SECTION 1. That where time is not allowed, the Master Mechanic

shall cause the trip report to be returned to the engineer or

fireman sending it in, stating why the time is not allowed, as soon

as practicable.

SEC. 2. All officers, engineers and firemen will observe strict

courtesy of manners in their intercourse with each other.

_Article XX._

All road engines will be provided with cracked coal suitable for

firing, and the company shall do all outside cleaning, and where

engines are pooled, the company to do all the cleaning.

_Article XXI._

Engineers and firemen shall not be required to go out when they

need rest, and they are expected to judge for themselves whether

they need rest or not.

_Article XXII._

It is understood that there will be no more examinations or tests,

except such as are agreed upon by the General Manager and the

General Grievance Committee.

_Article XXIII._

That on the adoption of this schedule, it shall be kept posted in a

conspicuous place in all register rooms on the line of road.

All previous schedules and contracts shall be considered void.

(Signed) S. E. HOGE, _Chairman Engineers_.

J. H. MURPHY, _Chairman Firemen_.

It will readily be seen that the engineers and firemen request that the

compensation be fixed by the mile, as that is the method adopted by

nine-tenths of the railroads in the United States.

The Burlington officials have said that this compensation was sought by

the Brotherhoods without regard to other conditions or circumstances.

This position of the company will not bear inspection. For instance: in

cases of high-class runs which they have cited, taking only a few hours

for the trip, engineers and firemen have been compelled to care for

their own engines; in fact, keep up the repairs of the engine, thereby

saving to the company the cost of a hostler, and keeping the engine in

constant use without the aid of the machinist. It was not sought by the

Brotherhoods to create these high-class runs; on the contrary, the

desire was to do away with them. Article XI. of the foregoing schedule

plainly says that hostlers must be provided at terminal points, and

where absolutely necessary for the engineer and fireman to perform this

duty, that they be paid the full rate per hour. It was evidently the

desire of the men to force these so-called high-class runs off the

schedule, while the company desired to retain them. It is also seen that

while the Brotherhoods asked for compensation according to the miles

run, the trip pay could still have been continued, providing that the

company did not require them to do the work of roundhouse men and

machinists. The only question involved here is, that this company should

pay as much per trip of equal length as is paid by the other important

lines of the country. If the desire had been to pay the men honestly

and fairly, it was immaterial whether the compensation be by the trip

or mile. To illustrate: If a passenger engineer runs one hundred miles,

this schedule calls for three dollars and fifty cents. This rate is paid

by the C., R. I. & P., A., T. & S. F., Wabash, and in fact ninety per

cent. of the great railway systems in the United States. The Burlington,

not desiring to pay upon a basis that would make a fair comparison of

wages with those of other companies, abandons the mile schedule, and

simply says: "We will pay you three dollars for the trip;" in other

words, three cents per mile for the same service for which other roads

pay three and one-half cents.

It is true that the Brotherhoods have demanded in this schedule "a

considerable average increase of pay," but the public must understand

that they did not demand this increase from the Burlington over what is

paid by its competitors in business. Had the Burlington conceded this

increase of pay, it would only have been called upon to pay precisely

what its neighbors and rivals have been paying for years. A large

average increase of pay must be made before the employes of this road

are placed upon an equal footing with those of other roads. For many

years the Burlington road had the advantage of a first-class equipment

of enginemen at rates of pay far below what its competitors have been

compelled to pay for the same service.

In strict justice, these men might have demanded restitution, but they

only asked for honest treatment in the future. They did not ask for the

abolishment of classification based upon merit, age or experience. The

proposition is substantially this: If an engineer is compelled to pull

the best train on the Burlington road, he should have the best pay. It

is not material whether he has been an engineer one year or ten

years--competency alone is the requisite.

When the company places a man in charge of one of its great express

trains, and intrusts to his skill and judgment the lives and property of

its patrons, by that very act it certifies that he is a first-class

engineer, and entitled to receive pay accordingly. A first-year man is

not necessarily a man of inferior ability; the company would not risk

its own property and reputation, nor would the public risk their lives,

with third-rate men. Why, then, should the company insist on paying them

third-class wages? It is injustice, imposition, and avarice! The man who

is able to perform the work of a first-class engineer should receive

first-class pay, whatever that may be; and he is a slave who accepts

less.

On the other hand the company takes this position: It places a man in a

position which requires at his hands the skill, knowledge and ability of

a first-class engineer. The first year it pays him much less than a

first-class engineer's wages; the second year it slightly advances his

wages, but still keeps them below that of the first-class; the third

year he is paid their highest wages to an engineer (which is still less

than that paid by other roads), having done the same character and

quality of work for three years. The result is that the company is

continually gaining from the men who are in their first and second

year's service a large per cent of wages. It thus gains all the

percentages in this scheme, because a number of men who work the first

or second year do not remain long enough in the employ of this company

to be entitled to the wages that are paid to the men who have served

their third year. These first and second year men who resign to accept

better positions on other roads, enter other occupations in life, or are

crippled, killed, or discharged by the company, are replaced by other

first and second year men, and the company is thus enabled to keep a

large percentage of employes at greatly reduced rates of wages. No

objection could be offered to paying those who had been employed on the

road a long time an extra gratuity if so desired, nor could complaint be

made if, in its generosity, the company wished to pension men who had

served it faithfully a number of years; but when this gratuity (?), this

generosity (?), is only a small portion of the sum stolen from the same

employes, the men were only human and failed to appreciate the kindness

intended.

One of two things must be true: either that the engineers were

first-class men entitled to first-class pay, or that the public was

deceived when it was asked to travel upon or risk property on trains run

by second and third grade, and, consequently inferior men. The latter

could not be maintained by the company. Every General Manager in the

Western country knows that the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy road was

equipped with first-class men in these departments, second to none

anywhere. This is clearly proven by their general eagerness to

re-engage the former employes of this company. Mr. Jeffrey, General

Manager of the Illinois Central road, and Chairman of the General

Managers' Association, stated that in the future all vacancies upon his

line would be held for the ex-employes of the Burlington road. Nor is

Mr. Jeffrey an exception in this matter; the C., R. I. & P., C., S. F. &

C., C. & N.-W., C. M. & St. P., Wisconsin Central, M. & N. W., C., A. &

St. L., together with the Eastern lines, are rapidly receiving these men

into their employ.

What has been said in relation to the engineers applies also to the

firemen, because upon all the roads the fireman's wages is based upon

those of the engineer, and he receives from fifty-five to sixty per cent

of the wages that is paid to the engineer; therefore, a shaving down of

the engineer's pay means also a shaving down of the amount paid to the

fireman, so that on all sides the peculiar system adopted by the

Burlington road robs both classes and enriches its own treasury.

In the circular issued by the company it says: "The company reserves the

right to ascertain by whatever examinations it may think advisable,

whether its employes of all classes are capable of fulfilling the duties

they undertake, and the public also demand that the railroad company

shall take every precaution to employ only those men who can safely

perform the work entrusted to them." This was one of the main points at

issue. When the company had made such examinations, and found that an

engineer or fireman was capable of taking charge of an engine, and that

he was competent to fill the company's obligation to the public, what

right, in justice, had they to ask that the man accept a lower grade of

compensation? He performed the same service rendered by the older men,

or those who had been longer on the road, and, in justice, should have

received the same pay. If sent out on freight runs, he performed harder

service, and a service that required skill and judgment equal at least

to the passenger engineer, and should have been paid accordingly in

strict sense of justice and equity.

The question now arises, had these men just cause to complain? Were the

engineers and firemen of the Burlington road seeking to take any undue

advantage of that corporation? Were they as well paid as the employes of

other roads performing similar services?

We invite the attention of the public to the following comparisons:

On the "Q" road there is a round trip between Rockford and Aurora which

is made twenty-six times a month by the engineer.

On the North-Western road there is a round trip between Rockford and

Chicago which is also made twenty-six times per month.

