THE TIDE TURNED.
Military Successes--Favorable Elections--Emancipation Policy--
Letter to Manchester (England) Workingmen--Proclamation for a
National Fast--Letter to Erastus Corning--Letter to a Committee
on recalling Vallandigham.
It had been decreed by a kind Providence that the year 1863 was to mark
a turn in the almost unbroken line of reverses which the Union army had
experienced for some time previous.
True, Hooker, who had superseded Burnside in command of the Army of
the Potomac, had been signally repulsed at Chancellorsville; but this
was more than compensated by the decided victory achieved by the same
troops, under Meade, over the rebels at Gettysburg. Grant, by the
capture of Vicksburg, and the surrender of Port Hudson, which was
the inevitable result, had opened the Mississippi to the Gulf, and
completely severed the bastard confederacy. We moreover secured East
Tennessee, and by the victories of Lookout Mountain and Missionary
Ridge, and the repulse of a rebel attempt to retake Knoxville, paved
the way for an offensive movement into the vitals of Georgia.
The sober, second thought of the people was manifest. Vallandigham in
Ohio, who for his treasonable practices had been tried by Burnside’s
order, convicted, and ordered South to his friends, but who had been
suffered to return _via_ Canada, and was put forward as the exponent
of “Democracy” in Ohio, was shelved by some one hundred thousand
majority. Pennsylvania, likewise, more than redeemed herself. In fact
every loyal State--except New Jersey--showed decided majorities for the
Administration.
In this election, be it remembered, the emancipation policy of the
President had entered largely as an element of discussion; and the
results were the more gratifying as it established conclusively, that
however unfavorable early indications might have been, the great pulse
of the people beat in unison with freedom for man as man. If in a
contest like that in which the nation was then engaged, all merely
mercenary considerations could be overlooked, deep-rooted prejudices
mastered, and long withheld rights cheerfully granted, there would be,
indeed, strong grounds to hope for the progress of our race.
At the beginning of the year, the President received a gratifying
evidence of the appreciation in which his efforts for freedom were
held, in a testimonial of sympathy and confidence from the workingmen
of Manchester, England; to which address he made the following reply:
“_Executive Mansion_, Washington, January 19, 1863.
“TO THE WORKINGMEN OF MANCHESTER:--I have the honor to acknowledge
the receipt of the address and resolutions which you sent me on the
eve of the new year.
“When I came, on the 4th of March, 1861, through a free and
constitutional election, to preside in the Government of the United
States, the country was found at the verge of civil war. Whatever
might have been the cause, or whosesoever the fault, one duty,
paramount to all others, was before me, namely, to maintain and
preserve at once the Constitution and the integrity of the Federal
Republic. A conscientious purpose to perform this duty is the key
to all the measures of administration which have been, and to all
which will hereafter be pursued. Under our frame of government and
my official oath, I could not depart from this purpose if I would.
It is not always in the power of governments to enlarge or restrict
the scope of moral results which follow the policies that they may
deem it necessary, for the public safety, from time to time to
adopt.
“I have understood well that the duty of self-preservation rests
solely with the American people. But I have, at the same time, been
aware that the favor or disfavor of foreign nations might have a
material influence in enlarging and prolonging the struggle with
disloyal men in which the country is engaged. A fair examination of
history has seemed to authorize a belief that the past action and
influences of the United States were generally regarded as having
been beneficial toward mankind. I have, therefore, reckoned upon
the forbearance of nations. Circumstances--to some of which you
kindly allude--induced me especially to expect that, if justice and
good faith should be practised by the United States, they would
encounter no hostile influence on the part of Great Britain. It
is now a pleasant duty to acknowledge the demonstration you have
given of your desire that a spirit of peace and amity toward this
country may prevail in the councils of your Queen, who is respected
and esteemed in your own country only more than she is by the
kindred nation which has its home on this side of the Atlantic.
“I know, and deeply deplore, the sufferings which the workingmen at
Manchester, and in all Europe, are called to endure in this crisis.
