[Richard III, 1483-1485]

Upon Edward’s death in 1483, the crown for a moment rested on the head

of his young son, Edward V, only to be snatched away in favor of the

lad’s uncle Richard III. Richard received from Parliament in 1484 a

grant of tunnage and poundage and the subsidy on wool for life.[265]

His death on Bosworth Field the next year gave the world no opportunity

to see what use he would make of the freedom which Parliament thus gave

him.

[Prohibition of benevolences, 1484]

During the brief three years of Richard’s ascendancy, however, there

occurred an assertion of right and its complementary statute which

assume great importance in the light of later events. When Richard was

invited to become king, he was presented with a remarkable address,

which, among other things, cited the benevolences of the late reign

as “extorcions, ... agenst the Lawes of God and Man,” and as more

intolerable than “jopardye of deth.”[266] At his only Parliament, held

in 1484, benevolences were declared unlawful, and were to be “dampned

and annulled forever.”[267]

[The Tudors]

Henry VII, the first of the Tudors, ascended the throne upon the

successful issue of the battle of Bosworth. The wonder of the era

which he introduced lies not in any increase in the powers of

Parliament, but rather that they existed at all when the period

closed. The one hundred and twenty years of the Tudor epoch exhibits

no progress toward the realization of parliamentary supremacy; on the

other hand, the trend was in the opposite direction. The Tudors were

not tyrannical enough to rouse opposition to the fever heat as did

John; they knew rather how to bridle their despotism in time to check

revolt, and especially how to make unlawful acts assume the aspect of

legality. Furthermore, the immense activity of commerce, the progress

of literature, the religious reconstitution during the sixteenth

century, were in themselves reasons for slow advance in matters of

government; the stress of trade consequent upon the discovery of a

new world, the absorbing interest in new subjects for thought, the

intensity and magnitude of new religious conceptions, engaged the minds

of men on subjects other than those of Parliament and king. As long

as these worked in apparent harmony and the results did not greatly

offend, men were content to let well enough alone. So it was that the

Tudors, surrounding themselves with a new nobility attached to the

throne by reasons of their very origin and continuance, were able to

follow their own devices and raise money almost as seemed to them good.

[Parliaments of Henry VII The “new-found” subsidy]

In all the twenty-four years of Henry VII’s reign he called Parliament

only seven times, and six of the seven Parliaments sat within the first

eleven years of his kingship. Each was the occasion of a demand for

money. At his first Parliament, that of 1485, he received a grant of

tunnage and poundage and a subsidy on wool for life.[268] Three years

later, however, the consequences of heavy taxation were disastrous.

Need arising for the enlistment of an army with which to aid the Duke

of Brittany against the King of France, a tax was devised which not

only exacted a tenth of incomes from freeholders, but applied as well

to movables, laying imposition upon articles used in trade and even

merchants’ stocks. This “new-found subsidy” proved so intolerable to

the lower classes that a great insurrection broke out in the north

against it.[269] The king with Tudor wisdom, remitted some £48,000

of the £75,000 which the tax was designed to raise, and Parliament

gave him in return a fifteenth and tenth. In 1497, a similar rebellion

occurred in Cornwall against a tax levied for the Scotch War.

With these examples of parliamentary taxation before him, Henry turned

away to fields at once more profitable and less dangerous, at least in

their immediate consequences.

[Morton’s crotch]

He turned to the old expedient of the benevolence, despite the statute

of Richard III prohibiting its imposition. The methods used in laying

a benevolence are illustrated in the famous account by Lord Francis

Bacon of the dilemma devised by Bishop Morton, Henry’s Chancellor, “to

raise up the benevolence to a higher rate; and some called it his fork

and some his crotch. For he had couched an article in the instructions

to the commissioners who were to levy the benevolence, that if they

met with any that were sparing, they should tell them that they must

needs have, because they laid up; and if they were spenders, they must

needs have, because it was seen in their port and manner of living;

so neither kind came amiss.”[270] Parliament, subservient to the

king, actually registered for the moment its approval of the practice

of levying benevolences, when in 1492 it passed the “Shoring or

Under-propping Act” making debts still owing on gifts promised to the

king legally collectable.

The benevolence was not the only means by which the ingenious monarch

increased his income. Like Edward IV, he revived obsolete statutes and

rigorously exacted fines in consequence of every infraction of them;

but worse than that was his perversion of every function of the courts

of law into a means of extortion. His odious instruments in that work

were Richard Empson and Edmund Dudly who later were made to suffer for

the evil practices of the father in the reign of the son. Beside these

forms of imposition, the king pushed to the extreme the exaction of

feudal dues accruing to the crown.

[Henry VIII’s early taxation]

Henry VIII succeeded to the crown in 1509. With his hand always on

the pulse of the nation, he knew when he could carry his designs into

execution and when he must wait for a fever to subside. His attitude

toward taxation was not characterized by the same uniform regard for

constitutional formalities that distinguished his other acts, nor was

Parliament on the other hand quite as subservient to his will as in

matters farther from their purses. His first Parliament showed its

trust in him by granting tunnage and poundage for life, but with the

distinct provision that it be not taken into precedent. Beside this,

the Parliaments of 1513 and 1514 made generous grants of a poll-tax,

of a fifteenth and tenth and of two subsidies of six pence in the

pound.[271] Despite the magnitude of the grant, no opposition seems to

have been provoked, an unfailing sign of increasing wealth.

[Cardinal Wolsey’s breach of privilege, 1523]

At the Parliament of 1523, the first since 1515, Cardinal Wolsey

committed a distinct breach of Parliamentary privilege. Under Henry IV

it had been admitted by the king that both houses of Parliament were

to commune apart, and that the king should have no knowledge of the

progress of a grant until the two houses be of one accord.[272] Wolsey,

as representative of the royal power, reversed the usual process. Going

into the House of Commons with all his following, “with his maces,

his pillars, his pole-axes, his cross, his hatte, and the great seale

too,”--in the words of the speaker, Sir Thomas More,--he asked for

no less than £800,000 and required that it be paid in four years; he

suggested that it “be raised out of the fifth part of every man’s goods

and lands.”

To the demand of the cardinal the commons maintained perfect silence.

The speaker “with many probable arguments endeavoured to shew the

cardinal that his manner of coming thither was neither expedient

nor agreeable to the ancient liberties of that House.”[273] Wolsey

thereupon departed in a rage. The next day the matter was argued by

the commons and the contention was made that “though some men were

well-monied, yet in general it was known that the fifth of men’s goods

was not in plate or money, but in stock and cattle. And that to pay

away all their coin would alter the whole frame and intercourse of

things.”[274] For fifteen days the commons debated the question and

at the end of that time granted to the king a graduated property tax,

much smaller in amount and covering four years in the payment. Wolsey’s

displeasure was very great and he made a second journey to the commons

in the hope that he might induce them to be more generous. He told them

that he “desired to reason with those who opposed his demands.” He

was answered that “it was the order of that House to hear, and not to

reason but amongst themselves.”[275] Thus rebuffed, the cardinal went

away.

[Henry’s commissions and benevolences]

Henry did without Parliament for the next seven years, but he was

not deprived thereby of money with which to carry on the business of

government. In 1526, commissions were issued for the collection of a

sixth from the goods of the laity and a fourth from the clergy.[276]

The people immediately evinced their knowledge of the law and

complained that the proceedings were illegal; the clergy led the

movement asserting that “the King could take no man’s goods without

the authority of Parliament.”[277] The people began to murmur and

insurrection seemed imminent. “If men should geue their goodes by a

Commission,” they said, “then wer it worse than the taxes of Fraunce,

and so England should be bond and not free.”[278] In Suffolk rebellion

actually broke out; in London and in Kent the people were in a ferment.

Henry, being what he was and knowing the nature of his subjects,

eased the tension by shoving the responsibility of the measure on to

the shoulders of Wolsey,[279] and declared that he would receive no

money save as an “amiable graunte,” which was collected in 1528, and

was nothing more agreeable than a benevolence. To this the citizens

of London raised objection on the ground of the statute of Richard

III. The judges thereupon handed down an opinion that that statute,

being the work of an usurper, was void. Thus did the courts evince

their subservience to the crown, and showed themselves as open to

royal influence as the tribunals of the Stuarts a hundred years

later.[280] So in theory Henry’s attempt at arbitrary taxation was

frustrated; in practice, however, the imposition, though its burden

was transferred from the turbulent lower classes to the more amenable

people of substance, merely underwent a change of name. The exaction

was unparliamentary whether it was levied as a king’s tax or under the

thin guise of a benevolence.

[Forced loans, 1522 and 1544]

But Henry had other strings to his bow, and of these the forced

loan was one which served him well. In 1522 commissioners were

appointed throughout the kingdom to ascertain the value of every

man’s possessions and to require a certain part for the king, on

the understanding that they be repaid out of the grants from the

next Parliament. The promise of repayment was under the king’s privy

seal.[281] In 1544, forced loans were again exacted, this time from

all persons rated at £50 and more per annum. Parliament, subservient

to the king, far from protesting because of these arbitrary demands

upon the pockets of the people, in two instances released the king

from liability to payment. In 1529, Parliament “for themselves and all

the whole body of the realm which they represent, freely, liberally,

and absolutely, give and grant unto the King’s highness ... all and

every sum and sums of money which to them and every of them, is,

ought, or might be due by reason of any money ... advanced or paid

by way of trust or loan.”[282] This caused much murmuring, but, as

Hall’s Chronicle rightly puts it, “Ther was no remedy.” In 1544 a

similar act of a servile Parliament not only gives the king the funds

borrowed under the forced loan of 1542, but commands the refunding of

sums already paid by him to his creditors in discharge of debts so

incurred.[283]

[Profits of the English Reformation]

The Reformation in England redounded to the financial benefit of the

Crown. In 1532 the clergy were relieved by act of Parliament from

the payment of annates or first fruits, the sums which the ordaining

authorities exacted from those accorded any preferment in the church,

and which amounted sometimes to as much as a year’s income from

the benefice. The exactions were denounced as having risen by “an

uncharitable custom, grounded upon no just or good title,” and through

them “great and inestimable sums of money have been daily conveyed out

of this realm, to the impoverishment of the same, and to the advantage

of the court of Rome.”[284] The same Parliament, meeting for its fifth

session on the 15th January, 1533-4, reënacted the statute without

the contingencies which had conditioned the other.[285] Closely

following came a statute that deprived the Pope of his petty exactions

which for generations he had drawn from the English Church. Thus were

discontinued peter-pence, procurations, fruits, fees for dispensations,

licenses, faculties and grants.[286] The sixth session of this

Parliament, meeting at the end of the year 1534, turned the procedure

into comedy by attaching to “the King’s imperial crown forever” the

first-fruits and tenths of the annual income of all ecclesiastical

benefices, the very payments which it had declared to be in conformity

with an “uncharitable custom.”[287]

[Parliament the confirming authority in clerical grants]

Furthermore, at the session of 1533-4, Parliament had laid very

definite restrictions upon the clergy in the matter of regular

taxation.[288] Since the early part of the fourteenth century, indeed,

almost since the beginning of Parliament itself, the lesser clergy

had attended the sessions with great irregularity, and had voted

their taxes for the most part in provincial assemblies. Now, however,

came the general prohibition that the clergy should not enact or

execute ordinances binding upon themselves without the king’s license

and without his approval when once they were made. Included within

the meaning of this prohibition was the granting of taxes. From

thenceforward until the time of Charles II, when, without any special

enactment but by simple process of evolution, the clergy began to be

taxed in the same manner and according to the same rate as the laity,

clerical grants were submitted to Parliament for confirmation.

