follows:

In front line, Leuze Wood:--London Scottish.

In support, Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road:--1/4th Londons.

In reserve, Maltzhorn Farm:--Rangers.

The Kensingtons were attached to the 169th Brigade, and were in

line to the south of Leuze Wood.

During the night the enemy's bombardment of the front line and Wedge

Wood Valley increased in intensity and two platoons of the 1/4th

Londons, under Lieuts. Oldrey and Garratt, were ordered forward to

reinforce the Scottish in Leuze Wood. This advance was successfully

accomplished, the platoons managing to get through an unpleasantly

heavy barrage with only one casualty. No enemy attack materialised, and

towards dawn, the hostile bombardment having subsided, the two platoons

rejoined the Battalion.

Throughout the 7th September and far into the night the enemy

shelled Wedge Wood Valley and the support line heavily, and the

Battalion suffered a good many casualties, chiefly among ration and

water-carrying parties, while communication with Battalion Headquarters

was exceedingly difficult. The Wedge Wood-Ginchy Road which ran

immediately in front of the trench was sunken at this point, and the

bank was honeycombed with German dugouts, among them one which had been

used as an aid-post, and which produced an ample supply of bandages,

lint and field-dressings, and also cigars and tobacco--trench stores

which were promptly taken on charge by the Battalion.

The road itself was littered with German dead, the remnants of the

battle of the 3rd, who had apparently been caught by our barrage,

of the destructive nature of which evidences were everywhere to be

seen. "Unfortunately," writes an eyewitness, "the sunken road was an

attraction to countless flies in the daytime. So numerous were they

that from the road arose a continuous hum which was audible at a

considerable distance. They swarmed over into the trench and settled

on our food in such numbers that they often found their way into our

mouths at mealtimes."

During the afternoon of the 7th orders were issued for the 56th

Division to extend its front to the left by taking over the sector held

by the right Brigade of the 16th Division. This consisted of a trench

following the Leuze Wood-Guillemont Road, from near the north corner

of Leuze Wood, for about 500 yards to the left. This relief was to be

effected by "side-stepping" the 168th Brigade to the left, its trenches

in Leuze Wood being handed over to the 169th Brigade. In pursuance

of this scheme the Battalion took over with A and D Companies the

advanced front line--about 200 yards' frontage on the immediate left

of Leuze Wood--from the 7th Inniskilling Fusiliers. Immediately after

relief these companies began to dig assembly trenches for the impending

continuance of the offensive, and this task was completed before dawn

on the 8th September. The Rangers meanwhile had come up in line on the

left of the 1/4th Londons, while the Scottish on relief in Leuze Wood

by the 169th Brigade had withdrawn into Brigade support, where they

were joined by the Kensingtons.

The 8th September was occupied in improving the assembly trenches, and

in establishing an advanced report centre in a German dugout at the

south-west corner of Leuze Wood--by now corrupted by the ever-ready wit

of the Cockney into "Lousy" Wood--while under cover of darkness the

Cheshire Pioneers connected the Wood with Wedge Wood by a communication

trench. In addition a great deal of work was carried out in collecting

advanced dumps of tools, bombs, ammunition and water, in the west edge

of Leuze Wood. All this work was effected under very heavy shell fire

under which the Battalion sustained some loss.

Orders had now been received for the resumption of the offensive on

the 9th, and during the night the 1/4th Londons and Rangers occupied

their newly dug assembly trenches, while the Kensingtons advanced to

the Wedge Wood support trench, the Scottish remaining at Maltzhorn

Farm. The advanced report centre in Leuze Wood was taken over by the

1/4th Londons and placed under charge of Capt. Houlder (17th Londons

attached). Capt. Houlder, who could speak German fluently, was

instrumental during the action in gaining from prisoners much useful

first-hand information which he was able to pass back to Battalion

and Brigade Headquarters. The terrifying aspect of this huge British

officer, coupled with the fact that he always had a loaded revolver

conspicuously displayed during his investigations, no doubt increased

the desire of his victims to respond to his enquiries!

The battle of the 9th September was an attack on the whole front of the

Fourth Army, the French co-operating on our right. The object of the

XIV Corps, of which the 56th and 16th Divisions were in line, was to

advance the British positions from the Combles valley on the extreme

right well to the east of Leuze Wood on a line running from south-east

to north-west as far as the Ginchy-Morval Road, which formed the left

of the 56th Division front. From this point the 16th Division was to

reach a line which ran due west for some 800 yards along the road

towards Ginchy and then bent northwards to include the whole of the

village.

Map No. 5 shows the objectives of the 56th Division, the 169th Brigade

on the right being responsible for forcing our lines forward of Leuze

Wood on its north and east sides; and the 168th Brigade continuing the

line as far as Point 141·7 on the Ginchy-Morval Road. The map also

indicates that nearly every battalion taking part in the assault would

have to make a change of direction from its starting point in order to

advance to its objective.

So far as the 168th Brigade was concerned the advance was to be made

in two stages, the first objective being a line of German trenches,

running from the north corner of Leuze Wood towards Ginchy, and

the final objective being as above described. For this purpose the

dispositions of the Brigade remained as they had been on the eve of the

battle, that is:

Right Assaulting Battalion--1/4th Londons.

Left do. --Rangers.

Support Battalion --Kensingtons.

Reserve do. --London Scottish.

The 1/4th Londons were disposed for attack as follows:

Right--B Company (Lieut. H. W. Vernon).

Centre--D Company (Lieut. G. H. Davis).

Left--A Company (Capt. J. R. Webster).

Support--C Company (2/Lieut. W. E. Osborne).

Each company occupied a two-platoon frontage, so that the whole

Battalion was on a front of six platoons and in a depth of four waves.

The morning of the 9th September dawned mistily, but by 10 o'clock

the sun's rays had dispersed the haze and disclosed to the enemy the

new earth thrown up in front of our hastily dug assembly trenches. A

heavy bombardment of the assembly areas on the whole Divisional front

followed, lasting all the morning and causing a good many casualties.

The assaulting companies having already formed up over night, the

trenches were crowded with troops waiting for the hour of attack, and

the experience of having quietly to endure this remarkably accurate and

heavy shoot was one of the most trying of the whole engagement.

At 4 o'clock the enemy put down a heavy barrage on our lines. A quarter

of an hour later our preparatory bombardment, which had opened at 10

a.m., increased to "hurricane" intensity, and for half an hour the

German positions were subjected to a frightful ordeal under which it

seemed that nothing could live. At 4.45 p.m. the British columns, on a

front of several miles, moved to the assault.

The 1/4th Londons on getting out of their assembly trenches had to

make a change of direction, pivoting on their right flank, and this

accomplished, they moved forward steadily, keeping well up to their

barrage and suffering comparatively little loss.

In consequence of the conflicting reports which were received during

the action, the heavy toll of casualties in all ranks, and the

resultant intermingling of companies in the positions gained, it has

been a matter of considerable difficulty to elucidate the position and

to extract from the mass of evidence a fair and impartial account of

what really occurred.

It seems evident, however, that the position marked as the 1/4th

Londons' first objective was innocent of the trench which it was

expected to find there. At all events if a trench had ever existed on

the line of the Leuze Wood-Ginchy track it had been so battered by

shell fire as to be no longer recognisable as such; and it appears

that the greater part of the assaulting companies overshot the mark

and moved straight on to what was really the second objective, which

they occupied under the impression that it was the first objective.

