Maysville and Rockville road companies I expressed my views fully in
regard to the power of Congress to construct roads and canals within a
State of to appropriate money for improvements of a local character. I
at the same time intimated me belief that the right to make
appropriations for such as were of a national character had been so
generally acted upon and so long acquiesced in by the Federal and State
Governments and the constituents of each as to justify its exercise on
the ground of continued and uninterrupted usage, but that it was, never
the less, highly expedient that appropriations even of that character
should, with the exception made at the time, be deferred until the
national debt is paid, and that in the mean while some general rule for
the action of the Government in that respect ought to be established.
These suggestions were not necessary to the decision of the question
then before me, and were, I readily admit, intended to awake the
attention and draw forth the opinion and observations of our
constituents upon a subject of the highest importance to their
interests, and one destined to exert a powerful influence upon the
future operations of our political system. I know of no tribunal to
which a public man in this country, in a case of doubt and difficulty,
can appeal with greater advantage or more propriety than the judgment
of the people; and although I must necessarily in the discharge of my
official duties be governed by the dictates of my own judgment, I have
no desire to conceal my anxious wish to conform as far as I can to the
views of those for whom I act.
All irregular expressions of public opinion are of necessity attended
with some doubt as to their accuracy, but making full allowances on
that account I can not, I think, deceive myself in believing that the
acts referred to, as well as the suggestions which I allowed myself to
make in relation to their bearing upon the future operations of the
Government, have been approved by the great body of the people. That
those whose immediate pecuniary interests are to be affected by
proposed expenditures should shrink from the application of a rule
which prefers their more general and remote interests to those which
are personal and immediate is to be expected. But even such objections
must from the nature of our population be but temporary in their
duration, and if it were otherwise our course should be the same, for
the time is yet, I hope, far distant when those intrusted with power to
be exercised for the good of the whole will consider it either honest
or wise to purchase local favors at the sacrifice of principle and
general good.
So understanding public sentiment, and thoroughly satisfied that the
best interests of our common country imperiously require that the
course which I have recommended in this regard should be adopted, I
have, upon the most mature consideration, determined to pursue it.
It is due to candor, as well as to my own feelings, that I should
express the reluctance and anxiety which I must at all times experience
in exercising the undoubted right of the Executive to withhold his
assent from bills on other grounds than their constitutionality. That
this right should not be exercised on slight occasions all will admit.
It is only in matters of deep interest, when the principle involved may
be justly regarded as next in importance to infractions of the
Constitution itself, that such a step can be expected to meet with the
approbation of the people. Such an occasion do I conscientiously
believe the present to be.
In the discharge of this delicate and highly responsible duty I am
sustained by the reflection that the exercise of this power has been
deemed consistent with the obligation of official duty by several of my
predecessors, and by the persuasion, too, that what ever liberal
institutions may have to fear from the encroachments of Executive
power, which has been every where the cause of so much strife and
bloody contention, but little danger is to be apprehended from a
precedent by which that authority denies to itself the exercise of
powers that bring in their train influence and patronage of great
extent, and thus excludes the operation of personal interests, every
where the bane of official trust.
I derive, too, no small degree of satisfaction from the reflection that
if I have mistaken the interests and wishes of the people the
Constitution affords the means of soon redressing the error by
selecting for the place their favor has bestowed upon me a citizen
whose opinions may accord with their own. I trust, in the mean time,
the interests of the nation will be saved from prejudice by a rigid
application of that portion of the public funds which might otherwise
be applied to different objects to that highest of all our obligations,
the payment of the public debt, and an opportunity be afforded for the
adoption of some better rule for the operations of the Government in
this matter than any which has hitherto been acted upon.
Profoundly impressed with the importance of the subject, not merely as
relates to the general prosperity of the country, but to the safety of
the federal system, I can not avoid repeating my earnest hope that all
good citizens who take a proper interest in the success and harmony of
our admirable political institutions, and who are incapable of desiring
to convert an opposite state of things into means for the gratification
of personal ambition, will, laying aside minor considerations and
discarding local prejudices, unite their honest exertions to establish
some fixed general principle which shall be calculated to effect the
greatest extent of public good in regard to the subject of internal
improvement, and afford the least ground for sectional discontent.
The general grounds of my objection to local appropriations have been
heretofore expressed, and I shall endeavor to avoid a repetition of
what has been already urged--the importance of sustaining the State
sovereignties as far as is consistent with the rightful action of the
Federal Government, and of preserving the greatest attainable harmony
between them. I will now only add an expression of my conviction--a
conviction which every day's experience serves to confirm--that the
political creed which inculcates the pursuit of those great objects as
a paramount duty is the true faith, and one to which we are mainly
indebted for the present success of the entire system, and to which we
must alone look for its future stability.
