The disasters of 1799 sealed the fate of the Directory, and placed
Bonaparte, who returned from Egypt with the prestige of a recent
victory, in his natural place as civil and military head of France. In
the course of the campaign the field strength of the French had been
gradually augmented, and in spite of losses now numbered 227,000 at the
front. These were divided into the Army of Batavia, Brune (25,000), the
Army of the Rhine, Moreau (146,000), the Army of Italy, Massena
(56,000), and, in addition, there were some 100,000 in garrisons and
depots in France.
Most of these field armies were in a miserable condition owing to the
losses and fatigues of the last campaign. The treasury was empty and
credit exhausted, and worse still--for spirit and enthusiasm, as in
1794, would have remedied material deficiencies--the conscripts obtained
under Jourdan's law of 1798 (see CONSCRIPTION) came to their regiments
most unwillingly. Most of them, indeed, deserted on the way to join the
colours. A large draft sent to the Army of Italy arrived with 310 men
instead of 10,250, and after a few such experiences, the First Consul
decided that the untrained men were to be assembled in the fortresses of
the interior and afterwards sent to the active battalions in numerous
small drafts, which they could more easily assimilate. Besides
accomplishing the immense task of reorganizing existing forces, he
created new ones, including the Consular Guard, and carried out at this
moment of crisis two such far-reaching reforms as the replacement of the
civilian drivers of the artillery by soldiers, and of the hired teams by
horses belonging to the state, and the permanent grouping of divisions
in army corps.
The Army of Reserve.
As early as the 25th of January 1800 the First Consul provided for the
assembly of all available forces in the interior in an "Army of
Reserve." He reserved to himself the command of this army,[15] which
gradually came into being as the pacification of Vendee and the return
of some of Brune's troops from Holland set free the necessary nucleus
troops. The conscription law was stringently reenforced, and impassioned
calls were made for volunteers (the latter, be it said, did not produce
five hundred useful men). The district of Dijon, partly as being central
with respect to the Rhine and Italian Armies, partly as being convenient
for supply purposes, was selected as the zone of assembly. Chabran's
division was formed from some depleted corps of the Army of Italy and
from the depots of those in Egypt. Chambarlhac's, chiefly of young
soldiers, lost 5% of its numbers on the way to Dijon from desertion--a
loss which appeared slight and even satisfactory after the wholesale
_debandade_ of the winter months. Lechi's Italian legion was newly
formed from Italian refugees. Boudet's division was originally assembled
from some of the southern garrison towns, but the units composing it
were frequently changed up to the beginning of May. The cavalry was
deficient in saddles, and many of its units were new formations. The
Consular Guard of course was a _corps d'elite_, and this and two and a
half infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade coming from the veteran
"Army of the West" formed the real backbone of the army. Most of the
newer units were not even armed till they had left Dijon for the front.
Such was the first constitution of the Army of Reserve. We can scarcely
imagine one which required more accurate and detailed staff work to
assemble it--correspondence with the district commanders, with the
adjutant-generals of the various armies, and orders to the civil
authorities on the lines of march, to the troops themselves and to the
arsenals and magazines. No one but Napoleon, even aided by a Berthier,
could have achieved so great a task in six weeks, and the great captain,
himself doing the work that nowadays is apportioned amongst a crowd of
administrative staff officers, still found time to administer France's
affairs at home and abroad, and to think out a general plan of campaign
that embraced Moreau's, Massena's and his own armies.
The Army of the Rhine, by far the strongest and best equipped, lay on
the upper Rhine. The small and worn-out Army of Italy was watching the
Alps and the Apennines from Mont Blanc to Genoa. Between them
Switzerland, secured by the victory of Zurich, offered a starting-point
for a turning movement on either side--this year the advantage of the
flank position was recognized and acted upon. The Army of Reserve was
assembling around Dijon, within 200 m. of either theatre of war. The
general plan was that the Army of Reserve should march through
Switzerland to close on the right wing of the Army of the Rhine. Thus
supported to whatever degree might prove to be necessary, Moreau was to
force the passage of the Rhine about Schaffhausen, to push back the
Austrians rapidly beyond the Lech, and then, if they took the offensive
in turn, to hold them in check for ten or twelve days. During this
period of guaranteed freedom the decisive movement was to be made. The
Army of Reserve, augmented by one large corps of the Army of the Rhine,
was to descend by the Splugen (alternatively by the St Gothard and even
by Tirol) into the plains of Lombardy. Magazines were to be established
at Zurich and Lucerne (not at Chur, lest the plan should become obvious
from the beginning), and all likely routes reconnoitred in advance. The
Army of Italy was at first to maintain a strict defensive, then to
occupy the Austrians until the entry of the Reserve Army into Italy was
assured, and finally to manoeuvre to join it.
