Mr. Chairman:--

I entertain the hope, perhaps a rash one, that my strength will hold

me out to speak a few minutes.

In my judgment, a right decision will depend more on the temper and

manner with which we may prevail upon ourselves to contemplate the

subject than upon the development of any profound political

principles, or any remarkable skill in the application of them. If

we could succeed to neutralize our inclinations, we should find less

difficulty than we have to apprehend in surmounting all our

objections.

The suggestion, a few days ago, that the House manifested symptoms

of heat and irritation, was made and retorted as if the charge ought

to create surprise, and would convey reproach. Let us be more just

to ourselves and to the occasion. Let us not affect to deny the

existence and the intrusion of some portion of prejudice and feeling

into the debate, when, from the very structure of our nature, we

ought to anticipate the circumstance as a probability, and when we

are admonished by the evidence of our senses that it is the fact.

How can we make professions for ourselves, and offer exhortations to

the House, that no influence should be felt but that of duty, and no

guide respected but that of the understanding, while the peal to

rally every passion of man is continually ringing in our ears?

Our understandings have been addressed, it is true, and with ability

and effect; but, I demand, has any corner of the heart been left

unexplored? It has been ransacked to find auxiliary arguments, and,

when that attempt failed, to awaken the sensibilities that would

require none. Every prejudice and feeling has been summoned to

listen to some peculiar style of address; and yet we seem to believe

and to consider as an affront a doubt that we are strangers to any

influence but that of unbiased reason.

It would be strange that a subject which has aroused in turn all the

passions of the country should be discussed without the interference

of any of our own. We are men, and, therefore, not exempt from those

passions; as citizens and representatives we feel the interests that

must excite them. The hazard of great interests cannot fail to

agitate strong passions. We are not disinterested; it is impossible

we should be dispassionate. The warmth of such feelings may becloud

the judgment, and, for a time, pervert the understanding. But the

public sensibility, and our own, has sharpened the spirit of

inquiry, and given an animation to the debate. The public attention

has been quickened to mark the progress of the discussion, and its

judgment, often hasty and erroneous on first impressions, has become

solid and enlightened at last. Our result will, I hope, on that

account, be the safer and more mature, as well as more accordant

with that of the nation. The only constant agents in political

affairs are the passions of men. Shall we complain of our nature--

shall we say that man ought to have been made otherwise? It is right

already, because he, from whom we derive our nature, ordained it so;

and because thus made and thus acting, the cause of truth and the

public good is the more surely promoted.

But an attempt has been made to produce an influence of a nature

more stubborn and more unfriendly to truth. It is very unfairly

pretended, that the constitutional right of this house is at stake,

and to be asserted and preserved only by a vote in the negative. We

hear it said that this is a struggle for liberty, a manly resistance

against the design to nullify this assembly and to make it a cipher

in the government; that the President and Senate, the numerous

meetings in the cities, and the influence of the general alarm of

the country, are the agents and instruments of a scheme of coercion

and terror, to force the treaty down our throats, though we loathe

it, and in spite of the clearest convictions of duty and conscience.

It is necessary to pause here and inquire whether suggestions of

this kind be not unfair in their very texture and fabric, and

pernicious in all their influences. They oppose an obstacle in the

path of inquiry, not simply discouraging, but absolutely

insurmountable. They will not yield to argument; for as they were

not reasoned up, they cannot be reasoned down. They are higher than

a Chinese wall in truth's way, and built of materials that are

indestructible. While this remains, it is vain to argue; it is vain

to say to this mountain, Be thou cast into the sea. For, I ask of

the men of knowledge of the world whether they would not hold him

for a blockhead that should hope to prevail in an argument whose

scope and object is to mortify the self-love of the expected

proselyte? I ask, further, when such attempts have been made, have

they not failed of success? The indignant heart repels a conviction

that is believed to debase it.

The self-love of an individual is not warmer in its sense, nor more

constant in its action, than what is called in French, _l'esprit_

_du_ _corps_, or the self-love of an assembly; that jealous

affection which a body of men is always found to bear towards its

own prerogatives and power. I will not condemn this passion. Why

should we urge an unmeaning censure or yield to groundless fears

that truth and duty will be abandoned, because men in a public

assembly are still men, and feel that _esprit_ _du_ _corps_ which is

one of the laws of their nature? Still less should we despond or

complain, if we reflect that this very spirit is a guardian instinct

that watches over the life of this assembly. It cherishes the

principle of self-preservation, and without its existence, and its

existence with all the strength we see it possess, the privileges of

the representatives of the people, and mediately the liberties of

the people, would not be guarded, as they are, with a vigilance that

never sleeps and an unrelaxed constancy and courage. If the

consequences, most unfairly attributed to the vote in the

affirmative, were not chimerical, and worse, for they are deceptive,

I should think it a reproach to be found even moderate in my zeal to

assert the constitutional powers of this assembly; and whenever they

shall be in real danger, the present occasion affords proof that

there will be no want of advocates and champions.

