CHAPTER XVII

THE FIRST FOREIGN WAR

AT the very time that the Emperor Taoukwang, by the dismissal of the

Portuguese astronomers at Pekin and by his general indifference to the

foreign question, was showing that no concessions were to be expected from

him, an unknown legislature at a remote distance from his capital was

decreeing, in complete indifference to the susceptibilities of the

occupant of the Dragon Throne, that trade with China might be pursued by

any English subject. Up to the year 1834 trade with China had, by the

royal charter, remained the monopoly of the East India Company; but when

the charter was renewed in that year for a further period of twenty years,

it was shorn of the last of its commercial privileges, and an immediate

change became perceptible in the situation at Canton, which was the

principal seat of the foreign trade. The withdrawal of the monopoly was

dictated solely by English, and not Chinese, considerations. Far from

facilitating trade with the Chinese, it tended to hinder and prevent its

developing; for the Chinese officials had no objection to foreigners

coming to Canton, and buying or selling articles of commerce, so long as

they derived personal profit from the trade, and so long as the laws of

the empire were not disputed or violated. The servants of the East India

Company were content to adapt themselves to this view, and they might have

carried on relations with the Hong merchants for an indefinite period, and

without any more serious collision than occasional interruptions. Had the

monopoly been renewed things would have been left in precisely the same

position as when intercourse was first established, and trade might have

continued within its old restricted limits. But the abolition of the

monopoly and the opening of the trade created quite a new situation, and

by intensifying the opposition of the Chinese government, paved the way to

the only practicable solution of the question of foreign intercourse with

China, which was that, however reluctantly she should consent to take her

place in the family of nations.

The Chinese were not left long in doubt as to the significance of this

change. In December, 1833, a royal commission was issued appointing Lord

Napier chief superintendent of trade with China, and two assistants under

him, of whom one was Sir John Davis. The Chinese had to some extent

contributed to this appointment, the Hoppo at Canton having written that

"in case of the dissolution of the Company it was incumbent on the British

government to appoint a chief to come to Canton for the general management

of commercial dealings, and to prevent affairs from going to confusion."

But in this message the Hoppo seems to have expressed his own view rather

than that of the Pekin government or the Canton viceroy; and certainly

none of the Chinese were prepared to find substituted for "a chief of

commercial dealings" an important commissioner clothed with all the

authority of the British ruler. How very different was the idea formed of

this functionary by the Chinese and English may be gathered from their

official views of his work. What the Chinese thought has been told in the

words of the Hoppo. Lord Palmerston was more precise from his point of

view. His instruction to Lord Napier read, "Your lordship will announce

your arrival at Canton by letter to the viceroy. In addition to the duty

of protecting and fostering the trade at Canton, it will be one of your

principal objects to ascertain whether it may not be practicable to extend

that trade to other parts of the Chinese dominions. It is obvious that,

with a view to the attainment of this object, the establishment of direct

communication with the imperial court at Pekin would be most desirable."

The two points of radical disagreement between these views were that the

Chinese wished to deal with an official who thought exclusively of trade,

whereas Lord Napier's task was not less diplomatic than commercial; and,

secondly, that they expected him to carry on his business with the Hoppo,

as the Company's agents had done, while Lord Napier was specially

instructed to communicate with the viceroy, whom those agents had never

dared to approach.

If it was thought that the Chinese would not realize all the significance

of the change, those who held so slight an opinion of their clear-

headedness were quickly undeceived. Lord Napier reached the Canton River

in July, 1834, and he at once addressed a letter of courtesy to the

viceroy announcing his arrival. The Chinese officers, after perusing it,

refused to forward it to the viceroy, and returned it to Lord Napier. Such

was the inauspicious commencement of the assumption of responsibility by

the crown in China. The Chinese refused to have anything to do with Lord

Napier, whom they described as "a barbarian eye," and they threatened the

merchants with the immediate suspension of the trade. The viceroy issued

an order forbidding the new superintendent to proceed to Canton, and

commanding him to stay at Macao until he had applied in the prescribed

form for permission to proceed up the river. But Lord Napier did not

listen to these representations, nor did he condescend to delay his

progress a moment at Macao. He proceeded up the river to Canton, but,

although he succeeded in making his way to the English factory, it was

only to find himself isolated, and that, in accordance with the viceroy's

order, the Hoppo had interdicted all intercourse with the English. The

Chinese declared that the national dignity was at stake, and so thoroughly

did both officials and merchants harmonize that the English factory was at

once deserted by all Chinese subjects, and even the servants left their

employment. On his arrival at Canton, Lord Napier found himself confronted

with the position that the Chinese authorities refused to have anything to

do with him, and that his presence effectually debarred his countrymen

from carrying on the trade, which it was his first duty to promote. At

this conjuncture it happened that the Chinese had discovered what they

thought to be a new grievance against the foreign traders in the steady

efflux of silver as the natural consequence of the balance of trade being

against China. In a report to the throne in 1833 it was stated that as

much as 60,000,000 taels of silver, or $100,000,000, had been exported

from China in the previous eleven years, and, as the Chinese of course

made no allowance for the equivalent value imported into their country,

this total seemed in their eyes an incredibly large sum to be lost from

the national treasure. It will be easily understood that at this

particular moment the foreign trade appeared to possess few advantages,

and found few patrons among the Chinese people.

In meeting this opposition Lord Napier endeavored to combine courtesy and

firmness. He wrote courteous and argumentative letters to the mandarins,

combating their views, and insisting on his rights as a diplomatist to be

received by the officials of the empire; and at the same time he issued a

notice to the Chinese merchants which was full of threats and defiance.

"The merchants of Great Britain," he said, "wish to trade with all China

on principles of mutual benefit; they will never relax in their exertions

till they gain a point of equal importance to both countries, and the

viceroy will find it as easy to stop the current of the Canton River as to

carry into effect the insane determinations of the Hong." This notice was

naturally enough interpreted as a defiance by the viceroy, who placed the

most severe restrictions he could on the trade, sent his troops into the

foreign settlements to remove all Chinese servants, and ordered the Bogue

forts to fire on any English ship that attempted to pass. The English

merchants, alarmed at the situation, petitioned Lord Napier to allay the

storm he had raised by retiring from Canton to Macao, and, harassed in

mind and enfeebled in body, Lord Napier acquiesced in an arrangement that

stultified all his former proceedings. The Chinese were naturally

intoxicated by their triumph, which vindicated their principle that no

English merchant or emissary should be allowed to come to Canton except by

the viceroy's permit, granted only to the petition and on the guarantee of

the Hong merchants. The viceroy had also carried his point of holding no

intercourse with the English envoy, to whom he had written that "the great

ministers of the Celestial Empire, unless with regard to affairs of going

to court and carrying tribute, or in consequence of imperial commands, are

not permitted to have interviews with outside barbarians." While the

Chinese officials had been both consistent and successful, the new English

superintendent of trade had been both inconsistent and discomfited. He had

attempted to carry matters with a high hand and to coerce the mandarins,

and he was compelled to show in the most public manner that he had failed

by his retirement to Macao. He had even imperiled the continuance of the

trade which he had come specially to promote, and all he could do to show

his indignation was to make a futile protest against "this act of

unprecedented tyranny and injustice." Very soon after Lord Napier's return

to Macao he died, leaving to other hands the settlement of the difficult

affair which neither his acts nor his language had simplified.

On Lord Napier's departure from Canton the restrictions placed on trade

were removed, and the intercourse between the English and Chinese

merchants of the Hong was resumed. But even then the mandarins refused to

recognize the trade superintendents, and after a short time they issued

certain regulations which had been specially submitted to and approved by

the Emperor Taoukwang as the basis on which trade was to be conducted.