Henry VIII died in 1547. Notwithstanding the heavy taxation,

parliamentary and unparliamentary, which had been exacted during his

reign, he remained popular with the great majority of his subjects

to his death. His many vices were counterbalanced by his successful

wars, the heavy taxation by the growing trade of England, and his

semi-independence of Parliament by most efficient administration.

[Elizabeth’s accession, 1558]

After the lapse of eleven years, which in so far as they concern the

evolution of the taxing power of Parliament, composed in effect an

interregnum, Elizabeth succeeded to the throne of England. Elizabeth’s

government was a despotism and was illegal; but it was so by

sufferance, not because the nation was ignorant of its true character

or because the people were unable to control it. When in later years

the attempt was made to create a despotism against the voice of the

people, the result was a Cromwell and his Charles I. Queen Elizabeth

was loved by her subjects and they put their trust in her. The sympathy

existing between queen and people could not be illustrated better

than by the following anecdote, which suggests that under her rule

benevolences were really made with the good will of the givers.

The queen, being at Coventry, is presented by the mayor with a purse

heavily filled with gold.

“I have few such gifts, Mr. Mayor,” says the queen; “it is a hundred

pounds in gold!”

“Please, your grace,” the mayor answers, “it is a great deal more we

give you.”

“What is it?” asks the queen.

“It is,” the mayor replies, “the hearts of your loving subjects.”

And the queen makes answer, “We thank you, Mr. Mayor; it is a great

deal more indeed.”[289]

[Liberality of Elizabeth’s Parliaments. Her

extra-Parliamentary exactions]

Subsidies were granted in Parliament with liberality and readiness.

Forced loans were indeed exacted from the wealthy, but Elizabeth took

care to repay honorably and as promptly as she could. A means of

revenue which relieved her from the frequent necessity of applying to

Parliament was the granting of monopolies, based upon the right of the

crown to assure to an inventor or orginator the exclusive benefits of

his invention or innovation. By 1601, however, the royal power had

encroached so far upon the rights of the individual that the grants

of monopoly comprised exclusive control over many of the necessaries

of life. The list which was read in the House of Commons in 1601,

included:--currants, iron, powder, cards, transportation of leather,

vinegar, sea-coal, lead, oil, starch, glass, and even salt. The matter

had been first discussed in the Parliament of 1571, was brought up

again in 1597, and in 1601 Elizabeth with the tact which she could

summon on occasion, sent a message to the House to allay if possible

the agitation which was going on there over the subject of monopolies.

It gave satisfaction. “Understanding that divers patents” so ran the

message, “which she had granted had been grievous to her subjects,

some should be presently repealed, some superseded, and none put in

execution but such as should first have a trial according to the law

for the good of the people.”[290] Thus was this means of indirect

taxation by the crown done away with, until the time when James I,

putting his clumsy shoulder to the wheel, should seek to introduce it

again.

[Commons assert their right to originate money bills, 1593]

Toward the close of the reign of Elizabeth there was another evidence

of the growing realization on the part of the commons that their powers

were not to be tampered with. In this instance, the vindication was not

against the prerogative of the sovereign, but against an arrogation of

power on the part of the House of Lords. The incident was based upon

the decreasing liberality of the commons in the years after the Armada.

They had risen nobly to the defense of the nation against the peril,

but, with the passing of it, their generosity had faded. In 1593, it

was represented that, though the queen had spent upon the war some

£1,030,000 of her own, the grants of the commons persisted in being

inadequate. A message was sent down from the lords which remarked upon

the need for a supply and requested the appointment of a committee of

conference. Sir Robert Cecil, reporting from the committee, stated

that the lords would assent to no smaller grant than three entire

subsidies.[291] The commons, on the other hand, had shown a disposition

to grant no more than two. Francis Bacon stated the issue. He yielded

to the subsidy, “but disliked,” he said, “that this house should join

with the upper house in granting it. For the custom and privilege of

this house hath always been, first to make offer of the subsidies from

hence, then to the upper house; except it were that they present a bill

unto this house, with desire of our assent thereto, and then to send

it up again.”[292] The commons refused to have further conference

with the lords, so determined were they to vindicate their right to

originate money bills, by the vote 217 to 128. Notwithstanding this

scrupulous adherence to principle, they accepted the suggestion and

came forward with a grant of three subsidies, six tenths and six

fifteenths.

The death of Queen Elizabeth in 1603, brought to an end the Tudor

period and cleared the throne for James Stuart. The Tudor era was one

which can be passed lightly over in a strict account of progress toward

parliamentary supremacy in taxation. In such a study the period of the

Tudors is a bywater. Yet the fact that the principles enunciated in

the years prior to their accession stayed alive despite the attacks of

Tudor subtlety, points to a vitality sufficient to down the Stuarts,

and to establish permanent parliamentary control over the laying of

taxes.

VII

THE STUARTS: 1603-1689

[Divine right as against Parliamentary supremacy]

THE theory of divine right, by which the Stuarts laid claim to a

sovereignty as irresponsible as it was far-reaching, in practice came

into direct conflict with another theory which had been taking shape

for some four centuries, the supremacy of Parliament. In the field

of taxation the issue is scarcely less apparent. Parliament asserted

the supremacy of its will over all kinds of taxes, indirect as well

as direct. The crown, on the other hand, hesitating to close with the

representatives of the people over a question of their authority in

direct taxation, maintained that unchecked royal power extended to

indirect taxes, including duties at the ports. Furthermore, the crown,

whenever occasion arose, sought to elude the hold of Parliament upon

direct taxation, by resorting to the familiar resources of benevolences

and the sale of monopolies, and at last to the levy of ship money.

With the issue so direct, the great question was that of strength.

Should the crown with its array of adherents, upholding as their ideal

the perfect exercise of the royal prerogative, prove itself stronger

than the House of Commons? Or were the commons to prevail, standing

for the principle that the representatives of the people sitting in

Parliament should have complete control over the public purse?

[James I, 1603-1625]

James Stuart, swollen with intellectual pride, was, according to the

Duc de Sully, “the wisest fool in Europe.” Worse than his vanity were

his unsteadiness and his insincerity, traceable, perhaps, to the

Italian-Gallic stock whence he was bred.[293] Divine right, a doctrine

by its nature offensive to Englishmen, was in him doubly hateful

because he was not born king, but was proclaimed by the Council, an act

ratified, however, by popular voice, and subsequently acquiesced in by

Parliament.[294] In the matter of religion, he was not more agreeable;

suspected at times of plots to further Roman Catholicism, he assumed

toward the Puritans especial animosity, they standing in his mind not

so much as preachers of religion as propagandists of republicanism.

[James I dictates the composition of the Commons, 1604]

He wasted no time in getting things started. In the proclamation

by which he summoned his first Parliament, he assumed the power of

dictating what manner of men should compose it, and directed that his

Court of Chancery should decide whether or not the certificates of

election fulfilled the royal conditions, “and if any shall be found to

be made contrarie to this proclamation, the same is to be rejected as

unlawful and insufficient.”[295] The commons, however, shortly after

their convening, vindicated their privilege in the case of Goodwin

and Fortescue, and succeeded in maintaining thereafter their right

to decide upon the legality of returns.[296] In their “Apology of

the House of Commons, made to the king, touching their Privileges,”

nearly at the close of this session, the commons complained against the

monopolies possessed by the great trading companies in the face of many

statutes to the contrary, and the oppressive exercise of the ancient

prerogative of purveyance.[297]

[James receives tunnage and poundage for life]

In the department of regular taxation, however, James at first adopted

a conciliatory attitude. On the 26th June, 1604, James sent to the

commons a letter “written with his own hand but corrected as to the

spelling,” in which he expressed his pleasure as to a subsidy.[298] He

stated his confidence in their good-will, assuring them “in the word

of a King” that he would “be so far from taking it unkindly, their not

offering” to him a subsidy, and that he would “only interpret it to

proceed from the care they have, that our people should not have any

occasion of distaste.” James’s letter accomplished for him what may

well have been his purpose; the commons immediately granted to him

tunnage and poundage for the space of his life.[299]

[Royal poverty]

At the two subsequent sessions of 1605-6 and 1606-7 there was constant

friction between king and commons, yet there were no very remarkable

assertions of royal prerogative or of parliamentary privilege. At the

session of 1605, Parliament granted the king three entire subsidies and

six fifteenths, designed principally to meet the royal indebtedness,

some of which held over since the time of Elizabeth.[300] After the

prorogation, James called no session of Parliament until the 9th

February, 1609-10.

But James could not meet his obligations with the ordinary revenues of

the crown. He was spending between £500,000 and £600,000 a year, and

his income was in the neighborhood of £400,000; his annual deficit,

therefore, was not far from £150,000.[301] James was obliged to turn

elsewhere, and the consequence of his action was the famous Bate

Case, the decision in which was a step toward freeing the king from

parliamentary control over his revenues.

