BOOK I.

Produced by Sue Asscher

LAWS

By Plato

Translated By Benjamin Jowett

INTRODUCTION AND ANALYSIS.

The genuineness of the Laws is sufficiently proved (1) by more than

twenty citations of them in the writings of Aristotle, who was residing

at Athens during the last twenty years of the life of Plato, and who,

having left it after his death (B.C. 347), returned thither twelve years

later (B.C. 335); (2) by the allusion of Isocrates

(Oratio ad Philippum missa, p.84: To men tais paneguresin enochlein

kai pros apantas legein tous sunprechontas en autais pros oudena legein

estin, all omoios oi toioutoi ton logon (sc. speeches in the assembly)

akuroi tugchanousin ontes tois nomois kai tais politeiais tais upo ton

sophiston gegrammenais.) --writing 346 B.C., a year after the death

of Plato, and probably not more than three or four years after the

composition of the Laws--who speaks of the Laws and Republics written by

philosophers (upo ton sophiston); (3) by the reference (Athen.) of the

comic poet Alexis, a younger contemporary of Plato (fl. B.C 356-306), to

the enactment about prices, which occurs in Laws xi., viz that the same

goods should not be offered at two prices on the same day

(Ou gegone kreitton nomothetes tou plousiou

Aristonikou tithesi gar nuni nomon,

ton ichthuopolon ostis an polon tini

ichthun upotimesas apodot elattonos

es eipe times, eis to desmoterion

euthus apagesthai touton, ina dedoikotes

tes axias agaposin, e tes esperas

saprous apantas apopherosin oikade.

Meineke, Frag. Com. Graec.); (4) by the unanimous voice of later

antiquity and the absence of any suspicion among ancient writers worth

speaking of to the contrary; for it is not said of Philippus of Opus

that he composed any part of the Laws, but only that he copied them

out of the waxen tablets, and was thought by some to have written the

Epinomis (Diog. Laert.) That the longest and one of the best writings

bearing the name of Plato should be a forgery, even if its genuineness

were unsupported by external testimony, would be a singular phenomenon

in ancient literature; and although the critical worth of the consensus

of late writers is generally not to be compared with the express

testimony of contemporaries, yet a somewhat greater value may be

attributed to their consent in the present instance, because the

admission of the Laws is combined with doubts about the Epinomis,

a spurious writing, which is a kind of epilogue to the larger work

probably of a much later date. This shows that the reception of the Laws

was not altogether undiscriminating.

The suspicion which has attached to the Laws of Plato in the judgment

of some modern writers appears to rest partly (1) on differences in

the style and form of the work, and (2) on differences of thought and

opinion which they observe in them. Their suspicion is increased by the

fact that these differences are accompanied by resemblances as striking

to passages in other Platonic writings. They are sensible of a want

of point in the dialogue and a general inferiority in the ideas,

plan, manners, and style. They miss the poetical flow, the dramatic

verisimilitude, the life and variety of the characters, the dialectic

subtlety, the Attic purity, the luminous order, the exquisite urbanity;

instead of which they find tautology, obscurity, self-sufficiency,

sermonizing, rhetorical declamation, pedantry, egotism, uncouth forms

of sentences, and peculiarities in the use of words and idioms. They are

unable to discover any unity in the patched, irregular structure. The

speculative element both in government and education is superseded by

a narrow economical or religious vein. The grace and cheerfulness of

Athenian life have disappeared; and a spirit of moroseness and religious

intolerance has taken their place. The charm of youth is no longer

there; the mannerism of age makes itself unpleasantly felt. The

connection is often imperfect; and there is a want of arrangement,

exhibited especially in the enumeration of the laws towards the end of

the work. The Laws are full of flaws and repetitions. The Greek is in

places very ungrammatical and intractable. A cynical levity is displayed

in some passages, and a tone of disappointment and lamentation over

human things in others. The critics seem also to observe in them bad

imitations of thoughts which are better expressed in Plato's other

writings. Lastly, they wonder how the mind which conceived the Republic

could have left the Critias, Hermocrates, and Philosophus incomplete or

unwritten, and have devoted the last years of life to the Laws.

The questions which have been thus indirectly suggested may be

considered by us under five or six heads: I, the characters; II, the

plan; III, the style; IV, the imitations of other writings of Plato;

V; the more general relation of the Laws to the Republic and the other

dialogues; and VI, to the existing Athenian and Spartan states.

I. Already in the Philebus the distinctive character of Socrates has

disappeared; and in the Timaeus, Sophist, and Statesman his function of

chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus, and

to the Eleatic Stranger, at whose feet he sits, and is silent. More and

more Plato seems to have felt in his later writings that the character

and method of Socrates were no longer suited to be the vehicle of his

own philosophy. He is no longer interrogative but dogmatic; not 'a

hesitating enquirer,' but one who speaks with the authority of a

legislator. Even in the Republic we have seen that the argument which is

carried on by Socrates in the old style with Thrasymachus in the first

book, soon passes into the form of exposition. In the Laws he is nowhere

mentioned. Yet so completely in the tradition of antiquity is Socrates

identified with Plato, that in the criticism of the Laws which we find

in the so-called Politics of Aristotle he is supposed by the writer

still to be playing his part of the chief speaker (compare Pol.).

The Laws are discussed by three representatives of Athens, Crete, and

Sparta. The Athenian, as might be expected, is the protagonist or chief

speaker, while the second place is assigned to the Cretan, who, as

one of the leaders of a new colony, has a special interest in the

conversation. At least four-fifths of the answers are put into his

mouth. The Spartan is every inch a soldier, a man of few words himself,

better at deeds than words. The Athenian talks to the two others,

although they are his equals in age, in the style of a master

discoursing to his scholars; he frequently praises himself; he

entertains a very poor opinion of the understanding of his companions.

Certainly the boastfulness and rudeness of the Laws is the reverse of

the refined irony and courtesy which characterize the earlier dialogues.

We are no longer in such good company as in the Phaedrus and Symposium.

Manners are lost sight of in the earnestness of the speakers, and

dogmatic assertions take the place of poetical fancies.

The scene is laid in Crete, and the conversation is held in the course

of a walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus, which takes place

on one of the longest and hottest days of the year. The companions start

at dawn, and arrive at the point in their conversation which terminates

the fourth book, about noon. The God to whose temple they are going is

the lawgiver of Crete, and this may be supposed to be the very cave

at which he gave his oracles to Minos. But the externals of the scene,

which are briefly and inartistically described, soon disappear, and we

plunge abruptly into the subject of the dialogue. We are reminded by

contrast of the higher art of the Phaedrus, in which the summer's day,

and the cool stream, and the chirping of the grasshoppers, and the

fragrance of the agnus castus, and the legends of the place are present

to the imagination throughout the discourse.

The typical Athenian apologizes for the tendency of his countrymen

'to spin a long discussion out of slender materials,' and in a similar

spirit the Lacedaemonian Megillus apologizes for the Spartan brevity

(compare Thucydid.), acknowledging at the same time that there may be

occasions when long discourses are necessary. The family of Megillus is

the proxenus of Athens at Sparta; and he pays a beautiful compliment to

the Athenian, significant of the character of the work, which, though

borrowing many elements from Sparta, is also pervaded by an Athenian

spirit. A good Athenian, he says, is more than ordinarily good, because

he is inspired by nature and not manufactured by law. The love of

listening which is attributed to the Timocrat in the Republic is also

exhibited in him. The Athenian on his side has a pleasure in speaking to

the Lacedaemonian of the struggle in which their ancestors were jointly

engaged against the Persians. A connexion with Athens is likewise

intimated by the Cretan Cleinias. He is the relative of Epimenides,

whom, by an anachronism of a century,--perhaps arising as Zeller

suggests (Plat. Stud.) out of a confusion of the visit of Epimenides

and Diotima (Symp.),--he describes as coming to Athens, not after the

attempt of Cylon, but ten years before the Persian war. The Cretan and

Lacedaemonian hardly contribute at all to the argument of which the

Athenian is the expounder; they only supply information when asked about

the institutions of their respective countries. A kind of simplicity or

stupidity is ascribed to them. At first, they are dissatisfied with the

free criticisms which the Athenian passes upon the laws of Minos and

Lycurgus, but they acquiesce in his greater experience and knowledge of

the world. They admit that there can be no objection to the enquiry; for

in the spirit of the legislator himself, they are discussing his laws

when there are no young men present to listen. They are unwilling to

allow that the Spartan and Cretan lawgivers can have been mistaken

in honouring courage as the first part of virtue, and are puzzled at

hearing for the first time that 'Goods are only evil to the evil.'

Several times they are on the point of quarrelling, and by an effort

learn to restrain their natural feeling (compare Shakespeare, Henry V,

act iii. sc. 2). In Book vii., the Lacedaemonian expresses a momentary

irritation at the accusation which the Athenian brings against the

Spartan institutions, of encouraging licentiousness in their women,

but he is reminded by the Cretan that the permission to criticize them

freely has been given, and cannot be retracted. His only criterion of

truth is the authority of the Spartan lawgiver; he is 'interested,'

in the novel speculations of the Athenian, but inclines to prefer the

ordinances of Lycurgus.

The three interlocutors all of them speak in the character of old

men, which forms a pleasant bond of union between them. They have the

feelings of old age about youth, about the state, about human things in

general. Nothing in life seems to be of much importance to them; they

are spectators rather than actors, and men in general appear to the

Athenian speaker to be the playthings of the Gods and of circumstances.

Still they have a fatherly care of the young, and are deeply impressed

by sentiments of religion. They would give confidence to the aged by an

increasing use of wine, which, as they get older, is to unloose their

tongues and make them sing. The prospect of the existence of the soul

after death is constantly present to them; though they can hardly be

said to have the cheerful hope and resignation which animates Socrates

in the Phaedo or Cephalus in the Republic. Plato appears to be

expressing his own feelings in remarks of this sort. For at the time of

writing the first book of the Laws he was at least seventy-four years of

age, if we suppose him to allude to the victory of the Syracusans under

Dionysius the Younger over the Locrians, which occurred in the year 356.

Such a sadness was the natural effect of declining years and failing

powers, which make men ask, 'After all, what profit is there in life?'

They feel that their work is beginning to be over, and are ready to say,

'All the world is a stage;' or, in the actual words of Plato, 'Let us

play as good plays as we can,' though 'we must be sometimes serious,

which is not agreeable, but necessary.' These are feelings which have

crossed the minds of reflective persons in all ages, and there is no

reason to connect the Laws any more than other parts of Plato's writings

with the very uncertain narrative of his life, or to imagine that this

melancholy tone is attributable to disappointment at having failed to

convert a Sicilian tyrant into a philosopher.

II. The plan of the Laws is more irregular and has less connexion than

any other of the writings of Plato. As Aristotle says in the Politics,

'The greater part consists of laws'; in Books v, vi, xi, xii the

dialogue almost entirely disappears. Large portions of them are rather

the materials for a work than a finished composition which may rank with

the other Platonic dialogues. To use his own image, 'Some stones are

regularly inserted in the building; others are lying on the ground ready

for use.' There is probably truth in the tradition that the Laws were

not published until after the death of Plato. We can easily believe that

he has left imperfections, which would have been removed if he had

lived a few years longer. The arrangement might have been improved;

the connexion of the argument might have been made plainer, and the

sentences more accurately framed. Something also may be attributed

to the feebleness of old age. Even a rough sketch of the Phaedrus or

Symposium would have had a very different look. There is, however, an

interest in possessing one writing of Plato which is in the process of

creation.

We must endeavour to find a thread of order which will carry us through

this comparative disorder. The first four books are described by Plato

himself as the preface or preamble. Having arrived at the conclusion

that each law should have a preamble, the lucky thought occurs to him at

the end of the fourth book that the preceding discourse is the

preamble of the whole. This preamble or introduction may be abridged as

follows:--

The institutions of Sparta and Crete are admitted by the Lacedaemonian

and Cretan to have one aim only: they were intended by the legislator

to inspire courage in war. To this the Athenian objects that the true

lawgiver should frame his laws with a view to all the virtues and not

to one only. Better is he who has temperance as well as courage, than he

who has courage only; better is he who is faithful in civil broils,

than he who is a good soldier only. Better, too, is peace than war; the

reconciliation than the defeat of an enemy. And he who would attain all

virtue should be trained amid pleasures as well as pains. Hence

there should be convivial intercourse among the citizens, and a man's

temperance should be tested in his cups, as we test his courage amid

dangers. He should have a fear of the right sort, as well as a courage

of the right sort.

At the beginning of the second book the subject of pleasure leads to

education, which in the early years of life is wholly a discipline

imparted by the means of pleasure and pain. The discipline of pleasure

is implanted chiefly by the practice of the song and the dance. Of

these the forms should be fixed, and not allowed to depend on the fickle

breath of the multitude. There will be choruses of boys, girls, and

grown-up persons, and all will be heard repeating the same strain, that

'virtue is happiness.' One of them will give the law to the rest; this

will be the chorus of aged minstrels, who will sing the most beautiful

and the most useful of songs. They will require a little wine, to mellow

the austerity of age, and make them amenable to the laws.

After having laid down as the first principle of politics, that peace,

and not war, is the true aim of the legislator, and briefly discussed

music and festive intercourse, at the commencement of the third book

Plato makes a digression, in which he speaks of the origin of society.

He describes, first of all, the family; secondly, the patriarchal stage,

which is an aggregation of families; thirdly, the founding of regular

cities, like Ilium; fourthly, the establishment of a military and

political system, like that of Sparta, with which he identifies Argos

and Messene, dating from the return of the Heraclidae. But the aims of

states should be good, or else, like the prayer of Theseus, they may

be ruinous to themselves. This was the case in two out of three of the

Heracleid kingdoms. They did not understand that the powers in a state

should be balanced. The balance of powers saved Sparta, while the excess

of tyranny in Persia and the excess of liberty at Athens have been the

ruin of both...This discourse on politics is suddenly discovered to have

an immediate practical use; for Cleinias the Cretan is about to give

laws to a new colony.

At the beginning of the fourth book, after enquiring into the

circumstances and situation of the colony, the Athenian proceeds to make

further reflections. Chance, and God, and the skill of the legislator,

all co-operate in the formation of states. And the most favourable

condition for the foundation of a new one is when the government is

in the hands of a virtuous tyrant who has the good fortune to be

the contemporary of a great legislator. But a virtuous tyrant is a

contradiction in terms; we can at best only hope to have magistrates who

are the servants of reason and the law. This leads to the enquiry, what

is to be the polity of our new state. And the answer is, that we are to

fear God, and honour our parents, and to cultivate virtue and justice;

these are to be our first principles. Laws must be definite, and

we should create in the citizens a predisposition to obey them. The

legislator will teach as well as command; and with this view he will

prefix preambles to his principal laws.

The fifth book commences in a sort of dithyramb with another and higher

preamble about the honour due to the soul, whence are deduced the duties

of a man to his parents and his friends, to the suppliant and stranger.

He should be true and just, free from envy and excess of all sorts,

forgiving to crimes which are not incurable and are partly involuntary;

and he should have a true taste. The noblest life has the greatest

pleasures and the fewest pains...Having finished the preamble, and

touched on some other preliminary considerations, we proceed to the

Laws, beginning with the constitution of the state. This is not the best

or ideal state, having all things common, but only the second-best,

in which the land and houses are to be distributed among 5040 citizens

divided into four classes. There is to be no gold or silver among

them, and they are to have moderate wealth, and to respect number and

numerical order in all things.

In the first part of the sixth book, Plato completes his sketch of the

constitution by the appointment of officers. He explains the manner

in which guardians of the law, generals, priests, wardens of town

and country, ministers of education, and other magistrates are to be

appointed; and also in what way courts of appeal are to be constituted,

and omissions in the law to be supplied. Next--and at this point

the Laws strictly speaking begin--there follow enactments respecting

marriage and the procreation of children, respecting property in slaves

as well as of other kinds, respecting houses, married life, common

tables for men and women. The question of age in marriage suggests the

consideration of a similar question about the time for holding offices,

and for military service, which had been previously omitted.

Resuming the order of the discussion, which was indicated in the

previous book, from marriage and birth we proceed to education in the

seventh book. Education is to begin at or rather before birth; to be

continued for a time by mothers and nurses under the supervision of

the state; finally, to comprehend music and gymnastics. Under music is

included reading, writing, playing on the lyre, arithmetic, geometry,

and a knowledge of astronomy sufficient to preserve the minds of the

citizens from impiety in after-life. Gymnastics are to be practised

chiefly with a view to their use in war. The discussion of education,

which was lightly touched upon in Book ii, is here completed.

The eighth book contains regulations for civil life, beginning with

festivals, games, and contests, military exercises and the like. On such

occasions Plato seems to see young men and maidens meeting together,

and hence he is led into discussing the relations of the sexes, the evil

consequences which arise out of the indulgence of the passions, and the

remedies for them. Then he proceeds to speak of agriculture, of arts and

trades, of buying and selling, and of foreign commerce.

The remaining books of the Laws, ix-xii, are chiefly concerned with

criminal offences. In the first class are placed offences against the

Gods, especially sacrilege or robbery of temples: next follow offences

against the state,--conspiracy, treason, theft. The mention of thefts

suggests a distinction between voluntary and involuntary, curable and

incurable offences. Proceeding to the greater crime of homicide, Plato

distinguishes between mere homicide, manslaughter, which is partly

voluntary and partly involuntary, and murder, which arises from avarice,

ambition, fear. He also enumerates murders by kindred, murders by

slaves, wounds with or without intent to kill, wounds inflicted in

anger, crimes of or against slaves, insults to parents. To these,

various modes of purification or degrees of punishment are assigned, and

the terrors of another world are also invoked against them.

At the beginning of Book x, all acts of violence, including sacrilege,

are summed up in a single law. The law is preceded by an admonition, in

which the offenders are informed that no one ever did an unholy act or

said an unlawful word while he retained his belief in the existence of

the Gods; but either he denied their existence, or he believed that they

took no care of man, or that they might be turned from their course

by sacrifices and prayers. The remainder of the book is devoted to the

refutation of these three classes of unbelievers, and concludes with the

means to be taken for their reformation, and the announcement of their

punishments if they continue obstinate and impenitent.

The eleventh book is taken up with laws and with admonitions relating to

individuals, which follow one another without any exact order. There are

laws concerning deposits and the finding of treasure; concerning slaves

and freedmen; concerning retail trade, bequests, divorces, enchantments,

poisonings, magical arts, and the like. In the twelfth book the same

subjects are continued. Laws are passed concerning violations of

military discipline, concerning the high office of the examiners and

their burial; concerning oaths and the violation of them, and the

punishments of those who neglect their duties as citizens. Foreign

travel is then discussed, and the permission to be accorded to citizens

of journeying in foreign parts; the strangers who may come to visit

the city are also spoken of, and the manner in which they are to be

received. Laws are added respecting sureties, searches for property,

right of possession by prescription, abduction of witnesses, theatrical

competition, waging of private warfare, and bribery in offices. Rules

are laid down respecting taxation, respecting economy in sacred rites,

respecting judges, their duties and sentences, and respecting sepulchral

places and ceremonies. Here the Laws end. Lastly, a Nocturnal Council

is instituted for the preservation of the state, consisting of older and

younger members, who are to exhibit in their lives that virtue which is

the basis of the state, to know the one in many, and to be educated

in divine and every other kind of knowledge which will enable them to

fulfil their office.

III. The style of the Laws differs in several important respects from

that of the other dialogues of Plato: (1) in the want of character,

power, and lively illustration; (2) in the frequency of mannerisms

(compare Introduction to the Philebus); (3) in the form and rhythm of

the sentences; (4) in the use of words. On the other hand, there are

many passages (5) which are characterized by a sort of ethical grandeur;

and (6) in which, perhaps, a greater insight into human nature, and a

greater reach of practical wisdom is shown, than in any other of Plato's

writings.

1. The discourse of the three old men is described by themselves as an

old man's game of play. Yet there is little of the liveliness of a game

in their mode of treating the subject. They do not throw the ball to

and fro, but two out of the three are listeners to the third, who is

constantly asserting his superior wisdom and opportunities of knowledge,

and apologizing (not without reason) for his own want of clearness of

speech. He will 'carry them over the stream;' he will answer for them

when the argument is beyond their comprehension; he is afraid of their

ignorance of mathematics, and thinks that gymnastic is likely to be more

intelligible to them;--he has repeated his words several times, and yet

they cannot understand him. The subject did not properly take the form

of dialogue, and also the literary vigour of Plato had passed away. The

old men speak as they might be expected to speak, and in this there is

a touch of dramatic truth. Plato has given the Laws that form or want of

form which indicates the failure of natural power. There is no regular

plan--none of that consciousness of what has preceded and what is to

follow, which makes a perfect style,--but there are several attempts

at a plan; the argument is 'pulled up,' and frequent explanations are

offered why a particular topic was introduced.

The fictions of the Laws have no longer the verisimilitude which

is characteristic of the Phaedrus and the Timaeus, or even of the

Statesman. We can hardly suppose that an educated Athenian would have

placed the visit of Epimenides to Athens ten years before the

Persian war, or have imagined that a war with Messene prevented the

Lacedaemonians from coming to the rescue of Hellas. The narrative of the

origin of the Dorian institutions, which are said to have been due to

a fear of the growing power of the Assyrians, is a plausible invention,

which may be compared with the tale of the island of Atlantis and the

poem of Solon, but is not accredited by similar arts of deception.

The other statement that the Dorians were Achaean exiles assembled

by Dorieus, and the assertion that Troy was included in the Assyrian

Empire, have some foundation (compare for the latter point, Diod.

Sicul.). Nor is there anywhere in the Laws that lively enargeia, that

vivid mise en scene, which is as characteristic of Plato as of some

modern novelists.

The old men are afraid of the ridicule which 'will fall on their heads

more than enough,' and they do not often indulge in a joke. In one

of the few which occur, the book of the Laws, if left incomplete, is

compared to a monster wandering about without a head. But we no longer

breathe the atmosphere of humour which pervades the Symposium and the

Euthydemus, in which we pass within a few sentences from the broadest

Aristophanic joke to the subtlest refinement of wit and fancy; instead

of this, in the Laws an impression of baldness and feebleness is often

left upon our minds. Some of the most amusing descriptions, as, for

example, of children roaring for the first three years of life; or of

the Athenians walking into the country with fighting-cocks under their

arms; or of the slave doctor who knocks about his patients finely; and

the gentleman doctor who courteously persuades them; or of the way of

keeping order in the theatre, 'by a hint from a stick,' are narrated

with a commonplace gravity; but where we find this sort of dry humour we

shall not be far wrong in thinking that the writer intended to make us

laugh. The seriousness of age takes the place of the jollity of youth.

Life should have holidays and festivals; yet we rebuke ourselves when we

laugh, and take our pleasures sadly. The irony of the earlier dialogues,

of which some traces occur in the tenth book, is replaced by a severity

which hardly condescends to regard human things. 'Let us say, if you

please, that man is of some account, but I was speaking of him in

comparison with God.'

The imagery and illustrations are poor in themselves, and are not

assisted by the surrounding phraseology. We have seen how in the

Republic, and in the earlier dialogues, figures of speech such as 'the

wave,' 'the drone,' 'the chase,' 'the bride,' appear and reappear at

intervals. Notes are struck which are repeated from time to time, as

in a strain of music. There is none of this subtle art in the Laws. The

illustrations, such as the two kinds of doctors, 'the three kinds of

funerals,' the fear potion, the puppet, the painter leaving a successor

to restore his picture, the 'person stopping to consider where three

ways meet,' the 'old laws about water of which he will not divert the

course,' can hardly be said to do much credit to Plato's invention. The

citations from the poets have lost that fanciful character which gave

them their charm in the earlier dialogues. We are tired of images taken

from the arts of navigation, or archery, or weaving, or painting, or

medicine, or music. Yet the comparisons of life to a tragedy, or of

the working of mind to the revolution of the self-moved, or of the aged

parent to the image of a God dwelling in the house, or the reflection

that 'man is made to be the plaything of God, and that this rightly

considered is the best of him,' have great beauty.

2. The clumsiness of the style is exhibited in frequent mannerisms and

repetitions. The perfection of the Platonic dialogue consists in the

accuracy with which the question and answer are fitted into one another,

and the regularity with which the steps of the argument succeed one

another. This finish of style is no longer discernible in the Laws.

There is a want of variety in the answers; nothing can be drawn out

of the respondents but 'Yes' or 'No,' 'True,' 'To be sure,' etc.; the

insipid forms, 'What do you mean?' 'To what are you referring?' are

constantly returning. Again and again the speaker is charged, or charges

himself, with obscurity; and he repeats again and again that he will

explain his views more clearly. The process of thought which should

be latent in the mind of the writer appears on the surface. In several

passages the Athenian praises himself in the most unblushing manner,

very unlike the irony of the earlier dialogues, as when he declares that

'the laws are a divine work given by some inspiration of the Gods,' and

that 'youth should commit them to memory instead of the compositions of

the poets.' The prosopopoeia which is adopted by Plato in the Protagoras

and other dialogues is repeated until we grow weary of it. The

legislator is always addressing the speakers or the youth of the state,

and the speakers are constantly making addresses to the legislator. A

tendency to a paradoxical manner of statement is also observable. 'We

must have drinking,' 'we must have a virtuous tyrant'--this is too much

for the duller wits of the Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who at first start

back in surprise. More than in any other writing of Plato the tone is

hortatory; the laws are sermons as well as laws; they are considered to

have a religious sanction, and to rest upon a religious sentiment in the

mind of the citizens. The words of the Athenian are attributed to the

Lacedaemonian and Cretan, who are supposed to have made them their own,

after the manner of the earlier dialogues. Resumptions of subjects which

have been half disposed of in a previous passage constantly occur: the

arrangement has neither the clearness of art nor the freedom of nature.

Irrelevant remarks are made here and there, or illustrations used which

are not properly fitted in. The dialogue is generally weak and laboured,

and is in the later books fairly given up, apparently, because unsuited

to the subject of the work. The long speeches or sermons of the

Athenian, often extending over several pages, have never the grace

and harmony which are exhibited in the earlier dialogues. For Plato is

incapable of sustained composition; his genius is dramatic rather than

oratorical; he can converse, but he cannot make a speech. Even the

Timaeus, which is one of his most finished works, is full of abrupt

transitions. There is the same kind of difference between the dialogue

and the continuous discourse of Plato as between the narrative and

speeches of Thucydides.

3. The perfection of style is variety in unity, freedom, ease,

clearness, the power of saying anything, and of striking any note in the

scale of human feelings without impropriety; and such is the divine gift

of language possessed by Plato in the Symposium and Phaedrus. From this

there are many fallings-off in the Laws: first, in the structure of

the sentences, which are rhythmical and monotonous,--the formal and

sophistical manner of the age is superseding the natural genius of

Plato: secondly, many of them are of enormous length, and the latter end

often forgets the beginning of them,--they seem never to have received

the second thoughts of the author; either the emphasis is wrongly

placed, or there is a want of point in a clause; or an absolute case

occurs which is not properly separated from the rest of the sentence; or

words are aggregated in a manner which fails to show their relation to

one another; or the connecting particles are omitted at the beginning of

sentences; the uses of the relative and antecedent are more indistinct,

the changes of person and number more frequent, examples of pleonasm,

tautology, and periphrasis, antitheses of positive and negative, false

emphasis, and other affectations, are more numerous than in the other

writings of Plato; there is also a more common and sometimes unmeaning

use of qualifying formulae, os epos eipein, kata dunamin, and of double

expressions, pante pantos, oudame oudamos, opos kai ope--these are too

numerous to be attributed to errors in the text; again, there is an

over-curious adjustment of verb and participle, noun and epithet, and

other artificial forms of cadence and expression take the place of

natural variety: thirdly, the absence of metaphorical language is

remarkable--the style is not devoid of ornament, but the ornament is of

a debased rhetorical kind, patched on to instead of growing out of the

subject; there is a great command of words, and a laboured use of

them; forced attempts at metaphor occur in several passages,--e.g.

parocheteuein logois; ta men os tithemena ta d os paratithemena; oinos

kolazomenos upo nephontos eterou theou; the plays on the word nomos =

nou dianome, ode etara: fourthly, there is a foolish extravagance of

language in other passages,--'the swinish ignorance of arithmetic;' 'the

justice and suitableness of the discourse on laws;' over-emphasis; 'best

of Greeks,' said of all the Greeks, and the like: fifthly, poor and

insipid illustrations are also common: sixthly, we may observe an

excessive use of climax and hyperbole, aischron legein chre pros autous

doulon te kai doulen kai paida kai ei pos oion te olen ten oikian: dokei

touto to epitedeuma kata phusin tas peri ta aphrodisia edonas ou monon

anthropon alla kai therion diephtharkenai.

4. The peculiarities in the use of words which occur in the Laws have

been collected by Zeller (Platonische Studien) and Stallbaum

(Legg.): first, in the use of nouns, such as allodemia, apeniautesis,

glukuthumia, diatheter, thrasuxenia, koros, megalonoia, paidourgia:

secondly, in the use of adjectives, such as aistor, biodotes,

echthodopos, eitheos, chronios, and of adverbs, such as aniditi, anatei,

nepoivei: thirdly, in the use of verbs, such as athurein, aissein

(aixeien eipein), euthemoneisthai, parapodizesthai, sebein, temelein,

tetan. These words however, as Stallbaum remarks, are formed according

to analogy, and nearly all of them have the support of some poetical or

other authority.

Zeller and Stallbaum have also collected forms of words in the Laws,

differing from the forms of the same words which occur in other places:

e.g. blabos for blabe, abios for abiotos, acharistos for acharis,

douleios for doulikos, paidelos for paidikos, exagrio for exagriaino,

ileoumai for ilaskomai, and the Ionic word sophronistus, meaning

'correction.' Zeller has noted a fondness for substantives ending in

-ma and -sis, such as georgema, diapauma, epithumema, zemioma, komodema,

omilema; blapsis, loidoresis, paraggelsis, and others; also a use

of substantives in the plural, which are commonly found only in the

singular, maniai, atheotetes, phthonoi, phoboi, phuseis; also, a

peculiar use of prepositions in composition, as in eneirgo, apoblapto,

dianomotheteo, dieiretai, dieulabeisthai, and other words; also, a

frequent occurrence of the Ionic datives plural in -aisi and -oisi,

perhaps used for the sake of giving an ancient or archaic effect.

To these peculiarities of words he has added a list of peculiar

expressions and constructions. Among the most characteristic are the

following: athuta pallakon spermata; amorphoi edrai; osa axiomata pros

archontas; oi kata polin kairoi; muthos, used in several places of

'the discourse about laws;' and connected with this the frequent use

of paramuthion and paramutheisthai in the general sense of 'address,'

'addressing'; aimulos eros; ataphoi praxeis; muthos akephalos; ethos

euthuporon. He remarks also on the frequent employment of the abstract

for the concrete; e.g. uperesia for uperetai, phugai for phugades,

mechanai in the sense of 'contrivers,' douleia for douloi, basileiai

for basileis, mainomena kedeumata for ganaika mainomenen; e chreia ton

paidon in the sense of 'indigent children,' and paidon ikanotes; to

ethos tes apeirias for e eiothuia apeiria; kuparitton upse te kai kalle

thaumasia for kuparittoi mala upselai kai kalai. He further notes some

curious uses of the genitive case, e.g. philias omologiai, maniai orges,

laimargiai edones, cheimonon anupodesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and of

the dative, omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai, anosioi plegon tolmai; and

of the dative omiliai echthrois, nomothesiai epitropois; and also some

rather uncommon periphrases, thremmata Neilou, xuggennetor teknon for

alochos, Mouses lexis for poiesis, zographon paides, anthropon spermata

and the like; the fondness for particles of limitation, especially

tis and ge, sun tisi charisi, tois ge dunamenois and the like; the

pleonastic use of tanun, of os, of os eros eipein, of ekastote; and

the periphrastic use of the preposition peri. Lastly, he observes the

tendency to hyperbata or transpositions of words, and to rhythmical

uniformity as well as grammatical irregularity in the structure of the

sentences.

For nearly all the expressions which are adduced by Zeller as arguments

against the genuineness of the Laws, Stallbaum finds some sort of

authority. There is no real ground for doubting that the work was

written by Plato, merely because several words occur in it which are

not found in his other writings. An imitator may preserve the usual

phraseology of a writer better than he would himself. But, on the other

hand, the fact that authorities may be quoted in support of most of

these uses of words, does not show that the diction is not peculiar.

Several of them seem to be poetical or dialectical, and exhibit an

attempt to enlarge the limits of Greek prose by the introduction of

Homeric and tragic expressions. Most of them do not appear to have

retained any hold on the later language of Greece. Like several

experiments in language of the writers of the Elizabethan age, they were

afterwards lost; and though occasionally found in Plutarch and imitators

of Plato, they have not been accepted by Aristotle or passed into the

common dialect of Greece.

5. Unequal as the Laws are in style, they contain a few passages which

are very grand and noble. For example, the address to the poets: 'Best

of strangers, we also are poets of the best and noblest tragedy; for

our whole state is an imitation of the best and noblest life, which we

affirm to be indeed the very truth of tragedy.' Or again, the sight

of young men and maidens in friendly intercourse with one another,

suggesting the dangers to which youth is liable from the violence of

passion; or the eloquent denunciation of unnatural lusts in the same

passage; or the charming thought that the best legislator 'orders

war for the sake of peace and not peace for the sake of war;' or the

pleasant allusion, 'O Athenian--inhabitant of Attica, I will not say,

for you seem to me worthy to be named after the Goddess Athene because

you go back to first principles;' or the pithy saying, 'Many a victory

has been and will be suicidal to the victors, but education is never

suicidal;' or the fine expression that 'the walls of a city should

be allowed to sleep in the earth, and that we should not attempt to

disinter them;' or the remark that 'God is the measure of all things in

a sense far higher than any man can be;' or that 'a man should be from

the first a partaker of the truth, that he may live a true man as long

as possible;' or the principle repeatedly laid down, that 'the sins of

the fathers are not to be visited on the children;' or the description

of the funeral rites of those priestly sages who depart in innocence;

or the noble sentiment, that we should do more justice to slaves than

to equals; or the curious observation, founded, perhaps, on his own

experience, that there are a few 'divine men in every state however

corrupt, whose conversation is of inestimable value;' or the acute

remark, that public opinion is to be respected, because the judgments

of mankind about virtue are better than their practice; or the deep

religious and also modern feeling which pervades the tenth book

(whatever may be thought of the arguments); the sense of the duty of

living as a part of a whole, and in dependence on the will of God, who

takes care of the least things as well as the greatest; and the picture

of parents praying for their children--not as we may say, slightly

altering the words of Plato, as if there were no truth or reality in the

Gentile religions, but as if there were the greatest--are very striking

to us. We must remember that the Laws, unlike the Republic, do not

exhibit an ideal state, but are supposed to be on the level of human

motives and feelings; they are also on the level of the popular

religion, though elevated and purified: hence there is an attempt made

to show that the pleasant is also just. But, on the other hand, the

priority of the soul to the body, and of God to the soul, is always

insisted upon as the true incentive to virtue; especially with great

force and eloquence at the commencement of Book v. And the work of

legislation is carried back to the first principles of morals.

6. No other writing of Plato shows so profound an insight into the world

and into human nature as the Laws. That 'cities will never cease from

ill until they are better governed,' is the text of the Laws as well as

of the Statesman and Republic. The principle that the balance of power

preserves states; the reflection that no one ever passed his whole life

in disbelief of the Gods; the remark that the characters of men are best

seen in convivial intercourse; the observation that the people must be

allowed to share not only in the government, but in the administration

of justice; the desire to make laws, not with a view to courage only,

but to all virtue; the clear perception that education begins with

birth, or even, as he would say, before birth; the attempt to purify

religion; the modern reflections, that punishment is not vindictive, and

that limits must be set to the power of bequest; the impossibility of

undeceiving the victims of quacks and jugglers; the provision for water,

and for other requirements of health, and for concealing the bodies

of the dead with as little hurt as possible to the living; above all,

perhaps, the distinct consciousness that under the actual circumstances

of mankind the ideal cannot be carried out, and yet may be a guiding

principle--will appear to us, if we remember that we are still in the

dawn of politics, to show a great depth of political wisdom.

IV. The Laws of Plato contain numerous passages which closely resemble

other passages in his writings. And at first sight a suspicion arises

that the repetition shows the unequal hand of the imitator. For why

should a writer say over again, in a more imperfect form, what he had

already said in his most finished style and manner? And yet it may

be urged on the other side that an author whose original powers

are beginning to decay will be very liable to repeat himself, as in

conversation, so in books. He may have forgotten what he had written

before; he may be unconscious of the decline of his own powers. Hence

arises a question of great interest, bearing on the genuineness of

ancient writers. Is there any criterion by which we can distinguish

the genuine resemblance from the spurious, or, in other words, the

repetition of a thought or passage by an author himself from the

appropriation of it by another? The question has, perhaps, never been

fully discussed; and, though a real one, does not admit of a precise

answer. A few general considerations on the subject may be offered:--

(a) Is the difference such as might be expected to arise at different

times of life or under different circumstances?--There would be nothing

surprising in a writer, as he grew older, losing something of his own

originality, and falling more and more under the spirit of his

age. 'What a genius I had when I wrote that book!' was the pathetic

exclamation of a famous English author, when in old age he chanced to

take up one of his early works. There would be nothing surprising again

in his losing somewhat of his powers of expression, and becoming less

capable of framing language into a harmonious whole. There would also be

a strong presumption that if the variation of style was uniform, it was

attributable to some natural cause, and not to the arts of the imitator.

The inferiority might be the result of feebleness and of want of

activity of mind. But the natural weakness of a great author would

commonly be different from the artificial weakness of an imitator; it

would be continuous and uniform. The latter would be apt to fill his

work with irregular patches, sometimes taken verbally from the writings

of the author whom he personated, but rarely acquiring his spirit.

His imitation would be obvious, irregular, superficial. The patches

of purple would be easily detected among his threadbare and tattered

garments. He would rarely take the pains to put the same thought into

other words. There were many forgeries in English literature which

attained a considerable degree of success 50 or 100 years ago; but it is

doubtful whether attempts such as these could now escape detection,

if there were any writings of the same author or of the same age to

be compared with them. And ancient forgers were much less skilful than

modern; they were far from being masters in the art of deception, and

had rarely any motive for being so.

(b) But, secondly, the imitator will commonly be least capable of

understanding or imitating that part of a great writer which is most

characteristic of him. In every man's writings there is something like

himself and unlike others, which gives individuality. To appreciate

this latent quality would require a kindred mind, and minute study

and observation. There are a class of similarities which may be called

undesigned coincidences, which are so remote as to be incapable of

being borrowed from one another, and yet, when they are compared, find

a natural explanation in their being the work of the same mind. The

imitator might copy the turns of style--he might repeat images or

illustrations, but he could not enter into the inner circle of Platonic

philosophy. He would understand that part of it which became popular

in the next generation, as for example, the doctrine of ideas or of

numbers: he might approve of communism. But the higher flights of Plato

about the science of dialectic, or the unity of virtue, or a person who

is above the law, would be unintelligible to him.

(c) The argument from imitation assumes a different character when

the supposed imitations are associated with other passages having the

impress of original genius. The strength of the argument from undesigned

coincidences of style is much increased when they are found side by

side with thoughts and expressions which can only have come from a great

original writer. The great excellence, not only of the whole, but even

of the parts of writings, is a strong proof of their genuineness--for

although the great writer may fall below, the forger or imitator cannot

rise much above himself. Whether we can attribute the worst parts of a

work to a forger and the best to a great writer,--as for example, in the

case of some of Shakespeare's plays,--depends upon the probability that

they have been interpolated, or have been the joint work of two writers;

and this can only be established either by express evidence or by a

comparison of other writings of the same class. If the interpolation or

double authorship of Greek writings in the time of Plato could be shown

to be common, then a question, perhaps insoluble, would arise, not

whether the whole, but whether parts of the Platonic dialogues are

genuine, and, if parts only, which parts. Hebrew prophecies and Homeric

poems and Laws of Manu may have grown together in early times, but there

is no reason to think that any of the dialogues of Plato is the result

of a similar process of accumulation. It is therefore rash to say

with Oncken (Die Staatslehre des Aristoteles) that the form in which

Aristotle knew the Laws of Plato must have been different from that in

which they have come down to us.

It must be admitted that these principles are difficult of application.

Yet a criticism may be worth making which rests only on probabilities

or impressions. Great disputes will arise about the merits of different

passages, about what is truly characteristic and original or trivial

and borrowed. Many have thought the Laws to be one of the greatest of

Platonic writings, while in the judgment of Mr. Grote they hardly rise

above the level of the forged epistles. The manner in which a writer

would or would not have written at a particular time of life must be

acknowledged to be a matter of conjecture. But enough has been said to

show that similarities of a certain kind, whether criticism is able to

detect them or not, may be such as must be attributed to an original

writer, and not to a mere imitator.

(d) Applying these principles to the case of the Laws, we have now

to point out that they contain the class of refined or unconscious

similarities which are indicative of genuineness. The parallelisms are

like the repetitions of favourite thoughts into which every one is apt

to fall unawares in conversation or in writing. They are found in a work

which contains many beautiful and remarkable passages. We may therefore

begin by claiming this presumption in their favour. Such undesigned

coincidences, as we may venture to call them, are the following. The

conception of justice as the union of temperance, wisdom, courage

(Laws; Republic): the latent idea of dialectic implied in the notion

of dividing laws after the kinds of virtue (Laws); the approval of the

method of looking at one idea gathered from many things, 'than which a

truer was never discovered by any man' (compare Republic): or again the

description of the Laws as parents (Laws; Republic): the assumption

that religion has been already settled by the oracle of Delphi (Laws;

Republic), to which an appeal is also made in special cases (Laws): the

notion of the battle with self, a paradox for which Plato in a manner

apologizes both in the Laws and the Republic: the remark (Laws) that

just men, even when they are deformed in body, may still be perfectly

beautiful in respect of the excellent justice of their minds (compare

Republic): the argument that ideals are none the worse because they

cannot be carried out (Laws; Republic): the near approach to the idea of

good in 'the principle which is common to all the four virtues,' a

truth which the guardians must be compelled to recognize (Laws; compare

Republic): or again the recognition by reason of the right pleasure and

pain, which had previously been matter of habit (Laws; Republic): or

the blasphemy of saying that the excellency of music is to give pleasure

(Laws; Republic): again the story of the Sidonian Cadmus (Laws), which

is a variation of the Phoenician tale of the earth-born men (Republic):

the comparison of philosophy to a yelping she-dog, both in the Republic

and in the Laws: the remark that no man can practise two trades (Laws;

Republic): or the advantage of the middle condition (Laws; Republic):

the tendency to speak of principles as moulds or forms; compare the

ekmageia of song (Laws), and the tupoi of religion (Republic): or the

remark (Laws) that 'the relaxation of justice makes many cities out of

one,' which may be compared with the Republic: or the description of

lawlessness 'creeping in little by little in the fashions of music and

overturning all things,'--to us a paradox, but to Plato's mind a fixed

idea, which is found in the Laws as well as in the Republic: or the

figure of the parts of the human body under which the parts of the state

are described (Laws; Republic): the apology for delay and diffuseness,

which occurs not unfrequently in the Republic, is carried to an excess

in the Laws (compare Theaet.): the remarkable thought (Laws) that the

soul of the sun is better than the sun, agrees with the relation in

which the idea of good stands to the sun in the Republic, and with the

substitution of mind for the idea of good in the Philebus: the passage

about the tragic poets (Laws) agrees generally with the treatment of

them in the Republic, but is more finely conceived, and worked out in a

nobler spirit. Some lesser similarities of thought and manner should not

be omitted, such as the mention of the thirty years' old students in the

Republic, and the fifty years' old choristers in the Laws; or the

making of the citizens out of wax (Laws) compared with the other image

(Republic); or the number of the tyrant (729), which is NEARLY equal

with the number of days and nights in the year (730), compared with the

'slight correction' of the sacred number 5040, which is divisible by all

the numbers from 1 to 12 except 11, and divisible by 11, if two families

be deducted; or once more, we may compare the ignorance of solid

geometry of which he complains in the Republic and the puzzle about

fractions with the difficulty in the Laws about commensurable and

incommensurable quantities--and the malicious emphasis on the word

gunaikeios (Laws) with the use of the same word (Republic). These and

similar passages tend to show that the author of the Republic is also

the author of the Laws. They are echoes of the same voice, expressions

of the same mind, coincidences too subtle to have been invented by the

ingenuity of any imitator. The force of the argument is increased, if we

remember that no passage in the Laws is exactly copied,--nowhere do

five or six words occur together which are found together elsewhere in

Plato's writings.

In other dialogues of Plato, as well as in the Republic, there are to

be found parallels with the Laws. Such resemblances, as we might expect,

occur chiefly (but not exclusively) in the dialogues which, on other

grounds, we may suppose to be of later date. The punishment of evil is

to be like evil men (Laws), as he says also in the Theaetetus. Compare

again the dependence of tragedy and comedy on one another, of which he

gives the reason in the Laws--'For serious things cannot be understood

without laughable, nor opposites at all without opposites, if a man

is really to have intelligence of either'; here he puts forward the

principle which is the groundwork of the thesis of Socrates in the

Symposium, 'that the genius of tragedy is the same as that of comedy,

and that the writer of comedy ought to be a writer of tragedy also.'

There is a truth and right which is above Law (Laws), as we learn also

from the Statesman. That men are the possession of the Gods (Laws), is

a reflection which likewise occurs in the Phaedo. The remark, whether

serious or ironical (Laws), that 'the sons of the Gods naturally

believed in the Gods, because they had the means of knowing about them,'

is found in the Timaeus. The reign of Cronos, who is the divine ruler

(Laws), is a reminiscence of the Statesman. It is remarkable that in the

Sophist and Statesman (Soph.), Plato, speaking in the character of the

Eleatic Stranger, has already put on the old man. The madness of the

poets, again, is a favourite notion of Plato's, which occurs also in the

Laws, as well as in the Phaedrus, Ion, and elsewhere. There are traces

in the Laws of the same desire to base speculation upon history which

we find in the Critias. Once more, there is a striking parallel with

the paradox of the Gorgias, that 'if you do evil, it is better to be

punished than to be unpunished,' in the Laws: 'To live having all goods

without justice and virtue is the greatest of evils if life be immortal,

but not so great if the bad man lives but a short time.'

The point to be considered is whether these are the kind of parallels

which would be the work of an imitator. Would a forger have had the wit

to select the most peculiar and characteristic thoughts of Plato; would

he have caught the spirit of his philosophy; would he, instead of openly

borrowing, have half concealed his favourite ideas; would he have formed

them into a whole such as the Laws; would he have given another

the credit which he might have obtained for himself; would he have

remembered and made use of other passages of the Platonic writings and

have never deviated into the phraseology of them? Without pressing

such arguments as absolutely certain, we must acknowledge that such a

comparison affords a new ground of real weight for believing the Laws to

be a genuine writing of Plato.

V. The relation of the Republic to the Laws is clearly set forth by

Plato in the Laws. The Republic is the best state, the Laws is the best

possible under the existing conditions of the Greek world. The Republic

is the ideal, in which no man calls anything his own, which may or may

not have existed in some remote clime, under the rule of some God, or

son of a God (who can say?), but is, at any rate, the pattern of

all other states and the exemplar of human life. The Laws distinctly

acknowledge what the Republic partly admits, that the ideal is

inimitable by us, but that we should 'lift up our eyes to the heavens'

and try to regulate our lives according to the divine image. The

citizens are no longer to have wives and children in common, and are

no longer to be under the government of philosophers. But the spirit of

communism or communion is to continue among them, though reverence for

the sacredness of the family, and respect of children for parents, not

promiscuous hymeneals, are now the foundation of the state; the sexes

are to be as nearly on an equality as possible; they are to meet

at common tables, and to share warlike pursuits (if the women will

consent), and to have a common education. The legislator has taken the

place of the philosopher, but a council of elders is retained, who are

to fulfil the duties of the legislator when he has passed out of life.

The addition of younger persons to this council by co-optation is

an improvement on the governing body of the Republic. The scheme of

education in the Laws is of a far lower kind than that which Plato had

conceived in the Republic. There he would have his rulers trained in all

knowledge meeting in the idea of good, of which the different branches

of mathematical science are but the hand-maidens or ministers; here he

treats chiefly of popular education, stopping short with the preliminary

sciences,--these are to be studied partly with a view to their practical

usefulness, which in the Republic he holds cheap, and even more with a

view to avoiding impiety, of which in the Republic he says nothing; he

touches very lightly on dialectic, which is still to be retained for

the rulers. Yet in the Laws there remain traces of the old educational

ideas. He is still for banishing the poets; and as he finds the works of

prose writers equally dangerous, he would substitute for them the study

of his own laws. He insists strongly on the importance of mathematics

as an educational instrument. He is no more reconciled to the Greek

mythology than in the Republic, though he would rather say nothing about

it out of a reverence for antiquity; and he is equally willing to have

recourse to fictions, if they have a moral tendency. His thoughts recur

to a golden age in which the sanctity of oaths was respected and in

which men living nearer the Gods were more disposed to believe in them;

but we must legislate for the world as it is, now that the old beliefs

have passed away. Though he is no longer fired with dialectical

enthusiasm, he would compel the guardians to 'look at one idea gathered

from many things,' and to 'perceive the principle which is the same in

all the four virtues.' He still recognizes the enormous influence of

music, in which every youth is to be trained for three years; and he

seems to attribute the existing degeneracy of the Athenian state and

the laxity of morals partly to musical innovation, manifested in the

unnatural divorce of the instrument and the voice, of the rhythm from

the words, and partly to the influence of the mob who ruled at the

theatres. He assimilates the education of the two sexes, as far as

possible, both in music and gymnastic, and, as in the Republic, he would

give to gymnastic a purely military character. In marriage, his object

is still to produce the finest children for the state. As in the

Statesman, he would unite in wedlock dissimilar natures--the passionate

with the dull, the courageous with the gentle. And the virtuous tyrant

of the Statesman, who has no place in the Republic, again appears.

In this, as in all his writings, he has the strongest sense of the

degeneracy and incapacity of the rulers of his own time.

In the Laws, the philosophers, if not banished, like the poets, are

at least ignored; and religion takes the place of philosophy in the

regulation of human life. It must however be remembered that the

religion of Plato is co-extensive with morality, and is that purified

religion and mythology of which he speaks in the second book of the

Republic. There is no real discrepancy in the two works. In a practical

treatise, he speaks of religion rather than of philosophy; just as he

appears to identify virtue with pleasure, and rather seeks to find

the common element of the virtues than to maintain his old paradoxical

theses that they are one, or that they are identical with knowledge. The

dialectic and the idea of good, which even Glaucon in the Republic could

not understand, would be out of place in a less ideal work. There may

also be a change in his own mind, the purely intellectual aspect of

philosophy having a diminishing interest to him in his old age.

Some confusion occurs in the passage in which Plato speaks of the

Republic, occasioned by his reference to a third state, which he

proposes (D.V.) hereafter to expound. Like many other thoughts in the

Laws, the allusion is obscure from not being worked out. Aristotle

(Polit.) speaks of a state which is neither the best absolutely, nor

the best under existing conditions, but an imaginary state, inferior

to either, destitute, as he supposes, of the necessaries of

life--apparently such a beginning of primitive society as is described

in Laws iii. But it is not clear that by this the third state of Plato

is intended. It is possible that Plato may have meant by his third state

an historical sketch, bearing the same relation to the Laws which the

unfinished Critias would have borne to the Republic; or he may, perhaps,

have intended to describe a state more nearly approximating than the

Laws to existing Greek states.

