Although there is want of precision in the article, its scope and

meaning can not be misunderstood. It constitutes a stipulation by which

the United States engage that the inhabitants of Louisiana should be

formed into a State or States, and as soon as the provisions of the

Constitution permit, that they should be admitted as new States into the

Union on the footing of the other States; and before such admission, and

during their territorial government, that they should be maintained and

protected by Congress in the enjoyment of their liberty, property, and

religion. The first clause of this stipulation will be executed by the

admission of Missouri as a new State into the Union, as such admission

will impart to the inhabitants of Missouri "all the rights, advantages,

and immunities" which citizens of the United States derive from the

Constitution thereof; these rights may be denominated Federal rights,

are uniform throughout the Union, and are common to all its citizens:

but the rights derived from the Constitution and laws of the States,

which may be denominated State rights, in many particulars differ

from each other. Thus, while the Federal rights of the citizens

of Massachusetts and Virginia are the same, their State rights are

dissimilar and different, slavery being forbidden in one, and permitted

in the other State. This difference arises out of the Constitutions

and laws of the two States, in the same manner as the difference in the

rights of the citizens of these States to vote for representatives

in Congress arises out of the State laws and Constitution. In

Massachusetts, every person of lawful age, and possessing property

of any sort, of the value of two hundred dollars, may vote for

representatives to Congress. In Virginia, no person can vote for

representatives to Congress, unless he be a freeholder. As the admission

of a new State into the Union confers upon its citizens only the rights

denominated Federal, and as these are common to the citizens of all the

States, as well of those in which slavery is prohibited, as of those

in which it is allowed, it follows that the prohibition of slavery in

Missouri will not impair the Federal rights of its citizens, and that

such prohibition is not sustained by the clause of the treaty which has

been cited.

As all nations do not permit slavery, the term property, in its common

and universal meaning, does not include or describe slaves. In treaties,

therefore, between nations, and especially in those of the United

States, whenever stipulations respecting slaves were to be made, the

word "negroes," or "slaves," have been employed, and the omission of

these words in this clause, increases the uncertainty whether, by the

term property, slaves were intended to be included. But admitting that

such was the intention of the parties, the stipulation is not only

temporary, but extends no further than to the property actually

possessed by the inhabitants of Missouri, when it was first occupied

by the United States. Property since acquired by them, and property

acquired or possessed by the new inhabitants of Missouri, has in each

case been acquired under the laws of the United States, and not during

and under the laws of the province of Louisiana. Should, therefore, the

future introduction of slaves into Missouri be forbidden, the feelings

of the citizens would soon become reconciled to their exclusion, and the

inconsiderable number of slaves owned by the inhabitants at the date

of the cession of Louisiana, would be emancipated or sent for sale into

States where slavery exists.

It is further objected, that the article of the act of admission into

the Union, by which slavery should be excluded from Missouri, would

be nugatory, as the new State in virtue of its sovereignty would be at

liberty to revoke its consent, and annul the article by which slavery is

excluded.

Such revocation would be contrary to the obligations of good faith,

which enjoins the observance of our engagements; it would be repugnant

to the principles on which government itself is founded; sovereignty in

every lawful government is a limited power, and can do only what it

is lawful to do. Sovereigns, like individuals, are bound by their

engagements, and have no moral power to break them. Treaties between

nations repose on this principle. If the new State can revoke and annul

an article concluded between itself and the United States, by which

slavery is excluded from it, it may revoke and annul any other article

of the compact; it may, for example, annul the article respecting public

lands, and in virtue of its sovereignty, assume the right to tax and to

sell the lands of the United States. There is yet a more satisfactory

answer to this objection. The judicial power of the United States is

co-extensive with their legislative power, and every question arising

under the Constitution or laws of the United States, is recognizable by

the judiciary thereof. Should the new State rescind any of the articles

of compact contained in the act of admission into the Union, that, for

example, by which slavery is excluded, and should pass a law authorizing

slavery, the judiciary of the United States on proper application, would

immediately deliver from bondage, any person retained as a slave in said

State. And, in like manner, in all instances affecting individuals,

the judiciary might be employed to defeat every attempt to violate the

Constitution and laws of the United States.

If Congress possess the power to exclude slavery from Missouri, it still

remains to be shown that they ought to do so. The examination of this

branch of the subject, for obvious reasons, is attended with peculiar

difficulty, and cannot be made without passing over arguments which, to

some of us, might appear to be decisive, but the use of which, in this

place, would call up feelings, the influence of which would disturb, if

not defeat, the impartial consideration of the subject.