These Regulations, eight in number, forbade foreign men-of-war to enter

the inner seas, and enforced the old practice that all requests on the

part of Europeans should be addressed through the Hong in the form of a

petition. It therefore looked as if the Chinese had completely triumphed

in carrying out their views, that the transfer of authority from the East

India Company to the British crown, with the so-called opening of the

trade, had effected no change in the situation, and that such commerce as

was carried on should be as the Chinese dictated, and in accordance with

their main idea, which was to "prevent the English establishing themselves

permanently at Canton." The death of the Viceroy Loo and the familiarity

resulting from increased intercourse resulted in some relaxation of these

severe regulations, and at last, in March, 1837, nearly three years after

Lord Napier's arrival in the Bogue, the new superintendent of trade,

Captain Elliot, received, at his own request, permission through the Hong

to proceed to Canton. The emperor passed a special edict authorizing

Captain Elliot to reside in the factory at Canton, where he was to

"control the merchants and seamen"; but it was also stipulated that he was

to strictly abide by the old regulations, and not to rank above a

supercargo. As Captain Elliot was the representative of a government not

less proud or exacting than that of China, it was clear that these

conditions could not be permanently enforced; and although he endeavored

for a period to conciliate the Chinese and to obtain more favorable terms

by concessions, there came a time when it was impossible to assent to the

arrogant demands of the mandarins, and when resort became necessary to the

_ultima ratio regum_. But for the first two critical years Captain Elliot

pursued the same policy as Lord Napier, alternating concessions with

threats, and, while vaunting the majesty of his sovereign, yielding to

demands which were unreasonable and not to be endured.

The balance of trade against China was the principal cause of the export

of silver, and the balance of trade was only against China through the

increasing import of opium. Without acquiescing in the least with the

strong allegations of the anti-opium party, there is no reason to doubt

that the excessive use of opium, especially in a crowded city like Canton,

was attended with sufficient mischief to justify its official

denunciation. The Pekin government may be so far credited with the honest

intention to reduce the mischief and to prevent a bad habit from becoming

more and more of a national vice, when they determined for far other

reasons to place it in the front of their tirade against foreign trade

generally. They soon found that it would be more convenient and more

plausible to substitute the moral opposition to the opium traffic for the

political disinclination to foreign intercourse in any form. They scarcely

expected that in this project they would receive the assistance and co-

operation of many of the Europeans themselves, who shared with them the

opinion that opium was detestable, and its use or sale a mark of

depravity.

In January, 1839, Taoukwang ordered Lin Tsihseu, viceroy of the double

province of Houkwang and an official of high reputation, to proceed to

Canton as Special Commissioner to report on the situation, and to propound

the best remedy for the opium evil. At this moment the anti-opium party

was supreme in the imperial council, and three Manchu princes were

disgraced and banished from Pekin for indulging in the practice. The

peremptory instructions given to Commissioner Lin, as he is historically

known, were "to cut off the fountain of evil, and, if necessary for the

attainment of his object, to sink his ships and break his caldrons, for

the indignation of the great emperor has been fairly aroused at these

wicked practices--of buying and selling and using opium--and that the

hourly thought of his heart is to do away with them forever."

Before Lin reached Canton there had been frequent friction between Captain

Elliot and the local mandarins, and more than one interruption of the

trade. Less than six months after his installation at Canton his official

relations were broken off, and he wrote home to his government a dispatch

complaining of the difficulty of conducting any sort of amicable relations

with the local mandarins, and indorsing the growing demand for the right

of dealing direct with the Pekin government. Captain Elliot, acting under

instructions from home, issued a public notice warning all English

subjects to discontinue the illicit opium trade, and stating that "her

Majesty's Government would not in any way interfere if the Chinese

Government should think fit to seize and confiscate the same."

At this juncture Commissioner Lin, whose fervor and energy carried him

away, appeared upon the scene, and, whereas a less capable or honest man

would have come to an arrangement with Captain Elliot, his very ability

and enthusiasm tended to complicate the situation and render a pacific

solution unattainable. Commissioner Lin, on taking up his post, lost no

time in showing that he was terribly in earnest; but both his language and

his acts proved that he had a very much larger programme than was included

in his propaganda against the opium traffic. He wished to achieve the

complete humiliation of the foreigners, and nothing less would satisfy

him. Within a week of his arrival at Canton he issued an edict denouncing

the opium trade; throwing all the blame for it on the English, and

asserting what was absolutely untrue; viz., that "the laws of England

prohibited the smoking of opium, and adjudged the user to death." The

language of the edict was unfriendly and offensive. The Europeans were

stigmatized as a barbarous people, who thought only of trade and of making

their way by stealth into the Flowery Land. At the same time that he

issued this edict he gave peremptory orders that no foreigner was to leave

Canton or Macao until the opium question had been settled to his

satisfaction. Even then English merchants and officials, who felt no great

sympathy with the opium traffic, saw that these proceedings indicated an

intention to put down the trade in other articles, and to render the

position of foreigners untenable. Lin's demands culminated in the request

for all stores of opium to be surrendered to him within three days. By the

efforts of some of the merchants about a thousand chests were collected

and handed over to the Chinese for destruction; but this did not satisfy

Lin, who collected a large rabble force, encamped it outside the

settlement, and threatened to carry the place by storm. In this crisis

Captain Elliot, who had declared that his confidence in the justice and

good faith of the provincial government was destroyed, and who had even

drawn up a scheme for concentrating all his forces at Hongkong, called

upon all the English merchants to surrender to him, for paramount

considerations of the lives and property of every one concerned, all the

stores of opium in their possession. More than 20,000 chests, of an

estimated value of $10,000,000, were placed at his disposal, and in due

course handed over by him to Commissioner Lin for destruction. This task

was performed at Chuenpee, when the opium was placed in trenches, then

mixed with salt and lime, and finally poured off into the sea. After this

very considerable triumph, Lin wrote a letter to Queen Victoria--whose

reign has witnessed the most critical periods of the China question and

its satisfactory settlement--calling upon her Majesty to interdict the

trade in opium forever. The letter was as offensive in its tone as it was

weak in argument, and no answer was vouchsafed to it. Before any reply

could be given, the situation, moreover, had developed into one of open

hostilities.

But great as were the concessions made by Captain Elliot, in consequence

of the threatening attitude of Commissioner Lin, the Chinese were not

satisfied, and made fresh and more exacting demands of those who had been

weak enough to make any concession at all. They reasserted their old

pretension that Europeans in China must be subject to her laws, and as the

sale of opium was a penal offense they claimed the right to punish those

Englishmen who had been connected with the traffic. They accordingly drew

up a list of sixteen of the principal merchants, some of whom had never

had anything to do with opium, and they announced their intention to

arrest them and to punish them with death. Not only did Commissioner Lin

and the Canton authorities claim the right to condemn and punish British

subjects, but they showed in the most insolent manner that they would take

away their liberty and lives on the flimsiest and falsest pretext. Captain

Elliot, weak and yielding as he was on many points, declared that "this

law is incompatible with safe or honorable continuance at Canton."

Apparently the Chinese authorities acted on the assumption that so long as

there remained even one offending European the mass of his countrymen

ought to be hindered in their avocations, and consequently petty

restrictions and provocations continued to be enforced. Then Captain

Elliot, seeing that the situation was hopeless and that there was no sign

of improvement, took the bold, or at least the pronounced, step of

ordering all British subjects to leave Canton or to stay at their own

peril. It was on this occasion that he explained away, or put a new

interpretation on, his action with regard to the opium surrendered for

destruction, which most of the merchants thought represented an

irrecoverable loss. It will be best to give the precise words used in his

notice of the 22d of May, 1839. "Acting on behalf of her Majesty's

Government in a momentous emergency, he has, in the first place, to

signify that the demand he recently made to her Majesty's subjects for the

surrender of British-owned opium under their control had no special

reference to the circumstances of that property; but (beyond the actual

pressure of necessity) that demand was founded on the principle that these

violent compulsory measures being utterly unjust _per se_ and of general

application for the enforced surrender of any other property, or of human

life, or for the constraint of any unsuitable terms or concessions, it

became highly necessary to vest and leave the right of exacting effectual

security and full indemnity for every loss directly in the queen."

Unfortunately, Captain Elliot's language at the time of the surrender of

the opium had undoubtedly led to the conclusion that he sympathized with

Commissioner Lin, and that he took the same view as the Chinese officials

of the moral iniquity of selling or using opium. The whole mercantile

community adopted Captain Elliot's counsel, and the English factory at

Canton, which had existed for nearly two hundred years, was abandoned. At

the same time a memorial was sent home begging the government to protect

the English merchants in China against "a capricious and corrupt

government," and demanding compensation for the $10,000,000 worth of opium

destroyed by Commissioner Lin. Pending the reply of the home government to

that appeal, nothing could be more complete than the triumph of

Commissioner Lin. The Emperor Taoukwang rewarded him with the important

viceroyship of the Two Kiang, the seat of which administration is at

Nankin.