It had been arranged that A Company on the left should consolidate

a strong point on the left of the real first objective at its point

of junction with the sector to be captured by the Rangers. Evidently

2/Lieut. Brodie, to whom was allotted this task, in making his change

of direction to the right took a somewhat wide sweep and struck the

east end of the Rangers' first objective, where a trench did actually

exist, and here he formed his block practically in the position where

it was intended to be. Subsequently Brodie, finding himself, no doubt,

out of touch with the remainder of the Battalion, who had gone too far,

came forward in the attempt to clear up the situation, but unhappily

was killed, together with all his men.

The too rapid advance of the Battalion naturally brought them under the

fire of our own barrage, and during the forty minutes' pause which was

ordered after the capture of the first objective before the resumption

of the advance on to the second, a good many casualties did in fact

occur from our own shells which were dropping in and uncomfortably

close to the trench which was occupied. This trench--the real second

objective--was subsequently known as Bully Trench. We will therefore so

refer to it in order to avoid confusion.

At 5.25 p.m. the Battalion, now including elements of all companies,

once more advanced in a commendably steady manner on to a trench just

topping the rise of the Main Ridge. This it occupied with very little

opposition. This advanced position--Beef Trench--was an isolated trench

about 150 yards ahead of Bully (the real second objective) with both

flanks in the air. It was shallow and evidently only in course of

construction. It afforded magnificent observation over the rearward

slopes of the Main Ridge on to the German third line system in front of

Morval, and in this position the work of consolidation was begun, two

Lewis gun posts being pushed forward overlooking the Morval-Lesbœufs

Road. Middle Copse, a small spinney about 200 yards to the front, was

seen to be teeming with Bosche who were effectively dealt with by our

Lewis guns.

In the meantime the right platoon of B Company under 2/Lieut. Garratt,

which, in keeping touch with the Queen Victorias, had got ahead of the

rest of the Battalion, had evidently become deflected slightly to the

right during its advance and had dropped into the communication trench

connecting Leuze Wood with Bully Trench. Apparently somewhat confusing

his direction in the total absence of landmarks, Garratt moved along

this trench and turned the corner to the left along Bully Trench.

Here he came in contact with a Bosche bombing party, and attacking

them vigorously pushed them back for some considerable distance, and

eventually constructed a temporary block in the trench, probably about

the centre of the Battalion's sector, _i.e._ about 200 yards short of

the Quadrilateral. In this bomb fighting the men of B Company displayed

great courage and dash, and their accurate throwing contributed largely

to their success. Among these gallant men Corpl. Udall was conspicuous,

and for his devotion to duty he was awarded the Military Medal.

During the advance of the assaulting companies of the Battalion from

Bully Trench to the advanced position in Beef, a somewhat determined

attack was delivered against B Company's block by a large party of the

enemy led by an officer. Fortunately the shallowness of the trench

exposed the enemy's advance and after a brisk exchange of bombs,

in the course of which some loss was inflicted on the attacking

party, including the officer who was shot by Garratt, the survivors

surrendered with the exception of a few who fled pursued by the fire of

our men and the Rangers. Garratt was subsequently awarded the Military

Cross for his good work.

On the Battalion's left the Rangers, whose line of advance was

dominated by the Quadrilateral and a small spur running from it in a

south-westerly direction, had been faced with a withering machine-gun

fire under which advance was utterly impossible. Their left company was

unable to make progress, and by 8.30 p.m. was compelled to withdraw

to its assembly positions in conjunction with the right Brigade of

the 16th Division who had also been unable to overcome the German

resistance. The right company of the Rangers pushed gallantly forward

losing heavily, but was finally brought to a stand in the vicinity of

the temporary block which was being held in Bully by Garratt. Here they

were forced to take such cover as shell craters afforded them, and to

reply to the Bosche fire, in which they were assisted by the party of B

Company at the block. Under the gathering darkness a good many of the

Rangers were able to make their way into Bully trench.

While all this was taking place two companies of the Kensingtons had

occupied the assembly trenches vacated by the 1/4th Londons, and the

commanders of these, appreciating the situation of the Rangers, at once

made a gallant attempt to fill the gap on the left. Their gallantry,

however, cost them dear, and the German barrage took a heavy toll of

casualties before they reached Bully Trench. The bravery of Major

Dickens was in particular remarkable. Mortally wounded some time before

he reached his objective, he continued to advance at the head of his

men, cheering and encouraging them until he collapsed into the trench.

Later in the evening the two remaining companies of the Kensingtons

were also thrown into the fight and became absorbed into the 1/4th

Londons' position in Bully Trench.

Darkness had now fallen, and the position of the companies in the

advanced trench was far from happy. Both flanks were in the air and

heavy losses had been suffered; of the officers who had started

with these companies, only four--Cooper, McCormick, Quennell and

Burford--were still standing. News from Garratt showed that he was

doubtful as to whether he could hold out against another attack.

Fearing to lose the advantage already gained, Cooper, who had assumed

command of the force in Beef Trench, decided to reoccupy Bully

temporarily, and finally clear it of the enemy. The withdrawal was

successfully accomplished in the dark, but the enemy was found to be

firmly established with an apparently ample supply of bombs on his

side of the block, which had now been completed with the help of the

Kensington and Ranger reinforcements; and further attempts to extend

our gains northward in Bully were abandoned. Communication being now

re-established with Battalion Headquarters, orders were received in

Bully for the reoccupation of the advanced positions in Beef; and the

Bully position being now much strengthened by Rangers and Kensingtons,

the 1/4th Londons moved forward alone to Beef Trench.

During the remainder of the night a good deal of work was necessary in

reorganising the somewhat mixed force by which the forward position was

now occupied. One or two enemy patrols approached the position but were

fired on and dispersed, and apart from continued shell fire and sniping

the night passed comparatively peacefully.

Captain Cooper gives the following account of a remarkable incident

which occurred during the night:--

A glow was seen in a shell hole some distance to the front and on

investigation this proved to be from the cigarette of a battalion

N.C.O., a corporal (Fergusson), who had formed part of one of the

forward posts. He had become separated from his men and wounded in

the back so that he was unable to walk. He stated that he had been

uncertain of his position and so had crawled into a shell hole. A

Bosche patrol had found him and removed his shoulder badges and

taken the contents of his pockets, but had propped him up in a

comfortable position and had left him his water-bottle, cigarettes

and matches. He was calmly and coolly enjoying a cigarette when

found. He was sent on a stretcher to the Aid Post.

While these events were taking place on the Battalion's front, the

Queen Victorias, the left of the 169th Brigade, had occupied their

objective, and were in touch on the right of Bully. The enemy, however,

had hitherto successfully resisted all efforts of the London Rifle

Brigade to emerge from the east side of Leuze Wood. At about 7 p.m. the

Bosche at this part of the line had launched a vigorous bomb attack

along the sunken road leading from Combles, and the L.R.B. had been

forced back after a most stubborn resistance which cost them heavily.

During the night the Queen's Westminsters took over the extreme right

of the Division.

The 16th Division on the left had also met with varied fortunes. The

47th Brigade on its left had successfully advanced through Ginchy

and established itself on its objective; but the right brigade, the

48th, whose objective lay along the Ginchy-Morval Road, met with most

stubborn resistance from the spur already referred to. In spite of

the most gallant efforts the Brigade was unable to make progress, and

eventually fell back with the left wing of the Rangers at about 8.30

p.m. and reoccupied their original position on the Wedge Wood-Ginchy

Road. About this time the London Scottish were ordered into the fight

in order to endeavour to clear up the situation in this part of the

field. After the march forward from Maltzhorn their preparations were

completed at about midnight, and shortly after they attacked from

a position to the left of the Rangers' assembly trenches towards

the Quadrilateral. The enemy was still vigorous in his defence, and

after losing their direction in the intense darkness, the Scottish

were ultimately withdrawn, having first rendered a good account of

themselves in a lively little hand-to-hand fight with a party of the

Bosche. During the night the 16th Division was relieved by the 3rd

Guards Brigade.

