It has been contended by certain economists that bank checks and bills

of exchange are money, or, at least, that they discharge the money

function and act on prices the same as money; but this definition

excludes checks and bills of exchange. A bill of exchange or bank

check is not accepted without reference to the character or credit of

the person who offers it. But Francis A. Walker leaves us in no doubt

on this question. On page 123 of his work on "Political Economy" he

says:

Money is a medium of exchange. Whatever performs this function,

does this work, is money, no matter what it is made of, and no

matter how it came to be a medium at first, or why it continues

to be such. So long as, in any community, there is an article

which all producers take freely and as a matter of course in

exchange for whatever they have to sell, instead of looking

about, at the time, for the particular things they, themselves,

wish to consume, that article is money, be it white, yellow, or

black, hard or soft, animal, vegetable, or mineral. There is no

other test of money than this. That which does the money work is

the money thing. It may do this well; it may do this ill. It may

be good money; it may be bad money; but it is money all the same.

We said _all_ producers, since it is not enough that a thing is

extensively used in exchange, to constitute it money. _Bank

checks are used in numerous and important transactions, yet are

not money._ It is essential to money that its acceptability

should be so nearly universal that practically every person in

the community who has any product or service to dispose of will

freely, gladly, and of preference, take this thing money, instead

of the particular products or service which he may individually

require from others, being well assured that with money he will

unfailingly obtain whatever he shall desire, in form and amount,

and at times to suit his wants.

It appears from the accepted definitions that bank checks and bills of

exchange are not money. They may to some extent, as other forms of

credit may to some extent, add to or increase the rapidity of

circulation; but, certainly, credit is not money nor does it possess

the essential elements of money. I think it is an essential element of

money that when used it closes the transaction between the parties to

the transaction. In other words, money, when paid in the purchase of a

commodity, closes the transaction, and neither party to the

transaction has any further claim or demand against the other.

Anything which does this (barter, of course, excluded) is money, and

anything which fails to do this is not money. If a credit is given or

a check received the transaction is not closed until the debt is paid

or the check cashed. I do not find that any economist has made this

distinction, in so many words, between money and credit, but I am

satisfied that it exists.

Does all the money available for use act on prices? It is contended by

a certain class of economists that only money of ultimate and final

redemption--in other words, gold and silver, in countries where gold

and silver are the standard money, and gold only, in countries where

gold is the standard money--can act directly on prices, and that other

forms of money can only act on prices in an indirect manner, and to

the extent only that they may increase the rapidity of the circulation

of redemption or standard money; that paper money, whether convertible

or inconvertible, covered or uncovered, and token money, can have no

direct influence on the general level of prices.

Is this contention true? We have already seen that money is a medium

of exchange, a counter for reckoning, an order for goods, and that its

value does not depend upon the intrinsic qualities which the material

out of which it is made may possess, but depends entirely upon

extrinsic qualities which law or common consent may confer, and that

anything (barter, of course, excluded) that closes transactions

between the parties to the transactions, is money; and also that the

value of money, that is, its purchasing power, is fixed and regulated

by the amount of money available for use. Why, then, should any part

of the money that possesses and discharges all the functions of money

be excluded? What peculiar property has money stamped on gold and

silver that it only can act on prices?

John Stuart Mill says:

After experience had shown that pieces of paper, of no intrinsic

value, by merely bearing upon them the written profession of

being equivalent to a certain number of francs, dollars, or

pounds, could be made to circulate as such, and to produce all

the benefit to the users which could have been produced by the

coins which they purported to represent, governments began to

think that it would be a happy device if they could appropriate

to themselves this benefit, free from the condition to which

individuals issuing such paper substitutes for money were

subject, of giving, when required, for the sign, the thing

signified. They determined to try whether they could not

emancipate themselves from this unpleasant obligation, and make a

piece of paper issued by them pass for a pound, by merely calling

it a pound and consenting to receive it in payment for taxes. And

such is the influence of almost all established governments, that

they have generally succeeded in attaining this object: _I

believe I may say they have always succeeded for a time, and the

power has only been lost to them after they had compromised it by

the most flagrant abuse._--"Political Economy," Book 3, Chap. 13.