[Illustration: Map of Italian Campaigns 1794-1800.]
Moreau, however, owing to want of horses for his pontoon train and also
because of the character of the Rhine above Basel, preferred to cross
below that place, especially as in Alsace there were considerably
greater supply facilities than in a country which had already been
fought over and stripped bare. With the greatest reluctance Bonaparte
let him have his way, and giving up the idea of using the Splugen and
the St Gothard, began to turn his attention to the more westerly passes,
the St Bernard and the Simplon. It was not merely Moreau's scruples that
led to this essential modification in the scheme. At the beginning of
April the enemy took the offensive against Massena. On the 8th Melas's
right wing dislodged the French from the Mont Cenis, and most of the
troops that had then reached Dijon were shifted southward to be ready
for emergencies. By the 25th Berthier reported that Massena was
seriously attacked and that he might have to be supported by the
shortest route. Bonaparte's resolution was already taken. He waited no
longer for Moreau (who indeed so far from volunteering assistance,
actually demanded it for himself). Convinced from the paucity of news
that Massena's army was closely pressed and probably severed from
France, and feeling also that the Austrians were deeply committed to
their struggle with the Army of Italy, he told Berthier to march with
40,000 men at once by way of the St Bernard unless otherwise advised.
Berthier protested that he had only 25,000 effectives, and the equipment
and armament was still far from complete--as indeed it remained to the
end--but the troops marched, though their very means of existence were
precarious from the time of leaving Geneva to the time of reaching
Milan, for nothing could extort supplies and money from the sullen
Swiss.
Napoleon's plan of campaign.
At the beginning of May the First Consul learned of the serious plight
of the Army of Italy. Massena with his right wing was shut up in Genoa,
Suchet with the left wing driven back to the Var. Meanwhile Moreau had
won a preliminary victory at Stokach, and the Army of Reserve had begun
its movement to Geneva. With these data the plan of campaign took a
clear shape at last--Massena to resist as long as possible; Suchet to
resume the offensive, if he could do so, towards Turin; the Army of
Reserve to pass the Alps and to debouch into Piedmont by Aosta; the Army
of the Rhine to send a strong force into Italy by the St Gothard. The
First Consul left Paris on the 6th of May. Berthier went forward to
Geneva, and still farther on the route magazines were established at
Villeneuve and St-Pierre. Gradually, and with immense efforts, the
leading troops of the long column[16] were passed over the St Bernard,
drawing their artillery on sledges, on the 15th and succeeding days.
Driving away small posts of the Austrian army, the advance guard entered
Aosta on the 16th and Chatillon on the 18th and the alarm was given.
Melas, committed as he was to his Riviera campaign, began to look to his
right rear, but he was far from suspecting the seriousness of his
opponent's purpose.
Bard.
Infinitely more dangerous for the French than the small detachment that
Melas opposed to them, or even the actual crossing of the pass, was the
unexpected stopping power of the little fort of Bard. The advanced guard
of the French appeared before it on the 19th, and after three wasted
days the infantry managed to find a difficult mountain by-way and to
pass round the obstacle. Ivrea was occupied on the 23rd, and Napoleon
hoped to assemble the whole army there by the 27th. But except for a few
guns that with infinite precautions were smuggled one by one through the
streets of Bard, the whole of the artillery, as well as a detachment
(under Chabran) to besiege the fort, had to be left behind. Bard
surrendered on the 2nd of June, having delayed the infantry of the
French army for four days and the artillery for a fortnight.
The military situation in the last week of May, as it presented itself
to the First Consul at Ivrea, was this. The Army of Italy under Massena
was closely besieged in Genoa, where provisions were running short, and
the population so hostile that the French general placed his field
artillery to sweep the streets. But Massena was no ordinary general, and
the First Consul knew that while Massena lived the garrison would resist
to the last extremity. Suchet was defending Nice and the Var by vigorous
minor operations. The Army of Reserve, the centre of which had reached
at Ivrea the edge of the Italian plains, consisted of four weak army
corps under Victor, Duhesme, Lannes and Murat. There were still to be
added to this small army of 34,000 effectives, Turreau's division, which
had passed over the Mont Cenis and was now in the valley of the Dora
Riparia, Moncey's corps of the Army of the Rhine, which had at last been
extorted from Moreau and was due to pass the St Gothard before the end
of May, Chabran's division left to besiege Bard, and a small force under
Bethencourt, which was to cross the Simplon and to descend by Arona
(this place proved in the event a second Bard and immobilized
Bethencourt until after the decisive battle). Thus it was only the
simplest part of Napoleon's task to concentrate half of his army at
Ivrea, and he had yet to bring in the rest. The problem was to
reconcile the necessity for time, which he wanted to ensure the maximum
force being brought over the Alps, with the necessity for haste, in view
of the impending fall of Genoa and the probability that once this
conquest was achieved, Melas would bring back his 100,000 men into the
Milanese to deal with the Army of Reserve. As early as the 14th of May
he had informed Moncey that from Ivrea the Army of Reserve would move on
Milan. On the 25th of May, in response to Berthier's request for
guidance, the First Consul ordered Lannes (advanced guard) to push out
on the Turin road, "in order to deceive the enemy and to obtain news of
Turreau," and Duhesme's and Murat's corps to proceed along the Milan
road. On the 27th, after Lannes had on the 26th defeated an Austrian
column near Chivasso, the main body was already advancing on Vercelli.
