England and China much more closely together, and have laid the basis of
what it must be hoped will prove a firm and durable alliance. If suspicion
was laid aside and candid relations established on the frontier, it should
not be difficult to maintain an excellent understanding with China, and at
the present moment every difficulty has been smoothed over with the
exception of that on the Burmese frontier. It is to be hoped that not less
success will be obtained in this quarter than in Sikhim and Hunza, and Mr.
O'Conor's convention of Pekin in July, 1886, recognizing China's right to
receive a tribute mission from Burmah once in ten years went far to prove
the extent of concession England would make to China. It is divulging what
cannot long be kept secret, to explain the circumstances under which Mr.
O'Conor's convention was signed, and the unusual concession made by a
British government of admitting its liability to send a tribute mission.
The Chefoo Convention, closing the Yunnan incident, contained a promise
from the Chinese government to allow an English mission to pass through
Tibet. Years passed without any attempt to give effect to this
stipulation, but at last, in 1884, Mr. Colman Macaulay, a member of the
Indian Civil Service, obtained the assent of his government to requesting
the permission of the Chinese government to visit Lhasa. He went to Pekin
and he came to London, and he obtained the necessary permission and the
formal passport of the Tsungli Yamen; and there is no doubt that if he had
set off for Tibet with a small party, he would have been honorably
received and passed safely through Tibet to India. On the other hand there
is no doubt that such a visit would have presented no feature of special
or striking importance. It would have been an interesting individual
experience, but scarcely an international landmark, This modest character
for his long-cherished project did not suit Mr. Macaulay, and unmindful of
the adage that there may be a slip betwixt the cup and the lip, he not
merely delayed the execution of his visit, but he made ostentatious
preparations for an elaborate mission, and he engaged many persons with
scientific qualifications to accompany him, with the view of examining the
mineral resources of Tibet. The Chinese themselves did not like, and had
never contemplated, such a mission, but their dissatisfaction was slight
in comparison with the storm it raised in Tibet; and the Chinese
government was thus brought face to face with a position in which it must
either employ its military power to coerce the Tibetans, who made
preparations to oppose the Macaulay mission by force of arms, or acquiesce
in the Tibetans ignoring its official passports, and thus provoke a
serious complication with this country. Such was the position of the
Tibetan question when Burmah was annexed in January, 1886, and
negotiations followed with China for the adjustment of her claims in the
country. Negotiations were carried on, in the first place by Lord
Salisbury, and in the second by Lord Rosebery, with the Chinese minister
in London, and the draft of more than one convention was prepared. Among
such contemplated arrangements were the dispatch of a mission from Burmah
to China, and of a return one from China; the appointment of the Head
Priest of Mandalay as the person to send the mission, thus making it a
purely native matter, outside the participation of the British government;
and the concession of material advantages on the Irrawaddy and in the Shan
country, as the equivalent for the surrender of the tribute. It is
probable that one of these three arrangements would have been carried out,
but that, on certain points being referred to Pekin, the knowledge came to
the ears of the British government that if the Tibetan mission were
withdrawn, the Chinese would be content with the formal admission of their
claim to receive the tribute mission from Burmah in accordance with
established usage. As both governments wanted a speedy settlement of the
question, the Chinese, with the view of allaying the rising agitation in
Tibet and getting rid of a troublesome question, and the English not less
anxious to have the claims of China in Burmah defined in diplomatic
language, the convention which bears Mr. O'Conor's name was drawn up and
signed with quite remarkable dispatch. For the abandonment of the Macaulay
mission, and the recognition of their right to receive the tribute mission
from Burmah, the authorities at Pekin were quite, at the moment, willing
to forego material claims such as a port on the Irrawaddy. Diplomacy has
not yet said the last word on this matter, and the exact frontier between
Burmah and China has still to be delimited, but the fixing of a definite
date for the dispatch of the first mission from Mandalay to Pekin, which
is timed to set out in January, 1894, is in itself of hopeful augury for
the settlement of all difficulties. When this matter is composed there
will be no cloud in the sky of Anglo-Chinese relations, and that such an
auspicious result will be obtained is not open to serious doubt. The most
gratifying fact in the history of China during the last ten years is the
increasing sympathy and tacit understanding between the two great empires
of England and China in Asia, which must in time constitute an effective
alliance against any common danger in that continent, and the aggressive
policy of Russia.
THE WAR WITH JAPAN AND SUBSEQUENT EVENTS
We have seen that, up to 1892, it had been customary to receive the
representatives of foreign powers in the Tse Kung Ko, or Hall of Tributary
Nations. Naturally, much dissatisfaction was provoked by the selection of
a place of audience which seemed to put the treaty powers on the same
footing as tributary states, and, accordingly, the foreign ministers
undertook to exact from the Tsungli Yamen, or Board for Foreign Affairs,
the designation of a more suitable locality in the imperial city for the
annual ceremony. The proposed innovation was resisted for some time; but
when Sir Nicolas O'Conor was appointed British Minister at Pekin, an
exception was made in his favor, and a place of superior importance to the
Hall of Tributary Nations was chosen for the presentation of his
credentials. The Emperor Kwangsu agreed to receive him in the Cheng Kuan
Tien Palace, or pavilion which forms part of the imperial residence of
Peace and Plenty within the Forbidden City. In pursuance of this
arrangement, the British representative, attended by his suite, proceeded
to this pavilion on December 13, 1892, and was received at the principal
entrance by the high court officials. It was also noted that the emperor
took a greater interest in the ceremony than on preceding occasions, and
followed with attention the reading of Queen Victoria's letter, by Prince
Ching, then president of the Tsungli Yamen. Thenceforth, there was
observed with every year a decided improvement in the mode of receiving
foreign diplomatists, and, eventually, the imperial audience was
supplemented with an annual dinner given by the Board for Foreign Affairs.
Through the personal reception accorded by the Emperor of China to Prince
Henry of Prussia on May 15, 1898, the audience question was finally
settled in favor of the right of foreign potentates to rank on an equality
with the so-called Son of Heaven.
We come now to the most memorable event in the modern history of China
since the Taeping Rebellion; to wit, the war with Japan. In order to
comprehend, however, the causes of this contest between the two chief
races of the Far East, it is necessary to review the development of the
Corean question which gave rise to it. There seems to be no doubt that
Japan derived its first civilizing settlers, and most of its arts and
industries, from the Corean peninsula. It is certain that, for centuries,
the intercourse between the two countries was very close, and that more
than one attempt was made by Japanese rulers to subjugate Corea. The
latest and most strenuous endeavor to that end was made near the end of
the sixteenth century, and, although it resulted in a temporary occupation
of the peninsula, the Japanese troops were eventually withdrawn, and Corea
resumed its former status of a kingdom tributary to the Celestial Empire.
Thenceforth, for almost three centuries, Corea and Tonquin bore, in
theory, precisely the same relation to the Middle Kingdom. In each
instance, the practical question was whether China was strong enough to
make good her nominal rights. The outcome of her resistance to French
aggression in Tonquin had shown that there, at least, she had no such
power. But, in the subsequent ten years, efforts had been made to organize
an efficient army and navy, and the belief was entertained at Pekin that
China was at all events strong enough to uphold her claims in Corea, which
was, geographically and strategically, of far more importance to the
Middle Kingdom than was Tonquin. Yet, while it was evident that Corea
would not be renounced without a struggle, the Pekin authorities, for some
years, met the Japanese encroachments with a weak and vacillating policy.
As early as 1876, the Mikado's advisers entered on a course which
obviously aimed at the attainment of commercial, if not, also, political,
ascendency in the Hermit Kingdom. An outrage having been committed upon
some of her sailors, Japan obtained, by way of reparation from the court
of Seoul, the opening of the port of Fushan to her trade. Four years
later, Chemulpo, the port of Seoul, was also opened. These forward steps
on the part of the Japanese aroused the Chinese to activity, and, in 1881,
a draft commercial treaty was prepared by the Chinese authorities in
council with the representatives of the principal powers at Pekin, and
sent to Seoul, where it was accepted. The Japanese alleged, however, that
they possessed a historical right to an equal voice with China in the
Corean peninsula, and that, consequently, the treaty to which we have just
referred required their ratification. To sustain this claim, the Japanese
allied themselves with the Progressive party in Corea, a move which
compelled the Chinese to lean upon the Reactionists, who were opposed to
the concessions lately made to foreigners, and who, as events were to
show, were preponderant in the Hermit Kingdom. In June, 1882, the Corean
Reactionists attacked the Japanese Legation at Seoul, murdered some
members of it, and compelled the survivors to flee to the seacoast.
