And concludes with these words:--

"In the full assurance that what the Storting here requests will be an

unqualified benefit to our people, it is hereby submitted that your

Majesty should take the necessary steps indicated."

A similar resolution was very near being voted by the DANISH FOLKETING

in 1875. The proposition as brought forward was, May 13th, unanimously

recommended by the committee in charge, but on account of the

dissolution of the House two days later, could not be acted upon.

Several years ago a petition was circulated in the various districts

of Denmark, by which Parliament was urged to co-operate as early

as possible in bringing about a permanent Scandinavian treaty of

arbitration.

In such a treaty, binding in the first instance for thirty years,

the petition affirms that the three northern kingdoms will have an

efficient moral support when there is occasion to withstand the

efforts of the great powers to entice or to threaten any of them to

take part in war as allies on one side or the other. Such a treaty

will, therefore, in great measure serve to preserve the neutrality of

the northern kingdoms, and thereby their lasting independence.

This petition was dealt with in the Folketing, March 27th, 1888. After

a short discussion, the following motion of F. Bajer was passed by

fifty votes against sixteen.

"Since the Folketing agrees with the wish expressed in the petition,

provided it is shared by the other States without whom it cannot be

carried out, the House passes on to the order of the day."

In his little paper: _On the Prevention of War by Arbitration_, F.

Bajer writes:

"It may certainly be granted, that a little State like Denmark cannot

well work at the creation of a European tribunal of arbitration,

so far as that means setting itself at the head of a movement for

inviting the other European States to a Congress by which its creation

shall be adopted.

"But a little State like Denmark can always do something in the

direction of arbitration between States. It can bring the matter a

practical step forward by applying first to the other small States,

especially to the neighbour States of Sweden and Norway, and proposing

to them that mutual disputes shall in future, as far as possible, be

settled by arbitration when other means have failed. The relations

between the three northern kingdoms are indeed now so friendly that a

war between them can hardly be thought of for a moment. But--as was

said in confirmation of the resolution in the first northern Peace

Meeting, respecting a permanent arbitration treaty between the three

kingdoms--they have carried on many bloody internecine wars, which

have only benefited their powerful neighbours, but have been in the

highest degree injurious to themselves; and the possibility of war

between the three northern kingdoms is not excluded so long as they

are not simultaneously neutralized, or in some other way engaged to

carry out a common foreign policy. It is no longer ago than 1873

that the so-called "pilots' war" in Oeresund caused much bad blood

among relatives on both sides of the sound. That that was settled

authoritatively by the mutual declaration of the 14th of August is

due to circumstances on whose continuance for the future it is not

possible to reckon. Had a strained relation at the same time obtained

between one or more of the great powers within or without the Baltic

ports, and had these endeavoured to sow discord between the coast

powers, that they might fish in the troubled waters, and feather

their own nests by getting these small states as their allies; and

if one power had got Denmark, but its enemy got Sweden-Norway as an

ally--a new northern fratricidal war would have broken out. Even if

such a future possibility cannot be entirely eradicated by a mutual

arbitration treaty amongst the northern nations, a new guarantee for

peace would be secured." (Bluntschli's expression.) "For the small

northern kingdoms would by such a treaty acquire an excellent moral

support when it came to withstanding the attempt of the great powers

to entice or threaten them into taking part in wars as their allies.

Such a participation is always a dangerous game, because, as history

shows, the small States lose rather than gain. The small States are

used as counters for the great ones to play with."

At this point we may remark, that as far back as 1848, the same year

that the Peace Congress was held in Brussels, Feb. 2nd, a treaty (the

Guadaloupe-Hidalgo Treaty) was concluded between the United States of

America and Mexico, containing a clause that a committee of arbitration

shall settle, not only such differences as may arise directly

concerning that treaty, but also shall, as the highest authority,

adjudicate as far as possible all disputes which may arise between the

high contracting States.[3]

SWITZERLAND concluded, July 20th, 1864, a similar treaty with the

HAWAIAN ISLANDS, and on October 30th with SAN SALVADOR.[4]

Siam, whose monarch has given many proofs of sympathy for Oskar II.,

concluded a similar treaty, May 18th, 1868, with the UNITED KINGDOMS,

and also with BELGIUM, Aug. 29th of the same year.[5] The CENTRAL and

SOUTH AMERICAN REPUBLICS, HONDURAS, and THE UNITED STATES OF COLOMBIA

did the same when on April 10th, 1882, they signed an arbitration

treaty between themselves.[6]

Since that time this vigorous idea has grown into the CENTRAL AND SOUTH

AMERICAN ARBITRATION LEAGUE, and is now making good way towards being

applied to the whole of America.