The march to Milan.
Very few of Napoleon's acts of generalship have been more criticized
than this resolution to march on Milan, which abandoned Genoa to its
fate and gave Melas a week's leisure to assemble his scattered forces.
The account of his motives he dictated at St Helena (_Nap.
Correspondence_, v. 30, pp. 375-377), in itself an unconvincing appeal
to the rules of strategy as laid down by the theorists--which rules
his own practice throughout transcended--gives, when closely examined,
some at least of the necessary clues. He says in effect that by
advancing directly on Turin he would have "risked a battle against
equal forces without an assured line of retreat, Bard being still
uncaptured." It is indeed strange to find Napoleon shrinking before
_equal_ forces of the enemy, even if we admit without comment that it
was more difficult to pass Bard the second time than the first. The
only incentive to go towards Turin was the chance of partial victories
over the disconnected Austrian corps that would be met in that
direction, and this he deliberately set aside. Having done so, for
reasons that will appear in the sequel, he could only defend it by
saying in effect that he might have been defeated--which was true, but
not the Napoleonic principle of war. Of the alternatives, one was to
hasten to Genoa; this in Napoleon's eyes would have been playing the
enemy's game, for they would have concentrated at Alessandria, facing
west "in their natural position." It is equally obvious that thus the
enemy would have played _his_ game, supposing that this was to relieve
Genoa, and the implication is that it was not. The third course, which
Napoleon took, and in this memorandum defended, gave his army the
enemy's depots at Milan, of which it unquestionably stood in sore
need, and the reinforcement of Moncey's 15,000 men from the Rhine,
while at the same time Moncey's route offered an "assured line of
retreat" by the Simplon[17] and the St Gothard. He would in fact make
for himself there a "natural position" without forfeiting the
advantage of being in Melas's rear. Once possessed of Milan, Napoleon
says, he could have engaged Melas with a light heart and with
confidence in the greatest possible results of a victory, whether the
Austrians sought to force their way back to the east by the right or
the left bank of the Po, and he adds that if the French passed on and
concentrated south of the Po there would be no danger to the Milan-St
Gothard line of retreat, as this was secured by the rivers Ticino and
Sesia. In this last, as we shall see, he is shielding an undeniable
mistake, but considering for the moment only the movement to Milan, we
are justified in assuming that his object was not the relief of Genoa,
but the most thorough defeat of Melas's field army, to which end,
putting all sentiment aside, he treated the hard-pressed Massena as a
"containing force" to keep Melas occupied during the strategical
deployment of the Army of Reserve. In the beginning he had told
Massena that he would "disengage" him, even if he had to go as far
east as Trent to find a way into Italy. From the first, then, no
direct relief was intended, and when, on hearing bad news from the
Riviera, he altered his route to the more westerly passes, it was
probably because he felt that Massena's containing power was almost
exhausted, and that the passage and reassembly of the Reserve Army
must be brought about in the minimum time and by the shortest way. But
the object was still the defeat of Melas, and for this, as the
Austrians possessed an enormous numerical superiority, the assembly of
all forces, including Moncey's, was indispensable. One essential
condition of this was that the points of passage used should be out of
reach of the enemy. The more westerly the passes chosen, the more
dangerous was the whole operation--in fact the Mont Cenis column never
reached him at all--and though his expressed objections to the St
Bernard line seem, as we have said, to be written after the event, to
disarm his critics, there is no doubt that at the time he disliked it.
It was a _pis aller_ forced upon him by Moreau's delay and Massena's
extremity, and from the moment at which he arrived at Milan he did, as
a fact, abandon it altogether in favour of the St Gothard. Lastly, so
strongly was he impressed with the necessity of completing the
deployment of all his forces, that though he found the Austrians on
the Turin side much scattered and could justifiably expect a series of
rapid partial victories, Napoleon let them go, and devoted his whole
energy to creating for himself a "natural" position about Milan. If he
sinned, at any rate he sinned handsomely, and except that he went to
Milan by Vercelli instead of by Lausanne and Domodossola[18] (on the
safe side of the mountains), his march is logistically beyond cavil.