That there are diversities in the interests of the different States
which compose this extensive Confederacy must be admitted. Those
diversities arising from situation, climate, population, and pursuits
are doubtless, as it is natural they should be, greatly exaggerated by
jealousies and that spirit of rivalry so inseparable from neighboring
communities. These circumstances make it the duty of those who are
intrusted with the management of its affairs to neutralize their
effects as far as practicable by making the beneficial operation of the
Federal Government as equal and equitable among the several States as
can be done consistently with the great ends of its institution.
It is only necessary to refer to undoubted facts to see how far the
past acts of the Government upon the subject under consideration have
fallen short of this object. The expenditures heretofore made for
internal improvements amount to upward of $5 millions, and have been
distributed in very unequal proportions amongst the States. The
estimated expense of works of which surveys have been made, together
with that of others projected and partially surveyed, amounts to more
than $96 millions.
That such improvements, on account of particular circumstances, may be
more advantageously and beneficially made in some States than in others
is doubtless true, but that they are of a character which should
prevent an equitable distribution of the funds amongst the several
States is not to be conceded. The want of this equitable distribution
can not fail to prove a prolific source of irritation among the States.
We have it constantly before our eyes that professions of superior zeal
in the cause of internal improvement and a disposition to lavish the
public funds upon objects of this character are daily and earnestly put
forth by aspirants to power as constituting the highest claims to the
confidence of the people. Would it be strange, under such
circumstances, and in times of great excitement, that grants of this
description should find their motives in objects which may not accord
with the public good? Those who have not had occasion to see and regret
the indication of a sinister influence in these matters in past times
have been more fortunate than myself in their observation of the course
of public affairs. If to these evils be added the combinations and
angry contentions to which such a course of things gives rise, with
their baleful influences upon the legislation of Congress touching the
leading and appropriate duties of the Federal Government, it was but
doing justice to the character of our people to expect the severe
condemnation of the past which the recent exhibitions of public
sentiment has evinced.
Nothing short of a radical change in the action of the Government upon
the subject can, in my opinion, remedy the evil. If, as it would be
natural to expect, the States which have been least favored in past
appropriations should insist on being redressed in those here after to
be made, at the expense of the States which have so largely and
disproportionately participated, we have, as matters now stand, but
little security that the attempt would do more than change the
inequality from one quarter to another.
Thus viewing the subject, I have heretofore felt it my duty to
recommend the adoption of some plan for the distribution of the surplus
funds, which may at any time remain in the Treasury after the national
debt shall have been paid, among the States, in proportion to the
number of their Representatives, to be applied by them to objects of
internal improvement.
Although this plan has met with favor in some portions of the Union, it
has also elicited objections which merit deliberate consideration. A
brief notice of these objections here will not, therefore, I trust, be
regarded as out of place.
They rest, as far as they have come to my knowledge, on the following
grounds: first, an objection to the ration of distribution; second, an
apprehension that the existence of such a regulation would produce
improvident and oppressive taxation to raise the funds for
distribution; 3rd, that the mode proposed would lead to the
construction of works of a local nature, to the exclusion of such as
are general and as would consequently be of a more useful character;
and, last, that it would create a discreditable and injurious
dependence on the part of the State governments upon the Federal power.
Of those who object to the ration of representatives as the basis of
distribution, some insist that the importations of the respective
States would constitute one that would be more equitable; and others
again, that the extent of their respective territories would furnish a
standard which would be more expedient and sufficiently equitable. The
ration of representation presented itself to my mind, and it still
does, as one of obvious equity, because of its being the ratio of
contribution, whether the funds to be distributed be derived from the
customs or from direct taxation. It does not follow, however, that its
adoption is indispensable to the establishment of the system proposed.
There may be considerations appertaining to the subject which would
render a departure, to some extent, from the rule of contribution
proper. Nor is it absolutely necessary that the basis of distribution
be confined to one ground. It may, if in the judgment of those whose
right it is to fix it it be deemed politic and just to give it that
character, have regard to several.
