heretofore expressed to Congress on this subject, and I deem it my duty
on the present occasion again to urge them upon the attention of the
Legislature. The soundest maxims of public policy and the principals
upon which our republican institutions are founded recommend a proper
adaptation of the revenue to the expenditure, and they also require
that the expenditure shall be limited to what, by an economical
administration, shall be consistent with the simplicity of the
Government and necessary to an efficient public service.
In effecting this adjustment it is due, in justice to the interests of
the different States, and even to the preservation of the Union itself,
that the protection afforded by existing laws to any branches of the
national industry should not exceed what may be necessary to counteract
the regulations of foreign nations and to secure a supply of those
articles of manufacture essential to the national independence and
safety in time of war. If upon investigation it shall be found, as it
is believed it will be, that the legislative protection granted to any
particular interest is greater than is indispensably requisite for
these objects, I recommend that it be gradually diminished, and that as
far as may be consistent with these objects the whole scheme of duties
be reduced to the revenue standard as soon as a just regard to the
faith of the Government and to the preservation of the large capital
invested in establishments of domestic industry will permit.
That manufactures adequate to the supply of our domestic consumption
would in the abstract be beneficial to our country there is no reason
to doubt, and to effect their establishment there is perhaps no
American citizen who would not for a while be willing to pay a higher
price for them. But for this purpose it is presumed that a tariff of
high duties, designed for perpetual protection, which they maintain has
the effect to reduce the price by domestic competition below that of
the foreign article. Experience, however, our best guide on this as on
other subjects, makes it doubtful whether the advantages of this system
are not counter-balanced by many evils, and whether it does not tend to
beget in the minds of a large portion of our country-men a spirit of
discontent and jealousy dangerous to the stability of the Union.
What, then, shall be done? Large interests have grown up under the
implied pledge of our national legislation, which it would seem a
violation of public faith suddenly to abandon. Nothing could justify it
but the public safety, which is the supreme law. But those who have
vested their capital in manufacturing establishments can not expect
that the people will continue permanently to pay high taxes for their
benefit, when the money is not required for any legitimate purpose in
the administration of the Government. Is it not enough that the high
duties have been paid as long as the money arising from them could be
applied to the common benefit in the extinguishment of the public debt?
Those who take an enlarged view of the condition of our country must be
satisfied that the policy of protection must be ultimately limited to
those articles of domestic manufacture which are indispensable to our
safety in time of war. Within this scope, on a reasonable scale, it is
recommended by every consideration of patriotism and duty, which will
doubtless always secure to it a liberal and efficient support. But
beyond this object we have already seen the operation of the system
productive of discontent. In some sections of the Republic its
influence is deprecated as tending to concentrate wealth into a few
hands, and as creating those germs of dependence and vice which in
other countries have characterized the existence of monopolies and
proved so destructive of liberty and the general good. A large portion
of the people in one section of the Republic declares it not only
inexpedient on these grounds, but as disturbing the equal relations of
property by legislation, and therefore unconstitutional and unjust.
Doubtless these effects are in a great degree exaggerated, and may be
ascribed to a mistaken view of the considerations which led to the
adoption of the tariff system; but they are never the less important in
enabling us to review the subject with a more thorough knowledge of all
its bearings upon the great interests of the Republic, and with a
determination to dispose of it so that none can with justice complain.
It is my painful duty to state that in one quarter of the United States
opposition to the revenue laws has arisen to a height which threatens
to thwart their execution, if not to endanger the integrity of the
Union. What ever obstructions may be thrown in the way of the judicial
authorities of the General Government, it is hoped they will be able
peaceably to overcome them by the prudence of their own officers and
the patriotism of the people. But should this reasonable reliance on
the moderation and good sense of all portions of our fellow citizens be
disappointed, it is believed that the laws themselves are fully
adequate to the suppression of such attempts as may be immediately
made. Should the exigency arise rendering the execution of the existing
laws impracticable from any cause what ever, prompt notice of it will
be given to Congress, with a suggestion of such views and measures as
may be deemed necessary to meet it.