But the limit of endurance had been reached, and the British government

was on the point of taking decisive action at the very moment when the

Chinese triumph seemed most complete and unthreatened. Even before the

action of the home authorities was known in the Bogue the situation had

become critical, and the sailors in particular had thrown off all

restraint. Frequent collisions occurred between them and the foreigners,

and in one of them a Chinaman was killed. Commissioner Lin characterized

this act as "going to the extreme of disobedience to the laws," and

demanded the surrender of the sailor who committed the act, so that a life

might be given for a life. This demand was flatly refused, and in

consequence of the measures taken by the Chinese at Lin's direction to

prevent all supplies reaching the English, Captain Elliot felt bound to

remove his residence from Macao to Hongkong. The Chinese called out all

their armed forces, and incited their people along the Canton River to

attack the foreigners wherever found. An official notice said, "Produce

arms and weapons; join together the stoutest of your villagers, and thus

be prepared to defend yourselves. If any of the said foreigners be found

going on shore to cause trouble, all and every of the people are permitted

to fire upon them, to withstand and drive them back, or to make prisoners

of them." This appeal to a force which the Chinese did not possess was an

act of indiscretion that betrayed an overweening confidence or a singular

depth of ignorance. When the mandarins refused to supply the ships with

water and other necessaries they carried their animosity to a length which

the English naval officers at once defined as a declaration of open

hostilities. They retaliated by ordering their men to seize by force

whatever was necessary, and thus began a state of things which may be

termed one of absolute warfare. The two men-of-war on the station had

several encounters with the forts in the Bogue, and on November 3, 1839,

they fought a regular engagement with a Chinese fleet of twenty-nine junks

off Chuenpee. The Chinese showed more courage than skill, and four of

their junks were sunk. It is worth noting that the English sailors

pronounced both their guns and their powder to be excellent. While this

action deterred the Chinese fleet from coming to close quarters, it also

imbittered the contest, and there was no longer room to doubt that if the

Chinese were to be brought to take a more reasonable view of foreign trade

it would have to be by the disagreeable lesson of force. And at the end of

1839 the Chinese were fully convinced that they had the power to carry out

their will and to keep the European nations out of their country by the

strong hand.

A short time after the action at Chuenpee an Englishman named Mr. Gribble

was seized by the Canton officials and thrown into prison. The English

men-of-war went up the river as far as the Bogue forts, which they

threatened to bombard unless he was released; and, after considerable

discussion, Mr. Gribble was set free, mainly because the Chinese heard of

the large force that was on its way from England. Before that armament

arrived the Emperor Taoukwang had committed himself still further to a

policy of hostility. A report of the fight at Chuenpee was duly submitted

to him, but the affair was represented as a very creditable one for his

commander, and as a Chinese victory. The misled monarch at once conferred

a high honor on his admiral, and commanded his officers at Canton "to at

once put a stop to the trade of the English nation." This had, practically

speaking, been already accomplished, and the English merchants had taken

refuge at Macao or in their ships anchored at Hongkong.

Before describing the military operations now about to take place, a

survey may conveniently be taken of events since the abolition of the

monopoly, and it may be pardonable to employ the language formerly used.

From an impartial review of the facts, and divesting our minds, so far as

is humanly possible, of the prejudice of accepted political opinions, and

of conviction as to the hurtful or innocent character of opium in the

mixture as smoked by the Chinese, it cannot be contended that the course

pursued by Lord Napier and Captain Elliot, and particularly by the latter,

was either prudent in itself or calculated to promote the advantage and

reputation of England. Captain Elliot's proceedings were marked by the

inconsistency that springs from ignorance. The more influential English

merchants, touched by the appeal to their moral sentiment, or impressed by

the depravity of large classes of the Canton population, of which the

practice of opium-smoking was rather the mark than the cause, set their

faces against the traffic in this article, and repudiated all sympathy and

participation in it. The various foreign publications, whether they

received their inspirations from Mr. Gutzlaff or not matters little,

differed on most points, but were agreed on this, that the trade in opium

was morally indefensible, and that we were bound, not only by our own

interests, but in virtue of the common obligations of humanity, to cease

to hold all connection with it. Those who had surrendered their stores of

opium at the request of Captain Elliot held that their claim for

compensation was valid, in the first place, against the English government

alone. They had given them up for the service of the country at the

request of the queen's representative, and, considering the line which

Captain Elliot had taken, many believed that it would be quite impossible

for the English government to put forward any demand upon the government

of China. The ten million dollars, according to these large-hearted and

unreflecting moralists, would have to be sacrificed by the people of

England in the cause of humanity, to which they had given so much by

emancipating the slaves, and the revenue of India should, for the future,

be poorer by the amount that used to pay the dividend of the great

Company! The Chinese authorities could not help being encouraged in their

opinions and course of proceeding by the attitude of the English. Their

most sweeping denunciations of the iniquity of the opium traffic elicited

a murmur of approval from the most influential among the foreigners. No

European stood up to say that their allegations as to the evil of using

opium were baseless and absurd. What is more, no one thought it. Had the

Chinese made sufficient use of this identity of views, and shown a desire

to facilitate trade in the so-called innocent and legitimate articles,

there is little doubt that the opium traffic would have been reduced to

very small dimensions, because there would have been no rupture. But the

action of Commissioner Lin revealed the truth that the Chinese were not to

be satisfied with a single triumph. The more easily they obtained their

objects in the opium matter the more anxious did they become to impress

the foreigners with a sense of their inferiority, and to force them to

accept the most onerous and unjust conditions for the sake of a

continuance of the trade. None the less, Captain Elliot went out of his

way to tie his own hands, and to bind his own government, so far as he

could, to co-operate with the emperor's officials in the suppression of

the opium traffic. That this is no random assertion may be judged from the

following official notice, issued several months after the surrender of

the stores of opium. In this Captain Elliot announced that "Her Majesty's

flag does not fly in the protection of a traffic declared illegal by the

emperor, and, therefore, whenever a vessel is suspected of having opium on

board Captain Elliot will take care that the officers of his establishment

shall accompany the Chinese officers in their search, and that if, after

strict investigation, opium shall be found, he will offer no objection to

the seizure and confiscation of the cargo."

The British expedition arrived at the mouth of the Canton River in the

month of June, 1840. It consisted of 4,000 troops on board twenty-five

transports, with a convoy of fifteen men-of-war. If it was thought that

this considerable force would attain its objects without fighting and

merely by making a demonstration, the expectation was rudely disappointed.

The reply of Commissioner Lin was to place a reward on the person of all

Englishmen, and to offer $20,000 for the destruction of an English man-of-

war. The English fleet replied to this hostile step by instituting a close

blockade at the mouth of the river, which was not an ineffectual retort.

Sir Gordon Bremer, the commander of the first part of the expedition, came

promptly to the decision that it would be well to extend the sphere of his

operations, and he accordingly sailed northward with a portion of his

force to occupy the island of Chusan, which had witnessed some of the

earliest operations of the East India Company two centuries before. The

capture of Chusan presented no difficulties to a well-equipped force, yet

the fidelity of its garrison and inhabitants calls for notice as a

striking instance of patriotism. The officials at Tinghai, the capital of

Chusan, refused to surrender, as their duty to their emperor would not

admit of their giving up one of his possessions. It was their duty to

fight, and although they admitted resistance to be useless, they refused

to yield, save to force. The English commander reluctantly ordered a

bombardment, and after a few hours the Chinese defenses were demolished,

and Tinghai was occupied. Chusan remained in our possession as a base of

operations during the greater part of the war, but its insalubrity rather

dissipated the reputation it had acquired as an advantageous and well-

placed station for operations on the coast of China. Almost at the same

time as the attack on Chusan, hostilities were recommenced against the

Chinese on the Canton River, in consequence of the carrying off of a

British subject, Mr. Vincent Stanton, from Macao. The barrier forts were

attacked by two English men-of-war and two smaller vessels. After a heavy

bombardment, a force of marines and blue-jackets was landed, and the

Chinese positions carried. The forts and barracks were destroyed, and Mr.

Stanton released. Then it was said that "China must either bend or break,"

for the hour of English forbearance had passed away, and unless China

could vindicate her policy by force of arms there was no longer any doubt

that she would have to give way.

