CHAPTER I

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THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

[Illustration: WILHELM II]

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

by

WILHELM II

Emperor of Germany 1888-1918

English Translation by Thomas R. Ybarra

Harper & Brothers Publishers

New York and London

1922

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

Copyright, 1922

By McClure Newspaper Syndicate

Copyright, 1922

By Harper & Brothers

Printed in the U. S. A.

_First Edition_

K-W

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I. BISMARCK 1

II. CAPRIVI 51

III. HOHENLOHE 59

IV. BÜLOW 95

V. BETHMANN 124

VI. MY CO-WORKERS IN THE ADMINISTRATION 171

VII. SCIENCE AND ART 196

VIII. MY RELATIONS WITH THE CHURCH 208

IX. ARMY AND NAVY 223

X. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 246

XI. THE POPE AND PEACE 263

XII. END OF THE WAR AND MY ABDICATION 272

XIII. THE ENEMY TRIBUNAL AND THE NEUTRAL TRIBUNAL 292

XIV. THE QUESTION OF GUILT 303

XV. THE REVOLUTION AND GERMANY'S FUTURE 337

THE KAISER'S MEMOIRS

CHAPTER I

Bismarck

Prince Bismarck's greatness as a statesman and his imperishable

services to Prussia and Germany are historical facts of such tremendous

significance that there is doubtless no man in existence, whatever his

party affiliations, who would dare to place them in question. For this

very reason alone it is stupid to accuse me of not having recognized

the greatness of Prince Bismarck. The opposite is the truth. I revered

and idolized him. Nor could it be otherwise. It should be borne in

mind with what generation I grew up--the generation of the devotees of

Bismarck. He was the creator of the German Empire, the paladin of my

grandfather, and all of us considered him the greatest statesman of his

day and were proud that he was a German. Bismarck was the idol in my

temple, whom I worshiped.

But monarchs also are human beings of flesh and blood, hence they, too,

are exposed to the influences emanating from the conduct of others;

therefore, looking at the matter from a human point of view, one will

understand how Prince Bismarck, by his fight against me, himself

destroyed, with heavy blows, the idol of which I have spoken. But my

reverence for Bismarck, the great statesman, remained unaltered.

While I was still Prince of Prussia I often thought to myself: "I hope

that the great Chancellor will live for many years yet, since I should

be safe if I could govern with him." But my reverence for the great

statesman was not such as to make me take upon my own shoulders, when

I became Emperor, political plans or actions of the Prince which I

considered mistakes. Even the Congress of Berlin in 1878 was, to my

way of thinking, a mistake, likewise the "Kulturkampf." Moreover, the

constitution of the Empire was drawn up so as to fit in with Bismarck's

extraordinary preponderance as a statesman; the big cuirassier boots

did not fit every man.

Then came the labor-protective legislation. I most deeply deplored the

dispute which grew out of this, but, at that time, it was necessary for

me _to take the road to compromise, which has generally been my road

both on domestic and foreign politics_. For this reason I could not

wage the open warfare against the Social Democrats which the Prince

desired. Nevertheless, this quarrel about political measures cannot

lessen my admiration for the greatness of Bismarck as a statesman; he

remains the creator of the German Empire, and surely no _one_ man need

have done more for his country than that.

Owing to the fact that the great matter of unifying the Empire was

always before my eyes, I did not allow myself to be influenced by the

agitations which were the commonplaces of those days. In like manner,

the fact that Bismarck was called the majordomo of the Hohenzollerns

could not shake my trust in the Prince, although he, perhaps, had

thoughts of a political tradition for his family. As evidence of this,

he felt unhappy, for instance, that his son Bill felt no interest in

politics and wished to pass on his power to Herbert.

HIS GRANDFATHER'S SUCCESSOR

The tragic element for me, in the Bismarck case, lay in the fact that I

became the successor of my grandfather--in other words, that I skipped

one generation, to a certain extent. And that is a serious thing. In

such a case one is forced to deal constantly with old deserving men,

who live more in the past than in the present, and cannot grow into the

future. When the grandson succeeds his grandfather and finds a revered

but old statesman of the stature of Bismarck, it is not a piece of good

luck for him, as one might suppose, and I, in fact, supposed. Bismarck

himself points that out in the third volume of his memoirs (p. 40),

when he speaks, in the chapter about Bötticher, of the oldish caution

of the Chancellor, and of the young Emperor.

And when Ballin had the Prince cast a glance over the new harbor of

Hamburg, Bismarck himself felt that a new era had begun which he no

longer thoroughly understood. On that occasion the Prince remarked, in

astonishment, "Another world, a new world!"

This point of view also showed itself on the occasion of the visit of

Admiral von Tirpitz at Friedrichsruh, at the time when he wished to win

the old Imperial Chancellor over to favoring the first Navy bill.

As for me personally, I have the satisfaction of recalling that

Bismarck intrusted to me in 1886 the very delicate Brest mission, and

said of me: "Some day that man will be his own Chancellor." This shows

that Bismarck must have had some belief in me.

I feel no grudge against him for the third volume of his reminiscences.

I released this volume after I had sought and obtained my rights. To

withhold the volume any longer would have been pointless, since the

main contents had become known already through indiscretions; were this

not true, there might have been varying opinions as to the advisability

in the choice of the time for publication. Bismarck would turn over

in his grave if he could know at what time the third volume appeared,

and what consequences it had. I should be honestly grieved if the

third volume had damaged the memory of the great Chancellor, because

Bismarck is one of the heroic figures whom the German people need for

their regeneration. My gratitude and reverence for the great Chancellor

cannot be impaired or extinguished by the third volume nor by anything

else whatever.

In the first half of the 'eighties I had been summoned to the Foreign

Office at the behest of Prince Bismarck; it was then presided over by

Count Herbert Bismarck. Upon reporting myself to the Prince he gave me

a short sketch of the personages employed at the Foreign Office, and

when he named Herr von Holstein, who was then one of the most prominent

collaborators of the Prince, it seemed to me that a slight warning

against this man ran through the Prince's words.

I got a room all to myself, and all the documents concerning the

preliminary history, origin, and conclusion of the alliance with

Austria (Andrassy) were laid before me in order that I might study

them. I went often to the home of the Prince and to that of Count

Herbert.

THE MAN WITH THE HYENA'S EYES

When I had thus become more intimate in the Bismarck circle I heard

more open talk about Herr von Holstein. I heard that he was very

clever, a good worker, inordinately proud, an odd sort of man, who

never showed himself anywhere and had no social relations, full of

distrust, much influenced by whims, and, besides all this, a good

hater, and, therefore, dangerous. Prince Bismarck called him "The Man

with the Hyena's Eyes," and told me that it would be well for me to

keep away from him. It was quite apparent that the bitter attitude

which the Prince showed later toward Holstein, his former collaborator,

was forming even at that time.

The Foreign Office was conducted with the strictest discipline by Count

Herbert, whose rudeness toward his employees particularly struck me.

The gentlemen there simply flew when they were summoned or dismissed

by the Count, so much so that a joking saying arose at the time that

"their coat tails stood straight out behind them." The foreign policy

was conducted and dictated by Prince Bismarck alone, after consultation

with Count Herbert, who passed on the commands of the Chancellor and

had them transformed into instructions. Hence _the Foreign Office was

nothing but an office of the great Chancellor_, where work was done

according to his directions. Able men, with independent ideas, were not

schooled and trained there.