In conformity with principles heretofore explained, and with the hope
of reducing the General Government to that simple machine which the
Constitution created and of withdrawing from the States all other
influence than that of its universal beneficence in preserving peace,
affording an uniform currency, maintaining the inviolability of
contracts, diffusing intelligence, and discharging unfelt its other
super-intending functions, I recommend that provision be made to
dispose of all stocks now held by it in corporations, whether created
by the General or State Governments, and placing the proceeds in the
Treasury. As a source of profit these stocks are of little or no value;
as a means of influence among the States they are adverse to the purity
of our institutions. The whole principle on which they are based is
deemed by many unconstitutional, and to persist in the policy which
they indicate is considered wholly inexpedient.
It is my duty to acquaint you with an arrangement made by the Bank of
the United States with a portion of the holders of the 3% stock, by
which the Government will be deprived of the use of the public funds
longer than was anticipated. By this arrangement, which will be
particularly explained by the Secretary of the Treasury, a surrender of
the certificates of this stock may be postponed until October, 1833,
and thus may be continued by the failure of the bank to perform its
duties.
Such measures as are within the reach of the Secretary of the Treasury
have been taken to enable him to judge whether the public deposits in
that institution may be regarded as entirely safe; but as his limited
power may prove inadequate to this object, I recommend the subject to
the attention of Congress, under the firm belief that it is worthy of
their serious investigation. An inquiry into the transactions of the
institution, embracing the branches as well as the principal bank,
seems called for by the credit which is given throughout the country to
many serious charges impeaching its character, and which if true may
justly excite the apprehension that it is no longer a safe depository
of the money of the people.
Among the interests which merit the consideration of Congress after the
payment of the public debt, one of the most important, in my view, is
that of the public lands. Previous to the formation of our present
Constitution it was recommended by Congress that a portion of the waste
lands owned by the States should be ceded to the United States for the
purposes of general harmony and as a fund to meet the expenses of the
war. The recommendation was adopted, and at different periods of time
the States of Massachusetts, New York, Virginia, North and South
Carolina, and Georgia granted their vacant soil for the uses for which
they had been asked. As the lands may now be considered as relieved
from this pledge, it is in the discretion of Congress to dispose of
them in such way as best to conduce to the quiet, harmony, and general
interest of the American people. In examining this question all local
and sectional feelings should be discarded and the whole United States
regarded as one people, interested alike in the prosperity of their
common country.
It can not be doubted that the speedy settlement of these lands
constitutes the true interest of the Republic. The wealth and strength
of a country are its population, and the best part of that population
are cultivators of the soil. Independent farmers are every where the
basis of society and true friends of liberty.
In addition to these considerations questions have already arisen, and
may be expected hereafter to grow out of the public lands, which
involve the rights of the new States and the powers of the General
Government, and unless a liberal policy be now adopted there is danger
that these questions may speedily assume an importance not now
generally anticipated. The influence of a great sectional interest,
when brought into full action, will be found more dangerous to the
harmony and union of the States than any other cause of discontent, and
it is the part of wisdom and sound policy to foresee its approaches and
endeavor if possible to counteract them.
Of the various schemes which have been hitherto proposed in regard to
the disposal of the public lands, none has yet received the entire
approbation of the National Legislature. Deeply impressed with the
importance of a speedy and satisfactory arrangement of the subject, I
deem it my duty on this occasion to urge it upon your consideration,
and to the propositions which have been heretofore suggested by others
to contribute those reflections which have occurred to me, in the hope
that they may assist you in your future deliberations.
It seems to me to be our policy that the public lands shall cease as
soon as practicable to be a source of revenue, and that they be sold to
settlers in limited parcels at a price barely sufficient to reimburse
to the United States the expense of the present system and the cost
arising under our Indian compacts. The advantages of accurate surveys
and undoubted titles now secured to purchasers seem to forbid the
abolition of the present system, because none can be substituted which
will more perfectly accomplish these important ends. It is desirable,
however, that in convenient time this machinery be withdrawn from the
States, and that the right of soil and the future disposition of it be
surrendered to the States respectively in which it lies.
The adventurous and hardy population of the West, besides contributing
their equal share of taxation under our impost system, have in the
progress of our Government, for the lands they occupy, paid into the
Treasury a large proportion of $40,000,000, and of the revenue received
therefrom but a small part has been expended among them. When to the
disadvantage of their situation in this respect we add the
consideration that it is their labor alone which gives real value to
the lands, and that the proceeds arising from their sale are
distributed chiefly among States which had not originally any claim to
them, and which have enjoyed the undivided emolument arising from the
sale of their own lands, it can not be expected that the new States
will remain longer contented with the present policy after the payment
of the public debt. To avert the consequences which may be apprehended
from this cause, to pub an end for ever to all partial and interested
legislation on the subject, and to afford to every American citizen of
enterprise the opportunity of securing an independent freehold, it
seems to me, therefore, best to abandon the idea of raising a future
revenue out of the public lands.
