THE EXPEDITION TO PARIS--THE FORCES ENGAGED IN
IT--DETAILS OF THE MOVEMENT TO THAT PLACE--CONDUCT
OF COLONEL WILLIAMS AND LIEUT. COL. BLAIR, WHILE
THERE--THEY RETURN RAPIDLY TO SHELBINA--GREEN PURSUES
AND CONFRONTS THEM WITH A LARGE FORCE--DETAILS OF
THE AFFAIR AT SHELBINA--COLONEL WILLIAMS RETREATS
TO HUDSON, WHERE HE MEETS GENERAL HURLBUT WITH
REINFORCEMENTS--THE PROPRIETY OF THE RETREAT
DISCUSSED--THE ACCOUNT OF THE REBELLION RECORD.
While we were marching from Kirksville to Shelbina, Colonel Williams
received an order, it is said, from General Fremont, the precise
nature of which I am not able to give. However, he collected his
available force, which consisted of the fifty well men left at
Brookfield by Colonel Scott, as many of the sick as had convalesced
during the subsequent two weeks, and sixty men of Company C, who had
been watching the enemy in the vicinity of St. Joseph. With this
force he proceeded to Hannibal, where he was joined by six companies,
or rather by a remnant of six companies of the gallant Second Kansas,
decimated by losses at Springfield and the sufferings of the hard
campaign of the Southwest, and now returning home by this route
to recruit their numbers and rest. This battalion, one company of
which was mounted, together with a company of Missouri cavalry under
Captain Dolan, increased his force to 630 men; with which he returned
as far as Shelbina, where he arrived at nightfall, and leaving
the cars began an immediate night march toward Paris, the county
seat of Monroe county, a flourishing inland town, where he arrived
about daybreak and bivouacked for the day. Learning from reliable
citizens that the enemy was in the vicinity with 1,200 men, he threw
out pickets in the outskirts of town, and sent out the cavalry to
reconnoiter. The latter had an affray with the enemy, and lost an
officer captured.
That night both Colonel Williams and Lieut. Colonel Blair, were too
much under the influence of liquor to be in a condition to command
men. Colonel Williams is said to have behaved most ridiculously. He
had his headquarters in the office of the Clerk of the Circuit Court.
He told his officers that the force was in imminent danger of attack,
and that they must not think of sleeping during the night. As to
himself, he was so worn out with fatigue and anxiety, that it would
be absolutely necessary for him to get a little sleep in order to be
prepared for emergencies that might arise! The officers of the Third
Iowa consulted together and decided that Colonel Williams was not
in a fit condition to continue in command. Whereupon they reported
this fact to Major Cloud, who informed them that Lieut. Col. Blair
was in a like condition, and that he had already assumed command of
the Kansas troops, and would assume command of the whole force; on
which they mutually agreed to obey him should anything occur during
the night. Before morning the camp was alarmed by the firing of the
pickets, and the troops took position for action. Colonel Williams
is said to have rode around the lines and delivered a few drunken
orders, which were not heeded, the officers obeying Major Cloud.
Whatever we may say in justification of Colonel Williams' conduct on
the following day, we do not attempt to justify this night's debauch.
In this, both he and Lieut. Col. Blair committed a fault for which
they should have been dismissed from the service. It was one of those
faults which amount to a high crime. They got drunk in the presence
of a superior enemy, and when they were expecting him to attack the
forces under their command. That was the crime. The situation of this
little force at best was a dangerous one. That very day Green crossed
the railroad in his retreat from Hurlbut. That he united with the
rebel force in the vicinity of Paris, and designed attacking Williams
while in this isolated position, subsequent events place beyond
doubt. Had the latter remained at Paris till noon the following day,
it is certain that Green would have inflicted a heavy disaster upon
him.
As it was, he began to retreat early in the morning toward Shelbina.
The promptness and rapidity of this movement, can not be placed to
his credit; for, though he had reason to believe he was followed, he
had no knowledge of the presence of Green. He arrived at Shelbina
about 2 P. M., and learned, doubtless with regret, of the departure
of Hurlbut and Scott from that place for Brookfield the previous day.
He had not been here half an hour when a heavy cloud of dust made its
appearance in the direction whence he had come; and soon the head of
a column of cavalry began to emerge from the long line of timber
which skirts the prairie of Shelbina about four miles to the south.
This column, lengthening as it emerged, came stretching over the
prairie, devouring, in expectation, the little band that was waiting
to receive it. Through this prairie runs a small brook, in the valley
of which the enemy disappeared in column and then reappeared, a
formidable line of battle a mile in length, stretching to the north
of the road and steadily advancing; at the same time bodies of troops
began to appear to the south of the road, which, when deployed,
extended so far as to reach the railroad to the east. The enemy now
presented, with two or three slight intervals, a line of battle two
miles in length, behind which could be seen, with the aid of a glass,
a line of infantry a half mile in length drawn up as a reserve. Green
then planted two pieces of cannon at different points, and sent to
Colonel Williams by flag of truce a demand for the surrender of his
force, giving him half an hour to decide. "Go to h----l!" is said to
have been the laconic response of the Colonel. He then ordered the
women and children out of the town.
Meanwhile he had been barricading the principal streets with lumber
and rubbish to protect his men from the fire of small arms. At the
expiration of the half hour, all eyes were strained with expectation
in the direction of the enemy. A burst of smoke enveloped one of his
pieces, and a nine pounder shot came screeching through the air.
After several discharges with this, he opened with his second piece,
and his extended flank began to advance, and close slowly toward our
right and left. The cavalry and two light companies of the Kansas
battalion made two or three slight demonstrations toward the enemy.
