of Philip II., from 1580 to 1598, mark the height of the wealth and
power of the Portuguese in the East, but their fall into nothingness
there during the reigns of Philip III. and Philip IV. was as rapid as
their success had been astounding. The first great blows were struck by
the Dutch merchants, whose ships were sent out at their own expense, and
in no way protected by the State. In 1597 two years after Houtman had
led a Dutch fleet round the Cape, the Dutch established a factory in
Java. In 1601 they defeated the Portuguese governor of Malacca, and took
that city; in 1607 they conquered the Portuguese settlements in the
Moluccas and Sumatra; and in 1618 they founded Batavia, which became the
capital of the trade of the Spice Islands, and soon not only took the
place of Malacca, but rivalled Goa. Not satisfied with the trade of the
further East, they attacked that of China also, and in 1635 occupied the
island of Formosa. At a later date they even ousted the Portuguese from
their chief settlements in India and Ceylon, always excepting Goa,
which, according to Catholic belief, has ever been preserved to the
Portuguese by the holy bones of St. Francis Xavier. Meanwhile, just as
the Dutch broke the power of the Portuguese in the Spice Islands and
China, a new power had arisen to attack their Indian monopoly. The
ancient allies of the Portuguese, the English, now made no distinction
between them and their bitter enemies, the Spaniards, and during the
last forty years of the “Sixty Years’ Captivity,” they laid the
foundation of their empire in India. During the reign of Elizabeth, the
English had sacked Pernambuco in 1594, destroyed Fort Arguin on the
African coast in 1595, and ravaged the Azores in 1597; during that of
James I. they attacked the Indian trade of Portugal. As was the case
with the Dutch, the assault upon the Portuguese monopoly was the work of
private traders, not of the State. This is not the place to trace the
slow growth of the English power in India, but it is enough to say that
the English ships went to Asia with no idea of conquest, and solely with
the desire to trade. This the Portuguese desired to hinder, and in
trying to prevent the English from taking on board cargoes at Surat in
1615, the Portuguese were defeated by Captain Best, and thus lost their
reputation for invincibility on the north-west coast of India. The
English, instead of showing a bold front, made efforts to live in
harmony with the Indian kings, and especially with the Great Mogul, and
were rewarded by being looked upon with favour instead of with
suspicion, and being allowed to set up many commercial agencies. As
traders, the English merchants had no wish to go to war and maintained
no armies to defend their agencies, and the only offensive operation
they undertook against the Portuguese was in 1622, when they assisted
the Persians to capture Ormuz. These rapid onslaughts completely
overthrew the Portuguese power in Asia. The Dutch quickly absorbed all
the trade of the further East, and of the Spice Islands in particular;
the English gained a good hold upon that with Persia and North-western
India; and in 1629 the Portuguese commerce with Bengal was almost
destroyed by the capture of their headquarters, Hūglī, by Shah
Jehān who killed one thousand Portuguese, and carried over four
thousand, including women and children, into captivity. Even smaller
European nations attacked their monopoly, and in 1616 the Danes
established themselves at Serampore and Tranquebar. Against all these
blows, Portugal made little resistance; Golden Goa was shorn of its
pre-eminence; and the Portuguese fleets when homeward bound were preyed
upon by the Dutch and English cruisers.