Thereupon, the Mikado sent some troops to exact reparation, and the
Chinese, on their part, dispatched a force to restore order. A compromise
was brought about, and, for two years, Japanese and Chinese soldiers
remained encamped beside one another under the walls of the Corean
capital. In December, 1884, however, a second collision occurred between
the Japanese and the Coreans, the latter being, this time, assisted by the
Chinese. The Mikado's subjects were again compelled to take to flight. The
Tokio government now resolved upon firm measures, and, while it exacted
compensation from the Coreans, it sent Count Ito Hirobumi to China to
bring about an accommodation with the Pekin government. At that
conjuncture, there is no doubt that China possessed advantages in the
Corean peninsula that were lacking to the Japanese. Not only was she
popular with the majority of the people, but the treaty powers were more
disposed to act through her than through Japan in order to secure the
general extension of trade with the Hermit Kingdom. Those advantages,
nevertheless, were thrown away by an agreement which the shortsighted
advisers of the Chinese emperor were persuaded to accept. Li Hung Chang
was appointed the Chinese Plenipotentiary to negotiate with Count Ito,
and, after a short conference, a convention was signed at Tientsin on
April 18, 1885. The provisions of the convention were, first, that both
countries should withdraw their troops from Corea; secondly, that no more
officers should be sent by either country to drill the Corean army; and,
thirdly, that if, at any future time, either of the two countries should
send troops to Corea, it must inform the other. It is manifest that, by
this agreement, China, practically, acquiesced in Japan's assertion of an
equal right to control the Hermit Kingdom. Thenceforth, it was impossible
to speak of Corea as being a vassal state of the Celestial Empire.
For some nine years, nevertheless, after the conclusion of the Tientsin
agreement, there were no dangerous disturbances in the Peninsular Kingdom.
In the early part of 1894, however, Kim-Ok-Kiun, a reformer, and the
leader of the Corean uprising in 1884, was assassinated at Shanghai, and
it subsequently transpired that the murder had been committed by the order
of the Corean authorities. It is certain that honors and rewards were
bestowed upon the assassin on his return to the Hermit Kingdom, while the
body of his victim was drawn and quartered as that of a traitor. Just at
this juncture, the Tonghaks, a body of religious reformers, having failed
to obtain certain concessions, revolted, and, by the end of May, achieved
so much success over the Corean forces that the Seoul government became
alarmed, and sent to China for assistance. In response to the request,
some two thousand Chinese troops were disembarked on June 10 at Asan, a
seaport some distance south of the Corean capital, and a few Chinese men-
of-war were dispatched to the coast of the peninsula. Formal notice of
these proceedings was given to Japan under the terms of the Tientsin
Convention. Thereupon, the Mikado's government decided to undertake a like
interposition, and acted with so much energy that, within forty-eight
hours after the arrival of the Chinese at Asan, they had placed at Seoul a
much superior force. They were thus able to dominate the court, although
it was in entire sympathy with China. The Pekin government now made the
mistake of reviving its pretensions to regard the Hermit Kingdom as a
vassal state. These pretensions Japan refused to tolerate, on the ground,
first, that she had never admitted them, and, secondly, that the Tientsin
Convention recognized an equality of rights in the two states. The
Japanese also called attention to the misrule that prevailed in Corea, and
proposed that the Chinese should join them in carrying out needful
reforms. To this proposal, China could not accede, being hampered by her
alliance with the reactionary party at Seoul; consequently, Japan
undertook the execution of the task alone. As a first step in that
direction, the Japanese got possession of the person of the Corean ruler,
and compelled him to act as the instrument of his captors. The initial
document which he was constrained to sign was an order that the Chinese
troops, who had come at his invitation, should leave the country. The
seizure of the king's person, which occurred on July 23, 1894, was
followed by two successful acts of aggression. On the 25th, the Japanese
squadron attacked the Chinese transport "Kowshing," conveying fresh
soldiers to Asan, and its escort of warships. In the engagement, one
Chinese man-of-war was sunk, one was disabled, and 1,200 soldiers were
destroyed on the "Kowshing," which was torpedoed. On July 29, the Japanese
general Oshima, at the head of a small force, made a night attack upon the
Chinese fortified camp at Song Hwang, and carried the place with a loss to
their opponents of 500 killed and wounded. These preliminary encounters
were followed by a declaration of war on August 1, 1894. During the
ensuing six weeks, Japan poured her troops into the peninsula, while the
Chinese fleet, instead of harassing the enemy, remained in the harbors of
Port Arthur and Wei-hai-Wei. On September 15, the Japanese army in Corea
was strong enough to detach a corps of 14,000 men to attack the Chinese
position at Pingyang, a town on the northern banks of the Paidong River.
The passage of the river was difficult, and the Chinese might have
overwhelmed the Japanese when crossing it, but they took no measures to
this end, and the battle began at sunrise on the day just named. There
were five forts to be captured, and some of them were vigorously defended,
nor was it until night set in that the garrison finally determined upon
evacuating the place. In the battle itself and the retreat, over 2,000
Chinese were killed, to say nothing of the wounded and the prisoners. The
Japanese themselves lost 162 killed, 438 wounded and 33 missing, and there
seems to be no reason to doubt that, had all the Chinese officers been
capable of the valor displayed by the general Tso-pao-kuei, the Japanese
would have been repulsed. As it was, the battle proved decisive, for not a
Chinaman paused until he had reached the other side of the Yalu River,
which forms the northwest boundary of Corea.
On the very day of the fight at Pingyang, a number of Chinese war vessels,
under the command of Admiral Ting, were transporting troops to the mouth
of the Yalu, where the Chinese were assembling a second army. On its
return from this task, it was encountered, September 17, off tha island of
Haiyang, by a Japanese squadron under Admiral Ito. Ostensibly, the two
fleets were evenly matched. They each numbered ten fighting vessels, and,
if two of the Chinese ships possessed a more powerful armament, the
Japanese were superior in steam power. It was to quickness in maneuvering
that the Japanese admiral trusted for victory, and his first attack
consisted mainly in circling around the Chinese squadron. He was careful,
also, to reserve his fire until only two miles separated him from his
adversaries. After a duel with the Japanese "Matsushima," the Chinese
flagship "Tingyuen" was severely damaged, and only saved from sinking by
the intervention of her sister ship, the "Chenyuen." These two ironclads,
together with the torpedo boats, succeeded in making their escape, but
five of the Chinese vessels were sunk or destroyed. In men, the Chinese
lost 700 killed or drowned and 300 wounded, while the Japanese lost 115
killed and 150 wounded. The result of this victory was that the Chinese
never afterward attempted to dispute the control of the sea, and their
water communication with the Yalu was effectually cut off.
After the battle of Pingyang, the Japanese army halted, and it was not
until after they received re-enforcements under Marshal Yamagata that they
resumed their forward movement. On October 10 their advance guard reached
the Yalu, a river broad and difficult of passage, behind which was
stationed a considerable Chinese army, which, however, after a nominal
resistance, soon retreated. In the abandoned positions on the northern
bank of the Yalu, the Japanese captured a vast quantity of material of
war, including 74 cannons, over 4,000 rifles, and more than 4,000,000
rounds of ammunition. It was supposed that the retreating Chinese force
would make a stand at Feng Hwang, but, on reaching that town, October 30,
the Japanese found it evacuated, and were informed that the Chinese
soldiers had dispersed.
While Marshal Yamagata was beginning the invasion of China from the
direction of Corea, another Japanese army, under Marshal Oyama, had landed
on the Liau-Tung, or Regent's Sword Peninsula, with the aim of capturing
the Chinese naval station of Port Arthur. Even in Chinese hands, this was
a redoubtable stronghold. It had 300 guns in position, and the garrison
numbered some 10,000 men, while the attacking force did not exceed 13,000,
although we should bear in mind that it was aided by the Japanese fleet.