Shortly after dawn on the 10th 2/Lieut. McCormick, who had come back

to Battalion Headquarters with a report of the situation, returned to

Beef Trench with orders for the immediate evacuation of the advanced

position. Accordingly, after establishing two Lewis gun positions in

Beef Trench, the withdrawal was proceeded with as rapidly as possible,

the activity of the German snipers in the growing daylight making

movement difficult except in the smallest parties. The return of the

1/4th Londons to Bully Trench caused congestion which was subsequently

intensified by the arrival of a large reinforcement of London Scottish.

This Battalion made efforts during the day to prolong the line in the

direction of the Quadrilateral, while the Guards, working eastward

along the Ginchy-Morval Road, sought to join hands with them, but

the Germans were well supplied with bombs and put up a very gallant

resistance. The continued occupation of the spur--which on the previous

day had stopped the 16th Division--moreover forced an unpleasantly deep

re-entrant in the British line, leaving the left flank of the 1/4th

Londons dangerously exposed. An effort to rout out the pertinacious

defenders of this spur was made during the afternoon by the 168th

Stokes mortars, who fired 35 rounds with good effect into the enemy

trenches.

The position on the right flank of the Battalion was still less

satisfactory than had been hoped for. At 7 a.m. and again at 3 p.m. the

Queen's Westminsters had made local attempts to gain the previous day's

objective, but each time without success.

Throughout the day the Battalion's position was kept under heavy German

shell fire which caused the already heavy casualty roll to mount higher

and higher, and it was found necessary to relieve the congestion

in Bully by withdrawing the Rangers and Kensingtons to the rear.

Communication with Headquarters was rendered exceedingly difficult,

though, as always, there was no lack of brave volunteers to try to

pass through the German barrage, and these in some cases succeeded

in reaching the report centre in Leuze Wood. Moreover the trench,

only a shallow and half-finished work to start with, was becoming

badly shattered and was filled with wounded men, whom there was no

means of evacuating, for all the stretcher-bearers with companies had

themselves become casualties. Throughout this trying day all ranks

displayed magnificent spirit and clung to their hardly won gains with

grim determination. That night the 168th Brigade was relieved, the

1/4th Londons handing over their objective to the 8th Middlesex of the

167th Brigade. Following the relief, which was complete by midnight,

the Battalion moved by companies--by now sadly reduced in numbers--to

Casement Trench, whence the Battalion moved as a unit to Billon Farm,

near Carnoy, arriving in bivouacs there at 5.30 a.m. on the 11th

September.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF GINCHY, SEPTEMBER 1916]

The five days' duty just completed were perhaps the most strenuous

the Battalion had yet experienced. Almost all the time exposed to bad

weather conditions and to very heavy and accurate artillery fire, the

spirit of the men was magnificent; and their steadiness, after the loss

of 15 out of the 20 officers who led the companies into action, as well

as a large proportion of N.C.O.'s, was unsurpassed. Their fighting

qualities too were firmly established, for they had taken their

objectives up to time-table and handed them over intact twenty-four

hours later. The total casualties during the five days amounted to 22

officers and about 250 other ranks.

The officer casualties were as follows:

7th and 8th September--Capts. F. O. J. Read and H. G. Stanham,

2/Lieuts. W. Richards, A. Potton, J. T. Middleton, C. H. T.

Heaver and L. W. Archer, wounded.

9th and 10th September--Capt. J. R. Webster, 2/Lieuts. C. J.

Brodie, F. J. Foden, W. E. Osborne, C. E. Lewis, C. S. G. Blows

and C. F. Mortleman, killed; Lieuts. H. W. Vernon and G. H.

Davis, 2/Lieuts. J. W. Price, V. R. Oldrey, C. F. English, N.

A. Ormiston and J. C. Graddon, wounded; and 2/Lieut. W. H.

Davey, D.C.M., missing, presumed killed.

Throughout the 11th and 12th heavy fighting continued in which the

167th Brigade co-operated with the Guards on the left in numerous

efforts to clear out the re-entrant and reach the Ginchy Quadrilateral.

This magnificently defended position, however, held out against the

most gallant attempts of the attackers. During the night of the 11/12th

September the 167th Brigade was also relieved, the line being taken

over by the 16th Brigade of the 6th Division.

The Battalion remained at Billon Farm for three most welcome days of

rest and reorganisation during which the weather, which now once more

became fine and warm, was of inestimable value in cheering the troops

after their somewhat trying experience. The relief to the men's spirits

on emerging even for a short spell from the ghastly featureless waste

of the battle area to surroundings where trees still bore their leaves,

roads still crossed the hillsides, and houses were not completely

effaced, was immense; and by the time the period of rest was over the

Battalion was once more braced up to continue the struggle.

One or two changes occurred during this period among the officers of

the Battalion, of which the most important was the assumption of the

Adjutancy by Lieut. W. J. Boutall on the evacuation to hospital of

Capt. R. L. Herring, who had occupied this trying position practically

since the Battalion joined the 56th Division. 2/Lieut. Garratt assumed

the duties of Assistant Adjutant almost immediately afterwards. Capt.

J. T. Sykes left the Battalion for attachment to the Indian Army, and

the signalling officer, Lieut. E. W. Monk, to join the R.A.F. The

latter's duties were taken over by 2/Lieut. S. J. Barkworth, M.M. In

addition to these 2/Lieut. A. C. Knight was evacuated to hospital.

_The Battle of Flers-Courcelette 15th-18th September_

The renewal of the offensive was not long to be delayed. The object

of the High Command was to follow up the blows delivered against the

German positions as rapidly as possible, and to leave the enemy little

respite for reorganisation and rest. The constant hammering on his

defences had already had an appreciable effect on his morale, and it

was hoped that before long the strain on his resources would prove so

great that the situation would develop rapidly in favour of the Allies.

The next general attack was arranged for the 15th September, the

assault being launched on the whole battle front from Morval to Le Sars

on the Albert-Bapaume Road. The great pivoting movement by which the

British right flank was to be swung forward in line with the left on

the Main Ridge had now reached an important stage, and the operations

of the XIV Corps were now more than ever bound up with the fortunes of

the French south of Combles. The French were aiming at establishing

themselves astride the Bapaume-Péronne Road at the village of Sailly

Saillisel, about two miles north-east of Combles; but the task

presented unusual difficulties owing to the restriction of the lines

of possible advance between the deep Combles ravine on the one flank,

and the extensive wood of St Pierre Vaast on the other. The evils of

this confinement were aggravated by the fact that the enemy position

about Morval at the extreme east end of the Main Ridge dominated the

whole of our Allies' line of advance. It was therefore essential to

the success, not only of the French in their ultimate object but also

of the combined "squeezing-out" process which was being applied to

Combles itself, that the British should at once possess themselves

of such portions of the Main Ridge as remained in the enemy's hands.

This entailed the breaking of the Third German system on the line

Morval-Lesbœufs-Flers, and this was the task of the XIV and XV Corps on

the 15th September.

The positions held by the Division at the opening of the battle were as

follows:

167th Brigade--On the line north of Leuze Wood and

intersecting the south end of Bouleaux Wood

which had been captured on the 9th by the Queen

Victorias, and thence along the south-east edge

of Leuze Wood for about half its length.

169th Brigade--On the right of Leuze Wood, in a line

running due north and south, between the 167th

and the French.