Napoleon's immediate purpose, then, was to reassemble the Army of
Reserve in a zone of manoeuvre about Milan. This was carried out in the
first days of June. Lannes at Chivasso stood ready to ward off a flank
attack until the main army had filed past on the Vercelli road, then
leaving a small force to combine with Turreau (whose column had not been
able to advance into the plain) in demonstrations towards Turin, he
moved off, still acting as right flank guard to the army, in the
direction of Pavia. The main body meanwhile, headed by Murat, advanced
on Milan by way of Vercelli and Magenta, forcing the passage of the
Ticino on the 31st of May at Turbigo and Buffalora. On the same day the
other divisions closed up to the Ticino,[19] and faithful to his
principles Napoleon had an examination made of the little fortress of
Novara, intending to occupy it as a _place du moment_ to help in
securing his zone of manoeuvre. On the morning of the 2nd of June Murat
occupied Milan, and in the evening of the same day the headquarters
entered the great city, the Austrian detachment under Vukassovich (the
flying right wing of Melas's general cordon system in Piedmont) retiring
to the Adda. Duhesme's corps forced that river at Lodi, and pressed on
with orders to organize Crema and if possible Orzinovi as temporary
fortresses. Lechi's Italians were sent towards Bergamo and Brescia.
Lannes meantime had passed Vercelli, and on the evening of the 2nd his
cavalry reached Pavia, where, as at Milan, immense stores of food,
equipment and warlike stores were seized.
Napoleon was now safe in his "natural" position, and barred one of the
two main lines of retreat open to the Austrians. But his ambitions went
further, and he intended to cross the Po and to establish himself on the
other likewise, thus establishing across the plain a complete barrage
between Melas and Mantua. Here his end outranged his means, as we shall
see. But he gave himself every chance that rapidity could afford him,
and the moment that some sort of a "zone of manoeuvre" had been secured
between the Ticino and the Oglio, he pushed on his main body--or rather
what was left after the protective system had been provided for--to the
Po. He would not wait even for his guns, which had at last emerged from
the Bard defile and were ordered to come to Milan by a safe and
circuitous route along the foot of the Alps.
Melas's movements.
At this point the action of the enemy began to make itself felt. Melas
had not gained the successes that he had expected in Piedmont and on the
Riviera, thanks to Massena's obstinacy and to Suchet's brilliant defence
of the Var. These operations had led him very far afield, and the
protection of his over-long line of communications had caused him to
weaken his large army by throwing off many detachments to watch the
Alpine valleys on his right rear. One of these successfully opposed
Turreau in the valley of the Dora Riparia, but another had been severely
handled by Lannes at Chivasso, and a third (Vukassovich) found itself,
as we know, directly in the path of the French as they moved from Ivrea
to Milan, and was driven far to the eastward. He was further handicapped
by the necessity of supporting Ott before Genoa and Elsnitz on the Var,
and hearing of Lannes's bold advance on Chivasso and of the presence of
a French column with artillery (Turreau) west of Turin, he assumed that
the latter represented the main body of the Army of Reserve--in so far
indeed as he believed in the existence of that army at all.[20] Next,
when Lannes moved away towards Pavia, Melas thought for a moment that
fate had delivered his enemy into his hands, and began to collect such
troops as were at hand at Turin with a view to cutting off the retreat
of the French on Ivrea while Vukassovich held them in front. It was only
when news came of Moncey's arrival in Italy and of Vukassovich's
fighting retreat on Brescia that the magnitude and purpose of the French
column that had penetrated by Ivrea became evident. Melas promptly
decided to give up his western enterprises, and to concentrate at
Alessandria, preparatory to breaking his way through the network of
small columns--as the disseminated Army of Reserve still appeared to
be--which threatened to bar his retreat. But orders circulated so slowly
that he had to wait in Turin till the 8th of June for Elsnitz, whose
retreat was, moreover, sharply followed up and made exceedingly costly
by the enterprising Suchet. Ott, too, in spite of orders to give up the
siege of Genoa at once and to march with all speed to hold the
Alessandria-Piacenza road, waited two days to secure the prize, and
agreed (June 4) to allow Massena's army to go free and to join Suchet.
And lastly, the cavalry of O'Reilly, sent on ahead from Alessandria to
the Stradella defile, reached that point only to encounter the French.
The barrage was complete, and it remained for Melas to break it with the
mass that he was assembling, with all these misfortunes and delays,
about Alessandria. His chances of doing so were anything but desperate.