The Statesman is a mere fragment when compared with the Laws, yet

combining a second interest of dialectic as well as politics, which is

wanting in the larger work. Several points of similarity and contrast

may be observed between them. In some respects the Statesman is

even more ideal than the Republic, looking back to a former state of

paradisiacal life, in which the Gods ruled over mankind, as the Republic

looks forward to a coming kingdom of philosophers. Of this kingdom of

Cronos there is also mention in the Laws. Again, in the Statesman, the

Eleatic Stranger rises above law to the conception of the living voice

of the lawgiver, who is able to provide for individual cases. A similar

thought is repeated in the Laws: 'If in the order of nature, and by

divine destiny, a man were able to apprehend the truth about these

things, he would have no need of laws to rule over him; for there is no

law or order above knowledge, nor can mind without impiety be deemed

the subject or slave of any, but rather the lord of all.' The union of

opposite natures, who form the warp and the woof of the political web,

is a favourite thought which occurs in both dialogues (Laws; Statesman).

The Laws are confessedly a Second-best, an inferior Ideal, to which

Plato has recourse, when he finds that the city of Philosophers is no

longer 'within the horizon of practical politics.' But it is curious

to observe that the higher Ideal is always returning (compare Arist.

Polit.), and that he is not much nearer the actual fact, nor more on

the level of ordinary life in the Laws than in the Republic. It is also

interesting to remark that the new Ideal is always falling away, and

that he hardly supposes the one to be more capable of being realized

than the other. Human beings are troublesome to manage; and the

legislator cannot adapt his enactments to the infinite variety of

circumstances; after all he must leave the administration of them to his

successors; and though he would have liked to make them as permanent

as they are in Egypt, he cannot escape from the necessity of change.

At length Plato is obliged to institute a Nocturnal Council which is

supposed to retain the mind of the legislator, and of which some of the

members are even supposed to go abroad and inspect the institutions of

foreign countries, as a foundation for changes in their own. The spirit

of such changes, though avoiding the extravagance of a popular assembly,

being only so much change as the conservative temper of old members

is likely to allow, is nevertheless inconsistent with the fixedness of

Egypt which Plato wishes to impress upon Hellenic institutions. He is

inconsistent with himself as the truth begins to dawn upon him that 'in

the execution things for the most part fall short of our conception of

them' (Republic).

And is not this true of ideals of government in general? We are always

disappointed in them. Nothing great can be accomplished in the

short space of human life; wherefore also we look forward to another

(Republic). As we grow old, we are sensible that we have no power

actively to pursue our ideals any longer. We have had our opportunity

and do not aspire to be more than men: we have received our 'wages and

are going home.' Neither do we despair of the future of mankind, because

we have been able to do so little in comparison of the whole. We look in

vain for consistency either in men or things. But we have seen enough of

improvement in our own time to justify us in the belief that the world

is worth working for and that a good man's life is not thrown away. Such

reflections may help us to bring home to ourselves by inward sympathy

the language of Plato in the Laws, and to combine into something like a

whole his various and at first sight inconsistent utterances.

VI. The Republic may be described as the Spartan constitution appended

to a government of philosophers. But in the Laws an Athenian element is

also introduced. Many enactments are taken from the Athenian; the four

classes are borrowed from the constitution of Cleisthenes, which Plato

regards as the best form of Athenian government, and the guardians of

the law bear a certain resemblance to the archons. In the constitution

of the Laws nearly all officers are elected by a vote more or less

popular and by lot. But the assembly only exists for the purposes of

election, and has no legislative or executive powers. The Nocturnal

Council, which is the highest body in the state, has several of the

functions of the ancient Athenian Areopagus, after which it appears to

be modelled. Life is to wear, as at Athens, a joyous and festive look;

there are to be Bacchic choruses, and men of mature age are encouraged

in moderate potations. On the other hand, the common meals, the public

education, the crypteia are borrowed from Sparta and not from Athens,

and the superintendence of private life, which was to be practised by

the governors, has also its prototype in Sparta. The extravagant dislike

which Plato shows both to a naval power and to extreme democracy is the

reverse of Athenian.

The best-governed Hellenic states traced the origin of their laws to

individual lawgivers. These were real persons, though we are uncertain

how far they originated or only modified the institutions which are

ascribed to them. But the lawgiver, though not a myth, was a fixed idea

in the mind of the Greek,--as fixed as the Trojan war or the earth-born

Cadmus. 'This was what Solon meant or said'--was the form in which the

Athenian expressed his own conception of right and justice, or argued a

disputed point of law. And the constant reference in the Laws of Plato

to the lawgiver is altogether in accordance with Greek modes of thinking

and speaking.

There is also, as in the Republic, a Pythagorean element. The highest

branch of education is arithmetic; to know the order of the heavenly

bodies, and to reconcile the apparent contradiction of their movements,

is an important part of religion; the lives of the citizens are to have

a common measure, as also their vessels and coins; the great blessing of

the state is the number 5040. Plato is deeply impressed by the antiquity

of Egypt, and the unchangeableness of her ancient forms of song and

dance. And he is also struck by the progress which the Egyptians had

made in the mathematical sciences--in comparison of them the Greeks

appeared to him to be little better than swine. Yet he censures the

Egyptian meanness and inhospitality to strangers. He has traced the

growth of states from their rude beginnings in a philosophical spirit;

but of any life or growth of the Hellenic world in future ages he is

silent. He has made the reflection that past time is the maker of states

(Book iii.); but he does not argue from the past to the future, that

the process is always going on, or that the institutions of nations

are relative to their stage of civilization. If he could have stamped

indelibly upon Hellenic states the will of the legislator, he would have

been satisfied. The utmost which he expects of future generations is

that they should supply the omissions, or correct the errors which

younger statesmen detect in his enactments. When institutions have been

once subjected to this process of criticism, he would have them fixed

for ever.

THE PREAMBLE.

BOOK I. Strangers, let me ask a question of you--Was a God or a man the

author of your laws? 'A God, Stranger. In Crete, Zeus is said to have

been the author of them; in Sparta, as Megillus will tell you, Apollo.'

You Cretans believe, as Homer says, that Minos went every ninth year to

converse with his Olympian sire, and gave you laws which he brought from

him. 'Yes; and there was Rhadamanthus, his brother, who is reputed among

us to have been a most righteous judge.' That is a reputation worthy of

the son of Zeus. And as you and Megillus have been trained under these

laws, I may ask you to give me an account of them. We can talk about

them in our walk from Cnosus to the cave and temple of Zeus. I am told

that the distance is considerable, but probably there are shady places

under the trees, where, being no longer young, we may often rest and

converse. 'Yes, Stranger, a little onward there are beautiful groves of

cypresses, and green meadows in which we may repose.'

My first question is, Why has the law ordained that you should have

common meals, and practise gymnastics, and bear arms? 'My answer is,

that all our institutions are of a military character. We lead the life

of the camp even in time of peace, keeping up the organization of an

army, and having meals in common; and as our country, owing to its

ruggedness, is ill-suited for heavy-armed cavalry or infantry, our

soldiers are archers, equipped with bows and arrows. The legislator was

under the idea that war was the natural state of all mankind, and that

peace is only a pretence; he thought that no possessions had any

value which were not secured against enemies.' And do you think that

superiority in war is the proper aim of government? 'Certainly I do, and

my Spartan friend will agree with me.' And are there wars, not only of

state against state, but of village against village, of family against

family, of individual against individual? 'Yes.' And is a man his own

enemy? 'There you come to first principles, like a true votary of the

goddess Athene; and this is all the better, for you will the sooner

recognize the truth of what I am saying--that all men everywhere are the

enemies of all, and each individual of every other and of himself;

and, further, that there is a victory and defeat--the best and the

worst--which each man sustains, not at the hands of another, but of

himself.' And does this extend to states and villages as well as to

individuals? 'Certainly; there is a better in them which conquers or

is conquered by the worse.' Whether the worse ever really conquers

the better, is a question which may be left for the present; but your

meaning is, that bad citizens do sometimes overcome the good, and that

the state is then conquered by herself, and that when they are defeated

the state is victorious over herself. Or, again, in a family there may

be several brothers, and the bad may be a majority; and when the

bad majority conquer the good minority, the family are worse than

themselves. The use of the terms 'better or worse than himself or

themselves' may be doubtful, but about the thing meant there can be no

dispute. 'Very true.' Such a struggle might be determined by a judge.

And which will be the better judge--he who destroys the worse and lets

the better rule, or he who lets the better rule and makes the others

voluntarily obey; or, thirdly, he who destroys no one, but reconciles

the two parties? 'The last, clearly.' But the object of such a judge or

legislator would not be war. 'True.' And as there are two kinds of war,

one without and one within a state, of which the internal is by far

the worse, will not the legislator chiefly direct his attention to

this latter? He will reconcile the contending factions, and unite them

against their external enemies. 'Certainly.' Every legislator will

aim at the greatest good, and the greatest good is not victory in war,

whether civil or external, but mutual peace and good-will, as in the

body health is preferable to the purgation of disease. He who makes war

his object instead of peace, or who pursues war except for the sake of

peace, is not a true statesman. 'And yet, Stranger, the laws both of

Crete and Sparta aim entirely at war.' Perhaps so; but do not let us

quarrel about your legislators--let us be gentle; they were in earnest

quite as much as we are, and we must try to discover their meaning. The

poet Tyrtaeus (you know his poems in Crete, and my Lacedaemonian friend

is only too familiar with them)--he was an Athenian by birth, and a

Spartan citizen:--'Well,' he says, 'I sing not, I care not about any

man, however rich or happy, unless he is brave in war.' Now I should

like, in the name of us all, to ask the poet a question. Oh Tyrtaeus, I

would say to him, we agree with you in praising those who excel in war,

but which kind of war do you mean?--that dreadful war which is termed

civil, or the milder sort which is waged against foreign enemies? You

say that you abominate 'those who are not eager to taste their enemies'

blood,' and you seem to mean chiefly their foreign enemies. 'Certainly

he does.' But we contend that there are men better far than your heroes,

Tyrtaeus, concerning whom another poet, Theognis the Sicilian, says that

'in a civil broil they are worth their weight in gold and silver.' For

in a civil war, not only courage, but justice and temperance and wisdom

are required, and all virtue is better than a part. The mercenary

soldier is ready to die at his post; yet he is commonly a violent,

senseless creature. And the legislator, whether inspired or uninspired,

will make laws with a view to the highest virtue; and this is not brute

courage, but loyalty in the hour of danger. The virtue of Tyrtaeus,

although needful enough in his own time, is really of a fourth-rate

description. 'You are degrading our legislator to a very low level.'

Nay, we degrade not him, but ourselves, if we believe that the laws of

Lycurgus and Minos had a view to war only. A divine lawgiver would have

had regard to all the different kinds of virtue, and have arranged his

laws in corresponding classes, and not in the modern fashion, which

only makes them after the want of them is felt,--about inheritances and

heiresses and assaults, and the like. As you truly said, virtue is the

business of the legislator; but you went wrong when you referred all

legislation to a part of virtue, and to an inferior part. For the object

of laws, whether the Cretan or any other, is to make men happy. Now

happiness or good is of two kinds--there are divine and there are human

goods. He who has the divine has the human added to him; but he who

has lost the greater is deprived of both. The lesser goods are health,

beauty, strength, and, lastly, wealth; not the blind God, Pluto, but one

who has eyes to see and follow wisdom. For mind or wisdom is the most

divine of all goods; and next comes temperance, and justice springs from

the union of wisdom and temperance with courage, which is the fourth or

last. These four precede other goods, and the legislator will arrange

all his ordinances accordingly, the human going back to the divine,

and the divine to their leader mind. There will be enactments about

marriage, about education, about all the states and feelings and

experiences of men and women, at every age, in weal and woe, in war and

peace; upon all the law will fix a stamp of praise and blame. There will

also be regulations about property and expenditure, about contracts,

about rewards and punishments, and finally about funeral rites and

honours of the dead. The lawgiver will appoint guardians to preside over

these things; and mind will harmonize his ordinances, and show them to

be in agreement with temperance and justice. Now I want to know whether

the same principles are observed in the laws of Lycurgus and Minos,

or, as I should rather say, of Apollo and Zeus. We must go through the

virtues, beginning with courage, and then we will show that what has

preceded has relation to virtue.

'I wish,' says the Lacedaemonian, 'that you, Stranger, would first

criticize Cleinias and the Cretan laws.' Yes, is the reply, and I will

criticize you and myself, as well as him. Tell me, Megillus, were not

the common meals and gymnastic training instituted by your legislator

with a view to war? 'Yes; and next in the order of importance comes

hunting, and fourth the endurance of pain in boxing contests, and in the

beatings which are the punishment of theft. There is, too, the so-called

Crypteia or secret service, in which our youth wander about the country

night and day unattended, and even in winter go unshod and have no beds

to lie on. Moreover they wrestle and exercise under a blazing sun, and

they have many similar customs.' Well, but is courage only a combat

against fear and pain, and not against pleasure and flattery? 'Against

both, I should say.' And which is worse,--to be overcome by pain, or

by pleasure? 'The latter.' But did the lawgivers of Crete and Sparta

legislate for a courage which is lame of one leg,--able to meet the

attacks of pain but not those of pleasure, or for one which can meet

both? 'For a courage which can meet both, I should say.' But if so,

where are the institutions which train your citizens to be equally brave

against pleasure and pain, and superior to enemies within as well as

without? 'We confess that we have no institutions worth mentioning which

are of this character.' I am not surprised, and will therefore only

request forbearance on the part of us all, in case the love of truth

should lead any of us to censure the laws of the others. Remember that

I am more in the way of hearing criticisms of your laws than you can be;

for in well-ordered states like Crete and Sparta, although an old man

may sometimes speak of them in private to a ruler or elder, a similar

liberty is not allowed to the young. But now being alone we shall not

offend your legislator by a friendly examination of his laws. 'Take any

freedom which you like.'

My first observation is, that your lawgiver ordered you to endure

hardships, because he thought that those who had not this discipline

would run away from those who had. But he ought to have considered

further, that those who had never learned to resist pleasure would be

equally at the mercy of those who had, and these are often among the

worst of mankind. Pleasure, like fear, would overcome them and take away

their courage and freedom. 'Perhaps; but I must not be hasty in giving

my assent.'

Next as to temperance: what institutions have you which are adapted

to promote temperance? 'There are the common meals and gymnastic

exercises.' These are partly good and partly bad, and, as in medicine,

what is good at one time and for one person, is bad at another time and

for another person. Now although gymnastics and common meals do good,

they are also a cause of evil in civil troubles, and they appear to

encourage unnatural love, as has been shown at Miletus, in Boeotia, and

at Thurii. And the Cretans are said to have invented the tale of Zeus

and Ganymede in order to justify their evil practices by the example of

the God who was their lawgiver. Leaving the story, we may observe that

all law has to do with pleasure and pain; these are two fountains which

are ever flowing in human nature, and he who drinks of them when and as

much as he ought, is happy, and he who indulges in them to excess, is

miserable. 'You may be right, but I still incline to think that the

Lacedaemonian lawgiver did well in forbidding pleasure, if I may judge

from the result. For there is no drunken revelry in Sparta, and any one

found in a state of intoxication is severely punished; he is not excused

as an Athenian would be at Athens on account of a festival. I myself

have seen the Athenians drunk at the Dionysia--and at our colony,

Tarentum, on a similar occasion, I have beheld the whole city in a

state of intoxication.' I admit that these festivals should be properly

regulated. Yet I might reply, 'Yes, Spartans, that is not your vice; but

look at home and remember the licentiousness of your women.' And to

all such accusations every one of us may reply in turn:--'Wonder not,

Stranger; there are different customs in different countries.' Now this

may be a sufficient answer; but we are speaking about the wisdom of

lawgivers and not about the customs of men. To return to the question of

drinking: shall we have total abstinence, as you have, or hard drinking,

like the Scythians and Thracians, or moderate potations like the

Persians? 'Give us arms, and we send all these nations flying before

us.' My good friend, be modest; victories and defeats often arise

from unknown causes, and afford no proof of the goodness or badness of

institutions. The stronger overcomes the weaker, as the Athenians have

overcome the Ceans, or the Syracusans the Locrians, who are, perhaps,

the best governed state in that part of the world. People are apt to

praise or censure practices without enquiring into the nature of them.

This is the way with drink: one person brings many witnesses, who sing

the praises of wine; another declares that sober men defeat drunkards

in battle; and he again is refuted in turn. I should like to conduct the

argument on some other method; for if you regard numbers, there are two

cities on one side, and ten thousand on the other. 'I am ready to pursue

any method which is likely to lead us to the truth.' Let me put the

matter thus: Somebody praises the useful qualities of a goat; another

has seen goats running about wild in a garden, and blames a goat or any

other animal which happens to be without a keeper. 'How absurd!' Would

a pilot who is sea-sick be a good pilot? 'No.' Or a general who is sick

and drunk with fear and ignorant of war a good general? 'A general

of old women he ought to be.' But can any one form an estimate of any

society, which is intended to have a ruler, and which he only sees in an

unruly and lawless state? 'No.' There is a convivial form of society--is

there not? 'Yes.' And has this convivial society ever been rightly

ordered? Of course you Spartans and Cretans have never seen anything of

the kind, but I have had wide experience, and made many enquiries about

such societies, and have hardly ever found anything right or good in

them. 'We acknowledge our want of experience, and desire to learn of

you.' Will you admit that in all societies there must be a leader?

'Yes.' And in time of war he must be a man of courage and absolutely

devoid of fear, if this be possible? 'Certainly.' But we are talking now

of a general who shall preside at meetings of friends--and as these

have a tendency to be uproarious, they ought above all others to have a

governor. 'Very good.' He should be a sober man and a man of the world,

who will keep, make, and increase the peace of the society; a drunkard

in charge of drunkards would be singularly fortunate if he avoided doing

a serious mischief. 'Indeed he would.' Suppose a person to censure such

meetings--he may be right, but also he may have known them only in their

disorderly state, under a drunken master of the feast; and a drunken

general or pilot cannot save his army or his ships. 'True; but although

I see the advantage of an army having a good general, I do not equally

see the good of a feast being well managed.' If you mean to ask what

good accrues to the state from the right training of a single youth or

a single chorus, I should reply, 'Not much'; but if you ask what is the

good of education in general, I answer, that education makes good

men, and that good men act nobly and overcome their enemies in

battle. Victory is often suicidal to the victors, because it creates

forgetfulness of education, but education itself is never suicidal. 'You

imply that the regulation of convivial meetings is a part of education;

how will you prove this?' I will tell you. But first let me offer a

word of apology. We Athenians are always thought to be fond of talking,

whereas the Lacedaemonian is celebrated for brevity, and the Cretan

is considered to be sagacious and reserved. Now I fear that I may be

charged with spinning a long discourse out of slender materials. For

drinking cannot be rightly ordered without correct principles of music,

and music runs up into education generally, and to discuss all these

matters may be tedious; if you like, therefore, we will pass on to

another part of our subject. 'Are you aware, Athenian, that our family

is your proxenus at Sparta, and that from my boyhood I have regarded

Athens as a second country, and having often fought your battles in my

youth, I have become attached to you, and love the sound of the Attic

dialect? The saying is true, that the best Athenians are more than

ordinarily good, because they are good by nature; therefore, be assured

that I shall be glad to hear you talk as much as you please.' 'I,

too,' adds Cleinias, 'have a tie which binds me to you. You know that

Epimenides, the Cretan prophet, came and offered sacrifices in your city

by the command of an oracle ten years before the Persian war. He told

the Athenians that the Persian host would not come for ten years, and

would go away again, having suffered more harm than they had inflicted.

Now Epimenides was of my family, and when he visited Athens he entered

into friendship with your forefathers.' I see that you are willing to

listen, and I have the will to speak, if I had only the ability. But,

first, I must define the nature and power of education, and by this

road we will travel on to the God Dionysus. The man who is to be good

at anything must have early training;--the future builder must play at

building, and the husbandman at digging; the soldier must learn to ride,

and the carpenter to measure and use the rule,--all the thoughts and

pleasures of children should bear on their after-profession.--Do you

agree with me? 'Certainly.' And we must remember further that we are

speaking of the education, not of a trainer, or of the captain of a

ship, but of a perfect citizen who knows how to rule and how to obey;

and such an education aims at virtue, and not at wealth or strength or

mere cleverness. To the good man, education is of all things the most

precious, and is also in constant need of renovation. 'We agree.' And

we have before agreed that good men are those who are able to control

themselves, and bad men are those who are not. Let me offer you an

illustration which will assist our argument. Man is one; but in one

and the same man are two foolish counsellors who contend within

him--pleasure and pain, and of either he has expectations which we call

hope and fear; and he is able to reason about good and evil, and reason,

when affirmed by the state, becomes law. 'We cannot follow you.' Let

me put the matter in another way: Every creature is a puppet of the

Gods--whether he is a mere plaything or has any serious use we do not

know; but this we do know, that he is drawn different ways by cords

and strings. There is a soft golden cord which draws him towards

virtue--this is the law of the state; and there are other cords made

of iron and hard materials drawing him other ways. The golden reasoning

influence has nothing of the nature of force, and therefore requires

ministers in order to vanquish the other principles. This explains the

doctrine that cities and citizens both conquer and are conquered by

themselves. The individual follows reason, and the city law, which is

embodied reason, either derived from the Gods or from the legislator.

When virtue and vice are thus distinguished, education will be better

understood, and in particular the relation of education to convivial

intercourse. And now let us set wine before the puppet. You admit that

wine stimulates the passions? 'Yes.' And does wine equally stimulate

the reasoning faculties? 'No; it brings the soul back to a state of

childhood.' In such a state a man has the least control over himself,

and is, therefore, worst. 'Very true.' Then how can we believe that

drinking should be encouraged? 'You seem to think that it ought to be.'

And I am ready to maintain my position. 'We should like to hear you

prove that a man ought to make a beast of himself.' You are speaking

of the degradation of the soul: but how about the body? Would any man

willingly degrade or weaken that? 'Certainly not.' And yet if he goes to

a doctor or a gymnastic master, does he not make himself ill in the hope

of getting well? for no one would like to be always taking medicine, or

always to be in training. 'True.' And may not convivial meetings have a

similar remedial use? And if so, are they not to be preferred to other

modes of training because they are painless? 'But have they any such

use?' Let us see: Are there not two kinds of fear--fear of evil and fear

of an evil reputation? 'There are.' The latter kind of fear is opposed

both to the fear of pain and to the love of pleasure. This is called by

the legislator reverence, and is greatly honoured by him and by every

good man; whereas confidence, which is the opposite quality, is the

worst fault both of individuals and of states. This sort of fear or

reverence is one of the two chief causes of victory in war, fearlessness

of enemies being the other. 'True.' Then every one should be both

fearful and fearless? 'Yes.' The right sort of fear is infused into

a man when he comes face to face with shame, or cowardice, or the

temptations of pleasure, and has to conquer them. He must learn by

many trials to win the victory over himself, if he is ever to be made

perfect. 'That is reasonable enough.' And now, suppose that the Gods had

given mankind a drug, of which the effect was to exaggerate every sort

of evil and danger, so that the bravest man entirely lost his presence

of mind and became a coward for a time:--would such a drug have any

value? 'But is there such a drug?' No; but suppose that there were;

might not the legislator use such a mode of testing courage and

cowardice? 'To be sure.' The legislator would induce fear in order to

implant fearlessness; and would give rewards or punishments to those

who behaved well or the reverse, under the influence of the drug?

'Certainly.' And this mode of training, whether practised in the case

of one or many, whether in solitude or in the presence of a large

company--if a man have sufficient confidence in himself to drink the

potion amid his boon companions, leaving off in time and not taking too

much,--would be an equally good test of temperance? 'Very true.' Let

us return to the lawgiver and say to him, 'Well, lawgiver, no such

fear-producing potion has been given by God or invented by man, but

there is a potion which will make men fearless.' 'You mean wine.'

Yes; has not wine an effect the contrary of that which I was just now

describing,--first mellowing and humanizing a man, and then filling him

with confidence, making him ready to say or do anything? 'Certainly.'

Let us not forget that there are two qualities which should be

cultivated in the soul--first, the greatest fearlessness, and, secondly,

the greatest fear, which are both parts of reverence. Courage and

fearlessness are trained amid dangers; but we have still to consider how

fear is to be trained. We desire to attain fearlessness and confidence

without the insolence and boldness which commonly attend them. For

do not love, ignorance, avarice, wealth, beauty, strength, while they

stimulate courage, also madden and intoxicate the soul? What better and

more innocent test of character is there than festive intercourse? Would

you make a bargain with a man in order to try whether he is honest? Or

would you ascertain whether he is licentious by putting your wife or

daughter into his hands? No one would deny that the test proposed is

fairer, speedier, and safer than any other. And such a test will be

particularly useful in the political science, which desires to know

human natures and characters. 'Very true.'

BOOK II. And are there any other uses of well-ordered potations? There

are; but in order to explain them, I must repeat what I mean by right

education; which, if I am not mistaken, depends on the due regulation

of convivial intercourse. 'A high assumption.' I believe that virtue

and vice are originally present to the mind of children in the form of

pleasure and pain; reason and fixed principles come later, and happy is

he who acquires them even in declining years; for he who possesses

them is the perfect man. When pleasure and pain, and love and hate, are

rightly implanted in the yet unconscious soul, and after the attainment

of reason are discovered to be in harmony with her, this harmony of the

soul is virtue, and the preparatory stage, anticipating reason, I

call education. But the finer sense of pleasure and pain is apt to be

impaired in the course of life; and therefore the Gods, pitying the

toils and sorrows of mortals, have allowed them to have holidays,

and given them the Muses and Apollo and Dionysus for leaders and

playfellows. All young creatures love motion and frolic, and utter

sounds of delight; but man only is capable of taking pleasure in

rhythmical and harmonious movements. With these education begins; and

the uneducated is he who has never known the discipline of the chorus,

and the educated is he who has. The chorus is partly dance and partly

song, and therefore the well-educated must sing and dance well. But when

we say, 'He sings and dances well,' we mean that he sings and dances

what is good. And if he thinks that to be good which is really good, he

will have a much higher music and harmony in him, and be a far greater

master of imitation in sound and gesture than he who is not of this

opinion. 'True.' Then, if we know what is good and bad in song and

dance, we shall know what education is? 'Very true.' Let us now consider

the beauty of figure, melody, song, and dance. Will the same figures or

sounds be equally well adapted to the manly and the cowardly when they

are in trouble? 'How can they be, when the very colours of their faces

are different?' Figures and melodies have a rhythm and harmony which are

adapted to the expression of different feelings (I may remark, by the

way, that the term 'colour,' which is a favourite word of music-masters,

is not really applicable to music). And one class of harmonies is akin

to courage and all virtue, the other to cowardice and all vice. 'We

agree.' And do all men equally like all dances? 'Far otherwise.' Do some

figures, then, appear to be beautiful which are not? For no one will

admit that the forms of vice are more beautiful than the forms of

virtue, or that he prefers the first kind to the second. And yet most

persons say that the merit of music is to give pleasure. But this is

impiety. There is, however, a more plausible account of the matter given

by others, who make their likes or dislikes the criterion of excellence.

Sometimes nature crosses habit, or conversely, and then they say that

such and such fashions or gestures are pleasant, but they do not like to

exhibit them before men of sense, although they enjoy them in private.

'Very true.' And do vicious measures and strains do any harm, or

good measures any good to the lovers of them? 'Probably.' Say, rather

'Certainly': for the gentle indulgence which we often show to vicious

men inevitably makes us become like them. And what can be worse than

this? 'Nothing.' Then in a well-administered city, the poet will not be

allowed to make the songs of the people just as he pleases, or to train

his choruses without regard to virtue and vice. 'Certainly not.' And

yet he may do this anywhere except in Egypt; for there ages ago they

discovered the great truth which I am now asserting, that the young

should be educated in forms and strains of virtue. These they fixed and

consecrated in their temples; and no artist or musician is allowed

to deviate from them. They are literally the same which they were ten

thousand years ago. And this practice of theirs suggests the reflection

that legislation about music is not an impossible thing. But the

particular enactments must be the work of God or of some God-inspired

man, as in Egypt their ancient chants are said to be the composition

of the goddess Isis. The melodies which have a natural truth and

correctness should be embodied in a law, and then the desire of novelty

is not strong enough to change the old fashions. Is not the origin of

music as follows? We rejoice when we think that we prosper, and we think

that we prosper when we rejoice, and at such times we cannot rest, but

our young men dance dances and sing songs, and our old men, who have

lost the elasticity of youth, regale themselves with the memory of the

past, while they contemplate the life and activity of the young. 'Most

true.' People say that he who gives us most pleasure at such festivals

is to win the palm: are they right? 'Possibly.' Let us not be hasty

in deciding, but first imagine a festival at which the lord of the

festival, having assembled the citizens, makes a proclamation that

he shall be crowned victor who gives the most pleasure, from whatever

source derived. We will further suppose that there are exhibitions

of rhapsodists and musicians, tragic and comic poets, and even

marionette-players--which of the pleasure-makers will win? Shall I

answer for you?--the marionette-players will please the children; youths

will decide for comedy; young men, educated women, and people in general

will prefer tragedy; we old men are lovers of Homer and Hesiod. Now

which of them is right? If you and I are asked, we shall certainly say

that the old men's way of thinking ought to prevail. 'Very true.' So far

I agree with the many that the excellence of music is to be measured by

pleasure; but then the pleasure must be that of the good and educated,

or better still, of one supremely virtuous and educated man. The true

judge must have both wisdom and courage. For he must lead the multitude

and not be led by them, and must not weakly yield to the uproar of

the theatre, nor give false judgment out of that mouth which has just

appealed to the Gods. The ancient custom of Hellas, which still prevails

in Italy and Sicily, left the judgment to the spectators, but this

custom has been the ruin of the poets, who seek only to please their

patrons, and has degraded the audience by the representation of inferior

characters. What is the inference? The same which we have often drawn,

that education is the training of the young idea in what the law affirms

and the elders approve. And as the soul of a child is too young to be

trained in earnest, a kind of education has been invented which tempts

him with plays and songs, as the sick are tempted by pleasant meats and

drinks. And the wise legislator will compel the poet to express in his

poems noble thoughts in fitting words and rhythms. 'But is this the

practice elsewhere than in Crete and Lacedaemon? In other states, as far

as I know, dances and music are constantly changed at the pleasure of

the hearers.' I am afraid that I misled you; not liking to be always

finding fault with mankind as they are, I described them as they ought

to be. But let me understand: you say that such customs exist among

the Cretans and Lacedaemonians, and that the rest of the world would be

improved by adopting them? 'Much improved.' And you compel your poets to

declare that the righteous are happy, and that the wicked man, even if

he be as rich as Midas, is unhappy? Or, in the words of Tyrtaeus,

'I sing not, I care not about him' who is a great warrior not having

justice; if he be unjust, 'I would not have him look calmly upon death

or be swifter than the wind'; and may he be deprived of every good--that

is, of every true good. For even if he have the goods which men regard,

these are not really goods: first health; beauty next; thirdly wealth;

and there are others. A man may have every sense purged and improved; he

may be a tyrant, and do what he likes, and live for ever: but you and

I will maintain that all these things are goods to the just, but to the

unjust the greatest of evils, if life be immortal; not so great if he

live for a short time only. If a man had health and wealth, and power,

and was insolent and unjust, his life would still be miserable; he might

be fair and rich, and do what he liked, but he would live basely, and if

basely evilly, and if evilly painfully. 'There I cannot agree with you.'

Then may heaven give us the spirit of agreement, for I am as convinced

of the truth of what I say as that Crete is an island; and, if I were

a lawgiver, I would exercise a censorship over the poets, and I would

punish them if they said that the wicked are happy, or that injustice is

profitable. And these are not the only matters in which I should make

my citizens talk in a different way to the world in general. If I asked

Zeus and Apollo, the divine legislators of Crete and Sparta,--'Are

the just and pleasant life the same or not the same'?--and they

replied,--'Not the same'; and I asked again--'Which is the happier'? And

they said'--'The pleasant life,' this is an answer not fit for a God

to utter, and therefore I ought rather to put the same question to some

legislator. And if he replies 'The pleasant,' then I should say to

him, 'O my father, did you not tell me that I should live as justly as

possible'? and if to be just is to be happy, what is that principle of

happiness or good which is superior to pleasure? Is the approval of

gods and men to be deemed good and honourable, but unpleasant, and their

disapproval the reverse? Or is the neither doing nor suffering evil good

and honourable, although not pleasant? But you cannot make men like what

is not pleasant, and therefore you must make them believe that the

just is pleasant. The business of the legislator is to clear up this

confusion. He will show that the just and the unjust are identical with

the pleasurable and the painful, from the point of view of the just man,

of the unjust the reverse. And which is the truer judgment? Surely that

of the better soul. For if not the truth, it is the best and most moral

of fictions; and the legislator who desires to propagate this useful

lie, may be encouraged by remarking that mankind have believed the story

of Cadmus and the dragon's teeth, and therefore he may be assured that

he can make them believe anything, and need only consider what fiction

will do the greatest good. That the happiest is also the holiest, this

shall be our strain, which shall be sung by all three choruses alike.

First will enter the choir of children, who will lift up their voices

on high; and after them the young men, who will pray the God Paean to be

gracious to the youth, and to testify to the truth of their words;

then will come the chorus of elder men, between thirty and sixty; and,

lastly, there will be the old men, and they will tell stories enforcing

the same virtues, as with the voice of an oracle. 'Whom do you mean by

the third chorus?' You remember how I spoke at first of the restless

nature of young creatures, who jumped about and called out in a

disorderly manner, and I said that no other animal attained any

perception of rhythm; but that to us the Gods gave Apollo and the Muses

and Dionysus to be our playfellows. Of the two first choruses I have

already spoken, and I have now to speak of the third, or Dionysian

chorus, which is composed of those who are between thirty and sixty

years old. 'Let us hear.' We are agreed (are we not?) that men, women,

and children should be always charming themselves with strains of

virtue, and that there should be a variety in the strains, that they may

not weary of them? Now the fairest and most useful of strains will be

uttered by the elder men, and therefore we cannot let them off. But how

can we make them sing? For a discreet elderly man is ashamed to hear the

sound of his own voice in private, and still more in public. The only

way is to give them drink; this will mellow the sourness of age. No one

should be allowed to taste wine until they are eighteen; from eighteen

to thirty they may take a little; but when they have reached forty

years, they may be initiated into the mystery of drinking. Thus they

will become softer and more impressible; and when a man's heart is warm

within him, he will be more ready to charm himself and others with song.

And what songs shall he sing? 'At Crete and Lacedaemon we only know

choral songs.' Yes; that is because your way of life is military. Your

young men are like wild colts feeding in a herd together; no one takes

the individual colt and trains him apart, and tries to give him the

qualities of a statesman as well as of a soldier. He who was thus

trained would be a greater warrior than those of whom Tyrtaeus speaks,

for he would be courageous, and yet he would know that courage was only

fourth in the scale of virtue. 'Once more, I must say, Stranger, that

you run down our lawgivers.' Not intentionally, my good friend, but

whither the argument leads I follow; and I am trying to find some style

of poetry suitable for those who dislike the common sort. 'Very good.'

In all things which have a charm, either this charm is their good, or

they have some accompanying truth or advantage. For example, in eating

and drinking there is pleasure and also profit, that is to say, health;

and in learning there is a pleasure and also truth. There is a pleasure

or charm, too, in the imitative arts, as well as a law of proportion or

equality; but the pleasure which they afford, however innocent, is not

the criterion of their truth. The test of pleasure cannot be applied

except to that which has no other good or evil, no truth or falsehood.

But that which has truth must be judged of by the standard of truth, and

therefore imitation and proportion are to be judged of by their truth

alone. 'Certainly.' And as music is imitative, it is not to be judged by

the criterion of pleasure, and the Muse whom we seek is the muse not of

pleasure but of truth, for imitation has a truth. 'Doubtless.' And if

so, the judge must know what is being imitated before he decides on the

quality of the imitation, and he who does not know what is true will not

know what is good. 'He will not.' Will any one be able to imitate the

human body, if he does not know the number, proportion, colour, or

figure of the limbs? 'How can he?' But suppose we know some picture or

figure to be an exact resemblance of a man, should we not also require

to know whether the picture is beautiful or not? 'Quite right.' The

judge of the imitation is required to know, therefore, first the

original, secondly the truth, and thirdly the merit of the execution?

'True.' Then let us not weary in the attempt to bring music to the

standard of the Muses and of truth. The Muses are not like human poets;

they never spoil or mix rhythms or scales, or mingle instruments and

human voices, or confuse the manners and strains of men and women, or of

freemen and slaves, or of rational beings and brute animals. They do

not practise the baser sorts of musical arts, such as the 'matured

judgments,' of whom Orpheus speaks, would ridicule. But modern poets

separate metre from music, and melody and rhythm from words, and use the

instrument alone without the voice. The consequence is, that the meaning

of the rhythm and of the time are not understood. I am endeavouring to

show how our fifty-year-old choristers are to be trained, and what

they are to avoid. The opinion of the multitude about these matters is

worthless; they who are only made to step in time by sheer force cannot

be critics of music. 'Impossible.' Then our newly-appointed minstrels

must be trained in music sufficiently to understand the nature of

rhythms and systems; and they should select such as are suitable to

men of their age, and will enable them to give and receive innocent

pleasure. This is a knowledge which goes beyond that either of the poets

or of their auditors in general. For although the poet must understand

rhythm and music, he need not necessarily know whether the imitation

is good or not, which was the third point required in a judge; but our

chorus of elders must know all three, if they are to be the instructors

of youth.

And now we will resume the original argument, which may be summed up as

follows: A convivial meeting is apt to grow tumultuous as the drinking

proceeds; every man becomes light-headed, and fancies that he can rule

the whole world. 'Doubtless.' And did we not say that the souls of the

drinkers, when subdued by wine, are made softer and more malleable at

the hand of the legislator? the docility of childhood returns to them.

At times however they become too valiant and disorderly, drinking out

of their turn, and interrupting one another. And the business of the

legislator is to infuse into them that divine fear, which we call shame,

in opposition to this disorderly boldness. But in order to discipline

them there must be guardians of the law of drinking, and sober generals

who shall take charge of the private soldiers; they are as necessary in

drinking as in fighting, and he who disobeys these Dionysiac commanders

will be equally disgraced. 'Very good.' If a drinking festival were well

regulated, men would go away, not as they now do, greater enemies, but

better friends. Of the greatest gift of Dionysus I hardly like to speak,

lest I should be misunderstood. 'What is that?' According to tradition

Dionysus was driven mad by his stepmother Here, and in order to revenge

himself he inspired mankind with Bacchic madness. But these are stories

which I would rather not repeat. However I do acknowledge that all men

are born in an imperfect state, and are at first restless, irrational

creatures: this, as you will remember, has been already said by us. 'I

remember.' And that Apollo and the Muses and Dionysus gave us harmony

and rhythm? 'Very true.' The other story implies that wine was given

to punish us and make us mad; but we contend that wine is a balm and a

cure; a spring of modesty in the soul, and of health and strength in

the body. Again, the work of the chorus is co-extensive with the work of

education; rhythm and melody answer to the voice, and the motions of the

body correspond to all three, and the sound enters in and educates

the soul in virtue. 'Yes.' And the movement which, when pursued as

an amusement, is termed dancing, when studied with a view to the

improvement of the body, becomes gymnastic. Shall we now proceed to

speak of this? 'What Cretan or Lacedaemonian would approve of your

omitting gymnastic?' Your question implies assent; and you will easily

understand a subject which is familiar to you. Gymnastic is based on the

natural tendency of every animal to rapid motion; and man adds a sense

of rhythm, which is awakened by music; music and dancing together form

the choral art. But before proceeding I must add a crowning word about

drinking. Like other pleasures, it has a lawful use; but if a state or

an individual is inclined to drink at will, I cannot allow them. I

would go further than Crete or Lacedaemon and have the law of the

Carthaginians, that no slave of either sex should drink wine at all, and

no soldier while he is on a campaign, and no magistrate or officer while

he is on duty, and that no one should drink by daylight or on a bridal

night. And there are so many other occasions on which wine ought to

be prohibited, that there will not be many vines grown or vineyards

required in the state.

BOOK III. If a man wants to know the origin of states and societies, he

should behold them from the point of view of time. Thousands of cities

have come into being and have passed away again in infinite ages,

every one of them having had endless forms of government; and if we

can ascertain the cause of these changes in states, that will probably

explain their origin. What do you think of ancient traditions about

deluges and destructions of mankind, and the preservation of a remnant?

'Every one believes in them.' Then let us suppose the world to have

been destroyed by a deluge. The survivors would be hill-shepherds, small

sparks of the human race, dwelling in isolation, and unacquainted with

the arts and vices of civilization. We may further suppose that the

cities on the plain and on the coast have been swept away, and that all

inventions, and every sort of knowledge, have perished. 'Why, if all

things were as they now are, nothing would have ever been invented. All

our famous discoveries have been made within the last thousand years,

and many of them are but of yesterday.' Yes, Cleinias, and you must not

forget Epimenides, who was really of yesterday; he practised the lesson

of moderation and abstinence which Hesiod only preached. 'True.' After

the great destruction we may imagine that the earth was a desert, in

which there were a herd or two of oxen and a few goats, hardly enough

to support those who tended them; while of politics and governments

the survivors would know nothing. And out of this state of things have

arisen arts and laws, and a great deal of virtue and a great deal of

vice; little by little the world has come to be what it is. At first,

the few inhabitants would have had a natural fear of descending into the

plains; although they would want to have intercourse with one another,

they would have a difficulty in getting about, having lost the arts,

and having no means of extracting metals from the earth, or of felling

timber; for even if they had saved any tools, these would soon have been

worn out, and they could get no more until the art of metallurgy had

been again revived. Faction and war would be extinguished among them,

for being solitary they would incline to be friendly; and having

abundance of pasture and plenty of milk and flesh, they would have

nothing to quarrel about. We may assume that they had also dwellings,

clothes, pottery, for the weaving and plastic arts do not require the

use of metals. In those days they were neither poor nor rich, and

there was no insolence or injustice among them; for they were of noble

natures, and lived up to their principles, and believed what they were

told; knowing nothing of land or naval warfare, or of legal practices

or party conflicts, they were simpler and more temperate, and also more

just than the men of our day. 'Very true.' I am showing whence the need

of lawgivers arises, for in primitive ages they neither had nor wanted

them. Men lived according to the customs of their fathers, in a simple

manner, under a patriarchal government, such as still exists both among

Hellenes and barbarians, and is described in Homer as prevailing among

the Cyclopes:--

'They have no laws, and they dwell in rocks or on the tops of mountains,

and every one is the judge of his wife and children, and they do not

trouble themselves about one another.'

'That is a charming poet of yours, though I know little of him, for in

Crete foreign poets are not much read.' 'But he is well known in Sparta,

though he describes Ionian rather than Dorian manners, and he seems to

take your view of primitive society.' May we not suppose that government

arose out of the union of single families who survived the destruction,

and were under the rule of patriarchs, because they had originally

descended from a single father and mother? 'That is very probable.' As

time went on, men increased in number, and tilled the ground, living in

a common habitation, which they protected by walls against wild beasts;

but the several families retained the laws and customs which they

separately received from their first parents. They would naturally like

their own laws better than any others, and would be already formed by

them when they met in a common society: thus legislation imperceptibly

began among them. For in the next stage the associated families would

appoint plenipotentiaries, who would select and present to the chiefs

those of all their laws which they thought best. The chiefs in turn

would make a further selection, and would thus become the lawgivers

of the state, which they would form into an aristocracy or a monarchy.

'Probably.' In the third stage various other forms of government would

arise. This state of society is described by Homer in speaking of the

foundation of Dardania, which, he says,

'was built at the foot of many-fountained Ida, for Ilium,

the city of the plain, as yet was not.'

Here, as also in the account of the Cyclopes, the poet by some divine

inspiration has attained truth. But to proceed with our tale. Ilium was

built in a wide plain, on a low hill, which was surrounded by streams

descending from Ida. This shows that many ages must have passed; for the

men who remembered the deluge would never have placed their city at the

mercy of the waters. When mankind began to multiply, many other cities

were built in similar situations. These cities carried on a ten years'

war against Troy, by sea as well as land, for men were ceasing to be

afraid of the sea, and, in the meantime, while the chiefs of the army

were at Troy, their homes fell into confusion. The youth revolted and

refused to receive their own fathers; deaths, murders, exiles ensued.

Under the new name of Dorians, which they received from their chief

Dorieus, the exiles returned: the rest of the story is part of the

history of Sparta.

Thus, after digressing from the subject of laws into music and drinking,

we return to the settlement of Sparta, which in laws and institutions is

the sister of Crete. We have seen the rise of a first, second, and third

state, during the lapse of ages; and now we arrive at a fourth state,

and out of the comparison of all four we propose to gather the nature

of laws and governments, and the changes which may be desirable in them.

'If,' replies the Spartan, 'our new discussion is likely to be as

good as the last, I would think the longest day too short for such an

employment.'

Let us imagine the time when Lacedaemon, and Argos, and Messene were all

subject, Megillus, to your ancestors. Afterwards, they distributed

the army into three portions, and made three cities--Argos, Messene,

Lacedaemon. 'Yes.' Temenus was the king of Argos, Cresphontes of

Messene, Procles and Eurysthenes ruled at Lacedaemon. 'Just so.' And

they all swore to assist any one of their number whose kingdom was

subverted. 'Yes.' But did we not say that kingdoms or governments can

only be subverted by themselves? 'That is true.' Yes, and the truth is

now proved by facts: there were certain conditions upon which the three

kingdoms were to assist one another; the government was to be mild and

the people obedient, and the kings and people were to unite in assisting

either of the two others when they were wronged. This latter condition

was a great security. 'Clearly.' Such a provision is in opposition to

the common notion that the lawgiver should make only such laws as the

people like; but we say that he should rather be like a physician,

prepared to effect a cure even at the cost of considerable suffering.

'Very true.' The early lawgivers had another great advantage--they

were saved from the reproach which attends a division of land and the

abolition of debts. No one could quarrel with the Dorians for dividing

the territory, and they had no debts of long standing. 'They had not.'

Then what was the reason why their legislation signally failed? For

there were three kingdoms, two of them quickly lost their original

constitution. That is a question which we cannot refuse to answer, if

we mean to proceed with our old man's game of enquiring into laws

and institutions. And the Dorian institutions are more worthy of

consideration than any other, having been evidently intended to be a

protection not only to the Peloponnese, but to all the Hellenes against

the Barbarians. For the capture of Troy by the Achaeans had given great

offence to the Assyrians, of whose empire it then formed part, and

they were likely to retaliate. Accordingly the royal Heraclid brothers

devised their military constitution, which was organised on a far better

plan than the old Trojan expedition; and the Dorians themselves were far

superior to the Achaeans, who had taken part in that expedition, and had

been conquered by them. Such a scheme, undertaken by men who had shared

with one another toils and dangers, sanctioned by the Delphian oracle,

under the guidance of the Heraclidae, seemed to have a promise of

permanence. 'Naturally.' Yet this has not proved to be the case. Instead

of the three being one, they have always been at war; had they been

united, in accordance with the original intention, they would have been

invincible.

And what caused their ruin? Did you ever observe that there are

beautiful things of which men often say, 'What wonders they would have

effected if rightly used?' and yet, after all, this may be a mistake.

And so I say of the Heraclidae and their expedition, which I may perhaps

have been justified in admiring, but which nevertheless suggests to me

the general reflection,--'What wonders might not strength and military

resources have accomplished, if the possessor had only known how to use

them!' For consider: if the generals of the army had only known how

to arrange their forces, might they not have given their subjects

everlasting freedom, and the power of doing what they would in all the

world? 'Very true.' Suppose a person to express his admiration of wealth

or rank, does he not do so under the idea that by the help of these

he can attain his desires? All men wish to obtain the control of all

things, and they are always praying for what they desire. 'Certainly.'

And we ask for our friends what they ask for themselves. 'Yes.' Dear is

the son to the father, and yet the son, if he is young and foolish, will

often pray to obtain what the father will pray that he may not obtain.

'True.' And when the father, in the heat of youth or the dotage of age,

makes some rash prayer, the son, like Hippolytus, may have reason to

pray that the word of his father may be ineffectual. 'You mean that a

man should pray to have right desires, before he prays that his desires

may be fulfilled; and that wisdom should be the first object of our

prayers?' Yes; and you will remember my saying that wisdom should be the

principal aim of the legislator; but you said that defence in war

came first. And I replied, that there were four virtues, whereas you

acknowledged one only--courage, and not wisdom which is the guide of all

the rest. And I repeat--in jest if you like, but I am willing that you

should receive my words in earnest--that 'the prayer of a fool is full

of danger.' I will prove to you, if you will allow me, that the ruin

of those states was not caused by cowardice or ignorance in war, but

by ignorance of human affairs. 'Pray proceed: our attention will show

better than compliments that we prize your words.' I maintain that

ignorance is, and always has been, the ruin of states; wherefore the

legislator should seek to banish it from the state; and the greatest

ignorance is the love of what is known to be evil, and the hatred of

what is known to be good; this is the last and greatest conflict of

pleasure and reason in the soul. I say the greatest, because affecting

the greater part of the soul; for the passions are in the individual

what the people are in a state. And when they become opposed to reason

or law, and instruction no longer avails--that is the last and greatest

ignorance of states and men. 'I agree.' Let this, then, be our first

principle:--That the citizen who does not know how to choose between

good and evil must not have authority, although he possess great mental

gifts, and many accomplishments; for he is really a fool. On the other

hand, he who has this knowledge may be unable either to read or swim;

nevertheless, he shall be counted wise and permitted to rule. For how

can there be wisdom where there is no harmony?--the wise man is the

saviour, and he who is devoid of wisdom is the destroyer of states and

households. There are rulers and there are subjects in states. And the

first claim to rule is that of parents to rule over their children; the

second, that of the noble to rule over the ignoble; thirdly, the elder

must govern the younger; in the fourth place, the slave must obey his

master; fifthly, there is the power of the stronger, which the poet

Pindar declares to be according to nature; sixthly, there is the rule of

the wiser, which is also according to nature, as I must inform Pindar,

if he does not know, and is the rule of law over obedient subjects.

'Most true.' And there is a seventh kind of rule which the Gods

love,--in this the ruler is elected by lot.

Then, now, we playfully say to him who fancies that it is easy to

make laws:--You see, legislator, the many and inconsistent claims to

authority; here is a spring of troubles which you must stay. And first

of all you must help us to consider how the kings of Argos and Messene

in olden days destroyed their famous empire--did they forget the saying

of Hesiod, that 'the half is better than the whole'? And do we suppose

that the ignorance of this truth is less fatal to kings than to peoples?

'Probably the evil is increased by their way of life.' The kings of

those days transgressed the laws and violated their oaths. Their deeds

were not in harmony with their words, and their folly, which seemed to

them wisdom, was the ruin of the state. And how could the legislator

have prevented this evil?--the remedy is easy to see now, but was not

easy to foresee at the time. 'What is the remedy?' The institutions of

Sparta may teach you, Megillus. Wherever there is excess, whether the

vessel has too large a sail, or the body too much food, or the mind

too much power, there destruction is certain. And similarly, a man who

possesses arbitrary power is soon corrupted, and grows hateful to

his dearest friends. In order to guard against this evil, the God who

watched over Sparta gave you two kings instead of one, that they

might balance one another; and further to lower the pulse of your body

politic, some human wisdom, mingled with divine power, tempered the

strength and self-sufficiency of youth with the moderation of age in

the institution of your senate. A third saviour bridled your rising and

swelling power by ephors, whom he assimilated to officers elected by

lot: and thus the kingly power was preserved, and became the preserver

of all the rest. Had the constitution been arranged by the original

legislators, not even the portion of Aristodemus would have been saved;

for they had no political experience, and imagined that a youthful

spirit invested with power could be restrained by oaths. Now that God

has instructed us in the arts of legislation, there is no merit in

seeing all this, or in learning wisdom after the event. But if the

coming danger could have been foreseen, and the union preserved, then

no Persian or other enemy would have dared to attack Hellas; and indeed

there was not so much credit to us in defeating the enemy, as discredit

in our disloyalty to one another. For of the three cities one only

fought on behalf of Hellas; and of the two others, Argos refused

her aid; and Messenia was actually at war with Sparta: and if the

Lacedaemonians and Athenians had not united, the Hellenes would have

been absorbed in the Persian empire, and dispersed among the barbarians.