168th Brigade--In reserve bivouacs in Angle Wood

Valley, the Battalion being at the head of the

Valley near Wedge Wood.

The position which the Battalion had captured on the 9th September was

now held by the 6th Division, who formed the centre of the Corps while

the Guards were on the extreme left.

The general idea of the attack was that the Guards and 6th Divisions

should attack positions in the German third line facing Lesbœufs, while

the 56th Division was to form a defensive flank facing the Combles

ravine.

To establish this defensive flank the 169th Brigade on the right was

to push forward of Leuze Wood and occupy a position roughly north

and south with its left flank astride the sunken road from Combles,

about 300 yards east of the edge of Leuze Wood. The 167th was to clear

Bouleaux Wood in two stages and establish a line parallel to and about

100 yards in front of its east edge. The 1/4th Londons were to follow

up the advance of the 167th Brigade and then "leapfrog" through it on

to the German third line immediately in front of Morval whence they

would connect up between the left of the 167th Brigade and the right of

the 6th Division.

The 15th September was on the greater part of the battle front a day

of big successes. At an early hour Flers fell before our assault, and

by the afternoon the British line had been pushed far beyond it; the

whole of High Wood was taken, and before nightfall Martinpuich and

Courcelette on the left had been added to the gains of the day.

On the extreme right, however, the advance suffered a rather severe

check. The Guards, who occupied the left of the Corps front, were able

to make solid advances between Flers and Lesbœufs, but the 6th Division

adjoining them were held up by the Quadrilateral at Ginchy, whose brave

defenders still maintained their position most stubbornly; and this

failure naturally reacted on the 56th Division who occupied a narrow

wedge between the Quadrilateral and the Combles ravine.

At 5.50 a.m. the three tanks which were to make their début with the

Division left their departure points for the first objective, and at

6.20 a.m. the infantry assault was launched. Almost three hours later,

at 9 a.m., the 1/4th Londons left their bivouacs in Angle Wood Valley

and moved forward in artillery formation towards the battle position

on the crest between the north edge of Leuze Wood and the west face

of Bouleaux Wood. Progress was not rapid owing to the heavy state of

the ground, and under the German shell fire a good many casualties

were sustained. The advance was made, however, in good order, and with

admirable steadiness.

The 169th Brigade made very slight advances on the south of Leuze Wood;

while the 167th managed to secure the part of its first objective which

lay outside Bouleaux Wood. The 8th Middlesex of the latter Brigade

even made a heroic attempt to reach the second objective, but had to

be brought back. The enemy barrage was heavy and fell, as it so often

had in the Somme battles, between the assaulting columns and their

starting-point, thus cutting them off from supplies and reinforcement,

while the accurate intensity of their machine-gun fire from their

positions in the Quadrilateral made advance an utter impossibility.

After ten hours' fighting, during which the assaulting Brigades did all

that men could do, the Corps Commander telephoned to Gen. Hull that the

Division would make no further attempt against Bouleaux Wood that day.

The 1/4th Londons luckily avoided the slaughter of the battle line this

day, for a few minutes prior to its advance from Angle Wood Valley

an order had been despatched to Brigade Headquarters to the effect

that in consequence of the check of the 6th Division in front of the

Quadrilateral the 168th Brigade would not occupy its battle position.

This order was transmitted by Brigade and reached the Battalion during

its advance. Upon receipt of it the Battalion was at once brought back

to its assembly area at Angle Wood Valley where, in common with the

remainder of the Brigade, it remained in bivouacs till the early hours

of the 18th September. This operation cost the Battalion a large number

of casualties among N.C.O.'s and men from the German shell fire, and

one officer, 2/Lieut. J. W. Chapman, wounded.

During these days Angle Wood Valley was a distinctly unhealthy

locality. The German artillery maintained a searching fire over the

whole area, and exacted a fair toll of casualties. The weather,

which a few days previously had shown signs of mending, had once

more turned wet and the shell holes, which formed the only available

cover, became not the most desirable resting-place for the troops. The

strain was great, but the situation was as usual not only borne by all

in the Battalion with an almost stoical resignation, but enlivened

occasionally with those rare flashes of humour which have made the

London soldiers famous during the War in three continents.

The story of the tanks on the 15th September is too well-known to

need elaboration here, and is, moreover, too much outside the actual

experience of the Battalion to allow of more than a passing reference.

The moral effect on the Germans was immense, and considering that their

employment had scarcely passed the experimental stage, the success

gained by them was conspicuous. As was anticipated, however, the tanks

promptly became a mark for a tremendous concentration of enemy fire

which made their room far more desirable than their company. Of the

three attached to the 56th Division one did useful work in the vicinity

of the Quadrilateral, and after trampling down a good deal of wire and

putting an enemy machine-gun team out of action returned to make a

personal report of its adventures. The careers of the other two were

sadly abbreviated, and the end of the day found them derelict--one

west of Bouleaux Wood, and one south-east of Leuze Wood--though not

before they had dealt out a certain amount of destruction to the German

defences.

Orders were received while the Battalion remained in Angle Wood

Valley for the resumption of the offensive on the 18th September. The

objectives on the XIV Corps front were on this occasion very much more

modest than they had been three days earlier, and so far as the 56th

Division was concerned were as follows:

169th Brigade--The sunken road from Leuze Wood to

Combles, between the east edge of the wood and

the orchard west of Combles.

67th Brigade--The east edge of Bouleaux Wood for a

distance of 600 yards from its southern

extremity, and thence a line through the wood to

Middle Copse. From Middle Copse the objective was

continued in a northerly direction by the 6th

Division.

The 168th Brigade remained in reserve in Angle Wood

Valley, but the 1/4th Londons and the London

Scottish were attached to the 167th.

For this operation the Battalion was detailed as the left assaulting

battalion of the 167th Brigade, its objective being the portion between

Middle Copse (which was held by an advanced post of the 7th Middlesex)

and the east edge of Bouleaux Wood. For this purpose its assembly

position was the old German communication trench connecting Bully

Trench with the north corner of Leuze Wood. The right of the Brigade

frontage was taken up by the 3rd Londons.

The hour of assault was fixed for 6.15 a.m. on the 18th, and to enable

it to reach its assembly position by 5.15 a.m. as ordered, the 1/4th

Londons moved from Angle Wood Valley at 3.30 a.m. But the ground was

impossible. All vestige of tracks had long since disappeared, and the

countryside in every direction was a vast slippery quagmire in which so

far from keeping any sort of march formation it was next to impossible

for the men, laden as they were with battle equipment, to stand upright

at all.

Zero hour arrived, but the Battalion as well as the 3rd Londons was

still slipping and struggling a long way short of its assembly area.

The British barrage opened and was at once replied to by a withering

machine-gun fire by the enemy. Seldom has the Battalion been exposed to

so accurate and devastating a fire. The only alternative to complete

destruction was to take cover in the waterlogged shell holes, which

movement was carried out with alacrity by all ranks: in this unexpected

position an order reached the Battalion abandoning the attack and

recalling it to Angle Wood.

On the right the much suffering 169th Brigade was able to achieve a

series of local bombing successes which carried their line appreciably

nearer Combles. From the 6th Division on the left, shortly after midday

came the cheering news that the Quadrilateral had at last fallen,

together with the trench to the north of it.

This important success, which had so long eluded the grasp of the

successive Divisions who had sought it, paved the way for the

magnificent achievements of the 25th September, which will be recounted

later, its especial importance being that it was practically the last

heavily fortified stronghold on the central portion of the Main Ridge

to resist the British attacks.