It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to
overthrow this Government, which was built upon the foundation
of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest
exclusively on the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain
the favor of Europe. Through the action of our disloyal citizens,
the workingmen of Europe have been subjected to severe trial, for
the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under these
circumstances, I can not but regard your decisive utterances upon
the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism, which has
not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an
energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth,
and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity and
freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will
be sustained by your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have
no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration,
esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the
American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore,
as an augury that, whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune
may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which
now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire
to make them, perpetual.
“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”
On the 30th of March the following proclamation was issued in pursuance
of a request to that effect from the Senate:
“WHEREAS, The Senate of the United States, devoutly recognizing
the supreme authority and just government of Almighty God in all
the affairs of men and of nations, has by a resolution requested
the President to designate and set apart a day for National prayer
and humiliation;
“AND WHEREAS, It is the duty of nations, as well as of men, to own
their dependence upon the overruling power of God, to confess their
sins and transgressions in humble sorrow yet with assured hope that
genuine repentance will lead to mercy and pardon, and to recognize
the sublime truth announced in the Holy Scriptures, and proven by
all history, that those nations only are blessed whose God is the
Lord;
“And, insomuch as we know that, by His Divine law, nations, like
individuals, are subjected to punishments and chastisements in this
world, may we not justly fear that the awful calamity of civil war,
which now desolates the land, may be but a punishment inflicted
upon us for our presumptuous sins, to the needful end of our
National reformation as a whole people? We have been the recipients
of the choicest bounties of Heaven. We have been preserved, these
many years, in peace and prosperity. We have grown in numbers,
wealth and power, as no other nation has ever grown. But we have
forgotten God. We have forgotten the gracious hand which preserved
us in peace, and multiplied and enriched and strengthened us;
and we have vainly imagined, in the deceitfulness of our hearts,
that all these blessings were produced by some superior wisdom
and virtue of our own. Intoxicated with unbroken success, we have
become too self-sufficient to feel the necessity of redeeming and
preserving grace, too proud to pray to the God that made us!
“It behooves us, then, to humble ourselves before the offended
Power, to confess our National sins, and to pray for clemency and
forgiveness.
“Now, therefore, in compliance with the request, and fully
concurring in the views of the Senate, I do, by this my
proclamation, designate and set apart Thursday, the thirteenth
day of April, 1863, as a day of National humiliation, fasting
and prayer. And I do hereby request all the people to abstain on
that day from their ordinary secular pursuits, and to unite, at
their several places of public worship and their respective homes,
in keeping the day holy to the Lord, and devoted to the humble
discharge of the religious duties proper to that solemn occasion.
“All this being done in sincerity and truth, let us then rest
humbly in the hope, authorized by the Divine teachings, that the
united cry of the Nation will be heard on high, and answered with
blessings, no less than the pardon of our National sins, and
restoration of our now divided and suffering country to its former
happy condition of unity and peace.
“In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the
seal of the United States to be affixed.
“Done at the City of Washington, on this thirtieth day of March, in
the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and sixty-three,
and of the Independence of the United States the eighty-seventh.
“By the President: ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
“WILLIAM H. SEWARD, Secretary of State.”
The following letter, which belongs in this place, will explain itself:
“_Executive Mansion_, Washington, June 13th, 1863.
“HON. ERASTUS CORNING and others--_Gentlemen_:--Your letter of May
19th, inclosing the resolutions of a public meeting held at Albany,
New York, on the 16th of the same month, was received several days
ago.
“The resolutions, as I understand them, are resolvable into two
propositions--first, the expression of a purpose to sustain the
cause of the Union, to secure peace through victory, and to support
the Administration in every constitutional and lawful measure to
suppress the rebellion; and, secondly, a declaration of censure
upon the Administration for supposed unconstitutional action, such
as the making of military arrests. And from the two propositions
a third is deduced, which is, that the gentlemen composing the
meeting are resolved on doing their part to maintain our common
Government and country, despite the folly or wickedness, as they
may conceive, of any Administration. This position is eminently
patriotic, and as such I thank the meeting and congratulate the
nation for it. My own purpose is the same; so that the meeting and
myself have a common object, and can have no difference, except in
the choice of means or measures for effecting that object.