On the 5th of June Murat, with his own corps and part of Duhesme's, had
moved on Piacenza, and stormed the bridge-head there. Duhesme with one
of his divisions pushed out on Crema and Orzinovi and also towards
Pizzighetone. Moncey's leading regiments approached Milan, and Berthier
thereupon sent on Victor's corps to support Murat and Lannes. Meantime
the half abandoned line of operations, Ivrea-Vercelli, was briskly
attacked by the Austrians, who had still detachments on the side of
Turin, waiting for Elsnitz to rejoin, and the French artillery train was
once more checked. On the 6th Lannes from Pavia, crossing the Po at San
Cipriano, encountered and defeated a large force, (O'Reilly's column),
and barred the Alessandria-Parma main road. Opposite Piacenza Murat had
to spend the day in gathering material for his passage, as the pontoon
bridge had been cut by the retreating garrison of the bridge-head. On
the eastern border of the "zone of manoeuvre" Duhesme's various columns
moved out towards Brescia and Cremona, pushing back Vukassovich.
Meantime the last divisions of the Army of Reserve (two of Moncey's
excepted) were hurried towards Lannes's point of passage, as Murat had
not yet secured Piacenza. On the 7th, while Duhesme continued to push
back Vukassovich and seized Cremona, Murat at last captured Piacenza,
finding there immense magazines. Meantime the army, division by
division, passed over, slowly owing to a sudden flood, near Belgiojoso,
and Lannes's advanced guard was ordered to open communication with Murat
along the main road Stradella-Piacenza. "Moments are precious" said the
First Consul. He was aware that Elsnitz was retreating before Suchet,
that Melas had left Turin for Alessandria, and that heavy forces of the
enemy were at or east of Tortona. He knew, too, that Murat had been
engaged with certain regiments recently before Genoa and (wrongly)
assumed O'Reilly's column, beaten by Lannes at San Cipriano, to have
come from the same quarter. Whether this meant the deliverance or the
surrender of Genoa he did not yet know, but it was certain that
Massena's holding action was over, and that Melas was gathering up his
forces to recover his communications. Hence Napoleon's great object was
concentration. "Twenty thousand men at Stradella," in his own words, was
the goal of his efforts, and with the accomplishment of this purpose the
campaign enters on a new phase.
Napoleon's dispositions.
Montebello.
On the 8th of June, Lannes's corps was across, Victor following as
quickly as the flood would allow. Murat was at Piacenza, but the road
between Lannes and Murat was not known to be clear, and the First Consul
made the establishment of the connexion, and the construction of a
third point of passage midway between the other two, the principal
objects of the day's work. The army now being disseminated between the
Alps, the Apennines, the Ticino and the Chiese, it was of vital
importance to connect up the various parts into a well-balanced system.
But the Napoleon of 1800 solved the problem that lay at the root of his
strategy, "concentrate, but be vulnerable nowhere," in a way that
compares unfavourably indeed with the methods of the Napoleon of 1806.
Duhesme was still absent at Cremona. Lechi was far away in the Brescia
country, Bethencourt detained at Arona. Moncey with about 15,000 men had
to cover an area of 40 m. square around Milan, which constituted the
original zone of manoeuvre, and if Melas chose to break through the
flimsy cordon of outposts on this side (the risk of which was the motive
for detaching Moncey at all) instead of at the Stradella, it would take
Moncey two days to concentrate his force on any battlefield within the
area named, and even then he would be outnumbered by two to one. As for
the main body at the Stradella, its position was wisely chosen, for the
ground was too cramped for the deployment of the superior force that
Melas might bring up, but the strategy that set before itself as an
object 20,000 men at the decisive point out of 50,000 available, is, to
say the least, imperfect. The most serious feature in all this was the
injudicious order to Lannes to send forward his advanced guard, and to
attack whatever enemy he met with on the road to Voghera. The First
Consul, in fact, calculated that Melas could not assemble 20,000 men at
Alessandria before the 12th of June, and he told Lannes that if he met
the Austrians towards Voghera, they could not be more than 10,000
strong. A later order betrays some anxiety as to the exactitude of these
assumptions, warns Lannes not to let himself be surprised, indicates his
line of retreat, and, instead of ordering him to advance on Voghera,
authorizes him to attack any corps that presented itself at Stradella.
But all this came too late. Acting on the earlier order Lannes fought
the battle of Montebello on the 9th. This was a very severe running
fight, beginning east of Casteggio and ending at Montebello, in which
the French drove the Austrians from several successive positions, and
which culminated in a savage fight at close quarters about Montebello
itself. The singular feature of the battle is the disproportion between
the losses on either side--French, 500 out of 12,000 engaged; Austrians,
2100 killed and wounded and 2100 prisoners out of 14,000. These figures
are most conclusive evidence of the intensity of the French military
spirit in those days. One of the two divisions (Watrin's) was indeed a
veteran organization, but the other, Chambarlhac's, was formed of young
troops and was the same that, in the march to Dijon, had congratulated
itself that only 5% of its men had deserted. On the other side the
soldiers fought for "the honour of their arms"--not even with the
courage of despair, for they were ignorant of the "strategic barrage"
set in front of them by Napoleon, and the loss of their communications
had not as yet lessened their daily rations by an ounce.
