THE PENINSULAR CAMPAIGN.
President’s War Order--Reason for the same--Results in West and
South-west--Army of the Potomac--Presidential Orders--Letter
to McClellan--Order for Army Corps--The Issue of the Campaign--
Unfortunate Circumstances--President’s Speech at Union Meeting--
Comments--Operations in Virginia and Maryland--In the West and
South-west.
Early in 1862 appeared the following:
“_Executive Mansion, Washington_, January 27th, 1862.
[President’s General War Order, No. 1.]
“ORDERED, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a
general movement of the land and naval forces of the United States
against the insurgent forces.
“That especially the Army at and about Fortress Monroe, the Army
of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the Army near
Mumfordsville, Kentucky, the Army and Flotilla at Cairo, and a
Naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready for a movement on that
day.
“That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective
commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey
additional orders when duly given.
“That the Heads of Departments, and especially the Secretaries
of War and of the Navy, with all their subordinates, and the
General-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of
land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and
full responsibilities for the prompt execution of this order.
“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”
In thus resuming whatever of his constitutional duties as
Commander-in-chief of the army and navy might have been temporarily
devolved upon others, and directing immediate and energetic aggressive
measures, the President only acted as the exponent of the popular
feeling, which had become manifest, of dissatisfaction at the
apparently inexcusable want of action in military affairs.
In the West and South-west followed the successful battle at Mill
Spring, Kentucky; the capture of Forts Henry and Donelson, compelling
the evacuation of Nashville, and ridding Kentucky of any organized
rebel force; the hardly contested, but successful battle of Pea Ridge,
Arkansas, relieving Missouri, in a great degree; victory for our arms
wrested from the jaws of defeat at Shiloh; and the occupation of New
Orleans, giving control of the Mouth of the Mississippi.
What at the East?--Roanoke Island.
Touching the movements of the Army of the Potomac, to which the country
looked so expectantly for grand results, efficiently officered,
thoroughly disciplined, and splendidly equipped as it was known or
supposed to be, the first difficulty was to fix upon a plan. For the
purpose of leading the attention of its General to something like a
definite decision however, the order of January 27th was succeeded by
the following:
“_Executive Mansion, Washington_, January 31st, 1862.
“ORDERED, That all the disposable force of the Army of the
Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of Washington, be
formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and
occupying a point upon the railroad south-westward of what is known
as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the
Commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before, or on the
twenty-second day of February next.
“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.”
General McClellan objecting to this movement and earnestly urging a
plan of advance upon Richmond by the Lower Rappahannock with Urbana as
a base, the President addressed him the following letter:
“_Executive Mansion, Washington_, February 3d, 1862.
“MY DEAR SIR:--You and I have distinct and different plans for
a movement of the Army of the Potomac; yours to be done by the
Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the
terminus of the railroad on the York river; mine to move directly
to a point on the railroad south-west of Manassas.
“If you will give satisfactory answers to the following questions,
I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:
“First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of
_time_ and _money_ than mine?
“Second. Wherein is a victory _more certain_ by your plan than mine?
“Third. Wherein is a victory _more valuable_ by your plan than mine?
“Fourth. In fact, would it not be _less_ valuable in this that it
would break no great line of the enemy’s communications, while mine
would?
“Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult
by your plan than mine?
“Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN.
“MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN.”
Which plain, practical questions were never directly answered.
This army being without any organization into Army Corps, the
President, on the 8th of March, as a movement was about to be made
toward Manassas, issued a peremptory order to the Commanding General
to attend forthwith to such organization, naming the Corps and their
Commanders, according to seniority of rank.
On the same day, the President, who had, against his own judgment,
yielded the plan for an advance upon Richmond which should at the same
time cover Washington, wise through experience, issued the following:
“_Executive Mansion, Washington_, March 8th, 1862.
“ORDERED. That no change of the base of operations of the Army of
the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington
such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-chief and the
commanders of Army Corps, shall leave said city entirely secure.
