under heavy fire that I sent a complimentary note both to the
battalion and to General Joubert, commanding the 58th Brigade on the
other side of the Canal--for the battalion belonged (to start with) to
his brigade. They published both my notes in the _Ordre du Jour_ of
the Division, and d'Oullenbourg received a Légion d'Honneur in
consequence (so St André told me). Anyway, he thoroughly deserved it.
Meanwhile we heard that the Cheshires, Manchesters, and K.O.S.B.'s
were all held up near Violaines by a beastly sugar factory which the
Germans occupied on the road north of La Bassée, and they could not
get on at all.
Generals Morland and Franklin turned up in the afternoon. We were
perpetually being urged to advance and attack, but how could we? There
was nothing to attack in front of us except La Bassée, a couple of
miles off, and we could not advance a yard in that direction without
exposing our right flank to a deadly enfilade fire from across the
Canal, for the Germans were still strongly holding that infernal
railway triangle, and nothing availed to get them out of it.[11]
General Morland wisely, therefore, ordered me not to advance in force.
[Footnote 11: They are still there (August 1917)!]
Later on we heard that the Cheshires had made a gain of 800 yards, but
had got so extended that they asked for a Bedford company to support
them, and this I sent.
In the evening I went to examine a French 75 mm. battery, and had the
whole thing explained to me. The gun is simply marvellous, slides
horizontally on its own axle, never budges however much it fires, and
has all sorts of patent dodges besides: but it is no use painting the
lily!
Wilson, of the 61st Howitzers, was, by the way, a little aggrieved by
this French battery coming and taking up its position close alongside
him and invading his observing stations. The captain also got on his
nerves, for he was somewhat excitable, and his shells were numerous
that burst prematurely, whilst a house only 100 yards off, which
should have been well under the trajectory of his shells, was several
times hit by them. However, he doubtless caused much damage to the
enemy.
On the 20th and 21st the Germans kept us fairly busy with threatened
attacks, especially on the Cheshires at Violaines; but nothing
definite happened, although we were kept on the perpetual _qui vive_,
and could not relieve our feelings by attacking, for we had orders to
"consolidate our position."
By this time we occupied a line as follows:--
Canal from crossed swords (_v._ map) to 300 yards North (French).
Thence to Canteleux (excl.) (Devons).
Canteleux to Pt. 21[12](Norfolks).
Pt. 21 to Violaines (Do. patrols).
Violaines (Cheshires and one company Bedfords).
Givenchy, in reserve (three companies Bedfords).
[Footnote 12: Nearly halfway to Violaines.]
On the evening of the 21st there was serious news on our left.
Although the Cheshires were still in occupation of Violaines, it
looked as if they might have to retire from it very soon, as the right
of the 14th Brigade, on the Cheshires' left, was being driven back.
Violaines, however, was very important, and to let the Germans get a
footing here was most dangerous. So, with General Morland's sanction,
and after communicating with the Cheshires, who cheerily said they
could hold out all right, I told the Cheshires to stick to Violaines,
throwing their left flank back in case the line to their left was
penetrated.
_Oct. 22nd._
A very anxious day ensued. At 6 A.M. the Cheshires were invaded in
front and flank by a surprise attack of the enemy in great force, and
had to fall back towards Rue du Marais, losing heavily. Some Dorsets
(who had been for the last three days at Stink Farm and were sent as
a support to the 13th Brigade) were supporting them, but they could
not do much, and they also lost a number of men. From what I could
gather, the Cheshires had been digging in the dark round the southern
and eastern flank of the village, and had their sentries out, but
apparently not quite far enough out for such thick weather, and when
the Germans appeared rushing through the fog they were taken at a
disadvantage, for they had cast their equipment in order to dig, and
the covering party was quickly cut down.
This, at all events, was what I made out from the surviving officers,
of whom one, 2nd Lieut. Pogson, was the senior. Mahony and Rich,
fighting gallantly, had been killed, and Shore wounded and taken
prisoner. About 200 men were also killed and wounded out of about 600,
and a good many of the Bedfords with them, including poor Coventry
(late Transport officer) killed.
