Next to all the matters which have preceded in the natural order of
legislation will come suits of law. Of suits those which relate to
agriculture have been already described, but the more important have not
been described. Having mentioned them severally under their usual names,
we will proceed to say what punishments are to be inflicted for each
offence, and who are to be the judges of them.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: There is a sense of disgrace in legislating, as we are about
to do, for all the details of crime in a state which, as we say, is
to be well regulated and will be perfectly adapted to the practice of
virtue. To assume that in such a state there will arise some one who
will be guilty of crimes as heinous as any which are ever perpetrated
in other states, and that we must legislate for him by anticipation, and
threaten and make laws against him if he should arise, in order to deter
him, and punish his acts, under the idea that he will arise--this, as I
was saying, is in a manner disgraceful. Yet seeing that we are not
like the ancient legislators, who gave laws to heroes and sons of gods,
being, according to the popular belief, themselves the offspring of the
gods, and legislating for others, who were also the children of divine
parents, but that we are only men who are legislating for the sons of
men, there is no uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our
citizens may be like a seed which has touched the ox's horn, having a
heart so hard that it cannot be softened any more than those seeds can
be softened by fire. Among our citizens there may be those who cannot be
subdued by all the strength of the laws; and for their sake, though
an ungracious task, I will proclaim my first law about the robbing of
temples, in case any one should dare to commit such a crime. I do not
expect or imagine that any well-brought-up citizen will ever take the
infection, but their servants, and strangers, and strangers' servants
may be guilty of many impieties. And with a view to them especially,
and yet not without a provident eye to the weakness of human nature
generally, I will proclaim the law about robbers of temples and similar
incurable, or almost incurable, criminals. Having already agreed that
such enactments ought always to have a short prelude, we may speak to
the criminal, whom some tormenting desire by night and by day tempts
to go and rob a temple, the fewest possible words of admonition and
exhortation: O sir, we will say to him, the impulse which moves you to
rob temples is not an ordinary human malady, nor yet a visitation
of heaven, but a madness which is begotten in a man from ancient and
unexpiated crimes of his race, an ever-recurring curse--against this you
must guard with all your might, and how you are to guard we will explain
to you. When any such thought comes into your mind, go and perform
expiations, go as a suppliant to the temples of the Gods who avert
evils, go to the society of those who are called good men among you;
hear them tell and yourself try to repeat after them, that every man
should honour the noble and the just. Fly from the company of the
wicked--fly and turn not back; and if your disorder is lightened by
these remedies, well and good, but if not, then acknowledge death to be
nobler than life, and depart hence.
Such are the preludes which we sing to all who have thoughts of unholy
and treasonable actions, and to him who hearkens to them the law has
nothing to say. But to him who is disobedient when the prelude is over,
cry with a loud voice--He who is taken in the act of robbing temples, if
he be a slave or stranger, shall have his evil deed engraven on his face
and hands, and shall be beaten with as many stripes as may seem good to
the judges, and be cast naked beyond the borders of the land. And if he
suffers this punishment he will probably return to his right mind and
be improved; for no penalty which the law inflicts is designed for evil,
but always makes him who suffers either better or not so much worse as
he would have been. But if any citizen be found guilty of any great or
unmentionable wrong, either in relation to the Gods, or his parents,
or the state, let the judge deem him to be incurable, remembering that
after receiving such an excellent education and training from youth
upward, he has not abstained from the greatest of crimes. His punishment
shall be death, which to him will be the least of evils; and his example
will benefit others, if he perish ingloriously, and be cast beyond the
borders of the land. But let his children and family, if they avoid the
ways of their father, have glory, and let honourable mention be made of
them, as having nobly and manfully escaped out of evil into good. None
of them should have their goods confiscated to the state, for the lots
of the citizens ought always to continue the same and equal.
Touching the exaction of penalties, when a man appears to have done
anything which deserves a fine, he shall pay the fine, if he have
anything in excess of the lot which is assigned to him; but more than
that he shall not pay. And to secure exactness, let the guardians of the
law refer to the registers, and inform the judges of the precise truth,
in order that none of the lots may go uncultivated for want of money.
But if any one seems to deserve a greater penalty, let him undergo a
long and public imprisonment and be dishonoured, unless some of his
friends are willing to be surety for him, and liberate him by assisting
him to pay the fine. No criminal shall go unpunished, not even for a
single offence, nor if he have fled the country; but let the penalty be
according to his deserts--death, or bonds, or blows, or degrading places
of sitting or standing, or removal to some temple on the borders of the
land; or let him pay fines, as we said before. In cases of death, let
the judges be the guardians of the law, and a court selected by merit
from the last year's magistrates. But how the causes are to be brought
into court, how the summonses are to be served, and the like, these
things may be left to the younger generation of legislators to
determine; the manner of voting we must determine ourselves.
Let the vote be given openly; but before they come to the vote let the
judges sit in order of seniority over against plaintiff and defendant,
and let all the citizens who can spare time hear and take a serious
interest in listening to such causes. First of all the plaintiff shall
make one speech, and then the defendant shall make another; and after
the speeches have been made the eldest judge shall begin to examine
the parties, and proceed to make an adequate enquiry into what has been
said; and after the oldest has spoken, the rest shall proceed in order
to examine either party as to what he finds defective in the evidence,
whether of statement or omission; and he who has nothing to ask shall
hand over the examination to another. And on so much of what has been
said as is to the purpose all the judges shall set their seals, and
place the writings on the altar of Hestia. On the next day they shall
meet again, and in like manner put their questions and go through the
cause, and again set their seals upon the evidence; and when they have
three times done this, and have had witnesses and evidence enough, they
shall each of them give a holy vote, after promising by Hestia that they
will decide justly and truly to the utmost of their power; and so they
shall put an end to the suit.
Next, after what relates to the Gods, follows what relates to the
dissolution of the state: Whoever by permitting a man to power enslaves
the laws, and subjects the city to factions, using violence and stirring
up sedition contrary to law, him we will deem the greatest enemy of the
whole state. But he who takes no part in such proceedings, and, being
one of the chief magistrates of the state, has no knowledge of treason,
or, having knowledge of it, by reason of cowardice does not interfere on
behalf of his country, such an one we must consider nearly as bad. Every
man who is worth anything will inform the magistrates, and bring the
conspirator to trial for making a violent and illegal attempt to change
the government. The judges of such cases shall be the same as of the
robbers of temples; and let the whole proceeding be carried on in the
same way, and the vote of the majority condemn to death. But let there
be a general rule, that the disgrace and punishment of the father is
not to be visited on the children, except in the case of some one whose
father, grandfather, and great-grandfather have successively undergone
the penalty of death. Such persons the city shall send away with all
their possessions to the city and country of their ancestors, retaining
only and wholly their appointed lot. And out of the citizens who have
more than one son of not less than ten years of age, they shall select
ten whom their father or grandfather by the mother's or father's side
shall appoint, and let them send to Delphi the names of those who are
selected, and him whom the God chooses they shall establish as heir
of the house which has failed; and may he have better fortune than his
predecessors!
