Antoine Pierre Joseph Marie Barnave was born at Grenoble, France, in
1761. He was the son of an advocate, who gave him a careful
education. His first work of a public character, a pamphlet against
the Feudal system, led to his election to the States-General in
1789. He advocated the Proclamation of the Rights of Man and
identified himself with those enthusiastic young Republicans of whom
Lafayette is the best type. The emancipation of the Jews from all
civil and religious disabilities and the abolition of slavery
throughout French territory owed much to his efforts. He also
opposed the Absolute Veto and led the fight for the sequestration of
the property of the Church. This course made him a popular idol and
in the early days of the Revolution he was the leader of the extreme
wing of the Republicans. When he saw, however, that mob law was
about to usurp the place of the Republican institutions for which he
had striven, he leaned towards the court and advocated the
sacrosanctity of the King's person. Denounced as a renegade, with
his life threatened and his influence lost, he retired to his native
province. In August 1792 he was impeached for correspondence with
the King, and on November 26th, 1793. he was guillotined. The
specimens of his eloquence here given were translated for this
Library from the Paris edition of his works, published in 1843.
REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY AGAINST MAJORITY ABSOLUTISM
(Delivered in the National Assembly, August 11th, 1791)
It is not enough to desire to be free--one must know how to be
free. I shall speak briefly on this subject, for after the success
of our deliberations, I await with confidence the spirit and action
of this Assembly. I only wish to announce my opinions on a
question, the rejection of which would sooner or later mean the loss
of our liberties. This question leaves no doubt in the minds of
those who reflect on governments and are guided by impartial
judgments. Those who have combatted the committee have made a
fundamental error. They have confounded democratic government with
representative government; they have confounded the rights of the
people with the qualifications of an elector, which society
dispenses for its well understood interest. Where the government is
representative, where there exists an intermediary degree of
electors, society which elects them has essentially the right to
determine the conditions of their eligibility. There is one right
existing in our constitution, that of the active citizen, but the
function of an elector is not a right. I repeat, society has the
right to determine its conditions. Those who misunderstand the
nature as they do the advantages of representative government,
remind us of the governments of Athens and Sparta, ignoring the
differences that distinguish them from France, such as extent of
territory, population, etc. Do they forget that they interdicted
representative government? Have they forgotten that the
Lacedemonians had the right to vote in the assemblies only when they
held helots? And only by sacrifice of individual rights did the
Lacedemonians, Athenians, and Romans possess any democratic
governments! I ask those who remind us of them, if it is at such
government they would arrive? I ask those who profess here
metaphysical ideas, because they have no practical ideas, those who
envelop the question in clouds of theory, because they ignore
entirely the fundamental facts of a positive government--I ask is
it forgotten that the democracy of a portion of a people would exist
but by the entire enslavement of the other portion of the people? A
representative government has but one evil to fear, that of
corruption. That such a government shall be good, there must be
guaranteed the purity and incorruptibility of the electorate. This
body needs the union of three eminent guarantees. First, the light
of a fair education and broadened views. Second, an interest in
things, and still better if each had a particular and considerable
interest at stake to defend. Third, such condition of fortune as to
place the elector above attack from corruption.
These advantages I do not look for in the superior class of the
rich, for they undoubtedly have too many special and individual
interests, which they separate from the general interests. But if
it is true that we must not look for the qualifications of the pure
elector among the eminently rich, neither should I look for it among
those whose lack of fortune has prevented their enlightenment; among
such, unceasingly feeling the touches of want, corruption too easily
can find its means. It is, then, in the middle class that we find
the qualities and advantages I have cited. And, I ask, is it the
demand that they contribute five to ten francs that causes the
assertion that we would throw elections into the hands of the rich?
You have established the usage that the electors receive nothing; if
it were otherwise their great number would make an election most
expensive. From the instant that the voter has not means enough to
enable him to sacrifice a little time from his daily labor, one of
three things would occur. The voter would absent himself, or insist
on being paid by the State, else he would be rewarded by the one who
wanted to obtain his suffrage. This does not occur when a
comfortable condition is necessary to constitute an elector. As
soon as the government is established, when the constitution is
guaranteed, there is but a common interest for those who live on
their property, and those who toil honestly. Then can be
distinguished those who desire a stable government and those who
seek but revolution and change, since they increase in importance in
the midst of trouble as vermin in the midst of corruption.
If it is true, then, that under an established constitutional
government all its well-wishers have the same interest, the power of
the same must be placed in the hands of the enlightened who can have
no interest pressing on them, greater than the common interest of
all the citizens. Depart from these principles and you fall into the
abuses of representative government. You would have extreme poverty
in the electorate and extreme opulence in the legislature. You would
see soon in France what yon see now in England, the purchase of
voters in the boroughs not with money even, but with pots of
beer. Thus incontestably are elected many of their parliamentary
members. Good representation must not be sought in either extreme,
but in the middle class. The committee have thus placed it by making
it incumbent that the voter shall possess an accumulation the
equivalent of, say forty days of labor. This would unite the
qualities needed to make the elector exercise his privilege with an
interest in the same. It is necessary that he own from one hundred
and twenty to two hundred and forty livres, either in property or
chattels. I do not think it can seriously be said that this
qualification is fixed too high, unless we would introduce among our
electors men who would beg or seek improper recompense.
If you would have liberty subsist do not hesitate because of
specious arguments which will be presented to you by those who, if
they reflect, will recognize the purity of our intentions and the
resultant advantages of our plans. I add to what I have already
said that the system will diminish many existing inconveniences, and
the proposed law will not have its full effect for two years. They
tell us we are taking from the citizen a right which elevated him by
the only means through which he can acquire it. I reply that if it
was an honor the career which you will open for them will imprint
them with character greater and more in conformity with true
equality. Our opponents have not failed either to magnify the
inconveniences of changing the constitution. Nor do I desire its
change. For that reason we should not introduce imprudent
discussions to create the necessity of a national convention. In
one word, the advice and conclusions of the committee are the sole
guarantees for the prosperity and peaceable condition of the nation.