The abortive operation of the 18th cost the Battalion a good many

casualties in N.C.O.'s and men, and one officer, 2/Lieut. W. H. Calnan,

wounded.

The same evening the 168th Brigade relieved the 167th in the Leuze

Wood trenches, the London Scottish occupying the front system, which

comprised Beef and Bully Trenches. The 1/4th Londons took over from

the 3rd Londons the support line, which ran diagonally through Leuze

Wood in a north and south direction. Leuze Wood was at all times

an unhealthy locality and formed an unfailing source of attraction

for every conceivable sort of German projectile. The 3rd Londons had

already suffered heavily here, and the night of the relief proved

to be no exception to the rule. Throughout the evening the wood was

plastered with high explosive shell, and even the inadequate shelter

of the trenches hastily dug, damaged and waterlogged as they were, was

exceedingly welcome. The position was, without exception, the muddiest

that had yet fallen to the lot of the Battalion. "To stand still,"

writes a company commander, "was to sink gradually until the whole

of the legs to well above the knees were immersed and movement was

correspondingly difficult." Lewis guns and rifles had become choked

with mud so as to render the Battalion practically defenceless, but

with much labour they were cleaned, and some rations which were found

in the trench distributed. Dawn broke on a chilled but yet remarkably

cheerful Battalion. The continued strain of heavy shell fire and

conditions of physical misery were, however, beginning to have their

effect, and several men who in earlier actions had given ample proof

of their courage, collapsed. "One man of D Company who had previously

shown himself one of the stoutest-hearted, lost his mental balance and

suddenly became possessed of the idea of killing all the Germans in

the German Army, and had to be forcibly restrained from mounting the

parapet. 2/Lieut. Barkworth, who came up from Battalion Headquarters,

succeeded by sheer strength of personality in restraining him and

getting him back to H.Q."

The 19th September was a day of comparative quiet on the battle front,

though shelling and sniping continued in a desultory fashion. Rain fell

steadily and the condition of the trenches, appallingly bad to start

with, became so wretched as to defy description.

During the night of the 19th a large working party of the 5th Cheshire

Pioneers, under the supervision of the Brigade Major (Capt. R. E.

Neame, V.C., D.S.O., R.E.), and covered by a screen of one and a half

companies of the Scottish, dug a new trench 800 yards long. This new

work, Gropi Trench, ran forward from Beef Trench towards the German

line, parallel to the west edge of Bouleaux Wood, as far as the Morval

tram-line. The task was successfully completed before dawn, but with

the advent of daylight and the consequent exposure of the newly

turned-up earth, the whole brigade area was again subjected to a heavy

bombardment by the enemy's artillery. The German snipers again became

particularly active, and every rash movement was promptly punished.

Under this gruelling there was nothing for the Battalion to do but to

keep quietly in its trenches and make the best of an unpleasant state

of affairs. That night the Kensingtons came forward from Angle Wood

Valley and took over the support line from the Battalion, and also

Bully Trench in front of it. The relief was completed by 9.30 p.m., and

never was relief more welcome. The Rangers at the same time took over

the Beef and Gropi system from the London Scottish. On withdrawal from

the trenches the Battalion moved by companies to bivouacs at Falfemont

Farm, arriving there at 10.45 p.m.

No further movement was made during the 21st and 22nd September, and

these two days were fairly quiet as the principal target for the German

guns was provided by the numerous British batteries in Angle Wood

Valley, which received heavy punishment.

Between the 20th September and the 2nd October the following

reinforcements joined:

Capt. R. N. Keen, Lieuts. W. H. Vernon and A. Bath, 2/Lieuts. C. A.

Speyer, C. Potter, W. R. Gifford, H. W. Spiers, L. C. Haycraft,

L. J. R. Atterbury, C. P. Russell, T. R. Fletcher and S. A. G.

Richardson.

2/Lieut. T. Siddall (25th Londons).

100 N.C.O.'s and men.

A few days after joining Lieut. A. Bath and 2/Lieut. C. P.

Russell were evacuated, the former with a broken ankle, the

latter sick.

The men of this draft represented so far as the 1/4th Battalion was

concerned the firstfruits of the "Derby" scheme, and it must always be

a matter for regret that the dreadful losses already incurred by the

Battalion made it inevitable to pitchfork this fine material straight

into the inferno of the Somme without any opportunity for it to become

previously assimilated into the ranks of the Battalion. The Somme

battles were a severe ordeal even to the most veteran soldiers; and the

bearing of these young and inexperienced troops in the trials of the

latter half of the Battalion's Somme fighting stands to their lasting

credit.

As we have already remarked, the Cockney soldier, however wretched

his conditions, is never so depressed by his surroundings as to be

unable to find humour in the situation of the hour. The Battalion had

now spent seven consecutive days in the desolation of the battle area

practically without shelter from the pitiless torrents of rain which

combined with the German shells to churn the whole surface of the

ground into a disgusting glutinous mass; the troops were soaked to the

skin and plastered with mud from head to foot; but the unconquerable

spirit of cheerfulness held them together, dirty and dishevelled as

they were, a well-knit and disciplined fighting unit. The condition

of the ground, which added so vastly to the labours of the troops, is

illustrated by a story told by an officer who was present:

A man attempted to cross the valley and started to plough his way

through the mud, but rashly omitted to lace up his boots, which he

had previously removed. His negligence was quickly visited upon

him, for scarcely had he begun his journey when the mud claimed one

of his boots, which became stuck fast. His powers of balance were

unequal to the task of putting his foot back in the boot, and he

toppled over, both his hands becoming firmly embedded. His efforts

to regain a standing position were prolonged and violent, but

after a time successful, and finally, boots in hand, he proceeded

on his way amid the cheers of the onlookers, who accepted his

performance as being arranged for their especial amusement, and

were particularly interested in the man's lurid observations on the

subject of boots, mud and war generally.

There were a few occasions, however, when circumstances seemed too

strong even for the 1/4th Londons, and one of them occurred that night

when the rum jars which arrived with the rations were found, alas, to

contain--lime juice!

On the evening of the 22nd September the 168th Brigade was relieved in

the left subsector by the 167th and the Battalion moved back to the

comparative peace of Casement Trench, where it occupied bivouacs until

the afternoon of the 24th, making preparations for the next bout in the

battle line.

_The Battle of Morval, 25th September_

The continuance of the offensive had been arranged for the 21st,

but the weather conditions placed such a handicap on the chances of

success that it was postponed, first until the 23rd and again till

the 25th September, when once more the battle broke out on a front

from the British right at Combles to a point half-way between Flers

and Martinpuich. The French were to co-operate in this attack on the

right of Combles ravine. The objectives of the XIV Corps included the

villages of Lesbœufs and Morval, and, as on the occasion of their

earlier attempt on the 15th, the 56th Division was to form a defensive

flank facing south-east over Combles.

A series of local bombing operations was conducted on the 24th by the

169th Brigade on the extreme right in conjunction with the French,

which gave them an increased hold on Combles Trench immediately in

front of the village, and appreciably improved their jumping-off

positions for the following day. During the night also the two tanks

allotted to the Division moved forward to their rendezvous in the

quarry west of Leuze Wood.

For the battle of the 25th the three Brigades of the Division were

all in line, the 169th on the right, with the 167th in the centre and

the 168th on the left. The 1/4th Londons were the right assaulting

Battalion of the 168th, their duty being to clear the northern end of

Bouleaux Wood and to establish a line of posts overlooking the ravine,

while the London Scottish on the left continued the defensive flank in

the direction of Morval (see Map No. 6).