This was in contrast to the General Staff under Moltke. There new

officers were carefully developed and trained to independent thinking

and action, in accordance with approved principles, and by dint of

preserving old traditions and taking into account all that modern times

had taught. At the Foreign Office there were only executive instruments

of a will, who were not informed as to the important interrelationship

of the questions turned over to them for treatment, and could not,

therefore, collaborate independently. The Prince loomed up like a huge

block of granite in a meadow; were he to be dragged away, what would be

found beneath would be mostly worms and dead roots.

I won the confidence of the Prince, who consulted me about many

things. For instance, when the Prince brought about the first German

colonial acquisitions (Gross and Klein Popo, Togo, etc.), I informed

him, at his wish, concerning the state of mind created in the public

and the navy by this move, and described to him the enthusiasm with

which the German people had hailed the new road. The Prince remarked

that the matter hardly deserved this.

Later on I spoke often with the Prince about the colonial question

and always found in him the intention to utilize the colonies as

commercial objects, or objects for swapping purposes, other than to

make them useful to the fatherland or utilize them as sources of raw

materials. As was my duty, I called the Prince's attention to the fact

that merchants and capitalists were beginning energetically to develop

the colonies and that, therefore--as I had learned from Hanseatic

circles--they counted upon protection from a navy. For this reason, I

pointed out that steps must be taken for _getting a fleet constructed_

in time, in order that German assets in foreign lands should not be

without protection; that, since the Prince had unfurled the German flag

in foreign parts, and the people stood behind it, there must also be a

navy behind it.

BISMARCK'S CONTINENTAL PREPOSSESSIONS

But the Prince turned a deaf ear to my statements and made use of

his pet motto: "If the English should land on our soil I should have

them arrested." His idea was that the colonies would be defended by

us at home. The Prince attached no importance to the fact that the

very assumption that the English could land without opposition in

Germany--since Heligoland was English--was unbearable for Germany, and

that we, in order to make a landing impossible from the start, needed a

sufficiently strong navy, and, likewise, Heligoland.

The political interest of the Prince was, in fact, concentrated

essentially upon continental Europe; England lay somewhat to one

side among the cares that burdened him daily, all the more so since

Salisbury stood well with him and had, in the name of England, hailed

with satisfaction the Double (_i. e._, Triple) Alliance, at the time

of its formation. The Prince worked primarily with Russia, Austria,

Italy, and Rumania, whose relations toward Germany and one another he

constantly watched over. As to the prudence and skill with which he

acted, Emperor William the Great once made a pointed remark to von

Albedyll, his chief of Cabinet.

The General found His Majesty much excited after a talk with Bismarck,

to such an extent that he feared for the health of the old Emperor. He

remarked, therefore, that His Majesty should avoid similar worry in

future; that, if Bismarck was unwilling to do as His Majesty wished,

His Majesty should dismiss him. Whereupon the Emperor replied that,

despite his admiration and gratitude toward the great Chancellor,

he had already thought of dismissing him, since the self-conscious

attitude of the Prince became at times too oppressive. But both he and

the country needed Bismarck too badly. Bismarck was the one man who

could juggle five balls of which at least two were always in the air.

That trick, added the Emperor, was beyond his own powers.

Prince Bismarck did not realize that, through the acquisition of

colonies for Germany, he would be obliged to look beyond Europe and

be automatically forced to act, politically, on a large scale--with

England especially. England, to be sure, was one of the five balls in

his diplomatic-statesmanly game, but she was merely one of the five,

and he did not grant her the special importance which was her due.

For this reason it was that the Foreign Office likewise was involved

entirely in the continental interplay of politics, had not the

requisite interest in colonies, navy, or England, and possessed no

experience in world politics. The English psychology and mentality, as

shown in the pursuit--constant, though concealed by all sorts of little

cloaks--of world hegemony, was to the German Foreign Office a book

sealed with seven seals.

SOURCE OF RUSSIAN ENMITY

Once Prince Bismarck remarked to me that his main object was to not

let Russia and England come to an understanding. I took the liberty of

observing that the opportunity to postpone such an understanding for

a long time lay ready to hand in 1877-78, when the Russians might have

been allowed to occupy Constantinople--had this been done, the English

fleet would have sailed in without further ado to defend Constantinople

and the Russo-English conflict would have been on. Instead, I

continued, the Treaty of San Stefano was forced upon the Russians and

they were compelled to turn about at the very gates of the city which

they had reached and saw before them, after frightful battles and

hardships.

This, I went on, had created an inextinguishable hatred in the Russian

army against us (as had been reported by Prussian officers who had

accompanied the Russian army on the Turkish campaign, especially Count

Pfeil); moreover, the above-mentioned treaty had been cast aside and

the Berlin Treaty substituted for it, which had burdened us even more

with the hostility of the Russians, who looked upon us as the enemy of

their "just interests in the East." Thus the conflict between Russia

and England, which the Prince desired, had been relegated far into the

future.

Prince Bismarck did not agree with this judgment of "his" Congress,

concerning the results of which he, as the "honest broker," was so

proud; he remarked earnestly that he had wished to prevent a general

conflagration and had been compelled to offer his services as a

mediator. When I, later on, told a gentleman at the Foreign Office

about this conversation, he replied that he had been present when

the Prince, after signing the Berlin Treaty, came into the Foreign

Office and received the congratulations of the officials assembled

there. After he had listened to them the Prince stood up and replied:

"Now I am driving Europe four-in-hand!" In the opinion of the said

gentleman the Prince was mistaken in this, since, even at that time,

there was the threat of a Russo-French friendship in place of the

Russo-Prussian--in other words, two horses were already to be counted

out of the four-in-hand. As Russia saw it, Disraeli's statecraft had

turned Bismarck's work as "honest broker" into the negotiation of an

Anglo-Austrian victory over Russia.

Despite considerable differences in our opinions, Prince Bismarck

remained friendly and kindly disposed to me, and, despite the great

difference in our ages, a pleasant relationship grew up between

us, since I, in common with all those of my generation, was an

ardent admirer of the Prince and had won his trust by my zeal and

frankness--nor have I ever betrayed that trust.

During the time of my assignment at the Foreign Office, Privy Councilor

Raschdau, among others, discoursed with me on commercial policy,

colonies, etc. In these matters, even at that early date, my attention

was called to our dependence upon England, due to the fact that we had

no navy and that Heligoland was in English hands. To be sure, there

was a project to extend our colonial possessions under the pressure of

necessity, but all this could happen only with England's permission.

This was a serious matter, and certainly an unworthy position for

Germany.

INTERCOURT POLITICS

My assignment at the Foreign Office brought a very unpleasant happening

in its wake. My parents were not very friendly toward Prince Bismarck

and looked with disfavor upon the fact that their son had entered into

the Prince's circle. There was fear of my becoming influenced against

my parents, of superconservatism, of all sorts of perils, which all

sorts of tale bearers from England and "liberal circles," who rallied

around my father, imputed against me. I never bothered my head with all

this nonsense, but my position in the house of my parents was rendered

much more difficult for me and, at times, painful. Through my work

under Prince Bismarck and the confidence reposed in me--often subjected

to the severest tests--I have had to suffer much in silence for the

sake of the Chancellor; he, however, apparently took this quite as a

matter of course.

I was on good terms with Count Herbert Bismarck. He could be a very

gay companion and knew how to assemble interesting men around his

table, partly from the Foreign Office, partly from other circles.

However, true friendship never ripened between us two. This was shown

particularly when the Count asked to go at the same time that his

father retired. My request that he stay by me and help me to maintain

tradition in our political policy elicited the sharp reply that he had

become accustomed to report to his father and serve him, wherefore it

was out of the question to demand that he come, with his dispatch case

under his arm, to report to anybody else than his father.

