The Question of Guilt
History can show nothing to compare with the World War of 1914-18. It
also can show nothing like the perplexity which has arisen as to the
causes leading up to the World War.
This is all the more astounding in that the Great War befell a highly
cultivated, enlightened, politically trained race of men, and the
causes leading up to it were plainly to be seen.
The apparent complicity in the crisis of July, 1914, should deceive
nobody. The telegrams exchanged at that time between the Cabinets of
the great powers and their rulers, the activities of the statesmen
and leading private individuals in verbal negotiations with important
personages of the Entente, were certainly of the greatest importance
on account of the decisive significance assumed by almost every word
when it came from responsible lips, by every line that was written or
telegraphed. The essential basis of the causes of the war, however, is
not altered by such things; it is firmly established, and people must
never hesitate from freeing it, calmly and with an eye to realities,
from the bewildering outcroppings from the events accompanying the
outbreak of war.
The general situation of the German Empire in the period before the
war had become continually more brilliant, and for that very reason
continually more difficult from the point of view of foreign politics.
Unprecedented progress in industry, commerce, and world traffic had
made Germany prosperous. The curve of our development tended steadily
upward.
The concomitant of this peaceful penetration of a considerable part of
the world's markets, to which German diligence and our achievements
justly entitled us, was bound to be disagreeable to older nations of
the world, particularly to England. This is quite a natural phenomenon,
having nothing remarkable about it. Nobody is pleased when a competitor
suddenly appears and obliges one to look on while the old customers
desert to him. For this reason I cannot reproach the British Empire
because of English ill humor at Germany's progress in the world's
markets.
Had England been able, by introducing better commercial methods, to
overcome or restrict German competition, she would have been quite
within her rights in doing so and no objections could have been made.
It simply would have been a case of the better man winning. In the life
of nations nobody can find it objectionable if two nations contend
against each other peacefully by the same methods--_i. e._, peaceful
methods--yet with all their energy, daring, and organizing ability,
each striving to benefit itself.
On the other hand, it is quite another matter if one of these nations
sees its assets on the world's balance sheet threatened by the
industry, achievements, and super business methods of the other,
and hence, not being able to apply ability like that of its young
competitor, resorts to force--_i. e._, to methods that are not those of
peace, but of war--in order to call a halt upon the other nation in its
peaceful campaign of competition, or to annihilate it.
NAVY MERELY PROTECTIVE
Our situation became more serious since we were obliged to build a
navy for the protection of our welfare, which, in the last analysis,
was not based on the nineteen billions yearly to which German exports
and imports amounted. The supposition that we built this navy for the
purpose of attacking and destroying the far stronger English fleet is
absurd, since it would have been impossible for us to win a victory on
the water, because of the discrepancy between the two navies. Moreover,
we were striding forward in the world market in accordance with our
desires and had no cause for complaint. Why, then, should we wish to
jeopardize the results of our peaceful labors?
In France the idea of revenge had been sedulously cultivated ever since
1870-71; it was fostered, with every possible variation, in literary,
political, and military writings, in the officer corps, in schools,
associations, political circles.
I can well understand this spirit. Looked at from the healthy national
standpoint, it is, after all, more honorable for a nation to desire
revenge for a blow received than to endure it without complaint.
But Alsace-Lorraine had been German soil for many centuries; it was
stolen by France and taken back by us in 1871 as our property. Hence, a
war of revenge which had as its aim the conquest of thoroughly German
territory was unjust and immoral. For us to have yielded on this point
would have been a slap in the face to our sentiments of nationality and
justice. Since Germany could never voluntarily return Alsace-Lorraine
to France, the French dream could be realized only by means of a
victorious war which should push forward the French boundary posts to
the left bank of the Rhine.
Germany, on the contrary, had no reason for staking what she had won
in 1870-71, so the course for her to pursue was to maintain peace with
France, all the more so because of the fact that the combination of
the powers against the German-Austrian Dual Alliance was continually
becoming more apparent.
As to Russia, the mighty empire of the Tsars was clamoring for an
outlet on the sea to the southward. This was a natural ambition and
not to be harshly judged. In addition, there was the Russian-Austrian
conflict of influence, especially in Serbia, which also concerned
Germany in so far as Germany and Austria-Hungary were allies.
The Russia of the Tsars, moreover, was in a state of continual internal
ferment and every Tsaristic Government had to keep the possibility for
a foreign conflict ever in readiness, in order always to be able to
deflect attention from inner troubles to foreign difficulties; to have
a safety valve as an outlet for the passions that might lead to trouble
at home.
Another point was that Russia's enormous demand for loans was met
almost exclusively by France; more than twenty billions of French
gold francs found their way to Russia, and France had a voice, to
some extent, in determining how they should be expended. As a result,
it became entirely a matter of expenditure on strategic measures and
preparations for war. The golden chain of the French billions not only
bound Russia to France financially, but made Russia serve the French
idea of revenge.