In my first message I stated it to be my opinion that "it is not
probably that any adjustment of the tariff upon principles satisfactory
to the people of the Union will until a remote period, if ever, leave
the Government without a considerable surplus in the Treasury beyond
what may be required for its current surplus". I have had no cause to
change that opinion, but much to confirm it. Should these expectations
be realized, a suitable fund would thus be produced for the plan under
consideration to operate upon, and if there be no such fund its
adoption will, in my opinion, work no injury to any interest; for I can
not assent to the justness of the apprehension that the establishment
of the proposed system would tend to the encouragement of improvident
legislation of the character supposed. What ever the proper authority
in the exercise of constitutional power shall at any time here after
decide to be for the general good will in that as in other respects
deserve and receive the acquiescence and support of the whole country,
and we have ample security that every abuse of power in that regard by
agents of the people will receive a speedy and effectual corrective at
their hands. The views which I take of the future, founded on the
obvious and increasing improvement of all classes of our fellow
citizens in intelligence and in public and private virtue, leave me
without much apprehension on that head.
I do not doubt that those who come after us will be as much alive as we
are to the obligation upon all the trustees of political power to
exempt those for whom they act from all unnecessary burthens, and as
sensible of the great truth that the resources of the nation beyond
those required for immediate and necessary purposes of Government can
no where be so well deposited as in the pockets of the people.
It may some times happen that the interests of particular States would
not be deemed to coincide with the general interest in relation to
improvements within such States. But if the danger to be apprehended
from this source is sufficient to require it, a discretion might be
reserved to Congress to direct to such improvements of a general
character as the States concerned might not be disposed to unite in,
the application of the quotas of those States, under the restriction of
confining to each State the expenditure of its appropriate quota. It
may, however, be assumed as a safe general rule that such improvements
as serve to increase the prosperity of the respective States in which
they are made, by giving new facilities to trade, and thereby
augmenting the wealth and comfort of their inhabitants, constitute the
surest mode of conferring permanent and substantial advantages upon the
whole. The strength as well as the true glory of the Confederacy is
founded on the prosperity and power of the several independent
sovereignties of which it is composed and the certainty with which they
can be brought into successful active cooperation through the agency of
the Federal Government.
It is, more over, within the knowledge of such as are at all conversant
with public affairs that schemes of internal improvement have from time
to time been proposed which, from their extent and seeming
magnificence, were readily regarded as of national concernment, but
which upon fuller consideration and further experience would now be
rejected with great unanimity.
That the plan under consideration would derive important advantages
from its certainty, and that the moneys set apart for these purposes
would be more judiciously applied and economically expended under the
direction of the State legislatures, in which every part of each State
is immediately represented, can not, I think, be doubted. In the new
States particularly, where a comparatively small population is
scattered over an extensive surface, and the representation in Congress
consequently very limited, it is natural to expect that the
appropriations made by the Federal Government would be more likely to
be expended in the vicinity of those numbers through whose immediate
agency they were obtained than if the funds were placed under the
control of the legislature, in which every county of the State has its
own representative. This supposition does not necessarily impugn the
motives of such Congressional representatives, nor is it so intended.
We are all sensible of the bias to which the strongest minds and purest
hearts are, under such circumstances, liable. In respect to the last
objection--its probable effect upon the dignity and independence of
State governments--it appears to me only necessary to state the case as
it is, and as it would be if the measure proposed were adopted, to show
that the operation is most likely to be the very reverse of that which
the objection supposes.
In the one case the State would receive its quota of the national
revenue for domestic use upon a fixed principle as a matter of right,
and from a fund to the creation of which it had itself contributed its
fair proportion. Surely there could be nothing derogatory in that. As
matters now stand the States themselves, in their sovereign character,
are not unfrequently petitioners at the bar of the Federal Legislature
for such allowances out of the National Treasury as it may comport with
their pleasure or sense of duty to bestow upon them. It can not require
argument to prove which of the two courses is most compatible with the
efficiency or respectability of the State governments.
But all these are matters for discussion and dispassionate
consideration. That the desired adjustment would be attended with
difficulty affords no reason why it should not be attempted. The
effective operation of such motives would have prevented the adoption
of the Constitution under which we have so long lived and under the
benign influence of which our beloved country has so signally
prospered. The framers of that sacred instrument had greater
difficulties to overcome, and they did overcome them. The patriotism of
the people, directed by a deep conviction of the importance of the
Union, produced mutual concession and reciprocal forbearance. Strict
right was merged in a spirit of compromise, and the result has
consecrated their disinterested devotion to the general weal. Unless
the American people have degenerated, the same result can be again
effected when ever experience points out the necessity of a resort to
the same means to uphold the fabric which their fathers have reared.