After landing at the mouth of the Huhua-Yuan River, about 100 miles north
of Port Arthur, the Japanese advanced south, and took the fortified city
of Chinchow, without incurring any loss. The next day they reached
Talienwan, where the Chinese had five heavily armed batteries, and a
considerable garrison, which, however, on the approach of the enemy,
abandoned the post without firing a shot. In the forts at this point were
found over 120 cannons, two and a half million rounds of ammunition for
the artillery and nearly 34,000,000 rifle cartridges. On November 20,
1894, the Japanese army was drawn up in front of Port Arthur, and the
fleet prepared to co-operate in the action. The attack began in the
morning of November 22, and, although, in one quarter, the Chinese offered
sturdy resistance, yet, by the end of the day, with the loss of no more
than 18 men killed and 250 wounded, the Japanese were in possession of the
strongest position in China, a naval fortress and arsenal on which
$30,000,000 had been spent.
Throughout December the force under Marshal Yamagata pushed forward into
Manchuria, but met there with more vigorous opposition than it had
hitherto encountered. In the fight at Kangwasai, the Japanese lost 400,
and, in the capture of the town of Kaiting, 300 killed and wounded. About
the middle of January, 1895, the Japanese began operations against Wei-
hai-Wei, the naval stronghold on the northern coast of Shangtung, in which
the remnant of China's fleet had taken refuge. Although not so strong as
Port Arthur, this harbor is considered one of the keys to the Gulf of
Pechihli. On January 20 the Japanese troops began to land at Yungchang, a
little west of the point to be attacked, and, on the 26th, they appeared
at the gates of Wei-hai-Wei. About half of the beleaguered garrison
consisted of 4,000 sailors from the fleet, under Admiral Ting, who was to
show himself a leader of courage and energy. The assault on the land side
of Wei-hai-Wei began on January 29, and continued throughout that and the
following day. At certain points, where Admiral Ting's squadron was able
to act with effect, the Japanese were repulsed, but, eventually, the whole
of the land garrison fled panic-stricken to Chefoo. Even then Ting's
squadron and the island force continued to resist, and it was not until
February 9, when almost all the vessels had been taken or sunk, that he
consented to capitulate, after receiving a telegram from Li Hung Chang to
the effect that no help could be given him. No sooner were the terms of
capitulation agreed upon than Admiral Ting retired to his cabin and took a
fatal dose of opium. He had held out for three weeks, whereas Port Arthur
had been lost in a day. The war continued for a few weeks longer, the
Japanese pursuing their advance in Manchuria, and capturing the two places
which are collectively called Newchang, thus threatening Pekin. They now
possessed an army of 100,000 men ready to advance upon the Chinese
capital. As there was no reason to suppose that Pekin could be
successfully defended, the necessity of concluding peace as promptly as
possible was recognized. To that end it was needful to appoint a
plenipotentiary whose name would convince the Japanese government that the
Chinese were in earnest in their overtures. The only two men who possessed
the requisite qualifications were Prince Kung and Li Hung Chang. The
former, however, being a prince of the imperial family, and the uncle of
the reigning emperor, Kwangsu, could not be induced to submit to the
humiliation of proceeding to Japan and suing for peace. The only possible
selection, therefore, was Li Hung Chang, who was, accordingly, appointed
plenipotentiary. He reached Shimonoseki on March 20, 1895, and, four days
after his arrival, the success of his mission was greatly promoted by the
attempt of a fanatic to assassinate him during his conference with Count
Ito, the Japanese representative. The wound was not very serious, but the
outrage caused a unanimous expression of sympathy and regret on the part
of the Japanese people, and the Mikado sent his own physician to attend
the wounded minister. To attest their sorrow for this incident, the
Japanese at once granted an armistice, and the terms of peace which they
at first proposed were materially mitigated. On April 17 the Treaty of
Shimonoseki was signed, and, on May 8, the ratifications were exchanged at
Chefoo. The terms of the original treaty were these: First, China was to
surrender Formosa and the Pescadores Islands and the southern part of the
Shingking province, including the Liau-Tung, or Regent's Sword Peninsula,
and of course, also, the naval fortress of Port Arthur. China was likewise
to pay in eight installments a money indemnity of 200,000,000 Kuping
taels, or, say, $160,000,000. She was also to grant certain commercial
concessions, including the admission of ships under the Japanese flag to
the Chinese lakes and rivers, and the appointment of consuls. In view of
the completeness of Japan's triumph, these conditions could not be
considered onerous, but they, undoubtedly, disturbed the balance of power
in the Far East, and, had they been permitted to stand, would have
effectually thwarted Russia's plan of advancing southward, and of
obtaining an ice-free port. The Czar's government, accordingly, determined
to interpose, and, having secured the co-operation of its French ally, and
also of Germany, it presented to the Mikado, in the name of the three
powers, a request that he should waive that part of the Shimonoseki Treaty
which provided for the surrender of the Liau-Tung Peninsula. It was
proposed that, in return for the renunciation of this territory on the
Chinese mainland, the pecuniary indemnity should be increased by
$30,000,000, and that Wei-hai-Wei should be retained until the whole sum
should have been paid. The demand was, obviously, one that could not be
rejected without war against the three interposing powers, and the odds
were too great for Japan to face without the assistance of Great Britain,
which Lord Rosebery, then prime minister, did not see fit to offer. The
Mikado, accordingly, submitted to the loss of the best part of the fruits
of victory, retaining only Formosa and the Pescadores, the value of which
is, as yet, undetermined; with the money indemnity, however, Japan has
been enabled so greatly to strengthen her fleet that, when all the vessels
building for her are completed, she will take rank as a naval power of the
first class in the Pacific.
For some time after the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty, the Chinese
seem to have imagined that the Czar had intervened from disinterested
motives, but Count Cassini, the Russian minister at Pekin, eventually made
it clear that the interposition would not be gratuitous. In what form the
payment for Russia's services should be made was, for some time, the
subject of debate, but, before Li Hung Chang left China in the spring of
1896, as a special embassador to attend the coronation of Nicholas II. at
Moscow, the heads of a convention had been drawn up, and, on Li's arrival
in Russia, he signed an agreement which embodied the concessions to be
made to the Czar in return for his services. This secret treaty gave
Russia the control of the Liau-Tung Peninsula, which she had ostensibly
saved, at the cost to China of $30,000,000, and the St. Petersburg
government was also to be allowed to build a branch of the Trans-Siberian
Railway through Manchuria to Talienwan and Port Arthur. A period of
eighteen months elapsed before the details of this momentous agreement
became known. On the return of Li Hung Chang to Pekin, he not only failed
to recover the viceroyship of Chihli, but he found his relations with the
Emperor Kwangsu quite as unsatisfactory as they had been after his return
from Shimonoseki. He was restored, indeed, to a seat on the Tsungli Yamen,
or Board of Foreign Affairs, but, for twelve months, it seemed as if,
despite the support of the Empress-dowager Tsi An, his influence would
never revive.
The two years that followed the Shimonoseki Treaty gave a breathing spell
to China, and should have been devoted to energetic reforms in the
military and naval administration. As a matter of fact, nothing had been
accomplished, when, in 1897, a blow fell which brought the Middle Kingdom
face to face with the prospect of immediate partition. In November of that
year, without any preliminary notice or warning to the Pekin government,
two German men-of-war entered the harbor of Kiao Chou, and ordered the
commandant to give up the place in reparation for the murder of two German
missionaries in the province of Shantung. Germany refused to evacuate Kiao
Chou unless due reparation should be made for the outrage on the
missionaries, and unless, further, China would cede to her the exclusive
right to construct railways and work mines throughout the extensive and
populous province of Shantung. This, of course, was equivalent to the
demarcation of a sphere of influence. For a time, the Pekin government
showed itself recalcitrant, but, in January, 1898, it consented to lease
Kiao Chou to Germany for ninety-nine years, and to make the required
additional concession of exclusive rights in Shantung. Russia, on her
part, did not wait long after the German seizure of Kiao Chou, to put
forward her claim for compensation on account of the services rendered in
the matter of the revision of the Shimonoseki Treaty. The terms of the
Cassini agreement were now gradually revealed. In December, 1897, the St.