At 8.30 A.M. I was ordered to send my three companies of Bedfords from
Givenchy to St Roch, to support the 13th Brigade, who were hanging on
about Rue du Marais. But, besides thus depriving me of my only
reserve, these companies had great difficulty in getting to their
places, as the country over which they had to pass was heavily shelled
by the enemy, and they took a long time getting there.
I heard that the combined 13th and 14th Brigades were to make a
counter-attack on Rue du Marais in the afternoon, and this was
certainly attempted. But owing to the mix-up of their battalions in
the enclosed country it was impossible to arrange a combined movement
under the heavy fire, and it was eventually given up--merely confused
fighting taking place during the afternoon. It was, however,
sufficient to stop the Germans for the time being. One reason for the
difficulty--as I afterwards heard--was that the officer temporarily
commanding the 13th Brigade had, by some mischance, got stuck right in
the firing line with his staff and signal section, and could not be
got at, nor could he move himself or issue orders,--a useful though
unhappy warning to Brigadiers.
I moved with the Brigade Staff from my house at Givenchy to another
house about 600 yards west of Festubert, so as to be more behind the
centre of my Brigade.
During the night, in pursuance of orders from the Division, we fell
back on to a somewhat undefined line of defence covering the front of
Festubert-Givenchy, and proceeded to dig ourselves in along a line
entirely in the open fields, and very visible, I fear, to the enemy.
Some battalions could not get sufficient tools, and were not half dug
in by daylight. However, the Germans must have suffered considerably
themselves, for they did not attack us in the morning, although their
Field Artillery kept up a heavy shrapnel fire. The West Ridings (13th
Brigade) were put under my orders.
_Oct. 23rd._
We were shelled all the morning, but had no serious casualties.
My Brigade now consisted of the Devons (14th Brigade), West Ridings
(13th Brigade), and the Norfolks (15th Brigade). The remains of the
Cheshires and Dorsets were withdrawn and put into the Rue de Béthune
hamlet in rear of Festubert, under orders of the 13th Brigade as their
reserve, whilst the Bedfords were attached to, I think, the 14th
Brigade, somewhere Quinque Rue way. It was a glorious jumble, and what
happened to the rest of the 13th Brigade I do not know. I believe
they combined in some way with the 14th, but I know that two days
afterwards the Brigadier was left with only one fighting battalion,
the West Kents, I think.
However, my command was shortly increased considerably by the arrival
of Commandant Blanchard with the 2nd Battalion of the 70th Infanterie
de Ligne (Regulars). Blanchard was a good solid man, and I put him to
hold Givenchy in conjunction with the Devons, who were now occupying
the Bedford trenches there. The French on the right of the 70th gave
us acute reason for anxiety by retiring calmly from their trenches
when they were shelled; but it was only their way, for half an hour
afterwards they trotted back into them quite happily, much to the
relief of the Devons and their exposed flank.
I rode down to Givenchy in the afternoon to see Blanchard and make
arrangements for holding the village, and here I met Williams (now
commanding the Devons since his C.O., Gloster, had been hit two days
before, not very seriously) and talked matters over with him.
We expected a night attack, and were certainly not in a strong
position to resist it. Had we been driven in we should have been
jammed into the swamp in rear, between the Canal and the
Gorre-Festubert road, which would have been extremely unpleasant. So I
issued orders to hold tight at all costs, besides secret orders to
certain C.O.'s as to what they were to do if we were badly mauled and
had to fall back.
Luckily no attack took place, and we had a fairly quiet night.
_Oct. 24th._
At 7 A.M. I received the encouraging news (from the 2nd corps) that we
were going to be heavily attacked to-day, and what certainly gave
colour to it was the arrival of a large number of Black Marias during
breakfast, which exploded within an unpleasantly narrow radius of our
house. It is quite conceivable that the position of our Headquarters
had been given away by some spy. Anyhow, it looked like it, and we
decamped at 9.30 to a cottage half a mile back. Perhaps it is as well
that we did so, for at 9.40 a big shell arrived through the roof and
exploded in my late bedroom, tearing out the corner of the house wall
and wrecking the stable; whilst nearly at the same moment another
shell completely wrecked the house just opposite, where Ballard
(commanding 15th Brigade R.F.A.) had been spending the night. He also
had cleared out about an hour before.