It is beyond the power of man to make a system of government like ours
or any other operate with precise equality upon States situated like
those which compose this Confederacy; nor is inequality always
injustice. Every State can not expect to shape the measures of the
General Government to suit its own particular interests. The causes
which prevent it are seated in the nature of things, and can not be
entirely counteracted by human means. Mutual forbearance becomes,
therefore, a duty obligatory upon all, and we may, I am confident,
count upon a cheerful compliance with this high injunction on the part
of our constituents. It is not to be supposed that they will object to
make such comparatively inconsiderable sacrifices for the preservation
of rights and privileges which other less favored portions of the world
have in vain waded through seas of blood to acquire.
Our course is a safe one if it be but faithfully adhered to.
Acquiescence in the constitutionally expressed will of the majority,
and the exercise of that will in a spirit of moderation, justice, and
brotherly kindness, will constitute a cement which would for ever
preserve our Union. Those who cherish and inculcate sentiments like
these render a most essential service to their country, while those who
seek to weaken their influence are, how ever conscientious and praise
worthy their intentions, in effect its worst enemies.
If the intelligence and influence of the country, instead of laboring
to foment sectional prejudices, to be made subservient to party
warfare, were in good faith applied to the eradication of causes of
local discontent, by the improvement of our institutions and by
facilitating their adaptation to the condition of the times, this task
would prove one of less difficulty. May we not hope that the obvious
interests of our common country and the dictates of an enlightened
patriotism will in the end lead the public mind in that direction?
After all, the nature of the subject does not admit of a plan wholly
free from objection. That which has for some time been in operation is,
perhaps, the worst that could exist, and every advance that can be made
in its improvement is a matter eminently worthy of your most deliberate
attention.
It is very possible that one better calculated to effect the objects in
view may yet be devised. If so, it is to be hoped that those who
disapprove the past and dissent from what is proposed for the future
will feel it their duty to direct their attention to it, as they must
be sensible that unless some fixed rule for the action of the Federal
Government in this respect is established the course now attempted to
be arrested will be again resorted to. Any mode which is calculated to
give the greatest degree of effect and harmony to our legislation upon
the subject, which shall best serve to keep the movements of the
Federal Government within the sphere intended by those who modeled and
those who adopted it, which shall lead to the extinguishment of the
national debt in the shortest period and impose the lightest burthens
upon our constituents, shall receive from me a cordial and firm
support.
Among the objects of great national concern I can not omit to press
again upon your attention that part of the Constitution which regulates
the election of President and Vice-President. The necessity for its
amendment is made so clear to my mind by observation of its evils and
by the many able discussions which they have elicited on the floor of
Congress and elsewhere that I should be wanting to my duty were I to
withhold another expression of my deep solicitude on the subject. Our
system fortunately contemplates a recurrence to first principles,
differing in this respect from all that have preceded it, and securing
it, I trust, equally against the decay and the commotions which have
marked the progress of other governments.
Our fellow citizens, too, who in proportion to their love of liberty
keep a steady eye upon the means of sustaining it, do not require to be
reminded of the duty they owe to themselves to remedy all essential
defects in so vital a part of their system. While they are sensible
that every evil attendant upon its operation is not necessarily
indicative of a bad organization, but may proceed from temporary
causes, yet the habitual presence, or even a single instance, of evils
which can be clearly traced to an organic defect will not, I trust, be
over-looked through a too scrupulous veneration for the work of their
ancestors.
The Constitution was an experiment committed to the virtue and
intelligence of the great mass of our country-men, in whose ranks the
framers of it themselves were to perform the part of patriotic
observation and scrutiny, and if they have passed from the stage of
existence with an increased confidence in its general adaptation to our
condition we should learn from authority so high the duty of fortifying
the points in it which time proves to be exposed rather than be
deterred from approaching them by the suggestions of fear or the
dictates of misplaced reverence.
A provision which does not secure to the people a direct choice of
their Chief Magistrate, but has a tendency to defeat their will,
presented to my mind such an inconsistence with the general spirit of
our institutions that I was indeed to suggest for your consideration
the substitute which appeared to me at the same time the most likely to
correct the evil and to meet the views of our constituents. The most
mature reflection since has added strength to the belief that the best
interests of our country require the speedy adoption of some plan
calculated to effect this end. A contingency which some times places it
in the power of a single member of the House of Representatives to
decide an election of so high and solemn a character is unjust to the
people, and becomes when it occurs a source of embarrassment to the
individuals thus brought into power and a cause of distrust of the
representative body.