The North-Western round trip is twenty-two miles greater than the "Q"

round trip. The North-Western engineer travels 572 miles per month more

than the "Q's" engineer.

At the rate of compensation asked by the engineers--viz: 3½ cts. per

mile--the North-Western road should only pay $20.02 per month to the

engineer on the Rockford-to-Chicago trip greater than that paid to the

"Q" engineer who runs on the Rockford-to-Aurora trip. But the fact is

that the "Q" road pays its engineer $104 per month, while the

North-Western pays its engineer $175. The "Q" engineer holds just as

responsible a position as the engineer on the North-Western. He has to

cross three intersecting roads in the making of his trip, and, in

addition to his work as an engineer, the labor of hostling or caring for

the engine is imposed upon him, while the engineer for the North-Western

is not obliged to care for his engine. The latter's work begins when he

jumps on the engine at one end of the trip, and ceases when he delivers

it at the other end.

The engineer on the Sterling Branch run draws $84.10 for ninety-eight

miles. He stops in Rock Falls six hours, and takes care of his own

engine. The engineer that runs the Batavia and Geneva accommodation

receives $87.10, and the Chicago & North-Western pays for like runs

$96.20, the distance being two miles greater on the Chicago, Burlington

& Quincy.

The reason we ask more pay for the branch runs is to compensate the men

for the extra work done on account of the engineers having to do the

work of a machinist.

The engineer on the Rockford way-freight runs nightly (twenty-six nights

constituting one month), for which he receives $56.00; fireman, $35.00

per month.

The engineers on the fast mail, Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 125 miles

per day, receive $97.50 for twenty-six days' time. The engineers on the

Chicago & North-Western, for the same service, receive $120.00.

The runs on the main line of the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy, 125 miles

per day, thirty-five days per month, amount received, $131.00. On the

trunk lines out of Chicago, for the same service, the engineers receive

$161.00.

The engineers on the Buda and Vermont Branch of the "Q" line, 188-3/10

miles per day, twenty-six days constituting one month, receive for same

$125.50. The Chicago & North-Western Railway pays for like service

$181.00.

We desire further to state that no first-class engineer on the Chicago &

North-Western receives less than $96.20 for twenty-six days' work, if

ready for duty.

The Rock Island road pays its engineers on all of its passenger trains

$3.60, and its firemen $2.15 for the 100-mile run.

The Quincy road only pays $3.50 for this same run to the engineers on a

few of its heaviest trains--like the Kansas City one--and on all other

trains it pays only $3.37½. It only pays its firemen $2.00 when with the

engineer who is paid $3.50, and $1.90 when with the engineer who

receives $3.37½.

The Rock Island road pays $4.15 for a run of one hundred miles to its

freight engineers, and does not require them to act as hostlers for

their engines.

The Quincy road pays its freight engineer on the 101-mile run from Galva

to New Boston $3.75. This run is on a branch road, and the engineer is

compelled to do hostler's duty for his engine at both ends of his run.

Let us compare two short runs: The first is on the Chicago, Milwaukee &

St. Paul road. The round trip between Chicago and Elgin is seventy-four

miles, for which the engineer is paid $3.70. The engineer has full

control of his time every second day, and has not to act as hostler for

his engine. The second is on the "Q" road. The round trip between

Chicago and Aurora is seventy-seven miles. The engineer is paid $3.35.

He has to "hostle" his engine, and his entire time belongs to the road.

Some days he has to be under the orders for eighteen hours per day.

Complaint is made in the road's circular because we asked that

"Galesburg Division engineers and firemen be not required to run east of

Aurora." The idea sought to be conveyed by the company is that this

request is unreasonable, and calculated to impose greater expense on the

road. The fact is that compliance with this request will not impose one

cent of extra expense on the road. No objection has been offered to

running the engines through from Galesburg to Chicago. The change of

crews--engineers and firemen--at Aurora will not increase the company's

outlay. There are about 300 of the engineers and firemen who live in

Aurora. Many of these men own homes; some of these homes, however, are

not entirely paid for. If they are compelled to run from Galesburg to

Chicago and return, they would have to sacrifice their property, and

remove either to Galesburg or to Chicago. They ask that the crews be

made to run on the one end of the route only from Chicago to Aurora and

return, and on the other end only from Galesburg to Aurora and return.

If we were paid on the mile system, the change of crews would not cost

the road one cent.

It is also complained that we ask that some arrangements be made in

relation to passing Brotherhood men on the "Q" trains. We make no demand

in this regard. Our purpose in making this request was to get some

uniform rule put in force on this road, the same as prevails on other

roads. We have no right to demand this. We did not demand it; our desire

was, while we were negotiating, to get this question, now unsettled, so

determined that the conductors would hereafter know precisely what to

do, and thus be able to avoid conflicts.

On the Pan Handle road the freight engineer who runs from Indianapolis

to Bradford, a distance of 105 miles, receives $4.25 for the trip; his

fireman receives $2.15.

On the "Q" road the round trip run from Galesburg to Peoria is 105

miles, for which the engineer receives $3.60 and the fireman $2.10.

From Quincy to Colchester the round trip is 107 miles. The "Q" road pays

its engineer for that trip $3.75, and its fireman $2.15.

For runs of 100 miles on the Union Pacific road the engineer on

passenger trains receives $3.85. The "Q" road is a competitor of the

Union Pacific, and for a long distance travels over parallel lines

through country of precisely the same character. Yet we have only asked

$3.50 per 100 miles for a passenger engineer on the "Q" road.

SUBMITTING THE PROPOSITIONS.

The requests of the men were met with indifference at the hands of the

Burlington officials. Not the slightest encouragement was given to the

Committees. They were given to understand, substantially, that no

concessions on the part of the company need be expected. The abominable

system of classification, the chief source of complaint, would be

continued, and the protests of the men, however emphatic or unanimous,

would not prevail.

FURTHER EFFORTS TO SECURE JUSTICE.

The Committees having exhausted every expedient to effect an amicable

adjustment, appealed to their Grand Executive Officers to come to the

rescue. Grand Chief Arthur and Grand Master Sargent responded to the

call. The Joint Committee was convened by the Grand Officers, and a

careful analysis of the grievances was made. Having satisfied themselves

that the demands of the men were reasonable and just, the Grand

Officers, accompanied by the Joint Committee, called upon the officials

of the C., B. & Q. system. A protracted interview followed, which

resulted practically in a failure, as the officials declined to accede

to a single proposition of the Committee, notwithstanding numerous

modifications were made in the interest of harmony. The interview ended

abruptly upon the declaration of General Manager Stone, that he would

not accede to any part of the proposition bearing upon classification.

In this, he was emphatic and uncompromising. This ended the conference

so far as General Manager Stone was concerned, and the Committee

respectfully withdrew.

STILL FURTHER EFFORTS IN THE INTEREST OF HARMONY AND JUSTICE.

Grand Chief Arthur and Grand Master Sargent, realizing that the

difficulty had assumed a most serious phase, decided, upon consultation,

to make a final effort to avert what now seemed inevitable--a strike. A

telegraphic dispatch was transmitted to President Perkins, at Boston,

appealing to him to do justice by his men and avert the impending

strike. His answer was evasive, indefinite, showing an utter

indifference as to what the result might be.

NEARING THE CRISIS.

Having now been cut off from every avenue leading to an honorable

adjustment of grievances, having exhausted every reasonable expedient to

prevent trouble, the Committee, with the sanction of the Grand Officers,

decided that the engineers and firemen should withdraw in a body from

the service of the company, at 4 o'clock, on Monday morning, February

27, unless some disposition was shown to remedy the grievances of the

men. On Sunday, February 26, the day previous to the inauguration of the

strike, Chairmen Hoge and Murphy called upon General Manager Stone, and

informed him of the action of the Committee, again appealing to him to

render justice to the men. The General Manager arbitrarily declined to

make any concessions, or to give the Committee any satisfaction, and

here the matter ended with the final conference, with the strike

inevitable and its consequences in full view.