The question now is, whether the VALUE OF PEACE TREATIES, in general

or in particular, which are established between mutually distant small

States can be estimated as highly as the good intention of their

creation, which is habitually acknowledged to be good? Are they

something to be depended upon? Will they be carried into effect?

That depends in the first place upon what is meant by peace treaties.

If reference is made to certain international settlements which the

conquered, with hatred in their hearts, bleeding, upon their knees were

FORCED to accept, we may at once grant that they imply no security

for peace, but, on the contrary, are a fresh source of warlike

complications.

Thus, for example, the conclusion of peace which France was FORCED to

sign at Versailles, Feb. 26th, 1871, and by which Alsace-Lorraine was

torn from France, became a volcano which now for nineteen years has

held the nations in suspense and unrest, and still threatens to ruin

Europe.

Neither would it be advisable to set much store on such obligations as

the Western Powers undertook in the agreement which goes by the name

of the NOVEMBER TREATY, to help us to defend the northern part of our

peninsula against Russia; because a guaranteed neutrality implies in

reality more danger than safety, if the guarantee is not mutual; that

is, in this instance, if our eastern neighbour is not included in the

guarantee; which is so far from being the case that the treaty, on the

contrary, is a source of menace and distrust to him.[7]

With respect to certain treaties of alliance, whose object is to

collect THE GREATEST POSSIBLE NUMBER OF BAYONETS as a mutual security

against other powers, who, on their side, seek to protect themselves

by uniting their forces, nobody can see in them anything else than a

guarantee for an armed peace, which, by the necessity of its nature,

leads to war.

If, on the contrary, by peace treaties are meant such international

contracts as are NOT WRITTEN IN BLOOD; such as relate to trade and

commerce, industry, art, science and so on, it would be in vain to seek

for a single instance of the breach of contract, either on the side of

the weaker or the stronger.

Neither can any example in our time be pointed to of open violation of

the rights of a small country in its quality of an independent State,

as long as these rights have stood under the mutual guarantee of the

great powers.

As evidence to the contrary, the London treaty of May 8th, 1853, has

been adduced, which was intended to secure Denmark's neutrality; the

Treaty of Paris, April 14th, 1856, respecting the Black Sea; and the

fifth article of the Peace of Prague in 1866. But here the fault lies

in a misunderstanding.

What the Treaty of London established was not the indivisibility of

Denmark, but of the Dano-German monarchy. The German territory was to

be fast linked to the Danish. This was admitted, as a principle, by the

treaty to be fitting and right, but the treaty contained no trace of

stipulations as to guarantee.

With respect to Russia's breach of treaty of the stipulations as to

her banishment from the Black Sea as a military power,[8] it must

be remembered that the representatives of the powers, and of Russia

also, on January 17th, 1871, signed a protocol, whereby it was

settled as an essential axiom in international law, that no power can

absolve itself from the obligations which are entered into by treaty

without the consent of the contracting parties. Therefore Russia

openly acknowledged that her declaration of not choosing to abide

by the injunctions stipulated for in the Treaty of Paris respecting

the Black Sea, was precipitate, and that, consequently, the treaty

was permanently in force until it was formally abrogated. This took

place in the new treaty of March 3rd, of the same year. Besides, here

comes in what was said above about the value of such treaties as are

concluded after brute force has determined the issue. And this not only

was the case in the Black Sea stipulations, but also with respect to

the unfulfilled promises of article 5 of the Treaty of Prague, whereby

the Danish people was to be given the opportunity for a plebiscite in

determining upon their reunion with Denmark. As to the peace treaties

between the lesser States, which certainly have important trade

relations one with another, but which, on account of their mutually

distant position, cannot reasonably be expected to go to war with each

other, it is true that one cannot in general attribute any special

importance to them. Nothing is gained by over-estimating their value.

But they deserve to be brought forward as enrichments of international

law and guide-posts for other States. And that the small States need

not wait until the great ones are ready to unite appears just as much

in accordance with the nature of the case as with the interests of

their own well-being.

Calvo, undeniably the first authority in these matters, emphasizes

as a significant fact, that no single example can be pointed to in

which States, after their mutual disputes have been referred to the

consideration or judgment of arbitrators, have sought to _withdraw from

the operation_ of the decision. And according to Henry Richard and

other authorities, by allowing international questions to be settled by

arbitration, at least in sixty-seven instances, disputes of a menacing

character have been averted.