Before I went I sent my senior officer, Ballard (Norfolks), down to
Givenchy to take local command over the French and English troops
there, and am glad I did so, for it introduced unity of command and
satisfaction. The Devons down there were meanwhile getting exhausted
after their long spell in the trenches; but I had no troops to relieve
them with, nor any reserve.
The "attack" did not materialize, and we had a fairly quiet afternoon,
the Germans limiting their activities to digging themselves in and
sniping perpetually.
It was an extraordinarily warm day, and we sat in the cottage with
windows and doors wide open till long after dark. An attack was made
about 10 P.M. on the French the other side of the Canal, but it was
too far off to interest us much.
_Oct. 25th._
Another lovely warm day of Indian summer. Also of many shells, some
falling pretty close to our cottage. The Germans were seen making
splendid use of the folds in the ground for driving saps and
connecting up their heads into trenches getting nearer and nearer to
our lines. And we could do nothing but shell them and snipe them as
best we could, but with little result, for artillery observation-posts
were almost impossible, and snap-shooting at an occasional head or
shovel appearing above ground produced but small results.
Three French batteries arrived during the morning and were put under
Blanchard's orders in the swampy wood behind Givenchy. Some spasmodic
attacks occurred on the trenches east of the village, and the French
lost rather heavily; for the Germans got into some of their evacuated
trenches and killed the wounded there. A speedy counter-attack,
however, drove them out again. The Devons lost two officers (Besley
and Quick) and ten men killed and thirty-eight wounded.
At 4.50 P.M. I got a message saying large columns of the enemy had
been seen by the French issuing from La Bassée and Violaines, and I
was ordered peremptorily to be ready to counter-attack at once, with
my whole force if required.
Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien arrived alone an hour or so afterwards, and I
pointed out our situation to him; he entirely concurred in my view,
and heartened me up considerably by quite recognising the state of
affairs and congratulating us, and especially the Devons, on sticking
it out so well.
Maynard (Major in the Devons) arrived about midnight and took over
command of the battalion, he having been on the staff of the 2nd
Corps.
_Oct. 26th._
Next morning I rode out again to Givenchy to see Ballard and my fresh
French troops; for the 6/285th (Captain Gigot), the 5/290th
(Commandant Ferracci--a typical little Corsican and a good soldier),
and a squadron of Chasseurs à Cheval had arrived to strengthen us,
besides the three batteries aforesaid (under Commandant Menuan). The
2/70th (now under Captain de Ferron) and the 6/295th (lately under
Baron d'Oullenbourg, now wounded; I have, I fear, forgotten his
successor's name) were, of course, also under me; so I had a nice
little command now of three English and four French battalions, four
English and three French batteries, and a French squadron. St André as
liaison officer was of the greatest possible use to me, being both
tactful and suggestive as to dealing with my new command, and keeping
up splendid communication.
I then relieved the Devons by the 6/295th--and well they deserved it
after their bad time for the last week,--and put the 296th in reserve
at various points during the night, sending the Devons as reserve to
the Norfolks and West Ridings at Les Plantins, between Givenchy and
Festubert.
There was practically no shelling at all during the whole day--I
wonder why; nor did the enemy make any movement. But we heard of their
bringing big guns on to the rising ground at Billy and Haisnes, to the
south of La Bassée, and tried to "find" them with our howitzers and
heavy artillery battery.
_Oct. 27th._
The reliefs were not finished till 2.30 A.M.--largely owing to some
idiots, French or English, loosing off their rifles as they left the
trench, which brought a heavy fire on us from the enemy and delayed
matters for a long time. It was also not easy--although we had made
elaborate and detailed arrangements--to relieve British by French
troops in pitch darkness, for, interpreters being scarce, they could
not understand each other when they met.
We heard that there was an attack on the 14th Brigade on our left
about 1 A.M., and that 200 Germans had got in behind the K.O.Y.L.I.
and were still there; what happened to them I do not know. The 7th
Brigade, on the left of the 14th, had also been driven in, and the
14th Brigade received orders to make a counter-attack in the evening,
with the Devons held ready to help them if required.
