It was at the same time provided that one-quarter, at least, of the
respective companies in every regiment should be formed into companies
of fifty privates at the least, who were to equip and hold themselves in
readiness to march at the shortest notice from the Committee of Safety
upon any emergency. Each company so formed was to choose a captain and
two lieutenants, and they were to be grouped in battalions to consist of
nine companies each and the captains and subalterns of each battalion
were to elect field officers to command them. These were the minute-men,
and were organized under this resolve, nearly six months before the
affair of April 19, 1775; and the promptness with which they assembled
in response to the alarm upon that memorable occasion is thereby
accounted for. The foregoing statement will also serve to explain what
has been a matter of confusion to many people; namely, the distinction
between minute-men and militia. The minute-men, while of the militia,
were, for a short time at the beginning of the war, a distinct body
under a separate organization. A minute-man was a member of the militia
who had engaged himself, with others, to march at a moment’s warning;
while a militiaman was one who had not so engaged, and yet was equally
liable to be called upon for service, when the Committee of Safety
should deem it necessary to order out the militia. It happened,
therefore, that companies of minute-men and companies of militia from
the same town responded under different commanders to the alarm of April
19, 1775. The service of one was as patriotic as that of the other; but
the minute-men were under special engagement to hold themselves in
readiness to march at a moment’s warning, and you may assume that they
were, as a rule, the youngest, most active, and most patriotic members
of their respective communities.
In December, 1774, a patriotic address by the committee on the state of
the Province was accepted by the Provincial Congress, and a copy thereof
sent to all the towns and districts in the Province. In this address
after a recital of the grievances and oppressions laid upon the people,
and of the necessity of guarding their rights and liberties, it was
recommended that particular care should be taken by each town and
district to equip each of the minute-men not already provided therewith
with an effective firearm, bayonet, pouch, knapsack, thirty rounds of
ball cartridges and that they be disciplined three times a week and
oftener, as opportunity might offer. The militia in general were also
not to be neglected, and their improvement in training and drill was
strongly recommended. Thus early before open hostilities were declared
did the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts take prompt and energetic
measures to place themselves upon a military footing, so as not to be
taken at a disadvantage when the shock of armed strife should occur.
The second Provincial Congress in February, 1775, confirmed the powers
of the Committee of Safety, to whom all military matters were directly
intrusted, repeated the recommendations of the previous Congress
relative to the militia, and appointed four general officers. The
commanding officer of each regiment of minute-men, as well as the
colonels of the militia regiments, were recommended to review their
respective commands and to make return of their number and equipment.
Six days before the 19th of April the Committee of Safety was authorized
to form six companies of the train artillery already provided by the
Colony, to immediately enter upon a course of discipline and be ready to
enter the service whenever an army should be raised.
The events of the historic 19th of April, 1775, brought matters to a
crisis more rapidly than had been anticipated; and, following that
incursion of the British troops (_excursion_ it is sometimes called in
the quaint language of the day, although one would hardly term it a
pleasant one), the Provincial Congress resolved that an army of 13,600
men should be raised immediately by the Province of Massachusetts Bay. A
few days later it was moved and passed that the companies in each
regiment should consist of fifty-nine men, including three officers, and
that each regiment should consist of ten such companies.
The militia and minute-men, as reorganized and prepared in accordance
with the directions of the Provincial Congress, responded with marvelous
promptitude when the call to arms came. Within ten days after the battle
of Lexington between fifteen and twenty thousand men had assembled at
Cambridge and Roxbury. But it was an armed assemblage rather than an
army. There was practically no cohesion beyond the company organization.
They were not accustomed to act with other units as battalions or
regiments. There was no term or limit of service prescribed or that
could be required of these men that came forward in response to the
alarm. Their own patriotic fervor or the persuasiveness of their
officers made the measure of their stay in the service. It was, in
consequence, a fluctuating force from day to day, with arrivals and
departures in constant progress. The problems involved in making it a
united or cohesive force for either aggression or defence would drive
the modern military man frantic. Yet of necessity this force had to
serve as the nucleus of the army it was proposed to raise to serve for
eight months or to December 31, 1775.