When Tsar Nicholas II, he who has been murdered, came of age, I was

assigned at the instigation of Prince Bismarck to confer upon the

heir-apparent at St. Petersburg the Order of the Black Eagle. Both the

Emperor and Prince Bismarck instructed me concerning the relationship

of the two countries and the two reigning dynasties with each other,

as well as concerning customs, personages, etc. The Emperor remarked

in conclusion that he would give his grandson the same piece of advice

that was given him, on the occasion of his first visit as a young man

to Russia, by Count Adlerberg, _viz._, "In general, there as well as

elsewhere, people prefer praise to criticism." Prince Bismarck closed

his remarks with these words: "In the East, all those who wear their

shirts outside their trousers are decent people, but as soon as they

tuck their shirts inside their trousers and hang a medal around their

necks, they become pig-dogs."

From St. Petersburg I repeatedly reported to my grandfather and to

Prince Bismarck. Naturally, I described, to the best of my knowledge,

the impressions which I got. I noticed especially that the old

Russo-Prussian relations and sentiments had cooled to a marked extent

and were no longer such as the Emperor and Prince Bismarck in their

talks with me had assumed. After my return, both my grandfather

and the Prince praised me for my plain, clear report, which was all

the pleasanter for me since I was oppressed by the feeling that,

in a number of things, I had been forced to disillusion these high

personages.

TO OFFER DARDANELLES TO RUSSIA

In 1886, at the end of August and beginning of September, after the

last meeting at Gastein of Emperor William the Great and Prince

Bismarck with Emperor Franz Josef, where I also was present at the

command of my grandfather, I was commissioned to report personally to

Tsar Alexander II concerning the decisions made there and to take up

with him the questions relating to the Mediterranean and Turkey. Prince

Bismarck gave me his instructions, sanctioned by Emperor William; they

dealt most especially with Russia's desire to reach Constantinople,

to which the Prince meant to raise no obstacles. On the contrary, I

received direct instructions to offer Russia Constantinople and the

Dardanelles (in other words, San Stefano and the Berlin Treaty had been

dropped!). There was a plan to persuade Turkey in a friendly way that

an understanding with Russia was desirable for her also.

The Tsar received me cordially at Brest-Litovsk and I was present there

at reviews of troops and fortress and defensive maneuvers, which, even

then, unquestionably bore an anti-German look.

To sum up my conversations with the Tsar, the following remark by him

is of importance: "If I wish to have Constantinople, I shall take

it whenever I feel like it, without need of permission or approval

from Prince Bismarck." After this rude refusal of the Bismarck offer

of Constantinople, I looked upon my mission as a failure and made my

report to the Prince accordingly.

When the Prince decided to make his offer to the Tsar, he must have

altered his political conceptions which had led to San Stefano and

the Congress of Berlin; or else, on account of the development of the

general political situation in Europe, he considered that the moment

had come for shuffling the political cards in another way or, as my

grandfather had put it, to "juggle" differently. Only a man of the

world importance and diplomatic ability of Prince Bismarck could embark

on such a course. Whether the Prince had planned his big political

game with Russia in such a way that he might, first, by means of the

Congress of Berlin, prevent a general war and cajole England, and then,

after having thus hindered Russia's Eastern aspirations, cater to these

aspirations later, by a stroke of genius, in an even more striking

manner, it is impossible for me to say--Prince Bismarck never told

anyone about his great political projects.

If the above is true, Bismarck, trusting absolutely to his

statesmanlike skill, must have reckoned upon bringing Germany all the

more into Russian favor because Russian aspirations were brought to

fulfillment by Germany alone--and that at a moment when the general

European political situation was less strained than in 1877-78.

In this case, nobody except Prince Bismarck could have played the

tremendous game to a successful end. And therein lies the weakness in

the superiority of great men. Had he also informed England of his offer

to the Tsar? England must have been opposed to it, as in 1878.

In any event, the Prince now adopted the policy which I had already

noted when I realized the disillusion of the Russians at having stood

before the gates of Constantinople without being allowed to enter.

PROPHECY OF RUSSIAN DOWNFALL

At Brest-Litovsk, in the course of the constant military preparations

of all kinds, I could easily see that the conduct of the Russian

officers toward me was essentially cooler and haughtier than on the

occasion of my first visit to St. Petersburg. Only the small group of

old generals, especially those at the Russian court, who dated from the

days of Alexander II, and who knew and esteemed Emperor William the

Great, still showed their reverence for him and their friendly feeling

toward Germany. In the course of a talk with one of them concerning

the relations between the two courts, armies, and countries, which I

had found undergoing a change in comparison with former times, the

old General said: "C'est ce vilain congrès de Berlin. Une grave faute

du Chancelier. Il a détruit l'ancienne amitié entre nous, planté la

méfiance dans les coeurs de la Cour et du Gouvernement, et fourni le

sentiment d'un grave tort fait à l'armée russe après sa campagne

sanglante de 1877, pour lequel elle veut sa revanche. Et nous voilà

ensemble avec cette maudite République Française, pleins de haine

contre vous et rempli d'idées subversives, qui en cas de guerre avec

vous, nous coûteront notre dynastie."[1]

A prophetic foreshadowing of the downfall of the reigning Russian

dynasty!

From Brest I went to Strassburg, where my grandfather was attending the

Imperial maneuvers. In spite of the failure of my mission I found calm

judgments of the political situation. My grandfather was pleased at

the cordial greetings from the Tsar, which, in so far as the personal

relationship of the two rulers was concerned, showed no change of

heart. Also, to my surprise, I received a letter from Prince Bismarck

wherein he expressed gratitude and appreciation to me for my actions

and my report. This meant all the more since my statements could not

have been agreeable to my grandfather and the Chancellor. The Congress

of Berlin had, especially in Russian military circles, done away with

the remnants of the brotherhood in arms still fostered among us and had

engendered a hatred against everything Prussian and German, stirred

up by association with French officers, which was increased by the

French until it developed into the desire of vengeance by means of

arms. That was the soil in which, later, the World War ambitions of our

foes found nourishment. "Revanche pour Sedan," combined with "Revanche

pour San Stefano." The words of the old General at Brest have remained

unforgettably engraved upon my memory; they induced me to bring about

my many meetings with Alexander III and Nicholas II, at which my

grandfather's wish, impressed upon me on his deathbed, that I watch

over our relations with Russia, has always been my guiding motive.

RELIEF AT CHANCELLOR'S DISMISSAL

In 1890, at the Narva maneuvers, I was obliged to describe minutely

to the Tsar the retirement of Prince Bismarck. The Tsar listened very

attentively. When I had finished, the usually very cool and reserved

sovereign, who seldom spoke about politics, spontaneously seized my

hand, thanked me for this token of my confidence, regretted that I

had been brought into such a situation and added, in exactly these

words: "Je comprends parfaitement ta ligne d'action; le Prince avec

toute sa grandeur n'était après tout rien d'autre que ton employé ou

fonctionnaire. Le moment où il réfusait d'agir selon tes ordres, il

fallait le renvoyer. Moi pour ma part je me suis toujours méfié de lui,

et je ne lui ai jamais cru un mot de ce qu'il faisait savoir ou me

disait lui-même, car j'étais sûr et savais qu'il me blaguait tout le

temps. Pour les rapports entre nous deux, mon cher Guillaume [this was

the first time that the Tsar so addressed me], la chute du Prince aura

les meilleures conséquences, la méfiance disparaîtra. J'ai confiance en

toi. Tu peux te fier à moi."[2]

I immediately wrote down this important talk at the time it occurred.