Indeed, so prompt are these feelings, and, when once roused, so

difficult to pacify, that if we could prove the alarm was

groundless, the prejudice against the appropriations may remain on

the mind, and it may even pass for an act of prudence and duty to

negative a measure which was lately believed by ourselves, and may

hereafter be misconceived by others, to encroach upon the powers of

the House. Principles that bear a remote affinity with usurpation

on those powers will be rejected, not merely as errors, but as

wrongs. Our sensibilities will shrink from a post where it is

possible they may be wounded, and be inflamed by the slightest

suspicion of an assault.

While these prepossessions remain, all argument is useless. It may

be heard with the ceremony of attention, and lavish its own

resources, and the patience it wearies, to no manner of purpose. The

ears may be open; but the mind will remain locked up, and every pass

to the understanding guarded.

Unless, therefore, this jealous and repulsive fear for the rights of

the House can be allayed, I will not ask a hearing.

I cannot press this topic too far; I cannot address myself with too

much emphasis to the magnanimity and candor of those who sit here,

to suspect their own feelings, and, while they do, to examine the

grounds of their alarm. I repeat it, we must conquer our persuasion

that this body has an interest in one side of the question more than

the other, before we attempt to surmount our objections. On most

subjects, and solemn ones too, perhaps in the most solemn of all, we

form our creed more from inclination than evidence.

Let me expostulate with gentlemen to admit, if it be only by way of

supposition, and for a moment, that it is barely possible they have

yielded too suddenly to their alarms for the powers of this House;

that the addresses which have been made with such variety of forms

and with so great dexterity in some of them, to all that is

prejudice and passion in the heart, are either the effects or the

instruments of artifice and deception, and then let them see the

subject once more in its singleness and simplicity.

It will be impossible, on taking a fair review of the subject, to

justify the passionate appeals that have been made to us to struggle

for our liberties and rights, and the solemn exhortations to reject

the proposition, said to be concealed in that on your table, to

surrender them forever. In spite of this mock solemnity, I demand,

if the House will not concur in the measure to execute the treaty,

what other course shall we take? How many ways of proceeding lie

open before us?

In the nature of things there are but three; we are either to make

the treaty, to observe it, or break it. It would be absurd to say

we will do neither. If I may repeat a phrase already much abused,

we are under coercion to do one of them; and we have no power, by

the exercise of our discretion, to prevent the consequences of a

choice.

By refusing to act, we choose. The treaty will be broken and fall to

the ground. Where is the fitness, then, of replying to those who

urge upon the House the topics of duty and policy that they attempt

to force the treaty down, and to compel this assembly to renounce

its discretion, and to degrade itself to the rank of a blind and

passive instrument in the hands of the treaty-making power? In case

we reject the appropriation, we do not secure any greater liberty of

action; we gain no safer shelter than before from the consequences

of the decision. Indeed, they are not to be evaded. It is neither

just nor manly to complain that the treaty-making power has produced

this coercion to act. It is not the act or the despotism of that

power--it is the nature of things that compels. Shall we, dreading

to become the blind instruments of power, yield ourselves the

blinder dupes of mere sounds of imposture? Yet that word, that empty

word, coercion, has given scope to an eloquence that, one would

imagine, could not be tired and did not choose to be quieted.

Let us examine still more in detail the alternatives that are before

us, and we shall scarcely fail to see, in still stronger lights, the

futility of our apprehensions for the power and liberty of the

House.

If, as some have suggested, the thing called a treaty is

incomplete,--if it has no binding force or obligation,--the first

question is, Will this House complete the instrument, and, by

concurring, impart to it that force which it wants?

