With regard to the first objection, _viz._, that the powers would not
enter upon Sweden's neutralization, it appears to me that circumstances
of great weight imply the contrary.
We may be quite sure that the powers will first and foremost consult
their own interests. Scandinavia may be certainly regarded as specially
valuable as a base of military operations to any of the great Baltic
and Western States. But it would be quite a matter of consideration,
whether these powers would not gain more by the reciprocal security of
being all alike cut off from this base, than by the doubtful advantage
of being possibly able to reckon upon Scandinavia as an ally.
A neutralized Scandinavia would be a Switzerland among the seas; a
breakwater in the way between England and France on the one side,
and Russia and Germany on the other. In case of a war between these
great powers it would now be of considerable moment for any of them to
get the powers along the coasts of the Sound and the Belts, upon its
side. And how difficult it would be for the latter to preserve their
neutrality during such a war, must be evident to everybody.
So the interests are seen to be equally great on all sides. It may
therefore be deemed prudent to establish, in time, a permanent
neutrality of the powers along the coast. Here, according to my view,
lies a great problem for the foreign secretaries of the united kingdoms
and Denmark.
My reason for speaking here of neutralizing the whole of Scandinavia
is, that I am convinced that the brother-nations take entirely the same
view as the Swedish. With respect to the general interests of European
peace, the neutralization of Scandinavia would be more important than
that of Switzerland and Belgium, because the interests of the great
powers are greater and more equally balanced around the Scandinavian
North than around those two small continental States.
We have old friends in the Western powers; we have gained a new friend
in united Germany and by the neutralization of Scandinavia we shall
not only make friendship with Russia, but Denmark will gain that of
Germany, perhaps causing the last-named power to fulfil its duty to
Denmark with respect to North Sleswick, seeing that it need no longer
fear that its small neighbour would ever be forced into an alliance
with a powerful enemy of Germany.
But it is not only the political interests of the powers which would be
advanced by the neutralization of Scandinavia.
In the course of the last ten years world-wide traffic has made an
unheard-of growth and connecting links between nations have been formed
in many regions. As an example of the effect of these we may mention
that even thirty years ago the normal freightage for corn was 50-60
shillings sterling per ton, from the Black Sea to North Europe; but
the freightage from California and Australia to Europe, now, hardly
exceeds the half. A European war would exercise a paralyzing effect
here. Every one who has any conception of the influence of the price of
corn on, to speak broadly, the whole civilization of modern times, will
easily understand this.
Before the century closes this development will have woven a net of
common interest all over our continent, and necessarily called forth
such a sensitiveness in the corporate body of Europe, that, for
example, an injury in the foot of Italy may be said to cause pain right
up to Norway.
The merchant fleet of Norway, alone, is indeed the third in rank of all
the merchant fleets of the world. As is well known, the united kingdoms
take an advanced place in the carrying trade by sea. According to what
was told me by a distinguished merchant, the transport trade undertaken
by Norwegian and Swedish ships between foreign countries is five times
greater than that between home and foreign lands. Consequently, as the
keen competition between steam and sailing vessels increases, the only
country which can dispense with the service of our sailing vessels
is England, the great power upon which we may reckon always as an
ally. Most of the remaining countries, on the other hand, require our
merchant fleet.
Since, now, we could not of course defend our merchant service in a
war, and other and greater nations may be jeopardized as much as we, it
may be assumed that they would be willing, through the neutralization
of Scandinavia, to secure its fleet against the eventualities of war.
If we add such interests as affect trade and credit, civilization and
humanity, to the political interests, it appears that we may plead on
grounds of strong probability that the great powers would be willing to
guarantee our neutrality.
According to the second objection, the country would gain no security
from a guaranteed neutrality, even if, contrary to expectation, such
could be obtained.
Perfect safety cannot be attained here on earth by any system.
This is as true for nations as for individuals but I believe that
a neutrality thus guaranteed would be a strong protection to our
national independence, whilst in a not inconsiderable degree it would
contribute to the preservation of peace, and gradually help to lessen
the military burdens of all lands; consequently, and in the first
place, of our own.
Treaties, it is said, are broken as easily as they are made. Even if
it be true that this has occurred, it does not necessarily follow that
it must continue to occur. New factors may come in making it more
difficult to break engagements that have been entered into.
Experience shows that righteous laws have been transgressed, but no
one would aver that they are therefore unnecessary. As the moral power
of the law makes it possible to diminish the police force, so also
treaties of neutrality make it possible to diminish the military forces.
Besides, our opponents ought to bring forward evidence that the rights
of States at present neutralized have been violated. That they have
been threatened is true, and it would have been a wonder if this had
not happened under the lawless condition which has obtained among
nations.