Petersburg government announced that the Chinese had given permission to
the Russian fleet to winter at Port Arthur; in February, 1898, Russia
added Talienwan to Port Arthur, but essayed to disarm criticism by
declaring that the first-named port would be opened to the ships of all
the great powers like other ports on the Chinese mainland. This promise
was subsequently qualified, and on March 27 a convention was signed at
Pekin giving the Russians the "usufruct" of Port Arthur and Talienwan,
which, practically, meant that Russia had obtained those harbors
unconditionally, and for an indefinite period. France, on her part,
obtained possession of the port of Kwangchowfoo, which is the best outlet
to the sea for the trade of the southern province of Kwangsi; she also
secured a promise that the island of Hainan should not be ceded to any
other power; and, finally, she gained a recognition of her claim, first
advanced in 1895, to a prior right to control the commercial development
of the province of Yunnan. This claim is as reasonable as that put forward
by Germany with reference to the province of Shantung, but it is
incompatible with the northeastward development of British Burmah. While
these acts, which, virtually, amounted to mutilations of the Middle
Kingdom, were being committed by Germany, Russia and France, England
undertook to assert the principle of the "open door," the principle,
namely, that, whatever territorial concessions might be made by the Pekin
government, no nation could be deprived of its treaty rights in the ports
ceded. That is to say, American citizens, British subjects, or the
subjects of any other power which has a treaty with China containing "the
most favored nation" clause, must be allowed to enjoy precisely the same
rights in Talienwan, Kiao Chou and Kwangchowfoo as they would have enjoyed
had not those places been surrendered to Russia, Germany and France
respectively. This principle could only have been enforced by war, in
which England would have needed the assistance of Japan; but Japan was not
yet ready to engage in a contest, for the reason that she still had to
receive $60,000,000 of the war indemnity due from China, and because the
war vessels which she had ordered to be constructed in foreign shipyards
were not yet sufficiently near completion. Being thus constrained to
abandon the hope of maintaining its treaty rights in the ceded parts of
China, the British Foreign Office changed its ground and fell back on the
policy of exacting an equivalent for the advantages gained by Russia,
Germany and France. In the pursuance of this policy it obtained Wei-hai-
Wei, which, as we have said, is one of the two keys to the Gulf of
Pechihli. It is, however, very inferior to Port Arthur; only by the
expenditure of a large sum of money could it be made a naval fortress of
high rank, and, even then, it would require a large garrison for its
protection. This was not all that England gained, however; she secured a
promise from the Pekin government that the valley of the Yangstekiang
should never be alienated to any foreign power except Great Britain. The
limits of the valley, nevertheless, were not defined, and the Pekin
authorities have acted on the hypothesis that the covenant against
alienation did not debar them from giving commercial and industrial
privileges within the basin to the subjects of European powers other than
England. The right to build, for instance, a railway from Pekin to
Hangchow has been conferred upon a syndicate nominally Belgian, in which,
however, it is understood that Russia is deeply interested. On the other
hand, in spite of protests from St. Petersburg, the privilege of extending
to Newchwang in Manchuria the railway which already extends some distance
in a northeasterly direction from Tientsin, has been secured by a British
corporation.
In September, 1898, a palace revolution occurred at Pekin. For some time,
the Emperor Kwangsu had been known to be under the influence of a highly
intelligent and progressive Cantonese named Kang Yu Wei. At the latter's
suggestion, edicts were put forth decreeing important administrative
reforms which would have deprived the mandarins of their opportunities of
embezzlement, and also indicating an intention to reorganize the
educational system of China upon European models. The necessity of such
changes is obvious enough if China is to follow Japan in the path of
progress, but it is equally plain that the advocacy of them would render
the emperor obnoxious to the whole body of mandarins and of the literati.
The unpopularity caused by his proposed innovations proved fatal to
Kwangsu; for the party at court, headed by the Empress-dowager Tsi An,
took advantage of it to arrest and imprison him. Kang Yu Wei, having
received warning of the conspiracy, had fled, and succeeded in gaining an
asylum under the British flag, but many of the emperor's personal
followers were put to death. On September 22, appeared an edict ostensibly
signed by Kwangsu announcing that he had requested the empress-dowager to
resume authority over the affairs of State. It has been since reported
that he has been killed. The immediate effect of the _coup d'etat_ was to
place all power at Pekin in the hands of Manchus least friendly to the
adoption of European ideas, and more willing to lean upon Russia than
upon any other foreign power. The early restoration to high office of Li
Hung Chang, who has, for some time, been a useful tool of the St.
Petersburg government, and who is a favorite of the empress-dowager, may
be looked upon as probable.
THE FUTURE OF CHINA
It is obvious that arterial communication is the first organic need of all
civilized States, and pre-eminently of a country so vast and various in
its terrestrial conditions as is China. This need has been recognized by
the ablest of its rulers, who, from time to time, have made serious
efforts to connect the most distant parts of the empire by both land and
water routes. The Grand Canal, or Yunho ("River of Transports"), is
pronounced as memorable a monument of human industry in its way as is the
Great Wall. It is not, however, a canal in the Western sense of the word,
but merely, as Richthofen has explained, "a series of abandoned river
beds, lakes and marshes, connected one with another by cuttings of no
importance, fed by the Wanho in Shantung, which divides into two currents
at its summit, and by other streams and rivers along its course. A part of
the water of the Wanho descends toward the Hoangho and Gulf of Pechihli;
the larger part runs south in the direction of the Yangtse." The Grand
Canal links Hangchow, a port on the East China Sea, south of the Yangtse,
with Tientsin in Chihli, where it unites with the Peiho, and thus may be
said to extend to Tungchow in the neighborhood of Pekin. When the canal
was in order, before the inflow of the Yellow River failed, there was
uninterrupted water communication from Pekin to Canton, and to the many
cities and towns met with on the way. For many years past, however, and
especially since the carriage of tribute-rice by steamers along the coast
began, repairs of the Grand Canal have been practically abandoned. The
roads in China, confined generally to the northern and western sections of
the country, are described as the very worst in the world. The paving,
according to Baber, "is of the usual Chinese pattern, rough bowlders and
blocks of stone being laid somewhat loosely together on the surface of the
ground; 'good for ten years and bad for ten thousand,' as the Chinese
proverb admits. On the level plains of China, where the population is
sufficiently affluent to subscribe for occasional repairs, the system has
much practical value. But, in the Yunnari mountains, the roads are never
repaired; so far from it, the indigent natives extract the most convenient
blocks to stop the holes in their hovel walls, or to build a fence on the
windward side of their poppy patches. The rains soon undermine the
pavement, especially where it is laid on a steep incline; sections of it
topple down the slope, leaving chasms a yard or more in depth." Where
traveling by water is impossible, sedan chairs are used to carry
passengers, and coolies with poles and slings transport the luggage and
goods. The distances covered by the sedan chair porters are remarkable,
being sometimes as much as thirty-five miles a day, even on a journey
extending over a month. The transport animals--ponies, mules, oxen and
donkeys--are strong and hardy, and manage to drag carts along the
execrable roads. The ponies are said to be admirable, and the mules
unequaled in any other country. The distances which these animals will
cover on the very poorest of forage are surprising.