Meanwhile, Napoleon had issued orders for the main body to stand fast,
and for the detachments to take up their definitive covering positions.
Duhesme's corps was directed, from its eastern foray, to Piacenza, to
join the main body. Moncey was to provide for the defence of the Ticino
line, Lechi to form a "flying camp" in the region of Orzinovi-Brescia
and Cremona, and another mixed brigade was to control the Austrians in
Pizzighetone and in the citadel of Piacenza. On the other side of the
Po, between Piacenza and Montebello, was the main body (Lannes, Murat
and part of Victor's and Duhesme's corps), and a flank guard was
stationed near Pavia, with orders to keep on the right of the army as it
advanced (this is the first and only hint of any intention to go
westward) and to fall back fighting should Melas come on by the left
bank. One division was to be always a day's march behind the army on the
right bank, and a flotilla was to ascend the Po, to facilitate the
speedy reinforcement of the flank guard. Farther to the north was a
small column on the road Milan-Vercelli. All the protective troops,
except the division of the main body detailed as an eventual support
for the flank guard, was to be found by Moncey's corps (which had
besides to watch the Austrians in the citadel of Milan) and Chabran's
and Lechi's weak commands. On this same day Bonaparte tells the Minister
of War, Carnot, that Moncey has only brought half the expected
reinforcements and that half of these are unreliable. As to the result
of the impending contest Napoleon counts greatly upon the union of
18,000 men under Massena and Suchet to crush Melas against the
"strategic barrage" of the Army of Reserve, by one or other bank of the
Po, and he seems equally confident of the result in either case. If
Genoa had held out three days more, he says, it would have been easy to
count the number of Melas's men who escaped. The exact significance of
this last notion is difficult to establish, and all that could be
written about it would be merely conjectural. But it is interesting to
note that, without admitting it, Napoleon felt that his "barrage" might
not stand before the flood. The details of the orders of the 9th to the
main body (written before the news of Montebello arrived at
headquarters) tend to the closest possible concentration of the main
body towards Casteggio, in view of a decisive battle on the 12th or
13th.
[Illustration: Map.]
Napoleon's advance.
But another idea had begun to form itself in his mind. Still believing
that Melas would attack him on the Stradella side, and hastening his
preparations to meet this, he began to allow for the contingency of
Melas giving up or failing in his attempt to re-establish his
communication with the Mantovese, and retiring on Genoa, which was now
in his hands and could be provisioned and reinforced by sea. On the 10th
Napoleon ordered reserve ammunition to be sent from Pavia, giving
Serravalle, which is south of Novi, as its probable destination. But
this was surmise, and of the facts he knew nothing. Would the enemy move
east on the Stradella, north-east on the Ticino or south on Genoa? Such
reports as were available indicated no important movements whatever,
which happened to be true, but could hardly appear so to the French
headquarters. On the 11th, though he thereby forfeited the
reinforcements coming up from Duhesme's corps at Cremona, Napoleon
ordered the main body to advance to the Scrivia. Lapoype's division (the
right flank guard), which was observing the Austrian posts towards
Casale, was called to the south bank of the Po, the zone around Milan
was stripped so bare of troops that there was no escort for the
prisoners taken at Montebello, while information sent by Chabran (now
moving up from Ivrea) as to the construction of bridges at Casale (this
was a feint made by Melas on the 10th) passed unheeded. The crisis was
at hand, and, clutching at the reports collected by Lapoype as to the
quietude of the Austrians toward Valenza and Casale, Bonaparte and
Berthier strained every nerve to bring up more men to the Voghera side
in the hope of preventing the prey from slipping away to Genoa.
On the 12th, consequently, the army (the _ordre de bataille_ of which
had been considerably modified on the 11th) moved to the Scrivia, Lannes
halting at Castelnuovo, Desaix (who had just joined the army from Egypt)
at Pontecurone, Victor at Tortona with Murat's cavalry in front towards
Alessandria. Lapoype's division, from the left bank of the Po, was
marching in all haste to join Desaix. Moncey, Duhesme, Lechi and Chabran
were absent. The latter represented almost exactly half of Berthier's
command (30,000 out of 58,000), and even the concentration of 28,000 men
on the Scrivia had only been obtained by practically giving up the
"barrage" on the left bank of the Po. Even now the enemy showed nothing
but a rearguard, and the old questions reappeared in a new and acute
form. Was Melas still in Alessandria? Was he marching on Valenza and
Casale to cross the Po? or to Acqui against Suchet, or to Genoa to base
himself on the British fleet? As to the first, why had he given up his
chances of fighting on one of the few cavalry battlegrounds in north
Italy--the plain of Marengo--since he could not stay in Alessandria for
any indefinite time? The second question had been answered in the
negative by Lapoype, but his latest information was thirty-six hours
old. As for the other questions, no answer whatever was forthcoming, and
the only course open was to postpone decisive measures and to send
forward the cavalry, supported by infantry, to gain information.