“And here I ought to close this paper, and would close it, if
there were no apprehension that more injurious consequences
than any merely personal to myself might follow the censures
systematically cast upon me for doing what, in my view of duty, I
could not forbear. The resolutions promise to support me in every
constitutional and lawful measure to suppress the rebellion, and
I have not knowingly employed, nor shall knowingly employ, any
other. But the meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that
certain military arrests and proceedings following them, for which
I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are
not. The resolutions quote from the Constitution the definition of
treason, and also the limiting safeguards and guaranties therein
provided for the citizen on trial for treason, and on his being
held to answer for capital, or otherwise infamous crimes; and in
criminal prosecutions, his right to a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury. They proceed to resolve, ‘that these safeguards
of the rights of the citizen against the pretensions of arbitrary
power were intended more _especially_ for his protection in times
of civil commotion.’
“And, apparently to demonstrate the proposition, the resolutions
proceed: ‘They were secured substantially to the English people
_after_ years of protracted civil war, and were adopted into our
Constitution at the _close_ of the Revolution. Would not the
demonstration have been better if it could have been truly said
that these safeguards had been adopted and applied _during_ the
civil wars and _during_ our Revolution, instead of _after_ the
one and at the _close_ of the other? I, too, am devotedly for
them _after_ civil war, and _before_ civil war, and at all times,
‘except when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety
may require’ their suspension. The resolutions proceed to tell
us that these safeguards ‘have stood the test of seventy-six
years of trial, under our republican system, under circumstances
which show that, while they constitute the foundation of all free
government, they are the elements of the enduring stability of
the Republic.’ No one denies that they have so stood the test up
to the beginning of the present rebellion, if we except a certain
occurrence at New Orleans; nor does any one question that they
will stand the same test much longer after the rebellion closes.
But these provisions of the Constitution have no application to
the case we have in hand, because the arrests complained of were
not made for treason--that is, not for _the_ treason defined in
the Constitution, and upon conviction of which the punishment is
death--nor yet were they made to hold persons to answer for any
capital or otherwise infamous crimes; nor were the proceedings
following, in any constitutional or legal sense, ‘criminal
prosecutions.’ The arrests were made on totally different grounds,
and the proceedings following accorded with the grounds of the
arrest. Let us consider the real case with which we are dealing,
and apply to it the parts of the Constitution plainly made for such
cases.
“Prior to my installation here, it had been inculcated that any
State had a lawful right to secede from the National Union, and
that it would be expedient to exercise the right whenever the
devotees of the doctrine should fail to elect a President to
their own liking. I was elected contrary to their liking, and
accordingly, so far as it was legally possible, they had taken
seven States out of the Union, and had seized many of the United
States forts, and had fired upon the United States flag, all
before I was inaugurated, and, of course, before I had done any
official act whatever. The rebellion thus began soon ran into
the present civil war; and, in certain respects, it began on
very unequal terms between the parties. The insurgents had been
preparing for it for more than thirty years, while the Government
had taken no steps to resist them. The former had carefully
considered all the means which could be turned to their account. It
undoubtedly was a well-pondered reliance with them that, in their
own unrestricted efforts to destroy Union, Constitution, and law
together, the Government would, in a great degree, be restrained
by the same Constitution and law from arresting their progress.