The method of recruiting seems odd in these days, but in reality it was
simple enough and was effective at the same time. “Beating orders,” as
they were called, were issued to captains and lieutenants, or rather to
those desiring to be commissioned in such capacities; and, upon their
securing the specified number of men agreeing to serve under them, they
were accepted with their men, and their commissions assured to them. In
this way the men practically chose their officers, while at the same
time each officer in a regiment from the colonel down became his own
recruiting officer, captains and lieutenants in order to fill up their
company strength, and colonels in order to obtain their full quota of
companies. No commissions were issued to any regiment until it was
completed. It was this practice that caused several New Hampshire
companies to be embodied in Massachusetts regiments.
The effectiveness of this method of enlistment can best be judged by the
fact, officially verified, that commissions had been issued to the
officers of fifteen regiments, they having at that time the proper
complement of men. It could not be expected, under the conditions that
prevailed, that an army so hastily gotten together and formed from small
local organizations, totally unused to acting in masses under any
military system as regiments or brigades, should have presented, either
in the matter of discipline or equipment, anything that would commend
itself to the trained military man. One thing, however, all those who
had assembled, whether as minute-men or militia, possessed in common;
and that was the patriotic determination to resist by every means in
their power any further encroachment upon their rights and liberties. A
goodly number of the recruits and many of the officers had served in the
expeditions against Canada; and these were sufficient to leaven the
mass, and communicate by example and precept something of the military
spirit to their younger comrades who had never rendered service in the
field. At that time the army was a Massachusetts army, and in fact it is
so termed in the official documents. The regiments were really what
would be designated in these days as State regiments, being enlisted,
officered, and maintained entirely by Massachusetts. There was no lack
of officers of the higher grades, as there were provided in addition to
the general officers previously named as having been appointed in making
the establishment for the organization of the army, May 23, 1775, one
lieutenant-general, two major-generals, four brigadier-generals, two
adjutant-generals, and two quartermaster-generals.
By June 13, 1775, it had been resolved that twenty-three regiments
should be commissioned, exclusive of one regiment of artillery, which
latter was to consist of ten companies, and had already been partly
organized. Such were the constituent parts of the army organized by
Massachusetts inside of two months after the 19th of April, 1775, from
her local militia; and it was these same raw and undisciplined levies,
assisted by the contingents from the neighboring Colonies, which had
assembled at Cambridge and Roxbury upon news being conveyed to them that
Massachusetts had accepted the gage of battle, who time after time
repelled the attacks of picked regiments of troops of Great Britain,
until compelled to leave the field by lack of ammunition upon the
seventeenth day of June, 1775. No better test of the mettle of the
American militiaman, when converted into a soldier, can be conceived
than was furnished upon that day when a number of these hastily
organized regiments met and shrank not from the attack of trained
soldiers. Although, naturally enough, regarded as a defeat, and,
therefore, in a measure discreditable to the provincials, so much so
that in after years veteran survivors cared not to exploit their
participation in the battle, it really had a tremendous moral effect
upon each side, the provincials being assured thereafter that under
anywhere near like equal conditions they could defeat the British, while
for the enemy there resulted the enforced conviction that the colonists
were not unworthy foes, and that like victory would be altogether too
dearly bought.
The encouragement offered to men to enlist into the eight months’
service would hardly be considered in the light of a very extravagant
bounty in these days. The Provincial Congress provided that a woollen
coat should be supplied to every soldier who enlisted, in addition to
his wages and travel allowance. These coats were to be provided by the
different towns throughout the Province; and a schedule was made up,
allotting a definite number to be furnished by each town. They were to
be of a uniform pattern, as far as the style of the coat was concerned;
but apparently the only distinctive military attachment in connection
with them was the buttons, which it was enacted should be of pewter and
bear the regimental number, when the coats were distributed to the men
belonging to the different organizations. It may well be imagined that
this method of securing coats did not result in very prompt delivery,
and in consequence it was provided later in the year that soldiers might
receive a money equivalent for the value of the coat. Inasmuch as many
of the men served the full term of their enlistment without ever being
gratified with the sight of the promised bounty coat, it is not to be
wondered at that thousands of them accepted the money equivalent, and
received it in some instances after the expiration of their term of
service. With the appointment of Washington as commander-in-chief by the
Continental Congress, the Massachusetts army, raised as I have
described, together with the levies raised by the other Colonies, became
a part of the Continental establishment. The eight months’ men raised by
Massachusetts can properly be regarded accordingly as Continental
soldiers, although originally raised under State auspices, without any
outside encouragement or assistance. The actual transfer of State
stores, supplies, etc., did not take place for some little time after
Washington had taken command at Cambridge; and many of the officers
exercised the duties of their positions under their State commissions,
and did not receive Continental commissions until September or October,
1775.
