CHAPTER XVI

_EUROPEAN ASSISTANCE_

During the four months’ interregnum between the granting of the

Constitution and the opening of Parliament, the Committee of Union

and Progress was the undisputed ruler of Turkey. It dictated to the

monarch what his decrees should be, it moved armies, it removed and

appointed ministers, governors of provinces, and other high officials.

These untried young men who formed the Committee, while introducing a

new order of things and protecting their country against the numerous

dangers that threatened to destroy the newly gained liberty, displayed

a wisdom, tact, moderation, shrewdness, and foresight that were

astonishing to foreign observers. They maintained order with firmness,

greatly assisted in this by the dignified self-control and patriotism

of the people themselves. Though they and thousands of others had

suffered much from the cruelty and rapacity of the Despotism and its

parasites, they displayed no vindictiveness; they punished only the

most guilty of these; removed only those who showed by their actions

that they were a source of danger to the Constitution; and they frankly

forgave the others. The relations of Turkey with foreign Powers were

directed by them with a tactful and resourceful statesmanship. Their

mistakes were remarkably few.

From the beginning they showed their fitness to rule. The avowed

object of the Young Turks had been to depose the Sultan, and when

they offered him the alternative of acceptance of the Constitution or

abdication, they had little expectation that he would submit to their

conditions. But when the astute Sultan did submit in a very graceful

manner, protesting that he was a believer in a constitutional form of

government, and posing as if he and not the revolutionary party had

brought the boon of liberty to his subjects, the Young Turks showed

their statesmanship by as graciously accepting the situation, and

became once more the loyal subjects of a constitutional monarch, whose

cleverness and diplomatic experience, if he would now use them rightly,

might be of great service to his country and his people. The Sultan is

the Commander of the Faithful to millions of Mussulmans, and had the

Committee attempted to depose him at that critical time a long civil

war might have resulted. So Abdul Hamid was left on the throne of

Othman, nominally ruling, to outward seeming popular with the people,

who cheered him enthusiastically whenever he appeared in public. But

the Young Turks had not forgotten how Abdul Hamid, in 1878, destroyed

the Constitution which he had sworn to uphold, so that power behind the

throne, the Committee of Union and Progress, remained ever watchful,

as the strong guardian of the people’s liberties.

I will now briefly sum up the results of the Committee’s energetic

action during the few weeks immediately following the proclamation

of the Constitution. In the first place it had to make itself as

strong as possible so as to combat the reactionary intrigues that

were working for the restoration of the Despotism. It therefore set

itself to establish its hold on the army, to obtain the sanction of

the Moslem religion, and to complete the pacification of Macedonia.

It took the precaution of removing from the Second and Third Army

Corps all officers suspected of reactionary views, and concentrated

the bulk of the troops loyal to the Constitution at Adrianople, within

striking distance of the capital, where, at any rate, a considerable

portion of the First Army Corps and the Sultan’s Prætorian Guard

only needed the word from the Palace to become the instrument of the

reactionaries. Later on the Committee was able to obtain the removal of

most of the battalions of the Imperial Guard from Constantinople and to

replace them with troops from Salonica, thus securing the Committee’s

domination in the capital.

[Illustration: CHATEAU OF ASIA]

As regards the religious question, the work of the Young Turks was

made easy by the Sheikh-ul-Islam, who—so soon as he had administered

to the Sultan the oath by which the latter swore to respect the

Constitution—proclaimed to the faithful that constitutional government

was not contrary to, but was in accordance with, the teaching of the

Koran; he rebuked the fanatics who were preaching against the

reforms as being anti-religious, and saw to it that the mosques were

not used as centres of reactionary agitation and intrigue. For the

reactionaries were not idle, and, in European as well as in Asiatic

Turkey, their agents—often ex-Palace spies disguised as doctors of the

sacred law and _hodjas_—were appealing to Moslem bigotry and denouncing

the Constitution as the invention of the Evil One himself. To

counteract this mischievous propaganda the Committee sent out its own

missionaries all over the country, and doctors learned in the sacred

law and others enlightened the people, supporting their arguments with

quotations from the Koran, and in many cases preaching sermons that

had been written for this purpose by the Sheikh-ul-Islam himself. It

was also a great help to the cause that nearly all the Turkish press

supported the Committee. Indeed, during the first few months of the new

_régime_, a paper holding the unpopular opposite opinions would have

had but few readers.

The Committee, having army, religion, and press on its side, was strong

enough to dominate the Palace. It demanded of the Sultan the signing

of _Iradé_ after _Iradé_, and if the required Imperial decree was

not immediately forthcoming, a threat that the Adrianople army would

march upon Constantinople within twenty-four hours always produced the

desired effect. Thus, within a few days after the proclamation of the

Constitution, Abdul Hamid had to sign _Iradés_ by virtue of which he

granted a general amnesty, the release of all political prisoners,

the abolition of the spy system, the inviolability of domicile, a free

press, the abolition of the censorship, the liberty of the individual

to travel in foreign countries, in short, all the privileges enjoyed by

the citizens of free countries.