[The Bate Case]

In 1603, in answer to the agitation against the great monopolies, an

Eastern trading company, known as the Levant Company, surrendered its

charter. This company, amongst other privileges, had enjoyed the right

of collecting a duty on currants from other merchants trading in them,

and paid to the crown in return for the franchise £4,000 a year. When,

therefore, the company yielded up its charter, the crown was the loser

by £4,000 annually. In order to make up for the loss, the crown itself

proceeded to lay a duty on currants.[302] In 1605, the Levant Company

again received a charter, but James levied upon it, nevertheless, his

duty on currants, the rate being five shillings on the hundred-weight

over and above that granted to him by Parliament in its tunnage and

poundage bill. It was a merchant of the Levant Company, John Bate, who

raised the question of the legality of the imposition. The case was

taken to the Court of Exchequer for decision. Had the barons confined

themselves to the strict laws of the matter, there would not have been

great ground for objection to their decision. Precedent drawn from the

time of the Tudors and statutes of the same period, were capable of

being brought forward in a fair adjudication of the case, and would

have substantiated the contention of the crown, thus returning customs

exactions, nearly to the situation of 1300.[303] The fact that the

four barons decided the case unanimously against John Bate could not,

therefore, be reasonably reprehended. But they permitted themselves to

slip off into philosophical generalizations which struck the people as

absolutist in tenor.

[Opinions of the Barons in the Bate Case]

“It seemeth to me strange,” says Baron Clarke in his opinion, “that

any subjects would contend with the King in this high point of

prerogative.... As it is not a kingdom without subjects and government,

so he is not a king without revenues.... The revenue of the Crown is

the very essential part of the Crown, and he who rendeth that from the

king pulleth also his crown from his head, for it cannot be separated

from the crown.” He proceeded to advance the opinion that the Statute

of Edward III[304] which prohibited to the crown the right of levying

new impositions on wool, woolfells, and leather, and which provided

that there be only imposed “the custom and subsidy granted to the

king,” had no effect in the present instance, because it extended to

Edward III alone, “and shall not bind his successors, for it is a

principal part of the Crown of England which the King cannot diminish.”

The opinion of Chief Baron Fleming was scarcely less sweeping. “The

King’s power is double,” he said, “ordinary and absolute.... That

of the ordinary is for the profit of particular subjects, for the

execution of civil justice ... in the ordinary courts, and nominated

... with us the common law; and these laws cannot be changed without

Parliament.... The absolute power of the king is not that which is

converted or executed to private use, ... but is only that which is

applied to the general benefit of the people.... This power is not

guided by the rules which direct only at the common law, and is most

properly named policy and government.... The matter in question is

material matter of state, and ought to be ruled by the rules of

policy, and if it be so, the king hath done well to execute his

extraordinary power. All customs, be they old or new, are no other but

the effects and issues of trades and commerce with foreign nations; but

all commerce and affairs with foreigners ... are made by the absolute

power of the king; and he who hath power of causes hath power also of

effects.”[305]

[The position of Parliament]

Parliament took its stand on the subject of the impositions even before

the decision was published. In the Petition of Grievances sent up by

the commons at the end of the session of 1606, a list which contained

so many complaints that James remarked that “they had sent an oyes

through the nation to find them,” the plea was made that no such duty

could be demanded legally without the consent of Parliament. The

decision was announced to them when they reassembled in November 1606,

but they took no action and for a time the matter rested.

[The Book of Rates published under decision in the Bate Case,

1608]

But it was James himself who, in his characteristic tactless obstinacy,

forced the issue. On the 29th July, 1608, taking advantage of the

Bate decision, he published under the authority of the Great Seal

his Book of Rates, which laid heavy duties upon almost all articles

of merchandise, “to be forever hereafter paid to the king and his

successors on pain of his displeasure.”[306] The statement of James’s

own views on the subject could not be more clearly put than he himself

expressed them in the commission for the levy of the impositions

addressed to the Earl of Salisbury, Treasurer of England. “This special

power and prerogative,” he asserted, “(amongst many others) hath both

by men of understanding in all ages and by the laws of all nations

been yielded and acknowledged to be proper and inherent in the persons

of princes, that they may according to their several occasions raise

to themselves such fit and competent means by levying of customs and

impositions upon merchandise transported out of their kingdom or

brought into their dominions ... as to their wisdoms and discretions

may seem convenient.”[307]

[Remonstrance from the Commons, 1609-10]

Even with the money thus obtained, James was obliged at last after a

lapse of nearly two years and a half to turn to Parliament. He summoned

it for the 9th February 1609-10. The commons, almost unanimously

opposed to the exercise of the royal prerogative in the matter of

the imposition, came prepared to dispute the decision in the Bate

Case. The discussion, carried on in the face of a royal prohibition,

was managed by Hakewill, Yelverton, and Whitelocke.[308] The upshot

was a remonstrance in which the commons reminded the king that “the

policy and constitution of this your kingdom appropriates unto the

kings of this realm, with the assent of the Parliament, as well the

sovereign power of making laws as that of taxing or imposing upon

the subjects’ goods or merchandises wherein they have justly such a

property as may not without their consent, be altered or changed.”

Further, they pointed to the former occasions when the commons had

complained in Parliament of similar impositions, and upon which redress

was forthcoming. Reference was made to the action of “famous kings,”

who “agreed that this old fundamental right should be further declared

and established by act of Parliament, wherein it is provided that no

such charges should ever be laid upon the people without their common

consent, as may appear by sundry records of former times.” They went on

to say, “We, therefore, your Majesty’s most humble Commons assembled

in Parliament, following the examples of this worthy case of our

ancestors, and out of a duty to those for whom we serve, finding that

your Majesty, without advice or consent of Parliament, hath lately, in

time of peace, set both greater impositions, and far more in number

than any of your noble ancestors did in time of war, have with all

humility presumed to present this most just and necessary petition unto

your Majesty: That all impositions set without the assent of Parliament

may be quite abolished and taken away; and that your Majesty, in

imitation likewise of your noble progenitors, will be pleased that

a law may be made during this session of Parliament to declare that

all impositions set or to be set, upon your people, their goods and

merchandises, save only by common assent in the Parliament, are and

shall be void.”[309] The outcome was unsatisfactory. A bill framed

to prohibit further impositions than those already in existence, was

passed by the House of Commons, but was cast out in the upper chamber.

The king was still able to cover himself with the decision in the Bate

Case.

[Cowel’s “Interpreter”]

The attitude of James toward a book “lately published by one Doctor

Cowel” and esteemed to “contain certain matters of scandal and offence

toward the high court of Parliament,”[310] all but brought him into

active conflict with the commons. This publication called “The

Interpreter” contained a defense of the royal prerogative in such terms

as greatly to offend the power of Parliament. Doctor Cowel had this to

say under the head of “Subsidy:”

“... A tax or tribute assessed by Parliament, and granted by the

Commons to be levied of every subject according to the value of his

lands or goods, after the rate of 4_s._ in the pound for land and

2_s._ 8_d._ for goods, as it is not commonly used at this day. Some

hold opinion that this subsidy is granted by the subject to the Prince,

in recompense or consideration, that whereas the Prince of his absolute

power might make laws of himself, he doth of favor admit the consent of

his subjects therein, that all things in their own confession may be

done with the greater indifferency.”[311]

King James had been thoughtless enough to let fall words of

commendation for the book, and his approval was followed by a request

from the commons for a conference with the lords. James, however,

wisely withdrew from his position and issued a proclamation prohibiting

the further circulation of the work and recalling the copies already

issued. Thus did the storm blow over.

[The “Great Contract,” 1610]

At this same session of Parliament, James, through the Lord Treasurer,

offered to accept a composition for the incidents of feudal tenure,

including the right of purveyance. By this so-called Great Contract,

Parliament was to provide for an annual payment to the king of

£200,000. But the idea, which at first was distasteful to the commons,

shortly became equally out of favor with the king. The amount of money

required seemed excessive, and the commons feared that it might make

the king independent of them. The king, on the other hand, arrived

ultimately at the conclusion that by careful manipulation he could

readily increase his income to a sum larger than that stated in the

Great Contract. Final consideration was put over to the session of

Parliament called for the 16th October following. At the last moment,

however, when an agreement seemed by no means hopeless, a religious

misunderstanding intervened, and the negotiations fell through.

The matter of a subsidy was treated with somewhat greater favor,

though with small generosity. Parliament granted the king one entire

subsidy and one fifteenth and tenth.[312] Parliament was dissolved

9th February, 1611, and for three years James tried to carry on his

government without it.

[Petty extortion after the dissolution of Parliament]

James’s attempt at absolutism was not a financial success; a court

which was as extravagant as it was dissolute helped him increase his

deficit; he ran behind about £200,000 a year, notwithstanding the

fact that he set in motion all the machinery of petty extortion that

he dared. He tried to force loans on the security of his privy seal

but frequently met with refusal from which there was no appeal. The

jurisdiction of the Star Chamber was used as a means to lay fines which

were usually unjust and always excessive. He sold peerages and raised

money on the crown lands, and induced the French king and the Dutch to

pay up old debts owing to England.

[James’s second Parliament, 1614, known as the “Addled

Parliament”]

His enormous annual deficit forced him in 1614 to summon his second

Parliament. It came with a great and active majority lined up against

the king. It speedily passed by a unanimous vote a resolution against

the king’s right of imposing taxes without the consent of Parliament,

and demanded a conference on that subject with the House of Lords;[313]

the lords, however, turned to the judges hoping to obtain from them

enlightenment on the legal points involved, but the judges, by the

words of Chief Justice Coke, refused to render an extra-judicial

opinion. The conference was then refused. The king, becoming impatient

at the delay of the commons in accomplishing the purpose for which

he had summoned them to Parliament, with his usual failure to adapt

himself to circumstances, sent a message to the House threatening a

dissolution of Parliament unless procedure were immediately taken in

the direction of granting supplies.[314] The commons met the issue

squarely; they said that they were determined to conclude the matter

of the impositions before granting a supply. On the 7th of June, two

months and two days after the date upon which it had been convened,

James redeemed his word and dissolved Parliament. It had not passed

a single bill and thus earned the title by which it is known to

history,--the “Addled” Parliament. But it had succeeded in maintaining

its principle of making supply wait upon redress of grievances, and

some of its members had shot barbed shafts at the king, wherefore James

locked up those who had aimed most surely.