The rapid adoption of steamers along the coast and on the Yangtse has
paved the way for railways. Shallow steamers have yet to traverse the
Poyang and the Tungting Lakes, which lie near the Yangtse, and Peiho and
Canton Rivers, as well as many minor streams. It is the railway, however,
that is the supreme necessity. Mr. Colquhoun has pointed out that, except
along the Yangtse for the thousand-odd miles now covered by steamers,
there is not a single trade route of importance in China where a railway
would not pay. Especially would a line from Pekin carried through the
heart of China to the extreme south, along the existing trade routes, be
advantageous and remunerative. The enormous traffic carried on throughout
the Celestial Empire in the face of appalling difficulties, on men's
backs, or by caravans of mules or ponies, or by the rudest of carts and
wheelbarrows, must be, some day, undertaken by railways. In the judgment
of careful observers, too much stress should not be laid on the
introduction of the locomotive for strategic purposes. The capital aim of
railway construction should be, they think, the development of the
interprovincial trade of China, the interchange of the varied products of
a country which boasts so many climates and soils. This would bring
prosperity to the people, render administrative reforms possible, and open
China for the Chinese quite as much as for the European merchant or
manufacturer. From the viewpoint of Chinese interests, the most useful
lines would be two that should connect Pekin, Tientsin and all the
northern part of the country with central and southern China. Trunk lines
could be constructed for this purpose without any difficulty. They would
pass along the old trade tracks, and would encounter populous cities the
whole way. Through eastern Shansi and Honan, for example, to Hangchow on
the Yangtse; thence to the Si Kiang and Canton; such lines would be shafts
driven through the heart of the Middle Kingdom, connecting the North and
the South. For the entire distance, some 1,300 or 1,400 miles, the extent,
fertility and variety of the soil are described as remarkable. From the
North, abounding in cotton and varieties of grain and pulse, to the South,
where many vegetable products of the Orient are met, the redundancy of the
population is a striking feature. A constant succession of villages, towns
and cities would be transformed into a picture of bustle and business.
The internal economical conditions of China to-day are very much the same
as were those of India when railways were introduced. The only difference
is that the Chinese people are better off per man, and that the Chinese
and Indo-Chinese, unlike the natives of India, are born travelers and
traders. Yet, even in India, contrary to expectation, the passenger
traffic on the railways has, from the first, exceeded the goods traffic.
In 1857, the number of passengers carried by railway in India was
2,000,000; in 1896, it had risen to 160,000,000. In the first named year,
the quantity of goods transported was 253,000 tons; in 1896, it was
32,500,000 tons. There has been witnessed in India during those forty
years an expansion of commerce which, at the outset of the period, would
have been deemed incredible. The imports and exports rose in that time
from 400,000,000 to 2,000,000,000 rupees. Forty years ago, India was
merely a dealer in drugs, dyes and luxuries; now she is one of the largest
purveyors of food grains, fibers, and many other staples. Few persons are
aware how favorably the earnings of Indian railways compare with those of
other countries. The average earnings of railways in the United States are
3 per cent; in Great Britain, 3.60 per cent; in India, 5.46 per cent. This
in spite of the fact that, in India, a man can travel 400 miles within
twenty-four hours for the sum of $2.08. The policy of low charges has
answered well, the people, on its adoption, at once having begun to travel
and to send their produce by rail. In China, also, low rates will be a
necessity. Another fact of importance to China is that, out of the 260,000
people employed on Indian railways, 95.66 per cent are natives. Only the
higher posts are held by Europeans. In China, the proportions would
probably be even more in favor of the native element.
Mr. Colquhoun, who is a high authority, has no doubt that, as Richthofen
anticipated years ago, China will eventually be directly connected with
Europe via Hami, Lanchow and Sian. "No direct connection of this kind,"
says Richthofen "is possible south of the Wei basin, and any road to the
north of it would have to keep entirely north of the Yellow River and run
altogether through desert countries." The same reason which confined the
commerce of China with the West during thousands of years to the natural
route via Hami will be decisive as regards railway communication also. In
respect of natural facilities, and because of the existence of populous,
productive and extensive commercial regions at both ends of the line, it
is the only practicable route. It is further to be noted that the whole
tract would be provided with coal. The province of Kansuh rivals Shansi in
the richness and extent of its coal fields; no section of it north of the
Tsungling Mountains appears to be deficient in coal measures, and, in some
parts, a superabundance of the combustible exists. The coal formation
extends, with few interruptions, from Eastern Shansi to Hi through thirty
degrees of longitude. There is scarcely, remarks Richthofen, an instance
on record "where so many favorable and essential conditions co-operate to
concentrate all future intercourse on so long a line upon one single and
definite channel." As regards railways within the empire, a Pekin-Hankow
line has been arranged for, as we pointed out in the previous chapter,
with a so-called Belgian syndicate, and, if properly executed, should be a
good line; but, as we have said, it is the opinion of experts that the
best railway contemplated in China would be that from Pekin via Tientsin
to Hangchow, with an extension later to Canton. The line would pass some
forty towns, with an average population of 25,000 each, and a large number
of villages. The length of the Grand Canal from Tientsin to Hangchow is
650 miles. According to Mr. Colquhoun, no better line for a railway exists
in the world, from the viewpoint of population, resources and cheapness of
construction. It follows the most important of the actual routes of
commerce in the empire, passes the greatest possible number of cities,
towns and villages, and connects great seaports with rich coal regions of
authenticated value.
We pass to the telegraph and postal service. It appears that government
telegraphs are being rapidly extended throughout the empire. There are
lines between Pekin and Tientsin, and lines connecting the capital with
the principal places in Manchuria as far as the Russian frontier on the
Amour and the Usuri, while Newchwang, Chefoo, Shanghai, Yangchow, Souchow,
the seven treaty ports on the Yangtse, Canton, Woochow, Lungchow, and, in
fact, most of the principal cities in the empire, are now joined by wire
with one another and with the metropolis. The line from Canton westward
passes via Yunnanfoo to Manwein, on the borders of Burmah. Shanghai is in
communication with Foochow and Moy, Kashing, Shaoshing, Ningpo and other
places. Lines have been constructed between Foochow and Canton and between
Taku, Port Arthur and Seoul in Corea, and the line along the Yangtse
Valley has been extended to Chungking. By an arrangement made with the
Russian telegraph authorities, the Chinese and Siberian lines in the Amour
Valley were joined in the latter part of 1892, and there is now overland
communication between Pekin and Europe through Russian territory. The
postal service of China is unquestionably primitive from a Western point
of view. It is carried on by means of post carts and runners. There are,
besides, numerous private postal couriers, and, during the winter, when
the approach to the capital is closed by sea and river, a service between
the office of Foreign Customs at Pekin and the outports is maintained. The
Chinese, it seems, have always been great believers in their own postal
system. Even those who have emigrated to British colonies have adhered to
their own method of transporting letters, refusing to use the duly
constituted government posts, except under compulsion. Both Hongkong and
the Straits Settlements have been actually compelled to legislate in the
matter. It is said, however, to be remarkable how safe the native post is,
not merely for the carriage of ordinary letters, but for the conveyance of
money. We should add that, on February 2, 1897, the Imperial Chinese Post
Office was opened under the management of Sir Robert Hart, and China has
since joined the Postal Union.
In a chapter of Mr. Colquhoun's book bearing the caption "England's
Objective in China," we are told that there are two ways of attacking the
trade of China in the Middle Kingdom, so far as England is concerned. The
one is from the seaboard, entering China by the chief navigable rivers,
notably the Yangtse, which is the main artery of China, and the West
River, which passes through the southern provinces. The other mode of
approach is from England's land base, Burmah, through Yunnan. It is
acknowledged that the sea approach, hitherto the only one, is, from the
purely trading point of view, incomparably the more important; but the
other, or complementary land route, is pronounced a necessity if England's
commercial and political influence is to be maintained and extended. The
isolation of China over sea has long since been annuled by steam, and her
former complete isolation by land has now ceased also. Hitherto cut off
from access by land, she will, in the north, be shortly placed in direct
railway communication with Europe, a fact which by itself renders
imperative a corresponding advance from the south. It is many years since
Mr. Colquhoun began to advocate the railway communication of Burmah with
southwestern China, first with the view to open Yunnan and Szchuen, and,
secondly, to effect a junction between those two great waterways, the
Yangtse and the Irrawaddy. It seemed to him that the connection of the
navigation limit of the Yangtse with the most easterly province of Anglo-
India was a matter of cardinal importance, not merely because it was
eminently desirable for commercial purposes to connect the central and
lower regions of the Yangtse with Burmah, but also for political reasons.