While these preliminary military events were occurring, the diplomatic

side of the question was also in evidence. Lord Palmerston had written a

letter stating in categorical language what he expected at the hands of

the Chinese government, and he had directed that it should be delivered

into nobody else's hands but the responsible ministers of the Emperor

Taoukwang. The primary task of the English expedition was to give this

dispatch to some high Chinese official who seemed competent to convey it

to Pekin. This task proved one of unexpected difficulty, for the

mandarins, basing their refusal on the strict letter of their duty, which

forbade them to hold any intercourse with foreigners, returned the

document, and declared that they could not receive it. This happened at

Amoy and again at Ningpo, and the occupation of Chusan did not bring our

authorities any nearer to realizing their mission. Baffled in these

attempts, the fleet sailed north for the mouth of the Peiho, when at last

Lord Palmerston's letter was accepted by Keshen, the viceroy of the

province, and duly forwarded by him to Pekin. The arrival of the English

fleet awoke the Chinese court for the time being from its indifference,

and Taoukwang not merely ordered that the fleet should be provided with

all the supplies it needed, but appointed Keshen High Commissioner for the

conclusion of an amicable arrangement. The difficulty thus seemed in a

fair way toward settlement, but as a matter of fact it was only at its

commencement, for the wiles of Chinese diplomacy are infinite and were

then only partially understood. Keshen was remarkable for his astuteness

and for the yielding exterior which covered a purpose of iron, and in the

English political officer, the Captain Elliot of Canton, he did not find

an opponent worthy of his steel. Although experience had shown how great

were the delays of negotiation at Canton, and how inaccessible were the

local officials, Captain Elliot allowed himself to be persuaded that the

best place to carry on negotiations was at that city, and after a brief

delay the fleet was withdrawn from the Peiho and all the advantages of the

alarm created by its presence at Pekin were surrendered. Relieved by the

departure of the foreign ships, Taoukwang sent orders for the dispatch of

forces from the inland provinces, so that he might be able to resume the

struggle with the English under more favorable conditions, and at the same

time he hastened to relieve his overcharged feelings by punishing the man

whom he regarded as responsible for his misfortunes and humiliation. The

full weight of the imperial wrath fell on Commissioner Lin, who from the

position of the foremost official in China fell at a stroke of the

vermilion pencil to a public criminal arraigned before the Board of

Punishments to receive his deserts. He was stripped of all his offices,

and ordered to proceed to Pekin, where, however, his life was spared.

Keshen arrived at Canton on November 29, 1840, but his dispatch to the

emperor explaining the position he found there shows that his view of the

situation did not differ materially from that of Lin. "Night and day I

have considered and examined the state of our relations with the English.

At first moved by the benevolence of his Majesty and the severity of the

laws, they surrendered the opium. Commissioner Lin commanded them to give

bonds that they would never more deal in opium--a most excellent plan for

securing future good conduct. This the English refused to give, and then

they trifled with the laws, and so obstinate were their dispositions that

they could not be made to submit. Hence it becomes necessary to soothe and

admonish them with sound instruction, so as to cause them to change their

mien and purify their hearts, after which it will not be too late to renew

their commerce. It behooves me to instruct and persuade them so that their

good consciences may be restored, and they reduced to submission." The

language of this document showed that the highest Chinese officers still

believed that the English would accept trade facilities as a favor, that

they would be treated _de haut en bas_, and that China possessed the

power to make good her lofty pretensions. China had learned nothing from

her military mishaps at Canton, Amoy, and Chusan, and from the appearance

of an English fleet in the Gulf of Pechihli. Keshen had gained a breathing

space by procrastination in the north, and he resorted to the same tactics

at Canton. Days expanded into weeks, and at last orders were issued for an

advance up the Canton River, as it had become evident that the Chinese

were not only bent on an obstructive policy, but were making energetic

efforts to assemble a large army. On January 7, 1841, orders were

consequently issued for an immediate attack on the Bogue forts, which had

been placed in a state of defense, and which were manned by large numbers

of Chinese. Fortunately for us, the Chinese possessed a very rudimentary

knowledge of the art of war, and showed no capacity to take advantage of

the strength of their position and forts, or even of their excellent guns.

The troops were landed on the coast in the early morning to operate on the

flank and rear of the forts at Chuenpee. The advance squadron, under

Captain, afterward Sir Thomas, Herbert, was to engage the same forts in

front, while the remainder of the fleet proceeded to attack the stockades

on the adjoining island of Taikok. The land force of 1,500 men and three

guns had not proceeded far along the coast before it came across a

strongly intrenched camp in addition to the Chuenpee forts, with several

thousand troops and many guns in position. After a sharp cannonade the

forts were carried at a rush, and a formidable army was driven

ignominiously out of its intrenchments with hardly any loss to the

assailants. The forts at Taikok were destroyed by the fire of the ships,

and their guns spiked and garrisons routed by storming parties. In all,

the Chinese lost 500 killed, besides an incalculable number of wounded,

and many junks. The Chinese showed some courage as well as incompetence,

and the English officers described their defense as "obstinate and

honorable."

The capture of the Bogue forts produced immediate and important

consequences. Keshen at once begged a cessation of hostilities, and

offered terms which conceded everything we had demanded. These were the

payment of a large indemnity, the cession of Hongkong, and the right to

hold official communication with the central government. In accordance

with these preliminary articles, Hongkong was proclaimed, on January 29,

1841, a British possession, and the troops evacuated Chusan to garrison

the new station. It was not considered at the time that the acquisition

was of much importance, and no one would have predicted for it the

brilliant and prosperous position it has since attained. But the promises

given by Keshen were merely to gain time and to extricate him from a very

embarrassing situation. The morrow of what seemed a signal reverse was

marked by the issue of an imperial notice, breathing a more defiant tone

than ever. Taoukwang declared, in this edict, that he was resolved "to

destroy and wash the foreigners away without remorse," and he denounced

the English by name as "staying themselves upon their pride of power and

fierce strength." He, therefore, called upon his officers to proceed with

courage and energy, so that "the rebellious foreigners might give up their

ringleaders, to be sent encaged to Pekin, to receive the utmost

retribution of the laws." So long as the sovereign held such opinions as

these it was evident that no arrangement could endure. The Chinese did not

admit the principle of equality in their dealings with the English, and

this was the main point in contention, far more than the alleged evils of

the opium traffic. So long as Taoukwang and his ministers held the

opinions which they did not hesitate to express, a friendly intercourse

was impossible. There was no practical alternative between withdrawing

from the country altogether and leaving the Chinese in undisturbed

seclusion, or forcing their government to recognize a common humanity and

an equality in national privileges.

It is not surprising that under these circumstances the suspension of

hostilities proved of brief duration. The conflict was hastened by the

removal of Keshen from his post, in consequence of his having reported

that he considered the Chinese forces unequal to the task of opposing the

English. His candor in recognizing facts did him credit, while it cost him

his position; and his successor, Eleang, was compelled to take an opposite

view, and to attempt something to justify it. Eleang refused to ratify the

convention signed by Keshen, and, on February 25, the English commander

ordered an attack on the inner line of forts which guarded the approaches

to Canton. After a brief engagement, the really formidable lines of

Anunghoy, with 200 guns in position, were carried at a nominal loss. The

many other positions of the Chinese, up to Whampoa, were occupied in

succession; and on March 1 the English squadron drew up off Howqua's

Folly, in Whampoa Reach, at the very gateway of Canton. On the following

day the dashing Sir Hugh Gough arrived to take the supreme direction of

the English forces. After these further reverses, the Chinese again begged

a suspension of hostilities, and an armistice for a few days was granted.

The local authorities were on the horns of a dilemma. They saw the

futility of a struggle with the English, and the Cantonese had to bear all

the suffering for the obstinacy of the Pekin government; but, on the other

hand, no one dared to propose concession to Taoukwang, who, confident of

his power, and ignorant of the extent of his misfortunes, breathed nothing

but defiance. After a few days' delay, it became clear that the Cantonese

had neither the will nor the power to conclude a definite arrangement, and

consequently their city was attacked with as much forbearance as possible.