It was not only in the East that disasters fell in quick succession upon
the Portuguese, but efforts were made also by the Dutch to dispossess
them of their great empire in South America. The history of the Dutch in
Brazil is as remarkable as their history in Asia, and considering the
small size of Holland, the same feeling of astonishment, which strikes
the student, when he reads of the exploits of the Portuguese in the
sixteenth century, affects him, when he examines the enterprises of the
Dutch in the seventeenth. It was in 1624, when success was assured in
Asia, that a Dutch West India Company was founded to drive the
Portuguese out of South America. The new company at once sent a fleet
under Admiral Willikens to attack Brazil, and this admiral met with
little opposition in the capture of San Salvador, the capital of
Portuguese South America. The Portuguese governor-general, Dom Diogo de
Mendonça, abandoned the city, but the Archbishop, Dom Miguel de
Teixeira, took his place, and calling on his clergy to take up arms, he
defended the city for a few days, and then retired to a neighbouring
port. Admiral Willikens plundered the city, and returned with a vast
booty, to the delight of his employers, and left only a small garrison
behind, which was soon driven back in all its forays, and eventually
closely blockaded by the gallant old archbishop, who took the title of
Captain-general of Brazil. In April, 1626, strong reinforcements arrived
under Dom Emmanuel de Menezes, and the city of San Salvador once more
fell into the hands of the Portuguese. It is not necessary to trace the
exact history of every Dutch expedition to Brazil; it is enough to say
that from 1626 to 1637, plunder was brought home every year and
distributed to the shareholders of the company, while no real attempt at
establishing trade or at colonization was made. This policy naturally
caused the Dutch to be loathed by the Portuguese settlers as robbers
and pirates, and kept them in a state of perpetual disquietude. In 1637,
a great ruler, Count Maurice of Nassau, was sent out by the Dutch West
India Company as Governor-general of their possessions in South America,
which extended roughly over the four Captainships of Pernambuco,
Tamaraca, Paraiba, and Rio Grande. This great general and statesman
attempted to entirely destroy the Portuguese power in South America, and
to establish a Dutch dominion there. His warlike expeditions were
successful, excepting an attack on San Salvador, and he also managed to
establish a general system of administration over the seven northern
captainships with his capital at Mauriceburgh opposite the strongly
fortified island of the Recife. It was Maurice of Nassau, who gave up
the system of plundering the Portuguese, and substituted that of taxing
them, and his power was at its height, when the news of the revolution
of 1640, and of the overthrow of the Spanish domination, arrived in
Brazil and revived the spirits of the Portuguese colonists.
To compensate for all these losses, the destruction of the monopoly of
the Asiatic trade, the loss of Ormuz and Malacca, and the reduction of
the greater part of Brazil, what advantages had Portugal received? The
promises made by Philip II. to the Cortes of Thomar were mostly broken
by his successors. The Duke of Lerma and the Count-Duke of Olivares, the
all-powerful ministers of Philip III. and Philip IV. tried to see how
far and how entirely they could prove to the Portuguese people that they
were subject to Spain, and not a free nation. The Cortes, instead of
being summoned frequently, was only summoned once during the reign of
Philip III., in 1619, in order to recognize his son as heir to the
throne; and was never summoned at all during the reign of Philip IV.
Spaniards filled every office in the kingdom, and more especially in the
garrison towns; Spanish ecclesiastics were consecrated to Portuguese
bishoprics; and the Portuguese council at the Court of Madrid was
reduced to a single secretary. Taxation was heavy, and the revenue from
it was not spent in the country, and the promise that no Portuguese land
should be granted to other than Portuguese subjects was often broken,
conspicuously in the case of the Duke of Lerma, who secured a grant of
the royal domains of Beja and Serpa. But Lerma and Olivares forgot that
the Portuguese were a separate race, with a great and noble history;
they would not be trampled on for ever, and to the surprise of Spain,
the little country rose in rebellion in 1640 and put an end to the
“Sixty Years’ Captivity.”
[Illustration: text decoration]
[Illustration: text decoration]
XIV.
THE REVOLUTION OF 1640.