PURPOSE OF "ENCIRCLEMENT"
Thus England, France, and Russia had, though for different reasons,
an aim in common--_viz._, to overthrow Germany. England wished to do
so for commercial-political reasons, France on account of her policy
of revenge, Russia because she was a satellite of France and also
for reasons of internal politics and because she wished to reach the
southern sea. These three great nations, therefore, were bound to act
together. The union of these ambitions in a common course of action,
duly planned, is what we call the "policy of encirclement."
Added to all this there was also the Gentlemen's Agreement which has
only recently come to light and has already been thoroughly discussed
in the "Hohenlohe" chapter; concerning this agreement I knew absolutely
nothing during my reign, and the German Foreign Office was only
superficially and unreliably informed.
When I learned of it, I immediately sought information about it from
Herr von Bethmann. He wrote me a rather puzzling letter to the effect
that there was surely something about it among the documents of the
Foreign Office; that the German ambassador at that time in Washington,
von Holleben, had made some confidential report on it, to be sure, but
had not given his source of information, wherefore the Foreign Office
had not attached any importance to the matter and had not reported
further on it to me. Hence the said agreement had actually no influence
upon Germany's policy, but it constitutes supplementary proof that the
Anglo-Saxon world as far back as 1897 had combined against us, and
thereby explains a number of obstacles encountered by Germany in her
foreign policy. It also explains America's attitude in the war.
We were quite well acquainted, on the other hand, with the Entente
Cordiale, its foundations and purposes, and it decisively influenced
the course of our policy.
In view of the grouping of England, France, and Russia--three very
strong powers--only one political course lay open to Germany, the
threat of deciding Germany's future by force of arms must be avoided
until we had secured for ourselves such an economic, military, naval,
and national-political position in the world as to make it seem
advisable to our opponents to refrain from risking a decision by arms
and to yield us the share in the apportionment and management of the
world to which our ability entitled us. We neither desired nor were we
entitled to jeopardize our hard-won welfare.
_The aims of the Entente could be attained only through a war, those of
Germany only without a war._ It is necessary to hold fast to this basic
idea; it is of more decisive value than all accessory matters. Hence I
shall not go into detail here, nor take up Belgian or other reports,
nor the telegrams sent just before the outbreak of war. The thorough
treatment of these details lies in the domain of research.
In Germany our situation was correctly understood, and we acted
accordingly.
SOUGHT ENGLAND'S FRIENDSHIP
Taking up once more our relations with England, we did everything in
our power to bring about a rapprochement; we consented to the demand
for limitation of naval construction, as I have shown in my report
of Haldane's visit to Berlin. I went so far as to try to utilize my
family connections. But in vain. The actions of King Edward VII
are explained by the simple fact that he was an Englishman and was
trying to bring to realization the plans of his Government. Maybe the
political ambitions of the King, who did not begin to reign until well
along in years, contributed to this.
We certainly did all that was possible to meet England halfway, but
it was useless, because the German export figures showed an increase;
naturally we could not limit our world commerce in order to satisfy
England. That would have been asking too much.
As regards our policy toward England, we have been much blamed for
having refused the offer of an alliance made us by Chamberlain, the
English Colonial Minister, toward the close of the 'nineties. This
matter, however, was far different in character, on closer inspection,
from what it was represented as being.
First, Chamberlain brought a letter with him from the English Premier,
Salisbury, to Bülow, in which the English Prime Minister declared that
Chamberlain was dealing on his own account only, that the English
Cabinet was not behind him. This, to be sure, might have meant the
adoption of a course that was diplomatically permissible, giving the
English Cabinet, which was responsible to Parliament, a free hand; but
it turned out later, be it remarked, that the Liberal group in England
was at that time hostile to a German-English alliance.
Nevertheless, in view of the fact that there was a possibility that the
course adopted was a mere diplomatic formality--that Chamberlain might
have been sent on ahead and complete freedom of action retained for the
English Cabinet, which is a favorite method in London--Prince Bülow,
with my consent, went thoroughly into the matter with Chamberlain.
It transpired then that the English-German alliance was aimed
unquestionably against Russia. Chamberlain spoke directly about a
war to be waged later by England and Germany against Russia. Prince
Bülow, in full agreement with me, declined politely but emphatically
thus to disturb the peace of Europe. In so doing he was but following
the example of the great Chancellor, for Prince Bismarck coined the
phrase--I myself have heard it repeatedly in the Bismarck family
circle: "Germany must never become England's dagger on the European
continent."
So we did nothing further at that time than to go straight ahead with
our policy--_viz._, we refused all agreements which might lead to a war
which was not based directly on the defense of our native soil. The
refusal of the Chamberlain offer is a proof of the German love of peace.