Their sympathizers pervaded all departments of the Government,
and nearly all communities of the people. From this material,
under cover of ‘liberty of speech,’ ‘liberty of the press,’ and
‘_habeas corpus_,’ they hoped to keep on foot among us a most
efficient corps of spies, informers, suppliers, and aiders and
abettors of their cause in a thousand ways. They knew that in times
such as they were inaugurating, by the Constitution itself, the
‘_habeas corpus_’ might be suspended; but they also knew they had
friends who would make a question as to _who_ was to suspend it;
meanwhile, their spies and others might remain at large to help on
their cause. Or if, as has happened, the Executive should suspend
the writ, without ruinous waste of time, instances of arresting
innocent persons might occur, as are always likely to occur in such
cases, and then a clamor could be raised in regard to this which
might be, at least, of some service to the insurgent cause. It
needed no very keen perception to discover this part of the enemy’s
programme, so soon as, by open hostilities, their machinery was put
fairly in motion. Yet, thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the
guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong
measures which by degrees I have been forced to regard as being
within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to
the public safety. Nothing is better known to history than that
courts of justice are utterly incompetent to such cases. Civil
courts are organized chiefly for trials of individuals, or, at
most, a few individuals acting in concert, and this in quiet times,
and on charges of crimes well defined in the law. Even in times
of peace, bands of horse-thieves and robbers frequently grow too
numerous and powerful for the ordinary courts of justice. But what
comparison, in numbers, have such bands ever borne to the insurgent
sympathizers even in many of the loyal States? Again, a jury too
frequently has at least one member more ready to hang the panel,
than to hang the traitor. And yet, again he who dissuades one man
from volunteering, or induces one soldier to desert, weakens the
Union cause as much as he who kills a Union soldier in battle.
Yet this dissuasion or inducement may be so conducted as to be no
defined crime of which any civil court would take cognizance.
“Ours is a case of rebellion--so called by the resolution before
me--in fact, a clear, flagrant, and gigantic case of rebellion; and
the provision of the Constitution that ‘the privilege of the writ
of _habeas corpus_ shall not be suspended unless when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it,’ is
_the_ provision which specially applies to our present case. This
provision plainly attests the understanding of those who made the
Constitution, that ordinary courts of justice are inadequate to
‘cases of rebellion’--attests their purpose that, in such cases,
men may be held in custody whom the courts, acting on ordinary
rules, would discharge. _Habeas corpus_ does not discharge men who
are proved to be guilty of defined crime; and its suspension is
allowed by the Constitution on purpose that men may be arrested and
held who can not be proved to be guilty of defined crime, ‘when,
in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require
it.’ This is precisely our present case--a case of rebellion,
wherein the public safety _does_ require the suspension. Indeed,
arrests by process of courts, and arrests in cases of rebellion, do
not proceed altogether upon the same basis. The former is directed
at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration
of crime; while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive
uprisings against the Government, which at most will succeed or
fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are
made, not so much for what has been done as for what probably would
be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the
vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are
much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The
man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government
is discussed, can not be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure
to help the enemy; much more, if he talks ambiguously--talks for
his country with ‘buts,’ and ‘ifs’ and ‘ands.’ Of how little value
the constitutional provisions I have quoted will be rendered, if
arrests shall never be made until defined crimes shall have been
committed, may be illustrated by a few notable examples. General
John C. Breckinridge, General Robert E. Lee, General Joseph E.
Johnston, General John B. Magruder, General William B. Preston,
General Simon B. Buckner, and Commodore Franklin Buchanan, now
occupying the very highest places in the rebel war service,
were all within the power of the Government since the rebellion
began, and were nearly as well known to be traitors then as now.
Unquestionably, if we had seized and held them, the insurgent
cause would be much weaker. But no one of them had then committed
any crime defined by law. Every one of them, if arrested, would
have been discharged on _habeas corpus_, were the writ allowed to
operate. In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not
unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few
arrests rather than too many.
