having respect to Fate and the Nature of the universe, according to
which every thing is governed. How then do these agree, both that
God is no way the cause of any dishonest thing, and again, that not
even the least thing imaginable can be otherwise done than according
to common Nature and its reason? For amongst all things that are
done, there must of necessity be also dishonest things attributed to
the Gods. And though Epicurus indeed turns himself every way, and
studies artifices, devising how to deliver and set loose our voluntary
free will from this eternal motion, that he may not leave vice
irreprehensible; yet Chrysippus gives vice a most absolute liberty,
as being done not only of necessity or according to Fate, but also
according to the reason of God and best Nature. And these things are
yet farther seen in what he says afterwards, being thus word for word:
“For common Nature extending to all things, it will be of necessity
that every thing, howsoever done in the whole or in any one soever
of its parts, must be done according to this common Nature and its
reason, proceeding on regularly without any impediment. For there is
nothing without that can hinder the administration, nor is there any of
the parts that can be moved or habituated otherwise than according to
common Nature.” What then are these habits and motions of the parts?
It is manifest, that the habits are vices and diseases, covetousness,
luxury, ambition, cowardice, injustice; and that the motions are
adulteries, thefts, treasons, murders, parricides. Of these Chrysippus
thinks, that no one, either little or great, is contrary to the reason
of Jupiter, or to his law, justice, and providence; so neither is the
transgressing of the law done against the law, nor the acting unjustly
against justice, nor the committing of sin against Providence.
35. And yet he says, that God punishes vice, and does many things for
the chastising of the wicked. And in his Second Book of the Gods he
says, that many adversities sometimes befall the good, not as they do
the wicked, for punishment, but according to another dispensation, as
it is in cities. And again in these words: “First we are to understand
of evils in like manner as has been said before: then, that these
things are distributed according to the reason of Jupiter, whether
for punishment, or according to some other dispensation, having in
some sort respect to the universe.” This therefore is indeed severe,
that wickedness is both done and punished according to the reason of
Jupiter. But he aggravates this contradiction in his Second Book of
Nature, writing thus: “Vice, in reference to grievous accidents, has
a certain reason of its own. For it is also in some sort according
to the reason of Nature, and, as I may so say, is not wholly useless
in respect of the universe. For otherwise also there would not be
any good.” Thus does he reprehend those that dispute indifferently
on both sides, who, out of a desire to say something wholly singular
and more exquisite concerning every thing, affirms, that men do not
unprofitably cut purses, calumniate, and play madmen, and that it is
not unprofitable there should be unprofitable, hurtful, and unhappy
persons. What manner of God then is Jupiter,—I mean Chrysippus’s
Jupiter,—who punishes an act done neither willingly nor unprofitably?
For vice is indeed, according to Chrysippus’s discourse, wholly
reprehensible; but Jupiter is to be blamed, whether he has made vice
which is an unprofitable thing, or, having made it not unprofitable,
punishes it.
36. Again, in his First Book of Justice, having spoken of the Gods as
resisting the injustices of some, he says: “But wholly to take away
vice is neither possible nor expedient.” Whether it were not better
that law-breaking, injustice, and folly should be taken away, is not
the design of this present discourse to enquire. But he himself, as
much as in him lies, by his philosophy taking away vice, which it is
not expedient to take away, does something repugnant both to reason and
God. Besides this, saying that God resists some injustices, he again
declares plainly the impiety of sins.
37. Having often written that there is nothing reprehensible, nothing
to be complained of in the world, all things being finished according
to a most excellent nature, he again elsewhere leaves certain
negligences to be reprehended, and those not concerning small or base
matters. For having in his Third Book of Substance related that some
such things befall honest and good men, he says: “Is it because some
things are not regarded, as in great families some bran—yea, and some
grains of corn also—are scattered, the generality being nevertheless
well ordered; or is it that there are evil Genii set over those things
in which there are real and faulty negligence?” And he also affirms
that there is much necessity intermixed. I let pass, how inconsiderate
it is to compare such accidents befalling honest and good men, as were
the condemnation of Socrates, the burning of Pythagoras, whilst he
was yet living, by the Cyloneans, the putting to death—and that with
torture—of Zeno by the tyrant Demylus, and of Antiphon by Dionysius,
with the letting of bran fall. But that there should be evil Genii
placed by Providence over such charges,—how can it but be a reproach
to God, as it would be to a king, to commit the administration of
his provinces to evil and rash governors and captains, and suffer
the best of his subjects to be despised and ill-treated by them? And
furthermore, if there is much necessity mixed amongst affairs, then God
has not power over them all, nor are they all administered according to
his reason.