THE STRIKE.

On Monday morning, the 27th instant, at 4 o'clock, the strike began, all

engineers and firemen on the entire system withdrawing from the service

of the company. All trains on the road at that hour were taken to their

terminal points. The men had exhibited throughout, patience, prudence

and forbearance, and the strike at once became monumental of an infamous

policy on the part of a rich and powerful corporation to rob its trusted

employes of money earned, that it might increase its profits, and with

equal distinctness does the strike record the fact that a great body of

workingmen sought by every honorable means to secure their rights,

preferring to suffer than to be longer degraded.

THE PRESS.

No sooner was the strike inaugurated than the press began to manipulate

public opinion. The most sensational reports were concocted and

published throughout the length and breadth of the land; and while at

the inception of the strike there seemed to be a disposition to treat

the men fairly, it was not long be fore a change of sentiment pervaded

the utterances of the press, and fair-dealing and honest criticism gave

place to the grossest misrepresentations, with the evident purpose of

arousing public opinion against the strikers, thereby making them the

victims of the corporation they were struggling against, and of which it

was the subsidized agent and representative.

When the switchmen joined the engineers and firemen, March 23, for a

short time there was a change in the tone of the press reports. They

evidently feared a repetition of the lawlessness of the strikes of 1877,

but when they found that the switchmen, too, were a law-abiding class of

men, they again acknowledged allegiance to the corporation. Reporters

were sent to the meetings of the strikers, who, believing that they

would be fairly dealt with, had appointed a Press Committee. In almost

every instance the papers failed to print the matter as given to the

reporters, and in many cases did print exactly the reverse. This Press

Committee, composed of conservative men, soon learned that the reporters

went directly from them to the Burlington officials, where the

interviews were inspected and put in proper shape to answer the purposes

of the company. An effort was then made by the Press Committee to get

their communications directly to the papers, without the use of the

reporters. In a short time this also failed. Chiefs Arthur and Sargent

and Chairmen Hoge and Murphy, at the Grand Pacific Hotel, had a similar

experience. It was impossible to get proper representation of the facts

printed. March 26 one paper accepted and printed a communication from

the Press Committee, but from that time on nothing was printed

verbatim. The article referred to is herewith given:

"As the Burlington Bureau of Information has ceased to give out facts,

but are drawing on advertising material, we wish to state the causes of

their trouble with the switchmen. They have not struck, but have left

the service of that company. 'Self-preservation is the first law of

nature.' This is the reason in a nutshell. For the past week every

switch engine in the house has been out. Three have gone in again

disabled, and less than half of the regular work has been done. As long

as the company were satisfied to let the men take time to insure safety

there was no trouble. But as the cars accumulated in the yards, they

considered it necessary to push the men beyond the point of safety,

against their protests, and the 'strike' or stoppage was the result. A

few of the engineers and firemen are locomotive men, but the majority

are not, and all are ignorant of our signals and methods of work. In

switching cars there should be no one in the cab but the engineer and

fireman, and both should be watching the movements and signals of the

switchmen. As it is now, the fireman stands in the gangway, while his

seat is occupied by two or three Pinkerton men. No signal can be seen

from that side of the engine. The engineer keeps his window closed, to

shut out the taunts of passers-by, and the switchmen are left to take

their chances. As long as he was allowed to pull pins with the train at

a stand-still, and make couplings with the engine attached, he could do

the work with reasonable safety, but this is not the manner of handling

cars on our western roads, and would not have been tolerated one month

ago. Aside from pulling pins and coupling cars, there is the continual

danger of collisions, as at Hawthorne, last Thursday night, when switch

engine 176 was run through by a road engine and train, whose engineer

did not see stop signals nor the headlight ahead of him on a straight

track. The tracks in and about Chicago are cut up with railroad

crossings, semaphores, connections and the interlocking switch systems.

These new engineers know nothing about them, and are continually running

through and under them, to the imminent danger of themselves, switchmen

and opposing trains. These varied sources of danger to life and limb are

so great that the men are undoubtedly justified in leaving the service

of that company."

THE FIRST BOYCOTT.

From a circular issued in June, by the Brotherhood of Engineers the

following is taken:

"Shortly after the inauguration of the strike, reports were received at

headquarters to the effect that certain lines of railway, parallel to

the C., B. & Q., were hauling the cars and handling the traffic of that

company. These reports created decidedly bitter feeling on the part of

the striking employes, and ultimated in the convening of the chairmen of

the Grievance Committees of the several systems complained of. At this

meeting, which took place at Chicago, on March 5, it was agreed that the

engineers and firemen employed on said systems should serve notice on

their respective officials, through the proper committees, that while

they were willing to perform all their legitimate duties, they would

decline thenceforth to haul C., B. & Q. cars, or transact any of the

business properly devolving upon that company, as by so doing, they

would virtually be taking the positions vacated by their striking

brethren, and by that means contribute to their defeat, while at the

same time they would be giving aid and comfort to the corporation

against which they were struggling for their rights.

THE QUESTION OF LAW INTRODUCED.

"Out of this action of the Committees arose a series of the most

threatening complications, which it may be well to explain at this

point. It should be understood, in the first place, that there is upon

the statute books of Illinois a law which provides that any officer,

chairman or leader of a labor organization, association or combination,

who advises or causes a body of employes to withdraw their services from

any company or corporation, thereby crippling the business or

interfering with the operations of the said company or corporation,

shall be deemed guilty of conspiracy, and shall be fined or imprisoned

in proportion to the extent of the injury caused. It will be observed

that the provisions of this law were exceedingly embarrassing to the

Grand Officers; and upon taking legal advice they found, to their

discomfiture, that they were even then occupying untenable ground and

exposing themselves to the liability of being prosecuted under the

conspiracy act referred to. Not only this, but it soon became apparent

that the action taken by the Committee on March 5 did not meet with the

unanimous approval of the engineers and firemen employed on the several

systems there represented. On the contrary, the engineers and firemen on

some of the lines positively refused to be bound by the agreement, and

openly avowed their intention to perform any and all duties that might

be required of them, including the handling of C., B. & Q. business.

WANT OF UNITY AND HARMONY.

"The lack of unanimity at this particular juncture proved fatal to any

good results that might have followed concert of action in carrying out

the instructions of the Committee. Division, discontent and disorder

soon began to appear. There was a total lack of harmony in the spirit

and purpose of the men, and those who were disposed to act in good faith

and refuse to handle C., B. & Q. traffic simply laid themselves liable

to dismissal from the service of the company, without assurance or hope

of protection or support from the men employed on the same system.

STRIKE ON THE SANTA FE.

"Under this condition of affairs occurred the noted strike on the Santa

Fe system, which was precipitated on March 16, on account of the alleged

aid given the C., B. & Q. by that company in hauling its cars and

transacting its business. Upon a more careful investigation of the

matter, it was found that there was no adequate cause for the

strike--that it grew out of a misapprehension of the facts in the case,

and on March 18, after being out two days, the men returned to work in a

body, the road resumed operations, and the same satisfactory relations

between the company and the men which had hitherto prevailed, were

restored.

THE SWITCHMEN.

"From the very inception of the strike, the members of the Switchmen's

Mutual Aid Association evinced a profound interest in the struggle and

freely tendered their sympathy and support to the strikers. They

realized that the contest was for the maintenance of a common cause, and

that the employes in every department of the railway service were

interested in the result. The Grand Master, J. L. Monaghan, prompted by

a desire to protect the interests of his men, as well as to extend a

helping hand to his co-laborers, came to the front nobly, and with the

aid of the members of his Order, took a decided stand in favor of the

strikers. The switchmen realized that their interests were largely at

stake, that a victory for the strikers meant a victory for them, and

_vice versa_, and, with this feeling, they left the service of the

company in a body, preferring to sacrifice their situations rather than

serve in the employ of a company that refused to do common justice to

its employes. Candor compels the admission, that we are indebted to the

switchmen for aid freely given in the hour of our direst necessity. They

acted the part of manly men, and are entitled to the thanks and

gratitude of the Brotherhoods."