“That no more than two Army Corps (about fifty thousand troops) of
said Army of the Potomac shall be moved _en route_ for a new base
of operations until the navigation of the Potomac, from Washington
to the Chesapeake Bay, shall be freed from the enemy’s batteries,
and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give
express permission.
“That any movement as aforesaid, _en route_ for a new base of
operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-chief, and
which may be intended to move upon Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to
move upon the bay as early as the 18th of March, instant, and the
General-in-chief shall be responsible that it moves as early as
that day.
“ORDERED, That the Army and Navy coöperate in an immediate
effort to capture the enemy’s batteries upon the Potomac between
Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.
“ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
“L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.”
Finally--after delays manifold, correspondence voluminous, discussions
heated, and patience nearly worn threadbare--commenced that military
movement, which has passed into history as the American Peninsular
Campaign; by virtue of which, commencing about the middle of March,
1862, a large body of finely disciplined troops--their numbers varying,
according to various accounts, from one hundred thousand nine hundred
and seventy, to one hundred and twenty-one thousand five hundred
men--left Alexandria for Richmond, _via_ Yorktown, and succeeded, after
sanguinary battles, swamp sickness, severe exposures, and terrible
hardships, in returning (how many of them?) to Alexandria _via_
Harrison’s Landing, by about the middle of August, 1862.
That campaign was the most disastrous drawback of the war, not merely
in the loss of men, nor in the failure to reach the end aimed at, but
mainly in its enervating effect upon the supporters of the Government.
It was Bull Run over again, only immensely magnified, indefinitely
prolonged. Fortune seemed determined never to favor our Eastern braves.
Into the details of that campaign it is needless to enter here. Every
schoolboy knows them by heart, so far as they are spread upon the
record. Equally idle is it to attempt a criticism upon the campaign in
a military point of view. That has been already done to a nauseating
extent; yet will, doubtless, continue to be done while the reader lives.
No details, nor military criticism therefore here. But that President
Lincoln may fairly be presented in his relations to this campaign,
certain observations must be made. And this is the place to make them.
Conceding to General McClellan all the ability, patriotism, and bravery
which have been claimed for him by his warmest admirers, there still
remain some unfortunate circumstances connected with him, by reason of
which--even though he, personally, were responsible for no single one
of them--not all the ability, patriotism, and bravery of a Napoleon,
Tell, and Bayard combined, could have secured in his person what this
country needed for the rooting out of the great rebellion.
It was unfortunate for him that, at the very outset--when so little was
known of him, when he had done so little--sycophantic flatterers should
have exalted him at once into a great military chieftain. Peculiarly
unfortunate was this, considering that the changeable American people
were to pass upon him and his actions--that people, in their relations
to their leading men, with their “Hosannas” to-day and their “Crucify
him’s” to-morrow. The sequel of “going up like a rocket” is not
generally supposed to be particularly agreeable.
It was unfortunate for him that the opinion obtained, in the minds of
many, impartial and competent to judge, that, in his case, caution had
passed the bounds of prudence and run mad. There are emergencies when
every thing must be risked that nothing be lost.
It was unfortunate for him that he was made the especial pet of those
individuals who were most clamorous against an Administration which,
whatever its short comings, every candid man knew was earnestly intent
upon ending the war upon such a basis as could alone, in its judgment,
secure permanent peace. If a subordinate general could not agree with
his superiors, or content himself with matters purely military, he
should have declined to remain in the service.
It was unfortunate for him that his especial friends sought, in print,
and public speech, and private conversation, to create the impression
that the President did not desire that he should succeed, owing
to a fear that he might prove a formidable competitor at the next
Presidential election. Peculiarly unfortunate, when one remembers that
this President had, at the outbreak of the war, put at the head of
three important military departments three of the most decided of his
political opponents--Patterson, Butler, and McClellan--that no man ever
occupied the Presidential chair, unless it be its first occupant, who
had less selfishness and more disinterestedness in his composition than
President Lincoln.