We make these reflections upon past and present legislators because we

desire to find out what other course could have been followed. We were

saying just now, that a state can only be free and wise and harmonious

when there is a balance of powers. There are many words by which we

express the aims of the legislator,--temperance, wisdom, friendship; but

we need not be disturbed by the variety of expression,--these words have

all the same meaning. 'I should like to know at what in your opinion

the legislator should aim.' Hear me, then. There are two mother forms

of states--one monarchy, and the other democracy: the Persians have

the first in the highest form, and the Athenians the second; and no

government can be well administered which does not include both. There

was a time when both the Persians and Athenians had more the character

of a constitutional state than they now have. In the days of Cyrus the

Persians were freemen as well as lords of others, and their soldiers

were free and equal, and the kings used and honoured all the talent

which they could find, and so the nation waxed great, because there was

freedom and friendship and communion of soul. But Cyrus, though a wise

general, never troubled himself about the education of his family. He

was a soldier from his youth upward, and left his children who were born

in the purple to be educated by women, who humoured and spoilt them.

'A rare education, truly!' Yes, such an education as princesses who had

recently grown rich might be expected to give them in a country where

the men were solely occupied with warlike pursuits. 'Likely enough.'

Their father had possessions of men and animals, and never considered

that the race to whom he was about to make them over had been educated

in a very different school, not like the Persian shepherd, who was

well able to take care of himself and his own. He did not see that

his children had been brought up in the Median fashion, by women and

eunuchs. The end was that one of the sons of Cyrus slew the other, and

lost the kingdom by his own folly. Observe, again, that Darius, who

restored the kingdom, had not received a royal education. He was one of

the seven chiefs, and when he came to the throne he divided the empire

into seven provinces; and he made equal laws, and implanted friendship

among the people. Hence his subjects were greatly attached to him, and

cheerfully helped him to extend his empire. Next followed Xerxes,

who had received the same royal education as Cambyses, and met with a

similar fate. The reflection naturally occurs to us--How could Darius,

with all his experience, have made such a mistake! The ruin of Xerxes

was not a mere accident, but the evil life which is generally led by the

sons of very rich and royal persons; and this is what the legislator has

seriously to consider. Justly may the Lacedaemonians be praised for not

giving special honour to birth or wealth; for such advantages are not to

be highly esteemed without virtue, and not even virtue is to be esteemed

unless it be accompanied by temperance. 'Explain.' No one would like

to live in the same house with a courageous man who had no control over

himself, nor with a clever artist who was a rogue. Nor can justice

and wisdom ever be separated from temperance. But considering these

qualities with reference to the honour and dishonour which is to be

assigned to them in states, would you say, on the other hand, that

temperance, if existing without the other virtues in the soul, is worth

anything or nothing? 'I cannot tell.' You have answered well. It would

be absurd to speak of temperance as belonging to the class of honourable

or of dishonourable qualities, because all other virtues in their

various classes require temperance to be added to them; having the

addition, they are honoured not in proportion to that, but to their own

excellence. And ought not the legislator to determine these classes?

'Certainly.' Suppose then that, without going into details, we make

three great classes of them. Most honourable are the goods of the soul,

always assuming temperance as a condition of them; secondly, those of

the body; thirdly, external possessions. The legislator who puts them in

another order is doing an unholy and unpatriotic thing.

These remarks were suggested by the history of the Persian kings; and to

them I will now return. The ruin of their empire was caused by the

loss of freedom and the growth of despotism; all community of feeling

disappeared. Hatred and spoliation took the place of friendship; the

people no longer fought heartily for their masters; the rulers, finding

their myriads useless on the field of battle, resorted to mercenaries as

their only salvation, and were thus compelled by their circumstances

to proclaim the stupidest of falsehoods--that virtue is a trifle in

comparison of money.

But enough of the Persians: a different lesson is taught by the

Athenians, whose example shows that a limited freedom is far better than

an unlimited. Ancient Athens, at the time of the Persian invasion,

had such a limited freedom. The people were divided into four classes,

according to the amount of their property, and the universal love of

order, as well as the fear of the approaching host, made them obedient

and willing citizens. For Darius had sent Datis and Artaphernes,

commanding them under pain of death to subjugate the Eretrians and

Athenians. A report, whether true or not, came to Athens that all the

Eretrians had been 'netted'; and the Athenians in terror sent all

over Hellas for assistance. None came to their relief except the

Lacedaemonians, and they arrived a day too late, when the battle of

Marathon had been already fought. In process of time Xerxes came to

the throne, and the Athenians heard of nothing but the bridge over the

Hellespont, and the canal of Athos, and the innumerable host and fleet.

They knew that these were intended to avenge the defeat of Marathon.

Their case seemed desperate, for there was no Hellene likely to assist

them by land, and at sea they were attacked by more than a thousand

vessels;--their only hope, however slender, was in victory; so they

relied upon themselves and upon the Gods. Their common danger, and

the influence of their ancient constitution, greatly tended to promote

harmony among them. Reverence and fear--that fear which the coward never

knows--made them fight for their altars and their homes, and saved them

from being dispersed all over the world. 'Your words, Athenian, are

worthy of your country.' And you Megillus, who have inherited the

virtues of your ancestors, are worthy to hear them. Let me ask you

to take the moral of my tale. The Persians have lost their liberty

in absolute slavery, and we in absolute freedom. In ancient times the

Athenian people were not the masters, but the servants of the laws. 'Of

what laws?' In the first place, there were laws about music, and the

music was of various kinds: there was one kind which consisted of hymns,

another of lamentations; there was also the paean and the dithyramb,

and the so-called 'laws' (nomoi) or strains, which were played upon the

harp. The regulation of such matters was not left to the whistling and

clapping of the crowd; there was silence while the judges decided, and

the boys, and the audience in general, were kept in order by raps of a

stick. But after a while there arose a new race of poets, men of genius

certainly, however careless of musical truth and propriety, who made

pleasure the only criterion of excellence. That was a test which the

spectators could apply for themselves; the whole audience, instead of

being mute, became vociferous, and a theatrocracy took the place of an

aristocracy. Could the judges have been free, there would have been no

great harm done; a musical democracy would have been well enough--but

conceit has been our ruin. Everybody knows everything, and is ready to

say anything; the age of reverence is gone, and the age of irreverence

and licentiousness has succeeded. 'Most true.' And with this freedom

comes disobedience to rulers, parents, elders,--in the latter days to

the law also; the end returns to the beginning, and the old Titanic

nature reappears--men have no regard for the Gods or for oaths; and the

evils of the human race seem as if they would never cease. Whither are

we running away? Once more we must pull up the argument with bit and

curb, lest, as the proverb says, we should fall off our ass. 'Good.'

Our purpose in what we have been saying is to prove that the legislator

ought to aim at securing for a state three things--freedom, friendship,

wisdom. And we chose two states;--one was the type of freedom, and the

other of despotism; and we showed that when in a mean they attained

their highest perfection. In a similar spirit we spoke of the Dorian

expedition, and of the settlement on the hills and in the plains of

Troy; and of music, and the use of wine, and of all that preceded.

And now, has our discussion been of any use? 'Yes, stranger; for by

a singular coincidence the Cretans are about to send out a colony,

of which the settlement has been confided to the Cnosians. Ten

commissioners, of whom I am one, are to give laws to the colonists, and

we may give any which we please--Cretan or foreign. And therefore let

us make a selection from what has been said, and then proceed with the

construction of the state.' Very good: I am quite at your service. 'And

I too,' says Megillus.

BOOK IV. And now, what is this city? I do not want to know what is to

be the name of the place (for some accident,--a river or a local deity,

will determine that), but what the situation is, whether maritime or

inland. 'The city will be about eleven miles from the sea.' Are there

harbours? 'Excellent.' And is the surrounding country self-supporting?

'Almost.' Any neighbouring states? 'No; and that is the reason for

choosing the place, which has been deserted from time immemorial.' And

is there a fair proportion of hill and plain and wood? 'Like Crete

in general, more hill than plain.' Then there is some hope for your

citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support

on other countries, no human power could have preserved you from

corruption. Even the distance of eleven miles is hardly enough. For the

sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of

strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is

only moderately fertile there will be no great export trade and no

great returns of gold and silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there

timber for ship-building? 'There is no pine, nor much cypress; and very

little stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of ships.' That is

good. 'Why?' Because the city will not be able to imitate the bad ways

of her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To explain my

meaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the Cretan laws,

that they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that they ought

to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will

retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider that

the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and

disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue.

What further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will

illustrate by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to

mention it. Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians

a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they

had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate

their enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for

them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the

tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not

a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and

then again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for

throwing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine

words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he

introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships

being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions

trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, a city

which owes its preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other

undeserving persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and

this is the ruin of states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of

Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.' Such is the prevailing

opinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the

deliverance, and that the battle of Plataea completed it; for these

battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium

made them no better. And we further affirm that mere existence is not

the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance

of the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us then endeavour to follow this

principle in colonization and legislation.

And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one

come from any city of Crete? For you would surely not send a general

invitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people

who have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our recruits

will be drawn from all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer

Peloponnesians. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans;

moreover the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from

Gortys in Peloponnesus.'

Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm

from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or

war. In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have

a community of race, language, and laws. But then again, they are less

obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very

laws and customs which caused their ruin at home. A mixed multitude,

on the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty

in making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects

men's virtue more than legislation and colonization. And yet I have a

word to say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is

that?'

I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all

sorts are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and

the frequent recurrence of bad seasons. The observer will be inclined to

say that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true

about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is

another thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs

all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. And

according to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a

storm it is well to have a pilot? And the same is true of legislation:

even if circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still

necessary. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions

under which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the

same? 'Certainly?' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the

conditions which you would have? He will answer, Grant me a city which

is ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable,

courageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition

of all virtue, which is temperance--not prudence, but that natural

temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly

reckoned among goods--with this he must be endowed, if the state is to

acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner.

And I must add one other condition: the tyrant must be fortunate, and

his good fortune must consist in his having the co-operation of a great

legislator. When God has done all this, He has done the best which

He can for a state; not so well if He has given them two legislators

instead of one, and less and less well if He has given them a great

many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state;

in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy; an

oligarchy is worst of all. 'I do not understand.' I suppose that you

have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'I have no desire

to see one.' You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had.

The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix

the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the

citizens readily follow the example which he sets. There is no quicker

way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. It is

hard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any

powerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. In

olden days there were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and

temperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now. If such an one

ever arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to

his words. For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there

are the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how

easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other,

is the task of giving a city good laws. 'How do you mean?' Let us old

men attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as

children make figures out of wax. 'Proceed. What constitution shall we

give--democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?' To which of these classes,

Megillus, do you refer your own state? 'The Spartan constitution seems

to me to contain all these elements. Our state is a democracy and also

an aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have

an ancient monarchy.' 'Much the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of

Cnosus.' The reason is that you have polities, but other states are

mere aggregations of men dwelling together, which are named after their

several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should

be called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. There is

a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and

abundant. Cronos, then lord of the world, knew that no mortal nature

could endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons

or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over man, as

man has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease

and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says

that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease

from ill. This was the manner of life which prevailed under Cronos, and

which we must strive to follow so far as the principle of immortality

still abides in us and we live according to law and the dictates of

right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing

principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under foot, and

there is no possibility of salvation. Is it not often said that there

are as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they

have no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are

relative to the will of the government? Which is as much as to say that

'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments enact

their own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its

principal aim. He who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer,

and punished accordingly. This was one of the unjust principles of

government which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to

rule. We were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder

the younger, the noble the ignoble. But there were also several other

principles, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' To whom then is

our state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious

faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the

conquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their

wrongs. Such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws

good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not

of the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any

man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But those who are

obedient to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be

promoted to the service of the Gods according to the degree of their

obedience. When I call the ruler the servant or minister of the law,

this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to

obey the law the existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger,

you have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man when he is old has his

intellectual vision most keen. And now shall we call in our colonists

and make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them, God holds in His

hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a

straight line towards the accomplishment of His will. Justice always

bears Him company, and punishes those who fall short of His laws. He who

would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who is lifted up with

pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and,

being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder. To many he seems a

great man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. Wherefore,

seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to

follow God.' What life, then, is pleasing to God? There is an old saying

that 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God ought to

be our measure in all things. The temperate man is the friend of God

because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend,

because he is not like Him. And the conclusion is, that the best of all

things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad

man has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the

Gods, while the good are accepted of them. I have told you the mark at

which we ought to aim. You will say, How, and with what weapons? In the

first place we affirm, that after the Olympian Gods and the Gods of the

state, honour should be given to the Gods below, and to them should

be offered everything in even numbers and of the second choice; the

auspicious odd numbers and everything of the first choice are reserved

for the Gods above. Next demi-gods or spirits must be honoured, and

then heroes, and after them family gods, who will be worshipped at their

local seats according to law. Further, the honour due to parents should

not be forgotten; children owe all that they have to them, and the debt

must be repaid by kindness and attention in old age. No unbecoming word

must be uttered before them; for there is an avenging angel who hears

them when they are angry, and the child should consider that the parent

when he has been wronged has a right to be angry. After their death

let them have a moderate funeral, such as their fathers have had before

them; and there shall be an annual commemoration of them. Living on this

wise, we shall be accepted of the Gods, and shall pass our days in good

hope. The law will determine all our various duties towards relatives

and friends and other citizens, and the whole state will be happy and

prosperous. But if the legislator would persuade as well as command,

he will add prefaces to his laws which will predispose the citizens to

virtue. Even a little accomplished in the way of gaining the hearts of

men is of great value. For most men are in no particular haste to become

good. As Hesiod says:

'Long and steep is the first half of the way to virtue, But when you

have reached the top the rest is easy.'

'Those are excellent words.' Yes; but may I tell you the effect which

the preceding discourse has had upon me? I will express my meaning in

an address to the lawgiver:--O lawgiver, if you know what we ought to do

and say, you can surely tell us;--you are not like the poet, who, as you

were just now saying, does not know the effect of his own words. And the

poet may reply, that when he sits down on the tripod of the Muses he is

not in his right mind, and that being a mere imitator he may be allowed

to say all sorts of opposite things, and cannot tell which of them is

true. But this licence cannot be allowed to the lawgiver. For example,

there are three kinds of funerals; one of them is excessive, another

mean, a third moderate, and you say that the last is right. Now if I

had a rich wife, and she told me to bury her, and I were to sing of her

burial, I should praise the extravagant kind; a poor man would commend

a funeral of the meaner sort, and a man of moderate means would prefer a

moderate funeral. But you, as legislator, would have to say exactly what

you meant by 'moderate.' 'Very true.' And is our lawgiver to have no

preamble or interpretation of his laws, never offering a word of advice

to his subjects, after the manner of some doctors? For of doctors are

there not two kinds? The one gentle and the other rough, doctors who are

freemen and learn themselves and teach their pupils scientifically, and

doctor's assistants who get their knowledge empirically by attending on

their masters? 'Of course there are.' And did you ever observe that the

gentlemen doctors practise upon freemen, and that slave doctors confine

themselves to slaves? The latter go about the country or wait for the

slaves at the dispensaries. They hold no parley with their patients

about their diseases or the remedies of them; they practise by the rule

of thumb, and give their decrees in the most arbitrary manner. When they

have doctored one patient they run off to another, whom they treat with

equal assurance, their duty being to relieve the master of the care

of his sick slaves. But the other doctor, who practises on freemen,

proceeds in quite a different way. He takes counsel with his patient and

learns from him, and never does anything until he has persuaded him of

what he is doing. He trusts to influence rather than force. Now is not

the use of both methods far better than the use of either alone? And

both together may be advantageously employed by us in legislation.

We may illustrate our proposal by an example. The laws relating to

marriage naturally come first, and therefore we may begin with them. The

simple law would be as follows:--A man shall marry between the ages of

thirty and thirty-five; if he do not, he shall be fined or deprived of

certain privileges. The double law would add the reason why: Forasmuch

as man desires immortality, which he attains by the procreation of

children, no one should deprive himself of his share in this good. He

who obeys the law is blameless, but he who disobeys must not be a gainer

by his celibacy; and therefore he shall pay a yearly fine, and shall not

be allowed to receive honour from the young. That is an example of what

I call the double law, which may enable us to judge how far the addition

of persuasion to threats is desirable. 'Lacedaemonians in general,

Stranger, are in favour of brevity; in this case, however, I prefer

length. But Cleinias is the real lawgiver, and he ought to be first

consulted.' 'Thank you, Megillus.' Whether words are to be many or few,

is a foolish question:--the best and not the shortest forms are always

to be approved. And legislators have never thought of the advantages

which they might gain by using persuasion as well as force, but trust to

force only. And I have something else to say about the matter. Here have

we been from early dawn until noon, discoursing about laws, and all that

we have been saying is only the preamble of the laws which we are about

to give. I tell you this, because I want you to observe that songs and

strains have all of them preludes, but that laws, though called by the

same name (nomoi), have never any prelude. Now I am disposed to give

preludes to laws, dividing them into two parts--one containing the

despotic command, which I described under the image of the slave

doctor--the other the persuasive part, which I term the preamble. The

legislator should give preludes or preambles to his laws. 'That shall

be the way in my colony.' I am glad that you agree with me; this is

a matter which it is important to remember. A preamble is not always

necessary to a law: the lawgiver must determine when it is needed, as

the musician determines when there is to be a prelude to a song. 'Most

true: and now, having a preamble, let us recommence our discourse.'

Enough has been said of Gods and parents, and we may proceed to consider

what relates to the citizens--their souls, bodies, properties,--their

occupations and amusements; and so arrive at the nature of education.

The first word of the Laws somewhat abruptly introduces the thought

which is present to the mind of Plato throughout the work, namely, that

Law is of divine origin. In the words of a great English writer--'Her

seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world.' Though

the particular laws of Sparta and Crete had a narrow and imperfect aim,

this is not true of divine laws, which are based upon the principles of

human nature, and not framed to meet the exigencies of the moment. They

have their natural divisions, too, answering to the kinds of virtue;

very unlike the discordant enactments of an Athenian assembly or of an

English Parliament. Yet we may observe two inconsistencies in Plato's

treatment of the subject: first, a lesser, inasmuch as he does not

clearly distinguish the Cretan and Spartan laws, of which the exclusive

aim is war, from those other laws of Zeus and Apollo which are said to

be divine, and to comprehend all virtue. Secondly, we may retort on him

his own complaint against Sparta and Crete, that he has himself given us

a code of laws, which for the most part have a military character; and

that we cannot point to 'obvious examples of similar institutions which

are concerned with pleasure;' at least there is only one such, that

which relates to the regulation of convivial intercourse. The military

spirit which is condemned by him in the beginning of the Laws, reappears

in the seventh and eighth books.

The mention of Minos the great lawgiver, and of Rhadamanthus the

righteous administrator of the law, suggests the two divisions of the

laws into enactments and appointments of officers. The legislator and

the judge stand side by side, and their functions cannot be wholly

distinguished. For the judge is in some sort a legislator, at any

rate in small matters; and his decisions growing into precedents, must

determine the innumerable details which arise out of the conflict of

circumstances. These Plato proposes to leave to a younger generation

of legislators. The action of courts of law in making law seems to

have escaped him, probably because the Athenian law-courts were popular

assemblies; and, except in a mythical form, he can hardly be said to

have had before his eyes the ideal of a judge. In reading the Laws of

Plato, or any other ancient writing about Laws, we should consider

how gradual the process is by which not only a legal system, but the

administration of a court of law, becomes perfected.

There are other subjects on which Plato breaks ground, as his manner is,

early in the work. First, he gives a sketch of the subject of laws; they

are to comprehend the whole of human life, from infancy to age, and from

birth to death, although the proposed plan is far from being regularly

executed in the books which follow, partly owing to the necessity of

describing the constitution as well as the laws of his new colony.

Secondly, he touches on the power of music, which may exercise so

great an influence on the character of men for good or evil; he refers

especially to the great offence--which he mentions again, and which he

had condemned in the Republic--of varying the modes and rhythms, as

well as to that of separating the words from the music. Thirdly, he

reprobates the prevalence of unnatural loves in Sparta and Crete, which

he attributes to the practice of syssitia and gymnastic exercises, and

considers to be almost inseparable from them. To this subject he again

returns in the eighth book. Fourthly, the virtues are affirmed to be

inseparable from one another, even if not absolutely one; this, too, is

a principle which he reasserts at the conclusion of the work. As in

the beginnings of Plato's other writings, we have here several 'notes'

struck, which form the preludes of longer discussions, although the hint

is less ingeniously given, and the promise more imperfectly fulfilled

than in the earlier dialogues.

The distinction between ethics and politics has not yet dawned upon

Plato's mind. To him, law is still floating in a region between the two.

He would have desired that all the acts and laws of a state should

have regard to all virtue. But he did not see that politics and law are

subject to their own conditions, and are distinguished from ethics by

natural differences. The actions of which politics take cognisance are

necessarily collective or representative; and law is limited to external

acts which affect others as well as the agents. Ethics, on the other

hand, include the whole duty of man in relation both to himself and

others. But Plato has never reflected on these differences. He fancies

that the life of the state can be as easily fashioned as that of the

individual. He is favourable to a balance of power, but never seems

to have considered that power might be so balanced as to produce an

absolute immobility in the state. Nor is he alive to the evils

of confounding vice and crime; or to the necessity of governments

abstaining from excessive interference with their subjects.

Yet this confusion of ethics and politics has also a better and a truer

side. If unable to grasp some important distinctions, Plato is at any

rate seeking to elevate the lower to the higher; he does not pull down

the principles of men to their practice, or narrow the conception of

the state to the immediate necessities of politics. Political ideals of

freedom and equality, of a divine government which has been or will be

in some other age or country, have greatly tended to educate and ennoble

the human race. And if not the first author of such ideals (for they are

as old as Hesiod), Plato has done more than any other writer to impress

them on the world. To those who censure his idealism we may reply in his

own words--'He is not the worse painter who draws a perfectly beautiful

figure, because no such figure of a man could ever have existed'

(Republic).

A new thought about education suddenly occurs to him, and for a time

exercises a sort of fascination over his mind, though in the later books

of the Laws it is forgotten or overlooked. As true courage is allied to

temperance, so there must be an education which shall train mankind to

resist pleasure as well as to endure pain. No one can be on his guard

against that of which he has no experience. The perfectly trained

citizen should have been accustomed to look his enemy in the face, and

to measure his strength against her. This education in pleasure is to be

given, partly by festive intercourse, but chiefly by the song and dance.

Youth are to learn music and gymnastics; their elders are to be trained

and tested at drinking parties. According to the old proverb, in vino

veritas, they will then be open and visible to the world in their true

characters; and also they will be more amenable to the laws, and more

easily moulded by the hand of the legislator. The first reason is

curious enough, though not important; the second can hardly be thought

deserving of much attention. Yet if Plato means to say that society

is one of the principal instruments of education in after-life, he has

expressed in an obscure fashion a principle which is true, and to

his contemporaries was also new. That at a banquet a degree of moral

discipline might be exercised is an original thought, but Plato has not

yet learnt to express his meaning in an abstract form. He is sensible

that moderation is better than total abstinence, and that asceticism is

but a one-sided training. He makes the sagacious remark, that 'those who

are able to resist pleasure may often be among the worst of mankind.' He

is as much aware as any modern utilitarian that the love of pleasure is

the great motive of human action. This cannot be eradicated, and must

therefore be regulated,--the pleasure must be of the right sort.

Such reflections seem to be the real, though imperfectly expressed,

groundwork of the discussion. As in the juxtaposition of the Bacchic

madness and the great gift of Dionysus, or where he speaks of the

different senses in which pleasure is and is not the object of imitative

art, or in the illustration of the failure of the Dorian institutions

from the prayer of Theseus, we have to gather his meaning as well as we

can from the connexion.

The feeling of old age is discernible in this as well as in several

other passages of the Laws. Plato has arrived at the time when men sit

still and look on at life; and he is willing to allow himself and others

the few pleasures which remain to them. Wine is to cheer them now that

their limbs are old and their blood runs cold. They are the best critics

of dancing and music, but cannot be induced to join in song unless they

have been enlivened by drinking. Youth has no need of the stimulus

of wine, but age can only be made young again by its invigorating

influence. Total abstinence for the young, moderate and increasing

potations for the old, is Plato's principle. The fire, of which there is

too much in the one, has to be brought to the other. Drunkenness, like

madness, had a sacredness and mystery to the Greek; if, on the one hand,

as in the case of the Tarentines, it degraded a whole population, it was

also a mode of worshipping the god Dionysus, which was to be practised

on certain occasions. Moreover, the intoxication produced by the fruit

of the vine was very different from the grosser forms of drunkenness

which prevail among some modern nations.

The physician in modern times would restrict the old man's use of wine

within narrow limits. He would tell us that you cannot restore strength

by a stimulus. Wine may call back the vital powers in disease, but

cannot reinvigorate old age. In his maxims of health and longevity,

though aware of the importance of a simple diet, Plato has omitted to

dwell on the perfect rule of moderation. His commendation of wine is

probably a passing fancy, and may have arisen out of his own habits

or tastes. If so, he is not the only philosopher whose theory has been

based upon his practice.

Plato's denial of wine to the young and his approval of it for

their elders has some points of view which may be illustrated by the

temperance controversy of our own times. Wine may be allowed to have a

religious as well as a festive use; it is commended both in the Old and

New Testament; it has been sung of by nearly all poets; and it may be

truly said to have a healing influence both on body and mind. Yet it is

also very liable to excess and abuse, and for this reason is prohibited

by Mahometans, as well as of late years by many Christians, no less than

by the ancient Spartans; and to sound its praises seriously seems to

partake of the nature of a paradox. But we may rejoin with Plato that

the abuse of a good thing does not take away the use of it. Total

abstinence, as we often say, is not the best rule, but moderate

indulgence; and it is probably true that a temperate use of wine may

contribute some elements of character to social life which we can ill

afford to lose. It draws men out of their reserve; it helps them to

forget themselves and to appear as they by nature are when not on their

guard, and therefore to make them more human and greater friends to

their fellow-men. It gives them a new experience; it teaches them to

combine self-control with a measure of indulgence; it may sometimes

restore to them the simplicity of childhood. We entirely agree with

Plato in forbidding the use of wine to the young; but when we are

of mature age there are occasions on which we derive refreshment and

strength from moderate potations. It is well to make abstinence the

rule, but the rule may sometimes admit of an exception. We are in a

higher, as well as in a lower sense, the better for the use of wine.

The question runs up into wider ones--What is the general effect of

asceticism on human nature? and, Must there not be a certain proportion

between the aspirations of man and his powers?--questions which have

been often discussed both by ancient and modern philosophers. So

by comparing things old and new we may sometimes help to realize to

ourselves the meaning of Plato in the altered circumstances of our own

life.

Like the importance which he attaches to festive entertainments, his

depreciation of courage to the fourth place in the scale of virtue

appears to be somewhat rhetorical and exaggerated. But he is speaking

of courage in the lower sense of the term, not as including loyalty or

temperance. He does not insist in this passage, as in the Protagoras,

on the unity of the virtues; or, as in the Laches, on the identity of

wisdom and courage. But he says that they all depend upon their leader

mind, and that, out of the union of wisdom and temperance with courage,

springs justice. Elsewhere he is disposed to regard temperance rather

as a condition of all virtue than as a particular virtue. He generalizes

temperance, as in the Republic he generalizes justice. The nature of the

virtues is to run up into one another, and in many passages Plato makes

but a faint effort to distinguish them. He still quotes the poets,

somewhat enlarging, as his manner is, or playing with their meaning. The

martial poet Tyrtaeus, and the oligarch Theognis, furnish him with

happy illustrations of the two sorts of courage. The fear of fear, the

division of goods into human and divine, the acknowledgment that peace

and reconciliation are better than the appeal to the sword, the analysis

of temperance into resistance of pleasure as well as endurance of pain,

the distinction between the education which is suitable for a trade or

profession, and for the whole of life, are important and probably new

ethical conceptions. Nor has Plato forgotten his old paradox (Gorgias)

that to be punished is better than to be unpunished, when he says, that

to the bad man death is the only mitigation of his evil. He is not less

ideal in many passages of the Laws than in the Gorgias or Republic. But

his wings are heavy, and he is unequal to any sustained flight.

There is more attempt at dramatic effect in the first book than in

the later parts of the work. The outburst of martial spirit in the

Lacedaemonian, 'O best of men'; the protest which the Cretan makes

against the supposed insult to his lawgiver; the cordial acknowledgment

on the part of both of them that laws should not be discussed publicly

by those who live under their rule; the difficulty which they alike

experience in following the speculations of the Athenian, are highly

characteristic.

In the second book, Plato pursues further his notion of educating by

a right use of pleasure. He begins by conceiving an endless power of

youthful life, which is to be reduced to rule and measure by harmony and

rhythm. Men differ from the lower animals in that they are capable of

musical discipline. But music, like all art, must be truly imitative,

and imitative of what is true and good. Art and morality agree in

rejecting pleasure as the criterion of good. True art is inseparable

from the highest and most ennobling ideas. Plato only recognizes the

identity of pleasure and good when the pleasure is of the higher kind.

He is the enemy of 'songs without words,' which he supposes to have some

confusing or enervating effect on the mind of the hearer; and he is also

opposed to the modern degeneracy of the drama, which he would probably

have illustrated, like Aristophanes, from Euripides and Agathon. From

this passage may be gathered a more perfect conception of art than

from any other of Plato's writings. He understands that art is at

once imitative and ideal, an exact representation of truth, and also a

representation of the highest truth. The same double view of art may be

gathered from a comparison of the third and tenth books of the Republic,

but is here more clearly and pointedly expressed.

We are inclined to suspect that both here and in the Republic Plato

exaggerates the influence really exercised by the song and the dance.

But we must remember also the susceptible nature of the Greek, and the

perfection to which these arts were carried by him. Further, the music

had a sacred and Pythagorean character; the dance too was part of a

religious festival. And only at such festivals the sexes mingled in

public, and the youths passed under the eyes of their elders.

At the beginning of the third book, Plato abruptly asks the question,

What is the origin of states? The answer is, Infinite time. We have

already seen--in the Theaetetus, where he supposes that in the course of

ages every man has had numberless progenitors, kings and slaves, Greeks

and barbarians; and in the Critias, where he says that nine thousand

years have elapsed since the island of Atlantis fought with Athens--that

Plato is no stranger to the conception of long periods of time. He

imagines human society to have been interrupted by natural convulsions;

and beginning from the last of these, he traces the steps by which the

family has grown into the state, and the original scattered society,

becoming more and more civilised, has finally passed into military

organizations like those of Crete and Sparta. His conception of the

origin of states is far truer in the Laws than in the Republic; but it

must be remembered that here he is giving an historical, there an ideal

picture of the growth of society.

Modern enquirers, like Plato, have found in infinite ages the

explanation not only of states, but of languages, men, animals, the

world itself; like him, also, they have detected in later institutions

the vestiges of a patriarchal state still surviving. Thus far Plato

speaks as 'the spectator of all time and all existence,' who may be

thought by some divine instinct to have guessed at truths which were

hereafter to be revealed. He is far above the vulgar notion that Hellas

is the civilized world (Statesman), or that civilization only began when

the Hellenes appeared on the scene. But he has no special knowledge

of 'the days before the flood'; and when he approaches more historical

times, in preparing the way for his own theory of mixed government,

he argues partially and erroneously. He is desirous of showing that

unlimited power is ruinous to any state, and hence he is led to

attribute a tyrannical spirit to the first Dorian kings. The decay of

Argos and the destruction of Messene are adduced by him as a manifest

proof of their failure; and Sparta, he thinks, was only preserved by the

limitations which the wisdom of successive legislators introduced into

the government. But there is no more reason to suppose that the Dorian

rule of life which was followed at Sparta ever prevailed in Argos and

Messene, than to assume that Dorian institutions were framed to protect

the Greeks against the power of Assyria; or that the empire of Assyria

was in any way affected by the Trojan war; or that the return of the

Heraclidae was only the return of Achaean exiles, who received a new

name from their leader Dorieus. Such fancies were chiefly based, as far

as they had any foundation, on the use of analogy, which played a great

part in the dawn of historical and geographical research. Because there

was a Persian empire which was the natural enemy of the Greek, there

must also have been an Assyrian empire, which had a similar hostility;

and not only the fable of the island of Atlantis, but the Trojan war,

in Plato's mind derived some features from the Persian struggle. So

Herodotus makes the Nile answer to the Ister, and the valley of the Nile

to the Red Sea. In the Republic, Plato is flying in the air regardless

of fact and possibility--in the Laws, he is making history by analogy.

In the former, he appears to be like some modern philosophers,

absolutely devoid of historical sense; in the latter, he is on a level,

not with Thucydides, or the critical historians of Greece, but with

Herodotus, or even with Ctesias.

The chief object of Plato in tracing the origin of society is to show

the point at which regular government superseded the patriarchical

authority, and the separate customs of different families were

systematized by legislators, and took the form of laws consented to

by them all. According to Plato, the only sound principle on which any

government could be based was a mixture or balance of power. The balance

of power saved Sparta, when the two other Heraclid states fell into

disorder. Here is probably the first trace of a political idea, which

has exercised a vast influence both in ancient and modern times. And

yet we might fairly ask, a little parodying the language of Plato--O

legislator, is unanimity only 'the struggle for existence'; or is the

balance of powers in a state better than the harmony of them?

In the fourth book we approach the realities of politics, and Plato

begins to ascend to the height of his great argument. The reign of

Cronos has passed away, and various forms of government have succeeded,

which are all based on self-interest and self-preservation. Right and

wrong, instead of being measured by the will of God, are created by

the law of the state. The strongest assertions are made of the purely

spiritual nature of religion--'Without holiness no man is accepted of

God'; and of the duty of filial obedience,--'Honour thy parents.' The

legislator must teach these precepts as well as command them. He is to

be the educator as well as the lawgiver of future ages, and his laws

are themselves to form a part of the education of the state. Unlike the

poet, he must be definite and rational; he cannot be allowed to say one

thing at one time, and another thing at another--he must know what he

is about. And yet legislation has a poetical or rhetorical element, and

must find words which will wing their way to the hearts of men. Laws

must be promulgated before they are put in execution, and mankind must

be reasoned with before they are punished. The legislator, when he

promulgates a particular law, will courteously entreat those who are

willing to hear his voice. Upon the rebellious only does the heavy blow

descend. A sermon and a law in one, blending the secular punishment with

the religious sanction, appeared to Plato a new idea which might have a

great result in reforming the world. The experiment had never been

tried of reasoning with mankind; the laws of others had never had any

preambles, and Plato seems to have great pleasure in contemplating his

discovery.

In these quaint forms of thought and language, great principles of

morals and legislation are enunciated by him for the first time. They

all go back to mind and God, who holds the beginning, middle, and end of

all things in His hand. The adjustment of the divine and human elements

in the world is conceived in the spirit of modern popular philosophy,

differing not much in the mode of expression. At first sight the

legislator appears to be impotent, for all things are the sport of

chance. But we admit also that God governs all things, and that chance

and opportunity co-operate with Him (compare the saying, that chance is

the name of the unknown cause). Lastly, while we acknowledge that God

and chance govern mankind and provide the conditions of human action,

experience will not allow us to deny a place to art. We know that there

is a use in having a pilot, though the storm may overwhelm him; and a

legislator is required to provide for the happiness of a state, although

he will pray for favourable conditions under which he may exercise his

art.

BOOK V. Hear now, all ye who heard the laws about Gods and ancestors:

Of all human possessions the soul is most divine, and most truly a man's

own. For in every man there are two parts--a better which rules, and an

inferior which serves; and the ruler is to be preferred to the servant.

Wherefore I bid every one next after the Gods to honour his own soul,

and he can only honour her by making her better. A man does not honour

his soul by flattery, or gifts, or self-indulgence, or conceit of

knowledge, nor when he blames others for his own errors; nor when he

indulges in pleasure or refuses to bear pain; nor when he thinks that

life at any price is a good, because he fears the world below, which,

far from being an evil, may be the greatest good; nor when he prefers

beauty to virtue--not reflecting that the soul, which came from heaven,

is more honourable than the body, which is earth-born; nor when

he covets dishonest gains, of which no amount is equal in value to

virtue;--in a word, when he counts that which the legislator pronounces

evil to be good, he degrades his soul, which is the divinest part of

him. He does not consider that the real punishment of evil-doing is to

grow like evil men, and to shun the conversation of the good: and that

he who is joined to such men must do and suffer what they by nature do

and say to one another, which suffering is not justice but retribution.

For justice is noble, but retribution is only the companion of

injustice. And whether a man escapes punishment or not, he is equally

miserable; for in the one case he is not cured, and in the other case he

perishes that the rest may be saved.

The glory of man is to follow the better and improve the inferior. And

the soul is that part of man which is most inclined to avoid the evil

and dwell with the good. Wherefore also the soul is second only to the

Gods in honour, and in the third place the body is to be esteemed, which

often has a false honour. For honour is not to be given to the fair or

the strong, or the swift or the tall, or to the healthy, any more than

to their opposites, but to the mean states of all these habits; and so

of property and external goods. No man should heap up riches that he may

leave them to his children. The best condition for them as for the state

is a middle one, in which there is a freedom without luxury. And the

best inheritance of children is modesty. But modesty cannot be implanted

by admonition only--the elders must set the example. He who would train

the young must first train himself.

He who honours his kindred and family may fairly expect that the Gods

will give him children. He who would have friends must think much of

their favours to him, and little of his to them. He who prefers to an

Olympic, or any other victory, to win the palm of obedience to the laws,

serves best both the state and his fellow-citizens. Engagements with

strangers are to be deemed most sacred, because the stranger, having

neither kindred nor friends, is immediately under the protection of

Zeus, the God of strangers. A prudent man will not sin against the

stranger; and still more carefully will he avoid sinning against the

suppliant, which is an offence never passed over by the Gods.

I will now speak of those particulars which are matters of praise and

blame only, and which, although not enforced by the law, greatly affect

the disposition to obey the law. Truth has the first place among the

gifts of Gods and men, for truth begets trust; but he is not to be

trusted who loves voluntary falsehood, and he who loves involuntary

falsehood is a fool. Neither the ignorant nor the untrustworthy man

is happy; for they have no friends in life, and die unlamented and

untended. Good is he who does no injustice--better who prevents others

from doing any--best of all who joins the rulers in punishing injustice.

And this is true of goods and virtues in general; he who has and

communicates them to others is the man of men; he who would, if he

could, is second-best; he who has them and is jealous of imparting them

to others is to be blamed, but the good or virtue which he has is to be

valued still. Let every man contend in the race without envy; for the

unenvious man increases the strength of the city; himself foremost in

the race, he harms no one with calumny. Whereas the envious man is

weak himself, and drives his rivals to despair with his slanders, thus

depriving the whole city of incentives to the exercise of virtue, and

tarnishing her glory. Every man should be gentle, but also passionate;

for he must have the spirit to fight against incurable and malignant

evil. But the evil which is remediable should be dealt with more in

sorrow than anger. He who is unjust is to be pitied in any case; for

no man voluntarily does evil or allows evil to exist in his soul. And

therefore he who deals with the curable sort must be long-suffering and

forbearing; but the incurable shall have the vials of our wrath poured

out upon him. The greatest of all evils is self-love, which is thought

to be natural and excusable, and is enforced as a duty, and yet is

the cause of many errors. The lover is blinded about the beloved, and

prefers his own interests to truth and right; but the truly great

man seeks justice before all things. Self-love is the source of

that ignorant conceit of knowledge which is always doing and never

succeeding. Wherefore let every man avoid self-love, and follow the

guidance of those who are better than himself. There are lesser matters

which a man should recall to mind; for wisdom is like a stream, ever

flowing in and out, and recollection flows in when knowledge is failing.

Let no man either laugh or grieve overmuch; but let him control his

feelings in the day of good- or ill-fortune, believing that the Gods

will diminish the evils and increase the blessings of the righteous.

These are thoughts which should ever occupy a good man's mind; he should

remember them both in lighter and in more serious hours, and remind

others of them.

So much of divine matters and the relation of man to God. But man is

man, and dependent on pleasure and pain; and therefore to acquire a true

taste respecting either is a great matter. And what is a true taste?

This can only be explained by a comparison of one life with another.

Pleasure is an object of desire, pain of avoidance; and the absence of

pain is to be preferred to pain, but not to pleasure. There are infinite

kinds and degrees of both of them, and we choose the life which has more

pleasure and avoid that which has less; but we do not choose that life

in which the elements of pleasure are either feeble or equally balanced

with pain. All the lives which we desire are pleasant; the choice of any

others is due to inexperience.

Now there are four lives--the temperate, the rational, the courageous,

the healthful; and to these let us oppose four others--the intemperate,

the foolish, the cowardly, the diseased. The temperate life has gentle

pains and pleasures and placid desires, the intemperate life has violent

delights, and still more violent desires. And the pleasures of the

temperate exceed the pains, while the pains of the intemperate exceed

the pleasures. But if this is true, none are voluntarily intemperate,

but all who lack temperance are either ignorant or wanting in

self-control: for men always choose the life which (as they think)

exceeds in pleasure. The wise, the healthful, the courageous life have

a similar advantage--they also exceed their opposites in pleasure.

And, generally speaking, the life of virtue is far more pleasurable and

honourable, fairer and happier far, than the life of vice. Let this be

the preamble of our laws; the strain will follow.

As in a web the warp is stronger than the woof, so should the rulers be

stronger than their half-educated subjects. Let us suppose, then, that

in the constitution of a state there are two parts, the appointment

of the rulers, and the laws which they have to administer. But, before

going further, there are some preliminary matters which have to be

considered.

As of animals, so also of men, a selection must be made; the bad breed

must be got rid of, and the good retained. The legislator must purify

them, and if he be not a despot he will find this task to be a difficult

one. The severer kinds of purification are practised when great

offenders are punished by death or exile, but there is a milder process

which is necessary when the poor show a disposition to attack the

property of the rich, for then the legislator will send them off to

another land, under the name of a colony. In our case, however, we

shall only need to purify the streams before they meet. This is often

a troublesome business, but in theory we may suppose the operation

performed, and the desired purity attained. Evil men we will hinder from

coming, and receive the good as friends.

Like the old Heraclid colony, we are fortunate in escaping the abolition

of debts and the distribution of land, which are difficult and dangerous

questions. But, perhaps, now that we are speaking of the subject, we

ought to say how, if the danger existed, the legislator should try to

avert it. He would have recourse to prayers, and trust to the healing

influence of time. He would create a kindly spirit between creditors and

debtors: those who have should give to those who have not, and poverty

should be held to be rather the increase of a man's desires than the

diminution of his property. Good-will is the only safe and enduring

foundation of the political society; and upon this our city shall

be built. The lawgiver, if he is wise, will not proceed with the

arrangement of the state until all disputes about property are settled.

And for him to introduce fresh grounds of quarrel would be madness.

Let us now proceed to the distribution of our state, and determine the

size of the territory and the number of the allotments. The territory

should be sufficient to maintain the citizens in moderation, and the

population should be numerous enough to defend themselves, and sometimes

to aid their neighbours. We will fix the number of citizens at 5040, to

which the number of houses and portions of land shall correspond. Let

the number be divided into two parts and then into three; for it is

very convenient for the purposes of distribution, and is capable of

fifty-nine divisions, ten of which proceed without interval from one to

ten. Here are numbers enough for war and peace, and for all contracts

and dealings. These properties of numbers are true, and should be

ascertained with a view to use.

In carrying out the distribution of the land, a prudent legislator will

be careful to respect any provision for religious worship which has been

sanctioned by ancient tradition or by the oracles of Delphi, Dodona, or

Ammon. All sacrifices, and altars, and temples, whatever may be their

origin, should remain as they are. Every division should have a patron

God or hero; to these a portion of the domain should be appropriated,

and at their temples the inhabitants of the districts should meet

together from time to time, for the sake of mutual help and friendship.

All the citizens of a state should be known to one another; for where

men are in the dark about each other's characters, there can be

no justice or right administration. Every man should be true and

single-minded, and should not allow himself to be deceived by others.

And now the game opens, and we begin to move the pieces. At first sight,

our constitution may appear singular and ill-adapted to a legislator who

has not despotic power; but on second thoughts will be deemed to be,

if not the very best, the second best. For there are three forms of

government, a first, a second, and a third best, out of which Cleinias

has now to choose. The first and highest form is that in which friends

have all things in common, including wives and property,--in which they

have common fears, hopes, desires, and do not even call their eyes or

their hands their own. This is the ideal state; than which there never

can be a truer or better--a state, whether inhabited by Gods or sons of

Gods, which will make the dwellers therein blessed. Here is the pattern

on which we must ever fix our eyes; but we are now concerned with

another, which comes next to it, and we will afterwards proceed to a

third.

Inasmuch as our citizens are not fitted either by nature or education to

receive the saying, Friends have all things in common, let them retain

their houses and private property, but use them in the service of their

country, who is their God and parent, and of the Gods and demigods of

the land. Their first care should be to preserve the number of their

lots. This may be secured in the following manner: when the possessor of

a lot dies, he shall leave his lot to his best-beloved child, who will

become the heir of all duties and interests, and will minister to the

Gods and to the family, to the living and to the dead. Of the remaining

children, the females must be given in marriage according to the law to

be hereafter enacted; the males may be assigned to citizens who have no

children of their own. How to equalize families and allotments will be

one of the chief cares of the guardians of the laws. When parents have

too many children they may give to those who have none, or couples

may abstain from having children, or, if there is a want of offspring,

special care may be taken to obtain them; or if the number of citizens

becomes excessive, we may send away the surplus to found a colony. If,

on the other hand, a war or plague diminishes the number of inhabitants,

new citizens must be introduced; and these ought not, if possible, to be

men of low birth or inferior training; but even God, it is said, cannot

always fight against necessity.

Wherefore we will thus address our citizens:--Good friends, honour

order and equality, and above all the number 5040. Secondly, respect the

original division of the lots, which must not be infringed by buying and

selling, for the law says that the land which a man has is sacred and

is given to him by God. And priests and priestesses will offer frequent

sacrifices and pray that he who alienates either house or lot may

receive the punishment which he deserves, and their prayers shall be

inscribed on tablets of cypress-wood for the instruction of posterity.

The guardians will keep a vigilant watch over the citizens, and they

will punish those who disobey God and the law.

To appreciate the benefit of such an institution a man requires to be

well educated; for he certainly will not make a fortune in our state, in

which all illiberal occupations are forbidden to freemen. The law also

provides that no private person shall have gold or silver, except

a little coin for daily use, which will not pass current in other

countries. The state must also possess a common Hellenic currency, but

this is only to be used in defraying the expenses of expeditions, or of

embassies, or while a man is on foreign travels; but in the latter case

he must deliver up what is over, when he comes back, to the treasury in

return for an equal amount of local currency, on pain of losing the sum

in question; and he who does not inform against an offender is to be

mulcted in a like sum. No money is to be given or taken as a dowry, or

to be lent on interest. The law will not protect a man in recovering

either interest or principal. All these regulations imply that the

aim of the legislator is not to make the city as rich or as mighty as

possible, but the best and happiest. Now men can hardly be at the same

time very virtuous and very rich. And why? Because he who makes twice as

much and saves twice as much as he ought, receiving where he ought not

and not spending where he ought, will be at least twice as rich as he

who makes money where he ought, and spends where he ought. On the other

hand, an utterly bad man is generally profligate and poor, while he who

acquires honestly, and spends what he acquires on noble objects, can

hardly be very rich. A very rich man is therefore not a good man, and

therefore not a happy one. But the object of our laws is to make the

citizens as friendly and happy as possible, which they cannot be if they

are always at law and injuring each other in the pursuit of gain. And

therefore we say that there is to be no silver or gold in the state,

nor usury, nor the rearing of the meaner kinds of live-stock, but only

agriculture, and only so much of this as will not lead men to neglect

that for the sake of which money is made, first the soul and afterwards

the body; neither of which are good for much without music and

gymnastic. Money is to be held in honour last or third; the highest

interests being those of the soul, and in the second class are to be

ranked those of the body. This is the true order of legislation, which

would be inverted by placing health before temperance, and wealth before

health.

It might be well if every man could come to the colony having equal

property; but equality is impossible, and therefore we must avoid causes

of offence by having property valued and by equalizing taxation. To

this end, let us make four classes in which the citizens may be placed

according to the measure of their original property, and the changes of

their fortune. The greatest of evils is revolution; and this, as the

law will say, is caused by extremes of poverty or wealth. The limit

of poverty shall be the lot, which must not be diminished, and may be

increased fivefold, but not more. He who exceeds the limit must give up

the excess to the state; but if he does not, and is informed against,

the surplus shall be divided between the informer and the Gods, and

he shall pay a sum equal to the surplus out Of his own property. All

property other than the lot must be inscribed in a register, so that any

disputes which arise may be easily determined.

The city shall be placed in a suitable situation, as nearly as possible

in the centre of the country, and shall be divided into twelve wards.

First, we will erect an acropolis, encircled by a wall, within which

shall be placed the temples of Hestia, and Zeus, and Athene. From this

shall be drawn lines dividing the city, and also the country, into

twelve sections, and the country shall be subdivided into 5040 lots.

Each lot shall contain two parts, one at a distance, the other near the

city; and the distance of one part shall be compensated by the nearness

of the other, the badness and goodness by the greater or less size.

Twelve lots will be assigned to twelve Gods, and they will give their

names to the tribes. The divisions of the city shall correspond to those

of the country; and every man shall have two habitations, one near the

centre of the country, the other at the extremity.

The objection will naturally arise, that all the advantages of which we

have been speaking will never concur. The citizens will not tolerate a

settlement in which they are deprived of gold and silver, and have the

number of their families regulated, and the sites of their houses fixed

by law. It will be said that our city is a mere image of wax. And the

legislator will answer: 'I know it, but I maintain that we ought to set

forth an ideal which is as perfect as possible. If difficulties arise

in the execution of the plan, we must avoid them and carry out the

remainder. But the legislator must first be allowed to complete his idea

without interruption.'

The number twelve, which we have chosen for the number of division,

must run through all parts of the state,--phratries, villages, ranks

of soldiers, coins, and measures wet and dry, which are all to be made

commensurable with one another. There is no meanness in requiring that

the smallest vessels should have a common measure; for the divisions of

number are useful in measuring height and depth, as well as sounds and

motions, upwards or downwards, or round and round. The legislator

should impress on his citizens the value of arithmetic. No instrument of

education has so much power; nothing more tends to sharpen and inspire

the dull intellect. But the legislator must be careful to instil a

noble and generous spirit into the students, or they will tend to become

cunning rather than wise. This may be proved by the example of the

Egyptians and Phoenicians, who, notwithstanding their knowledge of

arithmetic, are degraded in their general character; whether this defect

in them is due to some natural cause or to a bad legislator. For it

is clear that there are great differences in the power of regions to

produce good men: heat and cold, and water and food, have great effects

both on body and soul; and those spots are peculiarly fortunate in which

the air is holy, and the Gods are pleased to dwell. To all this the

legislator must attend, so far as in him lies.

BOOK VI. And now we are about to consider (1) the appointment of

magistrates; (2) the laws which they will have to administer must

be determined. I may observe by the way that laws, however good,

are useless and even injurious unless the magistrates are capable of

executing them. And therefore (1) the intended rulers of our imaginary

state should be tested from their youth upwards until the time of their

election; and (2) those who are to elect them ought to be trained in

habits of law, that they may form a right judgment of good and bad men.

But uneducated colonists, who are unacquainted with each other, will not

be likely to choose well. What, then, shall we do? I will tell you: The

colony will have to be intrusted to the ten commissioners, of whom you

are one, and I will help you and them, which is my reason for inventing

this romance. And I cannot bear that the tale should go wandering about

the world without a head,--it will be such an ugly monster. 'Very good.'