Equal candor on the part of those who signed the above circular would

compel the admission that the switchmen have not yet received that which

was so freely promised them during the early days of March and on the

night of March 22,--namely, federation.

From the 1st of March until the 22d, Mr. Monaghan was in frequent

consultation with Chiefs Arthur and Sargent. It was evident that the

switchmen in remaining at work with the new engineers were doing the

cause an incalculable injury, and efforts were made to overcome this new

difficulty.

FEDERATION.

The switchmen and the brakemen were willing and anxious to unite with

the Brotherhood. They did not wish the company to be victorious through

aid given by them, and they were equally unwilling to give aid to the

Brotherhood in this struggle and receive what many had received in the

past, only injury. In this condition of affairs an arrangement was made

whereby, in future troubles, the two Brotherhoods and the Association of

Switchmen were to stand faithfully by each other. It was at this time

the universal opinion among the switchmen, engineers and firemen that

some such plan should be devised, and the Constitutions changed

accordingly, and this feeling was concurred in by the officers of the

three organizations. The legal counsel was called into the conference

and a plan formulated for future action, which was to be subject to the

Annual Convention of each organization. True to the promises given by

Grand Master Sargent, the Convention of Firemen did, in September, 1888,

put forward a most comprehensive plan of federation, which was adopted

by the Convention of Switchmen in the same month, and which apparently

died at the Convention of Engineers in October.

Whatever the action since taken, the switchmen were then perfectly

satisfied--particularly so, as at the union meeting held in Chicago on

the night of March 22, prominent members of the two Brotherhoods from

all parts of the United States gave their unqualified approval to the

action of their officers, and, furthermore, pledged the honor of the

Brotherhoods that the obligation would be faithfully met and promptly

carried out. More solemn or binding obligations were never entered into

by men. The switchmen were promised, and written pledges given by the

officers of the Brotherhoods, that the same financial assistance given

to the engineers engaged in the strike should also be given to them, as

long as an engineer received a dollar, the switchmen should receive a

like amount.

SWITCHMEN ENTER THE STRIKE.

On the morning of March 23 the switchmen, with the consent of Grand

Master Monaghan, left the service of the Burlington Company in Chicago,

not one single man remaining behind. Out of seventeen yardmasters,

eleven went with the switchmen. Two of these, however, remained out but

a few days, and then returned to the service of the company. Of the

switchmen, but one returned.

ALONG THE LINE.

Messengers were immediately dispatched over the system to notify the

switchmen what action had at last been decided upon, and these, with few

exceptions, took the same course as was taken by their Chicago brethren.

At Aurora, Galesburg, Burlington, Ottumwa, Creston, Plattsmouth, Omaha,

Lincoln, Kansas City, St. Joe, Beardstown, and all points where switch

engines are employed, the men, with few exceptions, made the sacrifice

required of them, and did it freely. At Quincy the men also went out;

but on an offer of the agent to increase their pay, all but five

returned to work. It is gratifying to the rest of the men to know that

this promise was never fulfilled to the Quincy switchmen.

BRAKEMEN.

The brakemen did not go out in this movement, as was expected by

the switchmen. Written pledges were offered them by the

Brotherhoods, similar to those accepted by the Switchmen. Mr.

Wilkinson did not feel like assuming the responsibility of calling

his men out on the strength of these pledges.

The constitution gave him no such authority and he did not feel

like taking the responsibility of doing an unconstitutional act.

The feeling among those actually engaged in the strike is friendly

toward the Brotherhood of Brakemen. They know that these men were

not opposed to them, although they remained in the service of the

Company.

SECOND BOYCOTT.

Immediately after the switchmen left the service of the C., B. & Q.

corporation, a meeting of yard engineers, firemen and switchmen was held

at Chicago, at which it was agreed that no C., B. & Q. cars should be

handled from and after that time. Upon the taking effect of this

agreement, it became apparent that the yardmen would not receive the

support of many of the road men in carrying out its provisions; in fact,

it was currently reported, and not denied, that upon certain lines the

road men had decided to handle the business of the C., B. & Q., in the

event of the yard men declining to do so. This division in the policy of

the men created the most intense dissatisfaction, and gave rise to deep

indignation. The men who declined to handle C., B. & Q. cars were given

to understand that dismissal would be the penalty if they persisted in

carrying out that policy. Other men were ready to perform their duties.

To adhere to the agreement meant the sacrifice of their situations. A

number of them had already been dismissed. Demoralization and dismay,

the fruit of discord and disunion, were beginning to take root.

ON THE C., M. & ST. P. RAILWAY

this agreement was more faithfully carried out. When the yard engineers

refused to handle "Q" cars they were at once joined by the switchmen and

yardmasters (including the General Yardmaster). Switch-tenders, road

engineers and firemen, brakemen, and most of the conductors were

entirely in accord with them. The result was a general closing down of

business on the road. The men were discharged, and fully one-third of

the entire force of the road laid off. The company evidently intended

to clear the decks for a great battle.

It has been repeatedly claimed, that if the other roads centering in

Chicago had made the prompt action of the C., M. & St. P. men general,

the boycott, with all that the term implies would have been on to the

fullest extent.

A NEW DEPARTURE

was demanded to avert the gravest complications, which seemed

inevitable. A meeting was called, and counsel was taken from those who

were in position to map out a new and better line of action. This

meeting was addressed by the Grand Master of the Switchmen's

Association, the Grand Master of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen,

General Manager Jeffery of the Illinois Central, and others. The

situation was clearly defined, the peril of continuing in a hopeless

crusade against C., B. & Q. cars was vividly outlined, and, as a result

of the meeting, traffic was resumed upon the several railways the

following morning, and all those who had been dismissed for refusing to

handle C., B. & Q. cars were reinstated in their former positions. Much

unjust criticism has been passed upon this action, and yet we feel

confident that if the situation and surrounding conditions had been half

understood, it would have met with universal approval.

It must be remembered that unity of action had not been secured, and

there was no authority in the Brotherhood to enforce it, even if the

chief so-willed, which he evidently did not. Under the circumstances,

to continue the boycott against "Q" cars was to destroy or divide the

Brotherhood; the men were not yet educated up to the point of making so

great a sacrifice, or at least what they considered a sacrifice.

And yet, if this unity of action had been attained, if not one

Brotherhood man in the United States had taken another's place who

refused to handle "Q" cars, where was the power to defeat them? Such a

power does not exist! Not even in the General Government.

KNIGHTS OF LABOR.

At the very outset of the strike it was claimed by the Burlington

management that Knights of Labor stood ready to supplant the

Brotherhoods upon their lines. This has been proven to be a

misrepresentation to a very great extent. It was true, however, that

there was considerable feeling existing between the Knights of Labor and

the Brotherhood of Engineers, growing out of the strike of 1873 and the

Reading strike. In the strike of "'73" many of the Knights of Labor, or

those who are now Knights, took the places vacated by Brotherhood men on

the Pennsylvania lines. In the Reading strike of the Knights, members of

the Brotherhood, in turn, supplanted them.

At the commencement of the "Q" strike, individual members of the Knights

of Labor took it upon themselves to retaliate upon the Brotherhood, at

least it was called retaliation, but the object was apparently to secure

better jobs.

There is positive proof that these measures of retaliation were not, in

either case authorized by the heads of the organizations. The Burlington

Company sought to make capital for themselves out of this old trouble,

and did everything in their power to widen the breach.