At 4.30 p.m. on the 24th the Battalion marched from Casement Trench

to occupy positions of assembly, relieving the 7th Middlesex in the

Gropi-Ranger system as follows:

C Company--Left front, in Ranger Trench.

B Company--Right front, in Gropi Trench, and the small

communication trench leading forward to Ranger Trench.

D Company--Support, in Gropi Trench.

A Company--Reserve, in the southern part of Gropi

Trench and Middle Copse.

Battalion Headquarters were established in a dugout west of the

north part of Gropi Trench and the Aid Post in the quarry west of

Leuze Wood.

The evening of relief was fortunately fairly quiet, but owing to the

complete obliteration of all landmarks some difficulty was experienced

by the guides provided for the companies in locating the positions to

be occupied. However, Middle Copse was eventually reached, and this

point being gained a little prospecting discovered Gropi Trench, after

which the relief proceeded smoothly and was completed without unusual

incident. Gropi Trench, which had been dug by the Cheshires, was found

to be very well constructed, and the excellent cover it afforded was

the means of sparing the Battalion a good many casualties from the

enemy snipers, who were active from the direction of Bouleaux Wood

during the morning of the 25th.

After a preliminary bombardment by all available batteries the British

attack opened at 12.35 p.m. on the 25th, but the 168th Brigade's

positions being well in advance of those occupied by the 5th Division

on its left, its attack was deferred until seven minutes later in

order to allow the 5th Division to come up into line. The creeping

barrage, under which the Brigade's advance was made, was supplied by

batteries firing from Angle Wood Valley, and being thus in enfilade was

particularly efficient and accurate; and under its excellent protection

the 1/4th Londons and the London Scottish advanced steadily at 12.42

p.m.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF MORVAL, SEPTEMBER 1916]

The advance of the Battalion was led by C Company (Grimsdell) in two

waves at 50 paces distance, followed by D Company (Cooper) in similar

formation. B Company's rôle was to conform to the advance and protect

the Brigade's right flank against any possible hostile action from

the southern half of Bouleaux Wood, while A Company in reserve moved

forward to occupy the positions vacated by the assaulting companies.

The Battalion reached its objectives in the northern fringe of the Wood

with little opposition, and with slight loss, killing a large number

of Germans in the western edge of the Wood. A great many of the enemy

were also put to flight, and these were caught on the open hillside on

their way to Combles by the Lewis gunners of the Scottish advancing

on our left, who did great execution among them. The consolidation

of the strong posts allotted to the Battalion at once began, but was

considerably interfered with by German snipers, who were still clinging

to their posts farther south in the Wood. Under their fire Grimsdell

(in charge of C Company) fell, shot through the head. This harassing

fire rendered communication with Battalion Headquarters a matter of

some difficulty, and continued through the night, as the 167th Brigade

on the right had not been successful in pushing through the southern

extremity of Bouleaux Wood. By nightfall the new posts were completed

and occupied as follows:

Post A--By 30 men and Lewis gun of C Company.

Post B1--By 25 men of D Company.

Post B2--By 30 men and 1 Lewis gun of D Company.

These posts were improved and wired by parties from the Royal Engineers

and the Cheshire Pioneers, while A Company subsequently constructed an

additional post in the tram-line embankment north of the Wood.

Meanwhile the London Scottish had been equally successful on our left,

and had taken possession of the German trench running north-east from

Bouleaux Wood in the direction of Morval; and farther still to the

north the Guards Division had captured Lesbœufs, while the 5th Division

were hammering at the western outskirts of Morval.

The positions now occupied by the Brigade were of immense importance,

as they secured excellent observation over the northern exits of

Combles; and information received through the French from a German

officer prisoner being to the effect that the Combles garrison was

making preparations to fight its way out north-eastwards, the further

operations of the Brigade were directed towards working round the north

side of Combles and cutting off its communication with Morval. This

scheme naturally affected the left flank of the Brigade more than the

right flank, on which the Battalion was posted.

Shortly after midnight the 167th Brigade gained a foothold in Bouleaux

Wood on the right of the Battalion, and a reconnaissance made by

Lieut.-Col. Wheatley soon after dawn on the 26th showed that the Wood

was finally cleared of the enemy. Touch was rapidly gained with the 1st

Londons and the line established in front of the east edge of the Wood.

A few hours later definite information was received that the enemy had

evacuated Combles and that troops of the 56th Division had entered it

and had met in its deserted streets patrols of the 56th French Division.

The remainder of the day passed quietly for the Battalion, and a

distinct lull occurred in the enemy's shell fire, while owing to the

clearance of Bouleaux Wood the ground west of it, which had been on the

previous afternoon so much swept by snipers, was now quite peaceful.

Combles having fallen into our hands the most immediate need was to

improve touch with the French and carry the united line forward east

of the village. Early on the morning of the 26th Sept. the French

captured Frégicourt and succeeded in establishing themselves in touch

with the 169th Brigade south of Combles, thus securing the whole of

Combles Trench; while on the north of the village they managed to push

patrols forward towards the sunken road leading to Morval. The road was

occupied by the Rangers who had orders to occupy if possible the main

German third line between Morval and Frégicourt. This was found still

to be strongly held and the assistance of the Division's two tanks

were requisitioned. Unfortunately both these machines became badly

"ditched" before reaching their objective, and the Rangers' attack was

therefore abandoned.

That evening the Battalion was relieved in Bouleaux Wood by the

Kensingtons, and withdrew to Bully and Beef Trenches with feelings of

immense elation at having contributed materially to this striking and

solid success.

During the 27th September the trenches held by the Battalion were

heavily shelled, but no attempt was made by the enemy to launch a

counter-attack on the Brigade's front, and the Germans were evidently

content to accept the loss of Combles as irretrievable. In the evening

the 168th Brigade handed over its positions to the 2nd French Division,

and the Battalion, without relief in Bully and Beef Trenches, withdrew

to Casement Trench.

The casualties sustained by the Battalion during this highly successful

operation were remarkably few, amounting to 2 officers (2/Lieuts. R.

E. Grimsdell, killed, and E. McD. McCormick, wounded), and about 30

N.C.O.'s and men killed and wounded.

During the evening of relief reports of the full success of the battle

of the 25th September reached the Battalion, including the splendid

news of the fall of the famous series of German redoubts on the

Thiepval Ridge. This welcome intelligence, combined with the knowledge

of the Combles success, put all ranks into the highest spirits, and

created the pardonable expectation that a "break-through" on a large

scale was imminent. How premature these high hopes were the Battalion

was to learn to its cost on the 7th October.

Mention should be made here of the tasks performed by R. S. M. Harris

during the period the Battalion was operating in the Leuze Wood and

Bouleaux Wood area. He was responsible for organising all carrying

parties up to advanced Battalion Headquarters with water, rations and

munitions. These duties he carried out in a highly praiseworthy manner,

both he and his small band of carriers being continually called upon

day and night to tramp up the long Angle Wood Valley, often in the

rain, on practically impassable tracks and more often than not under

shell fire. "As Adjutant," writes Boutall, "I highly appreciated the

assistance he gave me in thus relieving me of a considerable amount of

additional work and anxiety. I do not remember a single instance during

this whole period when he failed us, in spite of the difficult and

heavy tasks we were obliged to impose on him."

_The Battle of the Le Transloy Ridges 1st-18th October_

Owing to the shortening of the line consequent upon the fall of

Combles, and the extension to their left of the French, the 56th

Division was now withdrawn and moved out of the battle area, the

Battalion marching at 2 p.m. on the 28th Sept. from Casement to

Ville-sur-Ancre, where rough but welcome billets were occupied. The

Division's rest was destined to be short-lived, for the following day a

warning order was received that it would take the place in the line of

the 6th and Guards Divisions, which had suffered considerably during a

prolonged period in action.