The idea of neutrality has, nevertheless, as I have tried to show by
many examples, little by little developed into a valid principle of
justice; and the growth continues. The neutralization of Scandinavia
would bring it a great step forward, to the blessing both of ourselves
and of other nations.
According to objections 3 and 4, a guaranteed neutrality would diminish
our independence without contributing to lessen our burdens for defence.
The truth is, that international law as at present constituted does
not permit another power to interfere under any pretext with the
internal concerns of a neutral state, and therefore not with anything
which affects its system of defence or its measures for preserving its
neutrality. With these the neutral State, and it only, can deal.
As a proof of this being so, Luxemburg was neutralized in 1867 upon
condition that the strong fortress bearing that name should be
demolished. But this circumstance, imperative for the general peace
of Europe, shows on the other hand that guaranteeing powers do not
willingly impose upon a State any serious duty of fortifying itself in
order to defend its rights. Nevertheless the powers found it needful
to make a supplementary clause to the protocol by which the congress
concluded the neutrality of Luxemburg, whereby it was emphasized, as a
matter of course, that the article respecting the destruction of the
fortress of Luxemburg did not imply any sort of limitation of the right
of the neutral State to maintain, or, if it chose, to improve its own
works of defence. Belgium did indeed construct the great fortresses
around Antwerp long after the country was neutralized.
In reference to what one and another has said about the value of the
subject, nothing is needed beyond the fact that neutral rights have,
even in its present position, been respected in all essentials. That
a neutral power must abstain from mixing itself up with the policy
of other powers cannot imply a greater limitation of its right to
self-regulation than that a guaranteeing power shall abstain from
attacking a neutralized State or from making military alliance with
it. There is certainly a limitation for both parties, as far as
is necessary for adopting an intelligent union between States,--a
limitation of physical force and of love of war.
The neutral State has not to submit to any guardianship beyond what
any man must do and does, when he subjects his passions to the control
of a moral purpose.
Seeing that a guaranteeing State has no right to interfere in our
internal concerns, not even in anything we think good for our defence,
we shall always be free to keep up a military force, large or small.
But a neutralized State is obliged to disarm the troops of other
belligerent powers that may overstep its frontiers, just as of course,
under the lawless condition which war is and which it entails, it has,
according to its ability, to protect its boundaries with arms. But if
this duty cannot exempt Switzerland and Belgium from proportionately
large war burdens in time of peace, this would not at all in the
same degree affect the neutralization of the Scandinavian peninsula,
since there could never be a question of disarming troops which had
overstepped its boundaries, but only of preventing the war-ships of
a belligerent power from entering Norwegian or Swedish seas, a thing
which, under the protection of a guaranteed neutrality, could not take
place.
Respecting the fifth objection, which declares that the proposition
is untimely, I do not hesitate to express my opinion that just now,
during the truce which prevails, is the time to bring it forward. The
need of a settled peace increases everywhere, and it is therefore
probable that a proposition to the great powers respecting a guaranteed
neutrality for the united kingdoms would meet with general sympathy in
Europe.
On these and many other grounds I sought to maintain my proposition.
It was opposed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron Hochschild,
amongst others, who declared that he could not possibly support it. He
informed us that the whole of his colleagues in the Government took
the same view of the subject as himself. He desired that the bill as
well as the contingent appointment of a committee should be thrown out
totally and entirely.
As the minister in this way has made the matter into a cabinet
question, there could not well, under the present conditions, be any
question of the adoption of the bill.
In spite of this, however, the request of the Foreign Minister was not
complied with, seeing the Second Chamber adopted an amendment after
fifty-three members had voted for the acceptance of the original bill.
By the amendment which was adopted, the Chamber did not accept the
grounds of the committee's opinion--which the Foreign Secretary
approved--but, in the hope that the Government would spontaneously
carry out the chief object of the bill, accepted for the present the
report of the committee that no address be sent to the King on the
subject.
By reason of this result in the Second Chamber no action was taken in
the First on the matter.[21]
During the debate in the Second Chamber, April 28, the Foreign
Secretary remarked that I must have overlooked the fact that the
European powers had, ever since 1814, looked upon the two kingdoms of
the Scandinavian peninsula as a political unity in questions relating
to peace and war; why otherwise should I propose from the first that
the sister kingdom should have the opportunity of expressing itself on
a matter which concerned Norway equally with Sweden. This objection was
without foundation.
During the drawn debate, March 3, I had already taken occasion to
point out that it would not be seemly for one moving a resolution in
the Swedish Riksdag to act as spokesman for Norway at the same time
expressing my confidence that the Storting would meet us in a friendly
manner, if the Riksdag approved the bill with respect to Sweden.[22]
That the neutralization ought to include not only Norway, but Denmark
too, seems to be obvious.