I am objective enough to ask myself to what extent the courtesy of

one ruler to another and possibly, in addition, the satisfaction at

the elimination of a statesman of Bismarck's importance, can have

influenced the Tsar, consciously or unconsciously, in making the

above-mentioned statement. Prince Bismarck's belief in the Tsar's trust

in him was, subjectively, undoubtedly genuine; and, moreover, there can

be no doubt as to the esteem in which Alexander III held Bismarck's

ability as a statesman.

In any event, the Tsar remained true to his word up to the day of his

death. This, to be sure, did little to change Russia's general policy,

but Germany, at least, was safe from an attack from that quarter. The

straightforward character of Alexander III guaranteed this--it became

otherwise under his weak son.

Whatever one's attitude may be toward Bismarck's Russian policy, one

thing must be acknowledged: the Prince, despite the Congress of Berlin

and the rapprochement of France to Russia, was able to avoid serious

friction. That is equivalent to saying that, reckoning from the time of

the Berlin Congress, he played a superior diplomatic and statesmanlike

game for twelve years (1878-90).

GERMANY AS PEACEMAKER

One must also lay stress upon the fact that it was a German statesman

who, in 1878, prevented a general war, even at the cost of weakening

the relations of Germany to Russia, in the justified belief that he

would succeed, being a statesman of genius who knew exactly what he was

aiming at, in strengthening these relations once more, or, at least,

in avoiding conflicts after he had overcome the crisis threatening all

Europe.

He succeeded in doing that for twelve years and his successors at the

helm of the ship of state succeeded in doing likewise for twenty-four

more years.

When I was a Prince I purposely held aloof from party politics,

concentrating my entire attention upon my duties in the different army

branches to which I was assigned. This afforded me satisfaction and

filled up my whole life. For this reason I avoided, while I was Prince

of Prussia, all attempts to drag me into party activities. Often enough

endeavors were made, under the cloak of harmless functions, teas and

the like, to ensnare me into political circles or for electioneering

purposes. But I always held aloof.

The outcome of the treacherous malady which killed Emperor Frederick

III was frankly told me in advance by German physicians called

into consultation as experts by the English physician, Sir Morell

Mackenzie. My deep grief and sorrow were all the greater because it

was almost impossible for me to speak alone with my beloved father.

He was guarded like a prisoner by the English physicians and, though

reporters from all countries could look upon the poor sick man from

the physicians' room, every kind of obstacle was placed in my path to

keep me from my father's side and even to prevent me from keeping in

constant touch with him by writing; my letters were often intercepted

and not delivered. Moreover, from among the group of watchers, an

infamous, organized campaign of slander was conducted in the newspapers

against me. Two journalists were especially active in this: one Herr

Schnidrowitz and M. Jacques St. Cère, of the _Figaro_--a German

Jew--who slandered him who was later Emperor in the most poisonous way

in France, until the "Petit Sucrier" trial put an end to his activities.

I gave the dying Emperor his last joy on earth when I had the Second

Infantry Brigade march past him, led by me in person. These were the

first and last troops seen by Frederick III as Emperor. He delighted

his son by writing on this occasion, on a little card, that he was

grateful for having had the pleasure of seeing these troops and proud

to call them his own. This event was a ray of light during the gloomy

ninety-nine days, which brought upon me also, as Crown Prince, much

grief, humiliation, and suspicion. In fulfillment of my duty during

this crisis, I kept a watchful eye upon all happenings in military,

official, and social circles, and was inwardly outraged at the signs of

slackness which I noted everywhere, most especially at the hostility

against my mother, which was becoming more and more noticeable.

Moreover, I was naturally deeply hurt at the constant campaign of

slander directed against me which depicted me as living in discord with

my father.

HE BECOMES EMPEROR

After Emperor Frederick III had closed his eyes forever, the heavy

burden of governing the Empire fell upon my youthful shoulders. First

of all I was confronted with the necessity of making changes in the

government personnel in various quarters. The military entourage of the

two emperors, as well as the body of officialdom, had grown too old.

The so-called "maison militaire" (military household of Emperor William

the Great) had been retained in its entirety by Emperor Frederick III,

without being required to discharge military duties. In addition, there

was the entourage of Emperor Frederick III. I proceeded to dismiss,

in the friendliest way, all those gentlemen who wished to go into

retirement; some of them received positions in the army, a few of the

younger remained in my service for the transition period.

During the ninety-nine days, while I was still Crown Prince, I had

silently concerned myself with those personages to whom I proposed

later to give appointments, since the physicians had left me no

doubt that my father had only a short time to live. I ignored court

or external considerations; nothing but previous achievements and

character moved me to my choice. I did away with the term "maison

militaire" and transformed it into "Main Headquarters of His

Majesty." In choosing my entourage I took the advice of only one man

in whom I reposed special confidence, my former chief and brigade

commander, General--afterward Adjutant General--von Versen, a man

of straightforward, knightly, rather harsh character, an officer of

the old Prussian school, a typical chip of the old block. During his

military service in line and guard regiments he had noted with an

observing eye the court influences and tendencies which had often

worked to the disadvantage of the officer corps in the old "maison

militaire." In this direction the circle of ladies of high position,

jokingly known among the officers as "trente et quarante" on account

of their age, also played a certain part. I wished to eliminate such

influences.

I appointed General von Wittich my First Adjutant General and General

von Hahnke, commander of the Second Infantry Guard Division, chief of

my Military Cabinet. The latter was a friend of Emperor Frederick III

and, while I was still serving with the First Infantry Guard Regiment,

he was my brigade commander. These two were men of military experience

and iron principles, who shared absolutely the sentiments of their

master, and remained bound to me to the end of their lives by the most

exemplary fidelity.

As the head of my court I appointed a man known to me from his youth,

the former Court Marshal of my father, Count August Eulenburg, who

remained at the head of the Ministry of the Royal House until his

death in June, 1921, at the age of eighty-two years. He was a man

of fine tact, uncommon ability, clear insight in court as well

as political matters, sincere character, and golden fidelity to

his King and his King's family. His manifold abilities would have

enabled him, to the same degree that they had made him known as Court

Marshal throughout Europe, to act with equal success as ambassador

or as Imperial Chancellor. Working with unswerving zeal, endowed

with winning politeness, he stood by me with helpful counsel in many

matters--dynastic, family, court, public life. He had to do with many

men, in all social strata and all walks of life, by all of whom he was

revered and esteemed, and he was treated by me likewise with friendship

and gratitude.

VICTORIA'S HAND IS FELT

After consultation with Prince Bismarck, Herr von Lucanus from the

Ministry of Public Worship and Instruction, was appointed chief of the

Civil Cabinet. Prince Bismarck observed jokingly that he was pleased

with this choice, since Herr von Lucanus was known to him as an able

and enthusiastic huntsman, which was always a good recommendation for

a civilian official; he added that a good huntsman was a regular good

fellow. Herr von Lucanus took over his post from His Excellency von

Wilmowski. He discharged his duties admirably and, being well endowed

in all pertaining to art, technical matters, science, and politics, he

was to me a counselor, untiring collaborator, and friend. He combined

with a healthy knowledge of men a strong dash of refined humor, which

is so often lacking in men of the Germanic race.

With Prince Bismarck I had stood on very good and trustful terms ever

since my assignment at the Foreign Office. Then, as well as before, I

revered the powerful Chancellor with all the ardor of my youth and was

proud to have served under him and to have the opportunity now to work

with him as my Chancellor.