“By the third resolution, the meeting indicate their opinion
that military arrests may be constitutional in localities
where rebellion actually exists, but that such arrests are
unconstitutional in localities where rebellion or insurrection does
_not_ actually exist. They insist that such arrests shall not be
made ‘outside of the lines of necessary military occupation and the
scenes of insurrection.’ Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution
itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there
_is_ any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class
of arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases
of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and
I insist that in such cases they are Constitutional _wherever_ the
public safety does require them; as well in places to which they
may prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it may be
already prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous
interference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress
the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well
where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where
they would prevent mutiny in the army; equally constitutional
at all places where they will conduce to the public safety, as
against the dangers of rebellion or invasion. Take the particular
case mentioned by the meeting. It is asserted, in substance, that
Mr. Vallandigham was, by a military commander, seized and tried
‘for no other reason than words addressed to a public meeting, in
criticism of the course of the Administration, and in condemnation
of the military orders of the general.’ Now, if there be no mistake
about this; if this assertion is the truth and the whole truth;
if there was no other reason for the arrest, then I concede that
the arrest was wrong. But the arrest, as I understand, was made
for a very different reason. Mr. Vallandigham avows his hostility
to the war on the part of the Union; and his arrest was made
because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising
of troops; to encourage desertion from the army, and to leave the
rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He
was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects
of the Administration, or the personal interests of the commanding
general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence
and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring
upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional
jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not
damaging the military power of the country, then this arrest was
made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on
reasonably satisfactory evidence.
“I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be
in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force--by armies.
Long experience has shown that armies cannot be maintained unless
desertions shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The
case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this
punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts,
while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to
desert? This is none the less injurious when effected by getting
a father, or brother, or friend, into a public meeting, and there
working upon his feelings till he is persuaded to write the soldier
boy that he is fighting in a bad cause, for a wicked Administration
of a contemptible Government, too weak to arrest and punish him
if he shall desert. I think that in such a case to silence the
agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but withal a
great mercy.
“If I be wrong on this question of constitutional power, my error
lies in believing that certain proceedings are constitutional when,
in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires them,
which would not be constitutional when, in the absence of rebellion
or invasion, the public safety does _not_ require them; in other
words, that the Constitution is not, in its application, in all
respects the same--in cases of rebellion or invasion involving
the public safety, as it is in time of profound peace and public
security. The Constitution itself makes the distinction; and I can
no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take
no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown
that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than
I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine
for a sick man, because it can be shown not to be good food for a
well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by
the meeting, that the American people will, by means of military
arrests during the rebellion, lose the right of public discussion,
the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial
by jury, and _habeas corpus_, throughout the indefinite peaceful
future, which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able
to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for
emetics, during temporary illness, as to persist in feeding upon
them during the remainder of his healthful life.
“In giving the resolutions that earnest consideration which you
request of me, I can not overlook the fact that the meeting speak
as ‘Democrats.’ Nor can I, with full respect for their known
intelligence, and the fairly presumed deliberation with which
they prepared their resolutions, be permitted to suppose that
this occurred by accident, or in any way other than that they
preferred to designate themselves ‘Democrats’ rather than ‘American
Citizens.’ In this time of National peril, I would have preferred
to meet you on a level one step higher than any party platform;
because I am sure that, from such more elevated position, we could
do better battle for the country we all love than we possibly
can from those lower ones where, from the force of habit, the
prejudices of the past, and selfish hopes of the future, we are
sure to expend much of our ingenuity and strength in finding fault
with and aiming blows at each other. But, since you have denied
me this, I will yet be thankful for the country’s sake, that not
all Democrats have done so. He on whose discretionary judgment
Mr. Vallandigham was arrested and tried is a Democrat, having
no old party affinity with me; and the judge who rejected the
constitutional view expressed in these resolutions, by refusing to
discharge Mr. Vallandigham on _habeas corpus_, is a Democrat of
better days than these, having received his judicial mantle at the
hands of President Jackson. And still more, of all those Democrats
who are nobly exposing their lives and shedding their blood on the
battle-field, I have learned that many approve the course taken
with Mr. Vallandigham, while I have not heard of a single one
condemning it. I can not assert that there are none such.
“And the name of Jackson recalls an incident of pertinent history:
After the battle of New Orleans, and while the fact that the treaty
of peace had been concluded was well known in the city, but before
official knowledge of it had arrived, Gen. Jackson still maintained
martial or military law. Now that it could be said the war was
over, the clamor against martial law, which had existed from the
first, grew more furious. Among other things, a Mr. Louiallier
published a denunciatory newspaper article. Gen. Jackson arrested
him. A lawyer by the name of Morrel procured the United States
Judge Hall to issue a writ of _habeas corpus_ to relieve Mr.