38. He contends much against Epicurus and those that take away
providence from the conceptions we have of the Gods, whom we esteem
beneficial and gracious to men. And these things being frequently said
by them, there is no necessity of setting down the words. Yet all do
not conceive the Gods to be good and favorable to us. For see what the
Jews and Syrians think of the Gods; see also with how much superstition
the poets are filled. But there is not any one, in a manner to speak
of, that imagines God to be corruptible or to have been born. And to
omit all others, Antipater the Tarsian, in his book of the Gods writes
thus, word for word: “At the beginning of our discourse we will briefly
repeat the opinion we have concerning God. We understand therefore God
to be an animal, blessed and incorruptible, and beneficial to men.”
And then expounding every one of these terms he says: “And indeed all
men esteem the Gods to be incorruptible.” Chrysippus therefore is,
according to Antipater, not one of “all men;” for he thinks none of
the Gods, except Fire, to be incorruptible, but that they all equally
were born and will die. These things are, in a manner, everywhere said
by him. But I will set down his words out of his Third Book of the
Gods: “It is otherwise with the Gods. For some of them are born and
corruptible, but others not born. And to demonstrate these things from
the beginning will be more fit for a treatise of Nature. For the Sun,
the Moon, and other Gods who are of a like nature, were begotten; but
Jupiter is eternal.” And again going on: “But the like will be said
concerning dying and being born, both concerning the other Gods and
Jupiter. For they indeed are corruptible, but his parts incorruptible.”
With these I compare a few of the things said by Antipater: “Whosoever
they are that take away from the Gods beneficence, they attack in some
part our preconception of them; and according to the same reason they
also do this, who think they participate of generation and corruption.”
If then he who esteems the Gods corruptible is equally absurd with him
who thinks them not to be provident and gracious to men, Chrysippus is
no less in an error than Epicurus. For one of them deprives the Gods of
beneficence, the other of incorruptibility.
39. And moreover, Chrysippus, in his Third Book of the Gods treating of
the other Gods being nourished, says thus: “The other Gods indeed use
nourishment, being equally sustained by it; but Jupiter and the World
are sustained after another manner from those who are consumed and were
engendered by fire.” Here indeed he declares, that all the other Gods
are nourished except the World and Jupiter; but in his First Book of
Providence he says: “Jupiter increases till he has consumed all things
into himself. For since death is the separation of the soul from the
body, and the soul of the World is not indeed separated, but increases
continually till it has consumed all matter into itself, it is not to
be said that the World dies.” Who can therefore appear to speak things
more contradictory to himself than he who says that the same God is now
nourished and again not nourished? Nor is there any need of gathering
this by argument; for himself has plainly written in the same place:
“But the World alone is said to be self-sufficient, because it alone
has in itself all things it stands in need of, and is nourished and
augmented of itself, the other parts being mutually changed into one
another.” He is then repugnant to himself, not only by declaring in one
place that all the Gods are nourished except the World and Jupiter, and
saying in another, that the World also is nourished; but much more,
when he affirms that the World increases by nourishing itself. Now the
contrary had been much more probable, to wit, that the World alone
does not increase, having its own destruction for its food; but that
addition and increase are incident to the other Gods, who are nourished
from without, and the World is rather consumed into them, if so it is
that the World feeds on itself, and they always receive something and
are nourished from that.
40. Secondly, the conception of the Gods contains in it felicity,
blessedness, and self-perfection. Wherefore also Euripides is commended
for saying:
For God, if truly God, does nothing want,
And all these speeches are but poets’ cant.[201]
But Chrysippus in the places I have alleged says, that the World
only is self-sufficient, because this alone has in itself all things
it needs. What then follows from this, that the World alone is
self-sufficient? That neither the Sun, Moon, nor any other of the Gods
is self-sufficient, and not being self-sufficient, they cannot be happy
or blessed.
41. He says, that the infant in the womb is nourished by Nature, like a
plant; but when it is brought forth, being cooled and hardened by the
air, it changes its spirit and becomes an animal; whence the soul is
not unfitly named Psyche because of this refrigeration (ψύχειν). But
again he esteems the soul the more subtile and fine spirit of Nature,
therein contradicting himself; for how can a subtile thing be made
of a gross one, and be rarefied by refrigeration and condensation?