During the months of January and February, the agents of the company

thoroughly canvassed the labor districts of the East, searching out

every dissatisfied Knight and every unprincipled character, who could by

any possible means be induced to put the finishing touches to his

disgrace. Among this horde were some few hitherto respectable workmen,

who were induced by brilliant promises to drop their respectability and

disgrace themselves by joining such a band and for such a cause.

Retaliation was their excuse, but a thinner disguise never clothed a

scoundrel. Had the Switchmen's Mutual Aid Association ever done them a

wrong? And yet, more of these so-called Knights are switching cars

to-day than are handling the throttle and scoop.

For a time these men were actually thought to be Knights of Labor in

good standing, and coming West with the full sanction of their Order.

Ample proof, however, exists that they were but the riffraff of the

Order. It is but justice to the Knights of Labor to say that these

fellows were a class who acknowledged allegiance to no particular Order,

and recognized no authority. Many of them belonged to suspended

Assemblies, or were expelled from the K. of L. as well as from the B. of

L. E. for dissolute habits and other causes.

T. V. POWDERLY.

On February 29, Grand Master Workman Powderly, issued a noted letter to

his Order, calling upon them to stand back and keep hands off in this

strike. The following extract from the letter demonstrates the fact that

Mr. Powderly's attitude was consistent with justice and right. "Let the

past be forgotten in this strike; no matter how bitter you may feel

toward these men, remember that they have not yet stepped out of the rut

of selfishness, and it is best to teach them what manhood means by

keeping your hands off the C., B. & Q. strike. The spectacle presented

by men of labor who belong to different organizations rushing at each

other's throats whenever a strike takes place, must be a gratifying

thing to the employers of labor. It must indeed give satisfaction to the

corporations to know that neither Knights of Labor nor Brotherhood men

dare in future ask for better treatment, with any assurance of receiving

it. It must be a consoling thought to the monopolist to know that his

power is not half so dangerous to the labor organizations as the

possibility that another labor organization will espouse his cause

through revenge. Labor will forever be bound hand and foot at the feet

of capital as long as one workingman can be pitted against another.

"No strike should be entered into until the court of last resort has

been reached; until the last effort consistent with manhood has been

made; until the heads of the opposing forces on both sides have been

consulted, and their verdict given; until the last bridge has been

burned between them; then, if it was determined that the last thing

possible had been done to avert trouble, every detachment of labor's

army--horse, foot and artillery--should be wheeled into line to defend

the rights of men in the breach. Knights of Labor, from Maine to

California, stand back! Keep your hands off! Let the law of retaliation

be disregarded, and let the men of the "Q" road win this strike if they

can!"

That all of these men did not stand back is not the fault of this

organization. Bad men exist in every Order, and probably always will.

The "Q" retain many of them, but it is no disgrace to the Knights of

Labor. They are men who have not the principles of Knighthood in their

hearts.

About the middle of April a committee of Brotherhood men went East to

confer with Grand Master Workman Powderly. The result of that meeting

was that all Knights of Labor who still acknowledged allegiance to that

Order should be called off from all lines operated by the Burlington

Company where they had taken the places of strikers. The general result

of this order was not very satisfactory. As before stated, they were a

class of men who recognized no authority from any labor organization.

The following circular of a later date gives the true standing of the

Knights of Labor on this question:

OFFICE OF STATE MASTER WORKMAN, }

Beatrice, Neb., June 21, 1888. }

AN APPEAL.

I have given thorough and conscientious examination into the

troubles existing between the striking Brotherhood of Engineers,

Firemen and Switchmen and the Chicago, Burlington & Quincy

Railroad Company. The justice of their cause against this

corporation appeals to my judgment and my sympathies. It should

arouse every Knight of Labor in the State, and place him to the

front in defense of their cause and in placing opprobrium upon the

Burlington monopoly. The Order should take a distinctive and

pronounced stand for these men, who are simply battling for

justice, and no more. What is the purpose of the C., B. & Q. people

in this struggle with the Brotherhood? It is to stamp organized

labor with defeat, and millions of dollars are behind them to

accomplish this result. Should they succeed, every laborer and

producer will sink lower in the scale of manhood and deeper into

the degradation of slavery. It is the purpose of the C., B. & Q. to

fasten perpetual manacles upon them, from which there can be no

escape but in death. It means slavery for all who toil, more

appalling and horrible than the slavery of the South, the fetters

of which were broken by war.

I urge, therefore, upon every knight in the State to boycott this

road that is the enemy of labor. Do not ride in its cars. Drive

your stock to some competing line, and do not sell your grain where

it will be shipped by them. Let the boycott be absolute and

complete so far as your patronage goes. Have nothing to do with

those who are in business and employ this road in any capacity.

Spend your dollars with those who are the friends of organized

labor. Persuade your friends to adopt the same course.

There is only one debt that the Knights of Labor owe to the C., B.

& Q. road, and that is the infamy of their eternal hate. Its hand

has forever been raised against us. Whenever its employes have come

to our ranks, that was sufficient ground for their discharge from

its service. Its power, its wealth, its secret detective service

and all the means at its command have been aimed at our

destruction. Do not stop to consider that there have been

differences in the past between the Knights of Labor and the

Brotherhoods. It is not the time to argue which organization has

been in the wrong. The past is a dead thing; let us give our

thoughts to the future and the living present.

The question is, are we going to help this corporation to destroy

labor organizations, or are we going to present a solid front, a

phalanx of determined men, who will say to the Brotherhoods, "We

will stand by you till you conquer in this fight, and all the power

of our membership and assemblies will be directed to help you win."

This is my theory of true knighthood, and I want to see it placed

in successful practice in the present grave emergency.

Let us do more than this. Let us make certain the defeat of this

corporation as a lasting memorial that will bear a lesson to all

corporations so long as time shall be.

Fraternally,

M. D. HUBBARD, S. M. W.

STATE RAILWAY COMMISSION.

This book would be incomplete did it not give an extract of the

testimony taken before the State Board of Warehouse and Railway

Commissioners on the 3d, 4th and 5th days of April, 1888. This testimony

grew out of the charges made before the Board by the citizens of Aurora.

We are indebted to the _Sunday World_ of April 15 for the matter herein

contained, which was not published or referred to by any other Chicago

paper, and was suppressed by the Board.

_Citizens of Aurora_ vs. _The C., B. & Q. Railway Company_:

Testimony taken before the Board of Warehouse and Railway

Commissioners of Illinois, on the 3d, 4th and 5th days of April, A.

D. 1888:

Present: Alexander Sullivan, Esq., on behalf of the citizens of

Aurora; Chester A. Dawes, Esq., on behalf of the C., B. & Q.

Railway Company.

Franklin L. Bliss, a witness called on behalf of the complainants,

having been duly sworn, was examined in chief by Mr. Sullivan, and

testified as follows:

Q. What is your name? A. Franklin L. Bliss.

Where do you live? Rock Island, Illinois.

What is your occupation? Locomotive engineer.

In what company's employ are you? Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul.

How long have you been a locomotive engineer? Over twenty-three

years.

Were you the engineer on the train on the Milwaukee road with

which a Quincy train collided on February 27? I was.

State to the Board, as briefly as you can, the circumstances; what

you did at that crossing; what it was your duty to do as to

stopping and giving signals, and whether or not you performed your

duty, and then state the occurrence of the accident? When I was

within half a mile of this crossing I gave a long signal for the

crossing; I brought the train to a full stop within 400 feet of the

railroad crossing; then I stepped over and looked on the left side

of the engine, and could see no train or hear no train on the left;

on the right there was no train I could see; then I gave two

whistles and started my train for the crossing; when I got the

engine onto the crossing (the cab was about on the crossing) I

looked to the left and saw a train coming down the Burlington track

right at me.

Commissioner Marsh: Just after you got on the crossing? A. Yes; the

cab of the engine was about on the crossing when I saw.

Commissioner Rinaker: Was there anything to hinder you seeing that

train before you got onto the crossing?