Yes; and I will be as good as my word, if God be gracious and old age

permit. But let us not forget what a courageously mad creation this our

city is. 'What makes you say so?' Why, surely our courage is shown in

imagining that the new colonists will quietly receive our laws? For no

man likes to receive laws when they are first imposed: could we only

wait until those who had been educated under them were grown up, and

of an age to vote in the public elections, there would be far greater

reason to expect permanence in our institutions. 'Very true.' The

Cnosian founders should take the utmost pains in the matter of the

colony, and in the election of the higher officers, particularly of the

guardians of the law. The latter should be appointed in this way: The

Cnosians, who take the lead in the colony, together with the colonists,

will choose thirty-seven persons, of whom nineteen will be colonists,

and the remaining eighteen Cnosians--you must be one of the eighteen

yourself, and become a citizen of the new state. 'Why do not you and

Megillus join us?' Athens is proud, and Sparta too; and they are both

a long way off. But let me proceed with my scheme. When the state is

permanently established, the mode of election will be as follows: All

who are serving, or have served, in the army will be electors; and the

election will be held in the most sacred of the temples. The voter

will place on the altar a tablet, inscribing thereupon the name of the

candidate whom he prefers, and of his father, tribe, and ward, writing

at the side of them his own name in like manner; and he may take away

any tablet which does not appear written to his mind, and place it in

the Agora for thirty days. The 300 who obtain the greatest number of

votes will be publicly announced, and out of them there will be a

second election of 100; and out of the 100 a third and final election

of thirty-seven, accompanied by the solemnity of the electors passing

through victims. But then who is to arrange all this? There is a common

saying, that the beginning is half the whole; and I should say a good

deal more than half. 'Most true.' The only way of making a beginning is

from the parent city; and though in after ages the tie may be broken,

and quarrels may arise between them, yet in early days the child

naturally looks to the mother for care and education. And, as I said

before, the Cnosians ought to take an interest in the colony, and select

100 elders of their own citizens, to whom shall be added 100 of the

colonists, to arrange and supervise the first elections and scrutinies;

and when the colony has been started, the Cnosians may return home and

leave the colonists to themselves.

The thirty-seven magistrates who have been elected in the manner

described, shall have the following duties: first, they shall be

guardians of the law; secondly, of the registers of property in the

four classes--not including the one, two, three, four minae, which are

allowed as a surplus. He who is found to possess what is not entered in

the registers, in addition to the confiscation of such property shall be

proceeded against by law, and if he be cast he shall lose his share

in the public property and in distributions of money; and his sentence

shall be inscribed in some public place. The guardians are to continue

in office twenty years only, and to commence holding office at fifty

years, or if elected at sixty they are not to remain after seventy.

Generals have now to be elected, and commanders of horse and brigadiers

of foot. The generals shall be natives of the city, proposed by the

guardians of the law, and elected by those who are or have been of the

age for military service. Any one may challenge the person nominated

and start another candidate, whom he affirms upon oath to be better

qualified. The three who obtain the greatest number of votes shall

be elected. The generals thus elected shall propose the taxiarchs or

brigadiers, and the challenge may be made, and the voting shall take

place, in the same manner as before. The elective assembly will be

presided over in the first instance, and until the prytanes and council

come into being, by the guardians of the law in some holy place; and

they shall divide the citizens into three divisions,--hoplites, cavalry,

and the rest of the army--placing each of them by itself. All are to

vote for generals and cavalry officers. The brigadiers are to be voted

for only by the hoplites. Next, the cavalry are to choose phylarchs for

the generals; but captains of archers and other irregular troops are to

be appointed by the generals themselves. The cavalry-officers shall be

proposed and voted upon by the same persons who vote for the generals.

The two who have the greatest number of votes shall be leaders of all

the horse. Disputes about the voting may be raised once or twice, but,

if a third time, the presiding officers shall decide.

The council shall consist of 360, who may be conveniently divided into

four sections, making ninety councillors of each class. In the first

place, all the citizens shall select candidates from the first class;

and they shall be compelled to vote under pain of a fine. This shall

be the business of the first day. On the second day a similar selection

shall be made from the second class under the same conditions. On the

third day, candidates shall be selected from the third class; but the

compulsion to vote shall only extend to the voters of the first three

classes. On the fourth day, members of the council shall be selected

from the fourth class; they shall be selected by all, but the compulsion

to vote shall only extend to the second class, who, if they do not vote,

shall pay a fine of triple the amount which was exacted at first, and to

the first class, who shall pay a quadruple fine. On the fifth day, the

names shall be exhibited, and out of them shall be chosen by all the

citizens 180 of each class: these are severally to be reduced by lot to

ninety, and 90 x 4 will form the council for the year.

The mode of election which has been described is a mean between monarchy

and democracy, and such a mean should ever be observed in the state.

For servants and masters cannot be friends, and, although equality makes

friendship, we must remember that there are two sorts of equality. One

of them is the rule of number and measure; but there is also a higher

equality, which is the judgment of Zeus. Of this he grants but little to

mortal men; yet that little is the source of the greatest good to cities

and individuals. It is proportioned to the nature of each man; it gives

more to the better and less to the inferior, and is the true political

justice; to this we in our state desire to look, as every legislator

should, not to the interests either of tyrants or mobs. But justice

cannot always be strictly enforced, and then equity and mercy have to

be substituted: and for a similar reason, when true justice will not be

endured, we must have recourse to the rougher justice of the lot, which

God must be entreated to guide.

These are the principal means of preserving the state, but perpetual

care will also be required. When a ship is sailing on the sea, vigilance

must not be relaxed night or day; and the vessel of state is tossing in

a political sea, and therefore watch must continually succeed watch, and

rulers must join hands with rulers. A small body will best perform

this duty, and therefore the greater part of the 360 senators may be

permitted to go and manage their own affairs, but a twelfth portion must

be set aside in each month for the administration of the state. Their

business will be to receive information and answer embassies; also they

must endeavour to prevent or heal internal disorders; and with this

object they must have the control of all assemblies of the citizens.

Besides the council, there must be wardens of the city and of the agora,

who will superintend houses, ways, harbours, markets, and fountains, in

the city and the suburbs, and prevent any injury being done to them by

man or beast. The temples, also, will require priests and priestesses.

Those who hold the priestly office by hereditary tenure shall not be

disturbed; but as there will probably be few or none such in a new

colony, priests and priestesses shall be appointed for the Gods who have

no servants. Some of these officers shall be elected by vote, some by

lot; and all classes shall mingle in a friendly manner at the elections.

The appointment of priests should be left to God,--that is, to the lot;

but the person elected must prove that he is himself sound in body and

of legitimate birth, and that his family has been free from homicide or

any other stain of impurity. Priests and priestesses are to be not less

than sixty years of age, and shall hold office for a year only. The laws

which are to regulate matters of religion shall be brought from Delphi,

and interpreters appointed to superintend their execution. These shall

be elected in the following manner:--The twelve tribes shall be formed

into three bodies of four, each of which shall select four candidates,

and this shall be done three times: of each twelve thus selected the

three who receive the largest number of votes, nine in all, after

undergoing a scrutiny shall go to Delphi, in order that the God may

elect one out of each triad. They shall be appointed for life; and when

any of them dies, another shall be elected by the four tribes who made

the original appointment. There shall also be treasurers of the temples;

three for the greater temples, two for the lesser, and one for those of

least importance.

The defence of the city should be committed to the generals and other

officers of the army, and to the wardens of the city and agora. The

defence of the country shall be on this wise:--The twelve tribes shall

allot among themselves annually the twelve divisions of the country, and

each tribe shall appoint five wardens and commanders of the watch. The

five wardens in each division shall choose out of their own tribe twelve

guards, who are to be between twenty-five and thirty years of age. Both

the wardens and the guards are to serve two years; and they shall make a

round of the divisions, staying a month in each. They shall go from West

to East during the first year, and back from East to West during the

second. Thus they will gain a perfect knowledge of the country at every

season of the year.

While on service, their first duty will be to see that the country is

well protected by means of fortifications and entrenchments; they will

use the beasts of burden and the labourers whom they find on the

spot, taking care however not to interfere with the regular course of

agriculture. But while they thus render the country as inaccessible as

possible to enemies, they will also make it as accessible as possible to

friends by constructing and maintaining good roads. They will restrain

and preserve the rain which comes down from heaven, making the barren

places fertile, and the wet places dry. They will ornament the fountains

with plantations and buildings, and provide water for irrigation at

all seasons of the year. They will lead the streams to the temples and

groves of the Gods; and in such spots the youth shall make gymnasia for

themselves, and warm baths for the aged; there the rustic worn with toil

will receive a kindly welcome, and be far better treated than at the

hands of an unskilful doctor.

These works will be both useful and ornamental; but the sixty wardens

must not fail to give serious attention to other duties. For they must

watch over the districts assigned to them, and also act as judges. In

small matters the five commanders shall decide: in greater matters up to

three minae, the five commanders and the twelve guards. Like all other

judges, except those who have the final decision, they shall be liable

to give an account. If the wardens impose unjust tasks on the villagers,

or take by force their crops or implements, or yield to flattery or

bribes in deciding suits, let them be publicly dishonoured. In regard to

any other wrong-doing, if the question be of a mina, let the neighbours

decide; but if the accused person will not submit, trusting that his

monthly removals will enable him to escape payment, and also in suits

about a larger amount, the injured party may have recourse to the common

court; in the former case, if successful, he may exact a double penalty.

The wardens and guards, while on their two years' service, shall live

and eat together, and the guard who is absent from the daily meals

without permission or sleeps out at night, shall be regarded as a

deserter, and may be punished by any one who meets him. If any of the

commanders is guilty of such an irregularity, the whole sixty shall

have him punished; and he of them who screens him shall suffer a still

heavier penalty than the offender himself. Now by service a man learns

to rule; and he should pride himself upon serving well the laws and the

Gods all his life, and upon having served ancient and honourable men in

his youth. The twelve and the five should be their own servants, and use

the labour of the villagers only for the good of the public. Let them

search the country through, and acquire a perfect knowledge of every

locality; with this view, hunting and field sports should be encouraged.

Next we have to speak of the elections of the wardens of the agora and

of the city. The wardens of the city shall be three in number, and they

shall have the care of the streets, roads, buildings, and also of the

water-supply. They shall be chosen out of the highest class, and when

the number of candidates has been reduced to six who have the greatest

number of votes, three out of the six shall be taken by lot, and, after

a scrutiny, shall be admitted to their office. The wardens of the agora

shall be five in number--ten are to be first elected, and every one

shall vote for all the vacant places; the ten shall be afterwards

reduced to five by lot, as in the former election. The first and second

class shall be compelled to go to the assembly, but not the third and

fourth, unless they are specially summoned. The wardens of the agora

shall have the care of the temples and fountains which are in the agora,

and shall punish those who injure them by stripes and bonds, if they be

slaves or strangers; and by fines, if they be citizens. And the wardens

of the city shall have a similar power of inflicting punishment and

fines in their own department.

In the next place, there must be directors of music and gymnastic; one

class of them superintending gymnasia and schools, and the attendance

and lodging of the boys and girls--the other having to do with contests

of music and gymnastic. In musical contests there shall be one kind

of judges of solo singing or playing, who will judge of rhapsodists,

flute-players, harp-players and the like, and another of choruses. There

shall be choruses of men and boys and maidens--one director will be

enough to introduce them all, and he should not be less than forty years

of age; secondly, of solos also there shall be one director, aged not

less than thirty years; he will introduce the competitors and give

judgment upon them. The director of the choruses is to be elected in

an assembly at which all who take an interest in music are compelled

to attend, and no one else. Candidates must only be proposed for their

fitness, and opposed on the ground of unfitness. Ten are to be elected

by vote, and the one of these on whom the lot falls shall be director

for a year. Next shall be elected out of the second and third classes

the judges of gymnastic contests, who are to be three in number, and

are to be tested, after being chosen by lot out of twenty who have been

elected by the three highest classes--these being compelled to attend at

the election.

One minister remains, who will have the general superintendence of

education. He must be not less than fifty years old, and be himself the

father of children born in wedlock. His office must be regarded by all

as the highest in the state. For the right growth of the first shoot

in plants and animals is the chief cause of matured perfection. Man is

supposed to be a tame animal, but he becomes either the gentlest or

the fiercest of creatures, accordingly as he is well or ill educated.

Wherefore he who is elected to preside over education should be the best

man possible. He shall hold office for five years, and shall be elected

out of the guardians of the law, by the votes of the other magistrates

with the exception of the senate and prytanes; and the election shall be

held by ballot in the temple of Apollo.

When a magistrate dies before his term of office has expired, another

shall be elected in his place; and, if the guardian of an orphan dies,

the relations shall appoint another within ten days, or be fined a

drachma a day for neglect.

The city which has no courts of law will soon cease to be a city; and a

judge who sits in silence and leaves the enquiry to the litigants, as

in arbitrations, is not a good judge. A few judges are better than

many, but the few must be good. The matter in dispute should be clearly

elicited; time and examination will find out the truth. Causes should

first be tried before a court of neighbours: if the decision is

unsatisfactory, let them be referred to a higher court; or, if

necessary, to a higher still, of which the decision shall be final.

Every magistrate is a judge, and every judge is a magistrate, on the day

on which he is deciding the suit. This will therefore be an appropriate

place to speak of judges and their functions. The supreme tribunal

will be that on which the litigants agree; and let there be two other

tribunals, one for public and the other for private causes. The high

court of appeal shall be composed as follows:--All the officers of

state shall meet on the last day but one of the year in some temple, and

choose for a judge the best man out of every magistracy: and those who

are elected, after they have undergone a scrutiny, shall be judges of

appeal. They shall give their decisions openly, in the presence of the

magistrates who have elected them; and the public may attend. If anybody

charges one of them with having intentionally decided wrong, he shall

lay his accusation before the guardians of the law, and if the judge

be found guilty he shall pay damages to the extent of half the injury,

unless the guardians of the law deem that he deserves a severer

punishment, in which case the judges shall assess the penalty.

As the whole people are injured by offences against the state, they

should share in the trial of them. Such causes should originate with the

people and be decided by them: the enquiry shall take place before any

three of the highest magistrates upon whom the defendant and plaintiff

can agree. Also in private suits all should judge as far as possible,

and therefore there should be a court of law in every ward; for he who

has no share in the administration of justice, believes that he has no

share in the state. The judges in these courts shall be elected by lot

and give their decision at once. The final judgment in all cases shall

rest with the court of appeal. And so, having done with the appointment

of courts and the election of officers, we will now make our laws.

'Your way of proceeding, Stranger, is admirable.'

Then so far our old man's game of play has gone off well.

'Say, rather, our serious and noble pursuit.'

Perhaps; but let me ask you whether you have ever observed the manner in

which painters put in and rub out colour: yet their endless labour will

last but a short time, unless they leave behind them some successor who

will restore the picture and remove its defects. 'Certainly.' And have

we not a similar object at the present moment? We are old ourselves,

and therefore we must leave our work of legislation to be improved

and perfected by the next generation; not only making laws for our

guardians, but making them lawgivers. 'We must at least do our best.'

Let us address them as follows. Beloved saviours of the laws, we give

you an outline of legislation which you must fill up, according to a

rule which we will prescribe for you. Megillus and Cleinias and I are

agreed, and we hope that you will agree with us in thinking, that the

whole energies of a man should be devoted to the attainment of manly

virtue, whether this is to be gained by study, or habit, or desire, or

opinion. And rather than accept institutions which tend to degrade and

enslave him, he should fly his country and endure any hardship. These

are our principles, and we would ask you to judge of our laws, and

praise or blame them, accordingly as they are or are not capable of

improving our citizens.

And first of laws concerning religion. We have already said that the

number 5040 has many convenient divisions: and we took a twelfth part of

this (420), which is itself divisible by twelve, for the number of the

tribe. Every divisor is a gift of God, and corresponds to the months

of the year and to the revolution of the universe. All cities have a

number, but none is more fortunate than our own, which can be divided by

all numbers up to 12, with the exception of 11, and even by 11, if two

families are deducted. And now let us divide the state, assigning to

each division some God or demigod, who shall have altars raised to them,

and sacrifices offered twice a month; and assemblies shall be held

in their honour, twelve for the tribes, and twelve for the city,

corresponding to their divisions. The object of them will be first

to promote religion, secondly to encourage friendship and intercourse

between families; for families must be acquainted before they marry

into one another, or great mistakes will occur. At these festivals there

shall be innocent dances of young men and maidens, who may have the

opportunity of seeing one another in modest undress. To the details

of all this the masters of choruses and the guardians will attend,

embodying in laws the results of their experience; and, after ten years,

making the laws permanent, with the consent of the legislator, if he be

alive, or, if he be not alive, of the guardians of the law, who shall

perfect them and settle them once for all. At least, if any further

changes are required, the magistrates must take the whole people into

counsel, and obtain the sanction of all the oracles.

Whenever any one who is between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five

wants to marry, let him do so; but first let him hear the strain which

we will address to him:--

My son, you ought to marry, but not in order to gain wealth or to avoid

poverty; neither should you, as men are wont to do, choose a wife who

is like yourself in property and character. You ought to consult the

interests of the state rather than your own pleasure; for by equal

marriages a society becomes unequal. And yet to enact a law that the

rich and mighty shall not marry the rich and mighty, that the quick

shall be united to the slow, and the slow to the quick, will arouse

anger in some persons and laughter in others; for they do not understand

that opposite elements ought to be mingled in the state, as wine should

be mingled with water. The object at which we aim must therefore be

left to the influence of public opinion. And do not forget our former

precept, that every one should seek to attain immortality and raise up

a fair posterity to serve God.--Let this be the prelude of the law about

the duty of marriage. But if a man will not listen, and at thirty-five

years of age is still unmarried, he shall pay an annual fine: if he be

of the first class, 100 drachmas; if of the second, 70; if of the third,

60; and if of the fourth, 30. This fine shall be sacred to Here; and if

he refuse to pay, a tenfold penalty shall be exacted by the treasurer of

Here, who shall be responsible for the payment. Further, the unmarried

man shall receive no honour or obedience from the young, and he shall

not retain the right of punishing others. A man is neither to give

nor receive a dowry beyond a certain fixed sum; in our state, for his

consolation, if he be poor, let him know that he need neither receive

nor give one, for every citizen is provided with the necessaries of

life. Again, if the woman is not rich, her husband will not be her

humble servant. He who disobeys this law shall pay a fine according to

his class, which shall be exacted by the treasurers of Here and Zeus.

The betrothal of the parties shall be made by the next of kin, or

if there are none, by the guardians. The offerings and ceremonies of

marriage shall be determined by the interpreters of sacred rites. Let

the wedding party be moderate; five male and five female friends, and a

like number of kinsmen, will be enough. The expense should not exceed,

for the first class, a mina; and for the second, half a mina; and should

be in like proportion for the other classes. Extravagance is to be

regarded as vulgarity and ignorance of nuptial proprieties. Much wine is

only to be drunk at the festivals of Dionysus, and certainly not on the

occasion of a marriage. The bride and bridegroom, who are taking a great

step in life, ought to have all their wits about them; they should be

especially careful of the night on which God may give them increase, and

which this will be none can say. Their bodies and souls should be in the

most temperate condition; they should abstain from all that partakes of

the nature of disease or vice, which will otherwise become hereditary.

There is an original divinity in man which preserves all things, if used

with proper respect. He who marries should make one of the two houses

on the lot the nest and nursery of his young; he should leave his father

and mother, and then his affection for them will be only increased by

absence. He will go forth as to a colony, and will there rear up his

offspring, handing on the torch of life to another generation.

About property in general there is little difficulty, with the exception

of property in slaves, which is an institution of a very doubtful

character. The slavery of the Helots is approved by some and condemned

by others; and there is some doubt even about the slavery of the

Mariandynians at Heraclea and of the Thessalian Penestae. This makes us

ask, What shall we do about slaves? To which every one would agree in

replying,--Let us have the best and most attached whom we can get. All

of us have heard stories of slaves who have been better to their masters

than sons or brethren. Yet there is an opposite doctrine, that slaves

are never to be trusted; as Homer says, 'Slavery takes away half a man's

understanding.' And different persons treat them in different ways:

there are some who never trust them, and beat them like dogs, until

they make them many times more slavish than they were before; and others

pursue the opposite plan. Man is a troublesome animal, as has been often

shown, Megillus, notably in the revolts of the Messenians; and great

mischiefs have arisen in countries where there are large bodies of

slaves of one nationality. Two rules may be given for their management:

first that they should not, if possible, be of the same country or have

a common language; and secondly, that they should be treated by their

master with more justice even than equals, out of regard to himself

quite as much as to them. For he who is righteous in the treatment of

his slaves, or of any inferiors, will sow in them the seed of virtue.

Masters should never jest with their slaves: this, which is a common but

foolish practice, increases the difficulty and painfulness of managing

them.

Next as to habitations. These ought to have been spoken of before; for

no man can marry a wife, and have slaves, who has not a house for them

to live in. Let us supply the omission. The temples should be placed

round the Agora, and the city built in a circle on the heights. Near the

temples, which are holy places and the habitations of the Gods, should

be buildings for the magistrates, and the courts of law, including those

in which capital offences are to be tried. As to walls, Megillus, I

agree with Sparta that they should sleep in the earth; 'cold steel

is the best wall,' as the poet finely says. Besides, how absurd to be

sending out our youth to fortify and guard the borders of our country,

and then to build a city wall, which is very unhealthy, and is apt to

make people fancy that they may run there and rest in idleness, not

knowing that true repose comes from labour, and that idleness is only

a renewal of trouble. If, however, there must be a wall, the private

houses had better be so arranged as to form one wall; this will have an

agreeable aspect, and the building will be safer and more defensible.

These objects should be attended to at the foundation of the city. The

wardens of the city must see that they are carried out; and they

must also enforce cleanliness, and preserve the public buildings from

encroachments. Moreover, they must take care to let the rain flow

off easily, and must regulate other matters concerning the general

administration of the city. If any further enactments prove to be

necessary, the guardians of the law must supply them.

And now, having provided buildings, and having married our citizens,

we will proceed to speak of their mode of life. In a well-constituted

state, individuals cannot be allowed to live as they please. Why do

I say this? Because I am going to enact that the bridegroom shall not

absent himself from the common meals. They were instituted originally

on the occasion of some war, and, though deemed singular when first

founded, they have tended greatly to the security of states. There was a

difficulty in introducing them, but there is no difficulty in them now.

There is, however, another institution about which I would speak, if I

dared. I may preface my proposal by remarking that disorder in a state

is the source of all evil, and order of all good. Now in Sparta and

Crete there are common meals for men, and this, as I was saying, is a

divine and natural institution. But the women are left to themselves;

they live in dark places, and, being weaker, and therefore wickeder,

than men, they are at the bottom of a good deal more than half the evil

of states. This must be corrected, and the institution of common

meals extended to both sexes. But, in the present unfortunate state

of opinion, who would dare to establish them? And still more, who can

compel women to eat and drink in public? They will defy the legislator

to drag them out of their holes. And in any other state such a proposal

would be drowned in clamour, but in our own I think that I can show the

attempt to be just and reasonable. 'There is nothing which we should

like to hear better.' Listen, then; having plenty of time, we will

go back to the beginning of things, which is an old subject with us.

'Right.' Either the race of mankind never had a beginning and will never

have an end, or the time which has elapsed since man first came into

being is all but infinite. 'No doubt.' And in this infinity of time

there have been changes of every kind, both in the order of the seasons

and in the government of states and in the customs of eating and

drinking. Vines and olives were at length discovered, and the blessings

of Demeter and Persephone, of which one Triptolemus is said to have been

the minister; before his time the animals had been eating one another.

And there are nations in which mankind still sacrifice their fellow-men,

and other nations in which they lead a kind of Orphic existence, and

will not sacrifice animals, or so much as taste of a cow--they offer

fruits or cakes moistened with honey. Perhaps you will ask me what is

the bearing of these remarks? 'We would gladly hear.' I will endeavour

to explain their drift. I see that the virtue of human life depends on

the due regulation of three wants or desires. The first is the desire

of meat, the second of drink; these begin with birth, and make us

disobedient to any voice other than that of pleasure. The third and

fiercest and greatest need is felt latest; this is love, which is a

madness setting men's whole nature on fire. These three disorders of

mankind we must endeavour to restrain by three mighty influences--fear,

and law, and reason, which, with the aid of the Muses and the Gods of

contests, may extinguish our lusts.

But to return. After marriage let us proceed to the generation of

children, and then to their nurture and education--thus gradually

approaching the subject of syssitia. There are, however, some other

points which are suggested by the three words--meat, drink, love.

'Proceed,' the bride and bridegroom ought to set their mind on having a

brave offspring. Now a man only succeeds when he takes pains; wherefore

the bridegroom ought to take special care of the bride, and the bride

of the bridegroom, at the time when their children are about to be born.

And let there be a committee of matrons who shall meet every day at

the temple of Eilithyia at a time fixed by the magistrates, and inform

against any man or woman who does not observe the laws of married life.

The time of begetting children and the supervision of the parents shall

last for ten years only; if at the expiration of this period they have

no children, they may part, with the consent of their relatives and the

official matrons, and with a due regard to the interests of either; if

a dispute arise, ten of the guardians of the law shall be chosen as

arbiters. The matrons shall also have power to enter the houses of the

young people, if necessary, and to advise and threaten them. If their

efforts fail, let them go to the guardians of the law; and if they

too fail, the offender, whether man or woman, shall be forbidden to

be present at all family ceremonies. If when the time for begetting

children has ceased, either husband or wife have connexion with others

who are of an age to beget children, they shall be liable to the same

penalties as those who are still having a family. But when both parties

have ceased to beget children there shall be no penalties. If men

and women live soberly, the enactments of law may be left to slumber;

punishment is necessary only when there is great disorder of manners.

The first year of children's lives is to be registered in their

ancestral temples; the name of the archon of the year is to be inscribed

on a whited wall in every phratry, and the names of the living members

of the phratry close to them, to be erased at their decease. The proper

time of marriage for a woman shall be from sixteen years to twenty; for

a man, from thirty to thirty-five (compare Republic). The age of holding

office for a woman is to be forty, for a man thirty years. The time for

military service for a man is to be from twenty years to sixty; for a

woman, from the time that she has ceased to bear children until fifty.

BOOK VII. Now that we have married our citizens and brought their

children into the world, we have to find nurture and education for them.

This is a matter of precept rather than of law, and cannot be precisely

regulated by the legislator. For minute regulations are apt to be

transgressed, and frequent transgressions impair the habit of obedience

to the laws. I speak darkly, but I will also try to exhibit my wares in

the light of day. Am I not right in saying that a good education tends

to the improvement of body and mind? 'Certainly.' And the body is

fairest which grows up straight and well-formed from the time of birth.

'Very true.' And we observe that the first shoot of every living thing

is the greatest; many even contend that man is not at twenty-five twice

the height that he was at five. 'True.' And growth without exercise of

the limbs is the source of endless evils in the body. 'Yes.' The body

should have the most exercise when growing most. 'What, the bodies of

young infants?' Nay, the bodies of unborn infants. I should like to

explain to you this singular kind of gymnastics. The Athenians are fond

of cock-fighting, and the people who keep cocks carry them about in

their hands or under their arms, and take long walks, to improve, not

their own health, but the health of the birds. Here is a proof of the

usefulness of motion, whether of rocking, swinging, riding, or tossing

upon the wave; for all these kinds of motion greatly increase strength

and the powers of digestion. Hence we infer that our women, when they

are with child, should walk about and fashion the embryo; and the

children, when born, should be carried by strong nurses,--there must be

more than one of them,--and should not be suffered to walk until they

are three years old. Shall we impose penalties for the neglect of these

rules? The greatest penalty, that is, ridicule, and the difficulty of

making the nurses do as we bid them, will be incurred by ourselves.

'Then why speak of such matters?' In the hope that heads of families may

learn that the due regulation of them is the foundation of law and order

in the state.

And now, leaving the body, let us proceed to the soul; but we must first

repeat that perpetual motion by night and by day is good for the young

creature. This is proved by the Corybantian cure of motion, and by the

practice of nurses who rock children in their arms, lapping them at

the same time in sweet strains. And the reason of this is obvious. The

affections, both of the Bacchantes and of the children, arise from fear,

and this fear is occasioned by something wrong which is going on

within them. Now a violent external commotion tends to calm the violent

internal one; it quiets the palpitation of the heart, giving to the

children sleep, and bringing back the Bacchantes to their right minds

by the help of dances and acceptable sacrifices. But if fear has such

power, will not a child who is always in a state of terror grow up timid

and cowardly, whereas if he learns from the first to resist fear he will

develop a habit of courage? 'Very true.' And we may say that the use

of motion will inspire the souls of children with cheerfulness and

therefore with courage. 'Of course.' Softness enervates and

irritates the temper of the young, and violence renders them mean and

misanthropical. 'But how is the state to educate them when they are as

yet unable to understand the meaning of words?' Why, surely they roar

and cry, like the young of any other animal, and the nurse knows the

meaning of these intimations of the child's likes or dislikes, and the

occasions which call them forth. About three years is passed by children

in a state of imperfect articulation, which is quite long enough time

to make them either good- or ill-tempered. And, therefore, during these

first three years, the infant should be as free as possible from fear

and pain. 'Yes, and he should have as much pleasure as possible.' There,

I think, you are wrong; for the influence of pleasure in the beginning

of education is fatal. A man should neither pursue pleasure nor wholly

avoid pain. He should embrace the mean, and cultivate that state of calm

which mankind, taught by some inspiration, attribute to God; and he who

would be like God should neither be too fond of pleasure himself, nor

should he permit any other to be thus given; above all, not the infant,

whose character is just in the making. It may sound ridiculous, but I

affirm that a woman in her pregnancy should be carefully tended, and

kept from excessive pleasures and pains.

'I quite agree with you about the duty of avoiding extremes and

following the mean.'

Let us consider a further point. The matters which are now in question

are generally called customs rather than laws; and we have already made

the reflection that, though they are not, properly speaking, laws, yet

neither can they be neglected. For they fill up the interstices of

law, and are the props and ligatures on which the strength of the whole

building depends. Laws without customs never last; and we must not

wonder if habit and custom sometimes lengthen out our laws. 'Very true.'

Up to their third year, then, the life of children may be regulated by

customs such as we have described. From three to six their minds have

to be amused; but they must not be allowed to become self-willed and

spoilt. If punishment is necessary, the same rule will hold as in the

case of slaves; they must neither be punished in hot blood nor ruined

by indulgence. The children of that age will have their own modes of

amusing themselves; they should be brought for their play to the village

temples, and placed under the care of nurses, who will be responsible

to twelve matrons annually chosen by the women who have authority over

marriage. These shall be appointed, one out of each tribe, and their

duty shall be to keep order at the meetings: slaves who break the rules

laid down by them, they shall punish by the help of some of the public

slaves; but citizens who dispute their authority shall be brought before

the magistrates. After six years of age there shall be a separation of

the sexes; the boys will go to learn riding and the use of arms, and the

girls may, if they please, also learn. Here I note a practical error in

early training. Mothers and nurses foolishly believe that the left hand

is by nature different from the right, whereas the left leg and foot are

acknowledged to be the same as the right. But the truth is that nature

made all things to balance, and the power of using the left hand, which

is of little importance in the case of the plectrum of the lyre, may

make a great difference in the art of the warrior, who should be a

skilled gymnast and able to fight and balance himself in any position.

If a man were a Briareus, he should use all his hundred hands at once;

at any rate, let everybody employ the two which they have. To these

matters the magistrates, male and female, should attend; the women

superintending the nursing and amusement of the children, and the men

superintending their education, that all of them, boys and girls alike,

may be sound, wind and limb, and not spoil the gifts of nature by bad

habits.

Education has two branches--gymnastic, which is concerned with the body;

and music, which improves the soul. And gymnastic has two parts, dancing

and wrestling. Of dancing one kind imitates musical recitation and aims

at stateliness and freedom; another kind is concerned with the training

of the body, and produces health, agility, and beauty. There is no

military use in the complex systems of wrestling which pass under the

names of Antaeus and Cercyon, or in the tricks of boxing, which are

attributed to Amycus and Epeius; but good wrestling and the habit of

extricating the neck, hands, and sides, should be diligently learnt and

taught. In our dances imitations of war should be practised, as in the

dances of the Curetes in Crete and of the Dioscuri at Sparta, or as

in the dances in complete armour which were taught us Athenians by the

goddess Athene. Youths who are not yet of an age to go to war should

make religious processions armed and on horseback; and they should also

engage in military games and contests. These exercises will be equally

useful in peace and war, and will benefit both states and families.

Next follows music, to which we will once more return; and here I shall

venture to repeat my old paradox, that amusements have great influence

on laws. He who has been taught to play at the same games and with the

same playthings will be content with the same laws. There is no greater

evil in a state than the spirit of innovation. In the case of the

seasons and winds, in the management of our bodies and in the habits of

our minds, change is a dangerous thing. And in everything but what is

bad the same rule holds. We all venerate and acquiesce in the laws to

which we are accustomed; and if they have continued during long

periods of time, and there is no remembrance of their ever having been

otherwise, people are absolutely afraid to change them. Now how can we

create this quality of immobility in the laws? I say, by not allowing

innovations in the games and plays of children. The children who are

always having new plays, when grown up will be always having new laws.

Changes in mere fashions are not serious evils, but changes in our

estimate of men's characters are most serious; and rhythms and music are

representations of characters, and therefore we must avoid novelties in

dance and song. For securing permanence no better method can be imagined

than that of the Egyptians. 'What is their method?' They make a calendar

for the year, arranging on what days the festivals of the various

Gods shall be celebrated, and for each festival they consecrate an

appropriate hymn and dance. In our state a similar arrangement shall

in the first instance be framed by certain individuals, and afterwards

solemnly ratified by all the citizens. He who introduces other hymns

or dances shall be excluded by the priests and priestesses and the

guardians of the law; and if he refuses to submit, he may be prosecuted

for impiety. But we must not be too ready to speak about such great

matters. Even a young man, when he hears something unaccustomed, stands

and looks this way and that, like a traveller at a place where three

ways meet; and at our age a man ought to be very sure of his ground

in so singular an argument. 'Very true.' Then, leaving the subject for

further examination at some future time, let us proceed with our laws

about education, for in this manner we may probably throw light upon our

present difficulty. 'Let us do as you say.' The ancients used the term

nomoi to signify harmonious strains, and perhaps they fancied that

there was a connexion between the songs and laws of a country. And we

say--Whosoever shall transgress the strains by law established is a

transgressor of the laws, and shall be punished by the guardians of

the law and by the priests and priestesses. 'Very good.' How can we

legislate about these consecrated strains without incurring ridicule?

Moulds or types must be first framed, and one of the types shall

be--Abstinence from evil words at sacrifices. When a son or brother

blasphemes at a sacrifice there is a sound of ill-omen heard in the

family; and many a chorus stands by the altar uttering inauspicious

words, and he is crowned victor who excites the hearers most with

lamentations. Such lamentations should be reserved for evil days, and

should be uttered only by hired mourners; and let the singers not wear

circlets or ornaments of gold. To avoid every evil word, then, shall be

our first type. 'Agreed.' Our second law or type shall be, that prayers

ever accompany sacrifices; and our third, that, inasmuch as all prayers

are requests, they shall be only for good; this the poets must be made

to understand. 'Certainly.' Have we not already decided that no gold or

silver Plutus shall be allowed in our city? And did not this show that

we were dissatisfied with the poets? And may we not fear that, if they

are allowed to utter injudicious prayers, they will bring the greatest

misfortunes on the state? And we must therefore make a law that the poet

is not to contradict the laws or ideas of the state; nor is he to show

his poems to any private persons until they have first received the

imprimatur of the director of education. A fourth musical law will be

to the effect that hymns and praises shall be offered to Gods, and to

heroes and demigods. Still another law will permit eulogies of eminent

citizens, whether men or women, but only after their death. As to songs

and dances, we will enact as follows:--There shall be a selection made

of the best ancient musical compositions and dances; these shall be

chosen by judges, who ought not to be less than fifty years of age. They

will accept some, and reject or amend others, for which purpose they

will call, if necessary, the poets themselves into council. The severe

and orderly music is the style in which to educate children, who,

if they are accustomed to this, will deem the opposite kind to be

illiberal, but if they are accustomed to the other, will count this to

be cold and unpleasing. 'True.' Further, a distinction should be made

between the melodies of men and women. Nature herself teaches that

the grand or manly style should be assigned to men, and to women the

moderate and temperate. So much for the subjects of education. But to

whom are they to be taught, and when? I must try, like the shipwright,

who lays down the keel of a vessel, to build a secure foundation for the

vessel of the soul in her voyage through life. Human affairs are hardly

serious, and yet a sad necessity compels us to be serious about them.

Let us, therefore, do our best to bring the matter to a conclusion.

'Very good.' I say then, that God is the object of a man's most serious

endeavours. But man is created to be the plaything of the Gods; and

therefore the aim of every one should be to pass through life, not in

grim earnest, but playing at the noblest of pastimes, in another spirit

from that which now prevails. For the common opinion is, that work is

for the sake of play, war of peace; whereas in war there is neither

amusement nor instruction worth speaking of. The life of peace is that

which men should chiefly desire to lengthen out and improve. They should

live sacrificing, singing, and dancing, with the view of propitiating

Gods and heroes. I have already told you the types of song and dance

which they should follow: and 'Some things,' as the poet well says, 'you

will devise for yourself--others, God will suggest to you.'

These words of his may be applied to our pupils. They will partly teach

themselves, and partly will be taught by God, the art of propitiating

Him; for they are His puppets, and have only a small portion in truth.

'You have a poor opinion of man.' No wonder, when I compare him with

God; but, if you are offended, I will place him a little higher.

Next follow the building for gymnasia and schools; these will be in

the midst of the city, and outside will be riding-schools and

archery-grounds. In all of them there ought to be instructors of the

young, drawn from foreign parts by pay, and they will teach them music

and war. Education shall be compulsory; the children must attend school,

whether their parents like it or not; for they belong to the state more

than to their parents. And I say further, without hesitation, that the

same education in riding and gymnastic shall be given both to men and

women. The ancient tradition about the Amazons confirms my view, and

at the present day there are myriads of women, called Sauromatides,

dwelling near the Pontus, who practise the art of riding as well as

archery and the use of arms. But if I am right, nothing can be more

foolish than our modern fashion of training men and women differently,

whereby the power the city is reduced to a half. For reflect--if women

are not to have the education of men, some other must be found for them,

and what other can we propose? Shall they, like the women of Thrace,

tend cattle and till the ground; or, like our own, spin and weave, and

take care of the house? or shall they follow the Spartan custom, which

is between the two?--there the maidens share in gymnastic exercises and

in music; and the grown women, no longer engaged in spinning, weave the

web of life, although they are not skilled in archery, like the Amazons,

nor can they imitate our warrior goddess and carry shield or spear, even

in the extremity of their country's need. Compared with our women,

the Sauromatides are like men. But your legislators, Megillus, as I

maintain, only half did their work; they took care of the men, and left

the women to take care of themselves.

'Shall we suffer the Stranger, Cleinias, to run down Sparta in this

way?'

'Why, yes; for we cannot withdraw the liberty which we have already

conceded to him.'

What will be the manner of life of men in moderate circumstances, freed

from the toils of agriculture and business, and having common tables

for themselves and their families which are under the inspection of

magistrates, male and female? Are men who have these institutions only

to eat and fatten like beasts? If they do, how can they escape the fate

of a fatted beast, which is to be torn in pieces by some other beast

more valiant than himself? True, theirs is not the perfect way of life,

for they have not all things in common; but the second best way of life

also confers great blessings. Even those who live in the second state

have a work to do twice as great as the work of any Pythian or Olympic

victor; for their labour is for the body only, but ours both for body

and soul. And this higher work ought to be pursued night and day to the

exclusion of every other. The magistrates who keep the city should be

wakeful, and the master of the household should be up early and before

all his servants; and the mistress, too, should awaken her handmaidens,

and not be awakened by them. Much sleep is not required either for our

souls or bodies. When a man is asleep, he is no better than if he were

dead; and he who loves life and wisdom will take no more sleep than

is necessary for health. Magistrates who are wide awake at night are

terrible to the bad; but they are honoured by the good, and are useful

to themselves and the state.

When the morning dawns, let the boy go to school. As the sheep need the

shepherd, so the boy needs a master; for he is at once the most cunning

and the most insubordinate of creatures. Let him be taken away from

mothers and nurses, and tamed with bit and bridle, being treated as a

freeman in that he learns and is taught, but as a slave in that he

may be chastised by all other freemen; and the freeman who neglects to

chastise him shall be disgraced. All these matters will be under the

supervision of the Director of Education.

Him we will address as follows: We have spoken to you, O illustrious

teacher of youth, of the song, the time, and the dance, and of martial

strains; but of the learning of letters and of prose writings, and of

music, and of the use of calculation for military and domestic purposes

we have not spoken, nor yet of the higher use of numbers in reckoning

divine things--such as the revolutions of the stars, or the arrangements

of days, months, and years, of which the true calculation is necessary

in order that seasons and festivals may proceed in regular course, and

arouse and enliven the city, rendering to the Gods their due, and making

men know them better. There are, we say, many things about which we have

not as yet instructed you--and first, as to reading and music: Shall

the pupil be a perfect scholar and musician, or not even enter on these

studies? He should certainly enter on both:--to letters he will apply

himself from the age of ten to thirteen, and at thirteen he will begin

to handle the lyre, and continue to learn music until he is sixteen;

no shorter and no longer time will be allowed, however fond he or his

parents may be of the pursuit. The study of letters he should carry

to the extent of simple reading and writing, but he need not care for

calligraphy and tachygraphy, if his natural gifts do not enable him to

acquire them in the three years. And here arises a question as to the

learning of compositions when unaccompanied with music, I mean, prose

compositions. They are a dangerous species of literature. Speak then, O

guardians of the law, and tell us what we shall do about them. 'You seem

to be in a difficulty.' Yes; it is difficult to go against the opinion

of all the world. 'But have we not often already done so?' Very true.

And you imply that the road which we are taking, though disagreeable

to many, is approved by those whose judgment is most worth having.

'Certainly.' Then I would first observe that we have many poets, comic

as well as tragic, with whose compositions, as people say, youth are

to be imbued and saturated. Some would have them learn by heart entire

poets; others prefer extracts. Now I believe, and the general opinion

is, that some of the things which they learn are good, and some bad.

'Then how shall we reject some and select others?' A happy thought

occurs to me; this long discourse of ours is a sample of what we want,

and is moreover an inspired work and a kind of poem. I am naturally

pleased in reflecting upon all our words, which appear to me to be just

the thing for a young man to hear and learn. I would venture, then, to

offer to the Director of Education this treatise of laws as a pattern

for his guidance; and in case he should find any similar compositions,

written or oral, I would have him carefully preserve them, and commit

them in the first place to the teachers who are willing to learn them

(he should turn off the teacher who refuses), and let them communicate

the lesson to the young.

I have said enough to the teacher of letters; and now we will proceed to

the teacher of the lyre. He must be reminded of the advice which we gave

to the sexagenarian minstrels; like them he should be quick to perceive

the rhythms suited to the expression of virtue, and to reject the

opposite. With a view to the attainment of this object, the pupil and

his instructor are to use the lyre because its notes are pure; the voice

and string should coincide note for note: nor should there be complex

harmonies and contrasts of intervals, or variations of times or rhythms.

Three years' study is not long enough to give a knowledge of these

intricacies; and our pupils will have many things of more importance to

learn. The tunes and hymns which are to be consecrated for each festival

have been already determined by us.

Having given these instructions to the Director of Music, let us now

proceed to dancing and gymnastic, which must also be taught to boys and

girls by masters and mistresses. Our minister of education will have a

great deal to do; and being an old man, how will he get through so much

work? There is no difficulty;--the law will provide him with assistants,

male and female; and he will consider how important his office is,

and how great the responsibility of choosing them. For if education

prospers, the vessel of state sails merrily along; or if education

fails, the consequences are not even to be mentioned. Of dancing and

gymnastics something has been said already. We include under the latter

military exercises, the various uses of arms, all that relates to

horsemanship, and military evolutions and tactics. There should be

public teachers of both arts, paid by the state, and women as well as

men should be trained in them. The maidens should learn the armed dance,

and the grown-up women be practised in drill and the use of arms, if

only in case of extremity, when the men are gone out to battle, and they

are left to guard their families. Birds and beasts defend their young,

but women instead of fighting run to the altars, thus degrading man

below the level of the animals. 'Such a lack of education, Stranger, is

both unseemly and dangerous.'

Wrestling is to be pursued as a military exercise, but the meaning of

this, and the nature of the art, can only be explained when action

is combined with words. Next follows dancing, which is of two kinds;

imitative, first, of the serious and beautiful; and, secondly, of the

ludicrous and grotesque. The first kind may be further divided into the

dance of war and the dance of peace. The former is called the Pyrrhic;

in this the movements of attack and defence are imitated in a direct and

manly style, which indicates strength and sufficiency of body and mind.

The latter of the two, the dance of peace, is suitable to orderly and

law-abiding men. These must be distinguished from the Bacchic dances

which imitate drunken revelry, and also from the dances by which

purifications are effected and mysteries celebrated. Such dances cannot

be characterized either as warlike or peaceful, and are unsuited to a

civilized state. Now the dances of peace are of two classes:--the first

of them is the more violent, being an expression of joy and triumph

after toil and danger; the other is more tranquil, symbolizing the

continuance and preservation of good. In speaking or singing we

naturally move our bodies, and as we have more or less courage or

self-control we become less or more violent and excited. Thus from the

imitation of words in gestures the art of dancing arises. Now one man

imitates in an orderly, another in a disorderly manner: and so the

peaceful kinds of dance have been appropriately called Emmeleiai, or

dances of order, as the warlike have been called Pyrrhic. In the latter

a man imitates all sorts of blows and the hurling of weapons and the

avoiding of them; in the former he learns to bear himself gracefully

and like a gentleman. The types of these dances are to be fixed by the

legislator, and when the guardians of the law have assigned them to the

several festivals, and consecrated them in due order, no further change

shall be allowed.

Thus much of the dances which are appropriate to fair forms and noble

souls. Comedy, which is the opposite of them, remains to be considered.

For the serious implies the ludicrous, and opposites cannot be

understood without opposites. But a man of repute will desire to

avoid doing what is ludicrous. He should leave such performances to

slaves,--they are not fit for freemen; and there should be some element

of novelty in them. Concerning tragedy, let our law be as follows: When

the inspired poet comes to us with a request to be admitted into our

state, we will reply in courteous words--We also are tragedians and your

rivals; and the drama which we enact is the best and noblest, being the

imitation of the truest and noblest life, with a view to which our state

is ordered. And we cannot allow you to pitch your stage in the agora,

and make your voices to be heard above ours, or suffer you to address

our women and children and the common people on opposite principles

to our own. Come then, ye children of the Lydian Muse, and present

yourselves first to the magistrates, and if they decide that your hymns

are as good or better than ours, you shall have your chorus; but if not,

not.

There remain three kinds of knowledge which should be learnt by

freemen--arithmetic, geometry of surfaces and of solids, and thirdly,

astronomy. Few need make an accurate study of such sciences; and of

special students we will speak at another time. But most persons must be

content with the study of them which is absolutely necessary, and may

be said to be a necessity of that nature against which God himself is

unable to contend. 'What are these divine necessities of knowledge?'

Necessities of a knowledge without which neither gods, nor demigods,

can govern mankind. And far is he from being a divine man who cannot

distinguish one, two, odd and even; who cannot number day and night, and

is ignorant of the revolutions of the sun and stars; for to every higher

knowledge a knowledge of number is necessary--a fool may see this; how

much, is a matter requiring more careful consideration. 'Very true.'

But the legislator cannot enter into such details, and therefore we

must defer the more careful consideration of these matters to another

occasion. 'You seem to fear our habitual want of training in these

subjects.' Still more do I fear the danger of bad training, which is

often worse than none at all. 'Very true.' I think that a gentleman

and a freeman may be expected to know as much as an Egyptian child.

In Egypt, arithmetic is taught to children in their sports by a

distribution of apples or garlands among a greater or less number of

people; or a calculation is made of the various combinations which are

possible among a set of boxers or wrestlers; or they distribute cups

among the children, sometimes of gold, brass, and silver intermingled,

sometimes of one metal only. The knowledge of arithmetic which is thus

acquired is a great help, either to the general or to the manager of

a household; wherever measure is employed, men are more wide-awake in

their dealings, and they get rid of their ridiculous ignorance. 'What do

you mean?' I have observed this ignorance among my countrymen--they are

like pigs--and I am heartily ashamed both on my own behalf and on that

of all the Hellenes. 'In what respect?' Let me ask you a question. You

know that there are such things as length, breadth, and depth?

'Yes.' And the Hellenes imagine that they are commensurable (1) with

themselves, and (2) with each other; whereas they are only commensurable

with themselves. But if this is true, then we are in an unfortunate

case, and may well say to our compatriots that not to possess necessary

knowledge is a disgrace, though to possess such knowledge is nothing

very grand. 'Certainly.' The discussion of arithmetical problems is a

much better amusement for old men than their favourite game of draughts.

'True.' Mathematics, then, will be one of the subjects in which youth

should be trained. They may be regarded as an amusement, as well as a

useful and innocent branch of knowledge;--I think that we may include

them provisionally. 'Yes; that will be the way.' The next question is,

whether astronomy shall be made a part of education. About the stars

there is a strange notion prevalent. Men often suppose that it is

impious to enquire into the nature of God and the world, whereas the

very reverse is the truth. 'How do you mean?' What I am going to say may

seem absurd and at variance with the usual language of age, and yet if

true and advantageous to the state, and pleasing to God, ought not to be

withheld. 'Let us hear.' My dear friend, how falsely do we and all the

Hellenes speak about the sun and moon! 'In what respect?' We are always

saying that they and certain of the other stars do not keep the same

path, and we term them planets. 'Yes; and I have seen the morning and

evening stars go all manner of ways, and the sun and moon doing what we

know that they always do. But I wish that you would explain your meaning

further.' You will easily understand what I have had no difficulty

in understanding myself, though we are both of us past the time of

learning. 'True; but what is this marvellous knowledge which youth are

to acquire, and of which we are ignorant?' Men say that the sun, moon,

and stars are planets or wanderers; but this is the reverse of the fact.

Each of them moves in one orbit only, which is circular, and not in

many; nor is the swiftest of them the slowest, as appears to human eyes.

What an insult should we offer to Olympian runners if we were to put

the first last and the last first! And if that is a ridiculous error in

speaking of men, how much more in speaking of the Gods? They cannot be

pleased at our telling falsehoods about them. 'They cannot.' Then people

should at least learn so much about them as will enable them to avoid

impiety.

Enough of education. Hunting and similar pursuits now claim our

attention. These require for their regulation that mixture of law and

admonition of which we have often spoken; e.g., in what we were saying

about the nurture of young children. And therefore the whole duty of the

citizen will not consist in mere obedience to the laws; he must regard

not only the enactments but also the precepts of the legislator. I

will illustrate my meaning by an example. Of hunting there are many

kinds--hunting of fish and fowl, man and beast, enemies and friends; and

the legislator can neither omit to speak about these things, nor make

penal ordinances about them all. 'What is he to do then?' He will praise

and blame hunting, having in view the discipline and exercise of youth.

And the young man will listen obediently and will regard his praises and

censures; neither pleasure nor pain should hinder him. The legislator

will express himself in the form of a pious wish for the welfare of the

young:--O my friends, he will say, may you never be induced to hunt for

fish in the waters, either by day or night; or for men, whether by sea

or land. Never let the wish to steal enter into your minds; neither

be ye fowlers, which is not an occupation for gentlemen. As to land

animals, the legislator will discourage hunting by night, and also

the use of nets and snares by day; for these are indolent and unmanly

methods. The only mode of hunting which he can praise is with horses

and dogs, running, shooting, striking at close quarters. Enough of the

prelude: the law shall be as follows:--

Let no one hinder the holy order of huntsmen; but let the nightly

hunters who lay snares and nets be everywhere prohibited. Let the fowler

confine himself to waste places and to the mountains. The fisherman is

also permitted to exercise his calling, except in harbours and sacred

streams, marshes and lakes; in all other places he may fish, provided he

does not make use of poisonous mixtures.