Then the Sultan was compelled to dismiss his favourites and principal

advisers, including his hated secretary, Izzet Pasha, his old Arab

astrologer, Abdul Houda, Tashin Pasha, and Ismail Pasha, the founder

of the detestable military spy system. The Camarilla, that had

all but destroyed Turkey, was broken up and scattered. Izzet and

several other notorious people effected their escape to England and

elsewhere—fortunately for some of them, who, had they remained, would

probably have been torn to pieces by infuriated mobs, like the infamous

Fehmi Pasha. But the Young Turks, as I have explained, despite the

intense hatred which some of them must have nourished against the

cruel oppressors and traitors to their country who had acted as the

instruments of the Despotism, refrained from vengeance, and there

were no reprisals. Penalties were only inflicted where the country’s

good demanded these. Some of the worst ministers of the tyranny were

imprisoned in the War Office, or confined in their own houses on

Prinkipo Island in the Sea of Marmora, where many rich Turks have their

summer residences. Some have undergone their trial, and have been

compelled to disgorge the public moneys which they had embezzled. For

the rest it was complete amnesty, and when the Constantinople mobs

began to occupy themselves in hunting down men recognised to have been

spies of the Palace, in order to carry them off to the prison of the

War Office, the Committee, whose word had to be obeyed, peremptorily

forbade this practice. On the other hand, if any man took advantage of

this leniency to indulge in reactionary intrigue, sterner justice was

administered. Ismail Pasha, for example, the inventor of the military

spy system, for very good reasons was shot in Constantinople in

December last by a young officer.

The Committee recognised that one of their first duties was to complete

the pacification of Macedonia. They successfully accomplished this

within a very short time, and without bloodshed. The Greeks alone were

causing any difficulty; but the Greek bishops, clergy, and leaders of

bands came to understand that the Young Turks would put up with no

nonsense from them, and that the sympathy of Europe would not be with

them if they resisted the new _régime_. So it was not long after the

granting of the Constitution that the last Greek band came in, and for

the first time for many years there was peace in Macedonia. The British

Government, recognising that there was no longer any need for European

intervention in that region, withdrew from the arrangement with Russia

that had resulted from the Reval meeting, displaying a confidence in

the Young Turks that won their deep gratitude. The Young Turks had a

very keen appreciation of the sympathy that was displayed for them by

the English. To Englishmen travelling in the country, at that time, the

sincere and hearty friendship extended to them by the Turkish people

was most gratifying and affecting.

It is one thing to make a revolution, but it is quite another thing

to undertake to govern and administer a country after the successful

revolution has swept away the old order. The Young Turks showed that

they were wise enough to know their own limitations. There were few

among them who had any knowledge of administration, public finance,

and diplomacy; so they decided to make use of the existing machinery

of government. They got rid of the notoriously corrupt among the high

officials, but retained the services of the more capable and upright

of the ministers, provincial governors, and others, even if they

happened to be Pashas of the old-school, fanatical Mussulmans who hated

European ways, looked askance at liberty, and regarded with horror the

scheme for giving equal rights to Christians and Moslems. But these

old servants of the State were kept under observation, and they were

promptly ousted if they failed to exercise their authority on the

lines laid down by the Constitution, and faithfully to hold aloof from

reactionary intrigue. As many of these officials were honest patriots

at heart, though narrow-minded in their views, the compromise worked

well pending the training of a new school of administrators belonging

to the Young Turk party.

Thus to the highest office of all, the Grand Vizierate, men of long

administrative experience have been appointed. So soon as the Sultan

had submitted to the will of the people, the then Grand Vizier, Ferid

Pasha, and his ministers had to go, for they were too closely connected

with the Hamidian system to be trusted; but the three Grand Viziers

who have so far succeeded Ferid—Said Pasha, Kiamil Pasha, and Hilmi

Pasha—have all taken a prominent part as servants of the State under

the old _régime_, Said and Hilmi having already been Grand Viziers

on several occasions. Said Pasha, the first Grand Vizier under the

new _régime_, has been the Sultan’s friend and adviser—disgraced at

intervals like the rest—from the commencement of the reign. First,

as the Sultan’s secretary, he helped his master to overthrow Midhat

Pasha’s Constitution and to destroy the power of the Sublime Porte.