And what is more, how does he, declaring an animal to be made by
refrigeration, think the sun to be animated, which is of fire and made
of an exhalation changed into fire? For he says in his Third Book of
Nature: “Now the change of fire is such, that it is turned by the air
into water; and the earth subsiding from this, the air exhales; the air
being subtilized, the ether is produced round about it; and the stars
are, with the sun, kindled from the sea.” Now what is more contrary
to kindling than refrigeration, or to rarefaction than condensation?
For the one makes water and earth of fire and air, and the other
changes that which is moist and earthy into fire and air. But yet in
one place he makes kindling, in another cooling, to be the beginning
of animation. And he moreover says, that when the inflammation is
throughout, it lives and is an animal, but being again extinct and
thickened, it is turned into water and earth and corporeity. Now in his
First Book of Providence he says: “For the world, indeed, being wholly
set on fire, is presently also the soul and guide of itself; but when
it is changed into moisture, and has changed the soul remaining within
it in some sort into a body and soul, so as to consist of these two,
it is then after another manner.” Here, forsooth, he plainly says,
that the inanimate parts of the world are by inflammation turned into
an animated thing, and that again by extinction the soul is relaxed
and moistened, being changed into corporeity. He seems therefore very
absurd, one while by refrigeration making animals of senseless things,
and again, by the same changing the greatest part of the world’s soul
into senseless and inanimate things.
But besides this, his discourse concerning the generation of the soul
has a demonstration contrary to his own opinion; for he says, that
the soul is generated when the infant is already brought forth, the
spirit being changed by refrigeration, as by hardening. Now for the
soul’s being engendered, and that after the birth, he chiefly uses
this demonstration, that the children are for the most part in manners
and inclinations like to their parents. Now the repugnancy of these
things is evident. For it is not possible that the soul, which is not
generated till after the birth, should have its inclination before
the birth; or it will fall out that the soul is like before it is
generated; that is, it will be in likeness, and yet not be, because
it is not yet generated. But if any one says that, the likeness being
bred in the tempers of the bodies, the souls are changed when they are
generated, he destroys the argument of the soul’s being generated. For
thus it may come to pass, that the soul, though not generated, may at
its entrance into the body be changed by the mixture of likeness.
42. He says sometimes, that the air is light and mounts upwards, and
sometimes, that it is neither heavy nor light. For in his Second Book
of Motion he says, that the fire, being without gravity, ascends
upwards, and the air like to that; the water approaching more to the
earth, and the air to the fire. But in his Physical Arts he inclines
to the other opinion, that the air of itself has neither gravity nor
levity.
43. He says that the air is by nature dark, and uses this as an
argument of its being also the first cold; for that its darkness is
opposite to the brightness, and its coldness to the heat of fire.
Moving this in his First Book of Natural Questions, he again in his
treatise of Habits says, that habits are nothing else but airs; for
bodies are contained by these, and the cause that every one of the
bodies contained in any habit is such as it is, is the containing
air, which they call in iron hardness, in stone solidness, in silver
whiteness. These words have in them much absurdity and contradiction.
For if the air remains such as it is of its own nature, how comes
black, in that which is not white, to be made whiteness; and soft, in
that which is not hard, to be made hardness; and rare, in that which
is not thick, to be made thickness? But if, being mixed with these,
it is altered and made like to them, how is it a habit or power or
cause of these things by which it is subdued? For such a change, by
which it loses its own qualities, is the property of a patient, not of
an agent, and not of a thing containing, but of a thing languishing.
Yet they everywhere affirm, that matter, being of its own nature idle
and motionless, is subjected to qualities, and that the qualities are
spirits, which, being also aërial tensions, give a form and figure to
every part of matter to which they adhere. These things they cannot
rationally say, supposing the air to be such as they affirm it. For if
it is a habit and tension, it will assimilate every body to itself,
so that it shall be black and soft. But if by the mixture with these
things it receives forms contrary to those it has, it will be in some
sort the matter, and not the cause or power of matter.
44. It is often said by Chrysippus, that there is without the world an
infinite vacuum, and that this infinity has neither beginning, middle,
nor end. And by this the Stoics chiefly refute that spontaneous motion
of the atoms downward, which is taught by Epicurus; there not being
in infinity any difference according to which one thing is thought to
be above, another below. But in his Fourth Book of Things Possible,
having supposed a certain middle place and middle region, he says
that the world is situated there. The words are these: “Wherefore,
if it is to be said of the world that it is corruptible, this seems
to want proof; yet nevertheless it rather appears to me to be so.