Marengo.
On the 13th, therefore, Murat, Lannes and Victor advanced into the plain
of Marengo, traversed it without difficulty and carrying the villages
held by the Austrian rearguard, established themselves for the night
within a mile of the fortress. But meanwhile Napoleon, informed we may
suppose of their progress, had taken a step that was fraught with the
gravest consequences. He had, as we know, no intention of forcing on a
decision until his reconnaissance produced the information on which to
base it, and he had therefore kept back three divisions under Desaix at
Pontecurone. But as the day wore on without incident, he began to fear
that the reconnaissance would be profitless, and unwilling to give Melas
any further start, he sent out these divisions right and left to find
and to hold the enemy, whichever way the latter had gone. At noon Desaix
with one division was despatched southward to Rivalta to head off Melas
from Genoa and at 9 A.M. on the 14th,[21] Lapoype was sent back over the
Po to hold the Austrians should they be advancing from Valenza towards
the Ticino. Thus there remained in hand only 21,000 men when at last, in
the forenoon of the 14th the whole of Melas's army, more than 40,000
strong, moved out of Alessandria, not southward nor northward, but due
west into the plain of Marengo (q.v.). The extraordinary battle that
followed is described elsewhere. The outline of it is simple enough. The
Austrians advanced slowly and in the face of the most resolute
opposition, until their attack had gathered weight, and at last they
were carrying all before them, when Desaix returned from beyond Rivalta
and initiated a series of counterstrokes. These were brilliantly
successful, and gave the French not only local victory but the supreme
self-confidence that, next day, enabled them to extort from Melas an
agreement to evacuate all Lombardy as far as the Mincio. And though in
this way the chief prize, Melas's army, escaped after all, Marengo was
the birthday of the First Empire.
One more blow, however, was required before the Second Coalition
collapsed, and it was delivered by Moreau. We have seen that he had
crossed the upper Rhine and defeated Kray at Stokach. This was followed
by other partial victories, and Kray then retired to Ulm, where he
reassembled his forces, hitherto scattered in a long weak line from the
Neckar to Schaffhausen. Moreau continued his advance, extending his
forces up to and over the Danube below Ulm, and winning several combats,
of which the most important was that of Hochstadt, fought on the famous
battlegrounds of 1703 and 1704, and memorable for the death of La Tour
d'Auvergne, the "First Grenadier of France" (June 19). Finding himself
in danger of envelopment, Kray now retired, swiftly and skilfully,
across the front of the advancing French, and reached Ingolstadt in
safety. Thence he retreated over the Inn, Moreau following him to the
edge of that river, and an armistice put an end for the moment to
further operations.
This not resulting in a treaty of peace, the war was resumed both in
Italy and in Germany. The Army of Reserve and the Army of Italy, after
being fused into one, under Massena's command, were divided again into a
fighting army under Brune, who opposed the Austrians (Bellegarde) on the
Mincio, and a political army under Murat, which re-established French
influence in the Peninsula. The former, extending on a wide front as
usual, won a few strategical successes without tactical victory, the
only incidents of which worth recording are the gallant fight of
Dupont's division, which had become isolated during a manoeuvre, at
Pozzolo on the Mincio (December 25) and the descent of a corps under
Macdonald from the Grisons by way of the Splugen, an achievement far
surpassing Napoleon's and even Suvarov's exploits, in that it was made
after the winter snows had set in.
Hohenlinden.