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Once more let there be a third general law respecting the
judges who are to give judgment, and the manner of conducting suits
against those who are tried on an accusation of treason; and as
concerning the remaining or departure of their descendants--there shall
be one law for all three, for the traitor, and the robber of temples,
and the subverter by violence of the laws of the state. For a thief,
whether he steal much or little, let there be one law, and one
punishment for all alike: in the first place, let him pay double the
amount of the theft if he be convicted, and if he have so much over and
above the allotment--if he have not, he shall be bound until he pay the
penalty, or persuade him who has obtained the sentence against him to
forgive him. But if a person be convicted of a theft against the state,
then if he can persuade the city, or if he will pay back twice the
amount of the theft, he shall be set free from his bonds.
CLEINIAS: What makes you say, Stranger, that a theft is all one, whether
the thief may have taken much or little, and either from sacred
or secular places--and these are not the only differences in
thefts--seeing, then, that they are of many kinds, ought not the
legislator to adapt himself to them, and impose upon them entirely
different penalties?
ATHENIAN: Excellent. I was running on too fast, Cleinias, and you
impinged upon me, and brought me to my senses, reminding me of what,
indeed, had occurred to my mind already, that legislation was never yet
rightly worked out, as I may say in passing. Do you remember the image
in which I likened the men for whom laws are now made to slaves who are
doctored by slaves? For of this you may be very sure, that if one of
those empirical physicians, who practise medicine without science, were
to come upon the gentleman physician talking to his gentleman patient,
and using the language almost of philosophy, beginning at the beginning
of the disease and discoursing about the whole nature of the body, he
would burst into a hearty laugh--he would say what most of those who
are called doctors always have at their tongue's end: Foolish fellow, he
would say, you are not healing the sick man, but you are educating him;
and he does not want to be made a doctor, but to get well.
CLEINIAS: And would he not be right?
ATHENIAN: Perhaps he would; and he might remark upon us, that he who
discourses about laws, as we are now doing, is giving the citizens
education and not laws; that would be rather a telling observation.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: But we are fortunate.
CLEINIAS: In what way?
ATHENIAN: Inasmuch as we are not compelled to give laws, but we may take
into consideration every form of government, and ascertain what is
best and what is most needful, and how they may both be carried into
execution; and we may also, if we please, at this very moment choose
what is best, or, if we prefer, what is most necessary--which shall we
do?
CLEINIAS: There is something ridiculous, Stranger, in our proposing such
an alternative, as if we were legislators, simply bound under some great
necessity which cannot be deferred to the morrow. But we, as I may by
the grace of Heaven affirm, like gatherers of stones or beginners of
some composite work, may gather a heap of materials, and out of this, at
our leisure, select what is suitable for our projected construction. Let
us then suppose ourselves to be at leisure, not of necessity building,
but rather like men who are partly providing materials, and partly
putting them together. And we may truly say that some of our laws, like
stones, are already fixed in their places, and others lie at hand.
ATHENIAN: Certainly, in that case, Cleinias, our view of law will be
more in accordance with nature. For there is another matter affecting
legislators, which I must earnestly entreat you to consider.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: There are many writings to be found in cities, and among
them there are discourses composed by legislators as well as by other
persons.
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: Shall we give heed rather to the writings of those
others--poets and the like, who either in metre or out of metre have
recorded their advice about the conduct of life, and not to the writings
of legislators? or shall we give heed to them above all?
CLEINIAS: Yes; to them far above all others.
ATHENIAN: And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his
opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach
what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be
happy?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not.
ATHENIAN: And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets
to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the
pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and
others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of
all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when
you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the
best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they
disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws
of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents,
rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and,
after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in
discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which
may or may not be attainable--at any rate, we will show our readiness
to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the
result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be
good!
CLEINIAS: Excellent; let us do as you say.
ATHENIAN: Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what
relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in
general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation,
we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some
others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us,
if you please, consider these matters.
CLEINIAS: By all means.
ATHENIAN: Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then
endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how
far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we
should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.
CLEINIAS: What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all
agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair,
and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are
deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the
excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any
inconsistency in this.
CLEINIAS: They would be quite right.
ATHENIAN: Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which
are just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just
sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.
CLEINIAS: And what is the inference?
ATHENIAN: The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just
partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle
be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the
argument is consistently carried out?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet
dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will
not the just and the honourable disagree?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been
already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to
what we are saying.
CLEINIAS: To what?
ATHENIAN: We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of
temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put
to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of
a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these
sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at
once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.
And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all
the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?
CLEINIAS: Such appears to be the case.
ATHENIAN: In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language
of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are
consistent about these matters.
CLEINIAS: Consistent in what?
ATHENIAN: I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the
discussion, but if I did not, let me now state--
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I
must proceed to draw a further inference.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his
will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily
is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is
involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.
I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any
contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against
their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree
with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if
you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me--Well, Stranger, if all this
be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes--shall
we legislate or not--what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should
reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what
are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of
voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we
make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no
such thing as voluntary crime?
CLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these
objections?
ATHENIAN: That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us--
CLEINIAS: Do what?
ATHENIAN: Let us remember what has been well said by us already,
that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and
contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves
once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have
we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ
from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,
two kinds of actions have been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the
other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But
shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and
get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?
How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible.
Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two,
and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty
upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some
way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
CLEINIAS: I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:
either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must
show the meaning and truth of this statement.
ATHENIAN: Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable--not
to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and
unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and
involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between
them.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us
upon that point.
ATHENIAN: Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the
citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful
examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are
injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds--one, voluntary, and
the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite
as many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I
am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias
and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury
involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea
that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say
that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and,
on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred,
the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O
my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be
described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider
whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle
and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must
fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the
hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that
which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when
compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to
win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of
enmity to those of friendship.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the
injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable
of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of
injustice will take the following direction.