The Portuguese people groaned under the powerlessness and poverty which
fell to their lot during the Sixty Years’ Captivity. None of the
advantages which had been so eloquently prophesied by Christovão de
Moura as the inevitable result of a union with Spain had been
experienced. Instead of being protected by great Spanish armies, the
colonies and trade of Portugal had been left an open prey to the enemies
of Spain; it was on account of her union with Spain that the Dutch and
English attacked the Portuguese possessions in both East and West; and
in return for all she lost, Portugal did not even have the satisfaction
of retaining the independence of its local government, but was
administered for the benefit of Spaniards alone. The proverbial
Castilian haughtiness was especially aggravating to the nobles and
people of Portugal; there was no attempt made to unite the two peoples;
they kept apart like oil and water, and the traditional hatred of the
Spaniard grew to be more intense than ever. The loss of material
prosperity and the insolent demeanour of the Spanish officials affected
all classes, high and low, and incited them to rebel, and to these
causes must be added the influence of the Portuguese writers. The great
Camoens had not lived to see the Spaniards supreme in his beloved
country, but he had successors during the Sixty Years’ Captivity, who
sang in the same lofty strain of the great deeds of the Portuguese
warriors during the heroic period. Such poems as the “Primeiro Cerco de
Dio” (“The First Siege of Diu”), by Francisco de Andrade; the “Segundo
Cerco de Dio,” by Jeronymo Corte-Real; the “Affonso Africano,” by Vasco
Mousinho de Quebedo; and the “Malacca Conquistada,” by Francisco de Sá
de Menezes, were all calculated to stir the hearts of the Portuguese of
the seventeenth century, and to make them desire to be worthy of their
great forefathers. Nor were the prose writers less eloquent than the
poets in telling of the great deeds of the past; the “Decadas” of Diogo
do Couto, and the “Asia,” “Europa,” “Africa,” and “America Portugueza,”
of Manoel de Faria e Sousa, continued the work of João de Barros in
making the Portuguese proud of their past exploits, while the
historians, Bernardo de Brito and Antonio Brandão, in their “Monarchia
Lusitana,” told the story of the centuries of independence before
Portugal became a province of Spain.
A universal feeling of discontent had arisen during the reigns of Philip
III. and Philip IV., but the final impulse from passive discontent to
active rebellion was supplied by the energy of certain Portuguese
noblemen, who relied for success on the weakness of Spain and on help
from France. The Spain of Philip IV. was indeed very different to the
Spain of Charles V. and Philip II.; its days of greatness were over;
Holland was practically independent; and Catalonia was in revolt. On the
other hand, France had passed through the terrible civil wars of the
sixteenth century, and was being moulded into a mighty kingdom by the
hand of Richelieu. One of the keynotes of Richelieu’s policy was to
harass Spain; and for this reason the great cardinal encouraged the
revolt of the Catalans in 1639, and had long fomented the feeling of
discontent in Portugal. As early as 1636, one of Richelieu’s secret
agents is found writing to his master, “All Portugal cries aloud, ‘When
will the King of France deliver us from the Pharaoh of Spain’?”[28] and
in 1638 the cardinal sent one of his most trusted agents, the Chevalier
de Saint-Pé, to report upon the disposition of the Portuguese people.
Richelieu soon grasped the situation of affairs, and resolved to
encourage an open rebellion in Portugal, in order to secure an
independent ally in the Iberian Peninsula, which should be such a thorn
in the side of Spain as Scotland had in former days been in the side of
England. The discontent of the people was shown in many overt acts; in
1634 the people of Lisbon refused to pay their taxes; in 1637 a serious
riot broke out at Evora, which remained in a state of insurrection for
many months; and attacks upon Spanish soldiers and officials constantly
took place all over the country.
TABLE III.
THE DUKES OF BRAGANZA.
JOHN “THE GREAT,” by Ines Pires (see p. 125)
|
AFFONSO, = (1) Beatrice, dau. of Nuno Alvares Pereira,
Duke of Braganza, 1412; | “The Holy Constable.”
d. 1461. | (2) Constance de Noronha.
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
FERDINAND, = Joanna de Castro. Affonso, Count of Ourem = Beatrice Isabel = John,
Constable of | de Sousa (from whom descended Duke of Beja,
Portugal. | the Marquises of Valencia). 4th son of John “the Great”
| (see Table I., p. 139).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | | |
FERDINAND, = Isabel, dau. of John, = Isabel de Noronha. Affonso Alvaro,
beheaded | Ferdinand, Duke Constable of Portugal, Count of Faro. Chancellor of Portugal
1483 | of Viseu and Beja d. 1484; (from whom descended
(see p. 162). | (see Table I., p. 139). Marquis of Monte Mor. the Dukes of Cadaval).
