CHAPTER XVII.

THE BATTLE ON MONDAY--DEFEAT OF THE ENEMY'S RIGHT

WING--FIRMNESS OF THE LEFT--GALLANT CONDUCT OF GEN.

HURLBUT--COL. JOHNSON IN COMMAND OF A PART OF OUR

DIVIDED BRIGADE--VICTORY--FLIGHT OF THE ENEMY AND

FAILURE TO PURSUE.

All night the troops of Buell continued to cross. Regiment after

regiment filed up the bluff, took position in line of battle, and

awaited the dawn of day. During the fore part of the night, a moist,

warm breeze blew from the south. About 10 P. M. the sky was overcast,

and there began a drizzling, uncomfortable rain. Nevertheless, the

soldiers, blanketless and weary, lay down and slept.

No one who has not experienced it knows with what a sleep a soldier

sleeps after a great battle. But ours was interrupted at regular

intervals by the jar of the gunboat howitzer, which had been ordered

to throw shells during the night to annoy the enemy. Thus awakened

and closing our eyes again to sleep, we saw in our brain-fever

all the terrible images of the day's battle--hedges of glittering

bayonets; blue masses swaying to and fro; and that last appalling

image, the army in retreat--gigantic even in ruin, sublime in its own

dismay. These images, flitting ghostlike and without effort through

our minds seemed to possess the reality of day. Could I have produced

them on canvas as I saw them in my mind that night, what a panorama

it would have been.

But the generals could not have slept, they were busy with the

preparations for the morning's battle. During the night two divisions

and a part of a third succeeded in getting across. Lines of battle

grew in the darkness and extended themselves over the hills. All

expected victory. The plan was an admirable one--to turn the enemy's

right and get possession of the Pittsburg and Corinth road, his only

line of retreat. But of this of course the men knew nothing. Buell's

men were as weary with marching as we with fighting, and all slept.

The day dawned. Our men arose and awaited the order to advance. The

enemy, too, began to form his lines of battle. To his soldiers,

who knew nothing of our being reinforced, our capture was expected

without difficulty. "We will have them by eight o'clock," said some.

Others thought we would hold out till nine and possibly later. Both

hosts were full of expectation. With what a shock, then, would they

join! Nevertheless the enemy formed his ranks slowly. His officers

had to use curses and threats to induce the men to move with

sufficient alacrity. Weary with yesterday's battle, added to their

previous fatigues, a stupor clung to their limbs which not even a

sense of their situation could dissipate.

Suddenly they heard the reports of rifles. Their pickets driven

in announced the advance of our troops. In a moment our infantry

confronted them. If the earth had sunk under their feet they could

not have been more stupified. Batteries mounted the crests of the

ridges and thundered at them. Lines of skirmishers appeared and

vanished, followed by full battalions advancing at a charge and

shouting victory! victory! It was not possible that the broken host

of yesterday had renewed its strength and were turning upon them. No,

Buell was on the field. They realized it immediately, expected the

worst, and determined to meet the shock like men.

The Fourth Division rested at this time on the bluffs as a reserve.

We listened with great impatience to the noise of battle on the

left, and to the frequent reports that came to us from that part of

the field. The firing rose and continued heavily for two or three

hours, growing the while more and more distant. The end of this

beginning is known. The enemy fought desperately, inflicting upon

us heavy loss, but he was forced back several miles, losing part of

his artillery. By nine o'clock his stragglers began to pace through

the woods towards Corinth, reporting Buell on the field and the day

lost. By twelve o'clock this part of his lines seems to have been

pushed nearly to Shiloh Springs, and crumbling and streaming through

the woods, is said to have left the field in rout. Why Buell did

not get possession of the Corinth road is more than the troops who

subsequently passed over this ground could understand. It must have

been owing to the stubborn resistance our attack met with on the

center and right. Here the battle rose as soon as it was well in

progress on the left, and raged heavily and with varying fortunes

until four o'clock in the afternoon.

