SUGGESTIONS FOR REGULATING THE TRADE.

I shall now conclude with some statements of sundry evils connected

with the cab business, under the old and also under the new system, and

shall then offer suggestions for their rectification.

One cab proprietor, after expressing his opinion that the new police

arrangements for the regulation of the trade would be a decided

improvement, suggested it would be an excellent plan to make policemen

of the watermen; for then, he said, the cabmen thieves would be

reluctant to approach the ranks. He also gave me the following

statement of what he considered would be greater improvements. “I

think,” he said, “it would do well for those in the cab-trade if

licenses were made 10_l._ instead of 5_l._, with a regulation that

5_l._ should be returned to any one on bringing his plates in previous

to leaving the trade, and so not wanting his license any longer.

This would, I believe, be a check to any illegal transfer, as men

wouldn’t be so ready to hand over their plates to other parties when

they disposed of their cabs, if they were sure of 5_l._ in a regular

and legal way. I would also,” he said, “reduce the duty from 10_s._

a-week to 5_s._, and that would allow cabs to ply for 6_d._ a-mile.

As everything is cheaper, I wonder people don’t want cheaper cabs.

’Busses don’t at all answer the purpose; for if it’s a wet day, almost

every one has to walk some way to his ’bus, and some way to the house

he’s going to. Sunday visitors particularly; and they like the wet

least of all. Now, if cabs ran at 6_d._, they could take a man and his

wife and two children, and more, two miles for 1_s._, or four miles

for 2_s._, about what the ’busses would charge four persons for those

distances: and the persons could go from door to door as cheap; or, if

not quite so cheap, they’d save it in not having their clothes spoiled

by the weather, and go far more comfortably than in a ’bus full of wet

people and dripping umbrellas. I know most cabmen don’t like to hear

of this plan; and why? Because, by the present system they reckon upon

getting a shilling a mile; and they almost always do get it for an

8_d._ fare, and for longer distances oft enough. But it wouldn’t be so

easy to overcharge when there’s a fixed coin a-mile for the fare. It

would be one, two, three, four, five, or as many sixpences as miles.

Now it’s 1_s._ 4_d._ for two miles, and that’s 1_s._ 6_d._--1_s._ 8_d._

for over two miles, and that means 2_s._--of course cabmen don’t carry

change unless for an even sum; 2_s._ 4_d._ for over three miles and a

half, and that’s 2_s._ 6_d._ if not 3_s._, and so on. The odd coppers

make cabmen like the present way.”

I now give a statement concerning “foul plates” and informers. It may,

however, be necessary to state first, that every cab proprietor must be

licensed, at a cost to him of 5_l._, and that he must affix a plate,

with his number, &c., to his cab, to show that he is duly licensed:

while every driver and waterman is licensed at a cost to each of 5_s._

a-year, and is bound to wear a metal ticket showing his number. The

law then provides, that in case of _unavoidable necessity_, which must

be proved to the satisfaction of the magistrate, a proprietor may be

allowed to employ an unlicensed person for twenty-four hours; with this

exception, every unlicensed person acting as driver, and every licensed

person lending his license, or permitting any other person to use or

wear his ticket, is to be fined 5_l._ The same provision applies to any

proprietor “lending his license,” but with a penalty of 10_l._ I now

give the statement:--

“You see, sir, if a man wants to dispose of his cab, why he must

dispose of it as a cab. Well, if it ain’t answered for him, he’ll get

somebody or other willing to try it on. And the new hand will say,

‘I’ll give you so much, and work your plates for you;’ and so he does

when a bargain’s made. Well, this thing’s gone on till there’s 1000 or

1200 ‘foul plates’ in the trade; and then government says, ‘What a lot

of foul plates! There must be a check to this.’ And a nice check they

found. Mister ---- (continued my informant, laying a peculiar emphasis

on the mister), the informer, was set to work, and he soon ferreted

out the foul plates, and there was a few summonses about them at first;

but it’s managed different now. Suppose I had a foul plate in my place

here, though in course I wouldn’t, but suppose I had, Mister ---- would

drop in some day and look about him, and say little or nothing, but

it’s known what he’s up to. In a day or two comes Mister ---- No. 2,

he’s Mister ---- No. 1’s friend; and he’ll look about and say, ‘Oh,

Mister ----, I see you’ve got so-and-so--it’s a foul plate. I’ll call

on you for 2_s._ in a day or two.’ He calls sure enough; and he calls

for the same money, perhaps, every three months. Some pays him 5_s._

a-year regular; and if he only gets that on 1000 plates, he makes a

good living of it--only 250_l._ a-year, 5_l._ a-week, that’s all. In

course Mister ---- No. 1 has nothing to do with Mister ---- No. 2,

not he: it’s always Mister ---- No. 2 what’s paid, and never Mister

---- No. 1. But if Mister ---- No. 2 ain’t paid, then Mister ---- No.

1 looks in, and lets you know there may be a hearing about the foul

plate; and so he goes on.”