Louiallier. Gen. Jackson arrested both the lawyer and the judge. A
Mr. Hollander ventured to say of some part of the matter that ‘it
was a dirty trick.’ Gen. Jackson arrested him. When the officer
undertook to serve the writ of _habeas corpus_, Gen. Jackson took
it from him, and sent him away with a copy. Holding the judge in
custody a few days, the general sent him beyond the limits of his
encampment, and set him at liberty, with an order to remain till
the ratification of peace should be regularly announced, or until
the British should have left the Southern coast. A day or two more
elapsed, the ratification of a treaty of peace was regularly
announced, and the judge and others were fully liberated. A few
days more, and the judge called Gen. Jackson into court and fined
him $1,000 for having arrested him and the others named. The
general paid the fine, and there the matter rested for nearly
thirty years, when Congress refunded principal and interest. The
late Senator Douglas, then in the House of Representatives, took a
leading part in the debates, in which the constitutional question
was much discussed. I am not prepared to say whom the journals
would show to have voted for the measure.
“It may be remarked: First, that we had the same Constitution then
as now; secondly, that we then had a case of invasion, and now we
have a case of rebellion; and, thirdly, that the permanent right
of the people to public discussion, the liberty of speech and of
the press, the trial by jury, the law of evidence, and the _habeas
corpus_, suffered no detriment whatever by that conduct of Gen.
Jackson, or its subsequent approval by the American Congress.
“And yet, let me say that, in my own discretion, I do not know
whether I would have ordered the arrest of Mr. Vallandigham. While
I can not shift the responsibility from myself, I hold that, as a
general rule, the commander in the field is the better judge of
the necessity in any particular case. Of course, I must practise a
general directory and revisory power in the matter.
“One of the resolutions expresses the opinion of the meeting that
arbitrary arrests will have the effect to divide and distract
those who should be united in suppressing the rebellion, and I am
specifically called on to discharge Mr. Vallandigham. I regard this
as, at least, a fair appeal to me on the expediency of exercising
a constitutional power which I think exists. In response to such
appeal, I have to say, it gave me pain when I learned that Mr.
Vallandigham had been arrested--that is, I was pained that there
should have seemed to be a necessity for arresting him--and that
it will afford me great pleasure to discharge him so soon as I
can, by any means, believe the public safety will not suffer by
it. I further say that, as the war progresses, it appears to me,
opinion and action which were in great confusion at first, take
shape and fall into more regular channels, so that the necessity
for strong dealing with them gradually decreases. I have every
reason to desire that it should cease altogether; and far from
the least is my regard for the opinions and wishes of those who,
like the meeting at Albany, declare their purpose to sustain the
Government in every constitutional and lawful measure to suppress
the rebellion. Still, I must continue to do so much as may seem to
be required by the public safety.
“A. LINCOLN.”
Mr. Lincoln, having been waited upon by a Committee of Ohio
“Democrats,” who urged him to recall Vallandigham, whom they sought to
exalt as a “martyr to popular rights,” addressed the following reply,
the quiet sarcasm of which is not the least of its many good points:
“Washington, June 29, 1863.
“GENTLEMEN:--The resolutions of the Ohio Democratic State
Convention, which you present me, together with your introductory
and closing remarks, being, in position and argument, mainly the
same as the resolutions of the Democratic meeting at Albany, New
York, I refer you to my response to the latter as meeting most of
the points in the former.
“This response you evidently used in preparing your remarks, and
I desire no more than that it be used with accuracy. In a single
reading of your remarks, I only discovered one inaccuracy in
matter which I suppose you took from that paper. It is where you
say, ‘The undersigned are unable to agree with you in the opinion
you have expressed that the Constitution is different in time of
insurrection or invasion from what it is in time of peace and
public security.’