It so happens that the navigation limit of that river lies within the
province of Szchuen, which, in Mr. Colquhoun's opinion, should be the
commercial and political objective of England. Szchuen, from its size,
population, trade and products, may, according to Mrs. Bishop, be truly
called the Empire Province. Apart from its great mineral resources, the
province produces silk, wax and tobacco, all of good quality; grass cloth,
grain in abundance, and tea, plentiful though of poor flavor. The climate
is changeable, necessitating a variety of clothing. Cotton is grown in
Szchuen, but Bourne states that Indian yarn is driving it out of
cultivation, not apparently on account of the enormous saving through
spinning by machinery, but because the fiber can be grown more cheaply in
India. The greater part of the surplus wealth of Szchuen is devoted to the
purchase of raw native and foreign cotton and woolen goods. All the cotton
bought is not consumed in the province, for the inhabitants manufacture
from the imported raw material and export the product to Yunnan and
western Kweichow. Rich as it is, Szchuen has the disadvantage of being
difficult of access from the rest of the world, for at present merchandise
can now only reach it during certain months of the year, and after a
difficult voyage. Its trade would be increased very greatly were the
navigation of the Yangtse rendered easier and safer, thus facilitating the
establishment of effective steam communication not only to Chungking, but
as far as Suifoo.
The natural channel of trade between Hongkong and southwestern China is
the Sikiang, or West River. Owing, however, to the obstacles raised by
taxation and the non-enforcement by England of the transit-pass system,
trade has been diverted to other channels, such as the Pakhoi-Nanning
route, and later to the Tonquin route, the French having insisted on the
effective carrying out of the transit-pass system via Mengtse. At present
British goods are actually sent from Hongkong through French territory via
Mengtse to a point within seven days of Bhamo in Burmah. The Lungchow
route, whatever its merits might have been, had the railway line from
Pakhoi to Nanning not been secured by the French government, is now,
according to Mr. Colquhoun, of quite secondary importance. He concedes
that, unless the West River is at once effectively opened throughout its
course, the Pakhoi-Nanning-Yunnan route is bound to command the largest
share of the trade of south and southwestern China.
Having passed under review the provinces of south and southwestern China
and the great waterways--to wit, the Yangtse and West rivers--we may now
inquire what measures should be adopted to improve the present state of
affairs in the interest of China and of foreign trade. The first step
suggested is the improvement of communication by railways and steam
navigation. So far as railways are concerned, Burmah should be connected
with Tali and Yunnanfoo, Yunnanfoo with Nanning, Canton with Kaulun. This
would thoroughly open the whole of Southern China lying between Burmah and
the British colony of Hongkong. Yunnanfoo should also be connected to the
northeast with Suifoo on the upper Yangtse, the navigation limit of that
waterway. Steam navigation should at once be extended to Nanning and to
Suifoo, and also, wherever it may be practicable, throughout all inland
waters. Next in importance to the creation of proper communication is the
question of taxation. All travelers, in Southern China especially, dwell
on the obstacles to trade resulting from the collection of so many various
imposts. The British government should insist on its treaty rights,
especially the enforcement, successfully accomplished by the French
government, of the transit-pass system. It is, finally, the conviction of
all competent students of the subject that it is from Burmah, on the one
hand, and from Shanghai and Hongkong on the other, that England must, by
the aid of steam applied overland and by water, practically occupy the
upper Yangtse region, which will be found to be the key to a dominant
position in China.
In some comments on China's prospective commercial development Mr.
Colquhoun, the latest first-hand observer, sets forth some statistics
which are of interest not only to Englishmen but to Americans. He shows
that in 1896 the total net value of imports and of exports was
55,768,500 pounds, and the total gross value 57,274,000 pounds, of which
the British dominions contributed 39,271,000 pounds, leaving for all other
nations 18,003,000 pounds. Of this aggregate Russia contributed 2,856,000
pounds, the rest of Europe 4,585,000 pounds, Japan 4,705,000 pounds, and
other countries, including the United States, 5,767,000 pounds. The
percentage of the carrying trade of the Middle Kingdom under foreign flags
was: British, 82.04; German, 7.49; French, 2.00; Japanese, 1.34; Russian,
0.59; other countries, 5.54. The percentage of dues and duties paid under
foreign flags was as follows: British, 76.04; German, 10.12; French, 2.95;
Japanese, 2.28; Russian, 1.90; all other nations, 6.71. It appears, then,
that Great Britain not only carries eighty-two per cent of the total
foreign trade with China, but pays seventy-two per cent of the revenue
resulting from that trade. Until recently, British subjects were at
liberty to carry on business at but eighteen ports in China. They were
Newchwang, Tientsin, Chifui, on the northern coast; Chungking, Ichang,
Hankow, Kiukiang, Wehu, Chinkiang and Shanghai, on the Yangtse River;
Ningpo, Wenchow, Foochow, Amoy, Swatow, Canton, Hoihow (Kiungchow) and
Pakhoy, on the coast south of the Yangtse. To these must be now added
Shansi on the Yangtse, between Ichang and Hankow; Hangchow and Souchow,
two inland cities near Shanghai; Woochow and Sanshui on the West River and
Ssumao and Lungchow, in the south. It is also reported that three other
ports have been very recently opened; viz., Yochow, on the Tungting Lake;
Chungwang, on the Gulf of Pechihli, and Funing in Fuhkien.
Let us now proceed to demonstrate how deeply the United States are
concerned in the China question from the industrial point of view.
Inasmuch as, owing to the fact that Americans now manufacture more than
they consume, they are compelled to embark on a foreign policy and to look
increasingly to foreign markets, they cannot but feel that the future of
the Middle Kingdom is a matter of vital importance to themselves. It is
manifest that the Pacific slope, though at present playing but a small
part, is destined to be more profoundly affected by the development of
China than is any other section of the American republic. Our Pacific
States are possessed of enormous natural resources; their manufactures
have quadrupled in twenty years, and will, in the course of time, find a
most advantageous market in the Far East. When the Nicaragua Canal shall
have been dug, the Atlantic States will also be brought into close
connection with China and with the rest of Eastern Asia. The volume of the
United States traffic with China already represented a considerable part
of the foreign trade of the empire in 1896. While the imports from China
received by the United States have increased but slowly, the exports from
the last-named country to the Middle Kingdom have increased 126 per cent
in ten years, and are more than fifty per cent greater than the exports of
Germany to the same market. The export of American cotton cloths to China
amounted to $7,485,000 in 1897, or nearly one-half the entire value of
cotton cloths sent abroad by the United States. The export of kerosene oil
from the States to China now ranks second in importance to that of cotton
goods, and is likely to increase at a rapid rate. The Chinese demand for
the illuminating fluid is quickly growing, and the delivery of it from the
United States to China has more than trebled in value during the past ten
years. That is to say, it has risen from $1,466,000 in 1888 to $4,498,000
in 1897. The Russian oil has hitherto been the only serious foreign
competitor of the American product, but the Langkat oil is coming to some
extent into use. The exports of American wheat flour to China reached a
value in 1897 of $3,390,000, and those of chemicals, dyes, etc.,
$1,000,000. At present, the export trade of the United States to China is
confined mainly to cottons and mineral oils; that is to say, it is largely
restricted to commodities which would be hard to sell in any Chinese port
where the conditions of equal trade did not prevail. It would probably
prove impossible to sell them in any Asiatic port controlled by Russia or
by France. It follows that, although England has most to lose by the
partition of China, even though she should receive a large share of
territory, the United States are also deeply interested in the question,
for their trade is already considerable, and is likely, under favorable
circumstances, to undergo great expansion.
Let us, finally, examine the Chinese question from a political point of
view. We concur with Mr. Colquhoun in believing that Englishmen are now at
the parting of the ways, and that their failure to take the right course
in the Far East will mean the loss of England's commercial supremacy, and,
eventually, the disintegration of the British Empire. He maintains that,
since November 16, 1896, when the German government was compelled by
Bismarck's revelations to disclose the drift of its future policy, it has
been apparent that there is an increasing tendency toward cooperation in
the Near East and the Par East between Germany and Russia, and therefore,
also, between those powers and France, which is Russia's ally. The
understanding is based upon mutual interest, territorial in the case of
Russia, commercial in that of Germany, and political in the case of
France. The cornerstone of the combination is Russia, whose goodwill is
sought for at all costs by France, in a lesser degree by Germany, and,
latterly, even by Austria-Hungary. The chief aim of the combination is the
reduction of England to a secondary position, politically and
commercially. In China, the outcome of the coalition has been to isolate
England completely. For some years past, her efforts to secure concessions
at Pekin have been frustrated by Russia and France. Meanwhile, these two
countries, and, more lately, Germany as well, have secured for themselves
solid advantages. Japan, on her part, since she was compelled to submit to
a revision of the Shimonoseki treaty, has been watching silently and
preparing anxiously for eventualities. England's official optimists talked
in 1895, however, as they still talk, of the successes gained, the
"rectification" of the Burmo-Chinese frontier and the incomplete "opening"
of the West River. As a matter of fact, the British government has done
little or nothing to establish overland railway communication from Burmah
to China, or to reach China "from behind," as Lord Salisbury called it;
and the Upper Yangtse, the main artery of China, has remained practically
unopened. Such, at least, was the situation a few months ago.