[Resort to extortion]

With the hope gone of securing a grant, James had to return to his old

courses of obtaining income. Forced loans, monopolies, heavy fines,

feudal payments rigorously exacted, and the systematic extortion of

benevolences, figured in his programme. The Council sent out orders

to all the sheriffs and magistrates to send in contributions from all

men of ability to pay; to those who refused, suggestions were made of

impending evil. The judges of assize were especially urged to recommend

payments. The benevolences netted less than £43,000 for the three years

during which they were made.[315]

[Case of Oliver St. John]

But the nation did not submit tamely. Several counties sent up

protests against the demand, recalling in defense of their position

the Statute of Richard III which forbade the levying of “exactions,

called benevolences.” The refusal of Oliver St. John to the request for

a benevolence by the mayor of Marlborough, brought him into immediate

conflict with the king. His written reply to the mayor maintained the

illegality of the demand on the ground that it was contrary to Magna

Carta and to the Statute of Richard III. He further charged the king

with breaking his coronation oath, and declared that all who paid the

benevolence were incriminated with him. He was haled before the Star

Chamber and sentenced by it to pay a fine of £5,000 and to imprisonment

during the king’s pleasure. Thus it was that James tried to rule

without a Parliament.

[James’s third Parliament, 1620-21]

But the rule could not long continue. James summoned his third

Parliament for the 30th January, 1620-21. He addressed both Houses

in a conciliatory manner, hopefully and with many promises. “For you

to hunt after grievances,” he said, “to the prejudice of your king

and yourselves, is not the errand: deal with me as I deserve at your

hands; I will leave nothing undone that becomes a just king, if you

deal with me accordingly.”[316] The commons were in a good temper and a

reconciliation seemed far more likely to eventuate than a struggle.

[Supply waits upon redress of grievances]

As for the royal advice about grievances, the commons were slow to

take it. When, shortly after the beginning of the session, it was

moved that the House proceed to the consideration of a supply, it

was stated that supply and redress of grievances should go “hand in

hand together,” that they were “as twins; to go together and have no

precedency.”[317] It was resolved that the business of the supply

be not decided independently of a consideration of grievances and

of a petition to the king for freedom of speech, thus recalling the

imprisonment of members in 1614 at the time of the dissolution of the

Addled Parliament.

[Revival of impeachment by the Commons]

High in the list of grievances was the granting of monopolies. Patents

of monopoly subserved a number of diverse purposes, some of which were

entirely legitimate. Objection could not be made to restrictions in

the sale of certain commodities such as liquors and explosives, nor to

the assurance given to an inventor that he had an exclusive right to

profits accruing from his invention. But James was free with his grants

of monopoly for the enrichment of his courtiers and himself. Parliament

laid by the heels the monopolists who had most abused their privileges,

and impeached and condemned Sir Giles Mompesson and Sir Francis

Mitchell.[318]

[Granting of a supply]

Before the judgment was given, however, but not before it was clearly

discernible what was to be the trend of events, the commons set

themselves to the consideration of a supply bill and on the 18th March

passed it unanimously. It provided for two entire subsidies. “In the

midst of their inquiries into public grievances, the commons had

thought fit to consider the necessities of the State and grant the king

a supply.”[319]

[James in a temper adjourns Parliament]

The major part of the session was spent in reforming abuses, both

by impeaching the officials responsible for them, and by framing

legislation for their correction. Chief amongst those who fell under

condemnation at the bar of the House of Lords was Lord Francis

Bacon, Lord Chancellor of England, convicted of bribery. King James

in the early part of the session seemed not out of sympathy with

these efforts to reform the administration, but as time wore on and

the commons still busied themselves with investigations of official

misconduct, he wearied, and on the 28th May, the Lord Treasurer

declared to the lords the king’s determination to adjourn Parliament.

Two of the five reasons assigned for the adjournment were these:

“For that the profits of his Majesty’s revenues are, as it were, at

a stand;” and “The omission of the State.”[320] A week later, after

great complaint by the commons, the session was adjourned to reassemble

on the 14th November. Throughout the four months during which it had

sat, no complaint had been registered against the impositions at the

outports. Apparently the commons were willing for the moment to let

them rest, or else, as is more likely, were quite unmindful of them.

[Dilatory action on a subsidy]

Parliament met on the 20th November for its final session. Lord

Treasurer Cranfield reported that the exchequer was depleted, that the

two subsidies which had been granted the previous March had been spent

in furthering the interests of James’s son-in-law, Frederic, Elector

Palatine, and “that the business now in hand required a great and

speedy supply.”[321] It was understood that the cost of maintaining an

army in the Palatinate would be not far from £900,000 a year. The Lord

Treasurer wished “that the Commons would so handle this business as to

make his Majesty in love with the Parliaments.”

But they took some time to consider it. At the end of the first week,

the commons resolved in committee of the whole house upon a single

subsidy, which, since it was to be levied doubly upon papists, would

provide some £100,000 for the prosecution of war in the Palatine.[322]

That was as near an actual grant as the commons came during the

session. On the 1st December, they fell into a conflict with the king

over matters of privilege, which had its rise in the imprisonment of

Sir Edwin Sandys during the last recess of Parliament, presumably for

utterances made in the House. There were petitions to James and replies

from him, culminating in a remarkable Protestation asserting the right

of free speech in the House.[323] On the day of the presentation of this

Protestation, the 18th December, James adjourned Parliament to the 8th

February; he then sent for the Journal of the House of Commons and tore

from it the objectionable entry with his own hand. In the stress of these

events, the proposed subsidy was allowed to slip out of mind; only did

the lords propose a meeting with the commons to consider a supply, and

this came to naught. On the 6th January, 1621-22, James saw fit not

to await the reassembling of Parliament, but issued a proclamation

of dissolution in which he denounced those who had questioned his

prerogatives in the House of Commons as “ill-tempered spirits.” Then he

committed to prison such of them as he regarded as being most hostile,

amongst whom were Sir Edward Coke, Pym, Selden, and Mallory.[324]

[James’s last Parliament, 1623-24]

[Supply granted for the Palatine war]

James convened his last Parliament on the 19th February, 1623-24. In

the interval which had elapsed since the dissolution, James recovered

his conciliatory attitude toward the commons. The plan of marrying the

Prince of Wales, the young Prince Charles, to the Infanta of Spain,

had been given up, and thus Englishmen were relieved of what to them

had been a pro-popish plot, and had been deprecated again and again as

the odious Spanish Match. The programme with respect to the Palatinate

favored by the king was that favored by the commons, and the reign

of James seemed to be approaching a happy conclusion. The commons

came forward with a grant of three subsidies and three fifteenths and

tenths, providing a somewhat greater sum than £300,000.[325] The money

was voted on the condition that, in order to insure its application to

the naval and military establishments, it be paid into the hands of

commissioners appointed by the commons, and be expended by them upon

direction of the council of war. The sympathy existing between king and

Parliament was further exhibited in the successful passage of an act

forbidding monopolies in the sale of any merchandise or in practicing

any trade, the only legislative act of constructive importance in his

reign.[326] Parliament was dissolved on the 29th May, 1624.

[Death of James I, 27th March, 1625]

Less than a year later King James died. Apparently at the end of

his reign he was learning wisdom for he was beginning to understand

Parliament. He left his crown to the keeping of a son who had in no

wise profited by the father’s experience. Charles I, brought up in an

atmosphere of divine right, was predisposed to pursue that theory to

the end. But worse than that, in arguing his melancholy destiny, was

his faithlessness. An odious policy executed without respect for truth

brought him at last to death outside his palace of Whitehall.

[First Parliament of Charles]

[Worry about the supply]

The first Parliament of Charles I recalls vividly the mid-reign

experiences of James. It convened on the 18th June, 1625, and was

met with a request for a large and unconditional grant with which

to prosecute the war which Charles had inherited from his father.

The commons, however, were careful; they looked rather for a solid

establishment of government at home than for a war abroad. Breaking

the habit of two centuries, they offered Charles tunnage and poundage

for a year instead of the term of his life, a measure which, because

of lack of precedent, was rejected in the House of Lords; and granted

only two subsidies.[327] On the 10th August, the chancellor delivered

a message to the commons from the king. He desired “a present answer

about his supply: If not, he will take care of their healths more than

they themselves, and make as good a shift for his present occasions

as he could.”[328] The House spent the rest of the day debating the

matter, and on the next proceeded in the consideration of grievances,

postponing the supply. Delay the king would not brook; perceiving that

the commons were bent upon a redress of grievances before the granting

of further aid, and because in the debates they had presumed “to

reflect upon some great persons near himself,” on the 12th August he

dissolved Parliament,[329] and looked to his privy seal as a means of

revenue.

[His second Parliament. Buckingham]

[A grant with hard conditions]

Six months later, on the 6th February, 1625-26, Charles opened his

second Parliament and met with no better success. The commons did not

consider immediately the question of a supply, but to the immense

irritation of the king, proceeded to inquire into the conduct of the

Duke of Buckingham, the favorite of Charles. He sent a message to the

commons saying that he would “not allow any of his servants to be

questioned amongst them, much less such as are of eminent place and

near unto him.” But the chief significance of his message was in its

conclusion. “I wish you would hasten my supply,” so it ran, “or else it

will be worse for yourselves; for if any ill happen, I think I shall be

the last that shall feel it.”[330] The commons replied with a grant of

three subsidies and three fifteenths, but the conditions were such as

to make it almost worse for Charles than no grant at all. The bill was

not to be brought in until the king should have given answer to their

list of grievances, and among the grievances the Duke of Buckingham was

chief.[331] Later a fourth subsidy was added and a movement was put on

foot to give Charles tunnage and poundage for life; but in the bill it

was specified that a remonstrance should be drawn up against his taking

those duties without the previous consent of Parliament.[332] Then

the commons went on with their formal impeachment of Buckingham. But

before the matter was settled, and consequently before the Commons had

made final grants of the promised subsidies, Charles, in the hope of

relieving the desperate plight of his favorite, dissolved Parliament,

on the 15th June.