I shall not here give a detailed account of all these instances, but

only with the greatest conciseness refer to some of them.

In 1794 a contest between England and the United States of America

respecting St. Croix river was settled by arbitration; in 1803

France was in the same way condemned to pay 18 million francs to the

United States of America for unlawful seizure of vessels; in 1818 a

threatening dispute between Spain and the United States of America was

settled by arbitration, and a contention between these and England was

arranged by the Emperor of Russia, who was chosen as arbitrator, etc.

The best known of such disputes was the so-called Alabama question,

which threatened a desolating world-war. This affair sprang out of the

North American civil war 1861-65. The Southern States had privateers

built in England, among which the _Alabama_ especially wrought great

mischief to the Northerners. The Government of the Union considered

that England had broken her neutrality in allowing the equipment of

the privateer, and requested compensation.

A bitter feeling grew up and war appeared inevitable. But on January

24th, 1869, an agreement was happily entered into, which, with fresh

negotiations, led to the Washington treaty, May 8th, 1871. In harmony

with this the dispute was referred for settlement to a Court of

Arbitration consisting of five members, of which England and the United

States each chose one, and the neutral states of Italy, Switzerland,

and Brazil, likewise each chose one. These five met on December 15th,

1871, as a tribunal of arbitration, at Geneva, and delivered their

judgment on September 14th following (four votes against England's

one), that the English Government had made a breach in its duty

as a neutral power with respect to some of the privateers under

consideration, and therefore England would have to pay an indemnity of

15-1/2 million dollars to the United States.[9]

England bowed to the award and fulfilled her duty.

In the same way the powerful insular kingdom voluntarily submitted

to settlement in the weary contention regarding the possession of

Delagoa Bay and the surrounding region on the east coast of Africa. The

dispute was entrusted for settlement, in 1874, to the President of the

French Republic, MacMahon, and he decided in July, 1875, in favour of

Portugal. That the new contention between these two States, which for

some time now has excited an inflammable spirit, not only in Portugal,

but in other countries as well, will be arranged in the same friendly

manner, there is but little doubt.

The claim of Portugal is much older than that of England. Its special

ground is the discovery of the coast which was made by Portuguese

mariners three hundred years ago. The Portuguese urge, that since

the coast is theirs, they have a right to go as far inland as they

choose and place the country thus entered under their dominion. They

say further, that they have made a treaty with a native ruler over a

kingdom which stretches far inland, and that ruined fortresses are

still to be found which show that they once had this distant region

in possession. To this assertion Lord Salisbury answers, that where

ruined fortresses are found they only testify to fallen dominion. The

English Government could not recognise Portugal's construction of the

contested question; according to that construction the question would

virtually turn upon the possession of Shireland and Mashonaland (the

inland country north and south of the Zambesi). It denied Portugal's

claim to this territory as so entirely groundless that it could not

enter into such a question; but has on the other hand made a peremptory

claim, arising from Portugal's violence towards the natives who are

under England's protection, for dishonour to the English flag, and for

other international offences, etc.

The right of possession of the regions in question can no longer

be regarded as doubtful, since Portugal had set aside the general

international axiom, that the claim for possession according to

colonial usage can only be held valid when colonization is actually

carried out to the furtherance of civilization and public safety.

Portugal's assertion that the signatories of the Congo Act would be

the right adjudicators of the question was denied, upon the ground

that Portugal had delayed to make her claim valid when Nyassaland was

declared to belong to the sphere of England's interests. On July 1st,

1889, the Under-secretary, Sir James Fergusson, in the Lower House,

explained that the Portuguese Government had been informed that they

would be held answerable for all loss which Englishmen might suffer

by the annulling of the Delagoa railway convention. The same day Lord

Salisbury informed the Upper House that the English Government would

send three war-ships to Delagoa Bay, to be ready in case of need.

Portugal's conduct was, in his opinion, unjustifiable.

Then came the noble lord's ultimatum, with the demand that Portugal

should recall all Portuguese officers and troops from the territory

which stands under the sovereignty of England or lies within the sphere

of England's interests, and give an answer within twenty-four hours;

otherwise England would be compelled to break off her relations with

Portugal. This threatening manner of procedure, by which a weaker

nation was humbled by superior power, roused bad blood in Portugal and

was sharply censured in many parts of Europe; yes, even in England,

and in Parliament, in the press, and at many great public meetings.