“A recurrence to the paper will show you that I have not
expressed the opinion you suppose. I expressed the opinion that
the Constitution is different _in its application_ in cases of
rebellion or invasion involving the public safety, from what it is
in times of profound peace and public security. And this opinion I
adhere to, simply because, by the Constitution itself, things may
be done in the one case which may not be done in the other.
“I dislike to waste a word on a merely personal point, but I must
respectfully assure you that you will find yourselves at fault
should you ever seek for evidence to prove your assumption that
I ‘opposed, in discussions before the people, the policy of the
Mexican War.’
“You say: ‘Expunge from the Constitution this limitation upon the
power of Congress to suspend the writ of _habeas corpus_, and yet
the other guaranties of personal liberty would remain unchanged.’
Doubtless, if this clause of the Constitution, improperly called,
as I think, a limitation upon the power of Congress, were expunged,
the other guaranties would remain the same; but the question is,
not how those guaranties would stand with that clause _out_ of the
Constitution, but how they stand with that clause remaining in it,
in case of rebellion or invasion involving the public safety. If
the liberty could be indulged in expunging that clause, letter and
spirit, I really think the constitutional argument would be with
you.
“My general view on this question was stated in the Albany
response, and hence I do not state it now. I only add that, as
seems to me, the benefit of the writ of _habeas corpus_ is the
great means through which the guaranties of personal liberty are
conserved and made available in the last resort; and corroborative
of this view is the fact that Mr. Vallandigham, in the very case in
question, under the advice of able lawyers, saw not where else to
go but to the _habeas corpus_. But by the Constitution the benefit
of the writ of _habeas corpus_ itself may be suspended, when, in
case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.
“You ask, in substance, whether I really claim that I may
override all the guaranteed rights of individuals, on the plea of
conserving the public safety--when I may choose to say the public
safety requires it. This question, divested of the phraseology
calculated to represent me as struggling for an arbitrary personal
prerogative, is either simply a question _who_ shall decide, or
an affirmation that _nobody_ shall decide, what the public safety
does require in cases of rebellion or invasion. The Constitution
contemplates the question as likely to occur for decision, but
it does not expressly declare who is to decide it. By necessary
implication, when rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is
to be made from time to time; and I think the man whom, for
the time, the people have, under the Constitution, made their
Commander-in-chief of the Army and Navy, is the man who holds the
power and bears the responsibility of making it. If he uses the
power justly, the same people will probably justify him; if he
abuses it, he is in their hands, to be dealt with by all the modes
they have reserved to themselves in the Constitution.
“The earnestness with which you insist that persons can only, in
times of rebellion, be lawfully dealt with in accordance with
the rules for criminal trials and punishments in times of peace,
induces me to add a word to what I said on that point in the Albany
response. You claim that men may, if they choose, embarrass those
whose duty it is to combat a giant rebellion, and then be dealt
with only in turn as if there were no rebellion. The Constitution
itself rejects this view. The military arrests and detentions
which have been made, including those of Mr. Vallandigham,
which are not different in principle from the other, have been
for _prevention_, and not for _punishment_--as injunctions to
stay injury, as proceedings to keep the peace--and hence, like
proceedings in such cases and for like reasons, they have not been
accompanied with indictments, or trial by juries, nor in a single
case by any punishment whatever beyond what is purely incidental
to the prevention. The original sentence of imprisonment in Mr.
Vallandigham’s case was to prevent injury to the military service
only, and the modification of it was made as a less disagreeable
mode to him of securing the same prevention.
“I am unable to perceive an insult to Ohio in the case of Mr.
Vallandigham. Quite surely nothing of this sort was or is intended.
I was wholly unaware that Mr. Vallandigham was, at the time of his
arrest, a candidate for the Democratic nomination for Governor,
until so informed by your reading to me the resolutions of the
convention. I am grateful to the State of Ohio for many things,
especially for the brave soldiers and officers she has given, in
the present national trial, to the armies of the Union.