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | |
JAYMÉ = (1) Leonor Guzman de Diniz Affonso,
| Medina Sidonia, (from whom descended the Dukes Grand Master of the
| (2) Joanna de Mendoza. of Taurisano, extinct 1694). Order of Christ.
|
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| | | | |
THEODOSIO = Isabella de Lemos. Constantino, John, Theotonio, Isabel = Edward,
| Viceroy of India Prior of Archbishop of Duke of Guimaraens,
| (see pp. 212, 246). Guimaraens. Evora. 6th son of King Emmanuel
| (see Table II., p. 279).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
| |
JOHN, = Catherine, elder dau. of Edward, Duke of Guimaraens, 6th son Jaymé
d. 1582. | of King Emmanuel (see Table II., p. 279). killed at Alcacer Quibir (see p. 255).
|
------------------------------------------------
| |
THEODOSIO, = Anna de Velasco. Edward, = heiress of Alvares Toledo,
Constable of Portugal, | Marquis of Count of Oropeza.
d. 1630. | Flechilla.
|
-------------------------------------------------
| |
JOHN IV., = Luisa Guzman de Edward, General of Artillery in the Emperor’s
King of Portugal, Medina Sidonia. service, delivered up to Spain 1641;
1640; d. 1656. d. 1649.
But the discontented people of Portugal wanted some one to rally round;
the nobility wanted a leader. This leader and representative was found
in John, eighth Duke of Braganza, the legitimate heir to the throne.
This great nobleman was the head of the most noble family in Portugal,
and the direct lineal descendant of the bastard son of John “the Great,”
who had married the daughter of the Holy Constable, and he was further
the grandson of Donna Catherine, the rightful heiress to the
Cardinal-King, Dom Henry. Philip II. had purchased the acquiescence of
the husband of Donna Catherine in his usurpation by securing to him the
vast possessions of the Braganza family in Portugal, but he had not
fulfilled his promise of the grant of Brazil in full sovereignty, to the
great disgust of the heiress to the throne of Portugal. She had inspired
her hatred for Spain and her love for Portugal into her son, Dom
Theodosio, seventh duke, but her grandson, Dom John, was an indolent and
timid nobleman, who preferred an easy life to a crown. Dom John had
succeeded to the duchy and estates in 1630, at the age of twenty-six,
and he had married Donna Luisa de Guzman, daughter of the Duke of Medina
Sidonia, in 1633. This marriage had been hailed with delight by
Olivares, as it seemed to bind the Braganza family closer to Spain, and
he persuaded Philip IV. to grant Dom John as a wedding-gift the duchy
and lordship of Guimaraens, which had been the property of Dom Edward,
youngest son of Emmanuel “the Fortunate,” the prince through whom the
Duke of Braganza traced his claim to the throne. But this marriage did
not cement the friendship of the House of Braganza with Spain. On the
contrary, the duchess seemed to surrender her Spanish nationality; she
made a point of speaking Portuguese, and became more patriotic than the
Portuguese themselves; she never forgot that her husband was by rights a
king, and was encouraged to use all her great abilities to scheme for
the throne of Portugal by the recollection of a prophecy made to her in
her childhood that she should be a queen. Dom John himself did not share
her opinions; he was no warrior, but loved hunting, music, and the arts,
and his lovely hunting-seat at Villa Viçosa, far more than he did
politics or even his country. But his easy nature made him subservient
to the will of his duchess, and she, through the duke’s agent, João
Pinto Ribeiro, Professor of Civil Law at Coimbra, let the nobility of
Portugal know that the Duke of Braganza would put himself at their head,
if they would but strike a blow for the freedom of their country.