BOOK VIII. Next, with the help of the Delphian Oracle, we will appoint

festivals and sacrifices. There shall be 365 of them, one for every day

in the year; and one magistrate, at least, shall offer sacrifice

daily according to rites prescribed by a convocation of priests and

interpreters, who shall co-operate with the guardians of the law, and

supply what the legislator has omitted. Moreover there shall be twelve

festivals to the twelve Gods after whom the twelve tribes are named:

these shall be celebrated every month with appropriate musical and

gymnastic contests. There shall also be festivals for women, to be

distinguished from the men's festivals. Nor shall the Gods below be

forgotten, but they must be separated from the Gods above--Pluto shall

have his own in the twelfth month. He is not the enemy, but the friend

of man, who releases the soul from the body, which is at least as good a

work as to unite them. Further, those who have to regulate these matters

should consider that our state has leisure and abundance, and wishing to

be happy, like an individual, should lead a good life; for he who leads

such a life neither does nor suffers injury, of which the first is very

easy, and the second very difficult of attainment, and is only to be

acquired by perfect virtue. A good city has peace, but the evil city is

full of wars within and without. To guard against the danger of external

enemies the citizens should practise war at least one day in every

month; they should go out en masse, including their wives and children,

or in divisions, as the magistrates determine, and have mimic contests,

imitating in a lively manner real battles; they should also have prizes

and encomiums of valour, both for the victors in these contests, and for

the victors in the battle of life. The poet who celebrates the victors

should be fifty years old at least, and himself a man who has done great

deeds. Of such an one the poems may be sung, even though he is not the

best of poets. To the director of education and the guardians of the law

shall be committed the judgment, and no song, however sweet, which has

not been licensed by them shall be recited. These regulations about

poetry, and about military expeditions, apply equally to men and to

women.

The legislator may be conceived to make the following address to

himself:--With what object am I training my citizens? Are they not

strivers for mastery in the greatest of combats? Certainly, will be

the reply. And if they were boxers or wrestlers, would they think of

entering the lists without many days' practice? Would they not as far as

possible imitate all the circumstances of the contest; and if they

had no one to box with, would they not practise on a lifeless image,

heedless of the laughter of the spectators? And shall our soldiers go

out to fight for life and kindred and property unprepared, because sham

fights are thought to be ridiculous? Will not the legislator require

that his citizens shall practise war daily, performing lesser exercises

without arms, while the combatants on a greater scale will carry arms,

and take up positions, and lie in ambuscade? And let their combats be

not without danger, that opportunity may be given for distinction,

and the brave man and the coward may receive their meed of honour

or disgrace. If occasionally a man is killed, there is no great harm

done--there are others as good as he is who will replace him; and the

state can better afford to lose a few of her citizens than to lose the

only means of testing them.

'We agree, Stranger, that such warlike exercises are necessary.' But why

are they so rarely practised? Or rather, do we not all know the reasons?

One of them (1) is the inordinate love of wealth. This absorbs the soul

of a man, and leaves him no time for any other pursuit. Knowledge is

valued by him only as it tends to the attainment of wealth. All is lost

in the desire of heaping up gold and silver; anybody is ready to do

anything, right or wrong, for the sake of eating and drinking, and

the indulgence of his animal passions. 'Most true.' This is one of the

causes which prevents a man being a good soldier, or anything else

which is good; it converts the temperate and orderly into shopkeepers or

servants, and the brave into burglars or pirates. Many of these latter

are men of ability, and are greatly to be pitied, because their souls

are hungering and thirsting all their lives long. The bad forms of

government (2) are another reason--democracy, oligarchy, tyranny, which,

as I was saying, are not states, but states of discord, in which the

rulers are afraid of their subjects, and therefore do not like them to

become rich, or noble, or valiant. Now our state will escape both

these causes of evil; the society is perfectly free, and has plenty of

leisure, and is not allowed by the laws to be absorbed in the pursuit

of wealth; hence we have an excellent field for a perfect education, and

for the introduction of martial pastimes. Let us proceed to describe the

character of these pastimes. All gymnastic exercises in our state

must have a military character; no other will be allowed. Activity and

quickness are most useful in war; and yet these qualities do not attain

their greatest efficiency unless the competitors are armed. The runner

should enter the lists in armour, and in the races which our heralds

proclaim, no prize is to be given except to armed warriors. Let there be

six courses--first, the stadium; secondly, the diaulos or double course;

thirdly, the horse course; fourthly, the long course; fifthly, races (1)

between heavy-armed soldiers who shall pass over sixty stadia and

finish at a temple of Ares, and (2) between still more heavily-armed

competitors who run over smoother ground; sixthly, a race for archers,

who shall run over hill and dale a distance of a hundred stadia, and

their goal shall be a temple of Apollo and Artemis. There shall be three

contests of each kind--one for boys, another for youths, a third for

men; the course for the boys we will fix at half, and that for the

youths at two-thirds of the entire length. Women shall join in the

races: young girls who are not grown up shall run naked; but after

thirteen they shall be suitably dressed; from thirteen to eighteen they

shall be obliged to share in these contests, and from eighteen to twenty

they may if they please and if they are unmarried. As to trials of

strength, single combats in armour, or battles between two and two, or

of any number up to ten, shall take the place of wrestling and the heavy

exercises. And there must be umpires, as there are now in wrestling,

to determine what is a fair hit and who is conqueror. Instead of the

pancratium, let there be contests in which the combatants carry bows

and wear light shields and hurl javelins and throw stones. The next

provision of the law will relate to horses, which, as we are in Crete,

need be rarely used by us, and chariots never; our horse-racing prizes

will only be given to single horses, whether colts, half-grown, or

full-grown. Their riders are to wear armour, and there shall be a

competition between mounted archers. Women, if they have a mind, may

join in the exercises of men.

But enough of gymnastics, and nearly enough of music. All musical

contests will take place at festivals, whether every third or every

fifth year, which are to be fixed by the guardians of the law, the

judges of the games, and the director of education, who for this

purpose shall become legislators and arrange times and conditions. The

principles on which such contests are to be ordered have been often

repeated by the first legislator; no more need be said of them, nor

are the details of them important. But there is another subject of the

highest importance, which, if possible, should be determined by the

laws, not of man, but of God; or, if a direct revelation is impossible,

there is need of some bold man who, alone against the world, will

speak plainly of the corruption of human nature, and go to war with the

passions of mankind. 'We do not understand you.' I will try to make my

meaning plainer. In speaking of education, I seemed to see young men and

maidens in friendly intercourse with one another; and there arose in my

mind a natural fear about a state, in which the young of either sex are

well nurtured, and have little to do, and occupy themselves chiefly with

festivals and dances. How can they be saved from those passions which

reason forbids them to indulge, and which are the ruin of so many?

The prohibition of wealth, and the influence of education, and the

all-seeing eye of the ruler, will alike help to promote temperance; but

they will not wholly extirpate the unnatural loves which have been the

destruction of states; and against this evil what remedy can be devised?

Lacedaemon and Crete give no assistance here; on the subject of love, as

I may whisper in your ear, they are against us. Suppose a person were to

urge that you ought to restore the natural use which existed before the

days of Laius; he would be quite right, but he would not be supported by

public opinion in either of your states. Or try the matter by the test

which we apply to all laws,--who will say that the permission of such

things tends to virtue? Will he who is seduced learn the habit of

courage; or will the seducer acquire temperance? And will any legislator

be found to make such actions legal?

But to judge of this matter truly, we must understand the nature of love

and friendship, which may take very different forms. For we speak of

friendship, first, when there is some similarity or equality of virtue;

secondly, when there is some want; and either of these, when in excess,

is termed love. The first kind is gentle and sociable; the second is

fierce and unmanageable; and there is also a third kind, which is akin

to both, and is under the dominion of opposite principles. The one is of

the body, and has no regard for the character of the beloved; but he who

is under the influence of the other disregards the body, and is a looker

rather than a lover, and desires only with his soul to be knit to the

soul of his friend; while the intermediate sort is both of the body

and of the soul. Here are three kinds of love: ought the legislator to

prohibit all of them equally, or to allow the virtuous love to remain?

'The latter, clearly.' I expected to gain your approval; but I will

reserve the task of convincing our friend Cleinias for another occasion.

'Very good.' To make right laws on this subject is in one point of view

easy, and in another most difficult; for we know that in some cases most

men abstain willingly from intercourse with the fair. The unwritten

law which prohibits members of the same family from such intercourse is

strictly obeyed, and no thought of anything else ever enters into the

minds of men in general. A little word puts out the fire of their lusts.

'What is it?' The declaration that such things are hateful to the Gods,

and most abominable and unholy. The reason is that everywhere, in jest

and earnest alike, this is the doctrine which is repeated to all

from their earliest youth. They see on the stage that an Oedipus or a

Thyestes or a Macareus, when undeceived, are ready to kill themselves.

There is an undoubted power in public opinion when no breath is heard

adverse to the law; and the legislator who would enslave these enslaving

passions must consecrate such a public opinion all through the city.

'Good: but how can you create it?' A fair objection; but I promised to

try and find some means of restraining loves to their natural objects. A

law which would extirpate unnatural love as effectually as incest is

at present extirpated, would be the source of innumerable blessings,

because it would be in accordance with nature, and would get rid of

excess in eating and drinking and of adulteries and frenzies, making men

love their wives, and having other excellent effects. I can imagine that

some lusty youth overhears what we are saying, and roars out in abusive

terms that we are legislating for impossibilities. And so a person

might have said of the syssitia, or common meals; but this is refuted by

facts, although even now they are not extended to women. 'True.' There

is no impossibility or super-humanity in my proposed law, as I shall

endeavour to prove. 'Do so.' Will not a man find abstinence more easy

when his body is sound than when he is in ill-condition? 'Yes.' Have we

not heard of Iccus of Tarentum and other wrestlers who abstained wholly

for a time? Yet they were infinitely worse educated than our citizens,

and far more lusty in their bodies. And shall they have abstained for

the sake of an athletic contest, and our citizens be incapable of a

similar endurance for the sake of a much nobler victory,--the victory

over pleasure, which is true happiness? Will not the fear of impiety

enable them to conquer that which many who were inferior to them have

conquered? 'I dare say.' And therefore the law must plainly declare

that our citizens should not fall below the other animals, who live all

together in flocks, and yet remain pure and chaste until the time of

procreation comes, when they pair, and are ever after faithful to their

compact. But if the corruption of public opinion is too great to allow

our first law to be carried out, then our guardians of the law must turn

legislators, and try their hand at a second law. They must minimize the

appetites, diverting the vigour of youth into other channels, allowing

the practice of love in secret, but making detection shameful. Three

higher principles may be brought to bear on all these corrupt natures.

'What are they?' Religion, honour, and the love of the higher qualities

of the soul. Perhaps this is a dream only, yet it is the best of dreams;

and if not the whole, still, by the grace of God, a part of what we

desire may be realized. Either men may learn to abstain wholly from any

loves, natural or unnatural, except of their wedded wives; or, at

least, they may give up unnatural loves; or, if detected, they shall

be punished with loss of citizenship, as aliens from the state in their

morals. 'I entirely agree with you,' said Megillus, 'but Cleinias must

speak for himself.' 'I will give my opinion by-and-by.'

We were speaking of the syssitia, which will be a natural institution

in a Cretan colony. Whether they shall be established after the model

of Crete or Lacedaemon, or shall be different from either, is an

unimportant question which may be determined without difficulty. We

may, therefore, proceed to speak of the mode of life among our citizens,

which will be far less complex than in other cities; a state which is

inland and not maritime requires only half the number of laws. There is

no trouble about trade and commerce, and a thousand other things. The

legislator has only to regulate the affairs of husbandmen and shepherds,

which will be easily arranged, now that the principal questions, such as

marriage, education, and government, have been settled.

Let us begin with husbandry: First, let there be a law of Zeus against

removing a neighbour's landmark, whether he be a citizen or stranger.

For this is 'to move the immoveable'; and Zeus, the God of kindred,

witnesses to the wrongs of citizens, and Zeus, the God of strangers,

to the wrongs of strangers. The offence of removing a boundary shall

receive two punishments--the first will be inflicted by the God himself;

the second by the judges. In the next place, the differences between

neighbours about encroachments must be guarded against. He who

encroaches shall pay twofold the amount of the injury; of all such

matters the wardens of the country shall be the judges, in lesser cases

the officers, and in greater the whole number of them belonging to

any one division. Any injury done by cattle, the decoying of bees, the

careless firing of woods, the planting unduly near a neighbour's

ground, shall all be visited with proper damages. Such details have been

determined by previous legislators, and need not now be mixed up with

greater matters. Husbandmen have had of old excellent rules about

streams and waters; and we need not 'divert their course.' Anybody

may take water from a common stream, if he does not thereby cut off a

private spring; he may lead the water in any direction, except through

a house or temple, but he must do no harm beyond the channel. If land

is without water the occupier shall dig down to the clay, and if at this

depth he find no water, he shall have a right of getting water from his

neighbours for his household; and if their supply is limited, he

shall receive from them a measure of water fixed by the wardens of the

country. If there be heavy rains, the dweller on the higher ground must

not recklessly suffer the water to flow down upon a neighbour beneath

him, nor must he who lives upon lower ground or dwells in an adjoining

house refuse an outlet. If the two parties cannot agree, they shall go

before the wardens of the city or country, and if a man refuse to abide

by their decision, he shall pay double the damage which he has caused.

In autumn God gives us two boons--one the joy of Dionysus not to be laid

up--the other to be laid up. About the fruits of autumn let the law be

as follows: He who gathers the storing fruits of autumn, whether

grapes or figs, before the time of the vintage, which is the rising of

Arcturus, shall pay fifty drachmas as a fine to Dionysus, if he gathers

on his own ground; if on his neighbour's ground, a mina, and two-thirds

of a mina if on that of any one else. The grapes or figs not used for

storing a man may gather when he pleases on his own ground, but on that

of others he must pay the penalty of removing what he has not laid down.

If he be a slave who has gathered, he shall receive a stroke for every

grape or fig. A metic must purchase the choice fruit; but a stranger may

pluck for himself and his attendant. This right of hospitality, however,

does not extend to storing grapes. A slave who eats of the storing

grapes or figs shall be beaten, and the freeman be dismissed with a

warning. Pears, apples, pomegranates, may be taken secretly, but he who

is detected in the act of taking them shall be lightly beaten off, if

he be not more than thirty years of age. The stranger and the elder may

partake of them, but not carry any away; the latter, if he does not obey

the law, shall fail in the competition of virtue, if anybody brings up

his offence against him.

Water is also in need of protection, being the greatest element of

nutrition, and, unlike the other elements--soil, air, and sun--which

conspire in the growth of plants, easily polluted. And therefore he

who spoils another's water, whether in springs or reservoirs, either by

trenching, or theft, or by means of poisonous substances, shall pay the

damage and purify the stream. At the getting-in of the harvest everybody

shall have a right of way over his neighbour's ground, provided he is

careful to do no damage beyond the trespass, or if he himself will gain

three times as much as his neighbour loses. Of all this the magistrates

are to take cognizance, and they are to assess the damage where the

injury does not exceed three minae; cases of greater damage can be

tried only in the public courts. A charge against a magistrate is to

be referred to the public courts, and any one who is found guilty of

deciding corruptly shall pay twofold to the aggrieved person. Matters

of detail relating to punishments and modes of procedure, and summonses,

and witnesses to summonses, do not require the mature wisdom of the aged

legislator; the younger generation may determine them according to their

experience; but when once determined, they shall remain unaltered.

The following are to be the regulations respecting handicrafts:--No

citizen, or servant of a citizen, is to practise them. For the citizen

has already an art and mystery, which is the care of the state; and no

man can practise two arts, or practise one and superintend another. No

smith should be a carpenter, and no carpenter, having many slaves who

are smiths, should look after them himself; but let each man practise

one art which shall be his means of livelihood. The wardens of the city

should see to this, punishing the citizen who offends with temporary

deprival of his rights--the foreigner shall be imprisoned, fined,

exiled. Any disputes about contracts shall be determined by the wardens

of the city up to fifty drachmae--above that sum by the public courts.

No customs are to be exacted either on imports or exports. Nothing

unnecessary is to be imported from abroad, whether for the service of

the Gods or for the use of man--neither purple, nor other dyes, nor

frankincense,--and nothing needed in the country is to be exported.

These things are to be decided on by the twelve guardians of the law who

are next in seniority to the five elders. Arms and the materials of war

are to be imported and exported only with the consent of the generals,

and then only by the state. There is to be no retail trade either in

these or any other articles. For the distribution of the produce of the

country, the Cretan laws afford a rule which may be usefully followed.

All shall be required to distribute corn, grain, animals, and other

valuable produce, into twelve portions. Each of these shall be

subdivided into three parts--one for freemen, another for servants,

and the third shall be sold for the supply of artisans, strangers, and

metics. These portions must be equal whether the produce be much or

little; and the master of a household may distribute the two portions

among his family and his slaves as he pleases--the remainder is to be

measured out to the animals.

Next as to the houses in the country--there shall be twelve villages,

one in the centre of each of the twelve portions; and in every village

there shall be temples and an agora--also shrines for heroes or for

any old Magnesian deities who linger about the place. In every division

there shall be temples of Hestia, Zeus, and Athene, as well as of the

local deity, surrounded by buildings on eminences, which will be the

guard-houses of the rural police. The dwellings of the artisans will be

thus arranged:--The artisans shall be formed into thirteen guilds, one

of which will be divided into twelve parts and settled in the city; of

the rest there shall be one in each division of the country. And the

magistrates will fix them on the spots where they will cause the least

inconvenience and be most serviceable in supplying the wants of the

husbandmen.

The care of the agora will fall to the wardens of the agora. Their

first duty will be the regulation of the temples which surround the

market-place; and their second to see that the markets are orderly and

that fair dealing is observed. They will also take care that the sales

which the citizens are required to make to strangers are duly executed.

The law shall be, that on the first day of each month the auctioneers to

whom the sale is entrusted shall offer grain; and at this sale a twelfth

part of the whole shall be exposed, and the foreigner shall supply his

wants for a month. On the tenth, there shall be a sale of liquids, and

on the twenty-third of animals, skins, woven or woollen stuffs, and

other things which husbandmen have to sell and foreigners want to buy.

None of these commodities, any more than barley or flour, or any other

food, may be retailed by a citizen to a citizen; but foreigners may

sell them to one another in the foreigners' market. There must also be

butchers who will sell parts of animals to foreigners and craftsmen,

and their servants; and foreigners may buy firewood wholesale of the

commissioners of woods, and may sell retail to foreigners. All other

goods must be sold in the market, at some place indicated by the

magistrates, and shall be paid for on the spot. He who gives credit, and

is cheated, will have no redress. In buying or selling, any excess or

diminution of what the law allows shall be registered. The same rule

is to be observed about the property of metics. Anybody who practises a

handicraft may come and remain twenty years from the day on which he is

enrolled; at the expiration of this time he shall take what he has and

depart. The only condition which is to be imposed upon him as the tax

of his sojourn is good conduct; and he is not to pay any tax for being

allowed to buy or sell. But if he wants to extend the time of his

sojourn, and has done any service to the state, and he can persuade the

council and assembly to grant his request, he may remain. The children

of metics may also be metics; and the period of twenty years, during

which they are permitted to sojourn, is to count, in their case, from

their fifteenth year.

No mention occurs in the Laws of the doctrine of Ideas. The will of God,

the authority of the legislator, and the dignity of the soul, have

taken their place in the mind of Plato. If we ask what is that truth or

principle which, towards the end of his life, seems to have absorbed

him most, like the idea of good in the Republic, or of beauty in the

Symposium, or of the unity of virtue in the Protagoras, we should

answer--The priority of the soul to the body: his later system mainly

hangs upon this. In the Laws, as in the Sophist and Statesman, we pass

out of the region of metaphysical or transcendental ideas into that of

psychology.

The opening of the fifth book, though abrupt and unconnected in style,

is one of the most elevated passages in Plato. The religious feeling

which he seeks to diffuse over the commonest actions of life, the

blessedness of living in the truth, the great mistake of a man living

for himself, the pity as well as anger which should be felt at evil,

the kindness due to the suppliant and the stranger, have the temper of

Christian philosophy. The remark that elder men, if they want to educate

others, should begin by educating themselves; the necessity of creating

a spirit of obedience in the citizens; the desirableness of limiting

property; the importance of parochial districts, each to be placed under

the protection of some God or demigod, have almost the tone of a modern

writer. In many of his views of politics, Plato seems to us, like some

politicians of our own time, to be half socialist, half conservative.

In the Laws, we remark a change in the place assigned by him to pleasure

and pain. There are two ways in which even the ideal systems of morals

may regard them: either like the Stoics, and other ascetics, we may say

that pleasure must be eradicated; or if this seems unreal to us, we may

affirm that virtue is the true pleasure; and then, as Aristotle says,

'to be brought up to take pleasure in what we ought, exercises a great

and paramount influence on human life' (Arist. Eth. Nic.). Or as Plato

says in the Laws, 'A man will recognize the noblest life as having the

greatest pleasure and the least pain, if he have a true taste.' If we

admit that pleasures differ in kind, the opposition between these two

modes of speaking is rather verbal than real; and in the greater part of

the writings of Plato they alternate with each other. In the Republic,

the mere suggestion that pleasure may be the chief good, is received

by Socrates with a cry of abhorrence; but in the Philebus, innocent

pleasures vindicate their right to a place in the scale of goods. In the

Protagoras, speaking in the person of Socrates rather than in his own,

Plato admits the calculation of pleasure to be the true basis of ethics,

while in the Phaedo he indignantly denies that the exchange of one

pleasure for another is the exchange of virtue. So wide of the mark

are they who would attribute to Plato entire consistency in thoughts or

words.

He acknowledges that the second state is inferior to the first--in this,

at any rate, he is consistent; and he still casts longing eyes upon the

ideal. Several features of the first are retained in the second: the

education of men and women is to be as far as possible the same; they

are to have common meals, though separate, the men by themselves, the

women with their children; and they are both to serve in the army; the

citizens, if not actually communists, are in spirit communistic;

they are to be lovers of equality; only a certain amount of wealth is

permitted to them, and their burdens and also their privileges are to

be proportioned to this. The constitution in the Laws is a timocracy

of wealth, modified by an aristocracy of merit. Yet the political

philosopher will observe that the first of these two principles is

fixed and permanent, while the latter is uncertain and dependent on the

opinion of the multitude. Wealth, after all, plays a great part in

the Second Republic of Plato. Like other politicians, he deems that a

property qualification will contribute stability to the state. The four

classes are derived from the constitution of Athens, just as the form

of the city, which is clustered around a citadel set on a hill, is

suggested by the Acropolis at Athens. Plato, writing under Pythagorean

influences, seems really to have supposed that the well-being of the

city depended almost as much on the number 5040 as on justice and

moderation. But he is not prevented by Pythagoreanism from observing the

effects which climate and soil exercise on the characters of nations.

He was doubtful in the Republic whether the ideal or communistic state

could be realized, but was at the same time prepared to maintain that

whether it existed or not made no difference to the philosopher, who

will in any case regulate his life by it (Republic). He has now lost

faith in the practicability of his scheme--he is speaking to 'men, and

not to Gods or sons of Gods' (Laws). Yet he still maintains it to be the

true pattern of the state, which we must approach as nearly as possible:

as Aristotle says, 'After having created a more general form of state,

he gradually brings it round to the other' (Pol.). He does not observe,

either here or in the Republic, that in such a commonwealth there would

be little room for the development of individual character. In several

respects the second state is an improvement on the first, especially in

being based more distinctly on the dignity of the soul. The standard

of truth, justice, temperance, is as high as in the Republic;--in one

respect higher, for temperance is now regarded, not as a virtue, but as

the condition of all virtue. It is finally acknowledged that the virtues

are all one and connected, and that if they are separated, courage is

the lowest of them. The treatment of moral questions is less speculative

but more human. The idea of good has disappeared; the excellences of

individuals--of him who is faithful in a civil broil, of the examiner

who is incorruptible, are the patterns to which the lives of the

citizens are to conform. Plato is never weary of speaking of the honour

of the soul, which can only be honoured truly by being improved. To make

the soul as good as possible, and to prepare her for communion with the

Gods in another world by communion with divine virtue in this, is the

end of life. If the Republic is far superior to the Laws in form and

style, and perhaps in reach of thought, the Laws leave on the mind

of the modern reader much more strongly the impression of a struggle

against evil, and an enthusiasm for human improvement. When Plato says

that he must carry out that part of his ideal which is practicable,

he does not appear to have reflected that part of an ideal cannot be

detached from the whole.

The great defect of both his constitutions is the fixedness which he

seeks to impress upon them. He had seen the Athenian empire, almost

within the limits of his own life, wax and wane, but he never seems

to have asked himself what would happen if, a century from the time at

which he was writing, the Greek character should have as much changed as

in the century which had preceded. He fails to perceive that the greater

part of the political life of a nation is not that which is given them

by their legislators, but that which they give themselves. He has never

reflected that without progress there cannot be order, and that mere

order can only be preserved by an unnatural and despotic repression. The

possibility of a great nation or of an universal empire arising never

occurred to him. He sees the enfeebled and distracted state of the

Hellenic world in his own later life, and thinks that the remedy is to

make the laws unchangeable. The same want of insight is apparent in his

judgments about art. He would like to have the forms of sculpture and of

music fixed as in Egypt. He does not consider that this would be fatal

to the true principles of art, which, as Socrates had himself taught,

was to give life (Xen. Mem.). We wonder how, familiar as he was with

the statues of Pheidias, he could have endured the lifeless and

half-monstrous works of Egyptian sculpture. The 'chants of Isis' (Laws),

we might think, would have been barbarous in an Athenian ear. But

although he is aware that there are some things which are not so well

among 'the children of the Nile,' he is deeply struck with the stability

of Egyptian institutions. Both in politics and in art Plato seems to

have seen no way of bringing order out of disorder, except by taking a

step backwards. Antiquity, compared with the world in which he lived,

had a sacredness and authority for him: the men of a former age were

supposed by him to have had a sense of reverence which was wanting among

his contemporaries. He could imagine the early stages of civilization;

he never thought of what the future might bring forth. His experience

is confined to two or three centuries, to a few Greek states, and to an

uncertain report of Egypt and the East. There are many ways in which

the limitations of their knowledge affected the genius of the Greeks.

In criticism they were like children, having an acute vision of things

which were near to them, blind to possibilities which were in the

distance.

The colony is to receive from the mother-country her original

constitution, and some of the first guardians of the law. The guardians

of the law are to be ministers of justice, and the president of

education is to take precedence of them all. They are to keep the

registers of property, to make regulations for trade, and they are to

be superannuated at seventy years of age. Several questions of modern

politics, such as the limitation of property, the enforcement of

education, the relations of classes, are anticipated by Plato. He hopes

that in his state will be found neither poverty nor riches; every

man having the necessaries of life, he need not go fortune-hunting in

marriage. Almost in the spirit of the Gospel he would say, 'How hardly

can a rich man dwell in a perfect state.' For he cannot be a good man

who is always gaining too much and spending too little (Laws; compare

Arist. Eth. Nic.). Plato, though he admits wealth as a political

element, would deny that material prosperity can be the foundation of

a really great community. A man's soul, as he often says, is more to be

esteemed than his body; and his body than external goods. He repeats the

complaint which has been made in all ages, that the love of money is the

corruption of states. He has a sympathy with thieves and burglars, 'many

of whom are men of ability and greatly to be pitied, because their souls

are hungering and thirsting all their lives long;' but he has

little sympathy with shopkeepers or retailers, although he makes the

reflection, which sometimes occurs to ourselves, that such occupations,

if they were carried on honestly by the best men and women, would be

delightful and honourable. For traders and artisans a moderate gain was,

in his opinion, best. He has never, like modern writers, idealized

the wealth of nations, any more than he has worked out the problems of

political economy, which among the ancients had not yet grown into a

science. The isolation of Greek states, their constant wars, the want of

a free industrial population, and of the modern methods and instruments

of 'credit,' prevented any great extension of commerce among them; and

so hindered them from forming a theory of the laws which regulate the

accumulation and distribution of wealth.

The constitution of the army is aristocratic and also democratic;

official appointment is combined with popular election. The two

principles are carried out as follows: The guardians of the law nominate

generals out of whom three are chosen by those who are or have been

of the age for military service; and the generals elected have the

nomination of certain of the inferior officers. But if either in the

case of generals or of the inferior officers any one is ready to swear

that he knows of a better man than those nominated, he may put the

claims of his candidate to the vote of the whole army, or of the

division of the service which he will, if elected, command. There is

a general assembly, but its functions, except at elections, are hardly

noticed. In the election of the Boule, Plato again attempts to mix

aristocracy and democracy. This is effected, first as in the Servian

constitution, by balancing wealth and numbers; for it cannot be supposed

that those who possessed a higher qualification were equal in number

with those who had a lower, and yet they have an equal number of

representatives. In the second place, all classes are compelled to vote

in the election of senators from the first and second class; but the

fourth class is not compelled to elect from the third, nor the third

and fourth from the fourth. Thirdly, out of the 180 persons who are thus

chosen from each of the four classes, 720 in all, 360 are to be taken by

lot; these form the council for the year.

These political adjustments of Plato's will be criticised by the

practical statesman as being for the most part fanciful and ineffectual.

He will observe, first of all, that the only real check on democracy

is the division into classes. The second of the three proposals, though

ingenious, and receiving some light from the apathy to politics which

is often shown by the higher classes in a democracy, would have little

power in times of excitement and peril, when the precaution was most

needed. At such political crises, all the lower classes would vote

equally with the higher. The subtraction of half the persons chosen

at the first election by the chances of the lot would not raise the

character of the senators, and is open to the objection of uncertainty,

which necessarily attends this and similar schemes of double

representative government. Nor can the voters be expected to retain the

continuous political interest required for carrying out such a proposal

as Plato's. Who could select 180 persons of each class, fitted to be

senators? And whoever were chosen by the voter in the first instance,

his wishes might be neutralized by the action of the lot. Yet the scheme

of Plato is not really so extravagant as the actual constitution of

Athens, in which all the senators appear to have been elected by

lot (apo kuamou bouleutai), at least, after the revolution made by

Cleisthenes; for the constitution of the senate which was established

by Solon probably had some aristocratic features, though their precise

nature is unknown to us. The ancients knew that election by lot was

the most democratic of all modes of appointment, seeming to say in the

objectionable sense, that 'one man is as good as another.' Plato, who is

desirous of mingling different elements, makes a partial use of the lot,

which he applies to candidates already elected by vote. He attempts also

to devise a system of checks and balances such as he supposes to have

been intended by the ancient legislators. We are disposed to say to

him, as he himself says in a remarkable passage, that 'no man ever

legislates, but accidents of all sorts, which legislate for us in all

sorts of ways. The violence of war and the hard necessity of poverty are

constantly overturning governments and changing laws.' And yet, as he

adds, the true legislator is still required: he must co-operate with

circumstances. Many things which are ascribed to human foresight are

the result of chance. Ancient, and in a less degree modern political

constitutions, are never consistent with themselves, because they are

never framed on a single design, but are added to from time to time as

new elements arise and gain the preponderance in the state. We often

attribute to the wisdom of our ancestors great political effects which

have sprung unforeseen from the accident of the situation. Power, not

wisdom, is most commonly the source of political revolutions. And

the result, as in the Roman Republic, of the co-existence of opposite

elements in the same state is, not a balance of power or an equable

progress of liberal principles, but a conflict of forces, of which one

or other may happen to be in the ascendant. In Greek history, as well as

in Plato's conception of it, this 'progression by antagonism' involves

reaction: the aristocracy expands into democracy and returns again to

tyranny.

The constitution of the Laws may be said to consist, besides the

magistrates, mainly of three elements,--an administrative Council,

the judiciary, and the Nocturnal Council, which is an intellectual

aristocracy, composed of priests and the ten eldest guardians of the law

and some younger co-opted members. To this latter chiefly are assigned

the functions of legislation, but to be exercised with a sparing hand.

The powers of the ordinary council are administrative rather than

legislative. The whole number of 360, as in the Athenian constitution,

is distributed among the months of the year according to the number of

the tribes. Not more than one-twelfth is to be in office at once,

so that the government would be made up of twelve administrations

succeeding one another in the course of the year. They are to exercise

a general superintendence, and, like the Athenian counsellors, are to

preside in monthly divisions over all assemblies. Of the ecclesia

over which they presided little is said, and that little relates to

comparatively trifling duties. Nothing is less present to the mind of

Plato than a House of Commons, carrying on year by year the work of

legislation. For he supposes the laws to be already provided. As little

would he approve of a body like the Roman Senate. The people and the

aristocracy alike are to be represented, not by assemblies, but by

officers elected for one or two years, except the guardians of the law,

who are elected for twenty years.

The evils of this system are obvious. If in any state, as Plato says

in the Statesman, it is easier to find fifty good draught-players than

fifty good rulers, the greater part of the 360 who compose the council

must be unfitted to rule. The unfitness would be increased by the short

period during which they held office. There would be no traditions

of government among them, as in a Greek or Italian oligarchy, and no

individual would be responsible for any of their acts. Everything seems

to have been sacrificed to a false notion of equality, according to

which all have a turn of ruling and being ruled. In the constitution

of the Magnesian state Plato has not emancipated himself from the

limitations of ancient politics. His government may be described as

a democracy of magistrates elected by the people. He never troubles

himself about the political consistency of his scheme. He does indeed

say that the greater part of the good of this world arises, not from

equality, but from proportion, which he calls the judgment of Zeus

(compare Aristotle's Distributive Justice), but he hardly makes any

attempt to carry out the principle in practice. There is no attempt

to proportion representation to merit; nor is there any body in his

commonwealth which represents the life either of a class or of the whole

state. The manner of appointing magistrates is taken chiefly from the

old democratic constitution of Athens, of which it retains some of the

worst features, such as the use of the lot, while by doing away with

the political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the

machine is taken out. The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number,

of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the Nocturnal Council at

the end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military

class, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore

have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character. Nothing is said

of the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to

be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the

ordinary council is related to it.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices. To some the

appointment is made by vote, to others by lot. In the elections to the

priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner

'demus and not demus.' The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic,

cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both--the

oracle of Delphi. From this the laws about all divine things are to be

derived. The final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir

for a vacant lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be

determined by it. Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts

to revive religion in states. For, as he says in the Laws, 'To institute

religious rites is the work of a great intelligence.'

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law

courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian

dicasteries. Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask

questions:--this is not possible if they are numerous; he would,

therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones. He is nevertheless

aware that both in public and private suits there must be a

popular element. He insists that the whole people must share in the

administration of justice--in public causes they are to take the first

step, and the final decision is to remain with them. In private suits

they are also to retain a share; 'for the citizen who has no part in the

administration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the

state. For this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe

(i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen

by lot.' Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial

sketch. Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various accounts

of them. It is however clear that although some officials, like the

guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have

power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in

the main popular. The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of

law and fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled Plato to

combine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or

to any other ancient political philosopher. Though desirous of limiting

the number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons

specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body

of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.

He would have men in the first place seek justice from their friends and

neighbours, because, as he truly remarks, they know best the questions

at issue; these are called in another passage arbiters rather than

judges. But if they cannot settle the matter, it is to be referred to

the courts of the tribes, and a higher penalty is to be paid by the

party who is unsuccessful in the suit. There is a further appeal allowed

to the select judges, with a further increase of penalty. The select

judges are to be appointed by the magistrates, who are to choose one

from every magistracy. They are to be elected annually, and therefore

probably for a year only, and are liable to be called to account before

the guardians of the law. In cases of which death is the penalty, the

trial takes place before a special court, which is composed of the

guardians of the law and of the judges of appeal.

In treating of the subject in Book ix, he proposes to leave for the most

part the methods of procedure to a younger generation of legislators;

the procedure in capital causes he determines himself. He insists that

the vote of the judges shall be given openly, and before they vote they

are to hear speeches from the plaintiff and defendant. They are then

to take evidence in support of what has been said, and to examine

witnesses. The eldest judge is to ask his questions first, and then

the second, and then the third. The interrogatories are to continue for

three days, and the evidence is to be written down. Apparently he does

not expect the judges to be professional lawyers, any more than he

expects the members of the council to be trained statesmen.

In forming marriage connexions, Plato supposes that the public interest

will prevail over private inclination. There was nothing in this very

shocking to the notions of Greeks, among whom the feeling of love

towards the other sex was almost deprived of sentiment or romance.

Married life is to be regulated solely with a view to the good of the

state. The newly-married couple are not allowed to absent themselves

from their respective syssitia, even during their honeymoon; they are

to give their whole mind to the procreation of children; their duties to

one another at a later period of life are not a matter about which

the state is equally solicitous. Divorces are readily allowed for

incompatibility of temper. As in the Republic, physical considerations

seem almost to exclude moral and social ones. To modern feelings there

is a degree of coarseness in Plato's treatment of the subject. Yet he

also makes some shrewd remarks on marriage, as for example, that a man

who does not marry for money will not be the humble servant of his wife.

And he shows a true conception of the nature of the family, when he

requires that the newly-married couple 'should leave their father and

mother,' and have a separate home. He also provides against extravagance

in marriage festivals, which in some states of society, for instance in

the case of the Hindoos, has been a social evil of the first magnitude.

In treating of property, Plato takes occasion to speak of property in

slaves. They are to be treated with perfect justice; but, for their own

sake, to be kept at a distance. The motive is not so much humanity to

the slave, of which there are hardly any traces (although Plato allows

that many in the hour of peril have found a slave more attached than

members of their own family), but the self-respect which the freeman and

citizen owes to himself (compare Republic). If they commit crimes, they

are doubly punished; if they inform against illegal practices of their

masters, they are to receive a protection, which would probably be

ineffectual, from the guardians of the law; in rare cases they are to be

set free. Plato still breathes the spirit of the old Hellenic world, in

which slavery was a necessity, because leisure must be provided for the

citizen.

The education propounded in the Laws differs in several points from that

of the Republic. Plato seems to have reflected as deeply and earnestly

on the importance of infancy as Rousseau, or Jean Paul (compare the

saying of the latter--'Not the moment of death, but the moment of

birth, is probably the more important'). He would fix the amusements of

children in the hope of fixing their characters in after-life. In the

spirit of the statesman who said, 'Let me make the ballads of a

country, and I care not who make their laws,' Plato would say, 'Let the

amusements of children be unchanged, and they will not want to change

the laws. The 'Goddess Harmonia' plays a great part in Plato's ideas

of education. The natural restless force of life in children, 'who do

nothing but roar until they are three years old,' is gradually to be

reduced to law and order. As in the Republic, he fixes certain forms

in which songs are to be composed: (1) they are to be strains of

cheerfulness and good omen; (2) they are to be hymns or prayers

addressed to the Gods; (3) they are to sing only of the lawful and good.

The poets are again expelled or rather ironically invited to depart; and

those who remain are required to submit their poems to the censorship of

the magistrates. Youth are no longer compelled to commit to memory many

thousand lyric and tragic Greek verses; yet, perhaps, a worse fate is

in store for them. Plato has no belief in 'liberty of prophesying'; and

having guarded against the dangers of lyric poetry, he remembers that

there is an equal danger in other writings. He cannot leave his old

enemies, the Sophists, in possession of the field; and therefore he

proposes that youth shall learn by heart, instead of the compositions of

poets or prose writers, his own inspired work on laws. These, and music

and mathematics, are the chief parts of his education.

Mathematics are to be cultivated, not as in the Republic with a view to

the science of the idea of good,--though the higher use of them is not

altogether excluded,--but rather with a religious and political aim.

They are a sacred study which teaches men how to distribute the portions

of a state, and which is to be pursued in order that they may learn not

to blaspheme about astronomy. Against three mathematical errors Plato

is in profound earnest. First, the error of supposing that the three

dimensions of length, breadth, and height, are really commensurable

with one another. The difficulty which he feels is analogous to the

difficulty which he formerly felt about the connexion of ideas, and is

equally characteristic of ancient philosophy: he fixes his mind on the

point of difference, and cannot at the same time take in the similarity.

Secondly, he is puzzled about the nature of fractions: in the Republic,

he is disposed to deny the possibility of their existence. Thirdly, his

optimism leads him to insist (unlike the Spanish king who thought that

he could have improved on the mechanism of the heavens) on the perfect

or circular movement of the heavenly bodies. He appears to mean, that

instead of regarding the stars as overtaking or being overtaken by one

another, or as planets wandering in many paths, a more comprehensive

survey of the heavens would enable us to infer that they all alike moved

in a circle around a centre (compare Timaeus; Republic). He probably

suspected, though unacquainted with the true cause, that the appearance

of the heavens did not agree with the reality: at any rate, his notions

of what was right or fitting easily overpowered the results of actual

observation. To the early astronomers, who lived at the revival of

science, as to Plato, there was nothing absurd in a priori astronomy,

and they would probably have made fewer real discoveries of they had

followed any other track. (Compare Introduction to the Republic.)

The science of dialectic is nowhere mentioned by name in the Laws, nor

is anything said of the education of after-life. The child is to begin

to learn at ten years of age: he is to be taught reading and writing for

three years, from ten to thirteen, and no longer; and for three years

more, from thirteen to sixteen, he is to be instructed in music. The

great fault which Plato finds in the contemporary education is the

almost total ignorance of arithmetic and astronomy, in which the Greeks

would do well to take a lesson from the Egyptians (compare Republic).

Dancing and wrestling are to have a military character, and women as

well as men are to be taught the use of arms. The military spirit which

Plato has vainly endeavoured to expel in the first two books returns

again in the seventh and eighth. He has evidently a sympathy with the

soldier, as well as with the poet, and he is no mean master of the

art, or at least of the theory, of war (compare Laws; Republic), though

inclining rather to the Spartan than to the Athenian practice of

it (Laws). Of a supreme or master science which was to be the

'coping-stone' of the rest, few traces appear in the Laws. He seems to

have lost faith in it, or perhaps to have realized that the time for

such a science had not yet come, and that he was unable to fill up

the outline which he had sketched. There is no requirement that the

guardians of the law shall be philosophers, although they are to know

the unity of virtue, and the connexion of the sciences. Nor are we

told that the leisure of the citizens, when they are grown up, is to

be devoted to any intellectual employment. In this respect we note a

falling off from the Republic, but also there is 'the returning to it'

of which Aristotle speaks in the Politics. The public and family duties

of the citizens are to be their main business, and these would, no

doubt, take up a great deal more time than in the modern world we are

willing to allow to either of them. Plato no longer entertains the idea

of any regular training to be pursued under the superintendence of the

state from eighteen to thirty, or from thirty to thirty-five; he has

taken the first step downwards on 'Constitution Hill' (Republic). But

he maintains as earnestly as ever that 'to men living under this second

polity there remains the greatest of all works, the education of the

soul,' and that no bye-work should be allowed to interfere with it.

Night and day are not long enough for the consummation of it.

Few among us are either able or willing to carry education into later

life; five or six years spent at school, three or four at a university,

or in the preparation for a profession, an occasional attendance at a

lecture to which we are invited by friends when we have an hour to spare

from house-keeping or money-making--these comprise, as a matter of fact,

the education even of the educated; and then the lamp is extinguished

'more truly than Heracleitus' sun, never to be lighted again'

(Republic). The description which Plato gives in the Republic of the

state of adult education among his contemporaries may be applied almost

word for word to our own age. He does not however acquiesce in this

widely-spread want of a higher education; he would rather seek to make

every man something of a philosopher before he enters on the duties of

active life. But in the Laws he no longer prescribes any regular course

of study which is to be pursued in mature years. Nor does he remark that

the education of after-life is of another kind, and must consist with

the majority of the world rather in the improvement of character than in

the acquirement of knowledge. It comes from the study of ourselves

and other men: from moderation and experience: from reflection on

circumstances: from the pursuit of high aims: from a right use of the

opportunities of life. It is the preservation of what we have been,

and the addition of something more. The power of abstract study or

continuous thought is very rare, but such a training as this can be

given by every one to himself.

The singular passage in Book vii., in which Plato describes life as a

pastime, like many other passages in the Laws is imperfectly expressed.

Two thoughts seem to be struggling in his mind: first, the reflection,

to which he returns at the end of the passage, that men are playthings

or puppets, and that God only is the serious aim of human endeavours;

this suggests to him the afterthought that, although playthings, they

are the playthings of the Gods, and that this is the best of them. The

cynical, ironical fancy of the moment insensibly passes into a religious

sentiment. In another passage he says that life is a game of which God,

who is the player, shifts the pieces so as to procure the victory of

good on the whole. Or once more: Tragedies are acted on the stage; but

the best and noblest of them is the imitation of the noblest life, which

we affirm to be the life of our whole state. Again, life is a chorus, as

well as a sort of mystery, in which we have the Gods for playmates. Men

imagine that war is their serious pursuit, and they make war that they

may return to their amusements. But neither wars nor amusements are the

true satisfaction of men, which is to be found only in the society of

the Gods, in sacrificing to them and propitiating them. Like a Christian

ascetic, Plato seems to suppose that life should be passed wholly in

the enjoyment of divine things. And after meditating in amazement on the

sadness and unreality of the world, he adds, in a sort of parenthesis,

'Be cheerful, Sirs' (Shakespeare, Tempest.)

In one of the noblest passages of Plato, he speaks of the relation of

the sexes. Natural relations between members of the same family have

been established of old; a 'little word' has put a stop to incestuous

connexions. But unnatural unions of another kind continued to prevail

at Crete and Lacedaemon, and were even justified by the example of the

Gods. They, too, might be banished, if the feeling that they were unholy

and abominable could sink into the minds of men. The legislator is

to cry aloud, and spare not, 'Let not men fall below the level of the

beasts.' Plato does not shrink, like some modern philosophers, from

'carrying on war against the mightiest lusts of mankind;' neither does

he expect to extirpate them, but only to confine them to their natural

use and purpose, by the enactments of law, and by the influence of

public opinion. He will not feed them by an over-luxurious diet, nor

allow the healthier instincts of the soul to be corrupted by music

and poetry. The prohibition of excessive wealth is, as he says, a very

considerable gain in the way of temperance, nor does he allow of those

enthusiastic friendships between older and younger persons which in

his earlier writings appear to be alluded to with a certain degree of

amusement and without reproof (compare Introduction to the Symposium).

Sappho and Anacreon are celebrated by him in the Charmides and the

Phaedrus; but they would have been expelled from the Magnesian state.

Yet he does not suppose that the rule of absolute purity can be enforced

on all mankind. Something must be conceded to the weakness of human

nature. He therefore adopts a 'second legal standard of honourable and

dishonourable, having a second standard of right.' He would abolish

altogether 'the connexion of men with men...As to women, if any man has

to do with any but those who come into his house duly married by sacred

rites, and he offends publicly in the face of all mankind, we shall be

right in enacting that he be deprived of civic honours and privileges.'

But feeling also that it is impossible wholly to control the mightiest

passions of mankind,' Plato, like other legislators, makes a compromise.

The offender must not be found out; decency, if not morality, must

be respected. In this he appears to agree with the practice of all

civilized ages and countries. Much may be truly said by the moralist

on the comparative harm of open and concealed vice. Nor do we deny

that some moral evils are better turned out to the light, because,

like diseases, when exposed, they are more easily cured. And secrecy

introduces mystery which enormously exaggerates their power; a mere

animal want is thus elevated into a sentimental ideal. It may very

well be that a word spoken in season about things which are commonly

concealed may have an excellent effect. But having regard to the

education of youth, to the innocence of children, to the sensibilities

of women, to the decencies of society, Plato and the world in general

are not wrong in insisting that some of the worst vices, if they must

exist, should be kept out of sight; this, though only a second-best

rule, is a support to the weakness of human nature. There are some

things which may be whispered in the closet, but should not be shouted

on the housetop. It may be said of this, as of many other things, that

it is a great part of education to know to whom they are to be spoken

of, and when, and where.

BOOK IX. Punishments of offences and modes of procedure come next in

order. We have a sense of disgrace in making regulations for all the

details of crime in a virtuous and well-ordered state. But seeing

that we are legislating for men and not for Gods, there is no

uncharitableness in apprehending that some one of our citizens may have

a heart, like the seed which has touched the ox's horn, so hard as to be

impenetrable to the law. Let our first enactment be directed against the

robbing of temples. No well-educated citizen will be guilty of such a

crime, but one of their servants, or some stranger, may, and with a view

to him, and at the same time with a remoter eye to the general infirmity

of human nature, I will lay down the law, beginning with a prelude. To

the intending robber we will say--O sir, the complaint which troubles

you is not human; but some curse has fallen upon you, inherited from

the crimes of your ancestors, of which you must purge yourself: go and

sacrifice to the Gods, associate with the good, avoid the wicked; and if

you are cured of the fatal impulse, well; but if not, acknowledge death

to be better than life, and depart.

These are the accents, soft and low, in which we address the would-be

criminal. And if he will not listen, then cry aloud as with the sound of

a trumpet: Whosoever robs a temple, if he be a slave or foreigner shall

be branded in the face and hands, and scourged, and cast naked beyond

the border. And perhaps this may improve him: for the law aims either

at the reformation of the criminal, or the repression of crime. No

punishment is designed to inflict useless injury. But if the offender be

a citizen, he must be incurable, and for him death is the only fitting

penalty. His iniquity, however, shall not be visited on his children,

nor shall his property be confiscated.

As to the exaction of penalties, any person who is fined for an offence

shall not be liable to pay the fine, unless he have property in excess

of his lot. For the lots must never go uncultivated for lack of means;

the guardians of the law are to provide against this. If a fine is

inflicted upon a man which he cannot pay, and for which his friends

are unwilling to give security, he shall be imprisoned and otherwise

dishonoured. But no criminal shall go unpunished:--whether death, or

imprisonment, or stripes, or fines, or the stocks, or banishment to a

remote temple, be the penalty. Capital offences shall come under the

cognizance of the guardians of the law, and a college of the best of the

last year's magistrates. The order of suits and similar details we shall

leave to the lawgivers of the future, and only determine the mode of

voting. The judges are to sit in order of seniority, and the proceedings

shall begin with the speeches of the plaintiff and the defendant; and

then the judges, beginning with the eldest, shall ask questions and

collect evidence during three days, which, at the end of each day, shall

be deposited in writing under their seals on the altar of Hestia; and

when they have evidence enough, after a solemn declaration that they

will decide justly, they shall vote and end the case. The votes are to

be given openly in the presence of the citizens.

Next to religion, the preservation of the constitution is the first

object of the law. The greatest enemy of the state is he who attempts to

set up a tyrant, or breeds plots and conspiracies; not far below him in

guilt is a magistrate who either knowingly, or in ignorance, fails to

bring the offender to justice. Any one who is good for anything will

give information against traitors. The mode of proceeding at such trials

will be the same as at trials for sacrilege; the penalty, death. But

neither in this case nor in any other is the son to bear the iniquity of

the father, unless father, grandfather, great-grandfather, have all of

them been capitally convicted, and then the family of the criminal

are to be sent off to the country of their ancestor, retaining their

property, with the exception of the lot and its fixtures. And ten are to

be selected from the younger sons of the other citizens--one of whom is

to be chosen by the oracle of Delphi to be heir of the lot.

Our third law will be a general one, concerning the procedure and the

judges in cases of treason. As regards the remaining or departure of the

family of the offender, the same law shall apply equally to the traitor,

the sacrilegious, and the conspirator.