The Prince, who was present during the last hours of the old Emperor

and had listened with me to the latter's political testament to his

grandson--_i. e._, his wish as to the special care to be lavished upon

relations with Russia--brought about my summer trip to St. Petersburg

as my first political act before the eyes of the world, in order to

emphasize our relationship to Russia in accordance with the last wish

of my dying grandfather. He also had "travel arrangements" drawn up

for me.

An obstacle was placed in the way of carrying out this plan by a

letter from Queen Victoria of England, who, upon hearing of the

projected visit to St. Petersburg, expressed to her eldest grandson,

in a good-humored but authoritative tone, her disapproval of the

contemplated journey. She said that a year of mourning must first

elapse, after which my first visit was due to her, since she was my

grandmother, and to England, it being the native country of my mother,

before other lands should be considered. When I placed this letter

before the Prince, he gave way to a violent fit of anger. He spoke

about "family dictation in England," of interference from that quarter

which must cease; the tone of the letter showed, he said, how the Crown

Prince and Emperor Frederick had been ordered about and influenced

by his mother-in-law, wife, etc. Thereupon the Prince wished to draw

up the text of a reply to the Queen. I remarked that I would prepare

the appropriate answer, steering the proper middle course between the

grandson and the Emperor, and that I would show it to the Prince before

dispatching it.

The answer paid heed in its outward form to the close relationship

between a grandson and his grandmother, who had carried him in her

arms when he was a baby and, in view of her age alone, commanded great

respect--but, in its essentials, it laid stress upon the position and

duty of the German Emperor, compelled to carry out unconditionally a

command of his dying father affecting Germany's most vital interests.

It stated that the grandson was obliged to respect this command of

his grandfather in the interest of the country, the representation of

which interests had now devolved upon him by the will of God, and that

his royal grandmother must leave to him the question of deciding in

what manner this was to be done. I added that, otherwise, I was her

loving grandson, who would always be grateful for any advice from his

grandmother, who had derived so much experience from her long reign;

but that I was, nevertheless, in matters affecting Germany, compelled

to retain my freedom of action; the visit to St. Petersburg, I said,

was politically necessary, and the command of my Imperial grandfather

was consonant with the close family relations between me and the

Russian Imperial house; therefore it would be carried out.

The Prince approved of the letter. The answer, which arrived after a

while, was surprising. The Queen agreed that her grandson was in the

right; he must act in accordance with the interests of his country; she

would be glad to see him, even if it were later on, at her own home.

From that day onward my relations with the Queen, who was feared even

by her own children, were of the best imaginable; from that day onward

she never treated her grandson except as a sovereign of equal rank with

herself!

On my first journeys I was accompanied by Count Herbert, as the

representative of the Foreign Office. He drew up the speeches and

conducted the political conferences, in so far as they were of an

official nature, in accordance with the instructions of his father.

CONFLICT ON TURKISH POLICY

Upon my return from Constantinople in 1889 I described to the Prince

at his request my impressions of Greece, where my sister Sophie was

married to the heir-apparent, Crown Prince Constantine, and also my

Constantinople impressions. In doing this, it struck me that Prince

Bismarck spoke quite disdainfully of Turkey, of the men in high

position there, and of conditions in that land. I thought I might

inspire him in part with essentially more favorable opinions, but my

efforts were of little avail. Upon asking the Prince the reason why

he held such an unfavorable opinion, he answered that Count Herbert

had reported very disapprovingly on Turkey. Prince Bismarck and Count

Herbert were never favorably inclined toward Turkey and they never

agreed with me in my Turkish policy--the old policy of Frederick the

Great.

During the last period of his tenure of office as Chancellor, Bismarck

declared that the maintenance of friendly relations with Russia, whose

Tsar reposed special trust in him, was the most important reason for

his remaining at his post. In this connection it was that he gave me

the first hints concerning the secret reinsurance treaty with Russia.

Up to then I had heard nothing about it, either from the Prince or

the Foreign Office, although it happened that I had concerned myself

especially with Russian matters.

When I assumed the reins of government owing to the early death of my

father, the generation of the grandson, as I have already remarked,

followed upon the generation of the grandfather, which meant that

the entire generation of Emperor Frederick was overleaped. This

generation, through its dealings with Crown Prince Frederick William,

was imbued with many liberal ideas and projects of reform which were

to be carried out under the direction of the Emperor Frederick. Upon

his death, this entire generation, especially the politicians, found

itself deceived in its hopes of exerting influence, and felt itself,

to a certain extent, in the position of an orphan. Those belonging

to it, despite the fact that they did not know my inner thoughts and

aims, adopted a distrustful and reserved attitude toward me, instead of

transferring their interest from the father to the son, for the purpose

of furthering the welfare of the fatherland.

There was one exception to this--a representative of the National

Liberals, Herr von Benda--a man still in the full bloom of youth. While

I was still Prince I had made his acquaintance at the great hare hunts

got up by Councilor Dietze at Barby. There Herr von Benda had won my

affection and confidence when I, surrounded by older men, had listened

to discussions on political, agricultural, and national-economic

questions. In the course of these, Herr von Benda held my attention

by means of his independent, interesting judgment. I accepted with

pleasure an invitation to Benda's country seat, Rudow, near Berlin, and

from this arose the custom of a regular yearly visit.

The hours spent in the family circle at Rudow stand out pleasantly in

my memory. His talented daughters used to regale us with music. The

political conversations there proved Herr von Benda to be a man of

great foresight, which, free from partisan considerations, gave him

an open mind as to the general needs of the state to an extent seldom

found among members of political parties. He gave me many a helpful

piece of advice for the future, drawn from the depths of his faithful,

genuinely Prussian heart, by which he was attached firmly to the family

of his sovereign; yet he was able to feel broad tolerance for other

parties.

HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTIES

The later periods of my reign proved that I was not hostile to any

party, with the exception of the Ultra-Socialists; also, that I was

not anti-Liberal. My most important Finance Minister was the Liberal,

Miquel; my Minister of Commerce was the Liberal, Möller; the leader

of the Liberals, Herr von Bennigsen, was Chief President of Hanover.

I stood very close, especially in the second half of my reign, to

an elderly Liberal deputy, whose acquaintance I made through Herr

von Miquel. This man was Herr Seydel (Celchen), owner of an estate

in eastern Germany--a man with two clever eyes, which gazed forth

from a clean-shaven face. He worked with Miquel in railway and canal

questions, and was a thoroughly able, simple, practical man--a Liberal

with a streak of conservatism.

Naturally, I had numerous dealings and points of contact with the

Conservative party, since the gentlemen of the country nobility often

met me at court hunts and other hunts, or else came to court and served

in court positions. Through them I could become thoroughly informed on

all agrarian questions and learn where the farmer's shoe pinched him.

The Free Thinkers, under the "unswerving" leader, entered into no

relations with me; they limited themselves to opposition.

In my conversations with Benda and Bennigsen we often spoke of the

future of Liberalism, and, on one occasion, Benda made this interesting

observation: "It is not necessary and also not advisable to have the

Prussian heir-apparent dabble in Liberalism--we have no use for that

sort of thing. He must be essentially conservative, though he must,

at the same time, combine this with breadth, and avoid narrowness and

prejudice against other parties."