Portugal was at the period, when the Duchess of Braganza involved her
husband in her ambitious schemes, under the nominal rule of Margaret of
Savoy, Duchess of Mantua; and the Court of this princess was, contrary
to the promises made by Philip II. to the Cortes of Thomar, entirely
filled with foreigners. Her Lord High Steward or Mordomo-Mor was the
Marquis de la Puebla, a Spaniard, and her Estribeiro-Mor, or Master of
the Horse, was the Marquis de Bainetti, an Italian, while among more
important posts, two Spaniards, Don Didace de Cardenas and Don Fernando
de Castro, were respectively general commanding the Portuguese cavalry,
and controller of the Portuguese navy. The most important native of the
country admitted to her council was Dom Sebastião de Mattos de Noronha,
Archbishop of Braga, Primate of the kingdom, and a wealthy nobleman, but
the chief administrative power was confided to Miguel de Vasconcellos de
Brito, Secretary of State. This man was hated by his fellow-countrymen
with the intensity of hatred only felt for a renegade. He had won the
favour of Olivares, the Spanish Minister, by his skill in squeezing
money out of Portugal, and his energy and activity made him
indispensable to the Duchess of Mantua. But if he was hated by all
classes of the Portuguese people, he was more especially obnoxious to
the Portuguese nobility owing to his policy of excluding them from all
posts of honour and emolument, and his personal insolence towards them.
This was the state of the government and the general position of affairs
in Portugal when João Pinto Ribeiro, acting with the full sanction of
the Duchess, and the half-hearted assent of the Duke, of Braganza, began
to form a conspiracy among the leading noblemen to bring about a
revolution and expel the Spaniards. If he could only combine the nobles
to take the lead and strike the first blow, he knew well that the people
would warmly support them. The first step was to make the future king
acquainted with his friends, and for this purpose great hunting parties
were organized at Villa Viçosa, to which the most patriotic Portuguese
noblemen were invited in turn. This behaviour, and the attitude of the
young duchess, began to inspire Olivares with a vague alarm, and he
began to regret the policy which had allowed the rightful heir to the
throne of Portugal to retain his vast estates in the quarter where his
influence was most to be feared. He first offered the government of the
Milanese, an office generally held by a prince of the blood, to the Duke
of Braganza, and, when the appointment was declined on the score of
ignorance of Italian politics, the astute Spanish statesman began to
feel still more uneasy. But it was necessary to disguise his
apprehensions, for he knew that it was impossible to arrest the Duke of
Braganza on his estates without causing serious disturbances, and he
therefore directed the duke to make a tour of Portugal in his capacity
of Constable to inspect the condition of the defences. This tour gave
the duke an opportunity to make the acquaintance of the greater part of
the people, while he avoided falling into the various traps set for him.
Then Olivares delivered his last stroke of policy; he ordered out the
whole _ban_ and _arrière-ban_ of Portugal to serve under the king in
person in putting down the Catalan rebellion, and directed the Duke of
Braganza to proceed immediately to Madrid. The duke delayed his
departure for a time, and João Pinto Ribeiro informed the noblemen who
had been forming a conspiracy in Lisbon that they must strike at once or
it would be too late.
The names of these noblemen are worthy of record, not only because of
the daring and successful revolution they initiated, but because they
show how patriotic the Portuguese nobility were as a body, since most of
the famous families of the early history of Portugal and of the heroic
period are represented among them. The leaders of the famous forty who
planned the revolution were Miguel de Almeida, a venerable nobleman, at
whose house the first meeting of the conspirators was held; Pedro de
Mendonça Furtado, Hereditary Grand Chamberlain or Camereiro-Mor; Antonio
and Luis de Almada; Jorge de Mello, Hereditary Grand Huntsman; Antonio
de Mello de Menezes, his brother; Estevão, and Luis da Cunha; Rodrigo
and Emmanuel de Sá; Pedro Mascarenhas, Carlos de Noronha, Gaston de
Coutinho and Antonio de Saldanha. The Archbishop of Lisbon, Rodrigo da
Cunha, the most popular ecclesiastical dignitary of the realm, if not
actually a conspirator, certainly had some knowledge of what was going
on through his relatives, the Almadas and Da Cunhas. The conspirators
met regularly and skilfully planned their rising, and in all their
deliberations João Pinto Ribeiro, though not a nobleman himself, and
rather looked down on by the forty, showed himself the boldest and most
sagacious leader of them all. There was no idea of establishing a
republic, in imitation of the Netherlands, as Vertot absurdly states,
for the keystone of their plan was to make a show of legality, and to
assert that they were merely placing the rightful king upon the throne.