Mill further says that such inconvertible paper money will act on

prices. And if inconvertible paper money will act on prices, why will

not convertible paper money, that is, paper money convertible into

coin on demand, also act on prices? Token money, especially if a legal

tender, and whether a legal tender or not, if accepted without

objection in the payment of debt, or if received in full payment for

commodities, discharges the money function, and is to all intents and

purposes money. It is not absolutely necessary that to make a thing

money it should be a legal tender in the payment of debt. Anything

which is commonly accepted in exchange for labor or property and in

payment of debt, whether so accepted by force of law (that is, its

legal tender property) or by common consent, is money. From 1861 to

1873 we had no gold or silver money in the United States, or virtually

none. The official reports of the Secretary of the Treasury show that

the gold and silver coin, including the gold and silver bullion in the

United States Treasury during that period, amounted to but

$25,000,000, and even that was not in circulation, except to a very

limited extent on the Pacific Coast. Yet during that period prices

reached the highest level ever attained in this country. Certainly,

the level of prices during that period was not fixed by the gold and

silver money available for use. In view of the foregoing facts I think

it must be apparent that any money which is received in full payment

for commodities, whether so received on account of its legal tender

property or by universal consent, and whether it is gold, silver,

paper, or token money, acts on prices, and tends to fix the general

level of prices.

It is claimed by a great many writers on political economy that credit

has the same influence in fixing the general level of prices that

money has, and that an expansion or contraction of credit would

inflate or contract prices in the same manner and to the same extent

as would result from a contraction or expansion of money; that if

credit is extended, if more commodities are sold on credit than

formerly, such extension of credit will tend to raise prices in the

same manner and to the same extent as would so much additional money;

and that if credits are contracted, if less credits are given than

formerly, such contraction of credits will tend to depress prices in

the same manner and to the same extent as a withdrawal of a like

amount of money from the channels of trade would depress them. At the

head of this school of political economists stands John Stuart Mill.

He says:

I apprehend that bank notes, bills, or cheques, as such, do not

act on prices at all. What does act on prices is credit, in

whatever shape given, and whether it gives rise to any

transferable instruments capable of passing into circulation or

not. (See Book 3, Chapter 12.)

Is this contention true? If so, then it is not true that the general

level of prices is determined by the amount of money available for

use; but is determined, rather, by the amount of credits available for

use. The debts of the world (and the credits, of course, are precisely

equal to the debts, as there could be no debt without a corresponding

credit) amount, in round numbers, to $200,000,000,000, and the money

in the world amounts in round numbers to $10,000,000,000. That is,

there are twenty dollars of credit to one dollar of money; and if

credit exercises the same influence in fixing the general level of

prices that money exercises, then it is absurd to say that the volume

of money available for use fixes the general level of prices, and at

the same time to contend that credit, dollar for dollar, is an equal

factor in fixing prices. If credit affects the general level of

prices in the same manner and to the same extent that money does, then

credit exerts an influence on prices twenty times greater than that

exerted by money, and we should say: The general level of prices is

fixed by credit, modified, it may be, to some extent by the amount of

money in circulation.

The difficulty seems to be in distinguishing between money and credit.

If we keep in mind the fact that anything which closes the transaction

between the parties to the transaction (barter excluded) is money, and

anything which leaves something still to be done is credit, we shall

have no difficulty in making the distinction.

Can credit affect the general level of prices? One of the most

familiar and common illustrations given by those who contend that

credit will raise the general level of prices, is that of a man

entering the market to buy cotton.

They say: "Suppose a person with $5,000 in money enters the cotton

market, and with his money purchases $5,000 worth of cotton. His

demand for cotton and his purchase of $5,000 worth will tend to

advance or stimulate the price of cotton." "Now," they say, "suppose

he has a credit of $5,000 and with this credit he purchases an

additional $5,000 worth of cotton. The second purchase, made on

credit," they contend, "will tend to still further advance the price

of cotton in the same manner and to the same extent that the cash

purchase did." Is this true?

Let us suppose that he purchased the second bunch of cotton on ninety

days' time. At the end of the ninety days he must pay for this cotton.

If he draws the $5,000 with which he pays this debt from money

invested in the cotton trade, the withdrawal of that sum from money

invested in that industry will tend to depress the price of cotton to

the extent that it was stimulated by the credit. If he withdraws it

from the grain trade or from some other industry, the withdrawal of

that sum of money will tend to depress prices in the industry from

which it is withdrawn to the same extent as the cotton industry was

stimulated by the credit. Whether the money to pay the debt is taken

from the cotton industry or from some other industry, the general

level of prices has not been raised. The purchase in the first

instance may have temporarily stimulated the price of cotton, but if

the payment of the debt is made from money drawn from that industry,

it will depress the price of cotton to where it was before the credit

purchase was made; and if the payment is made from money drawn from

some other industry, it will depress prices in that industry to the

same extent that the price of cotton was stimulated. In either event

the general level of prices remains the same. It is like robbing Peter

to pay Paul. It may make Paul richer, but how about Peter? There is no

more wealth in existence than before the robbery was committed.