As to France, we sought to bring about an endurable state of affairs.
This was difficult, for, in French eyes, we were the archenemy and
it was impossible for us to acquiesce in the demands inspired by the
policy of revenge. We settled the Morocco quarrel peacefully; no man of
standing in Germany entertained the idea of war on account of Morocco.
For the sake of peace we allowed France at that time to encroach
upon the essentially legitimate interests of Germany in Morocco,
strengthened as the French were by the agreement concluded secretly
with England as to mutual compensation in Egypt and Morocco.
In the Algeciras Conference the outline of the Great War was already
visible. It is assuredly not pleasant to be forced to retreat
politically, as we did in the Morocco matter, but Germany's policy
subordinated everything to the great cause of preserving the peace of
the world.
We tried to attain this end by courtesy, which was partially resented.
I recall the journey of my mother, the Empress Frederick, to Paris. We
expected a tolerably good reception, since she was an English Princess
and went, as an artist, to be the guest of French art. Twice I visited
the Empress Eugénie--once from Aldershot at her castle of Fernborough,
the other time aboard her yacht, in Norwegian waters, near Bergen. This
was a piece of politeness that seemed to me perfectly natural, seeing
that I happened to be very near her. When the French General Bonnal was
in Berlin with several officers, these gentlemen dined with the Second
Infantry Regiment. I was present and toasted the French army--something
that was still out of the ordinary, but was done with the best
intentions. I brought French female and male artists to Germany. All
this sort of thing, of course, was a trifle in the great game of
politics, but it at least showed our good will.
With regard to Russia, I went to the utmost trouble. My letters,
published in the meantime, were naturally never sent without the
knowledge of the Imperial Chancellors, but always in agreement with
them and largely at their desire. Russia would doubtless never have
got into a war with Germany under Alexander III, for he was reliable.
Tsar Nicholas was weak and vacillating; whoever had last been with him
was right; and, naturally, it was impossible for me always to be that
individual.
I made every effort with this Tsar, also, to restore the traditional
friendship between Germany and Russia. I was moved to do so not only
by political reasons, but by the promise which I had made to my
grandfather on his deathbed.
I most urgently advised Tsar Nicholas, repeatedly, to introduce liberal
reforms within his country, to summon the so-called Great Duma, which
existed and functioned even as far back as the reign of Ivan the
Terrible. In doing so it was not my intention to interfere in Russian
internal affairs; what I wanted was to eliminate, in the interests of
Germany, the ferment going on in Russia, which had often enough been
deflected before to foreign conflicts, as I have already described.
I wished to help toward eliminating at least this one phase of the
internal situation in Russia, which threatened to cause war, and I was
all the more willing to make the effort since I might thereby serve
both the Tsar and Russia.
The Tsar paid no heed to my advice, but created a new Duma instead,
which was quite inadequate for coping with the situation. Had he
summoned the old Duma he might have dealt and talked personally with
all the representatives of his huge realm and won their confidence.
When the Tsar resolved upon war against Japan, I told him that I would
assure him security in the rear and cause him no annoyances. Germany
kept this promise.
GRAND DUKE'S VISIT
When the course taken by the war did not fulfill the Tsar's
expectations, and the Russian and Japanese armies finally lay before
each other for weeks without serious fighting, the young brother of the
Tsar, Grand Duke Michael, arrived at Berlin for a visit. We could not
quite make out what he wanted. Prince Bülow, who was then Chancellor,
requested me to ask the Grand Duke sometime how matters really stood
with Russia; he said that he, the Prince, had received bad news and
thought it was high time for Russia to bring the war to an end.
I undertook this mission. The Grand Duke was visibly relieved when I
spoke to him frankly; he declared that things looked bad for Russia. I
told him that it seemed to me that the Tsar ought to make peace soon,
since what the Grand Duke had told me about the unreliability of troops
and officers appeared to me quite as serious as the renewed internal
agitation.
Grand Duke Michael was grateful for my having given him an opportunity
to talk. He said that the Tsar was vacillating, as always, but he must
make peace and would make it if I advised him to do so. He asked me to
write a few lines to the Tsar to that effect, for him to deliver.
I drafted a letter in English to Tsar Nicholas, went to Bülow, told him
what the Grand Duke had told me, and showed him the draft of my letter.
The Prince thanked me and found the letter suitable. The Grand Duke
informed the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Count Osten-Sacken, and,
after he had repeatedly expressed his thanks, went direct to the Tsar,
who then had peace negotiations begun.