Commissioner Marsh: Any obstruction in the way? A. Well there is a

cut on the east. I should think the mouth of the cut was some 900

feet from the crossing on the Burlington road.

Mr. Sullivan: When you looked before you started your engine was

there anything between you and that crossing--was the engine in

sight? A. No, sir.

Q. Describe the grade on the Quincy road between that cut and where

the collision occurred at the crossing; is it smooth? It is

down-grade to the crossing.

From the mouth of the cut? Yes, sir.

To the crossing? Yes, sir.

Did that engine, after it came out of that cut, stop before it

reached the crossing and collided with your train? A. No, sir.

It did not? No, sir. I gave two short whistles before I started the

train, after making the stop.

You came to a full stop? I came to a full stop; yes, sir.

Commissioner Rogers: What crossing do you have reference to--the

crossing at Aurora? A. This crossing is just about two miles and a

quarter south of Fulton Junction, on the Milwaukee road.

Q. Where the C., B. & Q. crosses? A. Yes, sir.

Commissioner Rinaker: How near to the crossing were you when you

stopped? Within 400 feet; the cylinder of my engine was just about

opposite the stopping board.

Q. Go on and describe the accident. You were describing what you

did, the signals you gave; go on and finish that. A. That was all

the signals I did give.

Two sharp whistles? Yes; then I started the train. I didn't see the

train till the engine got on the crossing, just about the cab. The

"Q" engine struck my tender just about midway of the back truck.

Mr. Sullivan: What damage, if you know, was done to your train, and

to the other, and what injuries to persons?

Commissioner Rinaker: The back truck of your engine or tender? A.

Of the tender--it throwed my tender or the tank down into the

ditch; took the back truck with it, and throwed the mail car also

down the bank; wrecked the mail car, too; also the "Q" engine went

off the track, and run along; the engine and baggage car kind of

went over, nearly onto one side; went into the ground and stopped.

Q. Was yours a passenger train? A. Yes, sir.

Was the other the "Q"? Yes, sir.

Both passenger trains? Yes, sir.

Who, if anyone, was hurt on your train? There was a route agent by

the name of Wilhelm; I don't know exactly what his name was.

Where does he live, do you know? Rock Island, I think. An express

messenger by the name of Morrison.

Do you know where he lived? I do not.

Who else? A mail agent by the name of Brown.

Do you know whether or not anyone was hurt on their train--the

Quincy train? The roadmaster, engineer and conductor of the train.

That was all that was injured? That was all that was injured.

Do you know their names? I do not.

F. L. Bliss, being recalled, was examined by Mr. Sullivan, and

testified as follows:

Q. At what rate of speed did you pull out after you left that

400-foot board--between that and the crossing? A. I pulled out

slow; it would not average over about six or eight miles an hour,

anyway.

Were you trying to make up for your lost time? No, sir.

Why? We have an order not to make up any time from Fulton Junction

to three miles west of Albany. There was an order on the board, and

has been there.

So that you were not trying to make up time, and were not running

at an extraordinary rate of speed? Not running any faster than

though we had been right on time.

And you think the time you were running between that 400 feet and

the crossing was about six to eight miles? I don't think when we

was on the crossing--I don't think it was over eight miles an hour,

anyway--six or eight.

Mr. Dawes: You rely on your fireman, don't you, to look out for his

side? A. No, sir.

Who do you rely on? I hardly ever go over the crossing without

looking myself; still, he tells me, but I think it is safer to look

myself.

You looked on your side? I did.

Did you look out on the other side? I did.

Where did you look out last? Before I started.

Before you started from the 400-foot post? Yes, sir.

Did you look out after that at all? Not after I started on the

train until I got on the crossing.

The fireman was shoveling in coal, wasn't he--firing up? Yes, sir.

Did you look out of your side of the cab after you left the

400-foot station, down the Burlington track? Yes, sir; I looked on

my side.

How long has that 400-foot post been there, do you know? The

400-foot on our track?

Yes. It has been there ever since I have run down there. I have

been running about fourteen years on that run. I don't know how

much longer it has been there.

Mr. Sullivan: That is all. The people that have been injured we

could not get.

Mr. Dawes: We will admit people were injured. The engineer we shall

call was injured more than anybody else.

D. W. Rhodes, a witness called on behalf of the Chicago, Burlington

& Quincy Railroad Company, being first duly sworn, was examined in

chief by Mr. Dawes, and testified as follows:

Q. What is your full name? A. D. W. Rhodes.

What is your business? Superintendent of motive power on the C., B.

& Q. road.

Are the engineers responsible to you? Through my assistants they

are directly responsible to me.

But they are immediate employes of your department? They are

immediate employes of my department.

Of which you are the head? Yes, sir.

Do you know Mr. Pearce? Yes, sir.

What is his business now, and what was it on the 19th day of March?

Mr. Pearce is assistant engineer of tests in our laboratory at

Aurora.

Is he an engineer in the employ of the Burlington road now? He is

not a locomotive engineer.

Was he ever, at any time, an engineer in the employ of the

Burlington road? He was never examined as an engineer for the

Burlington road.

You say he was not? No, sir; he was not.

Where was he sent? He was sent on this Clinton run, from Mendota to

Clinton.

Do you know about what time that run is made? No, I do not.

Was anybody sent with him? He had a pilot; the roadmaster was his

pilot.

The roadmaster of that section or division? Yes, sir. I am not very

clear about what Mr. Pearce's crew was. I had to take an engine out

myself that morning, and I was not at Aurora.

Mr. Sullivan: Do you know anything about it at all, except from

hearsay? Do you know from your own knowledge who was on the train?

A. From being present, no.

Mr. Sullivan: This testimony on that subject should be stricken

out. The witness: May I make one correction? I said I took an

engine out myself that morning; I fired an engine out that morning.

Cross-examination by Mr. Sullivan:

Q. Did Mr. Pearce ever run a locomotive engine before? A. Mr.

Pearce had handled a locomotive engine; yes, sir.

The question was, did he ever run a locomotive engine before?

Please answer that? I am not able to say whether he did or not.

Are you in the habit, when exercising your best judgment to select

engineers, to put a man on the road to run a locomotive engine when

you don't know whether he has ever run one before or not? In a case

like this, where our trains were----

In any case? We do so; I would do so again.

Where the lives of the public and the property of the public are in

peril, you will take a man without knowing whether he ever ran an

engine before or not, and put him in charge of an engine? No, sir;

Mr. Pearce's education and training justified me in believing that

he could handle that train properly.

Do you believe any technical education in the shops, without

practical experience, fits a man to be placed in charge of an

engine to which is attached a passenger train? Properly guided by a

pilot and conductor on the engine, I say so, decidedly.

You would do so at any time? If there had been no strike, you would

select a man of that experience, would you? I would only do that

under the circumstances as we were.

Only under emergencies? Yes, sir.

You would not say generally it is a wise thing for a railroad to

do; would you? I would say under circumstances such as we were left

in there it was a wise thing for us to do.

I ask you generally? If I had time to make a thorough examination

of a man I certainly would do it.

William H. Pearce, a witness called on behalf of the C., B. & Q.

railroad company, being first duly sworn, was examined in chief by

Mr. Dawes, and testified as follows:

Q. What is your name? A. William H. Pearce.

What is your business? Assistant engineer of tests in the C., B. &

Q.

State under what circumstances you took this engine on the 27th day

of February last? Upon learning of the strike, I, with several

other young men, signed a letter to Mr. Rhodes offering to go out

in any position which they should deem it advisable. I was detailed

by the Master Mechanic to go to Mendota and take that train to

Fulton, with the understanding that I was to have a pilot; we

struck the train; we had as pilot the roadmaster. We left Mendota

five minutes late, and we were about six minutes late when I first

see the St. Paul train.

How far was that out of Mendota, do you remember? It was somewhere

about in the neighborhood of sixty miles.