Again, it is claimed that credit stimulates prices by causing

commodities which are sold on credit to be sold for higher prices than

commodities of the same value are sold for when sold for cash. It is

true that sales on credit are, as a rule, at a higher price than sales

for cash in hand. Why is this so? For two reasons:

1st. Business done on credit is always attended with considerable

risk. Even when the utmost caution is exercised, bad debts will be

made, and a greater margin on sales is necessary.

2nd. When time is given a certain amount must be added to the price of

the goods to compensate the seller for the use of his capital between

the date of sale and the maturity of the account.

The additional price, thus received, is of no advantage to the

producer or to the seller of the commodity. The addition to the price

is consumed by losses from bad debts and in interest on capital. In

fact, the additional prices charged, when properly analyzed, are not

for the goods, but for the risk on the credit and for interest on

capital. The net selling price of the commodity is not increased.

Experience has proven that men who sell for the lesser price for cash

in hand are more apt to succeed than those who charge the higher rate

on the credit system.

Credit is always burdened with interest. If interest is not directly

charged, the goods are sold at an advance on the cash price equal to

the interest, which amounts to the same thing. Interest acts on

commerce like friction on machinery. As friction absorbs a portion of

the motive power, so interest absorbs a part of the value of all

commodities sold on credit. Interest, the necessary accompaniment of

credit, produces no wealth; but, on the contrary, absorbs wealth and

tends to concentrate it in the hands of the few; and, necessarily, in

the same ratio it takes from the masses the power to purchase the

things they desire and would otherwise consume. Its ultimate result

must be to lower prices. Credit burdened with interest, as it always

is, may temporarily increase the demand for a certain commodity and

consequently temporarily raise its price; but it must do this at the

expense of other commodities. Like a stimulant administered to a human

being, it may produce spasmodic results of extraordinary power; but

when the stimulant has spent its force it leaves the individual weaker

and in a worse condition than he was before the stimulant was

administered.

Henry Thornton, an English economist, attempts to prove that a bill of

exchange is money, and that, being money, it acts on prices. He says:

Let us imagine a farmer in the country to discharge a debt of £10

to his neighboring grocer by giving him a bill for that sum,

drawn on his corn-factor in London, for grain sold in the

metropolis; and the grocer to transmit the bill, he having

previously indorsed it, to a neighboring sugar-baker in discharge

of a like debt; and the sugar-baker to send it, when again

indorsed, to a West India merchant in an outport; and the West

India merchant to deliver it to his country banker, who also

indorses it and sends it into further circulation. The bill in

this case will have effected five payments, exactly as if it were

a £10 note payable to the bearer on demand. A multitude of bills

pass this way between traders in the country, in the manner which

has been described; _and they evidently form in the strictest

sense a part of the circulating medium of the kingdom_.

Mill in his "Political Economy" quotes this illustration with

approval. Is the conclusion arrived at correct?

Suppose that instead of a bill of exchange for £10, a horse worth £10

had been made use of, and the farmer had delivered the horse to the

grocer in satisfaction of his debt, and the grocer had turned it over

to the sugar-baker, and the sugar-baker to the West India merchant,

etc. The horse would have paid the five debts in precisely the same

manner that the bill of exchange did, but would such a use of the

horse _have made the horse, in the strictest sense of the term, a part

of the circulating medium of the kingdom_? I think not! A bill of

exchange is not money, but an order for money, and would be valueless

unless honored by payment on presentation. From the time the bill was

drawn until finally paid an amount of money equal to the demand of

the bill must be held out of circulation for its payment. It adds

nothing to the circulation, and in no sense does it constitute a part

of the circulating medium. It may, possibly, increase the rapidity of

circulation, but it is difficult to see how it could do even this. The

£10 held out of circulation for the payment of the bill would have

paid the debts in the same manner that the bill of exchange did, and I

fail to see why they would not have made the circuit as quickly. If a

horse had been made use of in the settlement of the debts mentioned by

Mr. Thornton, it would have been barter, pure and simple, and not a

money transaction.

That the contraction of the volume of credit will not tend to depress

prices in the same manner and to the same extent that a contraction of

the volume of money would will be apparent from the following

illustration.

The most conservative estimates place the national, municipal,

corporate, and individual debts in the United States at

$30,000,000,000. The Secretary of the Treasury estimates the amount of

money in circulation at $1,600,000,000. There is not, in fact,

one-third of the amount available for use; but for the purpose of this

illustration we will take the Secretary's estimate as correct. Now let

us suppose that the volume of credit should be reduced to

$28,400,000,000, either by the payment of $1,600,000,000 of the debt

or by bankruptcy proceedings or in some other manner. If that amount

of the credits were extinguished by payment, business would be

stimulated. That sum of money, or at least a considerable portion of

it, would pass into the hands of the creditor class, where it would

seek investment, and the tendency would be, not to contract, but to

expand prices. If that amount of the credits were extinguished by

bankruptcy proceedings in which no money passed in either direction,

such an extinguishment could not depress or expand prices; it could

have no influence upon them.