Count Osten-Sacken told me, when next we met, that I had done Russia
a great service. I was glad this was recognized, and felt justified
in hoping, on account of this, that my conduct would contribute
toward bringing about friendly relations with Russia. In acting as I
did I also worked toward preventing the possible spread of a Russian
revolution, during the Russo-Japanese War, across the frontiers of
Germany. Germany earned no thanks thereby; however, our conduct during
the Russo-Japanese War is another proof of our love of peace.
The same purpose underlay my suggestion which led to the Björkö
agreement (July, 1905). It contemplated an alliance between Germany
and Russia, which both the Allies as well as other nations should be
at liberty to join. Ratification of this agreement failed through the
opposition of the Russian Government (Isvolsky).
It remains to say a few words about America. Aside from the Gentlemen's
Agreement already mentioned, which assured America's standing beside
England and France in a World War, America did not belong to the
Entente Cordiale created by King Edward VII at the behest of his
Government, and, most important of all, America, in so far as it is
possible at present to judge events, did not contribute toward bringing
on the World War. Perhaps the unfriendly answer given by President
Wilson to the German Government at the beginning of the war may have
had some connection with the Gentlemen's Agreement.
AMERICAN FACTORS IN DEFEAT
But there can be no doubt that America's entry into the war, and the
enormous supplies of ammunition, and especially of war materials, which
preceded her entry, seriously hurt the chance of the Central Powers to
bring the war to a successful termination by force of arms.
It is necessary, however, to avoid all emotional criticism of America
also, since, in the great game of politics, real factors only can be
considered. America was at liberty (despite the Gentlemen's Agreement)
to remain neutral or to enter the war on the other side. One cannot
reproach a nation for a decision as to war or peace made in accordance
with its sovereign rights so long as the decision is not in violation
of definite agreements. Such is not the case here.
Nevertheless, it must be noted that John Kenneth Turner, in his already
mentioned book, _Shall It Be Again?_ shows, on the basis of extensive
proofs, that all Wilson's reasons for America's entry into the war
were fictitious, that it was far more a case of acting solely in the
interest of Wall Street high finance.
The great profit derived by America from the World War consists in
the fact that the United States was able to attract to itself nearly
fifty per cent of all the gold in the world, so that now the dollar,
instead of the English pound, determines the world's exchange rate. But
here also no reproach is at all justified, since any other nation in
a position to do so would have rejoiced in attracting to itself this
increase of gold and of prestige in the world's money market. It was
certainly regrettable for us that America did not do this stroke of
business on the side of the Central Powers.
But just as Germany objects with perfect justification to having had
her peaceful labors combated by the Entente, not with peaceful, but
with warlike means, so also she can and must enter constant protest--as
she is already trying to do by means of published material--against
America's violation of the right at the close of the World War.
Personally I do not believe that the American people would have
consented to this; American women particularly would not have
participated in the denial of President Wilson's Fourteen Points, if
they could have been enlightened at that time as to the facts. America,
more than other countries, had been misled by English propaganda,
and therefore allowed President Wilson, who had been provided with
unprecedented powers, to act on his own initiative at Paris--in other
words, to be beaten down on his Fourteen Points. Just as Mr. Wilson
omitted mention, later on, of the English blockade, against which he
had protested previously, so also he acted with regard to his Fourteen
Points.
The German Government had accepted Wilson's Fourteen Points, although
they were severe enough. The Allies likewise had accepted the Fourteen
Points, with the exception of those on reparations and the freedom of
the seas. Wilson had guaranteed the Fourteen Points.
FOURTEEN POINTS ABANDONED
I fail to find the most important of them in the Versailles instrument,
but only those expressing the Entente's policy of violence, and
even part of these in a greatly falsified form. Relying on Wilson's
guaranty, Germany evacuated the enemy territory occupied by her and
surrendered her weapons--in other words, made herself defenseless. In
this blind confidence and the abandonment of the Fourteen Points on the
one side, and in the outbreak of the German revolution on the other,
lies the key to our present condition.
According to Turner, the Fourteen Points, as far back as the drawing up
of the armistice terms, were, to Wilson, no more than a means of making
Germany lay down her arms; as soon as this end was achieved he dropped
them.
Already a very large part of the American people has arrayed itself
against Mr. Wilson and is unwilling to be discredited along with him. I
am not dreaming of spontaneous American help for Germany; all I count
upon is the sober acknowledgment by the American people that it has to
make good the gigantic wrong done Germany by its former President. For
the atmosphere of a victory does not last forever, and later on, not
only in Germany, but elsewhere, people will remember the unreliability
of the American President and look upon it as American unreliability.
That is not a good thing, however, for the American people. To have
the policy of a nation branded with the stigma of unreliability is not
advantageous. When judgment is passed hereafter on American policy,
people will forget that Mr. Wilson, unversed in the ways of the world,
was trapped by Lloyd George and Clemenceau.