[Forced loans at the rating of a subsidy]

The dissolution left Charles without the means with which to carry on

the proposed war with Spain. He turned again to old expedients; he

forced loans, exacted benevolences, and suspended penal laws for a

consideration. The loans took the form of a general levy according to

the well-known rate of the subsidy and were thus in effect assessments

of a general tax by the arbitrary power of the crown. Of great

importance in the light of subsequent history, was the requisition made

upon the seaport towns for ships armed and equipped, the precursor of

the demand for ship money. Imprisonment, impressment into the royal

navy, the quartering of soldiers upon the inhabitants, the dismissal

from offices held of the crown, were the several rewards of those

sufficiently courageous to stand by the principle that taxes be laid

only by the assent of Parliament.[333] By an order in Council it was

declared, “that all customs, duties, and imposts on all goods and

merchandizes exported and imported, which, for many ages had been

continued, and esteemed a principal and necessary part of the revenue

of the crown, should be levied and paid.” The hope was expressed that

these levies “might receive an absolute settlement by Parliament,” when

that body should again assemble.[334]

[Charles’s third Parliament, 1627-28]

[Threats of non-Parliamentary exaction]

Not being content with the financial difficulties incident to the war

with Spain, Charles, at the suggestion of Buckingham, slipped into

a war with France. Buckingham led an expedition to the Isle of Rhé,

met with disaster and ignominy, and succeeded in using up the ready

money of the king. Charles had to call his third Parliament in order

to obtain supplies. It met 17th March, 1627-28. The king attempted to

propitiate the commons by releasing the prisoners whom he still held

for refusing to meet the demand for the general loan. In his opening

speech, Charles took the wrong tack. “There is none here,” he said,

“but knows that common danger is the cause of this Parliament, and

that supply at this time is the chief end of it.... If you, (which God

forbid) should not do your duties in contributing what the State at

this time needs, I must in discharge of my conscience, use those other

means which God hath put into my hands, to save that which the follies

of some particular men may otherwise hazard to lose.”[335] Nor was this

bold assertion of the divine right of a king to put his hand in the

pockets of his subjects enough. The lord keeper said in addition, “This

way (of obtaining a supply), as his Majesty hath told you, he hath

chosen, not as the only way, but as the fittest; not as destitute of

others, but as most agreeable to the goodness of his own most gracious

disposition, and to the desire and weal of his people. If this be

deferred, necessity and the sword of the enemy will make way to others.

Remember his Majesty’s admonition: I say, remember it.”[336]

[Grievances have precedence]

[Denunciation of extortions]

The House immediately set itself to the consideration of grievances,

chief amongst which were “raising money by loans, by benevolences, and

privy seals: and what was too fresh in memory, the imprisonment of

certain gentlemen who refused to lend.”[337] The matter of a supply

was debated, but passed by in favor of the grievances. On the 3rd

April, the commons agreed unanimously to certain highly significant

resolutions against the powers assumed by the king. “No freeman ought

to be committed, or detained in prison, or otherwise restrained,” they

said, “by command of the king, or the Privy Council, or any other,”

except for lawful cause expressed in a lawful warrant; and “that

the ancient and undoubted right of every freeman is, that he hath a

full and absolute property in his goods and estate; and that no tax,

tallage, loan, benevolence, or other like charge, ought to be commanded

or levied by the king or his ministers, without common assent of

Parliament.”[338]

For the space of two months the commons and the House of Lords engaged

themselves in conference and separately in the consideration of a

petition defining, the rights asserted in the resolutions. On the part

of the commons the chief advocates were Selden, Littleton, and Digges;

Sir Edward Coke, whose unwillingness to bend the judicial knee to King

James had procured his dismissal long since from the chief-justiceship;

and Noy, the genius who was shortly to turn against the Commons and

in his invention of ship money furnish a means whereby to lay taxes

without parliamentary assent. The interest of the crown was defended by

attorney-general Heath and Sergent Ashley. The king was in a dilemma;

he could not permit the petition to be brought in, in parliamentary

form, and he could not dissolve Parliament without losing five

subsidies which the commons had signified their willingness to grant

him.[339] He therefore tried to steer a middle course; he offered to

Parliament his royal word not to imprison unjustly and expressed his

willingness to confirm the charters. Coke, however, insisted upon a

specific statement of issues; any such hazy settlement of difficulties

as the king proposed was unlikely to be permanent; definiteness was

essential. To that end he proposed the drawing up of a Petition of

Right.

[The Petition of Right]

When the instrument was at last drawn up, it was sent to the House

of Lords. The lords attempted to introduce an amendment designed “to

leave entire that sovereign power,” as the proposed change itself ran,

“wherewith your Majesty is trusted for the protection, safety and

happiness of your people;”[340] but the commons would have none of it,

and at last the lords yielded their assent. The king at first gave a

cumbersome, evasive answer to the petition which was in reality no

answer at all,[341] and roused thereby a storm of indignation, which

exhibited itself in a movement to censure Buckingham. This the king

averted by signing the Petition of Right in the usual manner, and

received in consequence his five subsidies.[342]

[The statutes cited in the Petition]

The Petition which thus became a regularly passed Act of Parliament,

is of transcendent importance in the development of the control of

the people over the public purse. In terms absolutely unequivocal,

it asserts that “your subjects have inherited this freedom, that they

should not be compelled to contribute to any tax, tallage, aid, or

other like charge, not set by common consent in Parliament.” The

statutory sources whence that freedom was inherited are cited in

detail. The citations, are, however, ill-taken. _Statutum de tallagio

non concedendo_ was in all likelihood no statute at all, but a

chronicler’s abstract of Edward I’s Confirmatio Cartarum, or perhaps an

unauthoritative copy of the pardon which was granted to Humfrey Bohun

and Roger Bigod at approximately the same time with the Confirmation

of the Charters. It is not unlikely that the citation of the statute

of the 25th of Edward III was an error; at any rate, the text of the

statute has not been discovered,[343] and the date at which it was said

to be enacted was at the height of the great plague, a time scarcely

adapted to the assertion of a great constitutional principle. But

the precise historical foundation upon which Sir Edward Coke and his

associates based their charges against the king, is of quite secondary

importance. The true value of the Petition of Right lies in this, that

Charles I had been obliged to subscribe to a statutory provision by

which no man thereafter was to “be compelled to make or yield any gift,

loan, benevolence, tax, or such like charge, without common consent by

Act of Parliament.” That was indeed supremely important.

[The Petition of Right and customs duties]

But the language of the Petition of Right might reasonably be taken

to refer only to internal taxes and that the matter of customs

duties, the charges upon merchandise at the outports, was left still

in the air. Protests had indeed been made against the exaction of

these duties by the crown, especially during the reign of James in

the great agitation over the Book of Rates, but no statute had been

passed providing definitely for parliamentary control. To that end,

the commons delayed the passage of a bill which gave the king tunnage

and poundage for life, pending the acceptance by him of a remonstrance

against impositions. The remonstrance as framed by the commons declared

that “there ought not any imposition to be laid upon the goods of

merchants, exported or imported, _without the common consent by Act

of Parliament_.”[344] It further made assertion that the laying of

impositions at the outports was contrary to the Petition of Right. The

king’s attitude was decisive; before the remonstrance was handed to

him, he evaded the issue by proroguing Parliament. Never, so he said,

would he give away tunnage and poundage; he must needs retain them for

himself. The session ended 26th June, 1628.[345]

[Tunnage and poundage]

During the six months which elapsed before the reassembling of

Parliament, Charles continued to levy tunnage and poundage upon his

own authority, relying still upon the decision in the Bate Case for

his justification. Several merchants who refused to pay were promptly

clapped into prison; among those whose goods were seized for the same

reason was Henry Rolles, a member of the House of Commons. The second

session of Parliament was called for the 20th January, 1628-29; the

commons came together with no pretense of smothering their indignation

against the conduct of the king. A number of plans were brought forward

as means of rectifying the abuses. The evident determination of the

commons to conclude the matter, daunted the king. Summoning both Houses

to Whitehall, he renounced the right of levying tunnage and poundage.

“It ever was, and still is my meaning,” so were his words, “by the gift

of my people to enjoy it, and my intention in my speech at the end

of the last session was not to challenge tunnage and poundage as of

right, but _de bene esse_, showing you the necessity, not the right,

by which I was to take it until you had granted it to me, assuring

myself according to your general professions that you wanted time and

not good-will to give it me.”[346] For a moment it appeared as though

this abandonment of position by the king would end the conflict. Three

days after his reception of the Houses at Whitehall, Mr. Secretary

Cooke moved the reading of a bill granting him tunnage and poundage for

life. But it never passed. The commons were distracted by a question

of religious innovation, talked at great length over their religious

grievances, and allowed their momentary flush of cordial feeling

toward the king to cool. Mr. Secretary Cooke on the two days following

that upon which he made his motion regarding tunnage and poundage,

delivered messages from Charles urging haste in the consideration of

the measure.[347] On the 2nd February, the commons acknowledged the

receipt of the messages, but rather than pass a bill satisfactory to

the king in this particular, they stated their intent to “proceed with

religion.”[348]

On the 19th February they began a lengthy consideration of the breach

of privilege committed against the House of Commons in the seizure

of the goods of Henry Rolles, the merchant member of the House, who

had refused payment of tunnage and poundage during the recent recess.

The officers who had participated in the seizure of his goods were

summoned before the commons that they might answer for contempt. The

stand was taken against the king on this ground of privilege, instead,

as Pym advised, of objecting on the broad constitutional ground that

Parliament had not granted the tax. This hostility was too much for the

conciliatory spirit which Charles had evinced at the opening of the

session. Through Mr. Secretary Cooke, he announced his unwillingness

to have his officers questioned, since “what they did was by his own

direct command, or by order of the council-board, his Majesty himself

being present, and therefore, would not have it divided from his

act.”[349]

[Tumult in the Commons]

The question was fought out on the 2nd March, when the commons

reassembled after a brief recess. The king, hoping to arrange the

difficulty privately with the leaders of the House, ordered the

recess to be continued until the 10th March. To this the commons

entered vigorous protest; at the putting of the question, the vote was

overwhelmingly against adjournment. The speaker, Sir John Finch, in

obedience to the royal will, attempted to leave his chair, and thus

break up the session; but Holles and Valentine, two members most eager

for the consideration of the matters pressing for attention, pushed him

back into his seat. Sir John Eliot, who had drawn up three resolutions

expressing the mind of the commons on the questions of religion and

taxation, read them above the uproar. The speaker and the clerk refused

to put the vote and the king’s guard was already on its way to make

a forcible end to the proceedings. At the moment when the guardsmen

were at the door, Holles read the resolutions and they were carried

by acclamation. The House then adjourned in a tumult until the 10th

March.[350]

The resolutions were most explicit. The two which concerned the

impositions said: “Whosoever shall counsel or advise the taking and

levying of the subsidies of tunnage and poundage, not being granted

by Parliament, or shall be an actor and instrument therein, shall be

likewise reputed an innovator in the government and a capital enemy

to this kingdom and commonwealth.” And: “If any merchant or other

person whatsoever shall voluntarily yield or pay the said subsidies of

tunnage and poundage not being granted by Parliament, he shall likewise

be reputed a betrayer of the liberty of England, and an enemy to the

same.”[351]

When the House reconvened on the 10th March, the king dissolved

Parliament without further ado. With respect to such of the commons as

merited his displeasure he remarked that the vipers amongst them would

meet with their rewards.