To understand the present situation, which is the natural sequel of 1895,
it is needful, first of all, to recognize the fact that Russia is, at this
moment, the protector of China against all comers, and that France
supports her firmly, while Germany, having once taken the decisive step of
placing herself alongside Russia, is likely to follow the czar's lead for
two sufficient reasons; namely, for fear of displeasing the Russian ally
of France, and because concessions are not likely to be obtained at Pekin
by Germany, if the latter country places itself in direct and open
opposition to the St. Petersburg government. Russian influence has, for
some time past, been omnipotent at Pekin, mainly through the kindly
assistance rendered to China in 1895, followed up by what has been
practically an offensive and defensive league. The nature of the
understanding between Russia and the Middle Kingdom has, indeed, for some
time been patent to all the world except Englishmen, the chief features of
it being: First, an offensive and defensive alliance; secondly, branch
railways through Manchuria; thirdly, the refortification of Port Arthur
and Talienwan, both to be paid for by China, and either or both of these
harbors to be placed at Russia's disposal whenever they may be required.
It is true that China has denied the existence of any agreement except
that concerning the northern Manchurian Railway, but Russia has never
denied anything except the accuracy of the version of the so-called
"Cassini" Convention, published by a Shanghai paper. Apart from the
existence of any written contract, the facts speak for themselves. Russia,
having had a prior lien on Kiao Chou, it is obvious that Germany could not
have seized that harbor in opposition to Russia. Again, what is to prevent
Germany from discovering some day that Kiao Chou does not "meet her
requirements," in which event what is there to hinder Russia from taking
over Kiao Chou and giving Germany another port? Provision has, in truth,
been made to enable Germany to treat Kiao Chou as a negotiable bill of
exchange.
There is really nothing unforeseen in the recent evolution of affairs in
the Far East. On the contrary, it has been clearly indicated by various
writers in the past fifty years. As far back as 1850, Meadows wrote:
"China will not be conquered by any Western power until she becomes the
Persia of some future Alexander the Great of Russia, which is the Macedon
of Europe. England, America and France will, if they are wise, wage,
severally or collectively, a war of exhaustion with Russia rather than
allow her to conquer China, for, when she has done that, she will be
mistress of the world." In reply to those who ridicule the policy of
"guarding against imaginary Russian dangers in China," he said: "Many may
suppose the danger to be too remote to be a practical subject for the
present generation. The subject is most practical at the present hour,
for, as the English, Americans and French now deal with China, and with
her relations to Russia, so the event will be. For those to whom 'it will
last our time' is a word of practical wisdom, this volume is not written."
Again, a few years later, Meadows wrote: "The greatest, though not
nearest, danger of a weak China lies precisely in those territorial
aggressions of Russia which she began two centuries ago, and which, if
allowed to go on, will speedily give her a large and populous territory,
faced with Sveaborgs and Sebastopols on the seaboard of Eastern Asia. Let
England, America and France beware how they create a sick giant in the Far
East. China is a world-necessity." Foreshadowing the gradual extension of
Russia into China, and the time when the former country would become
dominant at Pekin, and when, with all Manchuria organized behind her, she
would occupy the whole of the Yellow River basin, Meadows expressed the
belief that, should that occasion occur, no combination of powers would
then be able to thwart Russia's purpose. "With 120,000,000 Chinese to work
or fight for her, nothing would stand between Russia and the conquest of
the rest of the Celestial Empire; not China alone, but Europe itself would
then be dominated, and it would cost the Russian Emperor of China but
little trouble to overwhelm the Pacific States of the New World." Such was
the forecast of a writer whose name is to-day forgotten.
What are the advantages which Russia possesses over England in dealing
with China? There is, in the first place, the advantage of proximity. The
Chinese people in the northern provinces, and especially at the capital,
which is not far from the Great Wall, undoubtedly discriminate between
Russians and other foreigners. Like other Orientals, they only believe
what they see; and Russia is seen and realized on the northern frontier.
Besides the effect of contact, the Russians possess a gift in dealing with
the Chinese. The affinities and analogies which the Russians and Chinese
exhibit have been depicted by Michie in his book on the "Siberian Overland
Route." "Analogies in the manners, customs and modes of thought of the two
races are constantly turning up, and their resemblance to the Chinese has
become a proverb among the Russians themselves. The Russians and the
Chinese are peculiarly suited to each other in the commercial as well as
in the diplomatic departments. They have an equal disregard for truth, for
the Russian, in spite of his fair complexion, is, at the bottom, more than
half Asiatic. There is nothing original about this observation, but it
serves to explain how it is that the Russians have won their way into
China by quiet and peaceable means, while we have always been running our
heads against a stone wall, and never could get over it without breaking
it down. The Russians meet the Chinese as Greek meets Greek; craft is
encountered with craft, politeness with politeness, and patience with
patience. They understand each other's character thoroughly, because they
are so closely alike." Michie went on to say that "when either a Russian
or a Chinese meets a European, say an Englishman, he instinctively recoils
from the blunt, straightforward, up-and-down manner of coming to business
at once, and the Asiatic either declines a contest which he cannot fight
with his own weapons, or, seizing the weak point of his antagonist, he
angles for him until he wearies him into acquiescence. As a rule, the
Asiatic has the advantage. His patient equanimity and heedlessness of the
waste of time are too much for the impetuous haste of the European. This
characteristic of the Russian trading classes has enabled them to
insinuate them selves into the confidence of the Chinese; to fraternize
and identify themselves with them, and, as it were, to make common cause
with them in their daily life; while the Western European holds himself
aloof, and only comes in contact with the Chinese when business requires
it; for, in all the rest, a great gulf separates them in thoughts, ideas
and the aims of life."
Of interest, also, as showing how history repeats itself, are the
observations made nearly forty years ago by Lockhart, a missionary, after
a long residence in China. Lockhart wrote: "The Russian government
anticipated us, not in the knowledge of the advantages of close commercial
and political relations with an empire so enormous in its resources, but
in the employment of those arguments that alone could render a vain and
effeminate State sensible of their value.... The map of all the Russias,
published at St. Petersburg, now includes that vast portion of Central
Asia heretofore constituting the outlying provinces of the Chinese empire
beyond the Great Wall. Having placed a mission in the Chinese capital and
organized an overwhelming army in Chinese Tartary, with magazines of
warlike resources, Russia easily secured a permanent footing in region
after region, till she had dominated over, and then obtained the cession
of, all the intervening space, leaving the conquest of the entire Chinese
empire to the time when it should please the reigning Czar to order his
Cossacks to take possession. It is impossible to state with any precision
the amount of moral or material support which the Chinese emperor received
from his imperial brother and formidable neighbor, and which encouraged
him to the obstinate resistance that he offered to the demands of England
and France [in 1860]; but a slight acquaintance with Russian policy must
satisfy any one that, having established itself as a favored nation,
Russia could not regard with complacency any attempt made by another
nation to share such advantages." Comprehending, therefore, the Chinese
character, perceiving clearly that the present Manchu dynasty is unable to
perform the elementary functions of an organized society, that Pekin is
another Teheran or Constantinople, that, while the people are sound, the
courts and the officials are corrupt, Russia has studied and gained over
certain influential persons and applied skillfully the maxim, _divide et
impera_. What China is taught night and day is that Russia is a land
power, and, therefore, alone can protect China; that she keeps her
promises and threats; that, with England, on the other hand, it is always
a case of _vox et praeterea nihil_. In short, Russia protects China in
a peculiar sense, that is to say, for a price, to be paid to Russia or
even to her friends. The dominating idea instilled into the Chinese court
and bureaucracy, which, in the absence of a strong policy on England's
part, are in a hypnotized condition, is to be saved from Japan. The great
object of Russian policy is to utilize China for territorial and political
expansion.