A few years later, as Grand Vizier, he encouraged the Sultan in his

Pan-Islamic dreams, and in his effort to deprive the Christians in

Turkey of their ancient privileges. He had proved himself an upright

and strong man, and in his old age he had modified his views and

recognised the evils of the despotic system which he had helped to

build up, but he was scarcely the right sort of man to be Prime

Minister under a constitutional government, and it is not astonishing

that his term of office lasted for but a few days. His first mistake

was in the execution of the Imperial _Iradé_ that liberated all

political prisoners. He took it upon himself to free all the criminals

as well, letting loose upon the capital, at that critical time, a

crowd of murderers and robbers. The ever-watchful Committee, mindful

of Said’s career, suspected that he had acted thus in order to cause

disorder in the city, and so injure the cause of the Young Turkey party

in the interest of the reactionaries. A week later a discovery was made

that precipitated the crisis. Said, while drawing up a statement of the

principal points of the Constitution, to which the Sultan’s signature

was to be appended in token of adhesion, had altered a clause so as to

leave the appointment of the Ministers of War and Marine to the Sultan,

instead of to the Grand Vizier, as had been laid down by Midhat’s

Constitution. To leave the control of the army in the hands of the

Sultan was to place more trust in his word than the Young Turks were

willing to do. So the Committee, as guardian of the nation’s hard-won

liberty, gave the word that has to be obeyed. Said had to resign, and

his Ministers of War and Marine were at once placed under arrest, as a

precautionary measure.

On August 6, 1908, Kiamil Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier, and was

allowed to choose his own ministers; of the members of Said’s Ministry

he retained but two, the Sheikh-ul-Islam and the Minister of Foreign

Affairs. The appointment of Kiamil was universally acclaimed. Able,

firm, and patriotic, with an honourable career behind him, he was a

_persona grata_ with men of all races and creeds, and was the most

popular statesman in Turkey. He had always been the steadfast friend

of the English, and has many friends in England. The gracious telegram

of congratulation which King Edward VII sent on Kiamil’s appointment

produced a wonderful effect and did much to tighten the cordial

relations between the two countries.

Kiamil is now about eighty-seven years of age. Throughout his long

career this wise old man has shown himself incorrupt and a hater of

corruption, a lover of justice, an advocate of reform, but moderate,

unwilling to force radical changes on a people yet unripe, a man

of wide knowledge, free from fanaticism and friendly to Europeans,

while ready to protect his country against the undue influence in

her internal affairs which has been exercised with such callous

selfishness, to their own advantage and to Turkey’s partial ruin, by

certain Powers.

Six months before the outbreak of the revolution, Kiamil was holding

the important office of Vali of the province of Aidin, of which Smyrna,

the commercial centre of the Levant, is the capital. Here for thirteen

years he had won the confidence and affection of people of every class

by the justice and usefulness of his administration. But the Camarilla

ever hated a just and honest man, and Palace intrigue arranged for

his destruction. He was falsely accused of being in league with the

brigands of Asia Minor; secret instructions were given for his arrest,

and a steamer was sent to Smyrna to convey him as an exile to the

island of Rhodes. Under the Despotism exiles died quickly, and Captain

von Herbert, from whose description of the incident in the _Fortnightly

Review_ I have taken some of my facts, himself saw the canvas sack in

which it was intended to drop Kiamil overboard during the voyage—the

official account would doubtless have informed the world that the Pasha

had died of sea-sickness. But fortunately Kiamil obtained knowledge of

the order for his arrest, and on January 12 he hurried to the British

Consulate at Smyrna, and there took refuge under the British flag. The

Consul gladly received him, and got into telegraphic communication

with London. Sir Edward Grey commanded that British protection should

be extended to the Pasha, who as a native of Cyprus was technically

entitled to claim it. The Consulate was surrounded by police and spies,

the steamers in the port were closely watched; but, despite all the

precautions that were taken, Kiamil was able to escape in the steam

launch belonging to the well-known banking firm of the Whittals, and

got safely on board a German liner bound for Stamboul. The steamer duly

arrived at her destination; the British Ambassador guaranteed that

Kiamil should have interviews with the Sultan at which none of the

Camarilla would be present; and the Pasha landed in the capital, thus

placing himself in the power of the Despot; which was a brave thing to

do when one bears in mind the fate of Midhat and others. Kiamil had his

private interviews with Abdul Hamid, and spoke to him boldly concerning

the evils of his rule, the ruin that was threatening the Ottoman

Empire, and the corruption and villainy of the Sovereign’s _entourage_.

But the Camarilla still remained to exercise its mischievous power

until the very end, though apparently it dared not interfere with

one still nominally under the protection of England; for Kiamil did

not disappear mysteriously. He kept outside public affairs and dwelt

quietly in his house in Constantinople—no doubt under the close

surveillance of spies—until the successful revolution brought him once

again to the head of affairs.