I have met--particularly at the Kiel regattas--many American men and
women whose political judgment and caution would make it impossible for
them to approve such a flagrant breach of faith as was committed by
Mr. Wilson, because of its effect on America's political prestige. It
is upon such considerations of national egotism, not upon any sort of
sentimental considerations, that I base my hope that Germany's burden
will be lightened from across the ocean.
Besides the injustice in the abandonment of the Fourteen Points, it
must also be remembered that Mr. Wilson was the first to demand of the
German reigning dynasty that it withdraw, in doing which he hinted
that, were such action taken, the German people would be granted a
better peace. Before the Government of Prince Max joined in the demand
for my abdication of the throne, which it based on the same grounds as
Mr. Wilson--that Germany would thereby get better terms--(prevention of
civil war was used as a second means of bringing pressure on me)--it
was in duty bound to get some sort of a binding guaranty from Mr.
Wilson. In any event, the statements made, which became continually
more urgent and pressing, contributed toward making me resolve to quit
the country, since I was constrained to believe that I could render my
country a great service by so doing.
ACCEPTED "SIGHT UNSEEN"
I subordinated my own interests and those of my dynasty, which
certainly were not unimportant, and forced myself, after the severest
inward struggles, to acquiesce in the wish of the German authorities.
Later it transpired that the German Government had obtained no real
guaranties. But, in the tumultuous sequence of events during those
days, it was necessary for me to consider the unequivocal and definite
announcement of the Imperial Chancellor as authoritative. For this
reason I did not investigate it.
Why the Entente demanded, through Mr. Wilson, that I should abdicate
is now obvious. It felt perfectly sure that, following my being
dispossessed of the throne, military and political instability would
necessarily ensue in Germany and enable it to force upon Germany not
easier but harder terms. At that time the revolution had not yet
appeared as an aid to the Entente.
For me to have remained on the throne would have seemed to the Entente
more advantageous to Germany than my abdication. I myself agree with
this view of the Entente, now that it has turned out that the Max of
Baden Government had no substantial foundation for its declaration that
my abdication would bring better terms to my fatherland.
I go even further and declare that the Entente would never have dared
to offer such terms to an intact German Empire. It would not have dared
to offer them to an imperial realm upon which the parliamentary system
had not yet been forced, with the help of German Utopians, at the very
moment of its final fight for existence; to a realm whose monarchical
Government had not been deprived of the power to command its army and
navy.
In view of all this, heavy guilt also lies on the shoulders of the
American ex-President as a result of his having demanded my abdication
under the pretense that it would bring Germany better terms. Here also
we certainly have a point of support for the powerful lever which is
destined to drag the Treaty of Versailles from where it lies behind
lock and key. In Germany, however, Mr. Wilson should never be confused
with the American people.
In setting forth my political principles in what follows I am actuated
solely by a desire to contribute toward proving Germany's innocence of
having brought on the World War.
From the outset of my reign German policy was based upon compromise
of the differences which it found existing between nations. In its
entirety, therefore, my policy was eminently peaceful. This policy
of peaceful compromise became apparent in internal politics, at the
very beginning of my reign, in the legislation desired by me for the
protection of the workers. The development of social legislation,
which placed Germany at the head of civilized nations in the domain of
governmental protection, was based on a like foundation.
The fundamental idea of a policy of compromise went so far within
Germany that the strength of the army would have remained far less than
universal compulsory military service and the size of the population
made possible. Here, as well as in the matter of naval construction,
the curtailments demanded by the Reichstag were put up with by the
Crown and the Government. Already at that time the question of
Germany's capabilities of defense was left to the decision of the
people's representatives. A nation that wished and prepared war would
have adopted quite different tactics.
INADEQUATE PREPAREDNESS
The more apparent the Entente's "policy of encirclement" and attack
became, the more the means of protecting our welfare should have been
strengthened for defensive reasons. This idea of natural and justified
self-protection, by means of defensive measures against a possible
hostile attack was carried out in a wretchedly inadequate manner.
Germany's desire for peace, in fact, was unable to develop this
protection by land and sea in a manner compatible with her financial
and national strength and with the risk which our welfare was bound
to run in case of a war. Therefore, we are now suffering not from the
consequences of the tendency toward aggression falsely imputed to us,
but actually from the consequences of a well-nigh incredible love of
peace and of blind confidence.
The entirely different political principles of the Entente have already
been described by me, also our continuous efforts to get upon friendly
terms with the individual Entente nations.
I do not wish to ignore completely the less important work done by
Germany, also included within the framework of politics on a large
scale, which was always inspired by the same purpose: to effect
compromise of existing points of conflict. The Kiel regatta brought us
guests from all the leading nations. We sought compromise with the same
zeal on the neutral territory of sport as in the domain of science by
means of exchange professors, and foreign officers were most willingly
allowed to inspect our army system. This latter might be adjudged a
mistake, now that we can look back, but, in any event, all these points
are certain proofs of our honest desire to live at peace with all.