At one of these meetings, composed of 700 workmen delegates from

various parts of England and 130 Members of Parliament, in quality

of vice-presidents, it was unanimously resolved to protest against

Lord Salisbury's conduct as at variance with the dignity of the

British nation; and to request that the dispute should be settled by

arbitration--so much the rather, as the more certain one is of being

in the right, the more confidently can one's cause be placed in the

hands of an impartial tribunal. Later on the English Government,

together with the North American virtually resolved on this expedient

for solving, the difficulties relating to Delagoa Bay. Portugal made

difficulties and delays, but at length declared herself willing to

enter into a proposal for arbitration.[10] All three States were now

united in asking the Government of Switzerland to choose three of her

most distinguished jurist officials as arbitration judges.

At the time when the first Anglo-Portuguese contest was settled by the

President of the French Republic there occurred a second example of

both importance and interest. For many years there had been a menacing

boundary dispute between Italy and Switzerland, just a little seed of

quarrel, such as formerly always broke out into bloody strife, since

according to the traditions of national honour not an inch of a patch

of ground must be given up except at the sword's point. But the two

kingdoms decided to commend the case to an arbitrator, viz., the United

States minister in Rome, P. Marsh, who, after a careful study of the

claims of the contending parties, declared judgment in favour of Italy,

and so the contention was adjusted.

Two DANGEROUS DISPUTES, which in 1874-75 and 1880 threatened an

outbreak of war between CHINA and JAPAN, but were happily solved by

arbitration, might be named, but for fear of being prolix I dare not go

more particularly into them, instructive as they are.

The first arose as a result of a murder of some Japanese on the island

of Formosa, and was settled by the English minister in Pekin, who was

chosen by both parties as arbitrator, who decided that China should

give Japan in redress a large sum of money, which was done.[11]

The second of these disputes concerned the sovereignty of the Liu

Kiu Islands, and was adjusted by a compromise brought about by

ex-president Grant, who in a conversation with the Chinese Minister

uttered these memorable words: "An arbitration between two nations

will never satisfy both nations alike; but it always satisfies the

conscience of humanity."[12]

Not to be tedious, I pass over here many other remarkable instances in

which war and lesser misfortunes have been averted by arbitration; and

will now name further only some of the latest date.

In 1887 a lengthened dispute about boundaries between CHILI and the

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC was adjusted by arbitration, through the mediation

of the United States Ministers in the two countries. After a complete

and precise fixing of the boundary line, an agreement was added: That

the Straits of Magellan shall for ever be neutralized; free passage

shall be secured to ships of all nations, and the erection of forts or

other military works on either of its shores shall be forbidden.

Fresh in the memory is the passionate quarrel between SPAIN and GERMANY

about the CAROLINE ISLANDS. That was submitted, on Prince Bismarck's

proposal, to Pope Leo XIII. for settlement, and was adjusted by him.

Most people now living remember the AFGHANISTAN BOUNDARY question,

which was happily solved by the friendliness on both sides of the

RUSSIAN AND ENGLISH Governments. The whole world followed for a while

that dispute with anxiety and disquietude. The press unhappily, as

usual, employed its influence in stirring up the national passions

in both countries. But before it had gone too far, fortunately the

feelings were quieted by the public being reminded that both England

and Russia had taken part in the resolution of the Paris Congress,

which declared that when any serious dispute arose between any of

the contracting powers, it should be referred to the mediation of a

friendly power. Upon this ground the English Government proposed to the

Russian that the "dispute should be referred to the ruler of a friendly

State, to be adjusted in a manner consistent with the dignity of both

lands." This proposal was accepted, but did not come into practice. It

was not needed. The Afghanistan boundary commission itself carried out

its duties to a successful issue.

Still later many smaller INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES have been solved by

arbitration; for instance:--

Between ITALY and COLOMBIA in South America, respecting Italian

subjects who had suffered loss through the last revolution in Colombia,

in which Spain as arbitrator decided in favour of Italy.

Between BRAZIL and ARGENTINA respecting their boundaries, a dispute in

which both parties appealed for a settlement to the President of the

United States of America, and which was adjusted by him.

Between the UNITED STATES of North America and DENMARK, in which the

latter was, by the chosen arbitrator, the English Ambassador at Athens,

Sir Edward Monson, after long delay freed from the obligation to pay

compensation to the Americans, because the Danish authorities had fired

at an American ship which in 1854 was escaping out of the harbour of

St. Thomas, and which was suspected of carrying supplies to Venezuela,

at that time in insurrection.

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