A highly esteemed jurist, Count L. KAMAROWSKY, professor of law at
the University of Moscow, puts it as a matter of great importance
in the interests of the world's peace that international seas
and coasts should be neutralized.[23] This particularly affects
Denmark in connection with the other two Scandinavian States. Such
a neutralization, he says, will lead to a disarmament in the Sound
and Belts. These great traffic-ways would then be accessible for the
merchant and war vessels of all nations. They must not be fortified,
but the freedom of navigation would be watched over by an international
committee.
At the CONFERENCE at BERLIN in 1885, where fifteen States were
represented, just principles were adopted for the navigation of the
Congo and the Niger. Free navigation and commerce on these rivers was
secured to the flags of all nations. The same principle was likewise
extended to their tributaries and lakes, together with canals and
railroads which might in the future be constructed to get past the
unnavigable portions of the Congo and Niger. Not even in time of war
may the freedom of communication and commerce be interrupted. The
transport of contraband of war alone is forbidden. An international
commission takes care that all these international agreements are kept
in force. This authority, composed of delegates from each of the States
which took part in the Berlin Conference, is independent of the local
authorities in Congo-land.
Now, every free people has naturally an independent right to arrange
its own affairs as it chooses, upon condition that it grants the same
right to every other State.
In consequence of this principle in international law, neutralization
is applied in very varied ways according to the very varying conditions
of those who have the benefit of it, and altogether in harmony with
their wishes. Thus, for example, neutralization when it concerns a
territory, consists not only in forbidding any warlike operation in
the domain thus rendered inviolate, but involves a similar prohibition
with respect to any marching or countermarching of armies, or smaller
detachments, even of single officers or soldiers.
A canal or a strait may be so neutralized, on the other hand, that all
warlike operations are forbidden in it, but nevertheless it is open for
passage through, yet upon condition that no belligerent has a right, in
passing through, to land upon the shores of the neutralized region.
This is the kind of neutralization which appears applicable to the
Scandinavian seas.
* * * * *
One question which for a long time came up constantly at the congresses
of Peace Societies, was the NEUTRALIZATION of the SUEZ CANAL, until it
became at last solved in practice. After tedious negotiations, this
burning question was settled by an agreement between England and France
in the treaty of October 24, 1887, which was later entered into by the
other powers interested and that important channel of communication
became at all times inviolate.[24]
Upon the programme of the friends of peace questions have long been
mooted respecting the neutralization of Elsass-Lothringen, and of
the Balkan States, together with that of the Danube, Bosphorus,
Sea of Marmora, Dardanelles, and their European coasts; whereupon
should follow the rendering inviolate of Constantinople; as also
of the Baltic, and as a result of this, the neutralization of the
Scandinavian kingdoms.
In connection with the neutralization of the Sound has arisen the still
newer question of the non-German region north of the North Sea Canal,
now in course of construction, between the mouth of the Elbe and the
naval port of Kiel.
By constituting Elsass-Lothringen into an independent neutral State,
a division would be made between France and Germany, and these great
powers would be separated by a huge wall of neutral States which would
also narrow in an essential degree the European battle-field.
The same result is hoped for from a confederacy of neutral States on
the Balkan, with respect to the relations between Russia and Austria,
as well as with respect to the whole of Europe.
The Sound is one of the most important arteries of the world's
commerce. About one hundred vessels of all nations pass daily through
this strait, but only about ten (on the average, however, certainly
larger ships) pass through the Suez Canal, which in the interests of
the world's trade has become neutral.
It can be nothing but a gain to Europe that the entrances both into the
Baltic and the Black Sea should be rendered inviolate.
In an address upon the importance of the Sound to the North, given
to the National Economic Society, Mr. Bajer pointed out that so long
as the Sound and its coasts were not rendered inviolate, military
devastations will be carried on in and around the strait by belligerent
powers; also that the facts that the Sound is not Danish only, but
Swedish also, and that Sweden has a common foreign policy with
Norway, make it probable that it may the sooner be understood to be
for the European interest that all three northern kingdoms should be
simultaneously neutralized, and not one of them only.[25]
In consequence of Mr. Bajer's indefatigable zeal for the united
co-operation of the northern kingdoms in the cause of peace, this idea
has gained many influential adherents in foreign countries also; and
on his proposition, two international congresses, Geneva, Sept. 16th,
1883, and Berne, Aug. 6th, 1884, unanimously accepted the following
resolution, which in its general meaning was adopted by the First
Northern peace Meeting at Gotenberg, Aug. 19th, 1885:--