What would China be worth to Russia? This question is answered by Mr.
Colquhoun at considerable length. What the utilization of China would mean
can be realized, he says, only by a full appreciation of the extraordinary
resources of that country, judged from various points of view. The
Celestial Empire has the men with which to create armies and navies; the
materials, especially iron and coal, requisite for the purposes of railway
and steam navigation; all the elements, in fact, out of which to evolve a
great living force. One thing alone is wanting, namely, the will, the
directing power, which, absent from within, is now being applied from
without. That supplied, there are to be found in abundance within China
itself the capacity to carry out, the brains to plan, the hands to work.
When, moreover, it is understood that not merely is the soil fertile, but
that the mineral resources, the greatest, perhaps, in the whole world,
are, as yet, practically untouched, the merest surface being scratched;
when we further consider the volume of China's population, the ability and
enterprise, and, above all, the intense vitality of the people, as strong
as ever after four millenniums; when we reflect on the general
characteristics of the race; it seems indisputable that the Chinese, under
wise direction, are destined to dominate the whole of Eastern Asia, and,
may be, to play a leading part in the affairs of the world. Even although
the Celestial Empire appears to be now breaking up, it is capable, under
tutelage, of becoming reconsolidated. Often before now, when conquered,
has China either thrown off the yoke or absorbed its conquerors. But never
before has the conqueror come, as does the czar to-day, in the guise of a
great organizing force. To much the same effect wrote Michie, whose
opinion is of weight, and from whom we have already quoted: "The theory
that China's decadence is due to the fact that she has long since reached
maturity and has outlived the natural term of a nation's existence does
not hold good. The mass of the people have not degenerated; they are as
fresh and vigorous as ever they were; it is the government only that has
become old and feeble; a change of dynasty may yet restore to China the
luster which belongs legitimately to so great a nation. The indestructible
vitality of Chinese institutions has preserved the country unchanged
throughout many revolutions. The high civilization of the people and their
earnestness in the pursuit of peaceful industry have enabled them to
preserve their national existence through more dynastic changes than
perhaps any other country or nation has experienced." Mr. Colquhoun, for
his own part, testifies that, in peaceful pursuits, in agriculture, in the
arts and manufactures, no limit can be placed to the capabilities of
China. Even in the paths of war, he deems it difficult to foretell what,
under skillfull direction, may not be accomplished. It is true that,
touching this point, there is a wide difference of opinion. Prjevalski
said, apropos of the Tonquin campaign: "She [China] lacks the proper
material; she lacks the life-giving spirit. Let Europeans supply the
Chinese with any number of arms that they please: let them exert
themselves ever so energetically to train Chinese soldiers: let them even
supply leaders: the Chinese Army will, nevertheless, even under the most
favorable conditions, never be more than an artificially created,
mechanically united, unstable organism. Subject it but once to the serious
test of war, speedy dissolution will overtake such an army, which could
never hope for victory over a foe animated with any real spirit." On the
other hand, high testimony has been borne by other travelers and military
critics to the excellent quality of China's raw material for military
purposes. Wingrove Cooke, the "Times" correspondent with the allied forces
in 1857-58, who is generally accounted one of the best critics of Chinese
men and affairs; Count d'Escayrac de Lauture, one of the Pekin prisoners
in 1859-60; Chinese Gordon and Lord Wolseley, have all spoken highly of
the courage and endurance of the Chinese soldier. The following summary of
his capabilities was given by one who had had experience with Gordon's
"Ever-Victorious Army": "The old notion is pretty well got rid of that
they are at all a cowardly people, when properly paid and efficiently led;
while the regularity and order of their habits, which dispose them to
peace in ordinary times, give place to a daring bordering on recklessness
in times of war. Their intelligence and capacity for remembering facts
render them well fitted for use in modern warfare, as do also the coolness
and the calmness of their disposition. Physically, they are, on the
average, not so strong as Europeans, but considerably more so than most of
the other races of the East; and, on a cheap diet of rice, vegetables,
salt fish and pork, they can go through a vast amount of fatigue whether
in a temperate climate or a tropical one, where Europeans are ill fitted
for exertion. Their wants are few; they have no caste prejudices and
hardly any appetite for intoxicating liquors." It is Mr. Colquhoun's
opinion, based upon prolonged observation, that, if China were conquered
by Russia, organized, disciplined and led by Russian officers and Russian
administrators, an industrial and military organization would be developed
which India could not face, and which would shake to its foundations the
entire fabric of the British Empire. If, he says, the Chinese failed to
profit by their numerical superiority and their power of movement in
Tonquin, it must be remembered that they were as ill-equipped and supplied
and nearly as unorganized and unofficered as they were in the Chino-
Japanese war. Transport, commissariat, tents, medical service, all the
paraphernalia employed in organized army work, were then, as in the late
campaign, absolutely unknown. Notwithstanding the unfavorable judgment of
Prjevalski that the Chinese are animated by neither military nor patriotic
spirit, the conviction of many observers is that, however undisciplined
they proved themselves in the Chino-Japanese war; however badly the
undrilled, unfed, unled Chinamen in uniform compared with the highly
organized troops of Japan, their capabilities, as the components of a
fighting machine, should be rated exceedingly high. The apparent
inconsistencies of the Chinese can, in all likelihood, be reconciled. That
they offer excellent military material when shaped and guided by
foreigners may be pronounced certain. If they come from the Manchurian
provinces or from Shantung, they are found to be steady, willing to be
taught and amenable to discipline, of splendid physique and able to bear
hardships and cold without a murmur. If from Honan, they exhibit many of
the best characteristics of highland races--courage and loyalty to their
own leader, but they are more difficult to manage, and they are not steady
in any sense of the word. The southern Chinese seem to be held generally
in low esteem, but one should not forget that the best fighters of the
Taeping army were the men from the Canton province, and that, as seamen,
the coast populations of Southern China are unequaled. The western
highlanders, whether Mohammedans or not, are men of good physique, and
would make good fighting material. The Mongolians are horsemen from their
early years, and are suitable for light cavalry of the Cossack type.
Like the Central Asian peoples, the Chinese possess in a high degree the
virtue of passive bravery. At first the Russians, in their contests in
Central Asia, expended much time and wasted many lives in besieging towns.
They acted with caution, throwing up approaches and opening trenches. This
method, however, was presently abandoned for that of open escalade, as,
for instance, at Tashkend, Khojand and Uratapa. Finally, the plan was
adopted of storming breaches, to permit of which breaching batteries would
be thrown up at very close quarters, after which, a favorable time being
chosen, the place would be carried by storm. From every point of view,
this proved to be the most effective method. The Chinamen, as has been
proved repeatedly, is like other Central Asiatics in this respect, that,
under cover, he sustains the heaviest fire with indifference; he never
surrenders except under bold assaults, which he cannot withstand.
What is the conclusion to which the observations of all first-hand
students of China have conducted them? Their conclusion is that it is a
question of vital importance, a matter of commercial life and death, for
England to maintain and consolidate herself in the Yangtse basin, which
cannot possibly be done except by an effective occupation of the upper
Yangtse, and by developing in every possible way her communications along
that watercourse, and by the West River from Hongkong, also by railway
connection with Upper Burmah and through that province with India. Mr.
Colquhoun, for his part, also believes it to be high time that countries
like the United States, Australasia and Germany should set themselves to
watch with attention, not to say anxiety, the situation in the Far East.
He advises them to reflect upon the history of the ancient empire formed
by Genghis Khan and his successors, for that history is repeating itself
to-day. Russia is conquering by modern methods the kingdoms of Genghis and
Kublai Khan, and the Russian Czar, once emperor of China, will take the
place of the Tartar conquerors who carried fire and sword beyond the
Carpathians and the Vistula and throughout eastern, western and southern
Asia.
THE END