In considering whether a poet is intelligible and lucid, we ought not to
grope and grub about his work in search of obscurities and oddities, but
should, in the first instance at all events, attempt to regard his whole
scope and range; to form some estimate, if we can, of his general
purport and effect, asking ourselves for this purpose such questions as
these:--How are we the better for him? Has he quickened any passion,
lightened any burden, purified any taste? Does he play any real part in
our lives? When we are in love, do we whisper him in our lady's ear?
When we sorrow, does he ease our pain? Can he calm the strife of mental
conflict? Has he had anything to say which wasn't twaddle on those
subjects which, elude analysis as they may, and defy demonstration as
they do, are yet alone of perennial interest--
"On man, on nature, and on human life,"
on the pathos of our situation, looking back on to the irrevocable and
forward to the unknown? If a poet has said, or done, or been any of
these things to an appreciable extent, to charge him with obscurity is
both folly and ingratitude.
But the subject may be pursued further, and one may be called upon to
investigate this charge with reference to particular books or poems. In
Browning's case this fairly may be done; and then another crop of
questions arises, such as: What is the book about, i.e., with what
subject does it deal, and what method of dealing does it employ? Is it
didactical, analytical, or purely narrative? Is it content to describe,
or does it aspire to explain? In common fairness these questions must be
asked and answered, before we heave our critical half-bricks at strange
poets. One task is of necessity more difficult than another. Students of
geometry who have pushed their researches into that fascinating science
so far as the fifth proposition of the first book, commonly called the
'Pons Asinorum' (though now that so many ladies read Euclid, it ought,
in common justice to them, to be at least sometimes called the 'Pons
Asinarum'), will agree that though it may be more difficult to prove
that the angles at the base of an isosceles triangle are equal, and that
if the equal sides be produced, the angles on the other side of the base
shall be equal, than it was to describe an equilateral triangle on a
given finite straight line; yet no one but an ass would say that the
fifth proposition was one whit less intelligible than the first. When we
consider Mr. Browning in his later writings, it will be useful to bear
this distinction in mind.