Bennigsen agreed with me when I spoke to him of the necessity of

having the National Liberals revise their program, which--originally

bearing the motto: "Maintenance of the German Empire and Freedom of

the Press"--had long since rallied the members around the Liberal

banner--in order that, by such revision, the proselytizing power of

the old brand of Prussian Liberalism should not be lost among the

people. Both the Prussian Liberals and the Conservatives, I continued,

made the mistake of remembering too well the old period of conflict of

1861-66; and, at elections and other political fights, they were prone

to fall back into the habits of those days. That period, I said, had

already passed into history and come to an end so far as our generation

was concerned; the present had begun for us with the year 1870 and the

new Empire; our generation had drawn a line under the year 1866; we

must build anew upon the foundations of the Empire; political parties

must shape their course also in this direction and not take over from

the past stuff that was outworn and, moreover, calculated to create

discord. Unfortunately, all this has not come to pass. Bennigsen made

a very telling point when he said: "Woe to the North German Liberals

if they come under the leadership of the South German Democrats, for

that will mean the end of real, genuine Liberalism! Then we shall get

the masked democracy arising from below, for which we have no use

hereabout."

The Conservative party, honorable and faithful to its King,

unfortunately has not always produced leaders of superior endowments

who were at the same time skillful, tactically trained politicians. The

agrarian wing was at times too strongly marked and was a burden to the

party. Moreover, memories of the period of conflict were still too

lively. I counseled union with the Liberals, but found little support.

I often pointed out that the National Liberals in the Empire were true

to the Empire and to the Emperor, for which reason they should be

thoroughly welcome to the Conservatives as allies; that I could not and

did not wish to govern without them in the Empire, and was absolutely

unwilling to govern against them; that North German conservatism was

misunderstood in some parts of the Empire because of differences in

historical development; and that, therefore, the National Liberals were

the natural allies. It was owing to these views of mine, for instance,

that I removed Court Preacher Stöcker, a man of brilliant achievement

as a social missionary, from his post, since he made a demagogical

provocative speech in South Germany, aimed against the Liberals there.

The Center party was welded together by the "Kulturkampf" and was

strongly anti-Protestant and hostile to the Empire. Notwithstanding

this, I had dealings with many important men of the party and managed

to interest them in practical collaboration for the good of all. In

this Schorlemer (the father) was especially helpful to me. He never

made a secret of his Prussian loyalty to his King. His son, the

well-known Minister of Agriculture, even joined the Conservative party.

In many matters the Center co-operated; at one period it possessed in

its old leader, Windthorst, the keenest politician in the legislature.

Nevertheless, in spite of all this, one could not help being aware of

the underlying Centerist conviction that the interests of the Roman

Church must always be maintained and never relegated to a secondary

place.

THE BREAK WITH BISMARCK

When I was Prince William I was placed for a long time under the Chief

President of the Province of Brandenburg, von Achenbach, in order that

I might learn about home administration, get experience in economic

questions, and, moreover, take an active part in the work. Spurred

on by the captivating discourses of Achenbach, I derived from this

period of my life a special interest in the economic side of the inner

development of the country, whereas the purely judicial side of the

administration interested me to a lesser degree. Improvements, canal

construction, highway building, forestry, improvement in all kinds of

transportation facilities, betterment of dwellings, introduction of

machines into agriculture and their co-operative development--all of

these were matters with which I busied myself later on; this being

especially true of hydraulic work and the development of the network

of railways, particularly in the badly neglected territory of Eastern

Germany.

I discussed all these matters with the Ministers of State after I

had ascended the throne. In order to spur them on, I allowed them

free rein in their various domains. But it turned out that this was

hardly possible so long as Prince Bismarck remained in office, since

he reserved for himself the main deciding voice in everything, thereby

impairing the independence of those working with him. I soon saw that

the Ministers, being entirely under Bismarck's thumb, could not come

out in favor of "innovations" or ideas of the "young master" of which

Bismarck disapproved.

The Ministry, in short, was nothing but a tool in the hands of

Bismarck, acting solely in accordance with his wishes. This state

of things was, in itself, natural enough, since a Premier of such

overwhelming importance, who had won for Prussia and Germany such great

political victories, naturally dominated his Ministers completely and

led them despotically. Nevertheless, I found myself in a difficult

position; the typical answer with which my suggestions were met was:

"Prince Bismarck does not want that done; we cannot get him to consent

to that; Emperor William I would not have asked such a thing; that is

not in accordance with tradition, etc." I understood more and more

that, in reality, I had no Ministry of State at my disposal; that the

gentlemen composing it, from long force of habit, considered themselves

officials of Prince Bismarck.

Here is an example to show the attitude of the Cabinet toward me in

those Bismarck days: The question came up of renewing the Socialist

law, a political measure devised by Prince Bismarck for fighting

socialism. A certain paragraph therein was to be toned down, in order

to save the law. Bismarck opposed the change. There were sharp

differences of opinion. I summoned a Crown Council. Bismarck spoke

in the antechamber with my adjutant; he declared that His Majesty

completely forgot that he was an officer and wore a sword belt; that

he must fall back upon the army and lead it against the Socialists,

in case the Socialists should resort to revolutionary measures; that

the Emperor should leave him a free hand, which would restore quiet

once for all. At the Crown Council Bismarck stuck to his opinion. The

individual Ministers, when asked to express their views, were lukewarm.

A vote was taken--the entire Ministry voted against me.

This vote showed me once more the absolute domination exerted by the

Chancellor over his Ministers. Deeply dissatisfied, I talked over the

matter with His Excellency Lucanus, who was as much struck as I was by

the situation. Lucanus looked up some of the gentlemen and took them to

task for their attitude, whereupon they made it clear that they were

"not in a position" to oppose the Prince and declared that it was quite

impossible for anybody to expect them to vote against the wishes of the

Prince.

HANDLING A COAL STRIKE

The great Westphalian coal workers' strike in the spring of 1889 took

the civil administration by surprise, causing great confusion and

bewilderment, especially among members of the Westphalian provincial

administration. From all sides came calls for troops; every mine owner

wanted, if possible, to have sentries posted outside his room. The

commanders of the troops which were summoned immediately made reports

on the situation as they had found it.

Among these was one of my former barrack comrades, belonging to the

Hussar Guard Regiment, von Michaelis by name, who was famous as a wit.

He rode, alone and unarmed, among the striking crowds of workers,

who--the early spring being remarkably warm--were camped upon the

hillsides, and soon managed, by his confidence-inspiring, jovial ways,

to set up a harmless intercourse with the strikers. By questioning them

he obtained much valuable information about the grievances--real and

imaginary--of the workers, as well as about their plans, hopes, and

wishes for the future. He soon won for himself general appreciation

and affection among the workers and handled them so well that complete

quiet reigned in his territory. When I, on account of nervous and

worried telegrams from the big industrial leaders and officials

received at the office of the Imperial Chancellor, inquired of

Michaelis how the situation stood, the following telegraphed answer

came from him: "Everything quiet excepting the Government officials."

A mass of material was collected, during the spring and summer, from

the announcements and reports received which showed clearly that

all was not well in industrial circles; that many a wish of the

workers was justified and, to say the least, entitled to sympathetic

investigation on the part both of the employers and of the officials.

The realization of this, which was confirmed in me when I questioned

my former private teacher, Privy Councilor Dr. Hinzpeter--a man

particularly well informed on social phenomena, especially those in his

own province--caused the resolve to ripen in me to summon the State

Council, include employers and employees in its deliberations, and

bring about, under my personal direction, a thorough investigation of

the labor question. I decided that in so doing guiding principles and

material were to be acquired which would serve the Chancellor and the

Prussian Government as a basis for working out appropriate projects for

new laws.