About ten o'clock General Hurlbut was ordered to move forward his

division and reinforce the right. "Here," said the General, looking

at his fragments of battalions, "is what I am ordered to march

against the enemy." He then ordered the regiments to be counted. The

3d Iowa numbered one hundred and forty men, and First Lieutenant

George W. Crosley, as ranking officer, was in command. We moved by

the flank, the First Brigade in advance, and General Hurlbut and

Colonel Pugh at the head of the column. Thus this remnant of the

Fourth Division, gallant men whom nothing could dismay, led by a

general whom in one day they had learned to love, again moved forward

into the battle. Having advanced perhaps a mile, we came within range

of the enemy's shells, which fell in the rear of our line in this

part of the field with great rapidity. This firing fortunately did us

no damage. We reached the point we were ordered to support, and the

division was drawn up in front. The battle here raged heavily, and

the line in front of us which was engaged swayed to and fro.

To our right and rear, one of our batteries was engaged with one of

the enemy's, a short distance to our left and front. The duel they

kept up was rapid and revengeful. They fired shot and shell, which

flew directly over our heads and struck and burst behind us and

before us. A soldier in our ranks expressed the wonder whether the

battery on our right was ours or the enemy's. A voice from behind him

answered, "It is ours of course." Looking around us we saw General

Hurlbut, seated on his horse and smoking calmly. Such was the conduct

of this brave man. Whatever the danger, he kept constantly near his

line, inspiring us with his presence, and never omitting a word that

could encourage his meanest soldier.

In front of us we could catch glimpses of the battle. Regiments

advanced, disappeared in the thick woods, and came back in disorder.

It was a succession of successful and unsuccessful attacks. Now

fortune was with us, and now with the enemy. Behind all the Fourth

Division stood firmly, stayed the retreating battalions and held the

line. Through all, the enemy's battery held its position and kept up

its cannonade. Its shells seemed omnipresent. Its projectiles falling

far and near to right and left, scaling the tree tops or crashing

through their boughs, it seemed to overlook the field and talk to the

army's whole right wing.

General Hurlbut several times changed the disposition of his line as

circumstances seemed to dictate. A regiment retreating in confusion

by the flank, broke through it cutting it about the center of our

regiment. At this precise moment, Col. Pugh began to move the brigade

to the left. In the noise and confusion, the command was not heard

by those of the right, and one regiment thus separated from the

rest; nor was the movement known until the left of the brigade had

disappeared. This portion took position in the reserve line and

was not engaged during the day. The right of the brigade, however,

including about forty of our regiment with our colors, were to play a

very different part.

Col. Emory K. Johnson, of the 28th Illinois, assumed command, and

began immediately to advance the line. As it moved into more open

ground and discovered its length, it was evident he had command

of a greater part of the brigade. Having advanced a considerable

distance, the line halted and volunteer skirmishers were called

for. A sufficient number immediately went forward and when about a

hundred and fifty yards to the front, the line again advanced. The

skirmishers soon discovered the enemy moving by the left flank along

our front in the edge of a wide field. At the same time skirmishers

farther to the left reported him massing troops in that direction,

with the apparent design of flanking us. Col. Johnson immediately

took measures to meet this movement. He moved his line to the left

perhaps a quarter of a mile and then changed its direction to the

front.

Suddenly we confronted the enemy, standing in compact line of battle,

as if just dressed to begin an advance. We halted and both lines

began a vigorous and steady fire. On our part there was no swaying

nor straggling. It was a fair stand-up fight, the antagonists exposed

to view, and deliberately shooting each other down. The enemy must

have outnumbered us, for his right extended some distance beyond

our left. It was a splendid test of the _morale_ of the two forces.

Victory was with us. We had expended from twenty to thirty rounds of

ammunition, when the enemy's line gave way and ours followed at a

charge. We pushed him to the edge of a field, over which he fled in

disorder, suffering severely under our fire. A part of a battery fell

into our hands, around which dead men and horses lay thickly, showing

how severely it had suffered. The enemy, escaped across the field,

and began a feeble fire from the opposite side.

All at once our line was ordered to retreat. It fell back rapidly

and not without some disorder, and took position with the other

troops. I have never been able to ascertain why this retreat was

made. At the time it was commanded, the enemy's fire was so slight,

that without its being increased we could have easily crossed the

field. Neither part of our regiment was engaged during the remainder

of the day. Fresh troops went forward to reinforce the right, and

the battle raged with unvarying steadiness all along the line, the

enemy being gradually forced back till about four o'clock, when he

finally disappeared from the field, and the cavalry rode forward with

loud shouts to pursue. We who knew nothing of the ineffectiveness of

cavalry against infantry, and especially untrained cavalry, and on a

timbered field, expected them to perform prodigies in disorganizing

the retreating enemy. But when we learned they had only followed him

a short distance, picking up a few stragglers, "the man on the horse"

sunk profoundly low in our estimation. As it was, they doubtless did

all they could. Breckinridge's division covered the enemy's retreat,

and presented a strong front to them when they approached.