During the day one Captain Pigeonne and his batch of gendarmerie
arrived, with orders to clear Festubert of its civilian inhabitants.
This was necessary, as the Germans were pretty close up to it and
there were undoubtedly spies, and even snipers were reported in and
about the village. But hardly any people were found except the lunatic
inhabitants of a small asylum, together with their staff, who had
stayed there, both men and women, most devotedly for the last week,
with practically nothing to eat in the whole place. The inhabitants
were ordered to clear out, and some of them did. But others hid, and
yet others crept back again by night, so the result was practically
_nil_. One poor old woman was hunted out three times, but she returned
yet once more, piteously saying that she had nowhere to go to, and
wanted to die in her own house.
During the evening General Joubert, commanding the 58th Brigade,
arrived with orders to take over command of all French troops north of
the Canal. So my international command had not lasted long. But they
sent me a liaison N.C.O. of their artillery--a most intelligent man
with a yellow beard--and I was still allowed to call on the French
batteries for assistance whenever I needed them.
_Oct. 28th._
Joubert was a typical French General, white-moustached, short,
courteous, gallant, and altogether charming and practical, and I went
again to see and consult him next morning at Givenchy, cantering
through the swampy woods at the back, where most of our seven
batteries were posted under excellent cover. I also, before going to
bid him adieu, had written him what I thought was a charming letter,
congratulating him on the "galanterie de ses troupes." Alas, St André
was out when I wrote the letter, or probably I should have expressed
it differently; I hear it was subsequently published in orders, but I
trust it was edited first!
The night had been extraordinarily quiet, and after my visit to
Joubert the situation was so peaceful that I walked back a bit to
inspect a third line of trenches that were being dug by civilians and
spare troops under R.E. supervision. I was not much edified at the
portion that the 15th Brigade had been told off to, for it was within
150 yards of a bunch of houses in front, under cover of which the
Germans could have come up quite close; and if they had put a
selection of their snipers into them, we should have had a poor time.
But I quite allow that I was at a loss, owing to the awkward ground,
to suggest anything better. We had also a mile of front to cover, with
three weak battalions and a difficult line, whilst the four French
battalions had been allotted altogether only half a mile of excellent
natural trenches behind the Canal, or rather behind a broad
water-ditch which ran into the Canal.
The 2nd Manchesters, under Strickland,[13] late of the Norfolks, a
first-rate battalion just arrived from India, had now been attached to
the 14th Brigade--where their own 1st battalion were also--and had had
very heavy fighting during the last few days just north of Festubert.
The Devons were therefore sent to relieve them,--rather rough on them
after barely forty-eight hours out of the trenches.
[Footnote 13: Who had been with me as a Major in Belfast--a
most capable officer, now (1917) commanding a Division.]
_Oct. 29th._
We had an extraordinarily quiet night--a full eight hours' sleep
without any disturbance,--and we were consequently feeling much
fitter. But the ball began full early by a violent attack on the
Devons at dawn, and another at 7 on the 2nd Manchesters, both hard
pressed, but both repulsed--the Manchesters, who were short of
ammunition, getting well in with the bayonet.
I sent one company of the Norfolks to support the Devons, but I could
barely afford even that. The enemy was entrenching within 200 to 400
yards of all my battalions, pushing out saps from their trenches along
the ditches and folds of the ground, and connecting up their heads in
a most ingenious and hidden manner. The French were not attacked, so
they sent a couple of companies at my request to Les Plantins, behind
the Norfolks. However, after another attack between 9 and 10 A.M. the
Germans dried up for the present.
We knew that the Indian Divisions from Lahore and Meerut were shortly
coming to strengthen this part of the line, and I was therefore not
surprised to hear that Macbean, commanding one of their Brigades,
wanted to see Martyn[14] and me about the relief of our respective
Brigades. This was distinctly satisfactory from our point of view; but
I was not entirely happy, for I was very doubtful how far these
untried Indian troops would stand up to what was evidently going to be
a very difficult situation if the Germans went on attacking as they
had been doing. Fresh troops, it is true. But they had had no
experience of this sort of fighting, nor of trenches, nor of cold wet
weather: and they were going to have all three.