CLEINIAS: What direction?
ATHENIAN: When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law
will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again,
or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must
in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word
or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges,
by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed
to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the
just--this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees
any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty.
He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in
the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to
the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they
would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve
the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the
legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.
CLEINIAS: What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but
will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference
between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the
voluntary and involuntary which enter into them?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to do as you wish: Concerning the soul, thus
much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature
is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her,
and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational
force overturns many things.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite
power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all
things.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes.
Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into
two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter
offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of
wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he
knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of
ignorance, when possessed of power and strength, will be held by the
legislator to be the source of great and monstrous crimes, but when
attended with weakness, will only result in the errors of children
and old men; and these he will treat as errors, and will make laws
accordingly for those who commit them, which will be the mildest and
most merciful of all laws.
CLEINIAS: You are perfectly right.
ATHENIAN: We all of us remark of one man that he is superior to pleasure
and passion, and of another that he is inferior to them; and this is
true.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: But no one was ever yet heard to say that one of us is
superior and another inferior to ignorance.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: We are speaking of motives which incite men to the fulfilment
of their will; although an individual may be often drawn by them in
opposite directions at the same time.
CLEINIAS: Yes, often.
ATHENIAN: And now I can define to you clearly, and without ambiguity,
what I mean by the just and unjust, according to my notion of them:
When anger and fear, and pleasure and pain, and jealousies and desires,
tyrannize over the soul, whether they do any harm or not--I call all
this injustice. But when the opinion of the best, in whatever part
of human nature states or individuals may suppose that to dwell, has
dominion in the soul and orders the life of every man, even if it be
sometimes mistaken, yet what is done in accordance therewith, and the
principle in individuals which obeys this rule, and is best for the
whole life of man, is to be called just; although the hurt done by
mistake is thought by many to be involuntary injustice. Leaving the
question of names, about which we are not going to quarrel, and having
already delineated three sources of error, we may begin by recalling
them somewhat more vividly to our memory: One of them was of the painful
sort, which we denominate anger and fear.
CLEINIAS: Quite right.
ATHENIAN: There was a second consisting of pleasures and desires, and a
third of hopes, which aimed at true opinion about the best. The latter
being subdivided into three, we now get five sources of actions, and for
these five we will make laws of two kinds.
CLEINIAS: What are the two kinds?
ATHENIAN: There is one kind of actions done by violence and in the light
of day, and another kind of actions which are done in darkness and with
secret deceit, or sometimes both with violence and deceit; the laws
concerning these last ought to have a character of severity.
CLEINIAS: Naturally.
ATHENIAN: And now let us return from this digression and complete the
work of legislation. Laws have been already enacted by us concerning the
robbers of the Gods, and concerning traitors, and also concerning those
who corrupt the laws for the purpose of subverting the government. A
man may very likely commit some of these crimes, either in a state of
madness or when affected by disease, or under the influence of extreme
old age, or in a fit of childish wantonness, himself no better than
a child. And if this be made evident to the judges elected to try the
cause, on the appeal of the criminal or his advocate, and he be judged
to have been in this state when he committed the offence, he shall
simply pay for the hurt which he may have done to another; but he shall
be exempt from other penalties, unless he have slain some one, and have
on his hands the stain of blood. And in that case he shall go to another
land and country, and there dwell for a year; and if he return before
the expiration of the time which the law appoints, or even set his foot
at all on his native land, he shall be bound by the guardians of the law
in the public prison for two years, and then go free.
Having begun to speak of homicide, let us endeavour to lay down
laws concerning every different kind of homicide; and, first of all,
concerning violent and involuntary homicides. If any one in an athletic
contest, and at the public games, involuntarily kills a friend, and
he dies either at the time or afterwards of the blows which he has
received; or if the like misfortune happens to any one in war, or
military exercises, or mimic contests of which the magistrates enjoin
the practice, whether with or without arms, when he has been purified
according to the law brought from Delphi relating to these matters, he
shall be innocent. And so in the case of physicians: if their patient
dies against their will, they shall be held guiltless by the law. And if
one slay another with his own hand, but unintentionally, whether he be
unarmed or have some instrument or dart in his hand; or if he kill him
by administering food or drink, or by the application of fire or cold,
or by suffocating him, whether he do the deed by his own hand, or by the
agency of others, he shall be deemed the agent, and shall suffer one of
the following penalties: If he kill the slave of another in the belief
that he is his own, he shall bear the master of the dead man harmless
from loss, or shall pay a penalty of twice the value of the dead man,
which the judges shall assess; but purifications must be used greater
and more numerous than for those who committed homicide at the
games--what they are to be, the interpreters whom the God appoints shall
be authorised to declare. And if a man kills his own slave, when he has
been purified according to law, he shall be quit of the homicide. And
if a man kills a freeman unintentionally, he shall undergo the same
purification as he did who killed the slave. But let him not forget also
a tale of olden time, which is to this effect: He who has suffered a
violent end, when newly dead, if he has had the soul of a freeman in
life, is angry with the author of his death; and being himself full of
fear and panic by reason of his violent end, when he sees his murderer
walking about in his own accustomed haunts, he is stricken with terror
and becomes disordered, and this disorder of his, aided by the guilty
recollection of the other, is communicated by him with overwhelming
force to the murderer and his deeds. Wherefore also the murderer must
go out of the way of his victim for the entire period of a year, and not
himself be found in any spot which was familiar to him throughout the
country. And if the dead man be a stranger, the homicide shall be
kept from the country of the stranger during a like period. If any one
voluntarily obeys this law, the next of kin to the deceased, seeing all
that has happened, shall take pity on him, and make peace with him,
and show him all gentleness. But if any one is disobedient, and either
ventures to go to any of the temples and sacrifice unpurified, or will
not continue in exile during the appointed time, the next of kin to the
deceased shall proceed against him for murder; and if he be convicted,
every part of his punishment shall be doubled. And if the next of kin
do not proceed against the perpetrator of the crime, then the pollution
shall be deemed to fall upon his own head--the murdered man will fix the
guilt upon his kinsman, and he who has a mind to proceed against him may
compel him to be absent from his country during five years, according
to law. If a stranger unintentionally kill a stranger who is dwelling in
the city, he who likes shall prosecute the cause according to the same
rules. If he be a metic, let him be absent for a year, or if he be an
entire stranger, in addition to the purification, whether he have slain
a stranger, or a metic, or a citizen, he shall be banished for life
from the country which is in possession of our laws. And if he return
contrary to law, let the guardians of the law punish him with death; and
let them hand over his property, if he have any, to him who is next
of kin to the sufferer. And if he be wrecked, and driven on the coast
against his will, he shall take up his abode on the seashore, wetting
his feet in the sea, and watching for an opportunity of sailing; but
if he be brought by land, and is not his own master, let the magistrate
whom he first comes across in the city, release him and send him
unharmed over the border.