In former messages I have expressed my conviction that the Constitution
does not warrant the application of the funds of the General Government
to objects of internal improvement which are not national in their
character, and, both as a means of doing justice to all interests and
putting an end to a course of legislation calculated to destroy the
purity of the Government, have urged the necessity of reducing the
whole subject to some fixed and certain rule. As there never will occur
a period, perhaps, more propitious than the present to the
accomplishment of this object, I beg leave to press the subject again
upon your attention.
Without some general and well-defined principles ascertaining those
objects of internal improvement to which the means of the nation may be
constitutionally applied, it is obvious that the exercise of the power
can never be satisfactory. Besides the danger to which it exposes
Congress of making hasty appropriations to works of the character of
which they may be frequently ignorant, it promotes a mischievous and
corrupting influence upon elections by holding out to the people the
fallacious hope that the success of a certain candidate will make
navigable their neighboring creek or river, bring commerce to their
doors, and increase the value of their property. It thus favors
combinations to squander the treasure of the country upon a multitude
of local objects, as fatal to just legislation as to the purity of
public men.
If a system compatible with the Constitution can not be devised which
is free from such tendencies, we should recollect that that instrument
provides within itself the mode of its amendment, and that there is,
therefore, no excuse for the assumption of doubtful powers by the
General Government. If those which are clearly granted shall be found
incompetent to the ends of its creation, it can at any time apply for
their enlargement; and there is no probability that such an
application, if founded on the public interest, will ever be refused.
If the propriety of the proposed grant be not sufficiently apparent to
command the assent of 3/4 of the States, the best possible reason why
the power should not be assumed on doubtful authority is afforded; for
if more than one quarter of the States are unwilling to make the grant
its exercise will be productive of discontents which will far
over-balance any advantages that could be derived from it. All must
admit that there is nothing so worthy of the constant solicitude of
this Government as the harmony and union of the people.
Being solemnly impressed with the conviction that the extension of the
power to make internal improvements beyond the limit I have suggested,
even if it be deemed constitutional, is subversive of the best
interests of our country, I earnestly recommend to Congress to refrain
from its exercise in doubtful cases, except in relation to improvements
already begun, unless they shall first procure from the States such an
amendment of the Constitution as will define its character and
prescribe its bounds. If the States feel themselves competent to these
objects, why should this Government wish to assume the power? If they
do not, then they will not hesitate to make the grant. Both Governments
are the Governments of the people; improvements must be made with the
money of the people, and if the money can be collected and applied by
those more simple and economical political machines, the State
governments, it will unquestionably be safer and better for the people
than to add to the splendor, the patronage, and the power of the
General Government. But if the people of the several States think
otherwise they will amend the Constitution, and in their decision all
ought cheerfully to acquiesce.
For a detailed and highly satisfactory view of the operations of the
War Department I refer you to the accompanying report of the Secretary
of War.
The hostile incursions of the Sac and Fox Indians necessarily led to
the interposition of the Government. A portion of the troops, under
Generals Scott and Atkinson, and of the militia of the State of
Illinois were called into the field. After a harassing warfare,
prolonged by the nature of the country and by the difficulty of
procuring subsistence, the Indians were entirely defeated, and the
disaffected band dispersed or destroyed. The result has been creditable
to the troops engaged in the service. Severe as is the lesson to the
Indians, it was rendered necessary by their unprovoked aggressions, and
it is to be hoped that its impression will be permanent and salutary.
This campaign has evinced the efficient organization of the Army and
its capacity for prompt and active service. Its several departments
have performed their functions with energy and dispatch, and the
general movement was satisfactory.
Our fellow citizens upon the frontiers were ready, as they always are,
in the tender of their services in the hour of danger. But a more
efficient organization of our militia system is essential to that
security which is one of the principal objects of all governments.