It may be interesting to note how the effective forces at Washington’s
disposition compared with the authorized number directed to be raised by
the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts. They had provided for an army
of 13,600 men; but on July 10, 1775, Washington expressed his concern at
finding the army inadequate to the general expectation and the duties
which might be required of it. In this communication he states that the
number of men fit for duty of the forces raised by the Province,
including all the outposts and artillery, did not amount to 9000. He
also states that the troops raised in the other Colonies were more
complete, although they also fell short of their establishment; and his
estimate at that time of the total number of men at his disposition
available for duty was not more than 13,500. The proportion, however, of
the troops furnished by the different Colonies, and composing the army
that invested Boston, is shown by a general return, signed by
Adjutant-General Horatio Gates in July, 1775. It gives twenty-six
Massachusetts regiments (an additional regiment not being completed is
not included in the number), four independent companies, also of
Massachusetts, with a regiment of artillery, three Connecticut
regiments, three New Hampshire regiments, three Rhode Island regiments,
and a Rhode Island company of artillery, making altogether a total force
of 17,355 men.
At a council of war, July 9, 1775, it was estimated that the force of
the enemy amounted to 11,500, and that the army investing Boston ought
to consist of at least 22,000 men; and it was recommended, in order to
supply the deficiency, that an officer from each company raised in
Massachusetts Bay should be sent out to recruit all the regiments up to
their standard efficiency as fixed by the Provincial Congress, Rhode
Island and Connecticut being at the time engaged in recruiting for the
purpose of filling up their quotas of troops to the full establishment.
Naturally enough, the commander-in-chief found much to lament over in
the deficiencies both as to number and equipment of the army he found
almost ready made to his hand, and yet so lacking in all things from a
military point of view; but there is little of criticism in his letters
of the period, although they are filled with pleadings, expostulations,
and exhortations for the purpose of bringing up the army to a desired
state of efficiency.
While the enlisted men comprising this eight months’ army held the line
and were being brought more or less under military discipline and
system, there were times when their numbers fell short of the estimated
number required for a besieging army, where it was at any time possible
that the enemy equal in effective force might make an attack and break
the line. It was found necessary from time to time to call forth the
local militia from the towns in the vicinity of Boston to do duty for
longer or shorter periods; but then, as later, the general officers
criticised the efficiency of the militia thus called upon, as they could
not be depended upon for a continuance in camp for any definite period,
or regularity and discipline during the time they might stay. Such
criticism was inevitable, and was applied during the whole term of the
Revolutionary War to the militia contingents that were called forth in
all the Colonies by the officers commanding the regulars or the
Continental forces.
After the expiration of the term of service of the eight months’ men a
call was made for twelve months’ men; and many of those who served the
first term or first campaign, as it was called, both officers and men,
engaged for the second campaign. The organization of the standing
militia thereby became broken up and disrupted by the depletion of the
local organizations. It therefore became necessary to make a
reorganization and redistricting of the militia of the Province. An act
was accordingly passed January 22, 1776, by which this object was
attained. It provided that all able-bodied male persons from sixteen
years of age to fifty, with certain specified exemptions, in every town
and district should be considered members of the train band. The alarm
list should consist of all male persons from sixteen years of age to
sixty-five, not liable to be included in the train band and not exempted
under special provision. Each company was to consist of sixty-eight
privates, exclusive of the alarm list, officered by a captain and two
lieutenants, non-commissioned officers to be four sergeants, four
corporals, with a drummer and fifer for each company. A
brigadier-general was directed to be chosen for each county, and under
him the field officers of the different regiments were authorized to
divide up and district the regiments, each regiment having a colonel,
lieutenant-colonel, and two majors. Three major-generals were also to be
chosen by the Council or House of Representatives. Under this enactment
the county regiments were numbered, officered, and their organizations
established, and from the standing militia thus provided for all
detachments and drafts of Massachusetts militia that were made, either
for short terms of service upon alarms or as re-enforcements to the
Continental Army, were made during the remaining period of the war. This
establishment for the militia continued in force until after the
adoption of the State Constitution in 1780.