“You claim, as I understand, that, according to my own position in
the Albany response, Mr. Vallandigham should be released; and this
because, as you claim, he has not damaged the military service by
discouraging enlistments, encouraging desertions, or otherwise;
and that if he had, he should have been turned over to the civil
authorities under the recent Act of Congress. I certainly do
not _know_ that Mr. Vallandigham has specifically and by direct
language advised against enlistments and in favor of desertions and
resistance to drafting. We all know that combinations, armed, in
some instances, to resist the arrest of deserters, began several
months ago; that more recently the like has appeared in resistance
to the enrollment preparatory to a draft; and that quite a number
of assassinations have occurred from the same _animus_. These had
to be met by military force, and this again has led to bloodshed
and death. And now, under a sense of responsibility more weighty
and enduring than any which is merely official, I solemnly declare
my belief that this hindrance of the military, including maiming
and murder, is due to the cause in which Mr. Vallandigham has been
engaged, in a greater degree than to any other cause; and it is
due to him personally in a greater degree than to any other one man.
“These things have been notorious, known to all, and of course
known to Mr. Vallandigham. Perhaps I would not be wrong to say
they originated with his especial friends and adherents. With
perfect knowledge of them he has frequently, if not constantly,
made speeches in Congress and before popular assemblies; and if it
can be shown that, with these things staring him in the face, he
has ever uttered a word of rebuke or counsel against them, it will
be a fact greatly in his favor with me, and one of which, as yet,
I am totally ignorant. When it is known that the whole burden of
his speeches has been to stir up men against the prosecution of
the war, and that in the midst of resistance to it he has not been
known in any instance to counsel against such resistance, it is
next to impossible to repel the inference that he has counselled
directly in favor of it.
“With all this before their eyes, the convention you represent have
nominated Mr. Vallandigham for Governor of Ohio, and both they and
you have declared the purpose to sustain the National Union by all
constitutional means; but, of course, they and you, in common,
reserve to yourselves to decide what are constitutional means, and,
unlike the Albany meeting, you omit to state or intimate that, in
your opinion, an army is a constitutional means of saving the Union
against a rebellion, or even to intimate that you are conscious
of an existing rebellion being in progress with the avowed object
of destroying that very Union. At the same time, your nominee for
Governor, in whose behalf you appeal, is known to you, and to
the world, to declare against the use of an army to suppress the
rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion,
resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who
incline to desert and to escape the draft, to believe it is your
purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong
enough to do so.
“After a personal intercourse with you, gentlemen of the Committee,
I can not say I think you desire this effect to follow your
attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the
Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and by
consequence, a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope,
and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way
exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter, in order
that you, or a majority of you, may, if you choose, indorse your
names upon one of them, and return it thus indorsed to me, with
the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the
following propositions, and to nothing else:
“1. That there is now a rebellion in the United States, the object
and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that,
in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for
suppressing that rebellion.
“2. That no one of you will do any thing which, in his own
judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease,
or lessen the efficiency of the Army and Navy, while engaged in the
effort to suppress that rebellion; and--
“3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the
officers, soldiers, and seamen of the Army and Navy, while engaged
in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and
otherwise well provided and supported.
“And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter
and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which
publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in
relation to Mr. Vallandigham.
“It will not escape observation that I consent to the release of
Mr. Vallandigham upon terms not embracing any pledge from him or
from others as to what he will or will not do. I do this because
he is not present to speak for himself, or to authorize others to
speak for him; and hence I shall expect that on returning he would
not put himself practically in antagonism with the position of his
friends. But I do it chiefly because I thereby prevail on other
influential gentlemen of Ohio to so define their position as to be
of immense value to the army--thus more than compensating for the
consequences of any mistake in allowing Mr. Vallandigham to return,
so that, on the whole, the public safety will not have suffered by
it. Still, in regard to Mr. Vallandigham and all others, I must
hereafter, as heretofore, do so much as the public service may seem
to require.
“I have the honor to be respectfully, yours, etc.,
“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”