Moreover, Germany did not take advantage of a single one of the
opportunities that arose for waging war with a sure prospect of success.
I have already pointed out the benevolent neutrality of Germany toward
Russia at the time of the Russo-Japanese War.
At the time when England was deeply involved in the Boer War we might
have fought against England or against France, which, at that time,
would have been obliged to forego help from England. But we did not do
so. Also, while the Russo-Japanese War was in progress, we might have
fought not only against Russia, but also against France. But we did not
do so.
In addition to the Morocco crisis already touched upon, in connection
with which we set aside the idea of going to war, we also gave evidence
of our desire for peace by overcoming the Bosnian crisis by diplomatic
means.
When one considers these plainly visible political events as a whole
and adduces the declarations of Entente statesmen such as Poincaré,
Clemenceau, Isvolsky, Tardieu, and others, one is bound to ask one's
self, in amazement, how a peace treaty, founded upon Germany's guilt
in having brought on the World War, could have been drafted and put
through. This miscarriage of justice will not stand before the bar of
world history.
BLAMES FRANCE FOR 1870
A Frenchman, Louis Guetant, delegate from Lyon to the Society for the
Rights of Man, recently made this statement:
"If we once look upon events without prejudice, with complete
independence and frankness, without bothering about which camp chance
placed us in at birth, the following is forced upon our attention first
of all: The War of 1914 is a consequence of the War of 1870. For, ever
since that earlier date, the idea of revenge, more or less veiled, has
never left us.
"The War of 1870, however, was prepared and declared by the French
Government. The French Empire, indeed, needed it very badly in order to
contend against interior troubles and its steadily growing unpopularity
with the public. Even Gambetta, the wild tribune of the opposition,
exclaimed: 'If the Empire brings us the left bank of the Rhine, I shall
become reconciled with it!' Thus, it was a war of conquest; nobody
bothered about what the conquered populations might have to say about
it. 'We shall bend their will to ours!' Thus it is written in the law
of the victor!
"And now, suddenly, the opportunity for doing this was to escape
France. In view of the political difficulties and dangers of war caused
by his candidacy, Prince Leopold declared himself ready to withdraw.
That is bad! Without a pretext there can be no war!
"It was the same with France as with the milkmaid and the broken
pitcher in the fable, only instead of, 'Farewell, calf, cow, pig,
hens,' it was, 'Farewell, bloody profits, glory, victory, left bank
of the Rhine, even Belgium!'--for the latter, too, lay on that left
bank of the Rhine which France coveted. No, that would have been too
hard, the disillusionment would have been too great, the opportunity
must be created anew. The entire chauvinistic press, the entire clan
of boasters, set to work and soon found a way. Gramont, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, sent Ambassador Benedetti to visit Emperor William,
who was taking the cure at Ems, and demand from him a written
promise that, in case Prince Leopold should change his mind about
his withdrawal, he, William, as head of the family, would take issue
against this.
"The withdrawal of Prince Leopold was announced to France in a valid
manner and officially accepted by the Spanish Government. There could
be no doubt as to its genuineness. Nevertheless the Paris newspapers,
almost without exception, clamored for war. Whoever, like Robert
Michell in the _Constitutionel_, expressed his pleasure at the
prospects for peace and declared himself satisfied, was insulted on
the street. Gambetta shouted at him: 'You are satisfied! What a base
expression!' Copies of his newspapers were stolen from the news stands,
thrown into the river, hurled in his face! Emilie de Girandin wrote to
him: 'The opportunity is unique, unhoped-for; if the Empire misses it
the Empire is lost!' Then it was that preparation for the War of 1914
was begun."
Voices like this also, which are not unique either in France or
England, must always be adduced as proof that the guilt is not ours.
"MISTAKEN, BUT NOT GUILTY"
Our political and diplomatic operations in the course of decades were
not, it must be admitted, faultlessly conceived or executed. But where
we made mistakes they were caused invariably by the too great desire to
maintain world peace. Such _mistakes do not constitute guilt_.
As I mentioned elsewhere, I even consider the Congress of Berlin a
mistake, for it made our relations with Russia worse. The congress was
a victory for Disraeli, an Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia, which
turned Russian anger upon Germany. Yet--think of all that has been done
since then to make up with Russia! I have partly enumerated these acts.
And Bismarck's sole intention in bringing about the Congress of Berlin
was, as I have pointed out, the prevention of a great general war.