If any one slays a freeman with his own hand, and the deed be done
in passion, in the case of such actions we must begin by making a
distinction. For a deed is done from passion either when men suddenly,
and without intention to kill, cause the death of another by blows and
the like on a momentary impulse, and are sorry for the deed immediately
afterwards; or again, when after having been insulted in deed or word,
men pursue revenge, and kill a person intentionally, and are not sorry
for the act. And, therefore, we must assume that these homicides are of
two kinds, both of them arising from passion, which may be justly said
to be in a mean between the voluntary and involuntary; at the same time,
they are neither of them anything more than a likeness or shadow
of either. He who treasures up his anger, and avenges himself, not
immediately and at the moment, but with insidious design, and after an
interval, is like the voluntary; but he who does not treasure up his
anger, and takes vengeance on the instant, and without malice prepense,
approaches to the involuntary; and yet even he is not altogether
involuntary, but is only the image or shadow of the involuntary;
wherefore about homicides committed in hot blood, there is a difficulty
in determining whether in legislating we shall reckon them as voluntary
or as partly involuntary. The best and truest view is to regard them
respectively as likenesses only of the voluntary and involuntary, and
to distinguish them accordingly as they are done with or without
premeditation. And we should make the penalties heavier for those who
commit homicide with angry premeditation, and lighter for those who do
not premeditate, but smite upon the instant; for that which is like a
greater evil should be punished more severely, and that which is like
a less evil should be punished less severely: this shall be the rule of
our laws.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Let us proceed: If any one slays a freeman with his own hand,
and the deed be done in a moment of anger, and without premeditation,
let the offender suffer in other respects as the involuntary homicide
would have suffered, and also undergo an exile of two years, that he may
learn to school his passions. But he who slays another from passion, yet
with premeditation, shall in other respects suffer as the former; and
to this shall be added an exile of three instead of two years--his
punishment is to be longer because his passion is greater. The manner of
their return shall be on this wise: (and here the law has difficulty in
determining exactly; for in some cases the murderer who is judged by the
law to be the worse may really be the less cruel, and he who is judged
the less cruel may be really the worse, and may have executed the murder
in a more savage manner, whereas the other may have been gentler. But in
general the degrees of guilt will be such as we have described them. Of
all these things the guardians of the law must take cognizance): When a
homicide of either kind has completed his term of exile, the guardians
shall send twelve judges to the borders of the land; these during the
interval shall have informed themselves of the actions of the criminals,
and they shall judge respecting their pardon and reception; and the
homicides shall abide by their judgment. But if after they have returned
home, any one of them in a moment of anger repeats the deed, let him be
an exile, and return no more; or if he returns, let him suffer as the
stranger was to suffer in a similar case. He who kills his own slave
shall undergo a purification, but if he kills the slave of another in
anger, he shall pay twice the amount of the loss to his owner. And
if any homicide is disobedient to the law, and without purification
pollutes the agora, or the games, or the temples, he who pleases may
bring to trial the next of kin to the dead man for permitting him, and
the murderer with him, and may compel the one to exact and the other to
suffer a double amount of fines and purifications; and the accuser shall
himself receive the fine in accordance with the law. If a slave in a fit
of passion kills his master, the kindred of the deceased man may do with
the murderer (provided only they do not spare his life) whatever they
please, and they will be pure; or if he kills a freeman, who is not
his master, the owner shall give up the slave to the relatives of the
deceased, and they shall be under an obligation to put him to death,
but this may be done in any manner which they please. And if (which is
a rare occurrence, but does sometimes happen) a father or a mother in
a moment of passion slays a son or daughter by blows, or some other
violence, the slayer shall undergo the same purification as in other
cases, and be exiled during three years; but when the exile returns the
wife shall separate from the husband, and the husband from the wife, and
they shall never afterwards beget children together, or live under the
same roof, or partake of the same sacred rites with those whom they
have deprived of a child or of a brother. And he who is impious and
disobedient in such a case shall be brought to trial for impiety by any
one who pleases. If in a fit of anger a husband kills his wedded wife,
or the wife her husband, the slayer shall undergo the same purification,
and the term of exile shall be three years. And when he who has
committed any such crime returns, let him have no communication in
sacred rites with his children, neither let him sit at the same table
with them, and the father or son who disobeys shall be liable to be
brought to trial for impiety by any one who pleases. If a brother or
a sister in a fit of passion kills a brother or a sister, they shall
undergo purification and exile, as was the case with parents who killed
their offspring: they shall not come under the same roof, or share in
the sacred rites of those whom they have deprived of their brethren, or
of their children. And he who is disobedient shall be justly liable to
the law concerning impiety, which relates to these matters. If any one
is so violent in his passion against his parents, that in the madness
of his anger he dares to kill one of them, if the murdered person before
dying freely forgives the murderer, let him undergo the purification
which is assigned to those who have been guilty of involuntary homicide,
and do as they do, and he shall be pure. But if he be not acquitted, the
perpetrator of such a deed shall be amenable to many laws--he shall
be amenable to the extreme punishments for assault, and impiety, and
robbing of temples, for he has robbed his parent of life; and if a man
could be slain more than once, most justly would he who in a fit of
passion has slain father or mother, undergo many deaths. How can he,
whom, alone of all men, even in defence of his life, and when about to
suffer death at the hands of his parents, no law will allow to kill
his father or his mother who are the authors of his being, and whom the
legislator will command to endure any extremity rather than do this--how
can he, I say, lawfully receive any other punishment? Let death then be
the appointed punishment of him who in a fit of passion slays his father
or his mother. But if brother kills brother in a civil broil, or under
other like circumstances, if the other has begun, and he only defends
himself, let him be free from guilt, as he would be if he had slain an
enemy; and the same rule will apply if a citizen kill a citizen, or
a stranger a stranger. Or if a stranger kill a citizen or a citizen a
stranger in self-defence, let him be free from guilt in like manner; and
so in the case of a slave who has killed a slave; but if a slave have
killed a freeman in self-defence, let him be subject to the same law
as he who has killed a father; and let the law about the remission
of penalties in the case of parricide apply equally to every other
remission. Whenever any sufferer of his own accord remits the guilt of
homicide to another, under the idea that his act was involuntary, let
the perpetrator of the deed undergo a purification and remain in exile
for a year, according to law.