This same Mister ---- No. 1, I am informed by another cab proprietor,

is employed by the Excise to see after the duty, which has to be paid

every month. Should the proprietor be behind with the 10_s._ a-week,

the informer is furnished with a warrant for the month’s money; and

this he requires a fee of from 10_s._ to 1_l._ (according to the

circumstances of the proprietor), to hold over for a short time. It

is difficult to estimate how many fees are obtained in this way every

month; but I am assured that they must amount to something considerable

in the course of the year.

It is proper that I should add that my informants in this and other

matters refer to the systems with which they had been long familiar.

The new regulations when I was engaged in this inquiry, had been

so recently in force, that the cab proprietors said they could not

yet judge of their effect; but it was believed that they would be

beneficial. An experienced man complained to me that the clashing of

the magistrates’ decisions, especially when the police were mixed up

with the complaints against cabmen, was an evil. My informant also

pointed out a clause in the 2d and 3d Victoria, cap. 71, enacting that

magistrates should meet once a quarter, each furnishing a report of his

proceedings as respects the “Act for regulating the Police Courts in

the Metropolis.” Such a meeting, and a comparison of the reports, might

tend to a uniformity in decisions; but the clause, I am told, is a dead

letter, no such meeting taking place. Another cab proprietor said it

would be a great improvement if an authorised officer of the police, or

a government officer, had the fixing of plates on carriages, together

with the inspection and superintendence of them afterwards. These

plates, it was further suggested to me, should be metallic seals, and

easily perceptible inside or out. Some of the cab proprietors complain

of the stands in Oxford-street (the best in all London, they say),

being removed to out-of-the-way places.

Among the matters I heard complained of, that of privileged cabs was

much dwelt upon. These are the cabs which are privileged to stand

within a railway terminus, waiting to be hired on the arrival of

the trains. For this privilege 2_s._ a-week is paid by the cabmen

to some of the railway companies, and as much as 5_s._ a-week to

others. The cabmen complain of this as a monopoly established to their

disadvantage, and with no benefit to the public, but merely to the

railway companies; for there are cab-stands adjacent to all the railway

stations, at which the public would be supplied with conveyances in the

ordinary way. The horses in the cabs at the railway stations are, I am

informed, amongst the hardest-worked of any in London; the following

case being put to me:--“Suppose a man takes a fare of four persons

and heavy luggage from the Great Western Terminus to Mile End, which

is near upon seven miles, he must then hurry back again all the way,

because he plies only at the railway. Now, if he didn’t, he would go

to the nighest cab-stand, and his horse would be far sooner relieved.

Then, perhaps, he gets another fare to Finsbury, and must hurry back

again; and then another below Brompton; and he may live at Whitechapel,

and have to go home after all; so that his poor horse gets ‘bashed’ to

bits.”

Another cab proprietor furnished me with the following statement

in writing of his personal experience and observation concerning

the working of the 23d clause in the Hackney Carriage Act, or that

concerning the signing before alluded to. “A master is in want of

drivers. A, B, and C apply. The only questions asked are, ‘Are you a

driver? Where is your license? Well! here, sign this paper; my money

is so much.’ In very few large establishments is more caution used

as to real character of the driver than this; the effect of which

is, that a man with a really good character has no better claim to

employment than one of the worst. Then, as to the feeling of a man

who has placed himself under such a contract. ‘I must get my money,’

he says, ‘I will do anything to obtain it; and as a gaol hangs over

my head, what matters about my breaking the law?’ and so every unfair

trick is resorted to: and the means used are ‘gagging,’ that is to say,

driving about and loitering in the thoroughfares for jobs. It is known

that some men very seldom put on the ranks at all. Some masters have

told their drivers not to go on the stand, as they well know that the

money is not to be obtained by what is termed ‘ranking it.’ Now, the

effect of this is, that the thoroughfares are troubled with empty cabs.

It has also this effect: it causes great cruelty and overdriving to

the horses; and drivers under such circumstances frequently agree to

go for very much less than the fare, and then, as they term it, take

it out by insulting and bullying their customers. It may be said that

the law in force is sufficient to counteract this; but it may not be

known that a great many protection-clubs exist, by contributions from

cabmen, and which clubs are, in fact, premiums for breaking the law;

for by them a man is borne harmless of the consequences of being fined.

Now, these clubs exist sometimes at public-houses, but in many cases in

the proprietors’ yards, the proprietors themselves being treasurers,

and so becoming agents to induce their servants to infringe the law,

for the purpose of obtaining for themselves a large return. The moral

consequence of all this is, that men being dealt with and made to

suffer as criminals, that is to say, being sent to gaol to experience

the same treatment, save indignity, as convicted felons, and all this

for what they after all believe to be a debt, a simple contract between

man and man; the consequence, I repeat, is, that the driver having

served his time, as it is called, in prison, returns to the trade a

degraded character and a far worse man. Be it observed, also, that the

fact of a driver having been imprisoned is no barrier to his being

employed again if he will but sign--that’s the test.”

London Labour and the London Poor, Vol. 3 · 第 185 / 337 题