The fort called Dutch Folly was captured, and the outer line of defenses

was taken possession of, but no attempt was made to occupy the city

itself. Sir Hugh Gough stated, in a public notice, that the city was

spared because the queen had desired that all peaceful people should be

tenderly considered. The first English successes had entailed the disgrace

of Lin, the second were not less fatal to Keshen. Keshen was arraigned

before the Board at Pekin, his valuable property was escheated to the

crown, and he himself sentenced to decapitation, which was commuted to

banishment to Tibet, where he succeeded in amassing a fresh fortune. The

success of the English was proclaimed by the merchants re-occupying their

factories on March 18, 1841, exactly two years after Lin's first fiery

edict against opium. It was a strange feature in this struggle that the

instant they did so the Chinese merchants resumed trade with undiminished

ardor and cordiality. The officials even showed an inclination to follow

their example, when they learned that Taoukwang refused to listen to any

conclusive peace, and that his policy was still one of expelling the

foreigners. To carry out his views, the emperor sent a new commission of

three members to Canton, and it was their studious avoidance of all

communication with the English authorities that again aroused suspicion as

to the Chinese not being sincere in their assent to the convention which

had saved Canton from an English occupation. Taoukwang was ignorant of the

success of his enemy, and his commissioners, sent to achieve what Lin and

Keshen had failed to do, were fully resolved not to recognize the position

which the English had obtained by force of arms, or to admit that it was

likely to prove enduring. This confidence was increased by the continuous

arrival of fresh troops, until at last there were 50,000 men in the

neighborhood of Canton, and all seemed ready to tempt the fortune of war

again, and to make another effort to expel the hated foreigner. The

measure of Taoukwang's animosity may be taken by his threatening to punish

with death any one who suggested making peace with the barbarians.

[Illustration: CANTON--THE FLOWER PAGODA]

While the merchants were actively engaged in their commercial operations,

and the English officers in conducting negotiations with a functionary who

had no authority, and who was only put forward to amuse them, the Chinese

were busily employed in completing their warlike preparations, which at

the same time they kept as secret as possible, in the hope of taking the

English by surprise. But it was impossible for such extensive preparations

to be made without their creating some stir, and the standing aloof of the

commissioners was in itself ground of suspicion. Suspicion became

certainty when, on Captain Elliot paying a visit to the prefect in the

city, he was received in a disrespectful manner by the mandarins and

insulted in the streets by the crowd. He at once acquainted Sir Hugh

Gough, who was at Hongkong, with the occurrence, and issued a notice, on

May 21, 1841, advising all foreigners to leave Canton that day. This

notice was not a day too soon, for, during the night, the Chinese made a

desperate attempt to carry out their scheme. The batteries which they had

secretly erected at various points in the city and along the river banks

began to bombard the factories and the ships at the same time that fire-

rafts were sent against the latter in the hope of causing a conflagration.

Fortunately the Chinese were completely baffled, with heavy loss to

themselves and none to the English; and during the following day the

English assumed the offensive, and with such effect that all the Chinese

batteries were destroyed, together with forty war-junks. The only exploit

on which the Chinese could compliment themselves was that they had sacked

and gutted the English factory. This incident made it clearer than ever

that the Chinese government would only be amenable to force, and that it

was absolutely necessary to inflict some weighty punishment on the Chinese

leaders at Canton, who had made so bad a return for the moderation shown

them and their city, and who had evidently no intention of complying with

the arrangement to which they had been a party.

Sir Hugh Gough arrived at Canton with all his forces on May 24, and on the

following morning the attack commenced with the advance of the fleet up

the Macao passage, and with the landing of bodies of troops at different

points which appeared well suited for turning the Chinese position and

attacking the gates of Canton. The Chinese did not molest the troops in

landing, which was fortunate, as the operation proved exceedingly

difficult and occupied more than a whole day. The Chinese had taken up a

strong position on the hills lying north of the city, and they showed

considerable judgment in their selection, and no small skill in

strengthening their ground by a line of forts. The Chinese were said to be

full of confidence in their ability to reverse the previous fortune of the

war, and they fought with considerable confidence, while the turbulent

Cantonese populace waited impatiently on the walls to take advantage of

the first symptoms of defeat among the English troops. The English army,

divided into two columns of nearly 2,000 men each, with a strong artillery

force of seven guns, four howitzers, five mortars, and fifty-two rockets,

advanced on the Chinese intrenchments across paddy fields, rendered more

difficult of passage by numerous burial-grounds. The obstacles were

considerable and the progress was slow, but the Chinese did not attempt

any opposition. Then the battle began with the bombardment of the Chinese

lines, and after an hour it seemed as if the Chinese had had enough of

this and were preparing for flight, when a general advance was ordered.

But the Chinese thought better of their intention or their movement was

misunderstood, for when the English streamed up the hill to attack them

they stood to their guns and presented a brave front. Three of their forts

were carried with little or no loss, but at the fourth they offered a

stubborn if ill-directed resistance. Even then the engagement was not

over, for the Chinese rallied in an intrenched camp one mile in the rear

of the forts, and, rendered confident by their numbers, they resolved to

make a fresh stand, and hurled defiance at the foreigners. The English

troops never halted in their advance, and, led by the 18th or Royal Irish,

they carried the intrenchment at a rush and put the whole Chinese army to

flight. The English lost seventy killed and wounded, the Chinese losses

were never accurately known. It was arranged that Canton was to be stormed

on the following day, but a terrific hurricane and deluge of rain

prevented all military movements on May 26, and, as it proved, saved the

city from attack. Once more Chinese diplomacy came to the relief of

Chinese arms. To save Canton the mandarins were quite prepared to make

every concession, if they only attached a temporary significance to their

language, and they employed the whole of that lucky wet day in getting

round Captain Elliot, who once more allowed himself to place faith in the

promises of the Chinese. The result of this was seen on the 27th, when,

just as Sir Hugh Gough was giving orders for the assault, he received a

message from Captain Elliot stating that the Chinese had come to terms and

that all hostilities were to be suspended. The terms the Chinese had

agreed to in a few hours were that the commissioners and all the troops

should retire to a distance of sixty miles from Canton, and that

$6,000,000 should be paid "for the use of the English crown."

Five of the $6,000,000 had been handed over to Captain Elliot, and

amicable relations had been established with the city authorities, when

the imperial commissioners, either alarmed at the penalties their failure

entailed, or encouraged to believe in the renewed chances of success from

the impotence into which the English troops might have sunk, made a sudden

attempt to surprise Sir Hugh Gough's camp and to retrieve a succession of

disasters at a single stroke. The project was not without a chance of

success, but it required prompt action and no hesitation in coming to

close quarters--the two qualifications in which the Chinese were most

deficient. So it was on this occasion. Ten or fifteen thousand Chinese

braves suddenly appeared on the hills about two miles north of the English

camp; but instead of seizing the opportunity created by the surprise at

their sudden appearance and at the breach of armistice, and delivering

home their attack, they merely waved their banners and uttered threats of

defiance. They stood their ground for some time in face of the rifle and

artillery fire opened upon them, and then they kept up a sort of running

fight for three miles as they were pursued by the English. They did not

suffer any serious loss, and when the English troops retired in

consequence of a heavy storm they became in turn the pursuers and

inflicted a few casualties. The advantages they obtained were due to the

terrific weather more than to their courage, but one party of Madras

sepoys lost its way, and was surrounded by so overwhelming a number of

Chinese that they would have been annihilated but that their absence was

fortunately discovered and a rescuing party of marines, armed with the new

percussion gun, which was to a great degree secure against the weather,

went out to their assistance. They found the sepoys, under their two

English officers, drawn up in a square firing as best they could and

presenting a bold front to the foe--"many of the sepoys, after extracting

the wet cartridge very deliberately, tore their pocket handkerchiefs or

lining from their turbans and, baling water with their hands into the

barrel of their pieces, washed and dried them, thus enabling them to fire

an occasional volley." Out of sixty sepoys one was killed and fourteen

wounded. After this Sir Hugh Gough threatened to bombard Canton if there

were any more attacks on his camp, and they at once ceased, and when the

whole of the indemnity was paid the English troops were withdrawn, leaving

Canton as it was, for a second time "a record of British magnanimity and

forbearance."