Enough has been said of murders violent and involuntary and committed in
passion: we have now to speak of voluntary crimes done with injustice of
every kind and with premeditation, through the influence of pleasures,
and desires, and jealousies.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Let us first speak, as far as we are able, of their various
kinds. The greatest cause of them is lust, which gets the mastery of the
soul maddened by desire; and this is most commonly found to exist where
the passion reigns which is strongest and most prevalent among the mass
of mankind: I mean where the power of wealth breeds endless desires of
never-to-be-satisfied acquisition, originating in natural disposition,
and a miserable want of education. Of this want of education, the
false praise of wealth which is bruited about both among Hellenes and
barbarians is the cause; they deem that to be the first of goods which
in reality is only the third. And in this way they wrong both posterity
and themselves, for nothing can be nobler and better than that the truth
about wealth should be spoken in all states--namely, that riches are for
the sake of the body, as the body is for the sake of the soul. They are
good, and wealth is intended by nature to be for the sake of them, and
is therefore inferior to them both, and third in order of excellence.
This argument teaches us that he who would be happy ought not to seek to
be rich, or rather he should seek to be rich justly and temperately, and
then there would be no murders in states requiring to be purged away
by other murders. But now, as I said at first, avarice is the chiefest
cause and source of the worst trials for voluntary homicide. A second
cause is ambition: this creates jealousies, which are troublesome
companions, above all to the jealous man himself, and in a less degree
to the chiefs of the state. And a third cause is cowardly and unjust
fear, which has been the occasion of many murders. When a man is doing
or has done something which he desires that no one should know him to be
doing or to have done, he will take the life of those who are likely to
inform of such things, if he have no other means of getting rid of them.
Let this be said as a prelude concerning crimes of violence in general;
and I must not omit to mention a tradition which is firmly believed by
many, and has been received by them from those who are learned in the
mysteries: they say that such deeds will be punished in the world below,
and also that when the perpetrators return to this world they will pay
the natural penalty which is due to the sufferer, and end their lives in
like manner by the hand of another. If he who is about to commit murder
believes this, and is made by the mere prelude to dread such a penalty,
there is no need to proceed with the proclamation of the law. But if
he will not listen, let the following law be declared and registered
against him: Whoever shall wrongfully and of design slay with his own
hand any of his kinsmen, shall in the first place be deprived of legal
privileges; and he shall not pollute the temples, or the agora, or the
harbours, or any other place of meeting, whether he is forbidden of men
or not; for the law, which represents the whole state, forbids him, and
always is and will be in the attitude of forbidding him. And if a cousin
or nearer relative of the deceased, whether on the male or female side,
does not prosecute the homicide when he ought, and have him proclaimed
an outlaw, he shall in the first place be involved in the pollution, and
incur the hatred of the Gods, even as the curse of the law stirs up the
voices of men against him; and in the second place he shall be liable to
be prosecuted by any one who is willing to inflict retribution on behalf
of the dead. And he who would avenge a murder shall observe all the
precautionary ceremonies of lavation, and any others which the God
commands in cases of this kind. Let him have proclamation made, and then
go forth and compel the perpetrator to suffer the execution of justice
according to the law. Now the legislator may easily show that these
things must be accomplished by prayers and sacrifices to certain Gods,
who are concerned with the prevention of murders in states. But who
these Gods are, and what should be the true manner of instituting such
trials with due regard to religion, the guardians of the law, aided by
the interpreters, and the prophets, and the God, shall determine, and
when they have determined let them carry on the prosecution at law. The
cause shall have the same judges who are appointed to decide in the case
of those who plunder temples. Let him who is convicted be punished with
death, and let him not be buried in the country of the murdered man, for
this would be shameless as well as impious. But if he fly and will not
stand his trial, let him fly for ever; or, if he set foot anywhere
on any part of the murdered man's country, let any relation of the
deceased, or any other citizen who may first happen to meet with him,
kill him with impunity, or bind and deliver him to those among the
judges of the case who are magistrates, that they may put him to death.
And let the prosecutor demand surety of him whom he prosecutes; three
sureties sufficient in the opinion of the magistrates who try the cause
shall be provided by him, and they shall undertake to produce him at the
trial. But if he be unwilling or unable to provide sureties, then the
magistrates shall take him and keep him in bonds, and produce him at the
day of trial.
If a man do not commit a murder with his own hand, but contrives the
death of another, and is the author of the deed in intention and design,
and he continues to dwell in the city, having his soul not pure of
the guilt of murder, let him be tried in the same way, except in what
relates to the sureties; and also, if he be found guilty, his body after
execution may have burial in his native land, but in all other respects
his case shall be as the former; and whether a stranger shall kill a
citizen, or a citizen a stranger, or a slave a slave, there shall be
no difference as touching murder by one's own hand or by contrivance,
except in the matter of sureties; and these, as has been said, shall be
required of the actual murderer only, and he who brings the accusation
shall bind them over at the time. If a slave be convicted of slaying a
freeman voluntarily, either by his own hand or by contrivance, let the
public executioner take him in the direction of the sepulchre, to a
place whence he can see the tomb of the dead man, and inflict upon him
as many stripes as the person who caught him orders, and if he survive,
let him put him to death. And if any one kills a slave who has done no
wrong, because he is afraid that he may inform of some base and evil
deeds of his own, or for any similar reason, in such a case let him pay
the penalty of murder, as he would have done if he had slain a citizen.
There are things about which it is terrible and unpleasant to legislate,
but impossible not to legislate. If, for example, there should be
murders of kinsmen, either perpetrated by the hands of kinsmen, or by
their contrivance, voluntary and purely malicious, which most often
happen in ill-regulated and ill-educated states, and may perhaps occur
even in a country where a man would not expect to find them, we must
repeat once more the tale which we narrated a little while ago, in
the hope that he who hears us will be the more disposed to abstain
voluntarily on these grounds from murders which are utterly abominable.