Chancellor von Bethmann Hollweg also, who had strict orders from me to
maintain peace if it was at all possible, made mistakes in 1914; as a
statesman he was not at all adequate to the world crisis. But the blame
for the war cannot be put upon us simply because our opponents profited
by our mistakes. Bethmann Hollweg wished to avoid the war, like all
of us--sufficient proof of this is to be found in the one fact alone
that he persisted, until the 4th of August, in his political inertia,
negotiating with England in the erroneous belief that he could keep
England out of the Entente.
While on this subject I wish also to call attention to the delusion
under which Prince Lichnowsky, the German ambassador in London, was
laboring. Soon after he had become ambassador, King George came to the
Embassy to dinner. The King's example was followed automatically by the
best society people in London.
The Prince and Princess were singled out for marked attentions and
exceedingly well treated socially. From this the German ambassador
drew the conclusion that our relations with England had improved,
until, shortly before the war, Sir Edward Grey coolly informed him
that he must draw no political conclusions from social favors and good
treatment accorded to him personally.
Nothing could give a better insight into the difference between the
English and German mentality than this. The German assumed social
friendliness to be the expression of political friendliness, since
the German is accustomed to express aversion and approval by means of
social forms as well as otherwise. He is very outspoken about what he
has on his mind.
CHARGES ENGLISH INSINCERITY
The Englishman, however, makes a distinction; in fact, he is rather
pleased if the man to whom he is speaking confuses form with substance,
or, in other words, if he takes the form to be the expression of actual
sentiments and political views. Judged from the English standpoint,
the above-mentioned words of Sir Edward Grey were a perfectly frank
statement.
The much-discussed nonrenewal of the reinsurance treaty with Russia,
already touched upon by me, is not to be considered so decisive as
to have influenced the question of whether there was to be war or
peace. The reinsurance treaty, in my opinion, would not have prevented
the Russia of Nicholas II from taking the road to the Entente; under
Alexander III it would have been superfluous.
Prince Bismarck's view that the Russian ambassador, Prince Shuvaloff,
would have renewed the reinsurance treaty with him but not with his
successor, is naturally the honest, subjective way of looking at the
matter--judged in the light of fact, however, it does not hold water,
in view of what the two parties concerned had to consider at that
time. For instance, the Under Secretary of State of the Prince, Count
Berchem, stated officially in a report to the Prince that the treaty
could not be renewed, which meant that it could not be renewed through
Shuvaloff, either.
I thought that not the old treaty, but only a new and different kind
of treaty, was possible, in the drawing up of which Austria must
participate, as in the old Three-Emperor-Relationship.
But, as I said, treaties with Nicholas II would not have seemed
absolutely durable to me, particularly after the sentiment of the very
influential Russian general public had also turned against Germany.
Our acts were founded upon the clear perception that Germany could
reach the important position in the world and obtain the influence in
world affairs necessary to her solely by maintaining world peace. This
attitude was strengthened, moreover, by personal considerations.
Never have I had warlike ambitions. In my youth my father had given me
terrible descriptions of the battlefields of 1870 and 1871, and I felt
no inclination to bring such misery, on a colossally larger scale, upon
the German people and the whole of civilized mankind. Old Field Marshal
Moltke, whom I respected greatly, had left behind him the prophetic
warning: Woe to him who hurls the firebrand of war upon Europe! And I
considered as a political legacy from the great Chancellor the fact
that Prince Bismarck had said that Germany must never wage a preventive
war; that German resistance would be neutralized if she did.
Thus the trend of the German policy of maintaining the peace was
determined by political insight, personal inclination, the legacies
of two great men, Bismarck and Moltke, and the desire of the German
people to devote itself to peaceful labors and not to plunge into
adventures.
Whatever has been said in malevolent circles about the existence of a
German party favoring war is a conscious or unconscious untruth. In
every land there are elements which, in serious situations, either from
honest conviction or less lofty motives, favor the appeal to the sword,
but never have such elements influenced the course of German policy.
The accusations, especially those which have been made against the
General Staff to the effect that it worked for war, are pretty
untenable. The Prussian General Staff served its King and fatherland
by hard, faithful work, and maintained Germany's ability to defend
herself by labors extending over many years of peace, as was its duty,
but it exerted absolutely no political influence whatsoever. Interest
in politics, as is well known, was never particularly strong in the
Prussian-German army. Looking backward, one might almost say, in fact,
that it would have been better for us if those in leading military
circles had concerned themselves a bit more with foreign policy.
Therefore, how the Peace of Versailles, in view of this perfectly
clear state of affairs, could have been founded upon Germany's guilt
in having caused the World War, would seem an insoluble riddle
if it were not possible to trace the tremendous effect of a new
war weapon--_viz._, the political propaganda of England against
Germany--planned on a large scale and applied with audacity and
unscrupulousness. I cannot bring myself to dismiss this propaganda by
branding it with catchwords such as "a piece of rascality," etc., since
it constitutes an achievement which, in spite of its repugnant nature,
cannot be ignored; it did us more harm than the arms in the hands of
our opponents.