The doctrine has been avowed that the treaty, though formally

ratified by the executive power of both nations, though published as

a law for our own by the President's proclamation, is still a mere

proposition submitted to this assembly, no way distinguishable, in

point of authority or obligation, from a motion for leave to bring

in a bill, or any other original act of ordinary legislation. This

doctrine, so novel in our country, yet so dear to many, precisely

for the reason that, in the contention for power, victory is always

dear, is obviously repugnant to the very terms as well as the fair

interpretation of our own resolutions (Mr. Blount's). We declare

that the treaty-making power is exclusively vested in the President

and Senate, and not in this House. Need I say that we fly in the

face of that resolution when we pretend that the acts of that power

are not valid until we have concurred in them? It would be

nonsense, or worse, to use the language of the most glaring

contradiction, and to claim a share in a power which we at the same

time disdain as exclusively vested in other departments.

What can be more strange than to say that the compacts of the

President and Senate with foreign nations are treaties, without our

agency, and yet those compacts want all power and obligation, until

they are sanctioned by our concurrence? It is not my design, in this

place, if at all, to go into the discussion of this part of the

subject. I will, at least for the present, take it for granted, that

this monstrous opinion stands in little need of remark, and if it

does, lies almost out of the reach of refutation.

But, say those who hide the absurdity under the cover of ambiguous

phrases, Have we no discretion? And if we have, are we not to make

use of it in judging of the expediency or inexpediency of the

treaty? Our resolution claims that privilege, and we cannot

surrender it without equal inconsistency and breach of duty.

If there be any inconsistency in the case, it lies, not in making

the appropriations for the treaty, but in the resolution itself

(Mr. Blount's). Let us examine it more nearly. A treaty is a bargain

between nations, binding in good faith; and what makes a bargain?

The assent of the contracting parties. We allow that the treaty

power is not in this House; this House has no share in contracting,

and is not a party; of consequence, the President and Senate alone

may make a treaty that is binding in good faith. We claim, however,

say the gentlemen, a right to judge of the expediency of treaties;

that is the constitutional province of our discretion. Be it

so. What follows? Treaties, when adjudged by us to be inexpedient,

fall to the ground, and the public faith is not hurt. This,

incredible and extravagant as it may seem, is asserted. The amount

of it, in plainer language, is this--the President and Senate are to

make national bargains, and this House has nothing to do in making

them. But bad bargains do not bind this House, and, of inevitable

consequence, do not bind the nation. When a national bargain, called

a treaty, is made, its binding force does not depend upon the

making, but upon our opinion that it is good. . . .

To expatiate on the value of public faith may pass with some men for

declamation--to such men I have nothing to say. To others I will

urge, Can any circumstance mark upon a people more turpitude and

debasement? Can anything tend more to make men think themselves

mean, or degrade to a lower point their estimation of virtue and

their standard of action?

It would not merely demoralize mankind; it tends to break all the

ligaments of society, to dissolve that mysterious charm which

attracts individuals to the nation, and to inspire in its stead a

repulsive sense of shame and disgust.

What is patriotism? Is it a narrow affection for the spot where a

man was born? Are the very clods where we tread entitled to this

ardent preference because they are greener? No, sir; this is not the

character of the virtue, and it soars higher for its object. It is

an extended self-love, mingling with all the enjoyments of life, and

twisting itself with the minutest filaments of the heart. It is thus

we obey the laws of society, because they are the laws of virtue. In

their authority we see, not the array of force and terror, but the

venerable image of our country's honor. Every good citizen makes

that honor his own, and cherishes it not only as precious, but as

sacred. He is willing to risk his life in its defense, and is

conscious that he gains protection while he gives it. For what

rights of a citizen will be deemed inviolable when a State renounces

the principles that constitute their security? Or, if his life

should not be invaded, what would its enjoyments be in a country

odious in the eyes of strangers and dishonored in his own? Could he

look with affection and veneration to such a country as his parent?

The sense of having one would die within him; he would blush for his

patriotism, if he retained any, and justly, for it would be a

vice. He would be a banished man in his native land.

I see no exception to the respect that is paid among nations to the

law of good faith. If there are cases in this enlightened period

when it is violated, there are none when it is decried. It is the

philosophy of politics, the religion of governments. It is observed

by barbarians--a whiff of tobacco smoke, or a string of beads,

gives not merely binding force, but sanctity to treaties. Even in

Algiers a truce may be bought for money; but, when ratified, even

Algiers is too wise, or too just, to disown and annul its

obligation. Thus, we see neither the ignorance of savages nor the

principles of an association for piracy and rapine, permit a nation

to despise its engagements. If, sir, there could be a resurrection

from the foot of the gallows, if the victims of justice could live

again, collect together and form a society, they would, however

loath, soon find themselves obliged to make justice, that justice

under which they fell, the fundamental law of their state. They

would perceive it was their interest to make others respect, and

they would therefore soon pay some respect themselves to the

obligations of good faith.