Slavery, unhappily, exists within the United States. Enlightened men, in

the States where it is permitted, and everywhere out of them, regret its

existence among us, and seek for the means of limiting and of mitigating

it. The first introduction of slaves is not imputable to the present

generation, nor even to their ancestors. Before the year 1642, the trade

and ports of the colonies were open to foreigners equally as those of

the mother country; and as early as 1620, a few years only after the

planting of the colony of Virginia, and the same year in which the first

settlement was made in the old colony of Plymouth, a cargo of negroes

was brought into and sold as slaves in Virginia by a foreign ship. From

this beginning, the importation of slaves was continued for nearly

two centuries. To her honor, Virginia, while a colony, opposed the

importation of slaves, and was the first State to prohibit the same, by

a law passed for this purpose in 1778, thirty years before the general

prohibition enacted by Congress in 1808. The laws and customs of the

States in which slavery has existed for so long a period, must have had

their influence on the opinions and habits of the citizens, which ought

not to be disregarded on the present occasion.

* * * * *

When the general convention that formed the Constitution took this

subject into their consideration, the whole question was once more

examined; and while it was agreed that all contributions to the common

treasury should be made according to the ability of the several States

to furnish the same, the old difficulty recurred in agreeing upon a

rule whereby such ability should be ascertained, there being no simple

standard by which the ability of individuals to pay taxes can be

ascertained. A diversity in the selection of taxes has been deemed

requisite to their equalization. Between communities this difficulty is

less considerable, and although the rule of relative numbers would not

accurately measure the relative wealth of nations, in States in the

circumstances of the United States, whose institutions, laws, and

employments are so much alike, the rule of numbers is probably as near

equal as any other simple and practical rule can be expected to be

(though between the old and new States its equity is defective),--these

considerations, added to the approbation which had already been given to

the rule, by a majority of the States, induced the convention to agree

that direct taxes should be apportioned among the States, according to

the whole number of free persons, and three-fifths of the slaves which

they might respectively contain.

The rule for apportionment of taxes is not necessarily the most

equitable rule for the apportionment of representatives among the

States; property must not be disregarded in the composition of the first

rule, but frequently is overlooked in the establishment of the second.

A rule which might be approved in respect to taxes, would be disapproved

in respect to representatives; one individual possessing twice as much

property as another, might be required to pay double the taxes of such

other; but no man has two votes to another's one; rich or poor, each has

but a single vote in the choice of representatives.

In the dispute between England and the colonies, the latter denied the

right of the former to tax them, because they were not represented in

the English Parliament. They contended that, according to the law of the

land, taxation and representation were inseparable. The rule of taxation

being agreed upon by the convention, it is possible that the maxim

with which we successfully opposed the claim of England may have had

an influence in procuring the adoption of the same rule for the

apportionment of representatives; the true meaning, however, of this

principle of the English constitution is, that a colony or district

is not to be taxed which is not represented; not that its number

of representatives shall be ascertained by its quota of taxes. If

three-fifths of the slaves are virtually represented, or their owners

obtain a disproportionate power in legislation, and in the appointment

of the President of the United States, why should not other property

be virtually represented, and its owners obtain a like power in

legislation, and in the choice of the President? Property is not

confined in slaves, but exists in houses, stores, ships, capital in

trade, and manufactures. To secure to the owners of property in slaves

greater political power than is allowed to the owners of other and

equivalent property, seems to be contrary to our theory of the equality

of personal rights, inasmuch as the citizens of some States thereby

become entitled to other and greater political power than the citizens

of other States. The present House of Representatives consist of one

hundred and eighty-one members, which are apportioned among the States

in a ratio of one representative for every thirty-five thousand federal

members, which are ascertained by adding to the whole number of free

persons, three-fifths of the slaves. According to the last census, the

whole number of slaves within the United was 1,191,364, which entitles

the States possessing the same to twenty representatives, and twenty

presidential electors more than they would be entitled to, were the

slaves excluded. By the last census, Virginia contained 582,104 free

persons, and 392,518 slaves. In any of the States where slavery is

excluded, 582,104 free persons would be entitled to elect only sixteen

representatives, while in Virginia, 582,104 free persons, by the

addition of three-fifths of her slaves, become entitled to elect, and do

in fact elect, twenty-three representatives, being seven additional ones

on account of her slaves. Thus, while 35,000 free persons are requisite

to elect one representative in a State where slavery is prohibited,

25,559 free persons in Virginia may and do elect a representative: so

that five free persons in Virginia have as much power in the choice

of Representatives to Congress, and in the appointment of presidential

electors, as seven free persons in any of the States in which slavery

does not exist.