However, its occupation of the place wherein it stands co-operates
very much towards its seeming to be incorruptible, because it is in
the midst; since if it were thought to be anywhere else, corruption
would absolutely take hold of it.” And again, a little after: “For
so also in a manner has essence happened eternally to possess the
middle place, being immediately from the beginning such as it is; so
that both by another manner and through this chance it admits not any
corruption, and is therefore eternal.” These words have one apparent
and visible contradiction, to wit, his admitting a certain middle place
and middle region in infinity. They have also a second, more obscure
indeed, but withal more absurd than this. For thinking that the world
would not have remained incorruptible if its situation had happened
to have been in any other part of the vacuum, he manifestly appears
to have feared lest, the parts of essence moving towards the middle,
there should be a dissolution and corruption of the world. Now this
he would not have feared, had he not thought that bodies do by nature
tend from every place towards the middle, not of essence, but of the
region containing essence; of which also he has frequently spoken, as
of a thing impossible and contrary to Nature; for that (as he says)
there is not in the vacuum any difference by which bodies are drawn
rather this way than that way, but the construction of the world is
the cause of motion, bodies inclining and being carried from every
side to the centre and middle of it. It is sufficient to this purpose,
to set down the text out of his Second Book of Motion; for having
discoursed, that the world indeed is a perfect body, but that the parts
of the world are not perfect, because they have in some sort respect
to the whole and are not of themselves; and going forward concerning
its motion, as having been framed by Nature to be moved by all its
parts towards compaction and cohesion, and not towards dissolution
and breaking, he says thus: “But the universe thus tending and being
moved to the same point, and the parts having the same motion from the
nature of the body, it is probable that all bodies have this first
motion according to Nature towards the centre of the world,—the world
being thus moved as regards itself, and the parts being thus moved as
being its parts.” What then ailed you, good sir (might some one say to
him), that you have so far forgotten those words, as to affirm that the
world, if it had not casually possessed the middle place, would have
been dissoluble and corruptible? For if it is by Nature so framed as
always to incline towards the middle, and its parts from every side
tend to the same, into what place soever of the vacuum it should have
been transposed,—thus containing and (as it were) embracing itself,—it
would have remained incorruptible and without danger of breaking. For
things that are broken and dissipated suffer this by the separation
and dissolution of their parts, every one of them hasting to its own
place from that which it had contrary to Nature. But you, being of
opinion that, if the world should have been seated in any other place
of the vacuum, it would have been wholly liable to corruption, and
affirming the same, and therefore asserting a middle in that which
naturally can have no middle,—to wit, in that which is infinite,—have
indeed dismissed these tensions, coherences, and inclinations, as
having nothing available to its preservation, and attributed all the
cause of its permanency to the possession of place. And, as if you were
ambitious to confute yourself, to the things you have said before you
join this also: “In whatsoever manner every one of the parts moves,
being coherent to the rest, it is agreeable to reason that in the
same also the whole should move by itself; yea, though we should, for
argument’s sake, imagine and suppose it to be in some vacuity of this
world; for as, being kept in on every side, it would move towards the
middle, so it would continue in the same motion, though by way of
disputation we should admit that there were on a sudden a vacuum round
about it.” No part then whatsoever, though encompassed by a vacuum,
loses its inclination moving it towards the middle of the world; but
the world itself, if chance had not prepared it a place in the middle,
would have lost its containing vigor, the parts of its essence being
carried some one way, some another.
45. And these things indeed contain great contradictions to natural
reason; but this is also repugnant to the doctrine concerning God and
Providence, that assigning to them the least causes, he takes from them
the most principal and greatest. For what is more principal than the
permanency of the world, or that its essence, united in its parts, is
contained in itself? But this, as Chrysippus says, fell out casually.
For if the possession of place is the cause of incorruptibility, and
this was the production of chance, it is manifest that the preservation
of the universe is a work of chance, and not of Fate and Providence.
46. Now, as for his doctrine of possibles, how can it but be repugnant
to his doctrine of Fate? For if that is not possible which either is
true or shall be true, as Diodorus has it, but every thing which is
capable of being, though it never shall be, is possible, there will
be many things possible which will never be according to invincible,
inviolable, and all-conquering Fate. And thus either Fate will lose its
power; or if that, as Chrysippus thinks, has existence, that which is
susceptible of being will often fall out to be impossible. And every
thing indeed which is true will be necessary, being comprehended by the
principal of all necessities; and every thing that is false will be
impossible, having the greatest cause to oppose its ever being true.
For how is it possible that he should be susceptible of dying on the
land, who is destined to die at sea? And how is it possible for him who
is at Megara to come to Athens, if he is prohibited by Fate?