After this trade reverted to its former footing, and by the Canton

convention, signed by the imperial commissioners in July, 1841, the

English obtained all the privileges they could hope for from the local

authorities. But it was essentially a truce, not a treaty, and the great

point of direct intercourse with the central government was no nearer

settlement than ever. At this moment Sir Henry Pottinger arrived as

Plenipotentiary from England, and he at once set himself to obtaining a

formal recognition from the Pekin executive of his position and the

admission of his right to address them on diplomatic business. With the

view of pressing this matter on the attention of Taoukwang, who personally

had not deviated from his original attitude of emphatic hostility, Sir

Henry Pottinger sailed northward with the fleet and a large portion of the

land forces about the end of August. The important seaport of Amoy was

attacked and taken after what was called "a short but animated

resistance." This town is situated on an island, the largest of a group

lying at the entrance to the estuary of Lungkiang, and it has long been

famous as a convenient port and flourishing place of trade. The Chinese

had raised a rampart of 1,100 yards in length, and this they had armed

with ninety guns, while a battery of forty-two guns protected its flank.

Kulangsu was also fortified, and the Chinese had placed in all 500 guns in

position. They believed in the impregnability of Amoy, and it was allowed

that no inconsiderable skill as well as great expense had been devoted to

the strengthening of the place. When the English fleet arrived off the

port the Chinese sent a flag of truce to demand what it wanted, and they

were informed the surrender of the town. The necessity for this measure

would be hard to justify, especially as we were nominally at peace with

China, for the people of Amoy had inflicted no injury on our trade, and

their chastisement would not bring us any nearer to Pekin. Nor was the

occupation of Amoy necessary on military grounds. It was strong only for

itself, and its capture had no important consequences. As the Chinese

determined to resist the English, the fleet engaged the batteries, and the

Chinese, standing to their guns "right manfully," only abandoned their

position when they found their rear threatened by a landing party. Then,

after a faint resistance, the Chinese sought safety in flight, but some of

their officers, preferring death to dishonor, committed suicide, one of

them being seen to walk calmly into the sea and drown himself in face of

both armies. The capture of Amoy followed.

As the authorities at Amoy refused to hold any intercourse with the

English, the achievement remained barren of any useful consequence, and

after leaving a small garrison on Kulangsu, and three warships in the

roadstead, the English expedition continued its northern course. After

being scattered by a storm in the perilous Formosa channel, the fleet

reunited off Ningpo, whence it proceeded to attack Chusan for a second

time. The Chinese defended Tinghai, the capital, with great resolution. At

this place General Keo, the chief naval and military commander, was

killed, and all his officers, sticking to him to the last, also fell with

him. Their conduct in fact was noble; nothing could have surpassed it. On

the reoccupation of Chusan, which it was decided to retain until a formal

treaty had been concluded with the emperor, Sir Henry Pottinger issued a

proclamation to the effect that years might elapse before that place would

be restored to the emperor's authority, and many persons wished that it

should be permanently annexed as the best base for commercial operations

in China. A garrison of 400 men was left at Tinghai, and then the

expedition proceeded to attack Chinhai on the mainland, where the Chinese

had made every preparation to offer a strenuous resistance. The Chinese

suffered the most signal defeat and the greatest loss they had yet

incurred during the war. The victory at Chinhai was followed by the

unopposed occupation of the important city of Ningpo, where the

inhabitants shut themselves up in their houses, and wrote on their doors

"Submissive People." Ningpo was put to ransom and the authorities informed

that unless they paid the sum within a certain time their city would be

handed over to pillage and destruction. As the Pekin government had made

no sign of giving in, it was felt that no occasion ought to be lost of

overawing the Chinese, and compelling them to admit that any further

prolongation of the struggle would be hopeless. The arrival of further

troops and warships from Europe enabled the English commanders to adopt a

more determined and uncompromising attitude, and the capture of Ningpo

would have been followed up at once but for the disastrous events in

Afghanistan, which distracted attention from the Chinese question, and

delayed its settlement. It was hoped, however, that the continued

occupation of Amoy, Chusan and Ningpo would cause sufficient pressure on

the Pekin government to induce it to yield all that was demanded.

These anticipations were not fulfilled, for neither the swift-recurring

visitation of disaster nor the waning resources of the imperial government

in both men and treasure, could shake the fixed hostility of Taoukwang or

induce him to abate his proud pretensions. Minister after minister passed

into disgrace and exile. Misfortune shared the same fate as incompetence,

and the more the embarrassments of the state increased the heavier fell

the hand of the ruler and the verdict of the Board of Punishments upon

beaten generals and unsuccessful statesmen. The period of inaction which

followed the occupation of Ningpo no doubt encouraged the emperor to think

that the foreigners were exhausted, or that they had reached the end of

their successes, and he ordered increased efforts to be made to bring up

troops, and to strengthen the approaches to Pekin. The first proof of his

returning spirit was shown in March, 1842, when the Chinese attempted to

seize Ningpo by a coup de main. Suddenly, and without warning, a force of

between ten and twelve thousand men appeared at daybreak outside the south

and west gates of Ningpo, and many of them succeeded in making their way

over the walls and gaining the center of the town; but, instead of proving

the path to victory, this advance resulted in the complete overthrow of

the Chinese. Attacked by artillery and foot in the market-place they were

almost annihilated, and the great Chinese attack on Ningpo resulted in a

fiasco. Similar but less vigorous attacks were made about the same time on

Chinhai and Chusan, but they were both repulsed with heavy loss to the

Chinese. In consequence of these attacks and the improved position in

Afghanistan it was decided to again assume the offensive, and to break up

the hostile army at Hangchow, of which the body that attacked Ningpo was

the advanced guard. Sir Hugh Gough commanded the operations in person, and

he had the co-operation of a naval force under Sir William Parker. The

first action took place outside Tszeki, a small place ten miles from

Ningpo, where the Chinese fancied they occupied an exceedingly strong

position. But careful inspection showed it to be radically faulty. Their

lines covered part of the Segaou hills, but their left was commanded by

some higher hills on the right of the English position, and the Chinese

left again commanded their own right. It was evident, therefore, that the

capture of the left wing of the Chinese encampment would entail the

surrender or evacuation of the rest. The difficulties of the ground caused

a greater delay in the advance than had been expected, and the assault had

to be delivered along the whole line, as it was becoming obvious that the

Chinese were growing more confident, and, consequently, more to be feared

from the delay in attacking them. The assault was made with the

impetuosity good troops always show in attacking inferior ones, no matter

how great the disparity of numbers; and here the Chinese were driven out

of their position--although they stood their ground in a creditable

manner--and chased over the hills down to the rice fields below. The

Chinese loss was over a thousand killed, including many of the Imperial

Guard, of whom 500 were present, and whom Sir Hugh Gough described as

"remarkably fine men," while the English had six killed and thirty-seven

wounded. For the moment it was intended to follow up this victory by an

attack on the city of Hangchow, the famous Kincsay of medieval travelers;

but the arrival of fresh instructions gave a complete turn to the whole

war.

Little permanent good had been effected by these successful operations on

the coast, and Taoukwang was still as resolute as ever in his hostility;

nor is there any reason to suppose that the capture of Hangchow, or any

other of the coast towns, would have caused a material change in the

situation. The credit of initiating the policy which brought the Chinese

government to its knees belongs exclusively to Lord Ellenborough, then

governor-general of India. He detected the futility of operations along

the coast, and he suggested that the great waterway of the Yangtsekiang,

perfectly navigable for warships up to the immediate neighborhood of

Nankin, provided the means of coercing the Chinese, and effecting the

objects which the English Government had in view. The English expedition,

strongly re-enforced from India, then abandoned Ningpo and Chinhai, and,

proceeding north, began the final operations of the war with an attack on

Chapoo, where the Chinese had made extensive measures of defense. Chapoo

was the port appointed for trade with Japan, and the Chinese had collected

there a very considerable force from the levies of Chekiang, which ex-

Commissioner Lin had been largely instrumental in raising. Sir Hugh Gough

attacked Chapoo with 2,000 men, and the main body of the Chinese was

routed without much difficulty, but 300 desperate men shut themselves up

in a walled inclosure, and made an obstinate resistance. They held out

until three-fourths of them were slain, when the survivors, seventy-five

wounded men, accepted the quarter offered them from the first. The English

lost ten killed and fifty-five wounded, and the Chinese more than a

thousand. After this the expedition proceeded northward for the Great

River, and it was found necessary to attack Woosung, the port of Shanghai,

en route. This place was also strongly fortified with as many as 175 guns

in position, but the chief difficulty in attacking it lay in that of

approach, as the channel had first to be sounded, and then the sailing

ships towed into position by the steamers. Twelve vessels were in this

manner placed broadside to the batteries on land, a position which

obviously they could not have maintained against a force of anything like

equal strength; but they succeeded in silencing the Chinese batteries with

comparatively little loss, and then the English army was landed without

opposition. Shanghai is situated sixteen miles up the Woosung River, and

while part of the force proceeded up the river another marched overland.