The Battalion at this stage was unfortunate in losing Lieut.-Col.

Wheatley. The prolonged exposure had already undermined his health, and

at this period he was recommended a rest by the Medical Authorities. He

refused to go to hospital, and compromised by going to the Divisional

Rest Station, Major H. J. Duncan-Teape taking command, but so keen

was the Colonel to be with his unit, that without having sufficiently

recovered he returned on October 2nd.

The sector to be occupied was about 2000 yards in frontage, running in

a north-west to south-east direction through the eastern outskirts of

Lesbœufs, and was taken over on the evening of the 30th September with

the 169th Brigade on the right, and the 167th on the left, the dividing

line being the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road. The left subsector (or

northern half of the line) lay just below the crest of the ridge above

Lesbœufs, and orders were issued for the advancement of this part of

the line to positions from which direct observation could be obtained

over the German positions in front of Le Transloy, in preparation for

an early renewal of the offensive.

[Illustration: THE BATTLE OF THE LE TRANSLOY RIDGE, OCTOBER 1916]

The 168th Brigade remained in Divisional reserve, and on the morning

of the 30th the Battalion, together with the London Scottish, moved

forward to their former bivouac area between Trones and Bernafay Woods,

the Kensingtons and Rangers remaining at the Citadel.

The Battalion remained in the Trones Wood area during the 1st and 2nd

October, and a Brigade relief having been ordered for the following

day, moved forward at 4.30 p.m. to Lesbœufs, relieving the 2nd Londons.

The positions taken over by the Battalion formed the left subsector

of the Brigade front and extended from the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road,

which formed the left boundary, for some 800 yards southwards to the

junction with the London Scottish, who were in line on the right,

the latter battalion being the right flank of the British Army. The

Kensingtons moved into Brigade support in the old Morval-Flers line,

and the Rangers occupied bivouacs at Ginchy.

The main position taken over by the Battalion was a roughly constructed

trench known as Shamrock, about 50 yards east of the sunken road

leading from Lesbœufs to Morval. In advance of this main position,

which was allotted to A and B Companies, were a number of embryo

trenches in varying stages of construction and quite isolated from

the main line. Of these isolated trenches the chief was Rainy, which

adjoined the Lesbœufs-Le Transloy Road, about 300 yards ahead of

Shamrock, and Foggy, some distance farther south and separated from

Rainy by a gap of probably 300 yards. C and D Companies and Battalion

Headquarters took up positions in the old Lesbœufs-Gueudecourt line

west of the village.

The resumption of the offensive was imminent; and it was indeed first

fixed for the 5th October, though subsequently postponed till the 7th

owing to the continuance of adverse weather conditions.

A great deal of constructional work was immediately necessary in

assembly and communication trenches, as well as in the completion

of the necessary advanced dumps of munitions and stores of all

kinds. Working parties from the Battalion, of the greatest available

strength, began work on part of these tasks on the night of the 4th,

the new trenches to be dug comprising communications to join Rainy

with Shamrock and with a small advanced position on the crest of the

ridge overlooking Le Transloy. In addition the road at Rainy was

barricaded. Large working parties were also provided by the Kensingtons

to provide an advanced assembly position for the attack by connecting

Rainy and Foggy, and by the Cheshire Pioneers and the R.E.'s on other

tasks. This latter task, however, could not be completed in one night

and was continued the following evening. The shocking state of the

ground prevented it from ever being finished, and on the day of the

attack only about 150 yards of trench had been added to Foggy. On the

night of the 6/7th also a fresh assembly trench for the use of the

centre battalion was taped out by the Brigade Major, and dug by the

Kensingtons. This work was called New Trench.

Although the weather once again had embarked on a dry spell the

long continued rains had rendered working tasks immensely difficult

of accomplishment, and the tenacious character of the mud added

incalculably to the labour of digging and of reaching the site of the

work. The isolation of the various tasks in this appalling swamp, from

which every landmark had been swept out of existence, and the constant

harassing fire of the enemy's machine-gunners, caused great delays to

working parties in even locating their work, and all these factors

together tended to reduce the work actually carried out far below

expectations.

The Battalion, not being originally detailed for the assault, was

relieved in the trenches on the evening of the 5th by the Rangers and

moved by companies on relief to bivouacs between Ginchy and Guillemont,

leaving A and C Companies in line for the completion of their tasks

begun the previous night. The following day, however, intimation was

received of a change of orders, and the Battalion returned to the

trenches that night as the centre assaulting battalion of the Brigade,

its place in brigade support being taken by the Kensingtons.

So far as the 56th Division was concerned the attack of the 7th

October was for the purpose of advancing the line some 1400 yards

farther down the reverse slope of the Main Ridge, in order to provide

a suitable "jumping-off" line for a further offensive to be launched

later against the fourth German line in front of Le Transloy, which

guarded the Bapaume-Péronne Road. The advance was to be made under a

creeping barrage, in two stages, to objectives which were not marked

by enemy trenches, but on the farther of which the Division would

dig itself in. On the Division's right the French line would also be

advanced by the 56th French Division, with whom touch was to be gained

on the Frégicourt-Le Transloy Road.

The 168th Brigade's assault was entrusted to the London Scottish

(right), 1/4th Londons (centre) and Rangers (left), the dispositions

for attack of the Battalion being as follows:

D Company--(W. H. Vernon) two platoons in New Trench

and two platoons in 25 Trench; in touch with London

Scottish.

C Company--(Speyer) in Foggy Extension; in touch with

Rangers.

B Company--(Gifford) in Shamrock.

A Company--(Keen) in support in the sunken road.

Battalion Headquarters (Col. Wheatley) were in dugouts

south-west of Lesbœufs, and an advanced report centre (Major

Duncan-Teape) was established in the southern outskirts of

the village.

The plan of attack was for D, C and B Companies to advance at two

minutes after zero to the first objective, the two platoons of D in

New Trench being especially detailed to the task of "mopping up" some

German gun pits some 150 yards to the front which were believed to be

held by a few enemy snipers. At the same time A Company was to occupy

Foggy Extension. After about fifteen minutes' pause on the first

objective, the assault on the second objective would be pursued by C

and B Companies only.

Reference has already been made to the difficulty experienced prior

to the attack by working parties in locating their tasks, and similar

difficulty was met with by all troops throughout the operations.

The consistently bad atmospheric conditions had rendered aerial

photography almost impossible, and all through the action the doubt

which existed in the minds of commanders as to the exact position

of trenches, our own as well as the enemy's, was a fruitful source

of confusion and loss. The assembly of the companies for attack was

indeed only accomplished after serious delay owing to the extraordinary

but largely justifiable bewilderment of the guides detailed to the

Battalion. C Company only reached its position just before dawn

after having been led several hundred yards out of its way, to find

on arrival that its assembly trench was only knee deep and already

filled with wounded. Add to these obstacles to success, the fact that,

owing to the previous terrible losses in commissioned ranks, it was

impossible to avoid sending into the battle as many as nine officers

who had not been previously in action with the Battalion at all,

having only a few days earlier arrived from England, and it will be

appreciated that the probabilities of success were not great. Zero was

fixed for 1.45 p.m., and at that hour the barrage dropped. Two minutes

later the Battalion rose out of its trenches and made a gallant attempt

to advance. The story of the remainder of the day is a pitiful tragedy.