It is painful, I hope it is superfluous, to make even the

supposition, that America should furnish the occasion of this

opprobrium. No, let me not even imagine that a republican

government, sprung as our own is, from a people enlightened and

uncorrupted, a government whose origin is right, and whose daily

discipline is duty, can, upon solemn debate, make its option to be

faithless--can dare to act what despots dare not avow, what our

own example evinces, the states of Barbary are unsuspected of. No,

let me rather make the supposition that Great Britain refuses to

execute the treaty, after we have done everything to carry it into

effect. Is there any language of reproach pungent enough to express

your commentary on the fact? What would you say, or rather what

would you not say? Would you not tell them, wherever an Englishman

might travel, shame would stick to him--he would disown his country.

You would exclaim, England, proud of your wealth, and arrogant in

the possession of power--blush for these distinctions, which

become the vehicles of your dishonor. Such a nation might truly say

to corruption, Thou art my father, and to the worm, Thou art my

mother and my sister. We should say of such a race of men, their

name is a heavier burden than their debt.

I can scarcely persuade myself to believe that the consideration I

have suggested requires the aid of any auxiliary. But,

unfortunately, auxiliary arguments are at hand. Five millions of

dollars, and probably more, on the score of spoliations committed on

our commerce, depend upon the treaty. The treaty offers the only

prospect of indemnity. Such redress is promised as the merchants

place some confidence in. Will you interpose and frustrate that

hope, leaving to many families nothing but beggary and despair? It

is a smooth proceeding to take a vote in this body; it takes less

than half an hour to call the yeas and nays and reject the treaty.

But what is the effect of it? What, but this? The very men

formerly so loud for redress, such fierce champions that even to ask

for justice was too mean and too slow, now turn their capricious

fury upon the sufferers and say by their vote, to them and their

families, No longer eat bread; petitioners, go home and starve; we

can not satisfy your wrongs and our resentments.

Will you pay the sufferers out of the treasury? No. The answer was

given two years ago, and appears on our journals. Will you give them

letters of marque and reprisal to pay themselves by force? No; that

is war. Besides, it would be an opportunity for those who have

already lost much to lose more. Will you go to war to avenge their

injury? If you do, the war will leave you no money to indemnify

them. If it should be unsuccessful, you will aggravate existing

evils; if successful, your enemy will have no treasure left to give

our merchants; the first losses will be confounded with much

greater, and be forgotten. At the end of a war there must be a

negotiation, which is the very point we have already gained; and why

relinquish it? And who will be confident that the terms of the

negotiation, after a desolating war, would be more acceptable to

another House of Representatives than the treaty before us? Members

and opinions may be so changed that the treaty would then be

rejected for being what the present majority say it should be.

Whether we shall go on making treaties and refusing to execute them,

I know not. Of this I am certain, it will be very difficult to

exercise the treaty-making power on the new principles, with much

reputation or advantage to the country.

The refusal of the posts (inevitable if we reject the treaty) is a

measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its

consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. A

plain and obvious one will be the price of the western lands will

fall. Settlers will not choose to fix their habitation on a field of

battle. Those who talk so much of the interest of the United States

should calculate how deeply it will be affected by rejecting the

treaty; how vast a tract of wild land will almost cease to be

property. The loss, let it be observed, will fall upon a fund

expressly devoted to sink the national debt. What, then, are we

called upon to do? However the form of the vote and the

protestations of many may disguise the proceeding, our resolution is

in substance, and it deserves to wear the title of a resolution to

prevent the sale of the western lands and the discharge of the

public debt.

Will the tendency to Indian hostilities be contested by any one?

Experience gives the answer. The frontiers were scourged with war

till the negotiation with Great Britain was far advanced, and then

the state of hostility ceased. Perhaps the public agents of both

nations are innocent of fomenting the Indian war, and perhaps they

are not. We ought not, however, to expect that neighboring nations,

highly irritated against each other, will neglect the friendship of

the savages; the traders will gain an influence and will abuse it;

and who is ignorant that their passions are easily raised, and

hardly restrained from violence? Their situation will oblige them to

choose between this country and Great Britain, in case the treaty

should be rejected. They will not be our friends, and at the same

time the friends of our enemies.