Their preparations were fully made, when João Pinto Ribeiro brought the
news that the blow must be struck at once, or else that the Duke of
Braganza must proceed to Madrid.
The 1st of December, 1640, was the day appointed for the revolution and
on the morning of that day the conspirators assembled by different
streets in front of the palace. There had been no treachery, and
consequently the viceregal court was quite unprepared for resistance.
The signal was given by a pistol shot from Ribeiro, and each conspirator
went to his appointed place to accomplish his appointed task. Dom Miguel
de Almeida overpowered the German guards of the palace without any
difficulty, and Dom Jorge de Mello and Dom Estevão da Cunha were equally
successful with the Spanish guards. The third party, under the
leadership of Ribeiro, forced their way into the palace, and moved
towards the apartments of the hated Secretary of State, Miguel de
Vasconcellos. On their way they met Francisco de Soares de Albergaria,
the “Corregidor Civil,” or civil judge, who, in answer to their cries of
“Long live the Duke of Braganza!” shouted “Long live the King of Spain
and Portugal!” and was then immediately shot. They next came across
Antonio Correa, the secretary’s chief clerk, whose insolence had almost
rivalled his master’s, and Antonio de Menezes struck him down with his
poniard and severely wounded him. At last they reached the apartments of
the secretary, whom they discovered hidden in a cupboard under a mass of
papers. The trembling wretch was dragged from his concealment, and shot
by Dom Rodrigo de Sá. All parties now rushed to the part of the palace
inhabited by the Duchess of Mantua, whom they found with the Archbishop
of Braga. The princess was no coward, and boldly faced the conspirators,
but she was informed by Dom Carlos de Noronha that she was a prisoner,
and the life of the Archbishop of Braga, who attempted to cut his way
through his opponents, was with difficulty saved by Dom Miguel de
Almeida.
[Illustration: PORTUGUESE GENTLEMEN.
(_From “Les Royaumes d’Espagne,” &c. La Haye, 1720._)]
These successes in the palace were followed by equal successes in the
city of Lisbon. The populace of all classes detested the Spanish
domination; they rose in a body, armed themselves as best they could,
and arrested every Spaniard they could find from the Marquis de la
Puebla to the naval officers on shore from the Spanish vessels lying in
the Tagus. Dom Antonio de Saldanha, as previously arranged, entered the
_Relacão_, or High Court of Justice, and informed the judges of the
revolution, and the president, Gonçalo de Sousa, immediately began to
pronounce his decrees in the name of King John IV., instead of King
Philip III. Dom Gaston de Coutinho set free all the political prisoners,
and some young men rowed off to the three Spanish galleons in the port,
and easily obtained possession of them, since most of their officers had
already been arrested on shore. There remained only the citadel, or
castle, of St. George, garrisoned by a strong Spanish force under Don
Luiz de Campo. This important post was obtained by a stratagem of Dom
Antonio de Almada, who forced the Duchess of Mantua to sign an order for
its surrender by a threat to assassinate all the Spanish prisoners
already taken, and the order was willingly obeyed by the timorous
governor. The conspirators then assembled in the palace, and amidst the
shouts of the populace, the Archbishop of Lisbon was proclaimed
Lieutenant-General of the kingdom, with Dom Miguel de Almeida, Dom Pedro
de Mendonça Furtado, and Dom Antonio de Almada as councillors of state.
The new government sent off expresses in all directions to announce the
news of the successful revolution, and obtained peaceable possession of
all the chief fortresses and strong places round Lisbon, of Belem,
Bugio, S. Antonio, Almada, and Cascaes, with the exception only of S.
Julian, at the mouth of the Tagus.