An engine and a car filled with men went to the east and disturbed
his flank resting upon the railroad. He made a demonstration on the
railroad toward the right; but an engine with two cars filled with
men went out and drove him off.
When the enemy first made his appearance, Colonel Williams
telegraphed to General Hurlbut a statement of his condition, to
which the General replied, telling him to hold out, and promising
to reinforce him before night. Two hours and a half had now elapsed
without tidings of any assistance. The enemy was advancing his pieces
and drawing his lines so as to envelop our flanks, and the situation
was evidently becoming critical. The Colonel called together his
officers and asked their advice. They were unanimously of the opinion
that it was best to move on the cars out of range of the enemy and
await the promised reinforcements. But Lieut. Col. Blair and Major
Cloud expressed their determination to retreat with their battalion
at all events. Col. Williams then said that if he could not induce
the Kansas troops to remain, he would not remain with his own men.
He therefore ordered a retreat. The men got hastily aboard the cars,
leaving behind two or three baggage wagons and a small quantity of
camp equipage. The enemy, before he discovered this movement, got
his artillery quite close behind the screen of a cornfield, and
began to throw grape and canister. The two trains moved rapidly
toward the west, the cavalry galloping along on the side opposite the
enemy. When the trains reached Clarence, the first station west of
Shelbina, and twelve miles distant from it, they halted. But instead
of waiting reinforcements here, the cavalry got hastily aboard the
flat cars, and the retreat was continued with every evidence that
some one was greatly frightened. When Colonel Williams arrived at
Hudson (Macon City), he found General Hurlbut there with about 250
men on the way to reinforce him. General Hurlbut called the Colonel
and his officers to account for their conduct on this occasion, and
his personal conduct greatly increased the feeling against him, both
among the officers and men.
Col. Williams has been greatly censured on account of this retreat
from Shelbina, and there may have been some disposed to attach a
stigma to our regiment in consequence of it. At least the name of
a regiment always suffers more or less with that of its commanding
officer. If the Colonel was to blame, his officers, and particularly
Colonel Blair and Major Cloud were not less so; the former for
advising him to retreat; the two latter for refusing to remain with
him with the troops under their command. That he did not await
General Hurlbut at Clarence is altogether inexplicable. In continuing
the retreat beyond that place in the manner in which it was done,
there is every evidence of panic and fright. Nothing could have been
lost then by waiting the arrival of reinforcements, or the approach
of night or the enemy. This would have supported the confidence of
the men, and given it, in the eyes of the public, the appearance of
an orderly retreat, instead of a disgraceful flight. If he had waited
till night, without the appearance either of reinforcements or of the
enemy, it might have been wiser then to resume the retreat than to
run the risk of waking up in the morning to find himself surrounded,
as Colonel Smith had been at Monroe, with the track torn up and
the wires cut on either side of him. This undoubtedly would have
happened to him, had he held out and remained that night at Shelbina.
In passing judgment on this affair, we have to consider, first,
that to hold out against a superior enemy hightens the _morale_ of
troops; and that it especially discourages men to be compelled to
retreat from troops for whom they have a settled contempt, such as
lawless insurgents, poorly disciplined and armed, and whom they
have come to suppress; and, second, that a successful retreat, from
whatever enemy, discourages them less than a disaster. Finally,
considering the threatening approach of the enemy in such numbers,
the non-arrival of reinforcements, and particularly the refusal of
the Kansas field officers to remain, we can not see wherein Colonel
Williams was to blame in abandoning Shelbina; but the flight from
Clarence demands an explanation which has never been given to the
men of the Third Iowa, who suffered a share in the general disgrace.
A more resolute commander, one whose conduct on this occasion, as
well as previously, had been such as to inspire the respect of all
his subordinates, would not have given up the place without a severe
fight. Before what happened in this case, the example of Sigel at
Carthage or Mulligan at Lexington, would have been far preferable.
The whole thing was badly managed. Hurlbut was to blame for not
remaining at Shelbina the day before to support Williams. Williams
was to blame for drunkenness at Paris, and for the imbecility of
calling a council of officers during the progress of the action. And
again, Hurlbut was to blame for not reinforcing him more promptly and
with a larger force. To show how this affair figures in history, I
give the account found in the _Rebellion Record_, which is also found
in the _N. Y. Commercial_ of September 10, 1861:
"This afternoon, Col. N. G. Williams, with eleven hundred troops,
Kansas and Iowa Third, was attacked at Shelbina, Mo., by Martin
Green, with from fifteen hundred to two thousand troops. Green
commenced firing upon them with two pieces of artillery, and kept up
fire for about one and a half hours. One man, (Federal), had his leg
taken off with a cannon ball. Col. Williams retreated on two trains
to Hudson, Mo., leaving a number of horses and a part of his camp
utensils in the hands of the rebels. Col. Williams had no artillery.
General Hurlbut got as far as Hudson, Mo., from Brookfield, with two
hundred and fifty men, to reinforce Williams. When he arrived there,
Williams was at Clarence on his retreat."
Our only comment on this is that Lieut. Schrader, acting commissary
for the force, stated that he issued rations for 630 men, and that
Green, after receiving the reinforcements which joined him south
of the railroad, not including the riffraff who joined him for the
occasion, could not have had less than 3,000; nor could he have made
so formidable display of numbers with a less force. The casualty
mentioned was that of a captain of the Kansas troops, who had his
foot taken off by a cannon ball while attempting to rally some
Missourians.