[Footnote 14: Temporarily commanding 13th Brigade.]
The relief of the West Ridings by the Black Watch battalion of the
Indian Division was carried out on the same evening. The relief of the
Bedfords, Cheshires, and Dorsets was also arranged for, but the
Norfolks could not be relieved till the morrow. The 2nd Manchesters
were relieved, however, by the 2/8th Gurkhas, who looked very much out
of place with their big hats and tiny, sturdy Mongolian physique.
_Oct. 30th._
After a very quiet night--except for French guns which started
shelling heavily about 4 A.M., and kept us awake till daylight--we had
another unpleasant day.
There were repeated attacks on the Devons and Gurkhas all day, and at
3 P.M. Maynard reported that the Gurkhas had lost all their British
officers and were being driven out of their trenches, and that support
was badly wanted.
The first story about the Gurkhas was that they had come to an end of
their ammunition and were fighting with the bayonet, but were driven
back by superior numbers. But it turned out later that they lost very
heavily from shell fire, and, the trenches being too deep for the
little men, they could produce no effect with their rifles, and could
see nothing. So, having lost all their English officers, and being
bewildered by the heavy fire and totally new conditions, and having no
chance of getting in with the bayonet, they cleared out one by one, so
as to get together into formation. The Devons' last man was in the
firing line by this time, and so two Bedford companies and the West
Ridings, no longer under my command, were ordered to retake some
Gurkha trenches, into which the Germans had already penetrated,
alongside ours.
It was frightfully difficult to make out what was happening, as not
only were our troops in process of being relieved by the Indians, but
there was very heavy fire as well on all our supports and on the roads
leading up to the trenches, so that communication was all but
impossible, most telephone wires having been broken long ago and found
impossible to repair under such fire.
The 58th (Wilde's) Rifles had arrived, and were by way of relieving
the Norfolks; but owing to this attack they were deflected in rear of
the Devons. Then we were called on to send two companies to support
the Devons. But, considering that they now had already two Bedford
companies, four of West Ridings, and four of the 58th Rifles, to
support them in enclosed country where they could hardly move, and
that to weaken my already very thin line of Norfolks and Black Watch
meant leaving me no supports at all, I respectfully protested, and
gained my point.
Elaborate arrangements were made by the authorities for retaking the
lost trenches by the Bedfords, &c., at nightfall; then the movement
was deferred till 1.30 A.M., and then till dawn; but nothing happened
at all during the night except occasional fire-bursts, which sounded
like general attacks.
I might mention that during these "quiet" nights there were numerous
fire-bursts at intervals, which used to bring me out of, or rather
off, my bed three or four times a night, for the sentry on our cottage
had strict orders to call me in case anything alarming occurred in our
front. But they always slacked off after 5 or 10 minutes of my
waiting in the cold, wet, muddy road, and I crept to bed again till
the next one woke me.
It was a tiny cottage that we lived in during those days, belonging to
a poor woman who, with her child, had been turned out by some one else
and sent to another house half a mile off. She was perpetually coming
back and weeping to be readmitted, but there really was not room, and
we had to soothe her with promises, and eventually with cash in order
to get rid of her. After all, she was living with her friends, though
doubtless they were a bit crowded, and she returned to her cottage
when we left it.
Everything in that country was mud, thick clay mud, black and greasy,
and the country flat and hideous. And it rained perpetually and was
getting beastly cold. Altogether it was a nightmare of a place, even
without the fighting thrown in, and we prayed to be delivered from it,
and go and fight somewhere else.
Our prayers were destined to be answered, for on this morning we were
ordered, in spite of the desultory fighting going on, to hand over
to Macbean's Brigade and go north. This only meant the Brigade Staff,
two companies Bedfords, and about 300 Cheshires and 300 Dorsets who
had been in reserve to the 14th Brigade; but they were not in a very
happy condition, for they had hardly any officers left and had been
extremely uncomfortable for the last week, being hauled out of their
barns on most nights and made to sleep in the wet open as supports in
case of attack.
Our orders were, together with the 15th R.F.A. Brigade, to move north
and concentrate near Strazeele and Pradelles, where we were to go into
rest for five or six days.
I knew those rests.