Inspired by such thought I went to His Excellency von Bötticher, who

at once prophesied opposition on the part of the Chancellor to such

action, and advised strongly against it. I stuck to my ideas, adducing

in support of them the maxim of Frederick the Great: "Je veux être un

Roi des gueux" ("I wish to be King of the rabble"). I said that it was

my duty to take care of those Germans who were used up by industry, to

protect their strength and better their chances of existence.

FURTHER CONFLICT WITH CHANCELLOR

The predicted opposition from Prince Bismarck was not long in coming.

There was much trouble and fighting before I put through what I wanted,

owing to the fact that some of the big industrial interests ranged

themselves on the side of the Chancellor. The State Council met,

presided over by me. At the opening session the Chancellor unexpectedly

appeared. He made a speech in which he ironically criticized and

disapproved the whole undertaking set in motion by me, and refused his

co-operation. Thereupon he walked out of the room.

After his departure the strange scene had its effect on the assemblage.

The fury and ruthlessness which the great Chancellor brought to the

support of his own policy and against mine, based upon his absolute

belief in the correctness of his own judgment, made a tremendous

impression upon me and all those present. Nevertheless, it stood to

reason that I was deeply hurt by what had occurred. The assemblage

proceeded to take up its work again and turned out a wealth of material

for the extension of that social legislation called into being by

Emperor William the Great, which is the pride of Germany, evincing, as

it does, a protective attitude toward the laboring classes such as is

not to be found in any other land on earth.

Thereupon I decided to summon a general social congress. Prince

Bismarck opposed this also. Switzerland was contemplating something

similar, and had thought of convening a congress at Berne. Roth,

the Swiss ambassador, hearing of my scheme, advised canceling the

invitations to Berne and accepting an invitation to Berlin. What he

wished occurred. Thanks to the generosity of Herr Roth, it was possible

to convene the congress at Berlin. The material collected as a result

of it was worked out and applied in the form of laws--only in Germany,

however.

Later on I talked with Bismarck concerning his project of fighting

the socialists, in case they resorted to revolutionary acts, with

cannon and bayonets. I sought to convince him that it was out of

the question for me, almost immediately after William the Great had

closed his eyes after a blessed reign, to stain the first years of my

Government with the blood of my own people. Bismarck was unmoved; he

declared that he would assume responsibility for his actions; that all

I need do was to leave the thing to him. I answered that I could not

square such a course with my conscience and my responsibility before

God, particularly as I knew perfectly well that conditions among the

laboring classes were bad and must be bettered at all costs.

The conflict between the views of the Emperor and the Chancellor

relative to the social question--_i. e._, the furtherance of the

welfare of the laboring classes of the population, with participation

therein by the state--was the real cause of the break between us,

and caused a hostility toward me, lasting for years, on the part of

Bismarck and a large part of the German nation that was devoted to him,

especially of the official class.

This conflict between the Chancellor and me arose because of his belief

that the social problem could be solved by severe measures and, if

the worst came to the worst, by means of soldiers; not by following

principles of general love for mankind or humanitarian nonsense which,

he believed, he would have to adopt in conformity to my views.

BISMARCK'S LABOR VIEWS

Bismarck was not a foe to the laboring classes--on that I wish to lay

stress, in view of what I have previously said. On the contrary! He

was far too great a statesman to mistake the importance of the labor

question to the state. But he considered the whole matter from the

standpoint of pure expediency for the state. The state, he believed,

should care for the laborer, as much and in whatever manner it deemed

proper; he would not admit of any co-operation of the workers in this.

Agitation and rebellion, he believed, should be severely suppressed; by

force of arms, if necessary. Government protection on the one hand, the

mailed fist on the other--that was Bismarck's social policy.

I, however, wished to win over the soul of the German workingman,

and I fought zealously to attain this goal. I was filled with the

consciousness of a plain duty and responsibility toward my entire

people--also, therefore, toward the laboring classes. What was theirs

by right and justice should become theirs, I thought; moreover, I

believed that this should be brought about, wherever the will or power

of the employers ceased, by the lord of the land and his Government, in

so far as justice or necessity demanded. As soon as I had recognized

the necessity for reforms, to some of which the industrial elements

would not consent, I took up the cudgels for the laboring classes,

impelled by a sense of justice.

I had studied history sufficiently to guard myself against the delusion

of believing in the possibility of making an entire people happy. I

realized clearly that it was impossible for one human being to make

a nation happy. The truth is that the only nation which is happy is

the one that is contented, or at least is willing to be contented; a

willingness which implies a certain degree of realization of what is

possible--a sense of the practical, in short. Unfortunately, there is

often a lack of this.

I was well aware that, in the unbounded demands of the Socialist

leaders, unjustified greed would be constantly developed anew. But,

for the very reason that I wished to be able to combat unjustified

aspirations with a clear conscience and in a convincing way, it

behooved me not to deny recognition and aid to justified aspirations.

GERMAN SOCIAL PROBLEMS

The policy that kept in view the welfare of the workers unquestionably

imposed a heavy burden upon all the industrial elements of Germany in

the matter of competition in the world market, through the well-known

laws for the protection of workingmen. This was especially true in

relation to an industrial system like the Belgian, which could,

without hindrance, squeeze the last drop out of the human reserves of

Belgium and pay low wages, without feeling any pangs of conscience or

compassion for the sinking morale of the exhausted, unprotected people.

By means of my social legislation I made such conditions impossible in

Germany, and I caused it to be introduced also in Belgium, during the

war, by General von Bissing, in order to promote the welfare of the

Belgian workers. First of all, however, this legislation is--to use a

sporting term--a handicap upon German industry in the battle of world

competition: it alienated many big leaders of industry, which, from

their point of view, was quite natural. But the lord of the land must

always bear in mind the welfare of the whole nation; therefore, I went

my way unswervingly.

Those workers, on the other hand, who blindly followed the Socialist

leaders, gave me no word of thanks for the protection created for them

nor for the work I had done. Between them and me lies the motto of the

Hohenzollerns, "Suum cuique." That means, "To each his own"--not, as

the Social Democrats would have it, "To everyone the same!"

I also harbored the idea of preventing to some extent competitive

warfare, at least in the industrial world of the European continent,

by bringing about a sort of quota-fixing in foreign lands, thereby

facilitating production and making possible a healthier mode of life

among the working classes.

There is great significance in the impression which foreign workers

get in studying Germany's social legislation. A few years before the

war people in England, under the pressure of labor troubles, awoke

to the conviction that better care must be taken of the workers.

As a result of this, commissions visited Germany, some of them

composed of workingmen. Guided by representative Germans, among them

Socialists, they visited the industrial regions, factories, benevolent

institutions, sanatoria of insurance companies, etc., and were

astonished at all the things they saw. At the farewell dinner given

them the English leader of the workingmen's deputation turned to Bebel

and made this concluding remark:

"After all we have seen of what is done in Germany for the workers, I

ask you: Are you people still Socialists?" And the Englishmen remarked

to a German that they would be quite satisfied if they could succeed,

after long fights in Parliament, in putting through one tenth of what

had already been accomplished years before in Germany toward bettering

the condition of the laboring classes.

I had observed with interest these visits of the English deputations

and marveled at their ignorance of German conditions. But I marveled

even more at a question asked by the English Government, through the

channel of the English Embassy, on the same subject, which betrayed an

absolutely amazing lack of knowledge of the progress made in Germany

in the province of social reform. I questioned the English ambassador,

remarking that England, having been represented in 1890 at the Berlin

Social Congress, must certainly have been informed, at least through

the Embassy, of the Reichstag debates, which had dealt in a detailed

way with the various social measures. The ambassador replied that the

same thing had also occurred to him and caused him to have the earlier

records of the Embassy investigated, whereupon it had transpired that

the Embassy had sent the fullest reports on the subject to London

and that thorough reports had been forwarded home concerning every

important stage in the progress of social reform; but, "because they

came from Germany, nobody ever read them; they were simply pigeon-holed

and remained there ever since; it is a downright shame; Germany does

not interest people at home."