In Germany the war for a moment reached the sublime. Kray had been
displaced in command by the young archduke John, who ordered the
denunciation of the armistice and a general advance. His plan, or that
of his advisers, was to cross the lower Inn, out of reach of Moreau's
principal mass, and then to swing round the French flank until a
complete chain was drawn across their rear. But during the development
of the manoeuvre, Moreau also moved, and by rapid marching made good the
time he had lost in concentrating his over-dispersed forces. The weather
was appalling, snow and rain succeeding one another until the roads were
almost impassable. On the 2nd of December the Austrians were brought to
a standstill, but the inherent mobility of the Revolutionary armies
enabled them to surmount all difficulties, and thanks to the respite
afforded him by the archduke's halt, Moreau was able to see clearly into
the enemy's plans and dispositions. On the 3rd of December, while the
Austrians in many disconnected columns were struggling through the dark
and muddy forest paths about Hohenlinden, Moreau struck the decisive
blow. While Ney and Grouchy held fast the head of the Austrian main
column at Hohenlinden, Richepanse's corps was directed on its left
flank. In the forest Richepanse unexpectedly met a subsidiary Austrian
column which actually cut his column in two. But profiting by the
momentary confusion he drew off that part of his forces which had passed
beyond the point of contact and continued his march, striking the flank
of the archduke's main column, most of which had not succeeded in
deploying opposite Ney, at the village of Mattempost. First the baggage
train and then the artillery park fell into his hands, and lastly he
reached the rear of the troops engaged opposite Hohenlinden, whereupon
the Austrian main body practically dissolved. The rear of Richepanse's
corps, after disengaging itself from the Austrian column it had met in
the earlier part of the day, arrived at Mattempost in time to head off
thousands of fugitives who had escaped from the carnage at Hohenlinden.
The other columns of the unfortunate army were first checked and then
driven back by the French divisions they met, which, moving more swiftly
and fighting better in the broken ground and the woods, were able to
combine two brigades against one wherever a fight developed. On this
disastrous day the Austrians lost 20,000 men, 12,000 of them being
prisoners, and 90 guns.
Marengo and Hohenlinden decided the war of the Second Coalition as
Rivoli had decided that of the First, and the Revolutionary Wars came to
an end with the armistice of Steyer (December 25, 1800) and the treaty
of Luneville (February 9, 1801). But only the first act of the great
drama was accomplished. After a short respite Europe entered upon the
Napoleonic Wars.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.--By far the most important modern works are A. Chuquet's
_Guerres de la Revolution_ (11 monographs forming together a complete
history of the campaigns of 1792-93), and the publications of the
French General Staff. The latter appear first, as a rule, in the
official "Revue d'histoire" and are then republished in separate
volumes, of which every year adds to the number. V. Dupuis' _L'Armee
du nord 1793_; Coutanceau's _L'Armee du nord 1794_; J. Colin's
_Education militaire de Napoleon_ and _Campagne de 1793 en Alsace_;
and C. de Cugnac's _Campagne de l'armee de reserve 1800_ may be
specially named. Among other works of importance the principal are C.
von B(inder)-K(rieglstein), _Geist und Stoff im Kriege_ (Vienna,
1896); E. Gachot's works on Massena's career (containing invaluable
evidence though written in a somewhat rhetorical style); Ritter von
Angeli, _Erzherzog Karl_ (Vienna, 1896); F. N. Maude, _Evolution of
Modern Strategy_; G. A. Furse, _Marengo and Hohenlinden_; C. von
Clausewitz, _Feldzug 1796 in Italien_ and _Feldzug 1799_ (French
translations); H. Bonnal, _De Rosbach a Ulm_; Krebs and Moris,
_Campagnes dans les Alpes_ (Paris, 1891-1895); Yorck von Wartenburg,
_Napoleon als Feldherr_ (English and French translations); F. Bouvier,
_Bonaparte en Italie 1796_; Kuhl, _Bonaparte's erster Feldzug_; J. W.
Fortescue, _Hist. of the British Army_, vol. iv.; G. D. v.
Scharnhorst, _Ursache des Glucks der Franzosen 1793-1794_ (reprinted
in A. Weiss's _Short German Military Readings_, London, 1892); E.
D'Hauterive, _L'Armee sous la Revolution_; C. Rousset, _Les
Volontaires_; Max Jahns, _Das franzosische Heer_; Shadwell, _Mountain
Warfare_; works of Colonel Camon (_Guerre Napoleonienne_, &c.);
Austrian War Office, Krieg gegen die franz. Revolution 1792-1797
(Vienna, 1905); Archduke Charles, _Grundsatze der Strategie_ (1796
campaign in Germany), and _Gesch. des Feldzuges 1799 in Deutschl. und
der Schweiz_; v. Zeissberg, _Erzherzog Karl_; the old history called
_Victoires et conquetes des Francais_ (27 volumes, Paris, 1817-1825);
M. Hartmann, _Anteil der Russen am Feldzug 1799 in der Schweiz_
(Zurich, 1892); Danelewski-Miliutin, _Der Krieg Russlands gegen
Frankreich unter Paul I._ (Munich, 1858); German General Staff,
"Napoleons Feldzug 1796-1797" (Suppl. _Mil. Wochenblatt_, 1889), and
_Pirmasens und Kaiserslautern_ ("Kriegsgesch. Einzelschriften," 1893).
(C. F. A.)