To us Germans, such an instrument of insincerity, distortion, and
hypocrisy is not pleasing; it is something that is incompatible with
the German character; we try to convince our opponents with the weapon
of truth as well as with other weapons. But war is a cruel thing
and what matters in it is to win; after all, to fire heavy guns at
civilized beings is not a pleasant matter, nor to bombard beautiful old
towns, yet this had to be done by both sides in the war.
Moreover, we could not have developed a propaganda on a large scale
like that of our enemies during the war for the very reason that they
had no foes in their rear, whereas we were surrounded. In addition,
most Germans have not the gift to fit a scheme of propaganda to the
different nationalities of the nations upon which it is supposed to
work. But, just as the English were more than our match with that
terrible weapon of theirs, the tank, against which we could bring
nothing of equal efficiency, so also were they superior to us with
their very effective weapon of propaganda.
And this weapon still continues its work and we are compelled still to
defend ourselves against it over and over again. For there can be no
doubt that the unjust Peace of Versailles could not have been founded
upon Germany's war guilt unless propaganda had previously accomplished
its task and, partly with the support of German pacifists, instilled
into the brains of 100,000,000 human beings the belief in Germany's
guilt, so that the unjust Peace of Versailles seemed to many justified.
HOPES FOR VERSAILLES REACTION
Meanwhile, things have changed, the barriers between nations have
fallen, and gradually they are awakening to the realization of how
their confidence was imposed upon. The reaction will be crushing to
the makers of the Versailles Peace, but helpful to Germany. It goes
without saying that, among the statesmen, politicians, and publicists
of the Entente who really know, not a single one is really convinced of
Germany's guilt in having caused the World War. Every one of them knows
the real interrelation of events, and assuredly there never was a case
where so many augurs smiled at each other over a secret held in common
as the case of the responsibility for the World War. In fact, one may
even speak of a chorus of such individuals, since twenty-eight nations
took part in the war against Germany. But, in the long run, not even
the shrewdest augurs will suffice to make world history. Truth will
make its way forward and thus Germany will come into her rights.
The various stipulations of the Versailles Treaty are in themselves
null and void, since they can be observed neither by the Entente nor
by Germany. It has been possible for months to note what difficulties
are arising in the path not only of Germany, but of the victors, as a
result of such an extravagant instrument.
In many ways the treaty has been punctured by the Entente itself, and
for this the reason is easily found. In the present highly developed
state of the world, which rests upon free, systematic exchange of
material and intellectual property, regulated solely by production
itself, it is quite out of the question for three men--no matter how
eminent they may be--to sit themselves down anywhere and dictate
paragraphed laws to the world. Yet that is what the Versailles Treaty
does, not only for Germany, but also, indirectly, for the Entente and
America, since all economic questions can be solved by mutual, not
one-sided, action.
The life of nations is regulated always--and most particularly in our
day--not by paragraphs, but simply and solely by the needs of nations.
It is possible, to be sure, to do violence to those national needs
temporarily by the imposition of arbitrary decisions, but, in such
cases, both parties concerned must suffer.
The world is in such a stage just now. Conditions like those at present
cannot last; not guns, nor tanks, nor squadrons of airplanes, can
perpetuate them. Therefore, their removal has already begun; for, if
the peace of Versailles were really such a judicious, unimpeachable
instrument, bringing blessings upon the world, there would not be
constant need of new conferences, discussions, and meetings having
to do with this "marvelous" document. The constant necessity for new
interpretations is due, indeed, to the fact that the needs of highly
cultivated and civilized nations were not taken into account when the
peace was concluded.
One must not be pharisaical, however; up to a certain point the
extravagance of the terms imposed by the victor after a life-and-death
struggle is a natural consequence of the relief felt at having escaped
alive from deadly danger.
Nevertheless, I know that Germany, if we had emerged victorious from
the war, would have imposed quite different terms--_i. e._, terms that
would have been just and endurable. The peace treaties of Brest-Litovsk
and Bucharest--which indeed are not at all comparable with the Treaty
of Versailles--cannot be adduced against us. They were concluded in
the very midst of the war and had to include conditions which would
guarantee our safety until the end of the war. Had it come to a general
peace, the treaty made by us in the East would have had a far different
aspect; had we won the war, it would have been revised by ourselves. At
the time it was made it was necessary to give preference to military
requirements.
But enlightenment regarding the unjust Treaty of Versailles is on the
way and the necessities of life among present-day nations will speak
in imperious tones to victors and vanquished.
After years of the heaviest trial will come the liberation from a yoke
imposed unjustly upon a great, strong, honest nation. Then every one of
us will be glad and proud again that he is a German.