Both columns arrived together, and the disheartened Chinese evacuated

Shanghai after firing one or two random shots. No attempt was made to

retain Shanghai, and the expedition re-embarked, and proceeded to attack

Chankiang or Chinkiangfoo, a town on the southern bank of the

Yangtsekiang, and at the northern entrance of the southern branch of the

Great Canal. This town has always been a place of great celebrity, both

strategically and commercially, for not merely does it hold a very strong

position with regard to the Canal, but it forms, with the Golden and

Silver Islands, the principal barrier in the path of those attempting to

reach Nankin. At this point Sir Hugh Gough was re-enforced by the 98th

Regiment, under Colonel Colin Campbell. The difficulties of navigation and

the size of the fleet, which now reached seventy vessels, caused a delay

in the operations, and it was not until the latter end of July, or more

than a month after the occupation of Shanghai, that the English reached

Chinkiangfoo, where, strangely enough, there seemed to be no military

preparations whatever. A careful reconnaissance revealed the presence of

three strong encampments at some distance from the town, and the first

operation was to carry them, and to prevent their garrisons joining such

forces as might still remain in the city. This attack was intrusted to

Lord Saltoun's brigade, which was composed of two Scotch regiments and

portions of two native regiments, with only three guns. The opposition was

almost insignificant, and the three camps were carried with comparatively

little loss and their garrisons scattered in all directions. At the same

time the remainder of the force assaulted the city, which was surrounded

by a high wall and a deep moat. Some delay was caused by these obstacles,

but at last the western gate was blown in by Captain Pears, of the

Engineers, and at the same moment the walls were escaladed at two

different points, and the English troops, streaming in on three sides,

fairly surrounded a considerable portion of the garrison, who retired into

a detached work, where they perished to the last man either by our fire or

in the flames of the houses which were ignited partly by themselves and

partly by the fire of our soldiers. The resistance did not stop here, for

the Tartar or inner city was resolutely defended by the Manchus, and owing

to the intense heat the Europeans would have been glad of a rest; but, as

the Manchus kept up a galling fire, Sir Hugh Gough felt bound to order an

immediate assault before the enemy grew too daring. The fight was renewed,

and the Tartars were driven back at all points; but the English troops

were so exhausted that they could not press home this advantage. The

interval thus gained was employed by the Manchus, not in making good their

escape, but in securing their military honor by first massacring their

women and children, and then committing suicide. It must be remembered

that these were not Chinese, but Manchu Tartars of the dominant race.

The losses of the English army at this battle--40 killed, and 130 wounded

--were heavy, and they were increased by several deaths caused by the heat

and exhaustion of the day. The Chinese, or rather the Tartars, never

fought better, and it appears from a document discovered afterward that if

Hailing's recommendations had been followed, and if he had been properly

supported, the capture of Chinkiangfoo would have been even more difficult

and costly than it proved.

Some delay at Chinkiangfoo was rendered necessary by the exhaustion of the

troops and by the number of sick and wounded; but a week after the capture

of that place in the manner described the arrangements for the further

advance on Nankin were completed. A small garrison was left in an

encampment on a height commanding the entrance to the Canal; but there was

little reason to apprehend any fresh attack, as the lesson of Chinkiangfoo

had been a terrible one. That city lay beneath the English camp like a

vast charnel house, its half-burned buildings filled with the self-

immolated Tartars who had preferred honor to life; and so thickly strewn

were these and so intense the heat that the days passed away without the

ability to give them burial, until at last it became absolutely impossible

to render the last kind office to a gallant foe. Despite the greatest

precautions of the English authorities, Chinkiangfoo became the source of

pestilence, and an outbreak of cholera caused more serious loss in the

English camp than befell the main force intrusted with the capture of

Nankin. Contrary winds delayed the progress of the English fleet, and it

was not until the fifth of August, more than a fortnight after the battle

at Chinkiangfoo, that it appeared off Nankin, the second city in

reputation and historical importance of the empire, with one million

inhabitants and a garrison of 15,000 men, of whom two-thirds were Manchus.

The walls were twenty miles in length, and hindered, more than they

promoted, an efficient defense; and the difficulties of the surrounding

country, covered with the debris of the buildings which constituted the

larger cities of Nankin at an earlier period of history, helped the

assailing party more than they did the defenders. Sir Hugh Gough drew up

an admirable plan for capturing this vast and not defenseless city with

his force of 5,000 men, and there is no reason to doubt that he would have

been completely successful; but by this the backbone of the Chinese

government had been broken, and even the proud and obstinate Taoukwang was

compelled to admit that it was imperative to come to terms with the

English, and to make some concessions in order to get rid of them.

The minister Elepoo, who once enjoyed the closest intimacy with Taoukwang,

and who was the leader of the Peace party, which desired the cessation of

an unequal struggle, had begun informal negotiations several months before

they proved successful at Nankin. He omitted no opportunity of learning

the views of the English officers, and what was the minimum of concession

on which a stable peace could be based. He had endeavored also to give

something of a generous character to the struggle, and he had more than

once proved himself a courteous as well as a gallant foe. After the

capture of Chapoo and Woosung he sent back several officers and men who

had at different times been taken prisoners by the Chinese, and he

expressed at the same time the desire that the war should end. Sir Henry

Pottinger's reply to this letter was to inquire if he was empowered by the

emperor to negotiate. If he had received this authority the English

plenipotentiary would be very happy to discuss any matter with him, but if

not the operations of war must proceed. At that moment Elepoo had not the

requisite authority to negotiate, and the war went on until the victorious

English troops were beneath the walls of Nankin. At the same time as these

pourparlers were held with Elepoo at Woosung, Sir Henry Pottinger issued a

proclamation to the Chinese stating what the British Government required

to be done. In this document the equality of all nations as members of the

same human family was pointed out, and the right to hold friendly

intercourse insisted on as a matter of duty and common obligation. Sir

Henry said that "England, coming from the utmost west, has held

intercourse with China in this utmost east for more than two centuries

past, and during this time the English have suffered ill-treatment from

the Chinese officials, who, regarding themselves as powerful and us as

weak, have thus dared to commit injustice." Then followed a list of the

many high-handed acts of Commissioner Lin and his successors. The Chinese,

plainly speaking, had sought to maintain their exclusiveness and to live

outside the comity of nations, and they had not the power to attain their

wish. Therefore they were compelled to listen to and to accept the terms

of the English plenipotentiary, which were as follows:--The emperor was

first of all to appoint a high officer with full powers to negotiate and

conclude arrangements on his own responsibility, when hostilities would be

suspended. The three principal points on which these negotiations were to

be based were compensation for losses and expenses, a friendly and

becoming intercourse on terms of equality between officers of the two

countries, and the cession of insular territory for commerce and for the

residence of merchants, and as a security and guarantee against the future

renewal of offensive acts. The first step toward the acceptance of these

terms was taken when an imperial commission was formed of three members,

Keying, Elepoo, and Niu Kien, viceroy of the Two Kiang; and to the last

named, as governor of the provinces most affected, fell the task of

writing the first diplomatic communication of a satisfactory character

from the Chinese government to the English plenipotentiary. This letter

was important for more reasons than its being of a conciliatory nature. It

held out to a certain extent a hand of friendship, and it also sought to

assign an origin to the conflict, and Niu Kien could find nothing more

handy or convenient than opium, which thus came to give its name to the

whole war. With regard to the Chinese reverses, Niu Kien, while admitting

them, explained that "as the central nation had enjoyed peace for a long

time the Chinese were not prepared for attacking and fighting, which had

led to this accumulation of insult and disgrace." In a later communication

Niu Kien admitted that "the English at Canton had been exposed to insults

and extortions for a series of years, and that steps should be taken to

insure in future that the people of your honorable nation might carry on

their commerce to advantage, and not receive injury thereby." These

documents showed that the Chinese were at last willing to abandon the old

and impossible principle of superiority over other nations, for which they

had so long contended; and with the withdrawal of this pretension

negotiations for the conclusion of a stable peace became at once possible

and of hopeful augury.