[Charles’s eleven years without Parliament, 1629-40]

With the dissolution of his third Parliament, Charles entered upon a

new epoch in his reign; and at the conclusion of it, he found that his

game had been for too heavy stakes, and that he had lost. For eleven

years he did without a Parliament. He began by issuing a Declaration

addressed to his “loving subjects” in which he told the history of the

late session from his own point of view,--that he was in extreme need

of money with which to meet the necessities of England and relieve the

“miserable afflicted state” of Protestants abroad, that Parliament had

proved itself intractable, and had greatly delayed, contrary to all

precedent, in the matter of tunnage and poundage; not only that, but

upon his graciously yielding to Parliament the power of granting him

tunnage and poundage, it had raised up still another cause for delay in

the case of Henry Holles.[352] In a proclamation issued two weeks later

he plainly exhibited his intention to rule without a Parliament; “the

calling, continuing, and dissolving of them,” he said, “being always in

the King’s own power. And his Majesty shall be more inclinable to meet

in Parliament again when his people shall see more clearly into his

intents and actions, when such as have bred this interruption shall

receive their condign punishment.”[353]

[His financial expedients]

He imprisoned accordingly Holles, Strode, Sir John Eliot and others

whom he included amongst the vipers of the commons, and removed such

of them to the Tower as were able to sue out their writs of habeas

corpus, in order that he might thus elude the service of the writs. But

imprisonment was scarcely a means of relief to the king’s financial

exigencies. He turned to expedients which were exceedingly oppressive,

and most of them clearly illegal. He rigorously extorted tunnage and

poundage by the arbitrary authority of the crown; he reëstablished the

monopolies abolished under James I, and applied them to nearly every

article in common use; he revived laws long since dead and applied them

stringently for the sake of their fines; he revived forest legislation

and increased the limits of the royal woodlands, mulcting the owners of

adjoining property for encroachment; he searched titles of estates for

defects which would make them liable to reversion to the crown; he went

back to the old practice of compulsory knighthood for those who had

£40 or more in lands or rents.

[Ship money, first writ, 20th October, 1634]

But the supreme grievance was the extortion of ship money. Sir William

Noy, lately leader in the commons in defense of popular power against

royal prerogative, now become by the grace of the king attorney-general

and a chief supporter of that same royal prerogative, shut himself up

in the Tower for some days that he might better consult the ancient

authorities. “Shaking off the dust of ages from parchments in the

Tower,” says Hallam, “this man of venal diligence and prostituted

learning discovered that the seaports and even maritime counties had

in early times been sometimes called upon to furnish ships for the

public service; nay there were instances for a similar demand upon some

inland places.”[354] The first writ of ship money was directed to the

magistrates of London and other seaport towns, and was issued on the

20th October, 1634. It recited the depredations of pirates, “Turks,

enemies of the Christian name,” and the prevalence of war upon the

continent. It enjoined upon the magistrates the furnishing of ships

of specific tonnage and equipage by the 1st of the following March.

They were empowered to assess all the inhabitants according to their

substance, both for the fitting out of the ships and the maintenance

of their crews for the space of six months. Refusals to pay were

punishable by imprisonment. The writ was issued by the king with the

advice of the Privy Council.[355]

[The true occasion for the levy]

The show of precedent was barely an extenuation, not a justification

of the demand. As a matter of fact, it was virtually an extortion of a

tax, and as such was a distinct violation of the Petition of Right.

London, being the only port in the kingdom capable of constructing and

equipping ships of the character designated in the writs, was the only

town able to make literal compliance with the demand. The rest were

obliged to make money payments. But the matter was to come up later in

the courts, and the legality or illegality of the writs was there to

be decided. As for the occasion of the requisition denominated in the

ordinance, that was false. The design was not against “Turks, enemies

of the Christian name,” but against the Dutch Republic. Charles had

proposed a secret treaty with Spain whereby the government of the

Lowlanders should be overthrown and its territory be divided between

England and Spain.[356] Not only was this act of Charles a breach of

his recent great compact with the nation, but it had for its purpose

an act of aggression against the people who stood for the highest

political ideals then known in Europe, and was based on a lie.

[Second writ, 4th August, 1635. Its general application]

Sir John Finch, the chief justice of common pleas, the same who, as

speaker of the commons, had been forcibly held in his chair in order

to keep the House in session at the close of the last Parliament,

undertook the levying of ship money upon the death of Noy; he

advanced the fortunes of the writs by making them applicable to the

entire kingdom. On the 4th August, 1635, the demand made its second

appearance; it was to cover not only the needs of a navy, but to

furnish “a spring and magazine that should have no bottom, and for an

everlasting supply for all occasions.”[357] Instructions were included

in the writs to the sheriffs, by which the ships could be compounded

for by the counties, and the amount transmitted to the treasurer of the

navy for his Majesty’s uses. Payment was to be enforced.

[Third writ, 9th October, 1636]

A year later, the 9th October, 1636, the third assessment was laid.

Murmuring against the writs, which was common enough amongst the lower

classes in 1635, now spread to men of great position. The earls of

Danby and Warwick and other peers protested to the king, not so much

against the amount of the tax, as against the unconstitutional manner

of its levy. But Charles found it too profitable a means of income to

let go; he was the richer each year by some £200,000.

[Extra-judicial opinions]

The courts, however, seemed of contrary mind to the rest of the nation.

In November, 1635, at the instance of Sir John Finch, the following

extra-judicial opinion was delivered by the judges:--“I am of the

opinion that, as when the benefit doth more particularly redound to

the ports or maritime parts, as in case of piracy or depredations upon

the seas, that the charge hath been, and may be lawfully imposed upon

them according to precedents of former times; so when the good and

safety of the kingdom in general is concerned, and the whole kingdom

in danger (of which his Majesty is the only judge), then the charge of

the defence ought to be borne by all the realm in general. This I hold

agreeably both to law and reason.”[358]

On the 7th February, 1637, Charles laid the case before the judges of

the Exchequer extra-judicially in much the same terms as the opinion

of 1635. He requested an answer to the following question:--“When

the good and safety of the Kingdom in general is concerned, and the

whole Kingdom in danger, whether may not the King, by writ under the

Great Seal of England, command all the subjects of our Kingdom at

their charge to provide and furnish such a number of ships, with men,

victuals, and munition, and for such time as we shall think fit for the

defence and safeguard of the kingdom from such danger and peril, and

by law compel the doing thereof, in case of refusal or refractoriness:

and whether in such a case is not the King the sole judge both of the

danger, and when and how the same is to be prevented and avoided?”[359]

The opinion of the judges was ostensibly unanimous in favor of the

crown; Coke and Hutton as a matter of fact dissented, but subscribed on

the principle that the opinion of the majority should be that of the

whole body.

[Hampden’s Case, 1637]

In the face of this sweeping and conclusive opinion delivered privately

to the king, there was apparently no hope for any one who should have

to answer in that court for refusal. Shortly thereafter, however,

such a case came up. John Hampden, a gentleman of Buckinghamshire, had

refused to pay the assessment of 20_s._ which was laid upon some of his

lands, and by reason of his refusal was summoned to the Exchequer. He

appeared and answered to the charge in November, 1637. He was defended

by the brilliant Oliver St. John and Mr. Holborne. Solicitor General

Littleton and Attorney General Bankes conducted the case for the crown.

The question upon which the case was argued may be phrased as follows:

“Whether the king had a right on his own allegation of public danger

to require an inland county to furnish ships, or a prescribed sum of

money by way of commutation, for the defense of the kingdom?”[360] The

argument for Hampden can be summed up under five heads:

[The case for the defendant]

I. The law and constitution of England provide certain ordinary

revenues for the defense of the realm. These comprehend the military

forces provided by those holding lands by military tenure; the

liability of the Cinque Ports and others holding similarly to provide

a quota of ships, by reason of their tenure; the feudal and other

revenues inherent in the crown; the customs on wool and leather, and

tunnage and poundage, and other special dues which were wont to be

granted to the king in time of danger.[361]

II. The law and constitution of England provide certain extraordinary

revenues when the ordinary revenues should prove insufficient, and for

the defense of the realm. Chief among these were the subsidies and aids

which were granted in Parliament. That Parliament was the only body

capable of levying these charges was exhibited by the fact that the

kings of England were wont to denominate their arbitrary exactions as

“loans” and “benevolences.”

III. The statutes of the realm provided in most emphatic language

that no tax should be levied on the subject without the consent of

Parliament. The charter of the Conqueror, Magna Carta, especially

Confirmatio Cartarum and De Tallagio non Concedendo, the statutes

passed subsequently under Edward III, and more than all the others,

the Petition of Right, showed the utter illegality of the ship money.

IV. The citations by the crown of exactions similar to the ship money

did not demonstrate the lawfulness of the demand; they merely showed

precedents of such a general levy. The case must be decided by law, not

by precedents,--“_judicandum est legibus non exemplis_.”

V. In the present instance, the perils which the king cited were

insufficient to justify an unusual demand for money. The precedent of

the arbitrary actions of Queen Elizabeth at the time of the Armada

could in no wise be taken as a justification for so great an exercise

of the prerogative when the nation was at peace with the world; the

piratical acts of Turkish corsairs or even the insolence of rival

neighbors could not be reckoned amongst those imminent perils for which

a Parliament could provide too tardily.[362]

[A judgment for the crown]

The judgment was in favor of the crown seven to five. Three of

the minority based their decision upon the particular rather than

on general grounds; Croke and Hutton, however, denied the general

contention of the crown absolutely. Croke maintained that taxation

save by authority of Parliament is contrary to the common law and to

the statutes; that the exaction could not be defended upon the plea

of imminent danger; and that the extension to inland counties was not

legal or warranted by any legal precedent. The seven judges whose

opinions were favorable to the king, upheld the prerogative of the

crown as against the legislative power of Parliament. Sir John Finch,

chief justice of the common pleas, stated their attitude clearly.