Neither our situation nor our institutions require or permit the
maintenance of a large regular force. History offers too many lessons
of the fatal result of such a measure not to warn us against its
adoption here. The expense which attends it, the obvious tendency to
employ it because it exists and thus to engage in unnecessary wars, and
its ultimate danger to public liberty will lead us, I trust, to place
our principal dependence for protection upon the great body of the
citizens of the Republic. If in asserting rights or in repelling wrongs
war should come upon us, our regular force should be increased to an
extent proportional to the emergency, and our present small Army is a
nucleus around which such force could be formed and embodied. But for
the purposes of defense under ordinary circumstances we must rely upon
the electors of the country. Those by whom and for whom the Government
was instituted and is supported will constitute its protection in the
hour of danger as they do its check in the hour of safety.
But it is obvious that the militia system is imperfect. Much time is
lost, much unnecessary expense incurred, and much public property
wasted under the present arrangement. Little useful knowledge is gained
by the musters and drills as now established, and the whole subject
evidently requires a thorough examination. Whether a plan of
classification remedying these defects and providing for a system of
instruction might not be adopted is submitted to the consideration of
Congress. The Constitution has vested in the General Government an
independent authority upon the subject of the militia which renders its
action essential to the establishment or improvement of the system, and
I recommend the matter to your consideration in the conviction that the
state of this important arm of the public defense requires your
attention.
I am happy to inform you that the wise and humane policy of
transferring from the eastern to the western side of the Mississippi
the remnants of our aboriginal tribes, with their own consent and upon
just terms, has been steadily pursued, and is approaching, I trust, its
consummation. By reference to the report of the Secretary of War and to
the documents submitted with it you will see the progress which has
been made since your last session in the arrangement of the various
matters connected with our Indian relations. With one exception every
subject involving any question of conflicting jurisdiction or of
peculiar difficulty has been happily disposed of, and the conviction
evidently gains ground among the Indians that their removal to the
country assigned by the United States for their permanent residence
furnishes the only hope of their ultimate prosperity.
With that portion of the Cherokees, however, living within the State of
Georgia it has been found impracticable as yet to make a satisfactory
adjustment. Such was my anxiety to remove all the grounds of complaint
and to bring to a termination the difficulties in which they are
involved that I directed the very liberal propositions to be made to
them which accompany the documents herewith submitted. They can not but
have seen in these offers the evidence of the strongest disposition on
the part of the Government to deal justly and liberally with them. An
ample indemnity was offered for their present possessions, a liberal
provision for their future support and improvement, and full security
for their private and political rights. What ever difference of opinion
may have prevailed respecting the just claims of these people, there
will probably be none respecting the liberality of the propositions,
and very little respecting the expediency of their immediate
acceptance. They were, however, rejected, and thus the position of
these Indians remains unchanged, as do the views communicated in my
message to the Senate of February 22d, 1831.
I refer you to the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy, which
accompanies this message, for a detail of the operations of that branch
of the service during the present year.
Besides the general remarks on some of the transactions of our Navy
presented in the view which has been taken of our foreign relations, I
seize this occasion to invite to your notice the increased protection
which it has afforded to our commerce and citizens on distant seas
without any augmentation of the force in commission. In the gradual
improvement of its pecuniary concerns, in the constant progress in the
collection of materials suitable for use during future emergencies, and
in the construction of vessels and the buildings necessary to their
preservation and repair, the present state of this branch of the
service exhibits the fruits of that vigilance and care which are so
indispensable to its efficiency. Various new suggestions, contained in
the annexed report, as well as others heretofore to Congress, are
worthy of your attention, but none more so than that urging the renewal
for another term of six years of the general appropriation for the
gradual improvement of the Navy.
From the accompanying report of the Post Master General you will also
perceive that that Department continues to extend its usefulness
without impairing its resources or lessening the accommodations which
it affords in the secure and rapid transportation of the mail.
I beg leave to call the attention of Congress to the views heretofore
expressed in relation to the mode of choosing the President and Vice-
President of the United States, and to those respecting the tenure of
office generally. Still impressed with the justness of those views and
with the belief that the modifications suggested on those subjects if
adopted will contribute to the prosperity and harmony of the country, I
earnestly recommend them to your consideration at this time.
I have heretofore pointed out defects in the law for punishing official
frauds, especially within the District of Columbia. It has been found
almost impossible to bring notorious culprits to punishment, and,
according to a decision of the court for this District, a prosecution
is barred by a lapse of two years after the fraud has been committed.
It may happen again, as it has already happened, that during the whole
two years all the evidences of the fraud may be in the possession of
the culprit himself. However proper the limitation may be in relation
to private citizens, it would seem that it ought not to commence
running in favor of public officers until they go out of office.