they contemn and deride all about them, as if themselves were the only
men who regulated nature and custom as it ought to be, and who at
the same time adapted reason to each man’s peculiar state by means
of aversions, desires, appetites, pursuits, and impulses. But custom
has received no good from their logic, but, like the ear diseased by
vain sounds, is filled with difficulty and obscurity,—of which, if you
think good, we will elsewhere begin a new discourse. But now we will
run through the chief and principal heads of their natural philosophy,
which no less confounds the common conceptions than that other
concerning ends.
30. First, this is altogether absurd and against sense, to say that
is which is not, and things which are not are. But above all, that is
most absurd which they say of the universe. For, putting round about
the circumference of the world an infinite vacuum, they say that
the universe is neither a body nor bodiless. It follows then from
this that the universe has no being, since with them body only has a
being. Since therefore it is the part of that which has a being both
to do and suffer, and the universe has no being, it follows that the
universe will neither do nor suffer. Neither will it be in a place; for
that which takes up place is a body, and the universe is not a body,
therefore the universe is nowhere. And since that only rests which
continues in one and the same place, the universe rests not, because
it takes not up place. Neither yet is it moved, for what is moved must
have a place and space to move in. Moreover, what is moved either moves
itself, or suffers motion from another. Now, that which is moved by
itself has some bents and inclinations proceeding from its gravity or
levity; and gravity and levity are either certain habits or faculties
or differences of bodies. But the universe is not a body. It follows
then of necessity, that the universe is neither heavy nor light, and
consequently, that it has not in itself any principle of motion. Nor
yet will the universe be moved by any other; for there is nothing else
besides the universe. Thus are they necessitated to say as they do,
that the universe neither rests nor is moved. Lastly, since according
to their opinion it must not be said that the universe is a body, and
yet the heaven, the earth, animals, plants, men, and stones are bodies,
it follows that that which is no body will have bodies for its parts,
and things which have existence will be parts of that which has no
existence, and that which is not heavy will have parts that are heavy,
and what is not light will have parts that are light;—than which there
cannot be any dreams imagined more repugnant to the common conceptions.
Moreover, there is nothing so evident or so agreeing to common sense as
this, that what is not animate is inanimate, and what is not inanimate
is animate. And yet they overthrow also this evidence, confessing the
universe to be neither animate nor inanimate. Besides this, none thinks
the universe, of which there is no part wanting, to be imperfect; but
they deny the universe to be perfect, saying that what is perfect may
be defined, but the universe because of its infiniteness cannot be
defined. Therefore, according to them, there is something which is
neither perfect nor imperfect. Moreover, the universe is neither a
part, since there is nothing greater than it; nor the whole, for the
whole (they say) is predicated only of that which is digested into
order; but the universe is, through its infiniteness, undetermined and
unordered. Moreover, there is no other thing which can be the cause
of the universe, there being nothing besides the universe; nor is the
universe the cause of other things or even of itself; for its nature
suffers it not to act, and a cause is understood by its acting. Suppose
now, one should ask all men what they imagine _nothing_ to be, and
what notion they have of it. Would they not answer, that it neither
is a cause nor has a cause, that it is neither the whole nor a part,
that it is neither perfect nor imperfect, that it is neither animate
nor inanimate, that it neither is moved nor rests nor subsists, that
it is neither corporeal nor incorporeal; and that this and no other
thing is meant by _nothing_? Since then they alone predicate that of
the universe which all others do of _nothing_, it seems plain that
they make the _universe_ and _nothing_ to be the same. Time must
then be said to be nothing; the same also must be said of predicate,
axiom, connection, combination, which terms they use more than any
of the other philosophers, yet they say that they have no being. But
farther, to say that what is true has no being or subsistence but is
comprehended, and that that is comprehensible and credible which no way
partakes of the essence of being,—does not this exceed all absurdity?
31. But lest these things should seem to have too much of logical
difficulty, let us proceed to such as pertain more to natural
philosophy. Since then, as themselves say,