The soldiers now expected the order to pursue. It is now almost

useless to inquire why this was not done; but history will demand

to know why nearly two months of hardship and suffering, including

the recall of the army of the Mississippi from its theater of

successful operations, was required to force the evacuation of

Corinth, which might now have been accomplished by twenty-four

hours vigorous action. General Grant's apology for not pursuing the

enemy is expressed in his official report: "My force was too much

fatigued during two days hard fighting, and exposed in the open

air to a drenching rain during the intervening night, to pursue

immediately. Night closed in cloudy and with heavy rain, making

the roads impracticable for artillery by the next morning." This

statement admits of some qualification. None of Buell's army had been

engaged but one day; and of this but a part of Wood's Division, and

none of Thomas' had been engaged at all. The latter, though greatly

fatigued by the long and hurrying march they had made to reach the

scene of conflict, were eager to participate in the honors of the

occasion, and might have been advantageously used in the pursuit. At

least, were we not as able to pursue as the enemy to retreat? He had

suffered as much in fatigue as we, and proportionally far more in the

losses of the battle. He had marched against us expecting everything,

and had gained nothing but slaughter and defeat. His right wing

had left the field in rout. His whole army, conscious of our now

superior strength and of their utter inability to make a stand

against us, whatever the position they might take, was retreating

demoralized on a single road which defiled for twenty miles through

an almost uninterrupted forest, and which was now almost impassable

for his artillery and train. Before reaching Corinth his retreat

had degenerated into a rout, and his army had dissolved into a

disorganized and straggling multitude. If we may believe the

concurrent accounts of citizens, added to those of his own soldiers

whom we subsequently captured, such was their dismay, that a pursuit

conducted with ordinary skill and vigor, would have resulted in

immense captures of men and _materiel_. The enemy succeeded in

getting his artillery through to Corinth after the night's rain,

which General Grant avers made the road impassable for artillery. But

had this been the case, a successful pursuit could have been made

without doubt by infantry and cavalry alone. Who then shall say,

that, within the utmost scope of endurance, General Grant should not

have pursued as soon as the enemy retreated? The soldiers seemed to

think so, and murmured because it was not attempted.

Nevertheless, whole regiments dissolved into squads and scattered

over the field in search of their dead and wounded; and it was

not long before the entire field was covered with stragglers and

plunderers of the dead. To put a stop to this, the cavalry was

ordered to get up a panic among them. They rode frantically over the

field, circulating the report that the enemy's cavalry was upon them.

The effect was admirable. In a few minutes the panic communicated

itself to all parts of the field, and stragglers without number

poured through the woods toward the river like herds of frightened

brutes. No one could tell what he was running from. Each saw his

fellow straggler run and followed him, seized and mastered by an

indefinable, vague dread. At one point an officer, meeting a gang of

stragglers, advised them to congregate for their safety upon an open

field which was without a fence! The simpletons actually followed his

advice.

General Sherman pursued the enemy a short distance and returned.

The men of our regiment, after collecting their wounded and most of

their dead, assembled at our regimental camp. Through the energy and

prudence of Quartermaster Clark, during the forenoon of Monday, our

tents had been let down to the ground and our baggage hauled to the

landing. Thus the former were saved from being greatly injured by the

missiles of the battle, and the latter from capture by the enemy.

The baggage was not brought up till the next day. We divided and ate

a little food, put up our tents, and without covering lay down to

rest. With blankets for their shrouds our dead comrades lay near us.

Scattered over the field were thousands of wounded whose sufferings

we could not alleviate. Under ordinary circumstances it would seem

that men in this situation would scarcely wish to sleep at all. But

we slept a sound and joyous sleep.

All night it rained heavily and with scarcely a moment's

intermission. Storm, darkness and gloom--a fitting termination of

those two dreadful days.

Recollections with the Third Iowa Regiment · 第 17 / 28 章