“No act of Parliament,” he said, “can bar a king of his regality, as

that no lands should hold of him, or bar him of the allegiance of his

subjects or the relative on his part, as trust and power to defend his

people; therefore acts of Parliament to take away his royal power in

the defense of his kingdom are void; they are void acts of Parliament

to bind the king not to command the subjects, their persons, and

goods, and I say their money too; for no acts of Parliament make any

difference.”[363]

The effect of this decision upon the minds of the people was immediate;

it changed the payment of the ship money from a semi-voluntary gift

to the king into an extortion enforced by him. Previously they had

supposed that the ship money was paid out of sufferance, that if it

became too heavy, an appeal to the courts would be sufficient to remove

it; now they felt that the king had them by the throat and could force

them to do as he willed. Never was there a clearer issue; the king and

his prerogative against the commons and their long-developing rights;

the power of the king to levy taxes upon his own arbitrary authority

against taxation by the will of the taxed as expressed in Parliament.

[The Short Parliament, 1640]

The Scottish rebellion of 1638 which was waged for the defense of

religious freedom, and the interval of peace, beginning the 18th

June, 1639, which was used by Scots and English alike as a period of

armament, proved too much for Charles’s irregular financial supply.

Reluctantly he called his Fourth Parliament, commonly known as the

Short Parliament, for the 13th April, 1640. The assembly was, strange

to say, most moderate and loyal to the king. Charles through the

ex-Speaker Sir John Finch, now Lord Keeper, asked for a large supply

immediately, saying that he would listen to grievances afterwards.[364]

[Clash between the Houses]

The commons recalled instances wherein the royal word had been broken,

and preferred to withhold supply until the end of the session,

according to their familiar habit. They proceeded to inquire into the

Hampden case, and considered in detail the various occasions upon

which the law had been broken during their eleven years’ recess.

They appointed a committee to confer with the lords over a long list

of grievances, divided into the three departments of innovations in

religion, invasions of private property, and breaches of parliamentary

privilege.[365] At this Charles came forward with a gigantic piece of

tactlessness; thinking he saw a hole through which he could escape,

he tried to win the lords to his standard. Applying to them, they

voted and communicated to the House of Commons that “his Majesty’s

supply should have the precedency, and be resolved on before any other

matter whatsoever.”[366] To the commons this appeared an arrant breach

of privilege, it being their right that money bills should originate

in their House. The lords immediately adopted a conciliatory tone;

they renounced any intention of offending the commons. “The bill of

subsidies,” they admitted, “ought to have its inception and beginning

in your House; and that when it comes up to their lordships, and is by

them agreed unto, it must be returned back to you and be by your House

presented.”[367]

The king had reason to regret his intrusion since the dispute which he

had caused delayed a supply from the commons so much the more. He now

had recourse to a compromise. He offered the withdrawal of his claim

to ship money in consideration of a grant of twelve subsidies,[368]

payable in three years. The commons, perceiving that the proposition,

if acceded to, involved the tacit admission that the ship money

had been justly laid, insomuch as its removal was obtainable only

by purchase, refused to enter into the agreement. But the effect of

the message was not quite lost; on the contrary it seemed as though

the king would shortly receive his grant. At the moment when the

commons were on the point of deciding upon a supply, the amount to

be determined subsequently, Sir Henry Vane, secretary of state,

precipitated a crisis. He asserted that the supply would not be

accepted unless it were to the amount and in the manner designated in

the king’s message.[369] The next day, the 5th May, the king dissolved

his three-weeks-old Parliament, to his own great distress and the

trepidation of the nation.

[Dissolution of Parliament]

Charles employed the six months which intervened between the

dissolution of Parliament and the summons of the Long Parliament in

his usual occupations. He locked up several members of the House. He

exacted forced loans, created new monopolies, and levied ship money.

Prosecutions followed swiftly upon refusals to pay. “Coat and conduct

money,” a new exaction from the counties, was demanded to cover the

traveling expenses of recruits on their way to fight against the Scots.

He obtained six subsidies from the clergy whom he illegally kept in

convocation after the dissolution of Parliament.

[Sitting of the Long Parliament, 3rd November, 1640]

The wind of opposition was rising to a gale. With the sitting of the

Long Parliament, which convened on the 3rd November, 1640, the tempest

broke. The immediate occasion of the summons was the universal demand

of the people and the peers for a session of Parliament, coupled

with emptiness of the treasury which came with the commencement of

the disastrous Scottish war. The composition of the commons was

overwhelmingly anti-regal;[370] the popular leaders had been at work

in the counties ever since the dissolution of the Short Parliament

looking to the return of a strong majority in opposition to the king.

The assembly convened full of the idea that “they had now had an

opportunity to make their country happy by removing all grievances and

pulling up the causes of them by the roots, if all men would do their

duties.”[371]

Parliament lost no time in setting about its work. Proceedings were

immediately instituted looking to the impeachment of the Earl of

Strafford, Archbishop Laud, Finch, and six of the judges who had

figured in the ship money case. Various victims of the tyrannical

jurisdiction of the Star Chamber were set at liberty. The commons

exhibited their uncompromising hostility to the king by voting

assistance to their “brethren” the Scots, whose army was in possession

of much territory on the English side of the border. They granted them

£25,000 a month as long as their stay in England should be needful, and

in addition £300,000 as an indemnity.

[Royal exaction of tunnage and poundage declared illegal]

With such acts of open opposition to the king in process, it was

natural that Parliament should set itself to clean up all the abuses

which of recent times had crept into the government. Its actions were

not subversive of the constitution; on the contrary it left unassailed

many prerogatives of the king. On the 22nd June, 1641, Parliament

granted to the king tunnage and poundage for a length of time somewhat

less than two months[372] and in the same bill declared, “that it is

and hath been the ancient right of the subjects of this realm, that no

subsidy, custom, impost, or other charge whatsoever ought or may be

laid or imposed upon any merchandise exported or imported by subjects,

denizens, or aliens without common consent in Parliament.”[373] The Act

prescribed also the punishment which should be inflicted upon officers

who in time to come should exact payments not sanctioned by Parliament.

They were to “incur and sustain the pains, penalties, and forfeitures

ordained and provided by the Statute of Provision and Premunire made in

the sixteenth year of King Richard II, and shall also from thenceforth

be disabled during his life to see or implead any person in any action

real, mixed, or personal, or in any court whatsoever.” Thus was it

enacted that tunnage and poundage exacted by authority of the crown

was illegal, and protected merchants from being sued by the customs

officers in case of refusal to pay the unlawful imposition. The king

received tunnage and poundage by six subsequent acts for short terms

down to the 2nd July, 1642.

[The Ship Money Act, 7th August, 1641]

Six weeks later, on the 7th August, 1641, Parliament turned its

attention toward the matter of ship money. On that date it passed an

“Act for the declaring unlawful and void the late proceedings touching

Ship-Money, and for the vacating of all records and process concerning

the same.”[374] The act cites the Hampden Case and others of a similar

nature and outlines the plea of the royal prerogative as given in the

extra-judicial opinion of the judges. It condemns “all which writs and

proceedings” as being “utterly against the law of the land.” In greater

detail it enacts “that the said charge imposed upon the subject for

the providing and furnishing of ships commonly called ship money, and

the said extra-judicial opinion of the said justices ... and the said

judgment against John Hampden, were and are contrary to and against the

laws and statutes of this realm, the right of property, the liberty

of the subjects, former resolutions in Parliament and the Petition

of Right.” The act also provided that all particulars desired in the

Petition of Right should be “strictly holden and observed as in the

same Petition they are prayed and expressed.” The ship writs and the

Hampden judgment are specifically annulled.[375]

Thus came to an end the long chain of statutes which Parliament

from its inception had been forging to fetter the arms of the king

straining toward the prize of arbitrary taxation. The virtue of the

Long Parliament is thus commented upon by Hallam: “In the first place,”

he says, “it will appear ... that they made scarce any material change

in our constitution, such as it had been established and recognized

under the house of Plantagenet.... Thus in by far the greater part of

the enactments of 1641, the monarchy lost nothing that it anciently

possessed; and the balance of our constitution might seem rather to

have been restored to its former equipoise, than to have undergone

any change.... It is to be observed in the second place, that by these

salutary restrictions, and some new retrenchments of pernicious or

abused prerogative the Long Parliament formed our constitution such

nearly as it now exists.”[376] The legislation of 1641 in effect

restored to Parliament what power it nominally held two centuries

before.

[The Grand Remonstrance, 1st December, 1641]

A current of reaction now set in favorable to the king. The leaders in

the commons discovered that the popular support to their measures was

becoming weak, that the royalist party was recruiting adherents from

the former supporters of the opposition, that their own backing was by

a party, not by the nation. With the hope of winning back full national

adherence to Parliament, the Grand Remonstrance was framed by the House

of Commons and presented to the king, on the 1st December 1641.[377] It

purported to show the present state of the kingdom, the evil conditions

which Parliament had succeeded in bettering, and the darkness of the

future, if support were withdrawn from Parliament. With respect to

taxation, the Remonstrance recites the various illegalities and abuses

which the crown had practiced and the steps which the commons had taken

to provide for their correction. For future safeguard against their

return it suggests “that for the better preservation of the liberties

and laws, all illegal grievances and exactions should be presented and

punished at the sessions and assizes; and that judges and justices

should be sworn to the due execution of the Petition of Right and other

laws.”

[The Puritan Revolution]

With the delivery of the Grand Remonstrance, the contest for

Parliamentary taxation became of relatively small moment in the great

conflicts of the Puritan Revolution. The struggle over the impeachment

of Pym and the popular leaders in the House, the attempt of the king

to secure absolute command of the militia, the battles on the field

and in the House of Commons during the Civil War, the events which led

up to the execution of Charles--these were neither immediately caused

by the conflict over taxation nor did they have immediate effect upon

it. Taxation up to 1641 was a prime cause of opposition to the crown;

thereafter it ceased to be of so great importance.