This inequality in the apportionment of representatives was not

misunderstood at the adoption of the Constitution, but no one

anticipated the fact that the whole of the revenue of the United States

would be derived from indirect taxes (which cannot be supposed to

spread themselves over the several States according to the rule for the

apportionment of direct taxes), but it was believed that a part of

the contribution to the common treasury would be apportioned among the

States by the rule for the apportionment of representatives. The States

in which slavery is prohibited, ultimately, though with reluctance,

acquiesced in the disproportionate number of representatives and

electors that was secured to the slaveholding States. The concession

was, at the time, believed to be a great one, and has proved to

have been the greatest which was made to secure the adoption of the

Constitution.

Great, however, as this concession was, it was definite, and its full

extent was comprehended. It was a settlement between the original

thirteen States. The considerations arising out of their actual

condition, their past connection, and the obligation which all felt to

promote a reformation in the Federal Government, were peculiar to the

time and to the parties, and are not applicable to the new States, which

Congress may now be willing to admit into the Union.

The equality of rights, which includes an equality of burdens, is

a vital principle in our theory of government, and its jealous

preservation is the best security of public and individual freedom;

the departure from this principle in the disproportionate power and

influence, allowed to the slaveholding States, was a necessary sacrifice

to the establishment of the Constitution. The effect of this concession

has been obvious in the preponderance which it has given to the

slaveholding States over the other States. Nevertheless, it is an

ancient settlement, and faith and honor stand pledged not to disturb it.

But the extension of this disproportionate power to the new States would

be unjust and odious. The States whose power would be abridged, and

whose burdens would be increased by the measure, cannot be expected to

consent to it, and we may hope that the other States are too magnanimous

to insist on it.

* * * * *

It ought not to be forgotten that the first and main object of the

negotiation which led to the acquisition of Louisiana, was the free

navigation of the Mississippi, a river that forms the sole passage from

the western States to the ocean. This navigation, although of general

benefit, has been always valued and desired, as of peculiar advantage

to the Western States, whose demands to obtain it were neither equivocal

nor unreasonable. But with the river Mississippi, by a sort of coercion,

we acquired, by good or ill fortune, as our future measures shall

determine, the whole province of Louisiana. As this acquisition was made

at the common expense, it is very fairly urged that the advantages to be

derived from it should also be common. This, it is said, will not happen

if slavery be excluded from Missouri, as the citizens of the States

where slavery is permitted will be shut out, and none but citizens of

States where slavery is prohibited, can become inhabitants of Missouri.

But this consequence will not arise from the proposed exclusion of

slavery. The citizens of States in which slavery is allowed, like all

other citizens, will be free to become inhabitants of Missouri, in like

manner as they have become inhabitants of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois,

in which slavery is forbidden. The exclusion of slaves from Missouri

will not, therefore, operate unequally among the citizens of the United

States. The Constitution provides, "that the citizens of each State

shall be entitled to enjoy all the rights and immunities of citizens of

the several States"; every citizen may, therefore, remove from one

to another State, and there enjoy the rights and immunities of its

citizens. The proposed provision excludes slaves, not citizens, whose

rights it will not, and cannot impair.

Besides there is nothing new or peculiar in a provision for the

exclusion of slavery; it has been established in the States north-west

of the river Ohio, and has existed from the beginning in the old States

where slavery is forbidden. The citizens of States where slavery is

allowed, may become inhabitants of Missouri, but cannot hold slaves

there, nor in any other State where slavery is prohibited. As well might

the laws prohibiting slavery in the old States become the subject of

complaint, as the proposed exclusion of slavery in Missouri; but there

is no foundation for such complaint in either case. It is further urged,

that the admission of slaves into Missouri would be limited to the

slaves who are already within the United States; that their health and

comfort would be promoted by their dispersion, and that their numbers

would be the same whether they remain confined to the States where

slavery exists, or are dispersed over the new States that may be

admitted into the Union.