47. But moreover, the things that are boldly asserted by him concerning
fantasies or imaginations are very opposite to Fate. For desiring to
show that fantasy is not of itself a perfect cause of consent, he says,
that the Sages will prejudice us by imprinting false imaginations in
our minds if fantasies do of themselves absolutely cause consent; for
wise men often make use of falsity against the wicked, representing
a probable imagination,—which is yet not the cause of consent, for
then it would be also a cause of false apprehension and error. Any one
therefore, transferring these things from the wise man to Fate, may
say, that consents are not caused by Fate; for if they were, false
consents and opinions and deceptions would also be by Fate, and men
would be endamaged by Fate. Thus the reason which exempts the wise man
from doing hurt also demonstrates at the same time that Fate is not the
cause of all things. For if men neither opine nor are prejudiced by
Fate, it is manifest also that they neither act rightly nor are wise
nor remain firm in their sentiments nor have utility by Fate, but that
there is an end of Fate’s being the cause of all things. Now if any
one shall say that Chrysippus makes not Fate the absolute cause of all
things, but only a _procatarctical_ (or antecedent) one, he will again
show that he is contradictory to himself, since he excessively praises
Homer for saying of Jupiter,
Receive whatever ill or good
He sends to each of you;[202]
as also Euripides for these words,
O Jove, how can I say that wretched we,
Poor mortals, aught do understand? On thee
We all depend, and nothing can transact,
But as thy sacred wisdom shall enact.[203]
And himself writes many things agreeable to these. In fine, he
says that nothing, be it never so little, either rests or is moved
otherwise than according to the reason of Jupiter, which is the
same thing with Fate. Moreover, the antecedent cause is weaker than
the absolute one, and attains not to its effect when it is subdued
by others that rise up against it. But he himself, declaring Fate
to be an invincible, unimpeachable, and inflexible cause, calls it
Atropos,[204] Adrasteia,[205] Necessity, and Pepromene (as putting a
limit to all things). Whether then shall we say, that neither consents
nor virtues nor vices nor doing well nor doing ill is in our power?
Or shall we affirm, that Fate is deficient, that terminating destiny
is unable to determine, and that the motions and habits of Jupiter
cannot accomplish? For the one of these two consequences will follow
from Fate’s being an absolute, the other from its being only antecedent
cause. For if it is an absolute cause, it takes away our free will and
leaves nothing in our power; and if it is only antecedent, it loses
its being unimpeachable and effectual. For not once or ten times, but
everywhere, especially in his Physics, he has written, that there are
many obstacles and impediments to particular natures and motions,
but none to that of the universe. And how can the motion of the
universe, extending as it does to particular ones, be undisturbed and
unimpeached, if these are stopped and hindered? For neither can the
nature of man be free from impediment, if that of the foot or hand is
not so; nor can the motion of a ship but be hindered, if there are any
obstacles about the sails or the operation of the oars.
Besides all this, if the fantasies are not according to Fate, neither
are they causes of consents; but if, because it imprints fantasies
leading to consent, the consents are said to be according to Fate,
how is it not contrary to itself, imprinting in the greatest matters
different imaginations and such as draw the understanding contrary
ways? For (they say) those who adhere to one of them, and withhold
not their consent, do amiss: if they yield to obscure things, they
stumble; if to false, they are deceived; if to such as are not
commonly comprehended, they opine. And yet one of these three is of
necessity,—either that every fantasy is not the work of Fate, or that
every receipt and consent of fantasy is faultless, or that Fate itself
is not irreprehensible. For I do not know how it can be blameless,
proposing to us such fantasies that not the resisting or going against
them, but the following and yielding to them, is blamable. Moreover,
both Chrysippus and Antipater, in their disputes against the Academics,
take not a little pains to prove that we neither act nor are incited
without consent, saying, that they build on fictions and false
suppositions who think that, a proper fantasy being presented, we are
presently incited, without having either yielded or consented. Again,
Chrysippus says, that God imprints in us false imaginations, as does
also the wise man; not that they would have us consent or yield to
them, but only that we should act and be incited with regard to that
which appears; but we, being evil, do through infirmity consent to such
fantasies. Now the perplexity and discrepancy of these discourses among
themselves are not very difficult to be discerned. For he that would
not have men consent but only act according to the fantasies which he
presents unto them—whether he be God or a wise man—knows that the
fantasies are sufficient for acting, and that consents are superfluous.
For if, knowing that the imagination gives us not an instinct to work
without consent, he ministers to us false and probable fantasies,
he is the voluntary cause of our falling and erring by assenting to
incomprehensible things.