You had lost a minute in sixty miles, had you? Lost a minute in

running sixty miles.

Who were with you on the engine beside the roadmaster? When we

started out of Mendota there was only Mr. Chapin, the civil

engineer of the Chicago Division, and the roadmaster, Mr. Seegers,

and a machinist who came from the Aurora shop. After leaving Garden

Plain, which is the last stop before arriving at the crossing, the

conductor also came on the engine.

Were you familiar with that division, had you ever run over it

before? No, I never knew it; I never run over it at all.

Now state, Mr. Pearce, how this accident occurred. We were going

along, I should judge, about forty-five miles an hour. I will

preface it by saying that the roadmaster was very careful all the

way coming up, and I had no reason whatsoever to fear any lack of

duty in warning me of any such place; we were going about

forty-five miles an hour, and I had to look out for my water; it

was getting a little dark; we were going west; of course it cast a

shadow and I could not see the water glass; after losing a little

time that way I tried my gauge cocks; when I got through with that

I looked up and I saw this St. Paul train; that is the first

intimation I had of the crossing.

What did you do then? I shut off and put on the brakes.

Right off, did you? Yes, sir.

You struck this train as described? I struck a train; yes.

Did you do everything in your power to prevent that accident? Yes,

sir; I don't see how I could do anything more.

Commissioner Rinaker: Tell exactly what you did do? A. I shut off

and put the air on.

How far were you from the train, in your judgment, when you did

that? I should say in the neighborhood of 600 feet when I saw it,

and I would say right here about the speed, that that speed, down

grade, would require about a thousand feet to stop; it has been

proved by the Burlington tests.

Mr. Dawes: What became of you, do you know? A. I only know that

from hearsay. I know I was knocked off the engine and they got me

up; I was leaning against the drivers, they told me, laying up

against the drivers; the engine jumped the track, I understand; I

don't know; I didn't remember anything until the next morning.

Is your sight good--your eyesight? Yes; I think my sight is normal,

with my glasses.

You can see at a distance, can you, as well as ordinary

individuals? I think so.

In reference to your hearing? Well, I am hard of hearing in a room,

but I am not hard of hearing on an engine.

Had you received any warning before coming to this crossing, as far

as you remember of it? No.

It is fair to say that the roadmaster says he warned you; I say

that in justification of him. He says he did.

You did not hear any notice; that is what you swear, isn't it? I

did not hear him.

Are you, in your own judgment, from your education and experience,

both in study and on the road, capable of running a locomotive

engine? On such a train as that, yes; it is a branch road, and

there are comparatively few trains; I would not care about going on

a main line.

Cross-examination by Mr. Sullivan: Who was the pilot who was

furnished you? A Mr. Seegers, the roadmaster.

Can you not hear without putting your hand up? I don't wish to be

offensive, but I want, as a matter of fact, to find out. Not in

that tone. I can hear, yes; but I can hear better by putting it up,

as anyone could reasonably argue; probably you can yourself. It is

not necessary to do that where there is any noise or confusion

going on.

Could you have heard a notice to stop, or a notice that there was a

crossing, if Seegers had given it to you? I would have heard as

well as any other person.

Then you would have heard him if he gave such an order or gave such

information? You are very well aware of the fact you have to speak

more or less loud on an engine to anyone.

Did anyone speak more or less loud to you as to notify you that

there was a crossing there, and that you should stop 400 feet from

it? No.

Did you notice the crossing board on the Quincy road? I did not.

There is a board 400 feet from that crossing, four or five feet in

height?

Mr. Dawes: Who says there is a board there?

Mr. Sullivan: I will show there is by another witness.

Mr. Dawes: There may be, but I have not heard anybody say so yet.

Mr. Sullivan: How long would it have taken you to bring that train

to a full stop, running at the rate of forty-five miles an hour?

When I say how long, I mean in distance; at what space from that

crossing should you have attempted to bring it to a full stop in

order to stop it? A. If I knew the crossing?

How long would it take a train to stop? It would take in the

neighborhood of 1,000 feet.

You could not have stopped it at the rate of speed you were running

if you had noticed it at the 400 feet distance? No, sir.

When you got out of the cut was any information given to you that

it was necessary to stop there? I received no information. The

first intimation I had was the sight of the train.

Mr. Sullivan: Was there an engineer on the cab with you at the

time? Yes, sir.

Wasn't that engineer who was on the cab at that time held

responsible for it? He was.

When you were held responsible for it you never in your life run an

engine that length before, did you? No, sir.

If you had been working at the engine-house, and there was no such

emergency as this, would you have considered yourself competent to

do it? Not on a road in which I was entirely unfamiliar.

You were entirely unfamiliar with this, were you not? I was

entirely unfamiliar.

Did you shut off steam before you saw the Milwaukee train? No, sir.

How far was it from you when you did shut off the steam? Fifty or

sixty feet.

Did you reverse the engine? No, sir, I did not. With a well

designed driver-brake there is no benefit in reversing the engine.

Did you bring the lever down in front? No, sir.

Did you drop the reverse lever forward when you shut off? I don't

remember that particularly.

When you put the air on, did you use all that was indicated on your

gauge? I naturally should do so.

Did you? No, I slapped the air around, put the handle full around;

I didn't stop to see what was indicated on the gauge.

Did you use any sand? No.

Were quite excited at the time? I suppose I naturally was.

You lost your head in fact; isn't that the fact now? No, because it

is still on my shoulders.

You might as well have been without a head; you lost your judgment,

didn't you? I don't see that any judgment would come in after

having shut the steam off and put the air on.

Couldn't you have used sand? I did not.

You could have used it if you had thought of it? No, sir; because I

didn't see any benefit; as long as the drivers don't slip it is all

right.

Do you know that sand will help to stop a train quicker? No, sir, I

don't know it.

Do you swear it will not? No, sir, because I have never made any

experiment in that.

Then you know nothing about it? You don't know whether it would

help or not? I have only my judgment, which is formed after quite

an elaborate series of experiments on the brakes.

John F. Laughlin was examined in chief by Mr. Sullivan, and

testified:

Q. What is your name? A. John Francis Laughlin.

Where do you live? At 818 Washtenaw avenue.

What is your business? Switchman, in charge of switch engine.

For what road are you working? Chicago, Burlington & Quincy; I was

at one time, until I quit.

Were you employed on the 23d of March for that road? Yes, sir.

Why did you quit? Because I did not see fit to work with

incompetent engineers.

What were you engaged at on the evening of March 23d, and where

were you employed? March 23d I did not do much. I only took one

train to the Stock Yards and came back. This accident I have

reference to happened March 22d, I believe, at 10:30 p. m.

What were you doing on the evening of the 22d, and where were you

employed? On the evening of the 22d of March I had fifty cars

shoving into the new yard at Hawthorne, which is about three miles

and a half, as near as I can judge, from Western avenue. We stopped

to give me a chance to raise the semaphore for the protection of

trains coming east, and also set the switches going into the new

yard. I got up and gave the signal to go ahead, and as I did a

crash came.

What character of train was it that run into yours--a freight? A

freight train.

What was the condition of the track, so far as obstructions were

concerned, between your train and the train which collided with

you? There was no obstruction whatever; there was a clear view four

miles or three miles and a half; something like that.

What time in the evening was it? About half-past ten.

Had you a headlight on your engine? Yes, sir.

Had you a light on the other end of your train? No, sir; only my

own lamp.

You were at that end? And a red light; yes, sir.

You had a red light, as well? Yes, sir.

Do you know the number of the engine which collided with yours?

Yes, sir; 310.

What was the number of yours? 176.

Was engine 310 flagged? I presume it was, according to my helpers'

statement.

Your helpers are here, are they? Yes, sir.

You had enough helpers to give the necessary flagging? I believe I

had; I had two.

To how many of these new men did you give signals who were unable

to answer or failed to answer the signals? I should say three or

four.