[Accession of Charles II, 1660]

Charles II came to the throne in 1660 after the English people had

made an eleven years’ trial of a military despotism under a good

and moderate despot. His first Parliament, that of 1660, granted

him the proceeds of the customs for life. During the period of the

Commonwealth, the freedom from the feudal charges had been most

agreeable to those holding of the crown. Consequently, this Parliament

set itself to regulate the confused system of military tenure by the

simple expedient of abolition. The Great Contract which had been

proposed under James I for the same purpose, had been advocated in

vain. Now, however, the effort was successful. The feudal incidents,

such as wardships, marriages, knight’s service, as well as the three

feudal aids, knighting the king’s son, ransoming the king, and

furnishing dowry for his eldest daughter, were done away with. By this

great deprivation, the royal revenue was naturally much prejudiced.

Parliament made up the loss by granting to the crown an hereditary

excise on beer and some other liquors, increasing the royal revenue to

the annual value of £1,200,000.[378]

[Appropriation of supplies, 1665]

In 1665 the expenses incident to the Dutch War made it possible to

establish a principle which had been touched upon from time to time

since the days of Henry III. Sir George Downing, in the subsidy bill

of that year, introduced the provision that the money raised in

accordance with the bill, £1,250,000, be applicable solely to the

prosecution of the war, and that the money could not be paid out by

the Exchequer save by special warrant stating that as the purpose of

the payment. Clarendon opposed the measure as an encroachment upon the

honor of the crown, but Charles himself was not averse to it, mainly

by reason of his belief that the promised revenue would be thus more

acceptable to bankers as the security for loans. The appointment in the

following year of a commission to examine the public accounts in order

to determine the faithfulness with which the provision was carried

out, clinched the principle underlying its original passage. The bill

was the natural consequence of the liberty of appropriation enjoyed

under the Commonwealth. The exercise of the principle of appropriating

supplies in detail was not carried to its full extent until after

1689. Its importance is difficult to overestimate. It placed the

executive power in a position of perfect dependence upon the will of

Parliament, for the money requisite for any administrative act was to

be forthcoming only in accordance with the previously expressed intent

of Parliament.

[Reign of James II, 1685-88]

The reign of James II, who came to the throne in 1685 at the death

of Charles, was retrogressive. He assumed the crown with the full

intention of exercising arbitrary authority, and if he had not tried to

substitute Catholicism for the Established Church, there is little to

show that he would not at least for a time have succeeded. Before the

summons of his Parliament, which he called reluctantly notwithstanding

a lapse of five years under Charles without one, he continued to

himself the payment of the customs duties by proclamation. This illegal

act met with no serious objection from Parliament when it met. Nor

was this all; Parliament raised the permanent revenue of the king to

the annual amount of £2,000,000, and on the suppression of Monmouth’s

rebellion, gave him £700,000 more wherewith to support a standing army.

Thus did Parliament make James financially independent, provided he

was content to live within reason, and gave him an army in addition.

This was a combination of powers which on the Continent had sufficed to

create despotisms.

[William and Mary]

That it did not create a despotism in England is not greatly to be

wondered at. James set himself to fighting the battle of the Roman

Catholic church in England. The result was almost immediate disaster.

On the 5th November, 1688, William, Prince of Orange, and Stadtholder

of the United Provinces, landed at Torbay in Devonshire. He was

requested by seventy of the lords spiritual and temporal (all who

were then in London), by the members of the House of Commons which

met in the last Parliament of Charles II, and the corporation of the

City of London, to assume the provisional government of the kingdom

pending a session of Parliament. This was called for the 22nd January,

1688-89. On the 13th February following, a tender of the crown was

made to William, on the conditions denominated in the recently framed

Declaration of Right. In it the illegal acts of King James were recited

and the announcement was made that the throne had been abdicated;

it was asserted also that certain specified acts of King James were

illegal, and a resolution was appended settling the crown on William

and Mary. William, speaking for himself and for the Princess Mary,

“thankfully accepted what had been offered them.”

[The Bill of Rights, 1689]

The Declaration of Right, with some slight but essential changes,

was incorporated at the second session of this Parliament, the 25th

October, 1689, in statutory form known subsequently as the Bill of

Rights.[379] In the matter of taxation, it sums up in a few clauses the

whole principle which had been in course of evolution since the German

chieftains received gifts of cattle and fruits from their people.

It states that King James “did endeavor to subvert and extirpate ...

the laws and liberties of this kingdom ... by levying money for and to

the use of the crown, by pretense of prerogative, for other time and in

other manner than the same was granted by Parliament.” Then follows the

definite assertion, “that levying money for or to the use of the crown

by pretense of prerogative, without grant of Parliament for longer time

or in other manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal.”

The clause which gave to these statements the force of law, emphasizes

the power of Parliament. “All which their Majesties are contented and

pleased,” so it goes, “shall be declared, enacted, and established

by authority of this present Parliament, and shall stand, remain,

and be the law of this realm forever; and the same are by their said

Majesties, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords spiritual

and temporal, and Commons, in Parliament assembled, and by the

authority of the same, declared, enacted and established accordingly.”

With the passing of the Bill of Rights the principle was vindicated in

its fullness that Parliament rather than the crown has the power to

tax. Within Parliament itself the power of laying taxes had undergone

further differentiation in that the House of Commons claimed the

sole right of initiating tax levies. The theory deduced therefrom,

that the House of Commons has sole control over money bills and that

interference by the House of Lords is an assumption of power beyond

the constitutional rights of that House, came up for fuller definition

220 years later. The corollary principle that Parliament has the power

to appropriate supplies for specific purposes and that it can demand

an accounting for the money so appropriated were accorded general

acquiescence then and thereafter.

INDEX

Accounts, examination of, 186-188;

appointment of treasurers under Richard II, 191-194;

under Charles II, 303;

after Bill of Rights, 308.

Aid _pur fille marier_, Edward I, 121.

Ancient Customs, rate stated, 165.

Anglo-Saxons, their early ideas of taxation, 3.

Appropriation of Supplies, 184-186;

declaration under Henry VI, 210;

under Charles II, 303-304;

after Bill of Rights, 308.

Assize of Arms, 35.

_Auxilium vicecomitis_, 27, 29.

Bate Case, 241-242;

opinions of the Barons, 242-244;

position of Parliament, 244;

Book of Rates, 245;

remonstrance by Parliament, 246-248.

Becket, Thomas, his controversy with Henry II, 27-30.

Benevolence, a form of extortion, 214;

prohibiting statute of Richard III, 216-217;

Morton’s Crotch, 220;

Shoring or Under-propping Act, 221;

Henry VIII’s “amiable graunte,” 225;

under James I, 253;

St. John’s Case, 253-254;

under Charles I, 264, 267, 272, 294.

Bigod, Roger, dispute with Edward I, 135-138.

Bill of Rights, 306-308.

Bohun, Humfrey, dispute with Edward I, 135-138.

Book of Rates, 245.

Buckingham, 262-264, 265, 269.

Burghers, at Parliament of 1265, 102-103;

acquire function of taxing, 116-119.

_Carta Mercatoria_, 158;

complaint against, 162.

Carucage, 43, note 1;

imposition by Richard I, 43;

a revival of the Danegeld, 35, note 1;

levy of 1198, 44;

“assessed” by the Common Council, 77-78.

Charles I, his accession, 261;

signs Petition of Right, 269;

renounces tunnage and poundage, 274-275;

rules without Parliament, 279.

Charles II, his accession, 302;

death, 304.

Clergy, John’s antagonism of, 55;

need of their assent to taxation recognized, 125;

meet separately, 131, note 1;

attempted taxation of by Parliament, 1449, 210;

taxation after English Reformation, 228-230.

_Clericis laicos_, 133, note 1;

tendency to disregard, 1297, 142, 145;

adduced in 1301, 156.

Common Council, no provision for London representatives made in Magna

Carta, 66;

its composition, 66-68;

representation, 68-69;

part in taxation in early years of Henry III, 77-78;

grants a tax on movables, 1224, 79-81;

instances of refusal, 1232 and 1237, 81-82;

refuses a grant, 1242, 85;

its control over taxation in 1250, 91-92;

knights of the shires called, 1254, 92-94;

its control of disbursements, see Disbursements.

Commons, House of, foreshadowed in Parliament of 1265, 102, 103;

meets separately, 189, 190;

initiation of tax levies, 205-208, 308;

composition dictated by James I, 238;

revival of impeachment, 256;

breach of privilege in Short Parliament, 293.

_Commune Concilium_, see Common Council.

Conditional grant, early instance of, 1224, 79-80;

repetitions, 81-82.

_Confirmatio Cartarum_, action prior to, 142-144;

signed by Edward I, 145;

analysis of tax clauses, 146-150;

marks a stage in Parliamentary taxation, 152-153.

Contributions, voluntary, among the early Germans, 2, 3.

Cowel’s “Interpreter,” 248.

Customs, in early England, 113, note 1;

_Carta Mercatoria_, 158;

statutory provision for control by Parliament, Edward III, 177-178;

persistence of the struggle over customs, 179-180;

Bate Case, 242-244;

Book of Rates, 245;

collection ordered by Charles I, 265;

omission in Petition of Right, 273.

See also under New Customs, Ancient Customs.

Danegeld, origin 991 and early instances, 6-7;

authority for its exaction, 8-9;

reimposition under the Conqueror, 15-16;

under William Rufus, 18;

Stephen’s promise of abolition, 25-26;

supposed cause of Woodstock Controversy, 27, note 3;

its disappearance from the Rolls, 35, and note 1;

revival as “carucage,” 35, 43.

_De tallagio non concedendo_, 150-151, 159, 167;

cited in Petition of Right, 271.

Disbursements, rejection of commission for, 82-83, 85;

demand for supervision of, 87-88;

Matthew Paris’s scheme, 88.

Distraint of Knighthood, 117, 123;

resorted to by Charles I, 281;

made illegal, 299, note 1.

Divine right, etc., in taxation, 236;

assertion by Charles I, 266.

Domesday Survey, 17.

Duties, Bate Case, 242-244;

Book of Rates, 245.

See under Customs.

Edward I, accession, 107;

his character, 107-108;

dispute over foreign service, 134-137;

his financial preparations for the Gascon expedition, 1297, 140;

his part in attainment of Parliamentary taxation, 153;

last years of his reign, 157-159;

his death, 159.

Edward II, his accession, 159-160;

deposition, 169.

Edward III, accession and coronation, 169-170;

death of, 188.

The History of Parliamentary Taxation in England · 第 9 / 10 章