But am I reduced to the necessity of proving this point? Certainly

the very men who charged the Indian war on the detention of the

posts, will call for no other proofs than the recital of their own

speeches. It is remembered with what emphasis, with what acrimony,

they expatiated on the burden of taxes, and the drain of blood and

treasure into the western country, in consequence of Britain's

holding the posts. Until the posts are restored, they exclaimed, the

treasury and the frontiers must bleed.

If any, against all these proofs, should maintain that the peace

with the Indians will be stable without the posts, to them I will

urge another reply. From arguments calculated to produce conviction,

I will appeal directly to the hearts of those who hear me, and ask

whether it is not already planted there. I resort especially to the

convictions of the western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts

and no treaty, the settlers will remain in security. Can they take

it upon them to say that an Indian peace, under these circumstances,

will prove firm? No, sir; it will not be peace, but a sword; it will

be no better than a lure to draw victims within the reach of the

tomahawk.

On this theme, my emotions are unutterable. If I could find words

for them--if my powers bore any proportion to my zeal--I would

swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every

log house beyond the mountains, I would say to the inhabitants, Wake

from your false security; your cruel dangers, your more cruel

apprehensions, are soon to be renewed; the wounds, yet unhealed, are

to be torn open again; in the daytime, your path through the woods

will be ambushed; the darkness of midnight will glitter with the

blaze of your dwellings. You are a father--the blood of your sons

shall fatten your corn-field; you are a mother--the war-whoop shall

wake the sleep of the cradle.

On this subject you need not suspect any deception on your feelings.

It is a spectacle of horror which can not be overdrawn. If you have

nature in your hearts, it will speak a language compared with which

all I have said or can say will be poor and frigid.

Will it be whispered that the treaty has made a new champion for the

protection of the frontiers? It is known that my voice as well as

vote has been uniformly given in conformity with the ideas I have

expressed. Protection is the right of the frontiers; it is our duty

to give it.

Who will accuse me of wandering out of the subject? Who will say

that I exaggerate the tendencies of our measures? Will any one

answer by a sneer, that all this is idle preaching? Will any one

deny that we are bound, and I would hope to good purpose, by the

most solemn sanctions of duty, for the vote we give? Are despots

alone to be approached for unfeeling indifference to the tears and

blood of their subjects? Are republicans unresponsible? Have the

principles, on which you ground the reproach upon cabinets and

kings, no practical influence, no binding force? Are they merely

themes of idle declamation, introduced to decorate the morality of a

newspaper essay, or to furnish pretty topics of harangue from the

windows of that state house? I trust it is neither too presumptuous

nor too late to ask, Can you put the dearest interest of society at

risk without guilt, and without remorse?

It is vain to offer as an excuse, that public men are not to be

reproached for the evils that may happen to ensue from their

measures. This is very true, where they are unforeseen or

inevitable. Those I have depicted are not unforeseen; they are so

far from inevitable, we are going to bring them into being by our

vote. We choose the consequences, and become as justly answerable

for them as for the measure that we know will produce them.

By rejecting the posts, we light the savage fires--we bind the

victims. This day we undertake to render account to the widows and

orphans whom our decision will make, to the wretches that will be

roasted at the stake, to our country, and I do not deem it too

serious to say, to conscience and to God. We are answerable, and if

duty be anything more than a word of imposture, if conscience be not

a bugbear, we are preparing to make ourselves as wretched as our

country.

There is no mistake in this case; there can be none. Experience has

already been the prophet of events, and the cries of our future

victims have already reached us. The western inhabitants are not a

silent and uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues

from the shade of their wilderness. It exclaims, that while one hand

is held up to reject this treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. It

summons our imagination to the scenes that will open. It is no great

effort to the imagination to conceive that events so near are

already begun. I can fancy that I listen to the yells of savage

vengeance and the shrieks of torture. Already they seem to sigh in

the west wind--already they mingle with every echo from the

mountains.

It is not the part of prudence to be inattentive to the tendencies

of measures. Where there is any ground to fear that these will be

pernicious, wisdom and duty forbid that we should underrate them. If

we reject the treaty, will our peace be as safe as if we executed it

with good faith? I do honor to the intrepid spirit of those who say

it will. It was formerly understood to constitute the excellence of

a man's faith to believe without evidence and against it.

But as opinions on this article are changed, and we are called to

act for our country, it becomes us to explore the dangers that will

attend its peace, and to avoid them if we can.

Few of us here, and fewer still in proportion of our constituents,

will doubt that, by rejecting, all those dangers will be

aggravated. . . .

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