During the first six months of the new _régime_, that very critical

period when the Constitution was menaced by foes within and without,

and even the integrity of the Empire was at stake—Kiamil, as Grand

Vizier, steered the ship of State safely through many dangers, and his

shrewd and cautious diplomacy greatly strengthened the position of

Turkey. His ministers, among whom were one Armenian and one Greek, were

men whose characters were above reproach, and they did much to reform

the machinery of their respective departments. Kiamil stood his country

in good stead, and Turkey has good reason to be grateful to him; but

he, too, after six months of office, had to resign, though with no loss

of honour to himself, at the bidding of the Committee; and, as in the

case of his predecessor, Said Pasha, the question of the appointment of

the Ministers of War and Marine was the immediate cause of the Cabinet

crisis—a matter concerning which I shall say more in another chapter.

Kiamil’s successor to the Grand Vizierate, Hilmi Pasha, is another man

of the old _régime_. I have already spoken of the part which he took

in Salonica during the last days of the Despotism, when the Committee

threatened him with death. Long before any one thought that there

was a chance of Hilmi’s becoming Grand Vizier, he was described to

me as being an honest and able man of strong character, with a good

record behind him, somewhat fanatical, and with little sympathy with

the Christian elements of the population. As Inspector-General in

Salonica before the revolution, he obeyed the instructions given to

him by the Palace, and obstructed as much as possible the reforms in

Macedonia—dictated by the Great Powers—which it was his ostensible duty

to superintend. But to stand in the way of European intervention was no

grave fault in the eyes of the Young Turks. Though the officer of the

Despotism, Hilmi’s sympathies were with the cause of the reformers, and

he is now trusted by them.

From the beginning, therefore, the Young Turks have placed at the

head of the Government, not advanced reformers, not ambitious men out

of their own ranks, but experienced men of the old _régime_, who,

so far, have done well, and have been able on occasions to check

hasty and ill-considered changes. In other respects, too, the Young

Turks have manifested their moderation and wise opportunism. Foreign

intervention is the thing that they detest and fear most, for it has

worked nothing but ill for the Empire; but these men are free from

any anti-European feeling, and while anxious, as soon as possible, to

get rid of the Capitulations and other fetters which the Powers have

placed upon Ottoman independence, they welcome European assistance to

place their house in order. Thus it was at the request of the Turkish

Government that France lent Turkey the aid of the great financial

authority, M. Laurent, to assist in the reorganisation of the finances

of the country and the establishment of less wasteful methods of tax

collection, and that England lent the services of Mr. Crawford to

conduct the reorganisation of the Customs. Turkey has also asked for,

and has obtained, the services of an English admiral and several naval

officers to help her recreate the navy which was destroyed during the

Hamidian _régime_, and Baron von der Goltz, who has already done so

much good for the Turkish army, is to be entrusted with powers that

will enable him to bring it up to a high state of efficiency. The Young

Turks, anxious to develop the great natural resources of their country,

have also borrowed from France excellent engineers to superintend the

construction of irrigation works and the execution of other useful

projects.

While what is best of the old _régime_ still supplies the higher

officialdom, nearly all the men belonging to the lower grades of the

Civil Service, as I have already pointed out, had become adherents

of the Committee of Union and Progress some time before the outbreak

of the revolution. Most of these men, under the corrupt system that

then prevailed, had to supplement their miserable pay, generally in

arrears, by taking _bakshish_ and by robbing the State in other ways.

This general impurity of the officialdom was loathsome to many of those

who were compelled to follow the almost universal practice in order to

keep themselves and their families alive. Minor officials knew that

what was wrung from the people in the form of taxation was not spent

for the country’s good, but was for the most part appropriated by

the Palace gang, and it was but natural that they helped themselves

to a share. But the Turks, in their dealings between man and man,

are among the most honest of people, and public sentiment regarding

official corruption has been undergoing a remarkable change since the

revolution. The newspapers preached public purity, and the servants of

the State began to realise that for the future the misappropriation

of public moneys would not be at the cost of the Palace gang as

heretofore, but at the cost of their beloved country itself, which was

in sore need of money to further its regeneration and to strengthen its

defences against the formidable enemies that threatened its integrity.

I have told the story of the patriotic civil servants in Salonica, who

abandoned their claims to arrears of pay in view of their country’s

necessities; I am assured that the same sense of civic virtue has led

to a remarkable diminution of the corrupt practices in the various

public departments. I have heard it maintained that the Turks cannot

change their nature, and that Turkish administration always has

been, and always will be, corrupt, whether the form of government be

despotic or constitutional. One might as fairly have argued thus about

England’s administration in India, or in the British Isles themselves,

but a few generations ago. A people who, like the Turks, are honest

as individuals, and intensely patriotic, are likely to arrive at the

right moral sense in a matter like this. The Japanese, who, while being

as patriotic as the Turks, are not remarkable for commercial probity,

regard it as far more criminal to embezzle the country’s funds than to

cheat the individual; but Japan is the only country which has attained

this high ethical standard.

Turkey; the Awakening of Turkey; the Turkish Revolution of 1908 · 第 16 / 21 章