For the myth, or saying, or whatever we ought to call it, has been
plainly set forth by priests of old; they have pronounced that the
justice which guards and avenges the blood of kindred, follows the
law of retaliation, and ordains that he who has done any murderous act
should of necessity suffer that which he has done. He who has slain a
father shall himself be slain at some time or other by his children--if
a mother, he shall of necessity take a woman's nature, and lose his life
at the hands of his offspring in after ages; for where the blood of a
family has been polluted there is no other purification, nor can the
pollution be washed out until the homicidal soul which did the deed has
given life for life, and has propitiated and laid to sleep the wrath
of the whole family. These are the retributions of Heaven, and by such
punishments men should be deterred. But if they are not deterred, and
any one should be incited by some fatality to deprive his father, or
mother, or brethren, or children, of life voluntarily and of purpose,
for him the earthly lawgiver legislates as follows: There shall be the
same proclamations about outlawry, and there shall be the same sureties
which have been enacted in the former cases. But in his case, if he be
convicted, the servants of the judges and the magistrates shall slay him
at an appointed place without the city where three ways meet, and there
expose his body naked, and each of the magistrates on behalf of the
whole city shall take a stone and cast it upon the head of the dead man,
and so deliver the city from pollution; after that, they shall bear him
to the borders of the land, and cast him forth unburied, according to
law. And what shall he suffer who slays him who of all men, as they
say, is his own best friend? I mean the suicide, who deprives himself
by violence of his appointed share of life, not because the law of the
state requires him, nor yet under the compulsion of some painful and
inevitable misfortune which has come upon him, nor because he has had
to suffer from irremediable and intolerable shame, but who from sloth or
want of manliness imposes upon himself an unjust penalty. For him, what
ceremonies there are to be of purification and burial God knows, and
about these the next of kin should enquire of the interpreters and of
the laws thereto relating, and do according to their injunctions. They
who meet their death in this way shall be buried alone, and none shall
be laid by their side; they shall be buried ingloriously in the borders
of the twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated
and nameless, and no column or inscription shall mark the place of their
interment. And if a beast of burden or other animal cause the death
of any one, except in the case of anything of that kind happening to
a competitor in the public contests, the kinsmen of the deceased shall
prosecute the slayer for murder, and the wardens of the country, such,
and so many as the kinsmen appoint, shall try the cause, and let the
beast when condemned be slain by them, and let them cast it beyond the
borders. And if any lifeless thing deprive a man of life, except in the
case of a thunderbolt or other fatal dart sent from the Gods--whether
a man is killed by lifeless objects falling upon him, or by his falling
upon them, the nearest of kin shall appoint the nearest neighbour to be
a judge, and thereby acquit himself and the whole family of guilt. And
he shall cast forth the guilty thing beyond the border, as has been said
about the animals.
If a man is found dead, and his murderer be unknown, and after a
diligent search cannot be detected, there shall be the same proclamation
as in the previous cases, and the same interdict on the murderer; and
having proceeded against him, they shall proclaim in the agora by a
herald, that he who has slain such and such a person, and has been
convicted of murder, shall not set his foot in the temples, nor at all
in the country of the murdered man, and if he appears and is discovered,
he shall die, and be cast forth unburied beyond the border. Let this one
law then be laid down by us about murder; and let cases of this sort be
so regarded.
And now let us say in what cases and under what circumstances the
murderer is rightly free from guilt: If a man catch a thief coming into
his house by night to steal, and he take and kill him, or if he slay
a footpad in self-defence, he shall be guiltless. And any one who does
violence to a free woman or a youth, shall be slain with impunity by the
injured person, or by his or her father or brothers or sons. If a man
find his wife suffering violence, he may kill the violator, and be
guiltless in the eye of the law; or if a person kill another in warding
off death from his father or mother or children or brethren or wife who
are doing no wrong, he shall assuredly be guiltless.
Thus much as to the nurture and education of the living soul of man,
having which, he can, and without which, if he unfortunately be without
them, he cannot live; and also concerning the punishments which are
to be inflicted for violent deaths, let thus much be enacted. Of the
nurture and education of the body we have spoken before, and next in
order we have to speak of deeds of violence, voluntary and involuntary,
which men do to one another; these we will now distinguish, as far as we
are able, according to their nature and number, and determine what will
be the suitable penalties of each, and so assign to them their proper
place in the series of our enactments. The poorest legislator will have
no difficulty in determining that wounds and mutilations arising out of
wounds should follow next in order after deaths. Let wounds be divided
as homicides were divided--into those which are involuntary, and which
are given in passion or from fear, and those inflicted voluntarily
and with premeditation. Concerning all this, we must make some such
proclamation as the following: Mankind must have laws, and conform to
them, or their life would be as bad as that of the most savage beast.
And the reason of this is that no man's nature is able to know what is
best for human society; or knowing, always able and willing to do what
is best. In the first place, there is a difficulty in apprehending that
the true art of politics is concerned, not with private but with public
good (for public good binds together states, but private only distracts
them); and that both the public and private good as well of individuals
as of states is greater when the state and not the individual is first
considered. In the second place, although a person knows in the abstract
that this is true, yet if he be possessed of absolute and irresponsible
power, he will never remain firm in his principles or persist in
regarding the public good as primary in the state, and the private good
as secondary. Human nature will be always drawing him into avarice and
selfishness, avoiding pain and pursuing pleasure without any reason, and
will bring these to the front, obscuring the juster and better; and so
working darkness in his soul will at last fill with evils both him and
the whole city. For if a man were born so divinely gifted that he could
naturally apprehend the truth, he would have no need of laws to rule
over him; for there is no law or order which is above knowledge, nor can
mind, without impiety, be deemed the subject or slave of any man, but
rather the lord of all. I speak of mind, true and free, and in harmony
with nature. But then there is no such mind anywhere, or at least not
much; and therefore we must choose law and order, which are second
best. These look at things as they exist for the most part only, and
are unable to survey the whole of them. And therefore I have spoken as I
have.
And now we will determine what penalty he ought to pay or suffer who has
hurt or wounded another. Any one may easily imagine the questions which
have to be asked in all such cases: What did he wound, or whom, or
how, or when? for there are innumerable particulars of this sort which
greatly vary from one another. And to allow courts of law to determine
all these things, or not to determine any of them, is alike impossible.
There is one particular which they must determine in all cases--the
question of fact. And then, again, that the legislator should not permit
them to determine what punishment is to be inflicted in any of these
cases, but should himself decide about all of them, small or great, is
next to impossible.