Did you have any conversation with any of them in relation to the

signals? No, sir; well, I had a conversation with one; I gave him a

signal and he says, "I don't understand that signal."

Was that signal which you gave him and which he said he did not

understand the usual signal given by railroad men? Yes, sir.

The same signal which has been used on the road all the time you

have been in its employ? Yes, sir.

When was that, about what time? That was a couple or three nights

before I left.

Commissioner Marsh: State what conversation between you and him

there was at the time he told you he did not understand that

signal? I merely gave him a signal to back up. He says, "Partner, I

don't understand that signal." I merely says to him, "What kind do

you understand--steamboat signals?" He says, "No, stationary

engines."

William G. Frisbie was examined by Mr. Sullivan and testified:

Q. Were you on the train to which engine 176 was attached? A. I

belonged to that crew.

At Hawthorne, March 22. I belonged to that crew? Yes, sir.

Did you flag 310 that night? I did.

State to the Commissioners how far you went from your own engine,

176, to flag 310, the one which collided with it? I can tell you

perhaps better by car lengths; I can make a guess at the number of

feet. I did not measure it exactly. I should think it was in the

neighborhood of 1,500 feet to 2,000 feet that I was back of where

our engine stood. I found the train was not coming to a stop, and

kept going back myself as long as it was possible, giving them all

the swing that it was proper and right to stop him. He paid not the

slightest attention to my signal; never even whistled for brakes

until after his train passed me.

Did you start back as soon as your train stopped to flag? Yes, sir.

You went as far as you could? Yes, sir.

Re-direct examination by Mr. Sullivan:

Q. Did you ever, in all your experience, know a case where an

engineer was flagged on a clear track, as in this case, and

disobeyed a signal and run into another train? No, sir.

Stewart W. Hadlock, examined in chief by Mr. Sullivan, testified as

follows:

Q. What is your name? A. Stewart W. Hadlock.

Where do you reside? At Aurora.

What is your business? Engineer.

How long have you been an engineer? Nineteen years.

In what company's employ were you recently? C., B. & Q.

How long were you in the employ of that company? Twenty-three

years.

As engineer and fireman? Engineer and fireman both.

Do you know Hose De Witt? I do.

Do you know in whose employ he now is? He is in the employ of the

C., B. & Q.

In what capacity? Passenger engineer.

Hector H. Hall was examined in chief by Mr. Sullivan, and

testified:

Q. What is your name? A. Hector H. Hall.

Where do you live? At Pullman.

What is your occupation? Engineer.

What company are you working for? Pullman Company.

Do you know Hose De Witt? Yes, sir.

How long have you known him? About eight years.

Is he a sober man? No, sir.

What is his general reputation for sobriety? He is an habitual

drunkard.

Is that the reputation in the neighborhood where he lives? Yes,

sir.

Have you ever heard it discussed? His wife has been around to all

the saloons forbidding them to sell him anything.

Why? Because he was an habitual drunkard.

When did you see him last? I think it was last Thanksgiving day.

What condition was he in then? He was very drunk.

Did you ever see him sober? Well, no, sir; very seldom. I have once

or twice, probably; as a general thing he was under the influence

of liquor.

John B. Clark, examined in chief by Mr. Sullivan, testified:

Q. State your name? A. John B. Clark.

Where do you live? Aurora.

What is your business? I was a locomotive engineer.

How long were you engaged in that capacity? Ten years, probably.

For what company were you employed? Chicago, Burlington & Quincy.

Did you serve on any committee for that road while you were in its

employ? I was on the local examining board for the Chicago

division.

Do you know Hose De Witt? I do.

How long have you known him? About fourteen years, I think.

Do you know he was discharged from this company because of his

connection with a wreck at Naperville? I do.

Do you know what his reputation for sobriety is and has been during

all the time of your acquaintance? He was always a hard drinker,

when he fired and run here both.

Have you known him since he was in the employ of the company; have

you seen him since? I have seen him on my way through Plano; he

worked at Plano for the Plano Manufacturing Company, and I see him

there about in the neighborhood of a year ago; he struck me for a

ride to Chicago.

Mr. Dawes: I object to any specific instance of drunkenness a year

ago.

Mr. Sullivan: Was he drunk or sober? A. He was not sober.

Did you ever see him sober? I don't think I did; not what I should

call dead sober.

You have known him eight years? I have known him fourteen years.

Why did you refuse to give him a ride when he applied to you? Well,

it was against the rules; and then he was too full of whisky to be

a safe man to have around there.

You haven't seen him since, then? I have not, except since he came

back to work for the C., B. & Q.

Acting as engineer? Yes, sir.

Passenger or freight? Passenger.

On what road? On the C., B. & Q., on the main line?

Mr. Dawes, cross-examining: Did you regard that as a proper method

of determining the qualifications of engineers? A. Yes, sir; it is

well enough.

Is this (handing witness a paper) an accurate copy of the protest

of the Brotherhood? I will direct your attention to Article 22. I

don't represent the Brotherhood; I am here as a witness.

I will ask you whether you know as a matter of fact, Mr. Clark,

whether Article 22 is a copy of a grievance presented by the

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers to the Burlington road? I did

not present it.

I understand you did not; you know, do you not?

Mr. Sullivan: I object to all this as immaterial.

Commissioner Rinaker: I do not regard that as cross-examination at

present. Is that offered for the purpose of showing that the rule

itself was not regarded as a proper one?

Mr. Dawes: I want to ask this witness what his opinion is of this

particular grievance.

Mr. Sullivan: How often have you seen him in eight years? A. He

laid around Aurora two or three years before he got a job any

place.

He lived around Aurora two or three years after he was discharged?

Yes, sir.

When he hung around Aurora for two or three years did you see him

regularly? He hung around a variety saloon that used to be there in

Aurora.

Commissioner Rinaker: How often do you mean we shall understand you

are stating you have seen this man drunk in the last eight or ten

years?

Commissioner Rogers: When was it he wanted to come up with you on

the engine? A. As near as I can remember it was in the neighborhood

of a year ago.

Commissioner Rinaker: How many times have you seen him drunk? A. He

was drunk at that time.

How many more times? Between the seven years before that? Well, I

would not want to say how many times; but at the time he was

hanging around Aurora he was off and on. He would go away and hunt

for a job and come back, go away and come back; that is the way he

was.

Was he drunk when you would see him around this variety show? Yes,

we very seldom seen him sober.

Mr. Sullivan: Prior to this controversy between the railroad and

its employes could such a man as De Witt receive employment as an

engineer; would you have employed such a man?

(Objected to by Mr. Dawes.)

Q. Would they employ a man who had been dismissed as being

responsible for a wreck, as this man was?

(Objected to by Mr. Dawes.)

Commissioner Rinaker: Do you know why he was discharged? A. He was

discharged for having a collision about half a mile east of

Naperville station.

You know that from your own knowledge? Yes; I was mixed up a little

bit in it myself. I came near getting into trouble with it myself.

Hector H. Hall being recalled, was examined by Commissioner Rogers,

and testified as follows:

Q. How long is it since this notice was given by De Witt's wife to

the saloon-keepers not to give him liquor? A. I think it was on

Thanksgiving day, or the day after.

That is last year? Yes, sir.

That was on Thanksgiving day? Thanksgiving day or the day after; I

am not positive which.

J. A. Murray, locomotive engineer of thirteen years' service,

residing at Rock Island, testified that Frank Hamilton, Frank Horn,

Joseph Roach, J. Logston, Harry Zimmerman and William Patterson,

running engines on the C., B. & Q. R. R., were brakemen, conductors

and baggagemen, respectively; that he was acquainted with them all

for eight to ten years, and that they were inexperienced as

engineers or firemen.

Frank Hamilton, witness on behalf of the C., B. & Q. Railroad

Company, testified:

Q. Give your name in full? A. Frank Hamilton.

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