Now suppose that $1,600,000,000 of the money, every dollar now claimed

to be in circulation in the United States, should be withdrawn from

the channels of trade, it would not be difficult to see that prices

would fall; would, in fact, be completely annihilated. There would be

no money with which to make purchases or to pay debts, civilization

would go backwards, and universal bankruptcy and ruin would ensue.

Suppose that only one-half or one-third of the money available for use

should be withdrawn from circulation; even then business would be

paralyzed, the money remaining would be hoarded or would be collected

in the great money centres, prices would fall, and business men all

over the country would be forced into bankruptcy. I think that it must

be perfectly apparent that a contraction of credit does not act on the

general level of prices in the same manner and to the same extent that

a contraction of the volume of money does; that, in fact, it does not

act on the general level of prices at all.

I, therefore, conclude that money, and money only, acts on the general

level of prices, and that credit does not and cannot act on prices

except only as it may increase the rapidity of the circulation of

money; and even then it is the greater efficiency of the money, and

not the credit, that stimulates prices. Credit may temporarily

stimulate the price of the product of some particular industry, but to

do this it must attract money from some other industry, and the

stimulation will be at the expense of a corresponding depression in

prices in the industry from which the money is attracted.

LOS ANGELES, COL.

POINTS IN THE AMERICAN AND FRENCH CONSTITUTIONS COMPARED.

BY NIELS GRÖN.

There are several reasons why, particularly in the light of what is

going on in the two countries, a comparison between certain points of

the constitutions of the French and United States republics should be

of more than passing interest. Successive ministerial crises in France

threaten the stability of the republic; here, while political

conventions representing millions of people meet and produce radical

platforms, nobody is apprehensive of revolution or trouble. The

constitution is a bulwark against sudden change; its wisdom is

believed to be guarded by impregnable security against caprice or

panic.

One in the Eastern hemisphere, the other in the New World, the two

countries are the only great republics; both are watched by monarchies

with invidious eyes, and, as before suggested, both have passed

through, or are passing through, interesting not to say exciting

experiences. American admirers of the republican form of government

believe that the cause of human liberty would be seriously injured

were the French Republic to cease to exist; they go further, and say

that the death-knell of civil freedom would be sounded the moment the

American republic became a failure. Something like a crisis is seen in

the United States to-day, brought about by a whole series of

concomitant causes, such as business depression, bank failures,

industrial disputes terminating in strikes and lockouts, Coxey armies,

panicky people, and unsettled views regarding commerce and finance,

this last cause predominating.

Though France has her difficulties about raising sufficient money to

carry on the administration, and an income tax is just as unpopular

there as it would be here, nevertheless the chief cause of her trouble

is to be traced, not to financial, but to constitutional sources. The

country is very rich, and its ministers probably will always find some

means of raising enough money to pay the cost of administration.

Quite true, it is a sore point for a proud country which yearns for

revenge upon Germany and longs for large colonial possessions, that

its population does not increase, while the populations of its enemy,

Germany, and of its well-wisher, the United States, go up by leaps and

bounds. True, there are economic writers who regard the dearth and

even the decrease of population in France as an advantage to the

country. But these need not be considered in this inquiry, for it is

quite obvious that any country which really aspires to be numbered

with the great powers, and effectually wishes to own important

colonial possessions, must have a stalwart and increasing people. And

it is a real source of weakness that there should yet be in France so

many Royalists constantly on the alert and hoping always for a change

in the existing form of government.

Happily, on the contrary, no matter how widely the Western American

may differ from his friend in the East, or how keenly the

ex-Confederate may feel over the "lost cause," the warm-blooded son of

Kentucky will fight as bravely under the flag of the republic as will

his frozen-featured brother from Minnesota, and the dreamy individual

who gazes poetically upon the placid waters of Puget Sound will shout

as loudly for one country, and one allegiance to its glorious emblem,

as will the gilded youth whose republicanism is artistically refreshed

by a constant vision of the Statue of Liberty triumphantly standing in

New York harbor.

Royalism, conservatism, concentrationism, moderate republicanism,

opportunism, radicalism, ultra-radicalism, socialism, and heaven knows

how many other "isms" besides, exist in France to-day, and make it

hard for any ministry to carry on the government. Numerous

disintegrating influences are ever present, and political convictions

are seldom sufficiently decided for any ministry to form a stable

majority.

The Arena, Volume 18, No. 92, July, 1897 · 第 4 / 13 段