CLEINIAS: Then what is to be the inference?
ATHENIAN: The inference is, that some things should be left to courts of
law; others the legislator must decide for himself.
CLEINIAS: And what ought the legislator to decide, and what ought he to
leave to the courts of law?
ATHENIAN: I may reply, that in a state in which the courts are bad
and mute, because the judges conceal their opinions and decide causes
clandestinely; or what is worse, when they are disorderly and noisy,
as in a theatre, clapping or hooting in turn this or that orator--I say
that then there is a very serious evil, which affects the whole state.
Unfortunate is the necessity of having to legislate for such courts,
but where the necessity exists, the legislator should only allow them to
ordain the penalties for the smallest offences; if the state for which
he is legislating be of this character, he must take most matters into
his own hands and speak distinctly. But when a state has good
courts, and the judges are well trained and scrupulously tested, the
determination of the penalties or punishments which shall be inflicted
on the guilty may fairly and with advantage be left to them. And we are
not to be blamed for not legislating concerning all that large class
of matters which judges far worse educated than ours would be able to
determine, assigning to each offence what is due both to the perpetrator
and to the sufferer. We believe those for whom we are legislating to be
best able to judge, and therefore to them the greater part may be left.
At the same time, as I have often said, we should exhibit to the
judges, as we have done, the outline and form of the punishments to be
inflicted, and then they will not transgress the just rule. That was an
excellent practice, which we observed before, and which now that we are
resuming the work of legislation, may with advantage be repeated by us.
Let the enactment about wounding be in the following terms: If any one
has a purpose and intention to slay another who is not his enemy, and
whom the law does not permit him to slay, and he wounds him, but is
unable to kill him, he who had the intent and has wounded him is not
to be pitied--he deserves no consideration, but should be regarded as
a murderer and be tried for murder. Still having respect to the fortune
which has in a manner favoured him, and to the providence which in pity
to him and to the wounded man saved the one from a fatal blow, and the
other from an accursed fate and calamity--as a thank-offering to this
deity, and in order not to oppose his will--in such a case the law will
remit the punishment of death, and only compel the offender to emigrate
to a neighbouring city for the rest of his life, where he shall remain
in the enjoyment of all his possessions. But if he have injured the
wounded man, he shall make such compensation for the injury as the court
deciding the cause shall assess, and the same judges shall decide who
would have decided if the man had died of his wounds. And if a child
intentionally wound his parents, or a servant his master, death shall be
the penalty. And if a brother or a sister intentionally wound a brother
or a sister, and is found guilty, death shall be the penalty. And if a
husband wound a wife, or a wife a husband, with intent to kill, let him
or her undergo perpetual exile; if they have sons or daughters who are
still young, the guardians shall take care of their property, and have
charge of the children as orphans. If their sons are grown up, they
shall be under no obligation to support the exiled parent, but they
shall possess the property themselves. And if he who meets with such a
misfortune has no children, the kindred of the exiled man to the
degree of sons of cousins, both on the male and female side, shall meet
together, and after taking counsel with the guardians of the law and
the priests, shall appoint a 5040th citizen to be the heir of the house,
considering and reasoning that no house of all the 5040 belongs to
the inhabitant or to the whole family, but is the public and private
property of the state. Now the state should seek to have its houses as
holy and happy as possible. And if any one of the houses be unfortunate,
and stained with impiety, and the owner leave no posterity, but dies
unmarried, or married and childless, having suffered death as the
penalty of murder or some other crime committed against the Gods or
against his fellow-citizens, of which death is the penalty distinctly
laid down in the law; or if any of the citizens be in perpetual exile,
and also childless, that house shall first of all be purified and
undergo expiation according to law; and then let the kinsmen of the
house, as we were just now saying, and the guardians of the law, meet
and consider what family there is in the state which is of the highest
repute for virtue and also for good fortune, in which there are a number
of sons; from that family let them take one and introduce him to the
father and forefathers of the dead man as their son, and, for the sake
of the omen, let him be called so, that he may be the continuer of their
family, the keeper of their hearth, and the minister of their sacred
rites with better fortune than his father had; and when they have made
this supplication, they shall make him heir according to law, and the
offending person they shall leave nameless and childless and portionless
when calamities such as these overtake him.
Now the boundaries of some things do not touch one another, but there is
a borderland which comes in between, preventing them from touching. And
we were saying that actions done from passion are of this nature, and
come in between the voluntary and involuntary. If a person be convicted
of having inflicted wounds in a passion, in the first place he shall
pay twice the amount of the injury, if the wound be curable, or, if
incurable, four times the amount of the injury; or if the wound be
curable, and at the same time cause great and notable disgrace to the
wounded person, he shall pay fourfold. And whenever any one in wounding
another injures not only the sufferer, but also the city, and makes him
incapable of defending his country against the enemy, he, besides the
other penalties, shall pay a penalty for the loss which the state has
incurred. And the penalty shall be, that in addition to his own times of
service, he shall serve on behalf of the disabled person, and shall take
his place in war; or, if he refuse, he shall be liable to be convicted
by law of refusal to serve. The compensation for the injury, whether to
be twofold or threefold or fourfold, shall be fixed by the judges who
convict him. And if, in like manner, a brother wounds a brother, the
parents and kindred of either sex, including the children of cousins,
whether on the male or female side, shall meet, and when they have
judged the cause, they shall entrust the assessment of damages to
the parents, as is natural; and if the estimate be disputed, then the
kinsmen on the male side shall make the estimate, or if they cannot,
they shall commit the matter to the guardians of the law. And when
similar charges of wounding are brought by children against their
parents, those who are more than sixty years of age, having children of
their own, not adopted, shall be required to decide; and if any one
is convicted, they shall determine whether he or she ought to die, or
suffer some other punishment either greater than death, or, at any rate,
not much less. A kinsman of the offender shall not be allowed to judge
the cause, not even if he be of the age which is prescribed by the law.
If a slave in a fit of anger wound a freeman, the owner of the slave
shall give him up to the wounded man, who may do as he pleases with him,
and if he do not give him up he shall himself make good the injury.
And if any one says that the slave and the wounded man are conspiring
together, let him argue the point, and if he is cast, he shall pay for
the wrong three times over, but if he gains his case, the freeman who
conspired with the slave shall be liable to an action for kidnapping.
And if any one unintentionally wounds another he shall simply pay for
the harm, for no legislator is able to control chance. In such a case
the judges shall be the same as those who are appointed in the case of
children suing their parents; and they shall estimate the amount of the
injury.