Thus the Briton, with a shrug of his shoulders. Neither the British

King nor Parliament had enough conscience or time or desire to work for

the betterment of the working class. The "policy of encirclement" for

the annihilation of Germany, especially of its industry, and, thereby,

of its working population, was, in their eyes, far more important and

rewarding. On the 9th of November (1918) the German Radical Socialist

leaders, with their like-minded followers, joined forces with this

British policy of annihilation.

"WELFARE WORK" AT THE COURT

In a small way, in places where I had influence, as, for instance, in

the administration of my court and in the Imperial Automobile Club,

I laid stress upon the social point of view. For instance, I caused

a fund to be established, out of the tips paid for visiting palaces,

which was destined solely to the benefit of the domestic staff, and

which, in the course of time, reached a magnificent total. From this

fund the domestics and their families received money for trips to

bathing resorts, cost of taking cures, burial expenses, dowries for

their children, confirmation expenses, and similar payments.

When I, at the request of the newly founded Imperial Automobile Club,

took it under my protection, I accepted an invitation to a luncheon in

the beautiful rooms of the clubhouse, built by Ihne. In addition to

magnates like the Duke of Ratibor, the Duke of Ujest, etc., I found

there a number of gentlemen from Berlin's high financial circles, some

of whom behaved rather wildly. When the conversation turned to the

subject of drivers, I suggested establishing a fund which, in case of

accident, illness, or death befalling these men, should provide means

of livelihood for those whom they left behind. The suggestion met with

unanimous approval, and the fund has had most excellent results. Later

on I brought about the establishment of something similar for the

skippers and pilots attached to the Imperial Yacht Club at Kiel.

Special pleasure was afforded me by the Kaiser Wilhelm Children's

Home, founded by me at Ahlbeck, at which, in peace times, between May

and the end of September in each year, a large number of children

from the most poverty-stricken working people's districts in Berlin

were accommodated in successive detachments, each lot staying four

weeks. This home is still under the tried direction of the admirable

superintendent, Miss Kirschner, daughter of the former Chief

Burgomaster of Berlin, and it has achieved most brilliant results,

both in the physical and the psychical domain. Weakened, pale, needy

children were transformed there into fresh, blooming, happy little

beings, concerning whose welfare I often joyfully convinced myself by

personal visits.

For the very reason that I have spoken of my quarrel with Bismarck

as a result of labor questions, I wish to add to what I have already

said about his basic position in the matter--an example showing how

brilliantly the Prince behaved in something that concerned the workers.

In this, to be sure, he was impelled by nationalistic motives, but he

also realized at once that it was necessary to protect a large element

against unemployment, which caused him to intervene with the full

weight of his authority.

Sometime around 1886, while I was still Prince Wilhelm, I had learned

that the great Vulcan shipping concern at Stettin was confronted,

owing to lack of orders, with bankruptcy, and its entire force of

workmen, numbering many thousands, with starvation, which would mean a

catastrophe for the city of Stettin. Only by an order for the building

of a big ship could the Vulcan shipyards be saved.

Spurred on some time before by Admiral von Stosch, who wished to free

us once and for all from the English shipbuilders, the Vulcan people

had set to work courageously to build the first German armored ship,

christened by my mother in 1874 on her birthday, on which occasion I

was present. Ever since that time the warships built at the Vulcan

yards had always satisfied naval experts--the concern, however, seldom

built warships.

THE CHANCELLOR IN ACTION

The German merchant marine, on the other hand, had not dared to follow

the path courageously blazed by Admiral von Stosch. And now the brave

German shipyard company was faced with ruin, since the North German

Lloyd had refused its offer to build a passenger steamer, alleging

that the English, because of their years of shipbuilding traditions,

could build it better. It was a serious emergency. I hastened to Prince

Bismarck and laid before him the matter as I have described it above.

The Chancellor was furious; his eyes flashed, his fist came crashing

down on the table.

"What! Do you mean to say that these shopkeepers would rather have

their boats built in England than in Germany? Why, that is unheard of!

And is a good German shipyard to fail for such a reason? The devil take

this gang of traders!"

He rang the bell and a servant entered.

"Have Privy Councilor X come here immediately from the Foreign Office!"

In a few minutes--during which the Prince stamped up and down the

room--the man summoned appeared.

"Telegram to Hamburg, to our envoy--the Lloyd in Bremen is to have its

new ship built by the Vulcan Company in Stettin!"

The Privy Councilor vanished in hot haste, "with his coat tails

sticking straight out behind him." The Prince turned to me and said:

"I am greatly obliged to you. You have done the fatherland, and also

myself, an important service. Henceforth ships will be built only in

our yards--I'll take care to make this clear to the Hanseatic crowd.

You may telegraph to the Vulcan people that the Chancellor will

guarantee that the ship will be built in the Vulcan yards. May this be

the first of a whole lot of such ships! As for the workers whom you

have thus saved from unemployment, I hope that they will express their

thanks to you!"

I passed on the news to Privy Councilor Schlutow at Stettin and great

was the joy caused thereby. This was the first step upon the road

destined to lead to the construction of the magnificent German express

steamers.

When I went, after I had ascended the throne in 1888, to Stettin,

in order to place honorary insignia on the flags of my Pomeranian

Grenadiers, I also visited the Vulcan shipyards, at the invitation of

the directors. After my reception by the directors outside the yards,

the great doors were flung open and I walked inside. But, instead of

work and pounding hammers, I found deep silence. The entire body of

workmen was standing in a half circle, with bared heads; in the middle

stood the oldest workman of all, a man with a snow-white beard, bearing

a laurel wreath in his hand.

I was deeply moved. Schlutow whispered to me: "A little pleasure for

you, which the workmen themselves have thought up." The old workman

stepped forward and, in pithy, plain words, expressed to me the

gratitude of the workmen to me for having saved them, and, above all,

their wives and children, from hardship and hunger, by my appeal to

Bismarck about the building of the ship. As a token of their gratitude,

he asked my permission to hand over the laurel wreath. Most deeply

moved, I took the wreath and expressed my pleasure at receiving my

first laurels, without the shedding of a drop of blood, from the hands

of honest German workmen.

That was in the year 1888! In those days, the German laboring classes

knew how to appreciate the blessing of labor.

[1] "It is that confounded Congress of Berlin. A serious mistake on

the part of the Chancellor. He has destroyed the old friendship

between us, sown distrust in the hearts of the Court and the

Government, and engendered the idea of a great injustice done

the Russian army after its bloody 1877 campaign, for which it

wishes revenge. And here we are by the side of that damned French

Republic, full of hate for you and of subversive ideas, which, in

case of a war against you, will cost us our dynasty."

[2] "I understand perfectly your line of action; the Prince, with all

his greatness, was, after all, merely your employee or official.

As soon as he refused to follow your orders, it was necessary

to dismiss him. As for me, I always distrusted him, and I never

believed a word of what he had told me or said to me himself,

for I was sure and knew that he was hoaxing me all the time. As

to the relations between us two, my dear William, the downfall

of the Prince will have the best of results; distrust will

disappear. I have confidence in you. You can trust me."

The Kaiser's Memoirs · 第 1 / 15 章