[Footnote 14: This and the following regulations are taken from
Bluntschli's "Das moderne Völkerrecht der civilizirten Staatens,"
Nordlingen, 1872. Some of the treaty provisions and questions are
grounded upon "Recueil des traités, conventions," etc., par Ch. de
Martens and F de Cussy, Leipzig, 1846, and "Archives diplomatiques:"
--Since practical abstaining from war is the natural assumption of
neutrality, a neutral State is bound not to assist any belligerent
power in warlike purposes.
--A neutral State may not supply a belligerent power with weapons or
other war material.
--If private persons furnish belligerent powers with war material as
articles of commerce, they assuredly run the risk of confiscation by
the contending parties of such articles, as contraband of war; but the
neutral _State_ is not to be regarded as having violated its neutrality
by tolerating trade in contraband of war.
--Permission freely to purchase food even upon account of a belligerent
power is not regarded as a serious concession towards that State,
provided that the permission is general, applying alike to both parties.
--A neutral State may not permit the war-ships of a belligerent power
to run into its ports or (with any other object than to procure
provisions, water, coal, etc.) to traverse its sounds, rivers and
canals.
--Belligerent powers are bound fully to respect the right of peace
of the neutral States, and to abstain from any invasion of their
territories.
--Where a violation of neutral territory has taken place from ignorance
of the boundary and not from evil intent, the neutral State shall
immediately claim redress, compensation, and the adoption of measures
necessary to prevent a similar mistake in future.]
[Footnote 15: See in respect of this act, "Recueil des traités,
conventions," etc., Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, Part iii. p. 243
Leipzig, 1846.]
[Footnote 16: See Ch. de Martens and F. de Cussy, in the above-named
collection, Part iv. p. 575.]
[Footnote 17: Respecting the correspondence on this question, see the
remainder of "Archives diplomatiques," 1871-72.]
[Footnote 18: Motion in the Second Chamber, No. 97.
Since the European States have settled into their present grouping, the
material preponderance of the great powers over the smaller countries
has more and more diminished the possibility of these defending their
external liberty and independence by military power only.
There are States whose whole male population cannot equal or barely
exceed the number, which a great power can command for its fully
equipped army.
In olden time, a small high-spirited people might with success fight
against a greater and more powerful neighbour. In consequence of the
weak organization, the feeble spirit of cohesion and the slightly
developed art of war, it was then possible.
Now this condition is changed. As a rule we find that the military
strength of a State is in direct proportion to its population and
material wealth.
The consequence is that the smaller States have virtually ceased to
be belligerent powers. Such examples as Germany's proceeding against
Denmark in 1864, and England's against Egypt in 1882, or in general,
when the stronger State only needs to consider how large a portion of
its forces must be employed to accomplish its object, are not to be
considered as wars, but as military executions.
As to our own country (Sweden), it certainly has, together with Norway,
an advantage in its situation above other small powers. But it concerns
us that we utilize this advantage with wisdom and at the right time.
This is not to be done by turning Sweden into a military State, because
even if we did so to the greatest possible extent, we should, if left
to ourselves, not even so be in a condition to defend ourselves against
our powerful neighbours.
In proportion as a nation exhausts its resources by military
preparations, its ability lessens to cope with an over-powering enemy.
In our day, not only are great and well-disciplined hosts required for
carrying on war, but great material riches are equally indispensable.
The relation between a nation of four or five millions, and one of
forty or fifty millions, is like that between the dwarfs and the giants.
It is easily understood that patriotic feelings may bewilder the
judgment, and that our nation, with its brilliant war memories, can
only with difficulty perceive this simple truth, and with reluctance
accommodate itself to the changed condition which modern times have
created.
Let us, however, realize that we are standing at the parting of the
ways; that we have before us the alternative, on the one hand, of a
barren and ruinous militarism; on the other, the seeking of our defence
in a neutrality guaranteed by the united powers; making it possible for
us to get our defence adjusted, without any very great difficulty, and
settled upon a footing so satisfactory.
The first-named alternative would, in our naturally poor land,
excessively depress our natural vitality, and in a great degree prevent
our progress as a cultured people keeping pace with greater and
wealthier nations. The second would put us into a position to confine
our military burdens within reasonable limits, and to expend the powers
and resources of prosperity thus relieved, in means of promoting
business, trade, science, and well-being of all kinds.
The clear-sighted friend of his country, who sees the population in
ever-swelling numbers leaving their homes for a foreign shore, seeking
a new fatherland, will surely not hesitate in his choice.
It will perhaps be said that such a choice does not now lie before us.
There are two opinions about that. But in one thing we may all unite,
namely, that a settled neutrality for Sweden is a thing to be aimed at.
Here almost every interest of the fatherland converges.
But if such a neutralization is considered by many not a sufficient
peace-protection under all circumstances, yet no one with reason can
deny that it does form a security for our country against foreign
powers.
Accepting this conclusion as correct, it follows that we should find
some practicable means of realizing it; and if hindrances do meet us,
we shall, on nearer inspection, find that they are not great, but with
hearty goodwill and perseverance may be overcome.
This is my conviction.
In drawing attention to the subjoined, I would further bring to mind
that the seat of war in Europe is limited in the proportion in which
the number of neutralized States grows, a condition of things which may
little by little in an essential degree impede or prevent the outbreak
of war; that the peculiar situation of Sweden (greatly superior, for
example, to Belgium or Switzerland) must naturally facilitate its
neutralization; that, lastly, the neutrality proposed does not stand
in the way of arranging our own defence, but that rather, in case
Parliament rejects his Majesty's army bill, adapts itself powerfully to
contribute to a right solution of the _Defence question_; and so much
the more, as all suspicion that that old vexed question aims perhaps
at something more and other than DEFENCE of the country would thereby
disappear.
For this reason--and since we cannot expect that other powers should
take the first step and offer us what we do not ask for--I respectfully
propose:--
_That Parliament shall in writing express to the king its desire that
it might please his Majesty to initiate, amongst the states with which
Sweden has diplomatic relations, negotiations for bringing about a
permanent guaranteed[26] neutrality of Sweden, in harmony with the
principles of modern international law._