The first step of the Chinese commissioners was to draw up a memorial for

presentation to the emperor, asking his sanction of the arrangement they

suggested. In this document they covered the whole ground of the dispute,

and stated in clear and unmistakable language what the English demanded,

and they did not shrink from recommending compliance with their terms.

Keying and his colleagues put the only two alternatives with great

cogency. Which will be the heavier calamity, they said, to pay the English

the sum of money they demand (21,000,000 dollars, made up as follows: Six

million for the destroyed opium, 3,000,000 for the debts of the Hong

merchants, and 12,000,000 for the expenses of the war), or that they

should continue those military operations which seemed irresistible, and

from which China had suffered so grievously? Even if the latter

alternative were faced and the war continued, the evil day would only be

put off. The army expenses would be very great, the indemnity would be

increased in amount, and after all there would be only "the name of

fighting without the hope of victory." Similar arguments were used with

regard to the cession of Hongkong, and the right of trading at five of the

principal ports. The English no doubt demanded more than they ought, but

what was the use of arguing with them, as they were masters of the

situation? Moreover, some solace might be gathered in the midst of

affliction from the fact that the English were willing to pay certain

duties on their commerce which would in the end repay the war indemnity,

and contribute to "the expenditure of the imperial family." With regard to

the question of ceremonial intercourse on a footing of equality, they

declared that it might be "unreservedly granted." The reply of Taoukwang

to this memorial was given in an edict of considerable length, and he

therein assented to all the views and suggestions of the commissioners,

while he imposed on Keying alone the responsibility of making all the

arrangements for paying the large indemnity. All the preliminaries for

signing a treaty of peace had therefore been arranged before the English

forces reached Nankin, and as the Chinese commissioners were sincere in

their desire for peace, and as the emperor had sanctioned all the

necessary arrangements, there was no reason to apprehend any delay, and

much less a breakdown of the negotiations.

It was arranged that the treaty should be signed on board a British man-

of-war, and the Chinese commissioners were invited to pay a visit for the

purpose to the "Cornwallis," the flagship of the admiral. The event came

off on the 20th of August, 1842, and the scene was sufficiently

interesting, if not imposing. The long line of English warships and

transports, drawn up opposite to and within short range of the lofty walls

of Nankin; the land forces so disposed on the raised causeways on shore as

to give them every facility of approach to the city gates, while leaving

it doubtful to the last which gate would be the real object of attack; and

then the six small Chinese boats, gayly decorated with flags, bearing the

imperial commissioners and their attendants, to sign for the first time in

history a treaty of defeat with a foreign power. The commissioners were

dressed in their plainest clothes, as they explained, because imperial

commissioners are supposed to proceed in haste about their business, and

have no time to waste on their persons, but there is reason to believe

that they thought such clothing best consorted with the inauspicious

character for China of the occasion. The ceremony passed off without a

hitch, and four days later Sir Henry Pottinger paid the Chinese officers a

return visit, when he was received by them in a temple outside the city

walls. A third and more formal reception was held on the 26th of August in

the College Hall, in the center of Nankin, when Sir Henry Pottinger,

twenty officers, and an escort of native cavalry rode through the streets

of one of the most famous cities of China. It was noted at the time that

on this date an event of great importance had happened in each of the

three previous years. On the 26th of August, 1839, Lin had expelled the

English from Macao, in 1840 the British fleet anchored off the Peiho, and

in 1841 Amoy was captured. Three days after this reception the treaty

itself was signed on board the "Cornwallis," when Keying and his

colleagues again attended for the purpose. The act of signing was

celebrated by a royal salute of twenty-one guns, and the hoisting of the

standards of England and China at the masthead of the man-of-war. The

Emperor Taoukwang ratified the treaty with commendable dispatch, and the

only incident to mar the cordiality of the last scene in this part of the

story of Anglo-Chinese relations was the barbarous and inexcusable injury

inflicted by a party of English officers and soldiers on the famous

Porcelain Tower, which was one of the finest specimens of Chinese art,

having been built 400 years before at great expense and the labor of

twenty years.

The ports in addition to Canton to be opened to trade were Shanghai,

Ningpo, Amoy and Foochow, but these were not to be opened until a tariff

had been drawn up and consular officers appointed. As the installments of

the indemnity were paid the troops and fleet were withdrawn, but a

garrison was left for some time in Chusan and Kulangsu, the island off

Amoy. The attack and massacre of some shipwrecked crews on the coast of

Formosa gave the Chinese government an occasion of showing how marked a

change had come over its policy. An investigation was at once ordered, the

guilty officials were punished, and the emperor declared, "We will not

allow that, because the representation came from outside foreigners, it

should be carelessly cast aside without investigation. Our own subjects

and foreigners, ministers and people, should all alike understand that it

is our high desire to act with even-handed and perfect justice." Sir Henry

Pottinger's task was only half performed until he had drawn up the tariff

and installed consular officers in the new treaty ports. Elepoo was

appointed to represent China in the tariff negotiations, and Canton was

selected as the most convenient place for discussing the matter. Within

two months of the resumption of negotiations they seemed on the point of a

satisfactory termination, when the death of Elepoo, the most sincere and

straightforward of all the Chinese officials, caused a delay in the

matter. Elepoo was a member of the Manchu imperial family, being descended

from one of the brothers of Yung Ching, who had been banished by that

ruler and reinstated by Keen Lung. That the Pekin government did not wish

to make his death an excuse for backing out of the arrangement was shown

by the prompt appointment of Keying as his successor. At this stage of the

question the opium difficulty again rose up as of the first importance in

reference to the settlement of the commercial tariff. The main point was

whether opium was to appear in the tariff at all or to be relegated to the

category of contraband articles. Sir Henry Pottinger disclaimed all

sympathy with the traffic, and was quite willing that it should be

declared illicit; but at the same time he stated that the responsibility

of putting it down must rest with the Chinese themselves. The Chinese were

not willing to accept this responsibility, and said that "if the

supervision of the English representatives was not perfect, there will be

less or more of smuggling." Keying paid Sir Henry Pottinger a ceremonious

visit at Hongkong on the 2eth of June, 1843, and within one month of that

day the commercial treaty was signed. Sir Henry issued a public

proclamation calling upon British subjects to faithfully conform with its

provisions, and stating that he would adopt the most stringent and decided

measures against any offending persons. On his side Keying published a

notification that "trade at the five treaty ports was open to the men from

afar." The only weak point in the commercial treaty was that it contained

no reference to opium. Sir Henry Pottinger failed to obtain the assent of

the Chinese government to its legalization, and he refused to undertake

the responsibility of a preventive service in China, but at the same time

he publicly stated that the "traffic in opium was illegal and contraband

by the laws and imperial edicts of China." Those who looked further ahead

realized that the treaty of Nankin, by leaving unsettled the main point in

the controversy and the primary cause of difference, could not be

considered a final solution of the problem of foreign intercourse with

China. The opium question remained over to again disturb the harmony of

our relations.

As has been said before, it would be taking a narrow view of the question

to affirm that opium was the principal object at stake during this war.

The real point was whether the Chinese government could be allowed the

possession of rights which were unrecognized in the law of nations and

which rendered the continuance of intercourse with foreigners an

impossibility. What China sought to retain was never claimed by any other

nation, and could only have been established by extraordinary military

power. When people talk, therefore, of the injustice of this war as

another instance of the triumph of might over right, they should recollect

that China in the first place was wrong in claiming an impossible position

in the family of nations. We cannot doubt that if the acts of Commissioner

Lin had been condoned the lives of all Europeans would have been at the

mercy of a system which recognizes no gradation in crime, which affords

many facilities for the manufacture of false evidence, and which inflicts

punishment altogether in excess of the fault. It is gratifying to find

that many unprejudiced persons declared at the time that the war which

resulted in the Nankin treaty was a just one, and so eminent an authority

on international law as John Quincy Adams drew up an elaborate treatise to

show that "Britain had the righteous cause against China." We may leave

the scene of contest and turn from the record of an unequal war with the

reflection that the results of the struggle were to be good. However

inadequately the work of far-seeing statesmanship may have been performed

in 1842, enough was done to make present friendship possible and a better

understanding between two great governing peoples a matter of hope and not

desponding expectancy.