A thief, whether he steals much or little, must refund twice the amount,

if he can do so without impairing his lot; if he cannot, he must go to

prison until he either pays the plaintiff, or in case of a public theft,

the city, or they agree to forgive him. 'But should all kinds of theft

incur the same penalty?' You remind me of what I know--that legislation

is never perfect. The men for whom laws are now made may be compared

to the slave who is being doctored, according to our old image, by the

unscientific doctor. For the empirical practitioner, if he chance to

meet the educated physician talking to his patient, and entering into

the philosophy of his disease, would burst out laughing and say, as

doctors delight in doing, 'Foolish fellow, instead of curing the patient

you are educating him!' 'And would he not be right?' Perhaps; and

he might add, that he who discourses in our fashion preaches to the

citizens instead of legislating for them. 'True.' There is, however, one

advantage which we possess--that being amateurs only, we may either take

the most ideal, or the most necessary and utilitarian view. 'But why

offer such an alternative? As if all our legislation must be done

to-day, and nothing put off until the morrow. We may surely rough-hew

our materials first, and shape and place them afterwards.' That will be

the natural way of proceeding. There is a further point. Of all writings

either in prose or verse the writings of the legislator are the most

important. For it is he who has to determine the nature of good and

evil, and how they should be studied with a view to our instruction.

And is it not as disgraceful for Solon and Lycurgus to lay down false

precepts about the institutions of life as for Homer and Tyrtaeus?

The laws of states ought to be the models of writing, and what is at

variance with them should be deemed ridiculous. And we may further

imagine them to express the affection and good sense of a father or

mother, and not to be the fiats of a tyrant. 'Very true.'

Let us enquire more particularly about sacrilege, theft and other

crimes, for which we have already legislated in part. And this leads

us to ask, first of all, whether we are agreed or disagreed about the

nature of the honourable and just. 'To what are you referring?' I will

endeavour to explain. All are agreed that justice is honourable, whether

in men or things, and no one who maintains that a very ugly men who is

just, is in his mind fair, would be thought extravagant. 'Very true.'

But if honour is to be attributed to justice, are just sufferings

honourable, or only just actions? 'What do you mean?' Our laws supply a

case in point; for we enacted that the robber of temples and the traitor

should die; and this was just, but the reverse of honourable. In this

way does the language of the many rend asunder the just and honourable.

'That is true.' But is our own language consistent? I have already said

that the evil are involuntarily evil; and the evil are the unjust. Now

the voluntary cannot be the involuntary; and if you two come to me

and say, 'Then shall we legislate for our city?' Of course, I shall

reply.--'Then will you distinguish what crimes are voluntary and what

involuntary, and shall we impose lighter penalties on the latter, and

heavier on the former? Or shall we refuse to determine what is the

meaning of voluntary and involuntary, and maintain that our words have

come down from heaven, and that they should be at once embodied in a

law?' All states legislate under the idea that there are two classes of

actions, the voluntary and the involuntary, but there is great confusion

about them in the minds of men; and the law can never act unless they

are distinguished. Either we must abstain from affirming that unjust

actions are involuntary, or explain the meaning of this statement.

Believing, then, that acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary

and involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other mode of classifying

them. Hurts are voluntary and involuntary, but all hurts are not

injuries: on the other hand, a benefit when wrongly conferred may be an

injury. An act which gives or takes away anything is not simply just;

but the legislator who has to decide whether the case is one of hurt or

injury, must consider the animus of the agent; and when there is hurt,

he must as far as possible, provide a remedy and reparation: but if

there is injustice, he must, when compensation has been made, further

endeavour to reconcile the two parties. 'Excellent.' Where injustice,

like disease, is remediable, there the remedy must be applied in word

or deed, with the assistance of pleasures and pains, of bounties and

penalties, or any other influence which may inspire man with the love

of justice, or hatred of injustice; and this is the noblest work of

law. But when the legislator perceives the evil to be incurable, he will

consider that the death of the offender will be a good to himself,

and in two ways a good to society: first, as he becomes an example to

others; secondly, because the city will be quit of a rogue; and in such

a case, but in no other, the legislator will punish with death.

'There is some truth in what you say. I wish, however, that you would

distinguish more clearly the difference of injury and hurt, and the

complications of voluntary and involuntary.' You will admit that anger

is of a violent and destructive nature? 'Certainly.' And further, that

pleasure is different from anger, and has an opposite power, working by

persuasion and deceit? 'Yes.' Ignorance is the third source of crimes;

this is of two kinds--simple ignorance and ignorance doubled by conceit

of knowledge; the latter, when accompanied with power, is a source of

terrible errors, but is excusable when only weak and childish. 'True.'

We often say that one man masters, and another is mastered by pleasure

and anger. 'Just so.' But no one says that one man masters, and another

is mastered by ignorance. 'You are right.' All these motives actuate men

and sometimes drive them in different ways. 'That is so.' Now, then, I

am in a position to define the nature of just and unjust. By injustice I

mean the dominion of anger and fear, pleasure and pain, envy and desire,

in the soul, whether doing harm or not: by justice I mean the rule of

the opinion of the best, whether in states or individuals, extending to

the whole of life; although actions done in error are often thought to

be involuntary injustice. No controversy need be raised about names at

present; we are only desirous of fixing in our memories the heads of

error. And the pain which is called fear and anger is our first head of

error; the second is the class of pleasures and desires; and the third,

of hopes which aim at true opinion about the best;--this latter falls

into three divisions (i.e. (1) when accompanied by simple ignorance, (2)

when accompanied by conceit of wisdom combined with power, or (3) with

weakness), so that there are in all five. And the laws relating to them

may be summed up under two heads, laws which deal with acts of open

violence and with acts of deceit; to which may be added acts both

violent and deceitful, and these last should be visited with the utmost

rigour of the law. 'Very properly.'

Let us now return to the enactment of laws. We have treated of

sacrilege, and of conspiracy, and of treason. Any of these crimes may be

committed by a person not in his right mind, or in the second childhood

of old age. If this is proved to be the fact before the judges, the

person in question shall only have to pay for the injury, and not be

punished further, unless he have on his hands the stain of blood. In

this case he shall be exiled for a year, and if he return before the

expiration of the year, he shall be retained in the public prison two

years.

Homicides may be divided into voluntary and involuntary: and first of

involuntary homicide. He who unintentionally kills another man at the

games or in military exercises duly authorized by the magistrates,

whether death follow immediately or after an interval, shall be

acquitted, subject only to the purification required by the Delphian

Oracle. Any physician whose patient dies against his will shall in like

manner be acquitted. Any one who unintentionally kills the slave of

another, believing that he is his own, with or without weapons, shall

bear the master of the slave harmless, or pay a penalty amounting to

twice the value of the slave, and to this let him add a purification

greater than in the case of homicide at the games. If a man kill his

own slave, a purification only is required of him. If he kill a freeman

unintentionally, let him also make purification; and let him remember

the ancient tradition which says that the murdered man is indignant when

he sees the murderer walk about in his own accustomed haunts, and that

he terrifies him with the remembrance of his crime. And therefore the

homicide should keep away from his native land for a year, or, if he

have slain a stranger, let him avoid the land of the stranger for a like

period. If he complies with this condition, the nearest kinsman of the

deceased shall take pity upon him and be reconciled to him; but if he

refuses to remain in exile, or visits the temples unpurified, then

let the kinsman proceed against him, and demand a double penalty. The

kinsman who neglects this duty shall himself incur the curse, and any

one who likes may proceed against him, and compel him to leave his

country for five years. If a stranger involuntarily kill a stranger, any

one may proceed against him in the same manner: and the homicide, if

he be a metic, shall be banished for a year; but if he be an entire

stranger, whether he have murdered metic, citizen, or stranger, he shall

be banished for ever; and if he return, he shall be punished with death,

and his property shall go to the next of kin of the murdered man. If

he come back by sea against his will, he shall remain on the seashore,

wetting his feet in the water while he waits for a vessel to sail; or

if he be brought back by land, the magistrates shall send him unharmed

beyond the border.

Next follows murder done from anger, which is of two kinds--either

arising out of a sudden impulse, and attended with remorse; or committed

with premeditation, and unattended with remorse. The cause of both is

anger, and both are intermediate between voluntary and involuntary.

The one which is committed from sudden impulse, though not wholly

involuntary, bears the image of the involuntary, and is therefore the

more excusable of the two, and should receive a gentler punishment. The

act of him who nurses his wrath is more voluntary, and therefore more

culpable. The degree of culpability depends on the presence or absence

of intention, to which the degree of punishment should correspond. For

the first kind of murder, that which is done on a momentary impulse,

let two years' exile be the penalty; for the second, that which is

accompanied with malice prepense, three. When the time of any one's

exile has expired, the guardians shall send twelve judges to the borders

of the land, who shall have authority to decide whether he may return

or not. He who after returning repeats the offence, shall be exiled

and return no more, and, if he return, shall be put to death, like

the stranger in a similar case. He who in a fit of anger kills his own

slave, shall purify himself; and he who kills another man's slave, shall

pay to his master double the value. Any one may proceed against the

offender if he appear in public places, not having been purified;

and may bring to trial both the next of kin to the dead man and the

homicide, and compel the one to exact, and the other to pay, a double

penalty. If a slave kill his master, or a freeman who is not his master,

in anger, the kinsmen of the murdered person may do with the murderer

whatever they please, but they must not spare his life. If a father or

mother kill their son or daughter in anger, let the slayer remain in

exile for three years; and on the return of the exile let the parents

separate, and no longer continue to cohabit, or have the same sacred

rites with those whom he or she has deprived of a brother or sister. The

same penalty is decreed against the husband who murders his wife, and

also against the wife who murders her husband. Let them be absent three

years, and on their return never again share in the same sacred rites

with their children, or sit at the same table with them. Nor is a

brother or sister who have lifted up their hands against a brother or

sister, ever to come under the same roof or share in the same rites

with those whom they have robbed of a child. If a son feels such hatred

against his father or mother as to take the life of either of them,

then, if the parent before death forgive him, he shall only suffer the

penalty due to involuntary homicide; but if he be unforgiven, there

are many laws against which he has offended; he is guilty of outrage,

impiety, sacrilege all in one, and deserves to be put to death many

times over. For if the law will not allow a man to kill the authors of

his being even in self-defence, what other penalty than death can be

inflicted upon him who in a fit of passion wilfully slays his father

or mother? If a brother kill a brother in self-defence during a civil

broil, or a citizen a citizen, or a slave a slave, or a stranger a

stranger, let them be free from blame, as he is who slays an enemy in

battle. But if a slave kill a freeman, let him be as a parricide. In all

cases, however, the forgiveness of the injured party shall acquit the

agents; and then they shall only be purified, and remain in exile for a

year.

Enough of actions that are involuntary, or done in anger; let us proceed

to voluntary and premeditated actions. The great source of voluntary

crime is the desire of money, which is begotten by evil education;

and this arises out of the false praise of riches, common both among

Hellenes and barbarians; they think that to be the first of goods which

is really the third. For the body is not for the sake of wealth, but

wealth for the body, as the body is for the soul. If this were better

understood, the crime of murder, of which avarice is the chief cause,

would soon cease among men. Next to avarice, ambition is a source of

crime, troublesome to the ambitious man himself, as well as to the chief

men of the state. And next to ambition, base fear is a motive, which

has led many an one to commit murder in order that he may get rid of the

witnesses of his crimes. Let this be said as a prelude to all enactments

about crimes of violence; and the tradition must not be forgotten, which

tells that the murderer is punished in the world below, and that when

he returns to this world he meets the fate which he has dealt out to

others. If a man is deterred by the prelude and the fear of future

punishment, he will have no need of the law; but in case he disobey, let

the law be declared against him as follows:--He who of malice prepense

kills one of his kindred, shall in the first place be outlawed; neither

temple, harbour, nor agora shall be polluted by his presence. And if a

kinsman of the deceased refuse to proceed against his slayer, he shall

take the curse of pollution upon himself, and also be liable to be

prosecuted by any one who will avenge the dead. The prosecutor, however,

must observe the customary ceremonial before he proceeds against the

offender. The details of these observances will be best determined by a

conclave of prophets and interpreters and guardians of the law, and the

judges of the cause itself shall be the same as in cases of sacrilege.

He who is convicted shall be punished with death, and not be buried

within the country of the murdered person. He who flies from the law

shall undergo perpetual banishment; if he return, he may be put to

death with impunity by any relative of the murdered man or by any other

citizen, or bound and delivered to the magistrates. He who accuses a man

of murder shall demand satisfactory bail of the accused, and if this is

not forthcoming, the magistrate shall keep him in prison against the

day of trial. If a man commit murder by the hand of another, he shall

be tried in the same way as in the cases previously supposed, but if the

offender be a citizen, his body after execution shall be buried within

the land.

If a slave kill a freeman, either with his own hand or by contrivance,

let him be led either to the grave or to a place whence he can see the

grave of the murdered man, and there receive as many stripes at the hand

of the public executioner as the person who took him pleases; and if he

survive he shall be put to death. If a slave be put out of the way to

prevent his informing of some crime, his death shall be punished like

that of a citizen. If there are any of those horrible murders of kindred

which sometimes occur even in well-regulated societies, and of which the

legislator, however unwilling, cannot avoid taking cognizance, he will

repeat the old myth of the divine vengeance against the perpetrators of

such atrocities. The myth will say that the murderer must suffer what he

has done: if he have slain his father, he must be slain by his children;

if his mother, he must become a woman and perish at the hands of his

offspring in another age of the world. Such a preamble may terrify him;

but if, notwithstanding, in some evil hour he murders father or

mother or brethren or children, the mode of proceeding shall be as

follows:--Him who is convicted, the officers of the judges shall lead

to a spot without the city where three ways meet, and there slay him and

expose his body naked; and each of the magistrates shall cast a stone

upon his head and justify the city, and he shall be thrown unburied

beyond the border. But what shall we say of him who takes the life

which is dearest to him, that is to say, his own; and this not from any

disgrace or calamity, but from cowardice and indolence? The manner of

his burial and the purification of his crime is a matter for God and the

interpreters to decide and for his kinsmen to execute. Let him, at any

rate, be buried alone in some uncultivated and nameless spot, and

be without name or monument. If a beast kill a man, not in a public

contest, let it be prosecuted for murder, and after condemnation slain

and cast without the border. Also inanimate things which have caused

death, except in the case of lightning and other visitations from

heaven, shall be carried without the border. If the body of a dead man

be found, and the murderer remain unknown, the trial shall take place

all the same, and the unknown murderer shall be warned not to set foot

in the temples or come within the borders of the land; if discovered, he

shall die, and his body shall be cast out. A man is justified in taking

the life of a burglar, of a footpad, of a violator of women or youth;

and he may take the life of another with impunity in defence of father,

mother, brother, wife, or other relations.

The nurture and education which are necessary to the existence of men

have been considered, and the punishment of acts of violence which

destroy life. There remain maiming, wounding, and the like, which admit

of a similar division into voluntary and involuntary. About this class

of actions the preamble shall be: Whereas men would be like wild beasts

unless they obeyed the laws, the first duty of citizens is the care

of the public interests, which unite and preserve states, as private

interests distract them. A man may know what is for the public good, but

if he have absolute power, human nature will impel him to seek pleasure

instead of virtue, and so darkness will come over his soul and over the

state. If he had mind, he would have no need of law; for mind is the

perfection of law. But such a freeman, 'whom the truth makes free,' is

hardly to be found; and therefore law and order are necessary, which are

the second-best, and they regulate things as they exist in part

only, but cannot take in the whole. For actions have innumerable

characteristics, which must be partly determined by the law and partly

left to the judge. The judge must determine the fact; and to him also

the punishment must sometimes be left. What shall the law prescribe,

and what shall be left to the judge? A city is unfortunate in which the

tribunals are either secret and speechless, or, what is worse, noisy and

public, when the people, as if they were in a theatre, clap and hoot the

various speakers. Such courts a legislator would rather not have; but

if he is compelled to have them, he will speak distinctly, and leave as

little as possible to their discretion. But where the courts are good,

and presided over by well-trained judges, the penalties to be inflicted

may be in a great measure left to them; and as there are to be good

courts among our colonists, we need not determine beforehand the

exact proportion of the penalty and the crime. Returning, then, to

our legislator, let us indite a law about wounding, which shall run as

follows:--He who wounds with intent to kill, and fails in his object,

shall be tried as if he had succeeded. But since God has favoured both

him and his victim, instead of being put to death, he shall be allowed

to go into exile and take his property with him, the damage due to the

sufferer having been previously estimated by the court, which shall be

the same as would have tried the case if death had ensued. If a child

should intentionally wound a parent, or a servant his master, or brother

or sister wound brother or sister with malice prepense, the penalty

shall be death. If a husband or wife wound one another with intent to

kill, the penalty which is inflicted upon them shall be perpetual exile;

and if they have young children, the guardians shall take care of them

and administer their property as if they were orphans. If they have

no children, their kinsmen male and female shall meet, and after a

consultation with the priests and guardians of the law, shall appoint an

heir of the house; for the house and family belong to the state, being

a 5040th portion of the whole. And the state is bound to preserve

her families happy and holy; therefore, when the heir of a house has

committed a capital offence, or is in exile for life, the house is to be

purified, and then the kinsmen of the house and the guardians of the law

are to find out a family which has a good name and in which there are

many sons, and introduce one of them to be the heir and priest of the

house. He shall assume the fathers and ancestors of the family, while

the first son dies in dishonour and his name is blotted out.

Some actions are intermediate between the voluntary and involuntary.

Those done from anger are of this class. If a man wound another in

anger, let him pay double the damage, if the injury is curable; or

fourfold, if curable, and at the same time dishonourable; and fourfold,

if incurable; the amount is to be assessed by the judges. If the wounded

person is rendered incapable of military service, the injurer, besides

the other penalties, shall serve in his stead, or be liable to a suit

for refusing to serve. If brother wounds brother, then their parents

and kindred, of both sexes, shall meet and judge the crime. The damages

shall be assessed by the parents; and if the amount fixed by them is

disputed, an appeal shall be made to the male kindred; or in the last

resort to the guardians of the law. Parents who wound their children are

to be tried by judges of at least sixty years of age, who have children

of their own; and they are to determine whether death, or some lesser

punishment, is to be inflicted upon them--no relatives are to take part

in the trial. If a slave in anger smite a freeman, he is to be delivered

up by his master to the injured person. If the master suspect collusion

between the slave and the injured person, he may bring the matter to

trial: and if he fail he shall pay three times the injury; or if he

obtain a conviction, the contriver of the conspiracy shall be liable to

an action for kidnapping. He who wounds another unintentionally shall

only pay for the actual harm done.

In all outrages and acts of violence, the elder is to be more regarded

than the younger. An injury done by a younger man to an elder is

abominable and hateful; but the younger man who is struck by an elder

is to bear with him patiently, considering that he who is twenty years

older is loco parentis, and remembering the reverence which is due to

the Gods who preside over birth. Let him keep his hands, too, from the

stranger; instead of taking upon himself to chastise him when he is

insolent, he shall bring him before the wardens of the city, who shall

examine into the case, and if they find him guilty, shall scourge him

with as many blows as he has given; or if he be innocent, they shall

warn and threaten his accuser. When an equal strikes an equal, whether

an old man an old man, or a young man a young man, let them use only

their fists and have no weapons. He who being above forty years of age

commences a fight, or retaliates, shall be counted mean and base.

To this preamble, let the law be added: If a man smite another who is

his elder by twenty years or more, let the bystander, in case he be

older than the combatants, part them; or if he be younger than the

person struck, or of the same age with him, let him defend him as he

would a father or brother; and let the striker be brought to trial,

and if convicted imprisoned for a year or more at the discretion of

the judges. If a stranger smite one who is his elder by twenty years or

more, he shall be imprisoned for two years, and a metic, in like case,

shall suffer three years' imprisonment. He who is standing by and gives

no assistance, shall be punished according to his class in one of four

penalties--a mina, fifty, thirty, twenty drachmas. The generals and

other superior officers of the army shall form the court which tries

this class of offences.

Laws are made to instruct the good, and in the hope that there may be no

need of them; also to control the bad, whose hardness of heart will not

be hindered from crime. The uttermost penalty will fall upon those who

lay violent hands upon a parent, having no fear of the Gods above, or of

the punishments which will pursue them in the world below. They are

too wise in their own conceits to believe in such things: wherefore the

tortures which await them in another life must be anticipated in this.

Let the law be as follows:--

If a man, being in his right mind, dare to smite his father and mother,

or his grandfather and grandmother, let the passer-by come to the

rescue; and if he be a metic or stranger who comes to the rescue, he

shall have the first place at the games; or if he do not come to the

rescue, he shall be a perpetual exile. Let the citizen in the like

case be praised or blamed, and the slave receive freedom or a hundred

stripes. The wardens of the agora, the city, or the country, as the

case may be, shall see to the execution of the law. And he who is an

inhabitant of the same place and is present shall come to the rescue, or

he shall fall under a curse.

If a man be convicted of assaulting his parents, let him be banished for

ever from the city into the country, and let him abstain from all sacred

rites; and if he do not abstain, let him be punished by the wardens of

the country; and if he return to the city, let him be put to death. If

any freeman consort with him, let him be purified before he returns to

the city. If a slave strike a freeman, whether citizen or stranger, let

the bystander be obliged to seize and deliver him into the hands of the

injured person, who may inflict upon him as many blows as he

pleases, and shall then return him to his master. The law will be as

follows:--The slave who strikes a freeman shall be bound by his master,

and not set at liberty without the consent of the person whom he has

injured. All these laws apply to women as well as to men.

BOOK X. The greatest wrongs arise out of youthful insolence, and the

greatest of all are committed against public temples; they are in the

second degree great when private rites and sepulchres are insulted; in

the third degree, when committed against parents; in the fourth degree,

when they are done against the authority or property of the rulers; in

the fifth degree, when the rights of individuals are violated. Most

of these offences have been already considered; but there remains the

question of admonition and punishment of offences against the Gods. Let

the admonition be in the following terms:--No man who ever intentionally

did or said anything impious, had a true belief in the existence of the

Gods; but either he thought that there were no Gods, or that they did

not care about men, or that they were easily appeased by sacrifices and

prayers. 'What shall we say or do to such persons?' My good sir, let us

first hear the jests which they in their superiority will make upon us.

'What will they say?' Probably something of this kind:--'Strangers you

are right in thinking that some of us do not believe in the existence of

the Gods; while others assert that they do not care for us, and others

that they are propitiated by prayers and offerings. But we want you to

argue with us before you threaten; you should prove to us by reasonable

evidence that there are Gods, and that they are too good to be bribed.

Poets, priests, prophets, rhetoricians, even the best of them, speak

to us of atoning for evil, and not of avoiding it. From legislators who

profess to be gentle we ask for instruction, which may, at least, have

the persuasive power of truth, if no other.' What have you to say?

'Well, there is no difficulty in proving the being of the Gods. The sun,

and earth, and stars, moving in their courses, the recurring seasons,

furnish proofs of their existence; and there is the general opinion

of mankind.' I fear that the unbelievers--not that I care for their

opinion--will despise us. You are not aware that their impiety proceeds,

not from sensuality, but from ignorance taking the garb of wisdom. 'What

do you mean?' At Athens there are tales current both in prose and verse

of a kind which are not tolerated in a well-regulated state like yours.

The oldest of them relate the origin of the world, and the birth and

life of the Gods. These narratives have a bad influence on family

relations; but as they are old we will let them pass, and consider

another kind of tales, invented by the wisdom of a younger generation,

who, if any one argues for the existence of the Gods and claims that the

stars have a divine being, insist that these are mere earth and stones,

which can have no care of human things, and that all theology is a

cooking up of words. Now what course ought we to take? Shall we suppose

some impious man to charge us with assuming the existence of the Gods,

and make a defence? Or shall we leave the preamble and go on to the

laws? 'There is no hurry, and we have often said that the shorter and

worse method should not be preferred to the longer and better. The proof

that there are Gods who are good, and the friends of justice, is the

best preamble of all our laws.' Come, let us talk with the impious, who

have been brought up from their infancy in the belief of religion, and

have heard their own fathers and mothers praying for them and talking

with the Gods as if they were absolutely convinced of their existence;

who have seen mankind prostrate in prayer at the rising and setting of

the sun and moon and at every turn of fortune, and have dared to despise

and disbelieve all this. Can we keep our temper with them, when they

compel us to argue on such a theme? We must; or like them we shall go

mad, though with more reason. Let us select one of them and address him

as follows:

O my son, you are young; time and experience will make you change many

of your opinions. Do not be hasty in forming a conclusion about the

divine nature; and let me mention to you a fact which I know. You and

your friends are not the first or the only persons who have had these

notions about the Gods. There are always a considerable number who are

infected by them: I have known many myself, and can assure you that no

one who was an unbeliever in his youth ever persisted till he was old in

denying the existence of the Gods. The two other opinions, first, that

the Gods exist and have no care of men, secondly, that they care for

men, but may be propitiated by sacrifices and prayers, may indeed last

through life in a few instances, but even this is not common. I would

beg of you to be patient, and learn the truth of the legislator and

others; in the mean time abstain from impiety. 'So far, our discourse

has gone well.'

I will now speak of a strange doctrine, which is regarded by many as the

crown of philosophy. They affirm that all things come into being either

by art or nature or chance, and that the greater things are done by

nature and chance, and the lesser things by art, which receiving from

nature the greater creations, moulds and fashions all those lesser works

which are termed works of art. Their meaning is that fire, water, earth,

and air all exist by nature and chance, and not by art; and that out of

these, according to certain chance affinities of opposites, the sun, the

moon, the stars, and the earth have been framed, not by any action of

mind, but by nature and chance only. Thus, in their opinion, the heaven

and earth were created, as well as the animals and plants. Art came

later, and is of mortal birth; by her power were invented certain

images and very partial imitations of the truth, of which kind are the

creations of musicians and painters: but they say that there are

other arts which combine with nature, and have a deeper truth, such as

medicine, husbandry, gymnastic. Also the greater part of politics they

imagine to co-operate with nature, but in a less degree, having more of

art, while legislation is declared by them to be wholly a work of art.

'How do you mean?' In the first place, they say that the Gods exist

neither by nature nor by art, but by the laws of states, which are

different in different countries; and that virtue is one thing by nature

and another by convention; and that justice is altogether conventional,

made by law, and having authority for the moment only. This is repeated

to young men by sages and poets, and leads to impiety, and the pretended

life according to nature and in disobedience to law; for nobody believes

the Gods to be such as the law affirms. 'How true! and oh! how injurious

to states and to families!' But then, what should the lawgiver do?

Should he stand up in the state and threaten mankind with the severest

penalties if they persist in their unbelief, while he makes no attempt

to win them by persuasion? 'Nay, Stranger, the legislator ought never to

weary of trying to persuade the world that there are Gods; and he should

declare that law and art exist by nature.' Yes, Cleinias; but these are

difficult and tedious questions. 'And shall our patience, which was

not exhausted in the enquiry about music or drink, fail now that we are

discoursing about the Gods? There may be a difficulty in framing laws,

but when written down they remain, and time and diligence will make them

clear; if they are useful there would be neither reason nor religion in

rejecting them on account of their length.' Most true. And the general

spread of unbelief shows that the legislator should do something in

vindication of the laws, when they are being undermined by bad men.

'He should.' You agree with me, Cleinias, that the heresy consists in

supposing earth, air, fire, and water to be the first of all things.

These the heretics call nature, conceiving them to be prior to the soul.

'I agree.' You would further agree that natural philosophy is the source

of this impiety--the study appears to be pursued in a wrong way. 'In

what way do you mean?' The error consists in transposing first and

second causes. They do not see that the soul is before the body, and

before all other things, and the author and ruler of them all. And if

the soul is prior to the body, then the things of the soul are prior to

the things of the body. In other words, opinion, attention, mind, art,

law, are prior to sensible qualities; and the first and greater works of

creation are the results of art and mind, whereas the works of nature,

as they are improperly termed, are secondary and subsequent. 'Why do you

say "improperly"?' Because when they speak of nature they seem to mean

the first creative power. But if the soul is first, and not fire and

air, then the soul above all things may be said to exist by nature. And

this can only be on the supposition that the soul is prior to the body.

Shall we try to prove that it is so? 'By all means.' I fear that the

greenness of our argument will ludicrously contrast with the ripeness of

our ages. But as we must go into the water, and the stream is strong, I

will first attempt to cross by myself, and if I arrive at the bank, you

shall follow. Remembering that you are unaccustomed to such discussions,

I will ask and answer the questions myself, while you listen in safety.

But first I must pray the Gods to assist at the demonstration of their

own existence--if ever we are to call upon them, now is the time. Let

me hold fast to the rope, and enter into the depths: Shall I put the

question to myself in this form?--Are all things at rest, and is nothing

in motion? or are some things in motion, and some things at rest? 'The

latter.' And do they move and rest, some in one place, some in more?

'Yes.' There may be (1) motion in the same place, as in revolution on an

axis, which is imparted swiftly to the larger and slowly to the lesser

circle; and there may be motion in different places, having sometimes

(2) one centre of motion and sometimes (3) more. (4) When bodies in

motion come against other bodies which are at rest, they are divided

by them, and (5) when they are caught between other bodies coming from

opposite directions they unite with them; and (6) they grow by union and

(7) waste by dissolution while their constitution remains the same, but

are (8) destroyed when their constitution fails. There is a growth from

one dimension to two, and from a second to a third, which then becomes

perceptible to sense; this process is called generation, and the

opposite, destruction. We have now enumerated all possible motions

with the exception of two. 'What are they?' Just the two with which our

enquiry is concerned; for our enquiry relates to the soul. There is one

kind of motion which is only able to move other things; there is another

which can move itself as well, working in composition and decomposition,

by increase and diminution, by generation and destruction. 'Granted.'

(9) That which moves and is moved by another is the ninth kind of

motion; (10) that which is self-moved and moves others is the tenth. And

this tenth kind of motion is the mightiest, and is really the first, and

is followed by that which was improperly called the ninth. 'How do you

mean?' Must not that which is moved by others finally depend upon that

which is moved by itself? Nothing can be affected by any transition

prior to self-motion. Then the first and eldest principle of motion,

whether in things at rest or not at rest, will be the principle of

self-motion; and that which is moved by others and can move others will

be the second. 'True.' Let me ask another question:

What is the name which is given to self-motion when manifested in any

material substance? 'Life.' And soul too is life? 'Very good.' And are

there not three kinds of knowledge--a knowledge (1) of the essence, (2)

of the definition, (3) of the name? And sometimes the name leads us

to ask the definition, sometimes the definition to ask the name. For

example, number can be divided into equal parts, and when thus divided

is termed even, and the definition of even and the word 'even' refer

to the same thing. 'Very true.' And what is the definition of the thing

which is named 'soul'? Must we not reply, 'The self-moved'? And have we

not proved that the self-moved is the source of motion in other things?

'Yes.' And the motion which is not self-moved will be inferior to this?

'True.' And if so, we shall be right in saying that the soul is prior

and superior to the body, and the body by nature subject and inferior to

the soul? 'Quite right.' And we agreed that if the soul was prior to

the body, the things of the soul were prior to the things of the body?

'Certainly.' And therefore desires, and manners, and thoughts, and true

opinions, and recollections, are prior to the length and breadth and

force of bodies. 'To be sure.' In the next place, we acknowledge that

the soul is the cause of good and evil, just and unjust, if we suppose

her to be the cause of all things? 'Certainly.' And the soul which

orders all things must also order the heavens? 'Of course.' One soul

or more? More; for less than two are inconceivable, one good, the other

evil. 'Most true.' The soul directs all things by her movements, which

we call will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and

false, joy, sorrow, courage, fear, hatred, love, and similar affections.

These are the primary movements, and they receive the secondary

movements of bodies, and guide all things to increase and diminution,

separation and union, and to all the qualities which accompany

them--cold, hot, heavy, light, hard, soft, white, black, sweet, bitter;

these and other such qualities the soul, herself a goddess, uses, when

truly receiving the divine mind she leads all things rightly to their

happiness; but under the impulse of folly she works out an opposite

result. For the controller of heaven and earth and the circle of the

world is either the wise and good soul, or the foolish and vicious soul,

working in them. 'What do you mean?' If we say that the whole course

and motion of heaven and earth is in accordance with the workings and

reasonings of mind, clearly the best soul must have the care of the

heaven, and guide it along that better way. 'True.' But if the heavens

move wildly and disorderly, then they must be under the guidance of the

evil soul. 'True again.' What is the nature of the movement of the soul?

We must not suppose that we can see and know the soul with our bodily

eyes, any more than we can fix them on the midday sun; it will be safer

to look at an image only. 'How do you mean?' Let us find among the ten

kinds of motion an image of the motion of the mind. You remember, as

we said, that all things are divided into two classes; and some of them

were moved and some at rest. 'Yes.' And of those which were moved, some

were moved in the same place, others in more places than one. 'Just so.'

The motion which was in one place was circular, like the motion of a

spherical body; and such a motion in the same place, and in the same

relations, is an excellent image of the motion of mind. 'Very true.' The

motion of the other sort, which has no fixed place or manner or relation

or order or proportion, is akin to folly and nonsense. 'Very true.'

After what has been said, it is clear that, since the soul carries round

all things, some soul which is either very good or the opposite carries

round the circumference of heaven. But that soul can be no other than

the best. Again, the soul carries round the sun, moon, and stars, and if

the sun has a soul, then either the soul of the sun is within and moves

the sun as the human soul moves the body; or, secondly, the sun is

contained in some external air or fire, which the soul provides and

through which she operates; or, thirdly, the course of the sun is guided

by the soul acting in a wonderful manner without a body. 'Yes, in one

of those ways the soul must guide all things.' And this soul of the

sun, which is better than the sun, whether driving him in a chariot or

employing any other agency, is by every man called a God? 'Yes, by every

man who has any sense.' And of the seasons, stars, moon, and year, in

like manner, it may be affirmed that the soul or souls from which they

derive their excellence are divine; and without insisting on the manner

of their working, no one can deny that all things are full of Gods. 'No

one.' And now let us offer an alternative to him who denies that there

are Gods. Either he must show that the soul is not the origin of all

things, or he must live for the future in the belief that there are

Gods.

Next, as to the man who believes in the Gods, but refuses to acknowledge

that they take care of human things--let him too have a word of

admonition. 'Best of men,' we will say to him, 'some affinity to the

Gods leads you to honour them and to believe in them. But you have heard

the happiness of wicked men sung by poets and admired by the world, and

this has drawn you away from your natural piety. Or you have seen the

wicked growing old in prosperity, and leaving great offices to their

children; or you have watched the tyrant succeeding in his career of

crime; and considering all these things you have been led to believe in

an irrational way that the Gods take no care of human affairs. That your

error may not increase, I will endeavour to purify your soul.' Do you,

Megillus and Cleinias, make answer for the youth, and when we come to

a difficulty, I will carry you over the water as I did before. 'Very

good.' He will easily be convinced that the Gods care for the small as

well as the great; for he heard what was said of their goodness and of

their having all things under their care. 'He certainly heard.' Then now

let us enquire what is meant by the virtue of the Gods. To possess mind

belongs to virtue, and the contrary to vice. 'That is what we say.' And

is not courage a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice? 'Certainly.'

And to the Gods we ascribe virtues; but idleness and indolence are not

virtues. 'Of course not.' And is God to be conceived of as a careless,

indolent fellow, such as the poet would compare to a stingless drone?

'Impossible.' Can we be right in praising any one who cares for great

matters and leaves the small to take care of themselves? Whether God or

man, he who does so, must either think the neglect of such matters to be

of no consequence, or he is indolent and careless. For surely neither

of them can be charged with neglect if they fail to attend to something

which is beyond their power? 'Certainly not.'

And now we will examine the two classes of offenders who admit that

there are Gods, but say,--the one that they may be appeased, the other

that they take no care of small matters: do they not acknowledge that

the Gods are omnipotent and omniscient, and also good and perfect?

'Certainly.' Then they cannot be indolent, for indolence is the

offspring of idleness, and idleness of cowardice, and there is no

cowardice in God. 'True.' If the Gods neglect small matters, they must

either know or not know that such things are not to be regarded. But of

course they know that they should be regarded, and knowing, they

cannot be supposed to neglect their duty, overcome by the seductions

of pleasure or pain. 'Impossible.' And do not all human things share in

soul, and is not man the most religious of animals and the possession

of the Gods? And the Gods, who are the best of owners, will surely

take care of their property, small or great. Consider further, that the

greater the power of perception, the less the power of action. For it is

harder to see and hear the small than the great, but easier to control

them. Suppose a physician who had to cure a patient--would he

ever succeed if he attended to the great and neglected the little?

'Impossible.' Is not life made up of littles?--the pilot, general,

householder, statesman, all attend to small matters; and the builder

will tell you that large stones do not lie well without small ones.

And God is not inferior to mortal craftsmen, who in proportion to their

skill are careful in the details of their work; we must not imagine the

best and wisest to be a lazy good-for-nothing, who wearies of his work

and hurries over small and easy matters. 'Never, never!' He who charges

the Gods with neglect has been forced to admit his error; but I should

like further to persuade him that the author of all has made every part

for the sake of the whole, and that the smallest part has an appointed

state of action or passion, and that the least action or passion of any

part has a presiding minister. You, we say to him, are a minute fraction

of this universe, created with a view to the whole; the world is not

made for you, but you for the world; for the good artist considers the

whole first, and afterwards the parts. And you are annoyed at not seeing

how you and the universe are all working together for the best, so

far as the laws of the common creation admit. The soul undergoes many

changes from her contact with bodies; and all that the player does is to

put the pieces into their right places. 'What do you mean?' I mean that

God acts in the way which is simplest and easiest. Had each thing been

formed without any regard to the rest, the transposition of the Cosmos

would have been endless; but now there is not much trouble in the

government of the world. For when the king saw the actions of the living

souls and bodies, and the virtue and vice which were in them, and the

indestructibility of the soul and body (although they were not eternal),

he contrived so to arrange them that virtue might conquer and vice be

overcome as far as possible; giving them a seat and room adapted to

them, but leaving the direction of their separate actions to men's own

wills, which make our characters to be what they are. 'That is very

probable.' All things which have a soul possess in themselves the

principle of change, and in changing move according to fate and law;

natures which have undergone lesser changes move on the surface; but

those which have changed utterly for the worse, sink into Hades and the

infernal world. And in all great changes for good and evil which are

produced either by the will of the soul or the influence of others,

there is a change of place. The good soul, which has intercourse with

the divine nature, passes into a holier and better place; and the evil

soul, as she grows worse, changes her place for the worse. This,--as we

declare to the youth who fancies that he is neglected of the Gods,--is

the law of divine justice--the worse to the worse, the better to the

better, like to like, in life and in death. And from this law no man

will ever boast that he has escaped. Even if you say--'I am small,

and will creep into the earth,' or 'I am high, and will mount to

heaven'--you are not so small or so high that you shall not pay the

fitting penalty, either here or in the world below. This is also the

explanation of the seeming prosperity of the wicked, in whose actions

as in a mirror you imagined that you saw the neglect of the Gods, not

considering that they make all things contribute to the whole. And

how then could you form any idea of true happiness?--If Cleinias and

Megillus and I have succeeded in persuading you that you know not what

you say about the Gods, God will help you; but if there is still any

deficiency of proof, hear our answer to the third opponent.

Enough has been said to prove that the Gods exist and care for us;

that they can be propitiated, or that they receive gifts, is not to be

allowed or admitted for an instant. 'Let us proceed with the argument.'

Tell me, by the Gods, I say, how the Gods are to be propitiated by us?

Are they not rulers, who may be compared to charioteers, pilots, perhaps

generals, or physicians providing against the assaults of disease,

husbandmen observing the perils of the seasons, shepherds watching their

flocks? To whom shall we compare them? We acknowledged that the world is

full both of good and evil, but having more of evil than of good. There

is an immortal conflict going on, in which Gods and demigods are our

allies, and we their property; for injustice and folly and wickedness

make war in our souls upon justice and temperance and wisdom. There is

little virtue to be found on earth; and evil natures fawn upon the Gods,

like wild beasts upon their keepers, and believe that they can win them

over by flattery and prayers. And this sin, which is termed dishonesty,

is to the soul what disease is to the body, what pestilence is to the

seasons, what injustice is to states. 'Quite so.' And they who maintain

that the Gods can be appeased must say that they forgive the sins of

men, if they are allowed to share in their spoils; as you might suppose

wolves to mollify the dogs by throwing them a portion of the prey. 'That

is the argument.' But let us apply our images to the Gods--are they the

pilots who are won by gifts to wreck their own ships--or the charioteers

who are bribed to lose the race--or the generals, or doctors, or

husbandmen, who are perverted from their duty--or the dogs who

are silenced by wolves? 'God forbid.' Are they not rather our best

guardians; and shall we suppose them to fall short even of a moderate

degree of human or even canine virtue, which will not betray justice for

reward? 'Impossible.' He, then, who maintains such a doctrine, is the

most blasphemous of mankind.

And now our three points are proven; and we are agreed (1) that there

are Gods, (2) that they care for men, (3) that they cannot be bribed

to do injustice. I have spoken warmly, from a fear lest this impiety of

theirs should lead to a perversion of life. And our warmth will not have

been in vain, if we have succeeded in persuading these men to abominate

themselves, and to change their ways. 'So let us hope.' Then now that

the preamble is completed, we will make a proclamation commanding the

impious to renounce their evil ways; and in case they refuse, the law

shall be added:--If a man is guilty of impiety in word or deed, let

the bystander inform the magistrates, and let the magistrates bring the

offender before the court; and if any of the magistrates refuses to act,

he likewise shall be tried for impiety. Any one who is found guilty of

such an offence shall be fined at the discretion of the court, and

shall also be punished by a term of imprisonment. There shall be three

prisons--one for common offences against life and property; another,

near by the spot where the Nocturnal Council will assemble, which is to

be called the 'House of Reformation'; the third, to be situated in some

desolate region in the centre of the country, shall be called by a name

indicating retribution. There are three causes of impiety, and from each

of them spring impieties of two kinds, six in all. First, there is the

impiety of those who deny the existence of the Gods; these may be honest

men, haters of evil, who are only dangerous because they talk loosely

about the Gods and make others like themselves; but there is also a more

vicious class, who are full of craft and licentiousness. To this latter

belong diviners, jugglers, despots, demagogues, generals, hierophants

of private mysteries, and sophists. The first class shall be only

imprisoned and admonished. The second class should be put to death, if

they could be, many times over. The two other sorts of impiety, first of

those who deny the care of the Gods, and secondly, of those who affirm

that they may be propitiated, have similar subdivisions, varying in

degree of guilt. Those who have learnt to blaspheme from mere ignorance

shall be imprisoned in the House of Reformation for five years at least,

and not allowed to see any one but members of the Nocturnal Council,

who shall converse with them touching their souls health. If any of the

prisoners come to their right mind, at the end of five years let them be

restored to sane company; but he who again offends shall die. As to

that class of monstrous natures who not only believe that the Gods are

negligent, or may be propitiated, but pretend to practise on the souls

of quick and dead, and promise to charm the Gods, and to effect the ruin

of houses and states--he, I say, who is guilty of these things, shall

be bound in the central prison, and shall have no intercourse with

any freeman, receiving only his daily rations of food from the public

slaves; and when he dies, let him be cast beyond the border; and if any

freeman assist to bury him, he shall be liable to a suit for impiety.

But the sins of the father shall not be visited upon his children, who,

like other orphans, shall be educated by the state. Further, let there

be a general law which will have a tendency to repress impiety. No man

shall have religious services in his house, but he shall go with his

friends to pray and sacrifice in the temples. The reason of this is,

that religious institutions can only be framed by a great intelligence.

But women and weak men are always consecrating the event of the moment;

they are under the influence of dreams and apparitions, and they build

altars and temples in every village and in any place where they have

had a vision. The law is designed to prevent this, and also to deter men

from attempting to propitiate the Gods by secret sacrifices, which

only multiply their sins. Therefore let the law run:--No one shall

have private religious rites; and if a man or woman who has not been

previously noted for any impiety offend in this way, let them be

admonished to remove their rites to a public temple; but if the offender

be one of the obstinate sort, he shall be brought to trial before the

guardians, and if he be found guilty, let him die.

BOOK XI. As to dealings between man and man, the principle of them is

simple--Thou shalt not take what is not thine; and shalt do to others as

thou wouldst that they should do to thee. First, of treasure trove:--May

I never desire to find, or lift, if I find, or be induced by the counsel

of diviners to lift, a treasure which one who was not my ancestor has

laid down; for I shall not gain so much in money as I shall lose in

virtue. The saying, 'Move not the immovable,' may be repeated in a

new sense; and there is a common belief which asserts that such deeds

prevent a man from having a family. To him who is careless of such

consequences, and, despising the word of the wise, takes up a treasure

which is not his--what will be done by the hand of the Gods, God only

knows,--but I would have the first person who sees the offender, inform

the wardens of the city or the country; and they shall send to Delphi

for a decision, and whatever the oracle orders, they shall carry out.

If the informer be a freeman, he shall be honoured, and if a slave,

set free; but he who does not inform, if he be a freeman, shall be

dishonoured, and if a slave, shall be put to death. If a man leave

anywhere anything great or small, intentionally or unintentionally, let

him who may find the property deem the deposit sacred to the Goddess

of ways. And he who appropriates the same, if he be a slave, shall be

beaten with many stripes; if a freeman, he shall pay tenfold, and be

held to have done a dishonourable action. If a person says that another

has something of his, and the other allows that he has the property in

dispute, but maintains it to be his own, let the ownership be proved out

of the registers of property. If the property is registered as belonging

to some one who is absent, possession shall be given to him who offers

sufficient security on behalf of the absentee; or if the property is not

registered, let it remain with the three eldest magistrates, and if it

should be an animal, the defeated party must pay the cost of its keep. A

man may arrest his own slave, and he may also imprison for safe-keeping

the runaway slave of a friend. Any one interfering with him must produce

three sureties; otherwise, he will be liable to an action for violence,

and if he be cast, must pay a double amount of damages to him from whom

he has taken the slave. A freedman who does not pay due respect to his

patron, may also be seized. Due respect consists in going three times

a month to the house of his patron, and offering to perform any lawful

service for him; he must also marry as his master pleases; and if his

property be greater than his master's, he must hand over to him the

excess. A freedman may not remain in the state, except with the consent

of the magistrates and of his master, for more than twenty years; and

whenever his census exceeds that of the third class, he must in any case

leave the country within thirty days, taking his property with him. If

he break this regulation, the penalty shall be death, and his property

shall be confiscated. Suits about these matters are to be decided in the

courts of the tribes, unless the parties have settled the matter before

a court of neighbours or before arbiters. If anybody claim a beast, or

anything else, let the possessor refer to the seller or giver of the

property within thirty days, if the latter reside in the city, or, if

the goods have been received from a stranger, within five months, of

which the middle month shall include the summer solstice. All purchases

and exchanges are to be made in the agora, and paid for on the spot; the

law will not allow credit to be given. No law shall protect the money

subscribed for clubs. He who sells anything of greater value than fifty

drachmas shall abide in the city for ten days, and let his whereabouts

be known to the buyer, in case of any reclamation. When a slave is sold

who is subject to epilepsy, stone, or any other invisible disorder, the

buyer, if he be a physician or trainer, or if he be warned, shall have

no redress; but in other cases within six months, or within twelve

months in epileptic disorders, he may bring the matter before a jury of

physicians to be agreed upon by both parties; and the seller who loses

the suit, if he be an expert, shall pay twice the price; or if he be

a private person, the bargain shall be rescinded, and he shall simply

refund. If a person knowingly sells a homicide to another, who is

informed of his character, there is no redress. But if the judges--who

are to be the five youngest guardians of the law--decide that the

purchaser was not aware, then the seller is to pay threefold, and to

purify the house of the buyer.

He who exchanges money for money, or beast for beast, must warrant

either of them to be sound and good. As in the case of other laws, let

us have a preamble, relating to all this class of crime. Adulteration

is a kind of falsehood about which the many commonly say that at proper

times the practice may often be right, but they do not define at what

times. But the legislator will tell them, that no man should invoke the

Gods when he is practising deceit or fraud, in word or deed. For he is

the enemy of heaven, first, who swears falsely, not thinking of the Gods

by whom he swears, and secondly, he who lies to his superiors. (Now

the superiors are the betters of inferiors,--the elder of the younger,

parents of children, men of women, and rulers of subjects.) The trader

who cheats in the agora is a liar and is perjured--he respects neither

the name of God nor the regulations of the magistrates. If after hearing

this he will still be dishonest, let him listen to the law:--The seller

shall not have two prices on the same day, neither must he puff his

goods, nor offer to swear about them. If he break the law, any citizen

not less than thirty years of age may smite him. If he sell adulterated

goods, the slave or metic who informs against him shall have the goods;

the citizen who brings such a charge, if he prove it, shall offer up the

goods in question to the Gods of the agora; or if he fail to prove it,

shall be dishonoured. He who is detected in selling adulterated goods

shall be deprived of them, and shall receive a stripe for every drachma

of their value. The wardens of the agora and the guardians of the law

shall take experienced persons into counsel, and draw up regulations for

the agora. These shall be inscribed on a column in front of the court

of the wardens of the agora.--As to the wardens of the city, enough

has been said already. But if any omissions in the law are afterwards

discovered, the wardens and the guardians shall supply them, and have

them inscribed after the original regulations on a column before the

court of the wardens of the city.

Next in order follows the subject of retail trades, which in their

natural use are the reverse of mischievous; for every man is a

benefactor who reduces what is unequal to symmetry and proportion. Money

is the instrument by which this is accomplished, and the shop-keeper,

the merchant, and hotel-keeper do but supply the wants and equalize

the possessions of mankind. Why, then, does any dishonour attach to

a beneficent occupation? Let us consider the nature of the accusation

first, and then see whether it can be removed. 'What is your drift?'

Dear Cleinias, there are few men who are so gifted by nature, and

improved by education, as to be able to control the desire of making

money; or who are sober in their wishes and prefer moderation to

accumulation. The great majority think that they can never have enough,

and the consequence is that retail trade has become a reproach. Whereas,

however ludicrous the idea may seem, if noble men and noble women could

be induced to open a shop, and to trade upon incorruptible principles,

then the aspect of things would change, and retail traders would be

regarded as nursing fathers and mothers. In our own day the trader

goes and settles in distant places, and receives the weary traveller

hospitably at first, but in the end treats him as an enemy and a

captive, whom he only liberates for an enormous ransom. This is what

has brought retail trade into disrepute, and against this the legislator

ought to provide. Men have said of old, that to fight against two

opponents is hard; and the two opponents of whom I am thinking are

wealth and poverty--the one corrupting men by luxury; the other, through

misery, depriving them of the sense of shame. What remedies can a city

find for this disease? First, to have as few retail traders as possible;

secondly, to give retail trade over to a class whose corruption will not

injure the state; and thirdly, to restrain the insolence and meanness of

the retailers.

Let us make the following laws:--(1) In the city of the Magnetes none of

the 5040 citizens shall be a retailer or merchant, or do any service to

any private persons who do not equally serve him, except to his father

and mother and their fathers and mothers, and generally to his elders

who are freemen, and whom he serves as a freeman. He who follows an

illiberal pursuit may be cited for dishonouring his family, and kept

in bonds for a year; and if he offend again, he shall be bound for two

years; and for every offence his punishment shall be doubled: (2) Every

retailer shall be a metic or a foreigner: (3) The guardians of the law

shall have a special care of this part of the community, whose calling

exposes them to peculiar temptations. They shall consult with persons of

experience, and find out what prices will yield the traders a moderate

profit, and fix them.

When a man does not fulfil his contract, he being under no legal or

other impediment, the case shall be brought before the court of the

tribes, if not previously settled by arbitration. The class of artisans

is consecrated to Hephaestus and Athene; the makers of weapons to Ares

and Athene: all of whom, remembering that the Gods are their ancestors,

should be ashamed to deceive in the practice of their craft. If any man

is lazy in the fulfilment of his work, and fancies, foolish fellow, that

his patron God will not deal hardly with him, he will be punished by the

God; and let the law follow:--He who fails in his undertaking shall pay

the value, and do the work gratis in a specified time. The contractor,

like the seller, is enjoined by law to charge the simple value of his

work; in a free city, art should be a true thing, and the artist must

not practise on the ignorance of others. On the other hand, he who has

ordered any work and does not pay the workman according to agreement,

dishonours Zeus and Athene, and breaks the bonds of society. And if

he does not pay at the time agreed, let him pay double; and although

interest is forbidden in other cases, let the workman receive after the

expiration of a year interest at the rate of an obol a month for every

drachma (equal to 200 per cent. per ann.). And we may observe by the

way, in speaking of craftsmen, that if our military craft do their work

well, the state will praise those who honour them, and blame those who

do not honour them. Not that the first place of honour is to be assigned

to the warrior; a higher still is reserved for those who obey the laws.