It was unfortunate for him that such desperate efforts were made by
his supporters to fasten the responsibility for admitted failures upon
other parties. This began at Ball’s Bluff, as has already been noted.
The Secretary of War was dragged in, as well as the President, in
connection with the Peninsular Campaign. As to this last, nothing more
to the point can be adduced than the words of a man, whose honesty and
truthfulness were known wherever he was known--Abraham Lincoln--in a
characteristic speech made by him at a Union meeting in Washington,
August 6th, 1862, when the issue of the campaign was certain:
“FELLOW-CITIZENS:--I believe there is no precedent for my appearing
before you on this occasion; but it is also true that there is
no precedent for your being here yourselves, and I offer, in
justification of myself and of you, that, upon examination, I have
found nothing in the Constitution against it. I, however, have an
impression that there are younger gentlemen who will entertain you
better, and better address your understanding than I will or could,
and therefore I propose but to detain you a moment longer.
“I am very little inclined on any occasion to say any thing unless
I hope to produce some good by it. The only thing I think of just
now not likely to be better said by some one else is a matter
in which we have heard some other persons blamed for what I did
myself. There has been a very widespread attempt to have a quarrel
between General McClellan and the Secretary of War. Now, I occupy
a position that enables me to observe, that at least these two
gentlemen are not nearly so deep in the quarrel as some pretending
to be their friends. General McClellan’s attitude is such that,
in the very selfishness of his nature, he cannot but wish to be
successful, and I hope he will--and the Secretary of War is in
precisely the same situation. If the military commanders in the
field cannot be successful, not only the Secretary of War, but
myself, for the time being the master of them both, can not be but
failures. I know that General McClellan wishes to be successful,
and I know he does not wish it any more than the Secretary of
War for him, and both of them together no more than I wish it.
Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan
has had, and those who would disparage him say that he has had a
very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of
War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number.
The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference, and on
this occasion perhaps a wider one, between the grand total on
McClellan’s rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who
would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who
would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those at present fit
for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that
the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to
blame for asking what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of
War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I
say here, as far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no
one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation
against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand
here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has
been charged on the Secretary of War, as withholding from him. I
have talked longer than I expected to, and now I avail myself of my
privilege of saying no more.”
It was unfortunate for him that the precedents were so numerous in
American history for making a successful military man President. This
must have embarrassed him no little, and tempted him into much of that
correspondence which otherwise he would have avoided. Had it not been
for these fatal precedents, he, assuredly, would not have leisurely
seated himself at Harrison’s Landing to write to the President a
lengthy homily on affairs of State at a moment when it was doubtful
whether he would long have an army of which he could be General in
command.
Finally, it was unfortunate for him that he had not, when learning to
command, learned also to obey. This would have spared himself and the
country and the cause several entirely superfluous inflictions.
Whoever would form a correct estimate of President Lincoln’s connection
with the Peninsular campaign and its commander, must bear these facts
in mind. Aside from all considerations of a purely military nature,
they are indispensable in reaching an unbiassed decision.
What dogged the heels of the unfortunate campaign must be briefly told.
Vigorous orders from Pope, “headquarters in the saddle,” turned into
most melancholy bombast by his failure, occasioned either by want of
brains or willful lack of coöperation; a rebel invasion of Maryland;
the battle of South Mountain gained under McClellan; Antietam, not the
victory it might have been, for which a ream of reasons were given; the
withdrawal of the rebels; Government hard at work urging McClellan to
follow; supersedure of the latter by the President, who survived his
cabinet in clinging to him; appointment of Burnside, much against his
wishes; another defeat at Fredericksburg; and the Army of the Potomac
in winter-quarters again.
Such is the summary in the East for A. D. 1862.
In the West, the year closed with the opening of the battle of
Murfreesboro and Vicksburg still held out against all our attempts to
take it.