The gun pits which had been allotted to the two platoons of D Company

in New Trench were found to be alive with bravely-manned machine-guns,

and under their withering fire D Company simply melted out of

existence. C Company, following slightly to its right, was able to

avoid total extinction by taking cover in shell holes in dead ground

close by, but 2/Lieut. C. M. Taylor fell under this fire at the head

of the leading wave of the Company. B Company, following on from

Shamrock, met the full blast of the enemy counter-barrage, and suffered

heavy losses, but pushed bravely on and eventually filtered into the

same general line as was already held by C Company and the remains of

D. Under the devastating fire from the gun pits further advance was

impossible, and the troops continued to suffer loss where they lay. The

afternoon wore on and the Battalion remained clinging to its position,

about 50 yards from its starting-point, until after dark. Sergt. H. F.

Page of D Company displayed magnificent coolness, and from his shell

hole passed a busy afternoon picking off the German gunners in the

pits with great deliberation. He was subsequently commissioned to the

King's Own Regiment (Royal Lancaster). All ranks alike were exposed to

the fire and all suffered proportionately. L. C. Haycraft, a promising

young subaltern of D Company who had already proved his worth with the

bombers of the Civil Service Rifles in the Hairpin at Hulluch, made

an attempt after dark to ascertain the enemy's position, but he never

returned from his reconnaissance.

Gifford, in charge of B Company, also fell, as did his platoon

commanders, Fletcher and Richardson, the two last wounded; and C.S.M.

James, who received the Military Medal for his good work, took charge

of the Company and brought it out of action at the end of the day.

On the left the Rangers had met with a similar fate at the hands of

the machine-gunners in Dewdrop Trench, before whose fire they had been

stopped dead with ghastly loss immediately they rose from the assembly

trench.

The London Scottish, on the right, gained a little success, their right

flank achieving a maximum advance of about 400 yards, but their left

felt the blast of the deadly guns in the pits, and they were kept out

of all except the southern extremity of Hazy.

At about 8.30 p.m. the enemy delivered a counter-attack from Hazy and

Dewdrop under heavy artillery support, which had the effect of forcing

the Brigade definitely back to its starting trenches.

In the meantime a company of the Kensingtons had been brought up to

Burnaby with the idea of forcing the Dewdrop position by outflanking

it from the north, but the Germans being found still strongly in

possession of Spectrum, north of the road, the attack was cancelled.

It having become obvious that the assaulting battalions were

dangerously weakened, immediate reliefs were arranged, and the

Battalion that night handed over its position to the Queen Victorias,

who were attached to the Brigade, and withdrew to the bivouacs at

Trones Wood. Here it was joined by the London Rifle Brigade. The

withdrawal of the Battalion was supervised by Major Duncan-Teape,

who managed by great efforts to get the whole of the remnants of the

companies back over the Ridge just before daylight broke. The roll call

at Trones Wood was a gloomy spectacle, for neither the 1/4th Londons

nor the London Scottish could muster more than the strength of about

one company.

The total losses in all ranks sustained by the Battalion on this

unfortunate day amounted to about 300 all ranks, the casualties among

officers being:

Killed--Lieut. W. H. Vernon, 2/Lieuts. C. M. Taylor, W. H. Gilford,

L. J. R. Atterbury and L. C. Haycraft.

Wounded--Capt. R. N. Keen and 2/Lieuts. T. R. Fletcher, H. W.

Spiers and S. A. G. Richardson.

Of this, the last of the Battalion's actions in the great Somme

battles, but little more need be said. The position which it had been

proposed to carry with three weak battalions was attempted again the

following day with equal lack of success; and subsequently other

Divisions suffered heavy casualties in the unsuccessful endeavour.

Indeed the position never did fall into our possession until the enemy

deliberately gave it up in his retirement of the succeeding February on

to the Hindenburg line.

Lieut.-Col. L. L. Wheatley, D.S.O., had led the Battalion through many

trying ordeals with the unfailing confidence of all ranks who had the

honour to be under his command; but as already indicated, the strain of

the long-protracted struggle, especially of the last few days, combined

with continually wet clothes, had proved too much for him, and he now

contracted an acute attack of dysentery and was evacuated to hospital

on the 10th. He never returned to the Battalion which his compelling

personality had made essentially his own.

On the 11th October the Battalion moved to the Citadel Camp, the

gateway through which thirty-five days earlier it had entered

the inferno of the battle; and the Division being concentrated

here after relief by the 4th Division, it marched the following

morning to Ville-sur-Ancre, moving thence by motor-buses to a rest

area north-west of Amiens, billets being provided for it at St

Vaast-en-Chaussée.

Of all the great series of actions of the War the battles of the Somme

in 1916 stand out perhaps in the public memory as the most heroic, and

at the same time the most appalling, and we cannot leave the subject

finally without a few remarks generally reviewing the Battalion's

experiences. Of the thirty-five days spent in XIV Corps area only four

had been spent in rest bivouacs, and during the remaining thirty-one

the Battalion had taken part in active operations five times. The

losses incurred amounted to the enormous total of nearly 700 in all

ranks, of whom 40 were officers.

It would be unfitting to close our account of the Somme battles without

paying some tribute to the magnificent work performed throughout by

Rear Headquarters under Major H. J. Duncan-Teape. The administrative

ranks of a battalion in action are invariably worked to the limits

of human endurance, but usually with inadequate recognition of their

importance; for it is no exaggeration to say that on the efficiency

with which they maintain the stream of supplies, whether of rations or

munitions, to the fighting ranks, depends not merely the success, but

the very existence of the troops in advanced positions. On the Somme

the consistently atrocious weather increased tenfold the fatigue and

strain of the administrative portion of the Battalion: the mud swamps

which had to be traversed, the severe shell fire which plastered all

back areas, the wretched misery of the whole struggle, and above all

the vast responsibility which rested on them, all combined to make

the work of Rear Headquarters an enormous strain both mental and

physical. But throughout the battles Major Duncan-Teape was constantly

alert and constantly at advanced Headquarters, ascertaining exactly

what was wanted, and getting it done. In Lieut. H. B. A. Balls, the

Acting Quartermaster, and in R.S.M. Harris he found able and devoted

lieutenants whose cool handling of all difficulties was invaluable.

The transport sections of all battalions were brigaded under Capt. L.

G. Rix at the Citadel, and the 1/4th Londons' transport section under

Lieut. G. V. Lawrie worked throughout magnificently and never once

failed to deliver the day's supplies. Those who were present will fully

appreciate what this means. The work for horses and men was exhausting

and incessant; and oftentimes the limbers returned from the forward

area to the transport lines only just in time to load up once more for

the upward journey. The results that were obtained could only have been

achieved by the whole-hearted devotion of all ranks.

Of the men in the companies on whom day after day fell the burden

of physical discomfort and mental strain it is impossible to speak

adequately. The record of their achievements speaks, and can be left to

speak, for itself.

The decorations awarded for services rendered between the 1st July and

the 7th October were:

M.C.--Lieut. W. J. Boutall, 2/Lieuts. O. D. Garratt, S. J.

Barkworth, M.M., E. McD. McCormick and Rev. R. Palmer,

C.F.

D.C.M.--C.S.M. R. Davis, Sergt. T. Clark, Ptes. J. O'Brien and H.

S. Payne.

M.M.--C.Q.M.-Sergt. R. Forbes, Sergts. H. C. Gearle, H. H. Merrell,

R. Hebberd, R. R. L. Hyde, C. James and T. Lock, Corpl.

J. Castle, L.-Corpls. H. Whitehead, A. Sergeant, A. J.

Moger and L. R. Webb, Ptes. H. E. Hyde, W. Buckingham,

A. E. Colvin, F. Hedger, W. Lawrence and C. F. Collins.