Most of the dealings between man and man are now settled, with the

exception of such as relate to orphans and guardianships. These lead

us to speak of the intentions of the dying, about which we must make

regulations. I say 'must'; for mankind cannot be allowed to dispose of

their property as they please, in ways at variance with one another and

with law and custom. But a dying person is a strange being, and is not

easily managed; he wants to be master of all he has, and is apt to use

angry words. He will say,--'May I not do what I will with my own, and

give much to my friends, and little to my enemies?' 'There is reason

in that.' O Cleinias, in my judgment the older lawgivers were too

soft-hearted, and wanting in insight into human affairs. They were

too ready to listen to the outcry of a dying man, and hence they were

induced to give him an absolute power of bequest. But I would say to

him:--O creature of a day, you know neither what is yours nor yourself:

for you and your property are not your own, but belong to your whole

family, past and to come, and property and family alike belong to the

State. And therefore I must take out of your hands the charge of what

you leave behind you, with a view to the interests of all. And I hope

that you will not quarrel with us, now that you are going the way of all

mankind; we will do our best for you and yours when you are no longer

here. Let this be our address to the living and dying, and let the law

be as follows:--The father who has sons shall appoint one of them to be

the heir of the lot; and if he has given any other son to be adopted by

another, the adoption shall also be recorded; and if he has still a son

who has no lot, and has a chance of going to a colony, he may give him

what he has more than the lot; or if he has more than one son unprovided

for, he may divide the money between them. A son who has a house of his

own, and a daughter who is betrothed, are not to share in the bequest of

money; and the son or daughter who, having inherited one lot, acquires

another, is to bequeath the new inheritance to the next of kin. If a man

have only daughters, he may adopt the husband of any one of them; or if

he have lost a son, let him make mention of the circumstance in his will

and adopt another. If he have no children, he may give away a tenth of

his acquired property to whomsoever he likes; but he must adopt an heir

to inherit the lot, and may leave the remainder to him. Also he may

appoint guardians for his children; or if he die without appointing them

or without making a will, the nearest kinsmen,--two on the father's

and two on the mother's side,--and one friend of the departed, shall be

appointed guardians. The fifteen eldest guardians of the law are to have

special charge of all orphans, the whole number of fifteen being

divided into bodies of three, who will succeed one another according

to seniority every year for five years. If a man dying intestate leave

daughters, he must pardon the law which marries them for looking, first

to kinship, and secondly to the preservation of the lot. The legislator

cannot regard the character of the heir, which to the father is the

first consideration. The law will therefore run as follows:--If the

intestate leave daughters, husbands are to be found for them among

their kindred according to the following table of affinity: first,

their father's brothers; secondly, the sons of their father's brothers;

thirdly, of their father's sisters; fourthly, their great-uncles;

fifthly, the sons of a great-uncle; sixthly, the sons of a great-aunt.

The kindred in such cases shall always be reckoned in this way; the

relationship shall proceed upwards through brothers and sisters and

brothers' and sisters' children, and first the male line must be taken

and then the female. If there is a dispute in regard to fitness of

age for marriage, this the judge shall decide, after having made an

inspection of the youth naked, and of the maiden naked down to the

waist. If the maiden has no relations within the degree of third cousin,

she may choose whom she likes, with the consent of her guardians; or she

may even select some one who has gone to a colony, and he, if he be a

kinsman, will take the lot by law; if not, he must have her guardians'

consent, as well as hers. When a man dies without children and without

a will, let a young man and a young woman go forth from the family and

take up their abode in the desolate house. The woman shall be selected

from the kindred in the following order of succession:--first, a

sister of the deceased; second, a brother's daughter; third, a sister's

daughter; fourth, a father's sister; fifth, a daughter of a father's

brother; sixth, a daughter of a father's sister. For the man the

same order shall be observed as in the preceding case. The legislator

foresees that laws of this kind will sometimes press heavily, and that

his intention cannot always be fulfilled; as for example, when there are

mental and bodily defects in the persons who are enjoined to marry. But

he must be excused for not being always able to reconcile the general

principles of public interest with the particular circumstances of

individuals; and he is willing to allow, in like manner, that the

individual cannot always do what the lawgiver wishes. And then arbiters

must be chosen, who will determine equitably the cases which may arise

under the law: e.g. a rich cousin may sometimes desire a grander match,

or the requirements of the law can only be fulfilled by marrying a

madwoman. To meet such cases let the following law be enacted:--If any

one comes forward and says that the lawgiver, had he been alive, would

not have required the carrying out of the law in a particular case, let

him go to the fifteen eldest guardians of the law who have the care of

orphans; but if he thinks that too much power is thus given to them, he

may bring the case before the court of select judges.

Thus will orphans have a second birth. In order to make their sad

condition as light as possible, the guardians of the law shall be

their parents, and shall be admonished to take care of them. And what

admonition can be more appropriate than the assurance which we formerly

gave, that the souls of the dead watch over mortal affairs? About this

there are many ancient traditions, which may be taken on trust from the

legislator. Let men fear, in the first place, the Gods above; secondly,

the souls of the departed, who naturally care for their own descendants;

thirdly, the aged living, who are quick to hear of any neglect of family

duties, especially in the case of orphans. For they are the holiest

and most sacred of all deposits, and the peculiar care of guardians and

magistrates; and those who try to bring them up well will contribute

to their own good and to that of their families. He who listens to the

preamble of the law will never know the severity of the legislator; but

he who disobeys, and injures the orphan, will pay twice the penalty he

would have paid if the parents had been alive. More laws might have been

made about orphans, did we not suppose that the guardians have children

and property of their own which are protected by the laws; and the duty

of the guardian in our state is the same as that of a father, though

his honour or disgrace is greater. A legal admonition and threat may,

however, be of service: the guardian of the orphan and the guardian of

the law who is over him, shall love the orphan as their own children,

and take more care of his or her property than of their own. If the

guardian of the child neglect his duty, the guardian of the law shall

fine him; and the guardian may also have the magistrate tried for

neglect in the court of select judges, and he shall pay, if convicted,

a double penalty. Further, the guardian of the orphan who is careless

or dishonest may be fined on the information of any of the citizens in a

fourfold penalty, half to go to the orphan and half to the prosecutor

of the suit. When the orphan is of age, if he thinks that he has been

ill-used, his guardian may be brought to trial by him within five years,

and the penalty shall be fixed by the court. Or if the magistrate

has neglected the orphan, he shall pay damages to him; but if he have

defrauded him, he shall make compensation and also be deposed from his

office of guardian of the law.

If irremediable differences arise between fathers and sons, the father

may want to renounce his son, or the son may indict his father for

imbecility: such violent separations only take place when the family are

'a bad lot'; if only one of the two parties is bad, the differences do

not grow to so great a height. But here arises a difficulty. Although

in any other state a son who is disinherited does not cease to be a

citizen, in ours he does; for the number of citizens cannot exceed 5040.

And therefore he who is to suffer such a penalty ought to be abjured,

not only by his father, but by the whole family. The law, then, should

run as follows:--If any man's evil fortune or temper incline him to

disinherit his son, let him not do so lightly or on the instant; but let

him have a council of his own relations and of the maternal relations of

his son, and set forth to them the propriety of disinheriting him, and

allow his son to answer. And if more than half of the kindred male and

female, being of full age, condemn the son, let him be disinherited.

If any other citizen desires to adopt him, he may, for young men's

characters often change in the course of life. But if, after ten years,

he remains unadopted, let him be sent to a colony. If disease, or old

age, or evil disposition cause a man to go out of his mind, and he is

ruining his house and property, and his son doubts about indicting him

for insanity, let him lay the case before the eldest guardians of the

law, and consult with them. And if they advise him to proceed, and the

father is decided to be imbecile, he shall have no more control over his

property, but shall live henceforward like a child in the house.

If a man and his wife are of incompatible tempers, ten guardians of the

law and ten of the matrons who regulate marriage shall take their case

in hand, and reconcile them, if possible. If, however, their swelling

souls cannot be pacified, the wife may try and find a new husband, and

the husband a new wife; probably they are not very gentle creatures, and

should therefore be joined to milder natures. The younger of those

who are separated should also select their partners with a view to the

procreation of children; while the older should seek a companion for

their declining years. If a woman dies, leaving children male or female,

the law will advise, but not compel, the widower to abstain from a

second marriage; if she leave no children, he shall be compelled to

marry. Also a widow, if she is not old enough to live honestly without

marriage, shall marry again; and in case she have no children, she

should marry for the sake of them. There is sometimes an uncertainty

which parent the offspring is to follow: in unions of a female slave

with a male slave, or with a freedman or free man, or of a free woman

with a male slave, the offspring is to belong to the master; but if the

master or mistress be themselves the parent of the child, the slave and

the child are to be sent away to another land.

Concerning duty to parents, let the preamble be as follows:--We honour

the Gods in their lifeless images, and believe that we thus propitiate

them. But he who has an aged father or mother has a living image, which

if he cherish it will do him far more good than any statue. 'What do

you mean by cherishing them?' I will tell you. Oedipus and Amyntor and

Theseus cursed their children, and their curses took effect. This proves

that the Gods hear the curses of parents who are wronged; and shall we

doubt that they hear and fulfil their blessings too?' 'Surely not.' And,

as we were saying, no image is more honoured by the Gods than an aged

father and mother, to whom when honour is done, the God who hears their

prayers is rejoiced, and their influence is greater than that of the

lifeless statue; for they pray that good or evil may come to us in

proportion as they are honoured or dishonoured, but the statue is

silent. 'Excellent.' Good men are glad when their parents live to

extreme old age, or if they depart early, lament their loss; but to bad

man their parents are always terrible. Wherefore let every one honour

his parents, and if this preamble fails of influencing him, let him hear

the law:--If any one does not take sufficient care of his parents, let

the aggrieved person inform the three eldest guardians of the law and

three of the women who are concerned with marriages. Women up to forty

years of age, and men up to thirty, who thus offend, shall be beaten

and imprisoned. After that age they are to be brought before a court

composed of the eldest citizens, who may inflict any punishment upon

them which they please. If the injured party cannot inform, let any

freeman who hears of the case inform; a slave who does so shall be

set free,--if he be the slave of the one of the parties, by the

magistrate,--if owned by another, at the cost of the state; and let the

magistrates, take care that he is not wronged by any one out of revenge.

The injuries which one person does to another by the use of poisons

are of two kinds;--one affects the body by the employment of drugs and

potions; the other works on the mind by the practice of sorcery and

magic. Fatal cases of either sort have been already mentioned; and now

we must have a law respecting cases which are not fatal. There is no use

in arguing with a man whose mind is disturbed by waxen images placed at

his own door, or on the sepulchre of his father or mother, or at a spot

where three ways meet. But to the wizards themselves we must address

a solemn preamble, begging them not to treat the world as if they were

children, or compel the legislator to expose them, and to show men that

the poisoner who is not a physician and the wizard who is not a prophet

or diviner are equally ignorant of what they are doing. Let the law be

as follows:--He who by the use of poison does any injury not fatal to

a man or his servants, or any injury whether fatal or not to another's

cattle or bees, is to be punished with death if he be a physician, and

if he be not a physician he is to suffer the punishment awarded by the

court: and he who injures another by sorcery, if he be a diviner or

prophet, shall be put to death; and, if he be not a diviner, the court

shall determine what he ought to pay or suffer.

Any one who injures another by theft or violence shall pay damages at

least equal to the injury; and besides the compensation, a suitable

punishment shall be inflicted. The foolish youth who is the victim of

others is to have a lighter punishment; he whose folly is occasioned

by his own jealousy or desire or anger is to suffer more heavily.

Punishment is to be inflicted, not for the sake of vengeance, for

what is done cannot be undone, but for the sake of prevention and

reformation. And there should be a proportion between the punishment and

the crime, in which the judge, having a discretion left him, must,

by estimating the crime, second the legislator, who, like a painter,

furnishes outlines for him to fill up.

A madman is not to go about at large in the city, but is to be taken

care of by his relatives. Neglect on their part is to be punished in the

first class by a fine of a hundred drachmas, and proportionally in

the others. Now madness is of various kinds; in addition to that

which arises from disease there is the madness which originates in a

passionate temperament, and makes men when engaged in a quarrel use

foul and abusive language against each other. This is intolerable in a

well-ordered state; and therefore our law shall be as follows:--No one

is to speak evil of another, but when men differ in opinion they are to

instruct one another without speaking evil. Nor should any one seek

to rouse the passions which education has calmed; for he who feeds and

nurses his wrath is apt to make ribald jests at his opponent, with a

loss of character or dignity to himself. And for this reason no one may

use any abusive word in a temple, or at sacrifices, or games, or in

any public assembly, and he who offends shall be censured by the proper

magistrate; and the magistrate, if he fail to censure him, shall not

claim the prize of virtue. In any other place the angry man who indulges

in revilings, whether he be the beginner or not, may be chastised by an

elder. The reviler is always trying to make his opponent ridiculous; and

the use of ridicule in anger we cannot allow. We forbid the comic poet

to ridicule our citizens, under a penalty of expulsion from the country

or a fine of three minae. Jest in which there is no offence may be

allowed; but the question of offence shall be determined by the director

of education, who is to be the licenser of theatrical performances.

The righteous man who is in adversity will not be allowed to starve in a

well-ordered city; he will never be a beggar. Nor is a man to be pitied,

merely because he is hungry, unless he be temperate. Therefore let the

law be as follows:--Let there be no beggars in our state; and he who

begs shall be expelled by the magistrates both from town and country.

If a slave, male or female, does any harm to the property of another,

who is not himself a party to the harm, the master shall compensate the

injury or give up the offending slave. But if the master argue that the

charge has arisen by collusion, with the view of obtaining the slave,

he may put the plaintiff on his trial for malpractices, and recover from

him twice the value of the slave; or if he is cast he must make good

the damage and deliver up the slave. The injury done by a horse or other

animal shall be compensated in like manner.

A witness who will not come of himself may be summoned, and if he fail

in appearing, he shall be liable for any harm which may ensue: if he

swears that he does not know, he may leave the court. A judge who is

called upon as a witness must not vote. A free woman, if she is over

forty, may bear witness and plead, and, if she have no husband, she may

also bring an action. A slave, male or female, and a child may witness

and plead only in case of murder, but they must give sureties that they

will appear at the trial, if they should be charged with false witness.

Such charges must be made pending the trial, and the accusations shall

be sealed by both parties and kept by the magistrates until the trial

for perjury comes off. If a man is twice convicted of perjury, he is not

to be required, if three times, he is not to be allowed to bear witness,

or, if he persists in bearing witness, is to be punished with death.

When more than half the evidence is proved to be false there must be a

new trial.

The best and noblest things in human life are liable to be defiled and

perverted. Is not justice the civilizer of mankind? And yet upon the

noble profession of the advocate has come an evil name. For he is said

to make the worse appear the better cause, and only requires money

in return for his services. Such an art will be forbidden by the

legislator, and if existing among us will be requested to depart to

another city. To the disobedient let the voice of the law be heard

saying:--He who tries to pervert justice in the minds of the judges, or

to increase litigation, shall be brought before the supreme court. If he

does so from contentiousness, let him be silenced for a time, and, if

he offend again, put to death. If he have acted from a love of gain,

let him be sent out of the country if he be a foreigner, or if he be a

citizen let him be put to death.

BOOK XII. If a false message be taken to or brought from other states,

whether friendly or hostile, by ambassadors or heralds, they shall be

indicted for having dishonoured their sacred office, and, if convicted,

shall suffer a penalty.--Stealing is mean; robbery is shameless. Let no

man deceive himself by the supposed example of the Gods, for no God or

son of a God ever really practised either force or fraud. On this point

the legislator is better informed than all the poets put together. He

who listens to him shall be for ever happy, but he who will not listen

shall have the following law directed against him:--He who steals much,

or he who steals little of the public property is deserving of the same

penalty; for they are both impelled by the same evil motive. When the

law punishes one man more lightly than another, this is done under the

idea, not that he is less guilty, but that he is more curable. Now a

thief who is a foreigner or slave may be curable; but the thief who is

a citizen, and has had the advantages of education, should be put to

death, for he is incurable.

Much consideration and many regulations are necessary about military

expeditions; the great principal of all is that no one, male or

female, in war or peace, in great matters or small, shall be without a

commander. Whether men stand or walk, or drill, or pursue, or retreat,

or wash, or eat, they should all act together and in obedience to

orders. We should practise from our youth upwards the habits of command

and obedience. All dances, relaxations, endurances of meats and drinks,

of cold and heat, and of hard couches, should have a view to war, and

care should be taken not to destroy the natural covering and use of the

head and feet by wearing shoes and caps; for the head is the lord of

the body, and the feet are the best of servants. The soldier should have

thoughts like these; and let him hear the law:--He who is enrolled shall

serve, and if he absent himself without leave he shall be indicted for

failure of service before his own branch of the army when the expedition

returns, and if he be found guilty he shall suffer the penalty which the

courts award, and never be allowed to contend for any prize of valour,

or to accuse another of misbehaviour in military matters. Desertion

shall also be tried and punished in the same manner. After the courts

for trying failure of service and desertion have been held, the generals

shall hold another court, in which the several arms of the service will

award prizes for the expedition which has just concluded. The prize is

to be a crown of olive, which the victor shall offer up at the temple

of his favourite war God...In any suit which a man brings, let the

indictment be scrupulously true, for justice is an honourable maiden,

to whom falsehood is naturally hateful. For example, when men are

prosecuted for having lost their arms, great care should be taken by the

witnesses to distinguish between cases in which they have been lost from

necessity and from cowardice. If the hero Patroclus had not been killed

but had been brought back alive from the field, he might have been

reproached with having lost the divine armour. And a man may lose

his arms in a storm at sea, or from a fall, and under many other

circumstances. There is a distinction of language to be observed in the

use of the two terms, 'thrower away of a shield' (ripsaspis), and 'loser

of arms' (apoboleus oplon), one being the voluntary, the other the

involuntary relinquishment of them. Let the law then be as follows:--If

any one is overtaken by the enemy, having arms in his hands, and he

leaves them behind him voluntarily, choosing base life instead of

honourable death, let justice be done. The old legend of Caeneus, who

was changed by Poseidon from a woman into a man, may teach by contraries

the appropriate punishment. Let the thrower away of his shield be

changed from a man into a woman--that is to say, let him be all his life

out of danger, and never again be admitted by any commander into the

ranks of his army; and let him pay a heavy fine according to his class.

And any commander who permits him to serve shall also be punished by a

fine.

All magistrates, whatever be their tenure of office, must give an

account of their magistracy. But where shall we find the magistrate who

is worthy to supervise them or look into their short-comings and crooked

ways? The examiner must be more than man who is sufficient for these

things. For the truth is that there are many causes of the dissolution

of states; which, like ships or animals, have their cords, and girders,

and sinews easily relaxed, and nothing tends more to their welfare and

preservation than the supervision of them by examiners who are better

than the magistrates; failing in this they fall to pieces, and each

becomes many instead of one. Wherefore let the people meet after the

summer solstice, in the precincts of Apollo and the Sun, and appoint

three men of not less than fifty years of age. They shall proceed as

follows:--Each citizen shall select some one, not himself, whom he

thinks the best. The persons selected shall be reduced to one half, who

have the greatest number of votes, if they are an even number; but if an

odd number, he who has the smallest number of votes shall be previously

withdrawn. The voting shall continue in the same manner until three only

remain; and if the number of votes cast for them be equal, a distinction

between the first, second, and third shall be made by lot. The three

shall be crowned with an olive wreath, and proclamation made, that the

city of the Magnetes, once more preserved by the Gods, presents her

three best men to Apollo and the Sun, to whom she dedicates them as long

as their lives answer to the judgment formed of them. They shall choose

in the first year of their office twelve examiners, to continue until

they are seventy-five years of age; afterwards three shall be added

annually. While they hold office, they shall dwell within the precinct

of the God. They are to divide all the magistracies into twelve classes,

and may apply any methods of enquiry, and inflict any punishments which

they please; in some cases singly, in other cases together, announcing

the acquittal or punishment of the magistrate on a tablet which they

will place in the agora. A magistrate who has been condemned by the

examiners may appeal to the select judges, and, if he gain his suit,

may in turn prosecute the examiners; but if the appellant is cast,

his punishment shall be doubled, unless he was previously condemned to

death.

And what honours shall be paid to these examiners, whom the whole state

counts worthy of the rewards of virtue? They shall have the first place

at all sacrifices and other ceremonies, and in all assemblies and

public places; they shall go on sacred embassies, and have the exclusive

privilege of wearing a crown of laurel. They are priests of Apollo

and the Sun, and he of their number who is judged first shall be high

priest, and give his name to the year. The manner of their burial, too,

shall be different from that of the other citizens. The colour of their

funeral array shall be white, and, instead of the voice of lamentation,

around the bier shall stand a chorus of fifteen boys and fifteen

maidens, chanting hymns in honour of the deceased in alternate strains

during an entire day; and at dawn a band of a hundred youths shall carry

the bier to the grave, marching in the garb of warriors, and the boys in

front of the bier shall sing their national hymn, while the maidens and

women past child-bearing follow after. Priests and priestesses may also

follow, unless the Pythian oracle forbids. The sepulchre shall be a

vault built underground, which will last for ever, having couches of

stone placed side by side; on one of these they shall lay the departed

saint, and then cover the tomb with a mound, and plant trees on every

side except one, where an opening shall be left for other interments.

Every year there shall be games--musical, gymnastic, or equestrian, in

honour of those who have passed every ordeal. But if any of them, after

having been acquitted on any occasion, begin to show the wickedness

of human nature, he who pleases may bring them to trial before a court

composed of the guardians of the law, and of the select judges, and

of any of the examiners who are alive. If he be convicted he shall be

deprived of his honours, and if the accuser do not obtain a fifth part

of the votes, he shall pay a fine according to his class.

What is called the judgment of Rhadamanthus is suited to 'ages of

faith,' but not to our days. He knew that his contemporaries believed

in the Gods, for many of them were the sons of Gods; and he thought that

the easiest and surest method of ending litigation was to commit the

decision to Heaven. In our own day, men either deny the existence

of Gods or their care of men, or maintain that they may be bribed by

attentions and gifts; and the procedure of Rhadamanthus would therefore

be out of date. When the religious ideas of mankind change, their laws

should also change. Thus oaths should no longer be taken from plaintiff

and defendant; simple statements of affirmation and denial should be

substituted. For there is something dreadful in the thought, that nearly

half the citizens of a state are perjured men. There is no objection

to an oath, where a man has no interest in forswearing himself; as, for

example, when a judge is about to give his decision, or in voting at

an election, or in the judgment of games and contests. But where

there would be a premium on perjury, oaths and imprecations should be

prohibited as irrelevant, like appeals to feeling. Let the principles of

justice be learned and taught without words of evil omen. The oaths of

a stranger against a stranger may be allowed, because strangers are not

permitted to become permanent residents in our state.

Trials in private causes are to be decided in the same manner as lesser

offences against the state. The non-attendance at a chorus or sacrifice,

or the omission to pay a war-tax, may be regarded as in the first

instance remediable, and the defaulter may give security; but if he

forfeits the security, the goods pledged shall be sold and the money

given to the state. And for obstinate disobedience, the magistrate shall

have the power of inflicting greater penalties.

A city which is without trade or commerce must consider what it will do

about the going abroad of its own people and the admission of strangers.

For out of intercourse with strangers there arises great confusion of

manners, which in most states is not of any consequence, because the

confusion exists already; but in a well-ordered state it may be a great

evil. Yet the absolute prohibition of foreign travel, or the exclusion

of strangers, is impossible, and would appear barbarous to the rest of

mankind. Public opinion should never be lightly regarded, for the many

are not so far wrong in their judgments as in their lives. Even the

worst of men have often a divine instinct, which enables them to judge

of the differences between the good and bad. States are rightly advised

when they desire to have the praise of men; and the greatest and truest

praise is that of virtue. And our Cretan colony should, and probably

will, have a character for virtue, such as few cities have. Let

this, then, be our law about foreign travel and the reception of

strangers:--No one shall be allowed to leave the country who is under

forty years of age--of course military service abroad is not included in

this regulation--and no one at all except in a public capacity. To the

Olympic, and Pythian, and Nemean, and Isthmian games, shall be sent the

fairest and best and bravest, who shall support the dignity of the city

in time of peace. These, when they come home, shall teach the youth the

inferiority of all other governments. Besides those who go on sacred

missions, other persons shall be sent out by permission of the guardians

to study the institutions of foreign countries. For a people which has

no experience, and no knowledge of the characters of men or the reason

of things, but lives by habit only, can never be perfectly civilized.

Moreover, in all states, bad as well as good, there are holy and

inspired men; these the citizen of a well-ordered city should be ever

seeking out; he should go forth to find them over sea and over land,

that he may more firmly establish institutions in his own state which

are good already and amend the bad. 'What will be the best way of

accomplishing such an object?' In the first place, let the visitor of

foreign countries be between fifty and sixty years of age, and let him

be a citizen of repute, especially in military matters. On his return

he shall appear before the Nocturnal Council: this is a body which sits

from dawn to sunrise, and includes amongst its members the priests who

have gained the prize of virtue, and the ten oldest guardians of the

law, and the director and past directors of education; each of whom has

power to bring with him a younger friend of his own selection, who is

between thirty and forty. The assembly thus constituted shall consider

the laws of their own and other states, and gather information relating

to them. Anything of the sort which is approved by the elder members of

the council shall be studied with all diligence by the younger; who are

to be specially watched by the rest of the citizens, and shall receive

honour, if they are deserving of honour, or dishonour, if they prove

inferior. This is the assembly to which the visitor of foreign countries

shall come and tell anything which he has heard from others in the

course of his travels, or which he has himself observed. If he be made

neither better nor worse, let him at least be praised for his zeal; and

let him receive still more praise, and special honour after death, if

he be improved. But if he be deteriorated by his travels, let him be

prohibited from speaking to any one; and if he submit, he may live as

a private individual: but if he be convicted of attempting to make

innovations in education and the laws, let him die.

Next, as to the reception of strangers. Of these there are four

classes:--First, merchants, who, like birds of passage, find their way

over the sea at a certain time of the year, that they may exhibit their

wares. These should be received in markets and public buildings without

the city, by proper officers, who shall see that justice is done them,

and shall also watch against any political designs which they may

entertain; no more intercourse is to be held with them than is

absolutely necessary. Secondly, there are the visitors at the festivals,

who shall be entertained by hospitable persons at the temples for a

reasonable time; the priests and ministers of the temples shall have

a care of them. In small suits brought by them or against them, the

priests shall be the judges; but in the more important, the wardens of

the agora. Thirdly, there are ambassadors of foreign states; these are

to be honourably received by the generals and commanders, and placed

under the care of the Prytanes and of the persons with whom they are

lodged. Fourthly, there is the philosophical stranger, who, like our

own spectators, from time to time goes to see what is rich and rare in

foreign countries. Like them he must be fifty years of age: and let him

go unbidden to the doors of the wise and rich, that he may learn from

them, and they from him.

These are the rules of missions into foreign countries, and of the

reception of strangers. Let Zeus, the God of hospitality, be honoured;

and let not the stranger be excluded, as in Egypt, from meals and

sacrifices, or, (as at Sparta,) driven away by savage proclamations.

Let guarantees be clearly given in writing and before witnesses. The

number of witnesses shall be three when the sum lent is under a thousand

drachmas, or five when above. The agent and principal at a fraudulent

sale shall be equally liable. He who would search another man's house

for anything must swear that he expects to find it there; and he shall

enter naked, or having on a single garment and no girdle. The owner

shall place at the disposal of the searcher all his goods, sealed as

well as unsealed; if he refuse, he shall be liable in double the value

of the property, if it shall prove to be in his possession. If the owner

be absent, the searcher may counter-seal the property which is under

seal, and place watchers. If the owner remain absent more than five

days, the searcher shall take the magistrates, and open the sealed

property, and seal it up again in their presence. The recovery of goods

disputed, except in the case of lands and houses, (about which there

can be no dispute in our state), is to be barred by time. The public and

unimpeached use of anything for a year in the city, or for five years in

the country, or the private possession and domestic use for three years

in the city, or for ten years in the country, is to give a right of

ownership. But if the possessor have the property in a foreign country,

there shall be no bar as to time. The proceedings of any trial are to

be void, in which either the parties or the witnesses, whether bond or

free, have been prevented by violence from attending:--if a slave be

prevented, the suit shall be invalid; or if a freeman, he who is guilty

of the violence shall be imprisoned for a year, and shall also be liable

to an action for kidnapping. If one competitor forcibly prevents another

from attending at the games, the other may be inscribed as victor in

the temples, and the first, whether victor or not, shall be liable to an

action for damages. The receiver of stolen goods shall undergo the same

punishment as the thief. The receiver of an exile shall be punished with

death. A man ought to have the same friends and enemies as his country;

and he who makes war or peace for himself shall be put to death. And if

a party in the state make war or peace, their leaders shall be indicted

by the generals, and, if convicted, they shall be put to death. The

ministers and officers of a country ought not to receive gifts, even as

the reward of good deeds. He who disobeys shall die.

With a view to taxation a man should have his property and income

valued: and the government may, at their discretion, levy the tax upon

the annual return, or take a portion of the whole.

The good man will offer moderate gifts to the Gods; his land or hearth

cannot be offered, because they are already consecrated to all Gods.

Gold and silver, which arouse envy, and ivory, which is taken from the

dead body of an animal, are unsuitable offerings; iron and brass are

materials of war. Wood and stone of a single piece may be offered; also

woven work which has not occupied one woman more than a month in making.

White is a colour which is acceptable to the Gods; figures of birds and

similar offerings are the best of gifts, but they must be such as the

painter can execute in a day.

Next concerning lawsuits. Judges, or rather arbiters, may be agreed

upon by the plaintiff and defendant; and if no decision is obtained from

them, their fellow-tribesmen shall judge. At this stage there shall be

an increase of the penalty: the defendant, if he be cast, shall pay a

fifth more than the damages claimed. If he further persist, and appeal

a second time, the case shall be heard before the select judges; and

he shall pay, if defeated, the penalty and half as much again. And the

pursuer, if on the first appeal he is defeated, shall pay one fifth

of the damages claimed by him; and if on the second, one half. Other

matters relating to trials, such as the assignment of judges to courts,

the times of sitting, the number of judges, the modes of pleading

and procedure, as we have already said, may be determined by younger

legislators.

These are to be the rules of private courts. As regards public courts,

many states have excellent modes of procedure which may serve for

models; these, when duly tested by experience, should be ratified and

made permanent by us.

Let the judge be accomplished in the laws. He should possess writings

about them, and make a study of them; for laws are the highest

instrument of mental improvement, and derive their name from mind (nous,

nomos). They afford a measure of all censure and praise, whether in

verse or prose, in conversation or in books, and are an antidote to the

vain disputes of men and their equally vain acquiescence in each other's

opinions. The just judge, who imbibes their spirit, makes the city and

himself to stand upright. He establishes justice for the good, and cures

the tempers of the bad, if they can be cured; but denounces death, which

is the only remedy, to the incurable, the threads of whose life cannot

be reversed.

When the suits of the year are completed, execution is to follow. The

court is to award to the plaintiff the property of the defendant, if he

is cast, reserving to him only his lot of land. If the plaintiff is

not satisfied within a month, the court shall put into his hands the

property of the defendant. If the defendant fails in payment to the

amount of a drachma, he shall lose the use and protection of the court;

or if he rebel against the authority of the court, he shall be brought

before the guardians of the law, and if found guilty he shall be put to

death.

Man having been born, educated, having begotten and brought up children,

and gone to law, fulfils the debt of nature. The rites which are to be

celebrated after death in honour of the Gods above and below shall be

determined by the Interpreters. The dead shall be buried in uncultivated

places, where they will be out of the way and do least injury to the

living. For no one either in life or after death has any right to

deprive other men of the sustenance which mother earth provides for

them. No sepulchral mound is to be piled higher than five men can

raise it in five days, and the grave-stone shall not be larger than is

sufficient to contain an inscription of four heroic verses. The dead

are only to be exposed for three days, which is long enough to test the

reality of death. The legislator will instruct the people that the body

is a mere shadow or image, and that the soul, which is our true being,

is gone to give an account of herself before the Gods below. When they

hear this, the good are full of hope, and the evil are terrified. It

is also said that not much can be done for any one after death. And

therefore while in life all man should be helped by their kindred to

pass their days justly and holily, that they may depart in peace. When

a man loses a son or a brother, he should consider that the beloved one

has gone away to fulfil his destiny in another place, and should not

waste money over his lifeless remains. Let the law then order a moderate

funeral of five minae for the first class, of three for the second, of

two for the third, of one for the fourth. One of the guardians of the

law, to be selected by the relatives, shall assist them in arranging

the affairs of the deceased. There would be a want of delicacy in

prescribing that there should or should not be mourning for the dead.

But, at any rate, such mourning is to be confined to the house; there

must be no processions in the streets, and the dead body shall be taken

out of the city before daybreak. Regulations about other forms of burial

and about the non-burial of parricides and other sacrilegious persons

have already been laid down. The work of legislation is therefore nearly

completed; its end will be finally accomplished when we have provided

for the continuance of the state.

Do you remember the names of the Fates? Lachesis, the giver of the lots,

is the first of them; Clotho, the spinster, the second; Atropos, the

unchanging one, is the third and last, who makes the threads of the web

irreversible. And we too want to make our laws irreversible, for the

unchangeable quality in them will be the salvation of the state, and the

source of health and order in the bodies and souls of our citizens. 'But

can such a quality be implanted?' I think that it may; and at any rate

we must try; for, after all our labour, to have been piling up a fabric

which has no foundation would be too ridiculous. 'What foundation would

you lay?' We have already instituted an assembly which was composed

of the ten oldest guardians of the law, and secondly, of those who had

received prizes of virtue, and thirdly, of the travellers who had gone

abroad to enquire into the laws of other countries. Moreover, each of

the members was to choose a young man, of not less than thirty years of

age, to be approved by the rest; and they were to meet at dawn, when all

the world is at leisure. This assembly will be an anchor to the vessel

of state, and provide the means of permanence; for the constitutions of

states, like all other things, have their proper saviours, which are to

them what the head and soul are to the living being. 'How do you mean?'

Mind in the soul, and sight and hearing in the head, or rather, the

perfect union of mind and sense, may be justly called every man's

salvation. 'Certainly.' Yes; but of what nature is this union? In the

case of a ship, for example, the senses of the sailors are added to the

intelligence of the pilot, and the two together save the ship and

the men in the ship. Again, the physician and the general have their

objects; and the object of the one is health, of the other victory.

States, too, have their objects, and the ruler must understand, first,

their nature, and secondly, the means of attaining them, whether in laws

or men. The state which is wanting in this knowledge cannot be

expected to be wise when the time for action arrives. Now what class

or institution is there in our state which has such a saving power? 'I

suspect that you are referring to the Nocturnal Council.' Yes, to that

council which is to have all virtue, and which should aim directly at

the mark. 'Very true.' The inconsistency of legislation in most states

is not surprising, when the variety of their objects is considered. One

of them makes their rule of justice the government of a class; another

aims at wealth; another at freedom, or at freedom and power; and some

who call themselves philosophers maintain that you should seek for all

of them at once. But our object is unmistakeably virtue, and virtue is

of four kinds. 'Yes; and we said that mind is the chief and ruler of the

three other kinds of virtue and of all else.' True, Cleinias; and now,

having already declared the object which is present to the mind of the

pilot, the general, the physician, we will interrogate the mind of the

statesman. Tell me, I say, as the physician and general have told us

their object, what is the object of the statesman. Can you tell me? 'We

cannot.' Did we not say that there are four virtues--courage, wisdom,

and two others, all of which are called by the common name of virtue,

and are in a sense one? 'Certainly we did.' The difficulty is, not in

understanding the differences of the virtues, but in apprehending their

unity. Why do we call virtue, which is a single thing, by the two names

of wisdom and courage? The reason is that courage is concerned with

fear, and is found both in children and in brutes; for the soul may

be courageous without reason, but no soul was, or ever will be, wise

without reason. 'That is true.' I have explained to you the difference,

and do you in return explain to me the unity. But first let us consider

whether any one who knows the name of a thing without the definition has

any real knowledge of it. Is not such knowledge a disgrace to a man of

sense, especially where great and glorious truths are concerned? and can

any subject be more worthy of the attention of our legislators than the

four virtues of which we are speaking--courage, temperance, justice,

wisdom? Ought not the magistrates and officers of the state to instruct

the citizens in the nature of virtue and vice, instead of leaving them

to be taught by some chance poet or sophist? A city which is without

instruction suffers the usual fate of cities in our day. What then shall

we do? How shall we perfect the ideas of our guardians about virtue? how

shall we give our state a head and eyes? 'Yes, but how do you apply the

figure?' The city will be the body or trunk; the best of our young men

will mount into the head or acropolis and be our eyes; they will look

about them, and inform the elders, who are the mind and use the younger

men as their instruments: together they will save the state. Shall this

be our constitution, or shall all be educated alike, and the special

training be given up? 'That is impossible.' Let us then endeavour to

attain to some more exact idea of education. Did we not say that the

true artist or guardian ought to have an eye, not only to the many, but

to the one, and to order all things with a view to the one? Can there be

any more philosophical speculation than how to reduce many things which

are unlike to one idea? 'Perhaps not.' Say rather, 'Certainly not.' And

the rulers of our divine state ought to have an exact knowledge of

the common principle in courage, temperance, justice, wisdom, which is

called by the name of virtue; and unless we know whether virtue is one

or many, we shall hardly know what virtue is. Shall we contrive some

means of engrafting this knowledge on our state, or give the matter up?

'Anything rather than that.' Let us begin by making an agreement. 'By

all means, if we can.' Well, are we not agreed that our guardians ought

to know, not only how the good and the honourable are many, but also how

they are one? 'Yes, certainly.' The true guardian of the laws ought to

know their truth, and should also be able to interpret and execute them?

'He should.' And is there any higher knowledge than the knowledge of the

existence and power of the Gods? The people may be excused for following

tradition; but the guardian must be able to give a reason of the faith

which is in him. And there are two great evidences of religion--the

priority of the soul and the order of the heavens. For no man of

sense, when he contemplates the universe, will be likely to substitute

necessity for reason and will. Those who maintain that the sun and the

stars are inanimate beings are utterly wrong in their opinions. The

men of a former generation had a suspicion, which has been confirmed

by later thinkers, that things inanimate could never without mind have

attained such scientific accuracy; and some (Anaxagoras) even in those

days ventured to assert that mind had ordered all things in heaven; but

they had no idea of the priority of mind, and they turned the world,

or more properly themselves, upside down, and filled the universe

with stones, and earth, and other inanimate bodies. This led to

great impiety, and the poets said many foolish things against the

philosophers, whom they compared to 'yelping she-dogs,' besides making

other abusive remarks. No man can now truly worship the Gods who does

not believe that the soul is eternal, and prior to the body, and the

ruler of all bodies, and does not perceive also that there is mind

in the stars; or who has not heard the connexion of these things with

music, and has not harmonized them with manners and laws, giving a

reason of things which are matters of reason. He who is unable to

acquire this knowledge, as well as the ordinary virtues of a citizen,

can only be a servant, and not a ruler in the state.

Let us then add another law to the effect that the Nocturnal Council

shall be a guard set for the salvation of the state. 'Very good.' To

establish this will be our aim, and I hope that others besides myself

will assist. 'Let us proceed along the road in which God seems to guide

us.' We cannot, Megillus and Cleinias, anticipate the details which will

hereafter be needed; they must be supplied by experience. 'What do you

mean?' First of all a register will have to be made of all those whose

age, character, or education would qualify them to be guardians. The

subjects which they are to learn, and the order in which they are to

be learnt, are mysteries which cannot be explained beforehand, but not

mysteries in any other sense. 'If that is the case, what is to be done?'

We must stake our all on a lucky throw, and I will share the risk by

stating my views on education. And I would have you, Cleinias, who are

the founder of the Magnesian state, and will obtain the greatest glory

if you succeed, and will at least be praised for your courage, if you

fail, take especial heed of this matter. If we can only establish the

Nocturnal Council, we will hand over the city to its keeping; none of

the present company will hesitate about that. Our dream will then become

a reality; and our citizens, if they are carefully chosen and well

educated, will be saviours and guardians such as the world hitherto has

never seen.

The want of completeness in the Laws becomes more apparent in the later

books. There is less arrangement in them, and the transitions are more

abrupt from one subject to another. Yet they contain several noble

passages, such as the 'prelude to the discourse concerning the honour

and dishonour of parents,' or the picture of the dangers attending the

'friendly intercourse of young men and maidens with one another,' or the

soothing remonstrance which is addressed to the dying man respecting his

right to do what he will with his own, or the fine description of the

burial of the dead. The subject of religion in Book X is introduced as

a prelude to offences against the Gods, and this portion of the work

appears to be executed in Plato's best manner.

In the last four books, several questions occur for consideration: among

them are (I) the detection and punishment of offences; (II) the nature

of the voluntary and involuntary; (III) the arguments against atheism,

and against the opinion that the Gods have no care of human affairs;

(IV) the remarks upon retail trade; (V) the institution of the Nocturnal

Council.

I. A weak point in the Laws of Plato is the amount of inquisition into

private life which is to be made by the rulers. The magistrate is

always watching and waylaying the citizens. He is constantly to receive

information against improprieties of life. Plato does not seem to be

aware that espionage can only have a negative effect. He has not yet

discovered the boundary line which parts the domain of law from that of

morality or social life. Men will not tell of one another; nor will

he ever be the most honoured citizen, who gives the most frequent

information about offenders to the magistrates.

As in some writers of fiction, so also in philosophers, we may observe

the effect of age. Plato becomes more conservative as he grows older,

and he would govern the world entirely by men like himself, who are

above fifty years of age; for in them he hopes to find a principle of

stability. He does not remark that, in destroying the freedom he is

destroying also the life of the State. In reducing all the citizens to

rule and measure, he would have been depriving the Magnesian colony of

those great men 'whose acquaintance is beyond all price;' and he would

have found that in the worst-governed Hellenic State, there was more of

a carriere ouverte for extraordinary genius and virtue than in his own.

Plato has an evident dislike of the Athenian dicasteries; he prefers a

few judges who take a leading part in the conduct of trials to a great

number who only listen in silence. He allows of two appeals--in each

case however with an increase of the penalty. Modern jurists would

disapprove of the redress of injustice being purchased only at an

increasing risk; though indirectly the burden of legal expenses, which

seems to have been little felt among the Athenians, has a similar

effect. The love of litigation, which is a remnant of barbarism quite

as much as a corruption of civilization, and was innate in the Athenian

people, is diminished in the new state by the imposition of severe

penalties. If persevered in, it is to be punished with death.

In the Laws murder and homicide besides being crimes, are also

pollutions. Regarded from this point of view, the estimate of such

offences is apt to depend on accidental circumstances, such as the

shedding of blood, and not on the real guilt of the offender or the

injury done to society. They are measured by the horror which they

arouse in a barbarous age. For there is a superstition in law as well as

in religion, and the feelings of a primitive age have a traditional hold

on the mass of the people. On the other hand, Plato is innocent of the

barbarity which would visit the sins of the fathers upon the children,

and he is quite aware that punishment has an eye to the future, and not

to the past. Compared with that of most European nations in the last

century his penal code, though sometimes capricious, is reasonable and

humane.

A defect in Plato's criminal jurisprudence is his remission of the

punishment when the homicide has obtained the forgiveness of the

murdered person; as if crime were a personal affair between

individuals, and not an offence against the State. There is a ridiculous

disproportion in his punishments. Because a slave may fairly receive

a blow for stealing one fig or one bunch of grapes, or a tradesman for

selling adulterated goods to the value of one drachma, it is rather

hard upon the slave that he should receive as many blows as he has taken

grapes or figs, or upon the tradesman who has sold adulterated goods

to the value of a thousand drachmas that he should receive a thousand

blows.

II. But before punishment can be inflicted at all, the legislator

must determine the nature of the voluntary and involuntary. The great

question of the freedom of the will, which in modern times has been worn

threadbare with purely abstract discussion, was approached both by Plato

and Aristotle--first, from the judicial; secondly, from the sophistical

point of view. They were puzzled by the degrees and kinds of crime; they

observed also that the law only punished hurts which are inflicted by a

voluntary agent on an involuntary patient.

In attempting to distinguish between hurt and injury, Plato says that

mere hurt is not injury; but that a benefit when done in a wrong spirit

may sometimes injure, e.g. when conferred without regard to right and

wrong, or to the good or evil consequences which may follow. He means

to say that the good or evil disposition of the agent is the principle

which characterizes actions; and this is not sufficiently described by

the terms voluntary and involuntary. You may hurt another involuntarily,

and no one would suppose that you had injured him; and you may hurt him

voluntarily, as in inflicting punishment--neither is this injury; but if

you hurt him from motives of avarice, ambition, or cowardly fear, this

is injury. Injustice is also described as the victory of desire or

passion or self-conceit over reason, as justice is the subordination of

them to reason. In some paradoxical sense Plato is disposed to affirm

all injustice to be involuntary; because no man would do injustice who

knew that it never paid and could calculate the consequences of what

he was doing. Yet, on the other hand, he admits that the distinction of

voluntary and involuntary, taken in another and more obvious sense, is

the basis of legislation. His conception of justice and injustice is

complicated (1) by the want of a distinction between justice and virtue,

that is to say, between the quality which primarily regards others, and

the quality in which self and others are equally regarded; (2) by the

confusion of doing and suffering justice; (3) by the unwillingness to

renounce the old Socratic paradox, that evil is involuntary.

III. The Laws rest on a religious foundation; in this respect they

bear the stamp of primitive legislation. They do not escape the almost

inevitable consequence of making irreligion penal. If laws are based

upon religion, the greatest offence against them must be irreligion.

Hence the necessity for what in modern language, and according to a

distinction which Plato would scarcely have understood, might be termed

persecution. But the spirit of persecution in Plato, unlike that of

modern religious bodies, arises out of the desire to enforce a true and

simple form of religion, and is directed against the superstitions which

tend to degrade mankind. Sir Thomas More, in his Utopia, is in favour

of tolerating all except the intolerant, though he would not promote to

high offices those who disbelieved in the immortality of the soul. Plato

has not advanced quite so far as this in the path of toleration. But

in judging of his enlightenment, we must remember that the evils of

necromancy and divination were far greater than those of intolerance in

the ancient world. Human nature is always having recourse to the first;

but only when organized into some form of priesthood falls into the

other; although in primitive as in later ages the institution of a

priesthood may claim probably to be an advance on some form of religion

which preceded. The Laws would have rested on a sounder foundation, if

Plato had ever distinctly realized to his mind the difference between

crime and sin or vice. Of this, as of many other controversies, a clear

definition might have been the end. But such a definition belongs to a

later age of philosophy.

The arguments which Plato uses for the being of a God, have an extremely

modern character: first, the consensus gentium; secondly, the argument

which has already been adduced in the Phaedrus, of the priority of the

self-moved. The answer to those who say that God 'cares not,' is, that

He governs by general laws; and that he who takes care of the great

will assuredly take care of the small. Plato did not feel, and has not

attempted to consider, the difficulty of reconciling the special with

the general providence of God. Yet he is on the road to a solution, when

he regards the world as a whole, of which all the parts work together

towards the final end.

We are surprised to find that the scepticism, which we attribute to

young men in our own day, existed then (compare Republic); that the

Epicureanism expressed in the line of Horace (borrowed from Lucretius)--

'Namque Deos didici securum agere aevum,'

was already prevalent in the age of Plato; and that the terrors of

another world were freely used in order to gain advantages over other

men in this. The same objection which struck the Psalmist--'when I saw

the prosperity of the wicked'--is supposed to lie at the root of the

better sort of unbelief. And the answer is substantially the same which

the modern theologian would offer:--that the ways of God in this world

cannot be justified unless there be a future state of rewards and

punishments. Yet this future state of rewards and punishments is in

Plato's view not any addition of happiness or suffering imposed from

without, but the permanence of good and evil in the soul: here he is in

advance of many modern theologians. The Greek, too, had his difficulty

about the existence of evil, which in one solitary passage, remarkable

for being inconsistent with his general system, Plato explains,

after the Magian fashion, by a good and evil spirit (compare Theaet.,

Statesman). This passage is also remarkable for being at variance with

the general optimism of the Tenth Book--not 'all things are ordered by

God for the best,' but some things by a good, others by an evil spirit.

The Tenth Book of the Laws presents a picture of the state of belief

among the Greeks singularly like that of the world in which we live.

Plato is disposed to attribute the incredulity of his own age to several

causes. First, to the bad effect of mythological tales, of which he

retains his disapproval; but he has a weak side for antiquity, and is

unwilling, as in the Republic, wholly to proscribe them. Secondly, he

remarks the self-conceit of a newly-fledged generation of philosophers,

who declare that the sun, moon, and stars, are earth and stones only;

and who also maintain that the Gods are made by the laws of the state.

Thirdly, he notes a confusion in the minds of men arising out of their

misinterpretation of the appearances of the world around them: they do

not always see the righteous rewarded and the wicked punished. So in

modern times there are some whose infidelity has arisen from doubts

about the inspiration of ancient writings; others who have been made

unbelievers by physical science, or again by the seemingly political

character of religion; while there is a third class to whose minds the

difficulty of 'justifying the ways of God to man' has been the chief

stumblingblock. Plato is very much out of temper at the impiety of some

of his contemporaries; yet he is determined to reason with the victims,

as he regards them, of these illusions before he punishes them. His

answer to the unbelievers is twofold: first, that the soul is prior to

the body; secondly, that the ruler of the universe being perfect has

made all things with a view to their perfection. The difficulties

arising out of ancient sacred writings were far less serious in the age

of Plato than in our own.

We too have our popular Epicureanism, which would allow the world to go

on as if there were no God. When the belief in Him, whether of ancient

or modern times, begins to fade away, men relegate Him, either in theory

or practice, into a distant heaven. They do not like expressly to deny

God when it is more convenient to forget Him; and so the theory of the

Epicurean becomes the practice of mankind in general. Nor can we be

said to be free from that which Plato justly considers to be the worst

unbelief--of those who put superstition in the place of true religion.

For the larger half of Christians continue to assert that the justice of

God may be turned aside by gifts, and, if not by the 'odour of fat, and

the sacrifice steaming to heaven,' still by another kind of

sacrifice placed upon the altar--by masses for the quick and dead, by

dispensations, by building churches, by rites and ceremonies--by the

same means which the heathen used, taking other names and shapes. And

the indifference of Epicureanism and unbelief is in two ways the parent

of superstition, partly because it permits, and also because it

creates, a necessity for its development in religious and enthusiastic

temperaments. If men cannot have a rational belief, they will have an

irrational. And hence the most superstitious countries are also at a

certain point of civilization the most unbelieving, and the revolution

which takes one direction is quickly followed by a reaction in the

other. So we may read 'between the lines' ancient history and philosophy

into modern, and modern into ancient. Whether we compare the theory of

Greek philosophy with the Christian religion, or the practice of the

Gentile world with the practice of the Christian world, they will be

found to differ more in words and less in reality than we might have

supposed. The greater opposition which is sometimes made between them

seems to arise chiefly out of a comparison of the ideal of the one with

the practice of the other.