All the preceding injuries and every kind of assault are deeds of
violence; and every man, woman, or child ought to consider that the
elder has the precedence of the younger in honour, both among the Gods
and also among men who would live in security and happiness. Wherefore
it is a foul thing and hateful to the Gods to see an elder man assaulted
by a younger in the city, and it is reasonable that a young man when
struck by an elder should lightly endure his anger, laying up in store
for himself a like honour when he is old. Let this be the law: Every one
shall reverence his elder in word and deed; he shall respect any one who
is twenty years older than himself, whether male or female, regarding
him or her as his father or mother; and he shall abstain from laying
hands on any one who is of an age to have been his father or mother, out
of reverence to the Gods who preside over birth; similarly he shall
keep his hands from a stranger, whether he be an old inhabitant or newly
arrived; he shall not venture to correct such an one by blows, either
as the aggressor or in self-defence. If he thinks that some stranger has
struck him out of wantonness or insolence, and ought to be punished, he
shall take him to the wardens of the city, but let him not strike him,
that the stranger may be kept far away from the possibility of lifting
up his hand against a citizen, and let the wardens of the city take
the offender and examine him, not forgetting their duty to the God of
Strangers, and in case the stranger appears to have struck the citizen
unjustly, let them inflict upon him as many blows with the scourge as he
was himself inflicted, and quell his presumption. But if he be innocent,
they shall threaten and rebuke the man who arrested him, and let them
both go. If a person strikes another of the same age or somewhat older
than himself, who has no children, whether he be an old man who strikes
an old man or a young man who strikes a young man, let the person struck
defend himself in the natural way without a weapon and with his hands
only. He who, being more than forty years of age, dares to fight with
another, whether he be the aggressor or in self-defence, shall
be regarded as rude and ill-mannered and slavish--this will be a
disgraceful punishment, and therefore suitable to him. The obedient
nature will readily yield to such exhortations, but the disobedient,
who heeds not the prelude, shall have the law ready for him: If any man
smite another who is older than himself, either by twenty or by more
years, in the first place, he who is at hand, not being younger than the
combatants, nor their equal in age, shall separate them, or be disgraced
according to law; but if he be the equal in age of the person who is
struck or younger, he shall defend the person injured as he would a
brother or father or still older relative. Further, let him who dares to
smite an elder be tried for assault, as I have said, and if he be found
guilty, let him be imprisoned for a period of not less than a year, or
if the judges approve of a longer period, their decision shall be final.
But if a stranger or metic smite one who is older by twenty years or
more, the same law shall hold about the bystanders assisting, and he who
is found guilty in such a suit, if he be a stranger but not resident,
shall be imprisoned during a period of two years; and a metic who
disobeys the laws shall be imprisoned for three years, unless the court
assign him a longer term. And let him who was present in any of these
cases and did not assist according to law be punished, if he be of the
highest class, by paying a fine of a mina; or if he be of the second
class, of fifty drachmas; or if of the third class, by a fine of thirty
drachmas; or if he be of the fourth class, by a fine of twenty drachmas;
and the generals and taxiarchs and phylarchs and hipparchs shall form
the court in such cases.
Laws are partly framed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct
them how they may live on friendly terms with one another, and partly
for the sake of those who refuse to be instructed, whose spirit cannot
be subdued, or softened, or hindered from plunging into evil. These are
the persons who cause the word to be spoken which I am about to utter;
for them the legislator legislates of necessity, and in the hope that
there may be no need of his laws. He who shall dare to lay violent hands
upon his father or mother, or any still older relative, having no fear
either of the wrath of the Gods above, or of the punishments that are
spoken of in the world below, but transgresses in contempt of ancient
and universal traditions as though he were too wise to believe in them,
requires some extreme measure of prevention. Now death is not the worst
that can happen to men; far worse are the punishments which are said to
pursue them in the world below. But although they are most true tales,
they work on such souls no prevention; for if they had any effect there
would be no slayers of mothers, or impious hands lifted up against
parents; and therefore the punishments of this world which are inflicted
during life ought not in such cases to fall short, if possible, of the
terrors of the world below. Let our enactment then be as follows: If
a man dare to strike his father or his mother, or their fathers or
mothers, he being at the time of sound mind, then let any one who is
at hand come to the rescue as has been already said, and the metic or
stranger who comes to the rescue shall be called to the first place
in the games; but if he do not come he shall suffer the punishment of
perpetual exile. He who is not a metic, if he comes to the rescue, shall
have praise, and if he do not come, blame. And if a slave come to the
rescue, let him be made free, but if he do not come to the rescue, let
him receive 100 strokes of the whip, by order of the wardens of the
agora, if the occurrence take place in the agora; or if somewhere in the
city beyond the limits of the agora, any warden of the city who is in
residence shall punish him; or if in the country, then the commanders
of the wardens of the country. If those who are near at the time be
inhabitants of the same place, whether they be youths, or men, or women,
let them come to the rescue and denounce him as the impious one; and he
who does not come to the rescue shall fall under the curse of Zeus, the
God of kindred and of ancestors, according to law. And if any one is
found guilty of assaulting a parent, let him in the first place be
forever banished from the city into the country, and let him abstain
from the temples; and if he do not abstain, the wardens of the country
shall punish him with blows, or in any way which they please, and if
he return he shall be put to death. And if any freeman eat or drink, or
have any other sort of intercourse with him, or only meeting him have
voluntarily touched him, he shall not enter into any temple, nor into
the agora, nor into the city, until he is purified; for he should
consider that he has become tainted by a curse. And if he disobeys the
law, and pollutes the city and the temples contrary to law, and one of
the magistrates sees him and does not indict him, when he gives in his
account this omission shall be a most serious charge.
If a slave strike a freeman, whether a stranger or a citizen, let
any one who is present come to the rescue, or pay the penalty already
mentioned; and let the bystanders bind him, and deliver him up to
the injured person, and he receiving him shall put him in chains, and
inflict on him as many stripes as he pleases; but having punished him he
must surrender him to his master according to law, and not deprive him
of his property. Let the law be as follows: The slave who strikes a
freeman, not at the command of the magistrates, his owner shall receive
bound from the man whom he has stricken, and not release him until the
slave has persuaded the man whom he has stricken that he ought to be
released. And let there be the same laws about women in relation to
women, and about men and women in relation to one another.