That none but domestic slaves would be introduced into Missouri, and the

other new and frontier States, is most fully disproved by the thousands

of fresh slaves, which, in violation of our laws, are annually imported

into Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

We may renew our efforts, and enact new laws with heavier penalties

against the importation of slaves: the revenue cutters may more

diligently watch our shores, and the naval force may be employed on

the coast of Africa, and on the ocean, to break up the slave trade--but

these means will not put an end to it; so long as markets are open for

the purchase of slaves, so long they will be supplied;--and so long as

we permit the existence of slavery in our new and frontier States,

so long slave markets will exist. The plea of humanity is equally

inadmissible, since no one who has ever witnessed the experiment will

believe that the condition of slaves is made better by the breaking

up, and separation of their families, nor by their removal from the old

States to the new ones; and the objection to the provision of the bill,

excluding slavery from Missouri, is equally applicable to the like

prohibitions of the old States: these should be revoked, in order that

the slaves now confined to certain States, may, for their health and

comfort, and multiplication, be spread over the whole Union.

Slavery cannot exist in Missouri without the consent of Congress; the

question may therefore be considered, in certain lights, as a new one,

it being the first instance in which an inquiry respecting slavery, in a

case so free from the influence of the ancient laws, usages, and manners

of the country, has come before the Senate.

The territory of Missouri is beyond our ancient limits, and the inquiry

whether slavery shall exist there, is open to many of the arguments that

might be employed, had slavery never existed within the United States.

It is a question of no ordinary importance. Freedom and slavery are the

parties which stand this day before the Senate; and upon its decision

the empire of the one or the other will be established in the new State

which we are about to admit into the Union.

If slavery be permitted in Missouri with the climate, and soil, and in

the circumstances of this territory, what hope can be entertained that

it will ever be prohibited in any of the new States that will be formed

in the immense region west of the Mississippi? Will the co-extensive

establishment of slavery and of the new States throughout this region,

lessen the dangers of domestic insurrection, or of foreign aggression?

Will this manner of executing the great trust of admitting new States

into the Union, contribute to assimilate our manners and usages, to

increase our mutual affection and confidence, and to establish that

equality of benefits and burdens which constitutes the true basis of our

strength and union? Will the militia of the nation, which must furnish

our soldiers and seamen, increase as slaves increase? Will the

actual disproportion in the military service of the nation be thereby

diminished?--a disproportion that will be, as it has been, readily

borne, as between the original States, because it arises out of their

compact of Union, but which may become a badge of inferiority, if

required for the protection of those who, being free to choose, persist

in the establishment of maxims, the inevitable effect of which will

deprive them of the power to contribute to the common defence, and even

of the ability to protect themselves. There are limits within which

our federal system must stop; no one has supposed that it could be

indefinitely extended--we are now about to pass our original boundary;

if this can be done without affecting the principles of our free

governments, it can be accomplished only by the most vigilant attention

to plant, cherish, and sustain the principles of liberty in the new

States, that may be formed beyond our ancient limits; with our utmost

caution in this respect, it may still be justly apprehended that the

General Government must be made stronger as we become more extended.

But if, instead of freedom, slavery is to prevail and spread, as we

extend our dominion, can any reflecting man fail to see the necessity of

giving to the General Government greater powers, to enable it to

afford the protection that will be demanded of it? powers that will be

difficult to control, and which may prove fatal to the public liberties.

WILLIAM PINKNEY,

OF MARYLAND. (BORN 1764, DIED 1822.)

ON THE MISSOURI QUESTION'--UNITED STATES

SENATE, FEBRUARY 15, 1820.

As I am not a very frequent speaker in this assembly, and have shown a

desire, I trust, rather to listen to the wisdom of others than to lay

claim to superior knowledge by undertaking to advise, even when advice,

by being seasonable in point of time, might have some chance of being

profitable, you will, perhaps, bear with me if I venture to trouble you

once more on that eternal subject which has lingered here, until all

its natural interest is exhausted, and every topic connected with it

is literally worn to tatters. I shall, I assure you, sir, speak with

laudable brevity--not merely on account of the feeble state of my

health, and from some reverence for the laws of good taste which forbid

me to speak otherwise, but also from a sense of justice to those

who honor me with their attention. My single purpose, as I suggested

yesterday, is to subject to a friendly, yet close examination,

some portions of a speech, imposing, certainly, on account of the

distinguished quarter from whence it came--not very imposing (if I may

so say, without departing from that respect which I sincerely feel and

intend to manifest for eminent abilities and long experience) for any

other reason.

* * * * *

I confess to you, nevertheless, that some of the principles announced

by the honorable gentleman from New York, with an explicitness that

reflected the highest credit on his candor, did, when they were first

presented, startle me not a little. They were not perhaps entirely new.

Perhaps I had seen them before in some shadowy and doubtful shape,

"If shape it might be called, that shape had none,

Distinguishable in member, joint, or limb?"

American Eloquence, Volume 2 Studies In American Political History (1896) · 第 2 / 16 段