To the errors of superstition and unbelief Plato opposes the simple and

natural truth of religion; the best and highest, whether conceived in

the form of a person or a principle--as the divine mind or as the idea

of good--is believed by him to be the basis of human life. That all

things are working together for good to the good and evil to the evil in

this or in some other world to which human actions are transferred, is

the sum of his faith or theology. Unlike Socrates, he is absolutely free

from superstition. Religion and morality are one and indivisible to him.

He dislikes the 'heathen mythology,' which, as he significantly remarks,

was not tolerated in Crete, and perhaps (for the meaning of his words

is not quite clear) at Sparta. He gives no encouragement to individual

enthusiasm; 'the establishment of religion could only be the work of a

mighty intellect.' Like the Hebrews, he prohibits private rites; for the

avoidance of superstition, he would transfer all worship of the Gods

to the public temples. He would not have men and women consecrating

the accidents of their lives. He trusts to human punishments and not to

divine judgments; though he is not unwilling to repeat the old tradition

that certain kinds of dishonesty 'prevent a man from having a family.'

He considers that the 'ages of faith' have passed away and cannot now

be recalled. Yet he is far from wishing to extirpate the sentiment of

religion, which he sees to be common to all mankind--Barbarians as well

as Hellenes. He remarks that no one passes through life without, sooner

or later, experiencing its power. To which we may add the further remark

that the greater the irreligion, the more violent has often been the

religious reaction.

It is remarkable that Plato's account of mind at the end of the Laws

goes beyond Anaxagoras, and beyond himself in any of his previous

writings. Aristotle, in a well-known passage (Met.) which is an echo of

the Phaedo, remarks on the inconsistency of Anaxagoras in introducing

the agency of mind, and yet having recourse to other and inferior,

probably material causes. But Plato makes the further criticism, that

the error of Anaxagoras consisted, not in denying the universal agency

of mind, but in denying the priority, or, as we should say, the eternity

of it. Yet in the Timaeus he had himself allowed that God made the world

out of pre-existing materials: in the Statesman he says that there were

seeds of evil in the world arising out of the remains of a former chaos

which could not be got rid of; and even in the Tenth Book of the Laws he

has admitted that there are two souls, a good and evil. In the Meno, the

Phaedrus, and the Phaedo, he had spoken of the recovery of ideas from a

former state of existence. But now he has attained to a clearer point of

view: he has discarded these fancies. From meditating on the priority of

the human soul to the body, he has learnt the nature of soul absolutely.

The power of the best, of which he gave an intimation in the Phaedo

and in the Republic, now, as in the Philebus, takes the form of an

intelligence or person. He no longer, like Anaxagoras, supposes mind to

be introduced at a certain time into the world and to give order to

a pre-existing chaos, but to be prior to the chaos, everlasting and

evermoving, and the source of order and intelligence in all things. This

appears to be the last form of Plato's religious philosophy, which might

almost be summed up in the words of Kant, 'the starry heaven above and

the moral law within.' Or rather, perhaps, 'the starry heaven above and

mind prior to the world.'

IV. The remarks about retail trade, about adulteration, and about

mendicity, have a very modern character. Greek social life was more

like our own than we are apt to suppose. There was the same division

of ranks, the same aristocratic and democratic feeling, and, even in a

democracy, the same preference for land and for agricultural pursuits.

Plato may be claimed as the first free trader, when he prohibits the

imposition of customs on imports and exports, though he was clearly

not aware of the importance of the principle which he enunciated. The

discredit of retail trade he attributes to the rogueries of traders,

and is inclined to believe that if a nobleman would keep a shop, which

heaven forbid! retail trade might become honourable. He has hardly

lighted upon the true reason, which appears to be the essential

distinction between buyers and sellers, the one class being necessarily

in some degree dependent on the other. When he proposes to fix prices

'which would allow a moderate gain,' and to regulate trade in several

minute particulars, we must remember that this is by no means so absurd

in a city consisting of 5040 citizens, in which almost every one would

know and become known to everybody else, as in our own vast population.

Among ourselves we are very far from allowing every man to charge what

he pleases. Of many things the prices are fixed by law. Do we not often

hear of wages being adjusted in proportion to the profits of employers?

The objection to regulating them by law and thus avoiding the conflicts

which continually arise between the buyers and sellers of labour, is not

so much the undesirableness as the impossibility of doing so. Wherever

free competition is not reconcileable either with the order of society,

or, as in the case of adulteration, with common honesty, the government

may lawfully interfere. The only question is,--Whether the interference

will be effectual, and whether the evil of interference may not be

greater than the evil which is prevented by it.

He would prohibit beggars, because in a well-ordered state no good man

would be left to starve. This again is a prohibition which might have

been easily enforced, for there is no difficulty in maintaining the

poor when the population is small. In our own times the difficulty of

pauperism is rendered far greater, (1) by the enormous numbers, (2) by

the facility of locomotion, (3) by the increasing tenderness for human

life and suffering. And the only way of meeting the difficulty seems

to be by modern nations subdividing themselves into small bodies having

local knowledge and acting together in the spirit of ancient communities

(compare Arist. Pol.)

V. Regarded as the framework of a polity the Laws are deemed by Plato to

be a decline from the Republic, which is the dream of his earlier years.

He nowhere imagines that he has reached a higher point of speculation.

He is only descending to the level of human things, and he often returns

to his original idea. For the guardians of the Republic, who were

the elder citizens, and were all supposed to be philosophers, is now

substituted a special body, who are to review and amend the laws,

preserving the spirit of the legislator. These are the Nocturnal

Council, who, although they are not specially trained in dialectic,

are not wholly destitute of it; for they must know the relation of

particular virtues to the general principle of virtue. Plato has been

arguing throughout the Laws that temperance is higher than courage,

peace than war, that the love of both must enter into the character of

the good citizen. And at the end the same thought is summed up by him in

an abstract form. The true artist or guardian must be able to reduce the

many to the one, than which, as he says with an enthusiasm worthy of the

Phaedrus or Philebus, 'no more philosophical method was ever devised

by the wit of man.' But the sense of unity in difference can only be

acquired by study; and Plato does not explain to us the nature of this

study, which we may reasonably infer, though there is a remarkable

omission of the word, to be akin to the dialectic of the Republic.

The Nocturnal Council is to consist of the priests who have obtained the

rewards of virtue, of the ten eldest guardians of the law, and of the

director and ex-directors of education; each of whom is to select for

approval a younger coadjutor. To this council the 'Spectator,' who is

sent to visit foreign countries, has to make his report. It is not

an administrative body, but an assembly of sages who are to make

legislation their study. Plato is not altogether disinclined to changes

in the law where experience shows them to be necessary; but he is also

anxious that the original spirit of the constitution should never be

lost sight of.

The Laws of Plato contain the latest phase of his philosophy, showing in

many respects an advance, and in others a decline, in his views of life

and the world. His Theory of Ideas in the next generation passed

into one of Numbers, the nature of which we gather chiefly from the

Metaphysics of Aristotle. Of the speculative side of this theory there

are no traces in the Laws, but doubtless Plato found the practical value

which he attributed to arithmetic greatly confirmed by the possibility

of applying number and measure to the revolution of the heavens, and

to the regulation of human life. In the return to a doctrine of numbers

there is a retrogression rather than an advance; for the most barren

logical abstraction is of a higher nature than number and figure.

Philosophy fades away into the distance; in the Laws it is confined to

the members of the Nocturnal Council. The speculative truth which was

the food of the guardians in the Republic, is for the majority of the

citizens to be superseded by practical virtues. The law, which is the

expression of mind written down, takes the place of the living word of

the philosopher. (Compare the contrast of Phaedrus, and Laws; also the

plays on the words nous, nomos, nou dianome; and the discussion in the

Statesman of the difference between the personal rule of a king and

the impersonal reign of law.) The State is based on virtue and religion

rather than on knowledge; and virtue is no longer identified with

knowledge, being of the commoner sort, and spoken of in the sense

generally understood. Yet there are many traces of advance as well as

retrogression in the Laws of Plato. The attempt to reconcile the ideal

with actual life is an advance; to 'have brought philosophy down from

heaven to earth,' is a praise which may be claimed for him as well as

for his master Socrates. And the members of the Nocturnal Council are

to continue students of the 'one in many' and of the nature of God.

Education is the last word with which Plato supposes the theory of the

Laws to end and the reality to begin.

Plato's increasing appreciation of the difficulties of human affairs,

and of the element of chance which so largely influences them, is an

indication not of a narrower, but of a maturer mind, which had become

more conversant with realities. Nor can we fairly attribute any want of

originality to him, because he has borrowed many of his provisions from

Sparta and Athens. Laws and institutions grow out of habits and customs;

and they have 'better opinion, better confirmation,' if they have come

down from antiquity and are not mere literary inventions. Plato would

have been the first to acknowledge that the Book of Laws was not the

creation of his fancy, but a collection of enactments which had been

devised by inspired legislators, like Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon,

to meet the actual needs of men, and had been approved by time and

experience.

In order to do justice therefore to the design of the work, it is

necessary to examine how far it rests on an historical foundation and

coincides with the actual laws of Sparta and Athens. The consideration

of the historical aspect of the Laws has been reserved for this place.

In working out the comparison the writer has been greatly assisted

by the excellent essays of C.F. Hermann ('De vestigiis institutorum

veterum, imprimis Atticorum, per Platonis de Legibus libros indagandis,'

and 'Juris domestici et familiaris apud Platonem in Legibus cum veteris

Graeciae inque primis Athenarum institutis comparatio': Marburg, 1836),

and by J.B. Telfy's 'Corpus Juris Attici' (Leipzig, 1868).

EXCURSUS ON THE RELATION OF THE LAWS OF PLATO TO THE INSTITUTIONS OF

CRETE AND LACEDAEMON AND TO THE LAWS AND CONSTITUTION OF ATHENS.

The Laws of Plato are essentially Greek: unlike Xenophon's Cyropaedia,

they contain nothing foreign or oriental. Their aim is to reconstruct

the work of the great lawgivers of Hellas in a literary form. They

partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan character. Some of them too

are derived from Crete, and are appropriately transferred to a Cretan

colony. But of Crete so little is known to us, that although, as

Montesquieu (Esprit des Lois) remarks, 'the Laws of Crete are the

original of those of Sparta and the Laws of Plato the correction of

these latter,' there is only one point, viz. the common meals, in which

they can be compared. Most of Plato's provisions resemble the laws and

customs which prevailed in these three states (especially in the two

former), and which the personifying instinct of the Greeks attributed

to Minos, Lycurgus, and Solon. A very few particulars may have been

borrowed from Zaleucus (Cic. de Legibus), and Charondas, who is said to

have first made laws against perjury (Arist. Pol.) and to have forbidden

credit (Stob. Florileg., Gaisford). Some enactments are Plato's own, and

were suggested by his experience of defects in the Athenian and other

Greek states. The Laws also contain many lesser provisions, which are

not found in the ordinary codes of nations, because they cannot be

properly defined, and are therefore better left to custom and common

sense. 'The greater part of the work,' as Aristotle remarks (Pol.), 'is

taken up with laws': yet this is not wholly true, and applies to the

latter rather than to the first half of it. The book rests on an ethical

and religious foundation: the actual laws begin with a hymn of praise

in honour of the soul. And the same lofty aspiration after the good

is perpetually recurring, especially in Books X, XI, XII, and whenever

Plato's mind is filled with his highest themes. In prefixing to most of

his laws a prooemium he has two ends in view, to persuade and also

to threaten. They are to have the sanction of laws and the effect of

sermons. And Plato's 'Book of Laws,' if described in the language of

modern philosophy, may be said to be as much an ethical and educational,

as a political or legal treatise.

But although the Laws partake both of an Athenian and a Spartan

character, the elements which are borrowed from either state are

necessarily very different, because the character and origin of the two

governments themselves differed so widely. Sparta was the more ancient

and primitive: Athens was suited to the wants of a later stage of

society. The relation of the two states to the Laws may be conceived

in this manner:--The foundation and ground-plan of the work are more

Spartan, while the superstructure and details are more Athenian. At

Athens the laws were written down and were voluminous; more than a

thousand fragments of them have been collected by Telfy. Like the Roman

or English law, they contained innumerable particulars. Those of them

which regulated daily life were familiarly known to the Athenians; for

every citizen was his own lawyer, and also a judge, who decided the

rights of his fellow-citizens according to the laws, often after hearing

speeches from the parties interested or from their advocates. It is to

Rome and not to Athens that the invention of law, in the modern sense

of the term, is commonly ascribed. But it must be remembered that long

before the times of the Twelve Tables (B.C. 451), regular courts and

forms of law had existed at Athens and probably in the Greek colonies.

And we may reasonably suppose, though without any express proof of the

fact, that many Roman institutions and customs, like Latin literature

and mythology, were partly derived from Hellas and had imperceptibly

drifted from one shore of the Ionian Sea to the other (compare

especially the constitutions of Servius Tullius and of Solon).

It is not proved that the laws of Sparta were in ancient times either

written down in books or engraved on tablets of marble or brass. Nor is

it certain that, if they had been, the Spartans could have read

them. They were ancient customs, some of them older probably than the

settlement in Laconia, of which the origin is unknown; they occasionally

received the sanction of the Delphic oracle, but there was a still

stronger obligation by which they were enforced,--the necessity of

self-defence: the Spartans were always living in the presence of their

enemies. They belonged to an age when written law had not yet taken

the place of custom and tradition. The old constitution was very rarely

affected by new enactments, and these only related to the duties of the

Kings or Ephors, or the new relations of classes which arose as

time went on. Hence there was as great a difference as could well

be conceived between the Laws of Athens and Sparta: the one was the

creation of a civilized state, and did not differ in principle from our

modern legislation, the other of an age in which the people were held

together and also kept down by force of arms, and which afterwards

retained many traces of its barbaric origin 'surviving in culture.'

Nevertheless the Lacedaemonian was the ideal of a primitive Greek state.

According to Thucydides it was the first which emerged out of confusion

and became a regular government. It was also an army devoted to

military exercises, but organized with a view to self-defence and not

to conquest. It was not quick to move or easily excited; but stolid,

cautious, unambitious, procrastinating. For many centuries it retained

the same character which was impressed upon it by the hand of the

legislator. This singular fabric was partly the result of circumstances,

partly the invention of some unknown individual in prehistoric times,

whose ideal of education was military discipline, and who, by the

ascendency of his genius, made a small tribe into a nation which became

famous in the world's history. The other Hellenes wondered at the

strength and stability of his work. The rest of Hellas, says Thucydides,

undertook the colonisation of Heraclea the more readily, having a

feeling of security now that they saw the Lacedaemonians taking part in

it. The Spartan state appears to us in the dawn of history as a vision

of armed men, irresistible by any other power then existing in the

world. It can hardly be said to have understood at all the rights

or duties of nations to one another, or indeed to have had any moral

principle except patriotism and obedience to commanders. Men were so

trained to act together that they lost the freedom and spontaneity of

human life in cultivating the qualities of the soldier and ruler. The

Spartan state was a composite body in which kings, nobles, citizens,

perioeci, artisans, slaves, had to find a 'modus vivendi' with one

another. All of them were taught some use of arms. The strength of the

family tie was diminished among them by an enforced absence from

home and by common meals. Sparta had no life or growth; no poetry or

tradition of the past; no art, no thought. The Athenians started on

their great career some centuries later, but the Spartans would have

been easily conquered by them, if Athens had not been deficient in the

qualities which constituted the strength (and also the weakness) of her

rival.

The ideal of Athens has been pictured for all time in the speech which

Thucydides puts into the mouth of Pericles, called the Funeral Oration.

He contrasts the activity and freedom and pleasantness of Athenian

life with the immobility and severe looks and incessant drill of the

Spartans. The citizens of no city were more versatile, or more readily

changed from land to sea or more quickly moved about from place to

place. They 'took their pleasures' merrily, and yet, when the time for

fighting arrived, were not a whit behind the Spartans, who were like men

living in a camp, and, though always keeping guard, were often too late

for the fray. Any foreigner might visit Athens; her ships found a way

to the most distant shores; the riches of the whole earth poured in upon

her. Her citizens had their theatres and festivals; they 'provided their

souls with many relaxations'; yet they were not less manly than the

Spartans or less willing to sacrifice this enjoyable existence for their

country's good. The Athenian was a nobler form of life than that of

their rivals, a life of music as well as of gymnastic, the life of a

citizen as well as of a soldier. Such is the picture which Thucydides

has drawn of the Athenians in their glory. It is the spirit of this life

which Plato would infuse into the Magnesian state and which he seeks to

combine with the common meals and gymnastic discipline of Sparta.

The two great types of Athens and Sparta had deeply entered into his

mind. He had heard of Sparta at a distance and from common Hellenic

fame: he was a citizen of Athens and an Athenian of noble birth. He must

often have sat in the law-courts, and may have had personal experience

of the duties of offices such as he is establishing. There is no need to

ask the question, whence he derived his knowledge of the Laws of

Athens: they were a part of his daily life. Many of his enactments

are recognized to be Athenian laws from the fragments preserved in

the Orators and elsewhere: many more would be found to be so if we had

better information. Probably also still more of them would have been

incorporated in the Magnesian code, if the work had ever been finally

completed. But it seems to have come down to us in a form which is

partly finished and partly unfinished, having a beginning and end,

but wanting arrangement in the middle. The Laws answer to Plato's own

description of them, in the comparison which he makes of himself and his

two friends to gatherers of stones or the beginners of some

composite work, 'who are providing materials and partly putting them

together:--having some of their laws, like stones, already fixed in

their places, while others lie about.'

Plato's own life coincided with the period at which Athens rose to her

greatest heights and sank to her lowest depths. It was impossible that

he should regard the blessings of democracy in the same light as the

men of a former generation, whose view was not intercepted by the evil

shadow of the taking of Athens, and who had only the glories of Marathon

and Salamis and the administration of Pericles to look back upon. On the

other hand the fame and prestige of Sparta, which had outlived so many

crimes and blunders, was not altogether lost at the end of the life

of Plato. Hers was the only great Hellenic government which preserved

something of its ancient form; and although the Spartan citizens were

reduced to almost one-tenth of their original number (Arist. Pol.),

she still retained, until the rise of Thebes and Macedon, a certain

authority and predominance due to her final success in the struggle with

Athens and to the victories which Agesilaus won in Asia Minor.

Plato, like Aristotle, had in his mind some form of a mean state which

should escape the evils and secure the advantages of both aristocracy

and democracy. It may however be doubted whether the creation of such

a state is not beyond the legislator's art, although there have been

examples in history of forms of government, which through some community

of interest or of origin, through a balance of parties in the state

itself, or through the fear of a common enemy, have for a while

preserved such a character of moderation. But in general there arises a

time in the history of a state when the struggle between the few and

the many has to be fought out. No system of checks and balances, such as

Plato has devised in the Laws, could have given equipoise and stability

to an ancient state, any more than the skill of the legislator could

have withstood the tide of democracy in England or France during the

last hundred years, or have given life to China or India.

The basis of the Magnesian constitution is the equal division of land.

In the new state, as in the Republic, there was to be neither poverty

nor riches. Every citizen under all circumstances retained his lot, and

as much money as was necessary for the cultivation of it, and no one was

allowed to accumulate property to the amount of more than five times

the value of the lot, inclusive of it. The equal division of land was a

Spartan institution, not known to have existed elsewhere in Hellas. The

mention of it in the Laws of Plato affords considerable presumption that

it was of ancient origin, and not first introduced, as Mr. Grote and

others have imagined, in the reformation of Cleomenes III. But at

Sparta, if we may judge from the frequent complaints of the accumulation

of property in the hands of a few persons (Arist. Pol.), no provision

could have been made for the maintenance of the lot. Plutarch indeed

speaks of a law introduced by the Ephor Epitadeus soon after the

Peloponnesian War, which first allowed the Spartans to sell their land

(Agis): but from the manner in which Aristotle refers to the subject,

we should imagine this evil in the state to be of a much older standing.

Like some other countries in which small proprietors have been numerous,

the original equality passed into inequality, and, instead of a large

middle class, there was probably at Sparta greater disproportion in the

property of the citizens than in any other state of Hellas. Plato was

aware of the danger, and has improved on the Spartan custom. The land,

as at Sparta, must have been tilled by slaves, since other occupations

were found for the citizens. Bodies of young men between the ages of

twenty-five and thirty were engaged in making biennial peregrinations of

the country. They and their officers are to be the magistrates, police,

engineers, aediles, of the twelve districts into which the colony was

divided. Their way of life may be compared with that of the Spartan

secret police or Crypteia, a name which Plato freely applies to them

without apparently any consciousness of the odium which has attached to

the word in history.

Another great institution which Plato borrowed from Sparta (or Crete) is

the Syssitia or common meals. These were established in both states, and

in some respects were considered by Aristotle to be better managed in

Crete than at Lacedaemon (Pol.). In the Laws the Cretan custom appears

to be adopted (This is not proved, as Hermann supposes ('De Vestigiis,'

etc.)): that is to say, if we may interpret Plato by Aristotle, the cost

of them was defrayed by the state and not by the individuals (Arist.

Pol); so that the members of the mess, who could not pay their quota,

still retained their rights of citizenship. But this explanation is

hardly consistent with the Laws, where contributions to the Syssitia

from private estates are expressly mentioned. Plato goes further than

the legislators of Sparta and Crete, and would extend the common meals

to women as well as men: he desires to curb the disorders, which existed

among the female sex in both states, by the application to women of the

same military discipline to which the men were already subject. It

was an extension of the custom of Syssitia from which the ancient

legislators shrank, and which Plato himself believed to be very

difficult of enforcement.

Like Sparta, the new colony was not to be surrounded by walls,--a state

should learn to depend upon the bravery of its citizens only--a fallacy

or paradox, if it is not to be regarded as a poetical fancy, which is

fairly enough ridiculed by Aristotle (Pol.). Women, too, must be ready

to assist in the defence of their country: they are not to rush to the

temples and altars, but to arm themselves with shield and spear. In the

regulation of the Syssitia, in at least one of his enactments respecting

property, and in the attempt to correct the licence of women, Plato

shows, that while he borrowed from the institutions of Sparta and

favoured the Spartan mode of life, he also sought to improve upon them.

The enmity to the sea is another Spartan feature which is transferred

by Plato to the Magnesian state. He did not reflect that a non-maritime

power would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the

great highway. Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which

had to be protected by them, their struggles first of all with the

Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets,

forced the Greeks, mostly against their will, to devote themselves to

the sea. The islanders before the inhabitants of the continent, the

maritime cities before the inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before

the Spartans, were compelled to fit out ships: last of all the Spartans,

by the pressure of the Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a

naval force, which, after the battle of Aegospotami, for more than

a generation commanded the Aegean. Plato, like the Spartans, had a

prejudice against a navy, because he regarded it as the nursery of

democracy. But he either never considered, or did not care to explain,

how a city, set upon an island and 'distant not more than ten miles from

the sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent harbours,' could have

safely subsisted without one.

Neither the Spartans nor the Magnesian colonists were permitted to

engage in trade or commerce. In order to limit their dealings as far

as possible to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the

Magnesians were only allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when

they travelled abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they

received permission from the government. Like the Spartans, Plato

was afraid of the evils which might be introduced into his state

by intercourse with foreigners; but he also shrinks from the utter

exclusiveness of Sparta, and is not unwilling to allow visitors of a

suitable age and rank to come from other states to his own, as he also

allows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries and bring

back a report of them. Such international communication seemed to him

both honourable and useful.

We may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the Laws

approximates to the Athenian model. These are much more numerous than

the previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the

laws of Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to

us of Athens than of Sparta.

The information which we possess about Athenian law, though

comparatively fuller, is still fragmentary. The sources from which our

knowledge is derived are chiefly the following:--

(1) The Orators,--Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes,

Aeschines, Lycurgus, and others.

(2) Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later

writers, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.

(3) Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and

the compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain

date, and to a great extent based upon one another. Their writings

extend altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to

the tenth century.

(4) The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.

(5) A few inscriptions.

Our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the

most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. No

critic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed

under his name in later ages. Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers

attempt to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the

time when they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found

in books only. Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur

in the Laws of Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable

this may appear.

There are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of

Athens: (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments.

(i) The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much

more nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which

succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own

day. It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a

Syracusan tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly. There

are various expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of

moderation. (1) The whole people were to be educated: they could not be

all trained in philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements

of music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject

to military discipline, archontes kai archomenoi. (2) The majority of

them were, or had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had

the experience which is given by office. (3) The persons who held the

highest offices were to have a further education, not much inferior to

that provided for the guardians in the Republic, though the range of

their studies is narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue: here

their philosophy comes to an end. (4) The entire number of the citizens

(5040) rarely, if ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. The

whole people were divided into four classes, each having the right to be

represented by the same number of members in the Council. The result of

such an arrangement would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius,

to give a disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who

may be supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. This

tendency was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote,

previous to the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be

to hand over to the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many

poor, and vice versa. (5) The most important body in the state was the

Nocturnal Council, which is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it

existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes

and the Eumenides of Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In

some particulars Plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and

procedure of the Areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (Telfy). There

was a resemblance also in more important matters. Like the Areopagus,

the Nocturnal Council was partly composed of magistrates and other

state officials, whose term of office had expired. (7) The constitution

included several diverse and even opposing elements, such as

the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8) There was much less

exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in

the government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in

the rest of the world.--All these were moderating influences.

A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the

Magnesian colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges

and other magistrates. That such a mode of election should have

been resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been

transferred by Plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular

to us. The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of

leaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates

should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or

flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet there were many considerations

which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to

the democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as

another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or

many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the

pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven

(compare Laws). (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and

intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot,

the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered

on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if

disqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be

called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election

of councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be

chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body

previously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer

from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed

their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their

disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of

citizens (compare Arist. Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use

of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council,

but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The

evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the

magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay

from the state.

Another parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was

omnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence. In

Plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and

little political power entrusted to it. At Athens it was the mainspring

of the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and

death; the acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned

by it; no office or person was above its control. Plato was far from

allowing such a despotic power to exist in his model community, and

therefore he minimizes the importance of the Assembly and narrows its

functions. He probably never asked himself a question, which naturally

occurs to the modern reader, where was to be the central authority in

this new community, and by what supreme power would the differences of

inferior powers be decided. At the same time he magnifies and brings

into prominence the Nocturnal Council (which is in many respects a

reflection of the Areopagus), but does not make it the governing body of

the state.

Between the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was

very great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. Plato not

unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. At

Athens any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of

the Heliaea. This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior

courts, but an occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in

number six thousand, met in a single court (Andoc. de Myst.). Plato

significantly remarks that a few judges, if they are good, are better

than a great number. He also, at least in capital cases, confines the

plaintiff and defendant to a single speech each, instead of allowing two

apiece, as was the common practice at Athens. On the other hand, in all

private suits he gives two appeals, from the arbiters to the courts of

the tribes, and from the courts of the tribes to the final or supreme

court. There was nothing answering to this at Athens. The three courts

were appointed in the following manner:--the arbiters were to be agreed

upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of the tribes to be elected

by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the end of each year by the

great officers of state out of their own number--they were to serve for

a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the Athenian judges, to vote

openly. Plato does not dwell upon methods of procedure: these are the

lesser matters which he leaves to the younger legislators. In cases of

murder and some other capital offences, the cause was to be tried by a

special tribunal, as was the custom at Athens: military offences, too,

as at Athens, were decided by the soldiers. Public causes in the Laws,

as sometimes at Athens, were voted upon by the whole people: because, as

Plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them. They were to

be previously investigated by three of the principal magistrates. He

believes also that in private suits all should take part; 'for he who

has no share in the administration of justice is apt to imagine that he

has no share in the state at all.' The wardens of the country, like the

Forty at Athens, also exercised judicial power in small matters, as

well as the wardens of the agora and city. The department of justice is

better organized in Plato than in an ordinary Greek state, proceeding

more by regular methods, and being more restricted to distinct duties.

The executive of Plato's Laws, like the Athenian, was different from

that of a modern civilized state. The difference chiefly consists in

this, that whereas among ourselves there are certain persons or classes

of persons set apart for the execution of the duties of government, in

ancient Greece, as in all other communities in the earlier stages of

their development, they were not equally distinguished from the rest of

the citizens. The machinery of government was never so well organized as

in the best modern states. The judicial department was not so completely

separated from the legislative, nor the executive from the judicial, nor

the people at large from the professional soldier, lawyer, or priest. To

Aristotle (Pol.) it was a question requiring serious consideration--Who

should execute a sentence? There was probably no body of police to whom

were entrusted the lives and properties of the citizens in any Hellenic

state. Hence it might be reasonably expected that every man should be

the watchman of every other, and in turn be watched by him. The ancients

do not seem to have remembered the homely adage that, 'What is every

man's business is no man's business,' or always to have thought of

applying the principle of a division of labour to the administration

of law and to government. Every Athenian was at some time or on some

occasion in his life a magistrate, judge, advocate, soldier, sailor,

policeman. He had not necessarily any private business; a good deal

of his time was taken up with the duties of office and other public

occupations. So, too, in Plato's Laws. A citizen was to interfere in a

quarrel, if older than the combatants, or to defend the outraged party,

if his junior. He was especially bound to come to the rescue of a parent

who was ill-treated by his children. He was also required to prosecute

the murderer of a kinsman. In certain cases he was allowed to arrest an

offender. He might even use violence to an abusive person. Any

citizen who was not less than thirty years of age at times exercised

a magisterial authority, to be enforced even by blows. Both in the

Magnesian state and at Athens many thousand persons must have shared

in the highest duties of government, if a section only of the Council,

consisting of thirty or of fifty persons, as in the Laws, or at

Athens after the days of Cleisthenes, held office for a month, or for

thirty-five days only. It was almost as if, in our own country, the

Ministry or the Houses of Parliament were to change every month. The

average ability of the Athenian and Magnesian councillors could not have

been very high, considering there were so many of them. And yet they

were entrusted with the performance of the most important executive

duties. In these respects the constitution of the Laws resembles Athens

far more than Sparta. All the citizens were to be, not merely soldiers,

but politicians and administrators.

(ii) There are numerous minor particulars in which the Laws of Plato

resemble those of Athens. These are less interesting than the preceding,

but they show even more strikingly how closely in the composition of his

work Plato has followed the laws and customs of his own country.

(1) Evidence. (a) At Athens a child was not allowed to give evidence

(Telfy). Plato has a similar law: 'A child shall be allowed to give

evidence only in cases of murder.' (b) At Athens an unwilling witness

might be summoned; but he was not required to appear if he was ready

to declare on oath that he knew nothing about the matter in question

(Telfy). So in the Laws. (c) Athenian law enacted that when more than

half the witnesses in a case had been convicted of perjury, there was to

be a new trial (anadikos krisis--Telfy). There is a similar provision in

the Laws. (d) False-witness was punished at Athens by atimia and a fine

(Telfy). Plato is at once more lenient and more severe: 'If a man be

twice convicted of false-witness, he shall not be required, and if

thrice, he shall not be allowed to bear witness; and if he dare to

witness after he has been convicted three times,...he shall be punished

with death.'

(2) Murder. (a) Wilful murder was punished in Athenian law by death,

perpetual exile, and confiscation of property (Telfy). Plato, too,

has the alternative of death or exile, but he does not confiscate the

murderer's property. (b) The Parricide was not allowed to escape by

going into exile at Athens (Telfy), nor, apparently, in the Laws. (c)

A homicide, if forgiven by his victim before death, received no

punishment, either at Athens (Telfy), or in the Magnesian state. In both

(Telfy) the contriver of a murder is punished as severely as the doer;

and persons accused of the crime are forbidden to enter temples or

the agora until they have been tried (Telfy). (d) At Athens slaves who

killed their masters and were caught red-handed, were not to be put to

death by the relations of the murdered man, but to be handed over to the

magistrates (Telfy). So in the Laws, the slave who is guilty of wilful

murder has a public execution: but if the murder is committed in anger,

it is punished by the kinsmen of the victim.

(3) Involuntary homicide. (a) The guilty person, according to the

Athenian law, had to go into exile, and might not return, until the

family of the man slain were conciliated. Then he must be purified

(Telfy). If he is caught before he has obtained forgiveness, he may be

put to death. These enactments reappear in the Laws. (b) The curious

provision of Plato, that a stranger who has been banished for

involuntary homicide and is subsequently wrecked upon the coast, must

'take up his abode on the sea-shore, wetting his feet in the sea, and

watching for an opportunity of sailing,' recalls the procedure of

the Judicium Phreatteum at Athens, according to which an involuntary

homicide, who, having gone into exile, is accused of a wilful murder,

was tried at Phreatto for this offence in a boat by magistrates on the

shore. (c) A still more singular law, occurring both in the Athenian

and Magnesian code, enacts that a stone or other inanimate object which

kills a man is to be tried, and cast over the border (Telfy).

(4) Justifiable or excusable homicide. Plato and Athenian law agree in

making homicide justifiable or excusable in the following cases:--(1) at

the games (Telfy); (2) in war (Telfy); (3) if the person slain was found

doing violence to a free woman (Telfy); (4) if a doctor's patient dies;

(5) in the case of a robber (Telfy); (6) in self-defence (Telfy).

(5) Impiety. Death or expulsion was the Athenian penalty for impiety

(Telfy). In the Laws it is punished in various cases by imprisonment for

five years, for life, and by death.

(6) Sacrilege. Robbery of temples at Athens was punished by death,

refusal of burial in the land, and confiscation of property (Telfy).

In the Laws the citizen who is guilty of such a crime is to 'perish

ingloriously and be cast beyond the borders of the land,' but his

property is not confiscated.

(7) Sorcery. The sorcerer at Athens was to be executed (Telfy): compare

Laws, where it is enacted that the physician who poisons and the

professional sorcerer shall be punished with death.

(8) Treason. Both at Athens and in the Laws the penalty for treason was

death (Telfy), and refusal of burial in the country (Telfy).

(9) Sheltering exiles. 'If a man receives an exile, he shall be punished

with death.' So, too, in Athenian law (Telfy.).

(10) Wounding. Athenian law compelled a man who had wounded another to

go into exile; if he returned, he was to be put to death (Telfy). Plato

only punishes the offence with death when children wound their parents

or one another, or a slave wounds his master.

(11) Bribery. Death was the punishment for taking a bribe, both

at Athens (Telfy) and in the Laws; but Athenian law offered an

alternative--the payment of a fine of ten times the amount of the bribe.

(12) Theft. Plato, like Athenian law (Telfy), punishes the theft of

public property by death; the theft of private property in both involves

a fine of double the value of the stolen goods (Telfy).

(13) Suicide. He 'who slays him who of all men, as they say, is his own

best friend,' is regarded in the same spirit by Plato and by Athenian

law. Plato would have him 'buried ingloriously on the borders of the

twelve portions of the land, in such places as are uncultivated and

nameless,' and 'no column or inscription is to mark the place of his

interment.' Athenian law enacted that the hand which did the deed should

be separated from the body and be buried apart (Telfy).

(14) Injury. In cases of wilful injury, Athenian law compelled the

guilty person to pay double the damage; in cases of involuntary injury,

simple damages (Telfy). Plato enacts that if a man wounds another in

passion, and the wound is curable, he shall pay double the damage, if

incurable or disfiguring, fourfold damages. If, however, the wounding is

accidental, he shall simply pay for the harm done.

(15) Treatment of parents. Athenian law allowed any one to indict

another for neglect or illtreatment of parents (Telfy). So Plato bids

bystanders assist a father who is assaulted by his son, and allows any

one to give information against children who neglect their parents.

(16) Execution of sentences. Both Plato and Athenian law give to the

winner of a suit power to seize the goods of the loser, if he does not

pay within the appointed time (Telfy). At Athens the penalty was also

doubled (Telfy); not so in Plato. Plato however punishes contempt of

court by death, which at Athens seems only to have been visited with a

further fine (Telfy).

(17) Property. (a) Both at Athens and in the Laws a man who has disputed

property in his possession must give the name of the person from whom he

received it (Telfy); and any one searching for lost property must enter

a house naked (Telfy), or, as Plato says, 'naked, or wearing only a

short tunic and without a girdle. (b) Athenian law, as well as Plato,

did not allow a father to disinherit his son without good reason and the

consent of impartial persons (Telfy). Neither grants to the eldest

son any special claim on the paternal estate (Telfy). In the law of

inheritance both prefer males to females (Telfy). (c) Plato and Athenian

law enacted that a tree should be planted at a fair distance from a

neighbour's property (Telfy), and that when a man could not get water,

his neighbour must supply him (Telfy). Both at Athens and in Plato there

is a law about bees, the former providing that a beehive must be set up

at not less a distance than 300 feet from a neighbour's (Telfy), and the

latter forbidding the decoying of bees.

(18) Orphans. A ward must proceed against a guardian whom he suspects

of fraud within five years of the expiration of the guardianship. This

provision is common to Plato and to Athenian law (Telfy). Further, the

latter enacted that the nearest male relation should marry or provide

a husband for an heiress (Telfy),--a point in which Plato follows it

closely.

(19) Contracts. Plato's law that 'when a man makes an agreement which he

does not fulfil, unless the agreement be of a nature which the law or

a vote of the assembly does not allow, or which he has made under the

influence of some unjust compulsion, or which he is prevented from

fulfilling against his will by some unexpected chance,--the other party

may go to law with him,' according to Pollux (quoted in Telfy's note)

prevailed also at Athens.

(20) Trade regulations. (a) Lying was forbidden in the agora both by

Plato and at Athens (Telfy). (b) Athenian law allowed an action of

recovery against a man who sold an unsound slave as sound (Telfy).

Plato's enactment is more explicit: he allows only an unskilled person

(i.e. one who is not a trainer or physician) to take proceedings in such

a case. (c) Plato diverges from Athenian practice in the disapproval of

credit, and does not even allow the supply of goods on the deposit of

a percentage of their value (Telfy). He enacts that 'when goods are

exchanged by buying and selling, a man shall deliver them and receive

the price of them at a fixed place in the agora, and have done with

the matter,' and that 'he who gives credit must be satisfied whether he

obtain his money or not, for in such exchanges he will not be protected

by law. (d) Athenian law forbad an extortionate rate of interest

(Telfy); Plato allows interest in one case only--if a contractor does

not receive the price of his work within a year of the time agreed--and

at the rate of 200 per cent. per annum for every drachma a monthly

interest of an obol. (e) Both at Athens and in the Laws sales were to be

registered (Telfy), as well as births (Telfy).

(21) Sumptuary laws. Extravagance at weddings (Telfy), and at funerals

(Telfy) was forbidden at Athens and also in the Magnesian state.

There remains the subject of family life, which in Plato's Laws

partakes both of an Athenian and Spartan character. Under this head may

conveniently be included the condition of women and of slaves. To family

life may be added citizenship.

As at Sparta, marriages are to be contracted for the good of the state;

and they may be dissolved on the same ground, where there is a failure

of issue,--the interest of the state requiring that every one of the

5040 lots should have an heir. Divorces are likewise permitted by Plato

where there is an incompatibility of temper, as at Athens by mutual

consent. The duty of having children is also enforced by a still higher

motive, expressed by Plato in the noble words:--'A man should cling to

immortality, and leave behind him children's children to be the servants

of God in his place.' Again, as at Athens, the father is allowed to put

away his undutiful son, but only with the consent of impartial persons

(Telfy), and the only suit which may be brought by a son against a

father is for imbecility. The class of elder and younger men and women

are still to regard one another, as in the Republic, as standing in the

relation of parents and children. This is a trait of Spartan character

rather than of Athenian. A peculiar sanctity and tenderness was to be

shown towards the aged; the parent or grandparent stricken with years

was to be loved and worshipped like the image of a God, and was to be

deemed far more able than any lifeless statue to bring good or ill

to his descendants. Great care is to be taken of orphans: they are

entrusted to the fifteen eldest Guardians of the Law, who are to be

'lawgivers and fathers to them not inferior to their natural fathers,'

as at Athens they were entrusted to the Archons. Plato wishes to make

the misfortune of orphanhood as little sad to them as possible.

Plato, seeing the disorder into which half the human race had fallen at

Athens and Sparta, is minded to frame for them a new rule of life. He

renounces his fanciful theory of communism, but still desires to place

women as far as possible on an equality with men. They were to be

trained in the use of arms, they are to live in public. Their time was

partly taken up with gymnastic exercises; there could have been little

family or private life among them. Their lot was to be neither like that

of Spartan women, who were made hard and common by excessive practice

of gymnastic and the want of all other education,--nor yet like that of

Athenian women, who, at least among the upper classes, retired into a

sort of oriental seclusion,--but something better than either. They were

to be the perfect mothers of perfect children, yet not wholly taken up

with the duties of motherhood, which were to be made easy to them as far

as possible (compare Republic), but able to share in the perils of war

and to be the companions of their husbands. Here, more than anywhere

else, the spirit of the Laws reverts to the Republic. In speaking of

them as the companions of their husbands we must remember that it is an

Athenian and not a Spartan way of life which they are invited to share,

a life of gaiety and brightness, not of austerity and abstinence, which

often by a reaction degenerated into licence and grossness.

In Plato's age the subject of slavery greatly interested the minds of

thoughtful men; and how best to manage this 'troublesome piece of goods'

exercised his own mind a good deal. He admits that they have often

been found better than brethren or sons in the hour of danger, and are

capable of rendering important public services by informing against

offenders--for this they are to be rewarded; and the master who puts

a slave to death for the sake of concealing some crime which he has

committed, is held guilty of murder. But they are not always treated

with equal consideration. The punishments inflicted on them bear

no proportion to their crimes. They are to be addressed only in the

language of command. Their masters are not to jest with them, lest they

should increase the hardship of their lot. Some privileges were granted

to them by Athenian law of which there is no mention in Plato; they

were allowed to purchase their freedom from their master, and if they

despaired of being liberated by him they could demand to be sold, on the

chance of falling into better hands. But there is no suggestion in

the Laws that a slave who tried to escape should be branded with the

words--kateche me, pheugo, or that evidence should be extracted from him

by torture, that the whole household was to be executed if the master

was murdered and the perpetrator remained undetected: all these were

provisions of Athenian law. Plato is more consistent than either the

Athenians or the Spartans; for at Sparta too the Helots were treated in

a manner almost unintelligible to us. On the one hand, they had arms put

into their hands, and served in the army, not only, as at Plataea, in

attendance on their masters, but, after they had been manumitted, as a

separate body of troops called Neodamodes: on the other hand, they were

the victims of one of the greatest crimes recorded in Greek history

(Thucyd.). The two great philosophers of Hellas sought to extricate

themselves from this cruel condition of human life, but acquiesced in

the necessity of it. A noble and pathetic sentiment of Plato, suggested

by the thought of their misery, may be quoted in this place:--'The right

treatment of slaves is to behave properly to them, and to do to them, if

possible, even more justice than to those who are our equals; for he

who naturally and genuinely reverences justice, and hates injustice, is

discovered in his dealings with any class of men to whom he can easily

be unjust. And he who in regard to the natures and actions of his slaves

is undefiled by impiety and injustice, will best sow the seeds of virtue

in them; and this may be truly said of every master, and tyrant, and of

every other having authority in relation to his inferiors.'

All the citizens of the Magnesian state were free and equal; there was

no distinction of rank among them, such as is believed to have prevailed

at Sparta. Their number was a fixed one, corresponding to the 5040 lots.

One of the results of this is the requirement that younger sons or those

who have been disinherited shall go out to a colony. At Athens, where

there was not the same religious feeling against increasing the size of

the city, the number of citizens must have been liable to considerable

fluctuations. Several classes of persons, who were not citizens by

birth, were admitted to the privilege. Perpetual exiles from other

countries, people who settled there to practise a trade (Telfy), any one

who had shown distinguished valour in the cause of Athens, the Plataeans

who escaped from the siege, metics and strangers who offered to serve

in the army, the slaves who fought at Arginusae,--all these could or

did become citizens. Even those who were only on one side of Athenian

parentage were at more than one period accounted citizens. But at times

there seems to have arisen a feeling against this promiscuous extension

of the citizen body, an expression of which is to be found in the law

of Pericles--monous Athenaious einai tous ek duoin Athenaion gegonotas

(Plutarch, Pericles); and at no time did the adopted citizen enjoy the

full rights of citizenship--e.g. he might not be elected archon or to

the office of priest (Telfy), although this prohibition did not extend

to his children, if born of a citizen wife. Plato never thinks of making

the metic, much less the slave, a citizen. His treatment of the former

class is at once more gentle and more severe than that which prevailed

at Athens. He imposes upon them no tax but good behaviour, whereas at

Athens they were required to pay twelve drachmae per annum, and to

have a patron: on the other hand, he only allows them to reside in the

Magnesian state on condition of following a trade; they were required to

depart when their property exceeded that of the third class, and in any

case after a residence of twenty years, unless they could show that they

had conferred some great benefit on the state. This privileged position

reflects that of the isoteleis at Athens, who were excused from the

metoikion. It is Plato's greatest concession to the metic, as the

bestowal of freedom is his greatest concession to the slave.

Lastly, there is a more general point of view under which the Laws of

Plato may be considered,--the principles of Jurisprudence which are

contained in them. These are not formally announced, but are scattered

up and down, to be observed by the reflective reader for himself. Some

of them are only the common principles which all courts of justice have

gathered from experience; others are peculiar and characteristic. That

judges should sit at fixed times and hear causes in a regular order,

that evidence should be laid before them, that false witnesses should

be disallowed, and corruption punished, that defendants should be

heard before they are convicted,--these are the rules, not only of the

Hellenic courts, but of courts of law in all ages and countries.

But there are also points which are peculiar, and in which ancient

jurisprudence differs considerably from modern; some of them are of

great importance...It could not be said at Athens, nor was it ever

contemplated by Plato, that all men, including metics and slaves, should

be equal 'in the eye of the law.' There was some law for the slave, but

not much; no adequate protection was given him against the cruelty of

his master...It was a singular privilege granted, both by the Athenian

and Magnesian law, to a murdered man, that he might, before he died,

pardon his murderer, in which case no legal steps were afterwards to

be taken against him. This law is the remnant of an age in which the

punishment of offences against the person was the concern rather of

the individual and his kinsmen than of the state...Plato's division of

crimes into voluntary and involuntary and those done from passion, only

partially agrees with the distinction which modern law has drawn between

murder and manslaughter; his attempt to analyze them is confused by the

Socratic paradox, that 'All vice is involuntary'...It is singular that

both in the Laws and at Athens theft is commonly punished by a twofold

restitution of the article stolen. The distinction between civil and

criminal courts or suits was not yet recognized...Possession gives a

right of property after a certain time...The religious aspect under

which certain offences were regarded greatly interfered with a just

and natural estimate of their guilt...As among ourselves, the intent to

murder was distinguished by Plato from actual murder...We note that

both in Plato and the laws of Athens, libel in the market-place and

personality in the theatre were forbidden...Both in Plato and Athenian

law, as in modern times, the accomplice of a crime is to be punished as

well as the principal...Plato does not allow a witness in a cause to

act as a judge of it...Oaths are not to be taken by the parties to a

suit...Both at Athens and in Plato's Laws capital punishment for

murder was not to be inflicted, if the offender was willing to go into

exile...Respect for the dead, duty towards parents, are to be enforced

by the law as well as by public opinion...Plato proclaims the noble

sentiment that the object of all punishment is the improvement of the

offender... Finally, he repeats twice over, as with the voice of a

prophet, that the crimes of the fathers are not to be visited upon the

children. In this respect he is nobly distinguished from the Oriental,

and indeed from the spirit of Athenian law (compare Telfy,--dei kai

autous kai tous ek touton atimous einai), as the Hebrew in the age of

Ezekial is from the Jewish people of former ages.

Of all Plato's provisions the object is to bring the practice of the law

more into harmony with reason and philosophy; to secure impartiality,

and while acknowledging that every citizen has a right to share in the

administration of justice, to counteract the tendency of the courts to

become mere popular assemblies.

...

Thus we have arrived at the end of the writings of Plato, and at the

last stage of philosophy which was really his. For in what followed,

which we chiefly gather from the uncertain intimations of Aristotle, the

spirit of the master no longer survived. The doctrine of Ideas passed

into one of numbers; instead of advancing from the abstract to the

concrete, the theories of Plato were taken out of their context, and

either asserted or refuted with a provoking literalism; the Socratic or

Platonic element in his teaching was absorbed into the Pythagorean or

Megarian. His poetry was converted into mysticism; his unsubstantial

visions were assailed secundum artem by the rules of logic. His

political speculations lost their interest when the freedom of Hellas

had passed away. Of all his writings the Laws were the furthest removed

from the traditions of the Platonic school in the next generation. Both

his political and his metaphysical philosophy are for the most part

misinterpreted by Aristotle. The best of him--his love of truth, and

his 'contemplation of all time and all existence,' was soonest lost; and

some of his greatest thoughts have slept in the ear of mankind almost

ever since they were first uttered.

We have followed him during his forty or fifty years of authorship, from

the beginning when he first attempted to depict the teaching of Socrates

in a dramatic form, down to the time at which the character of Socrates

had disappeared, and we have the latest reflections of Plato's own mind

upon Hellas and upon philosophy. He, who was 'the last of the poets,' in

his book of Laws writes prose only; he has himself partly fallen

under the rhetorical influences which in his earlier dialogues he was

combating. The progress of his writings is also the history of his life;

we have no other authentic life of him. They are the true self of the

philosopher, stripped of the accidents of time and place. The great

effort which he makes is, first, to realize abstractions, secondly,

to connect them. In the attempt to realize them, he was carried into a

transcendental region in which he isolated them from experience, and we

pass out of the range of science into poetry or fiction. The fancies of

mythology for a time cast a veil over the gulf which divides phenomena

from onta (Meno, Phaedrus, Symposium, Phaedo). In his return to earth

Plato meets with a difficulty which has long ceased to be a difficulty

to us. He cannot understand how these obstinate, unmanageable ideas,

residing alone in their heaven of abstraction, can be either combined

with one another, or adapted to phenomena (Parmenides, Philebus,

Sophist). That which is the most familiar process of our own minds, to

him appeared to be the crowning achievement of the dialectical art. The

difficulty which in his own generation threatened to be the destruction

of philosophy, he has rendered unmeaning and ridiculous. For by his

conquests in the world of mind our thoughts are widened, and he has

furnished us with new dialectical instruments which are of greater

compass and power. We have endeavoured to see him as he truly was, a

great original genius struggling with unequal conditions of knowledge,

not prepared with a system nor evolving in a series of dialogues ideas

which he had long conceived, but contradictory, enquiring as he goes

along, following the argument, first from one point of view and then

from another, and therefore arriving at opposite conclusions, hovering

around the light, and sometimes dazzled with excess of light, but always

moving in the same element of ideal truth. We have seen him also in his

decline, when the wings of his imagination have begun to droop, but his

experience of life remains, and he turns away from the contemplation of

the eternal to take a last sad look at human affairs.

...

And so having brought into the world 'noble children' (Phaedr.), he

rests from the labours of authorship. More than two thousand two hundred

years have passed away since he returned to the place of Apollo and

the Muses. Yet the echo of his words continues to be heard among men,

because of all philosophers he has the most melodious voice. He is the

inspired prophet or teacher who can never die, the only one in whom the

outward form adequately represents the fair soul within; in whom the

thoughts of all who went before him are reflected and of all who come

after him are partly anticipated. Other teachers of philosophy are dried

up and withered,--after a few centuries they have become dust; but he

is fresh and blooming, and is always begetting new ideas in the minds of

men. They are one-sided and abstract; but he has many sides of wisdom.

Nor is he always consistent with himself, because he is always moving

onward, and knows that there are many more things in philosophy than can

be expressed in words, and that truth is greater than consistency. He

who approaches him in the most reverent spirit shall reap most of

the fruit of his wisdom; he who reads him by the light of ancient

commentators will have the least understanding of him.

We may see him with the eye of the mind in the groves of the Academy,

or on the banks of the Ilissus, or in the streets of Athens, alone or

walking with Socrates, full of those thoughts which have since become

the common possession of mankind. Or we may compare him to a statue hid

away in some temple of Zeus or Apollo, no longer existing on earth,