The life of every man, especially of every philosopher, should agree
with what he believes and teaches, 428. The lives of Chrysippus,
Zeno, and other Stoic philosophers, did not agree with their
doctrines, 429, _et seq._ It has been so when any of them have
managed state affairs, 429. And in regard to the worship of the gods,
430. They represent virtue as one indivisible quality of the mind,
and yet admit several virtues, 431. They say that students should
first learn logic, secondly ethics, then physics, and then say that
natural science should come first, 432, 433. Chrysippus has written
on both sides of the same question; he has opposed his own doctrines,
434-436. They say that the law commands good actions and forbids evil
actions; and yet wicked men cannot do good, 437. Chrysippus says that
nothing properly belongs to a bad man, or is profitable to him; that
no one vice or sin is greater than another, nor any good deed better
than another; and then contradicts himself, 438-441. He disparages
the fear of divine wrath as a motive to virtue, and yet commends
it, 442. In one place he allows pleasure to be a good; in another
place he denies that it is so, 443. In one place he asserts that he
who injures another injures also himself, and in another place says
this is absurd, 444. He often asserts that vice is the essence of
unhappiness; but elsewhere says that it is profitable for a bad man
to live rather than to die, although he never become good, 446. He
says it is sometimes meet for the happy to make away with themselves,
and for the unhappy to continue to live, 447. He says that good
things are totally and necessarily different from bad; and yet that
a man may change from one to the other without perceiving it, 447.
He maintains that a prudent man meddles not with public affairs; and
also says that a wise man willingly takes upon him a kingdom, 448. He
makes a wise man indifferent to wealth, and yet eager to receive pay,
449. In one place he justifies unclean practices from the example
of brute animals, and in another place condemns them, 452. When two
things are exactly alike, and there is a necessity to choose between
them, the mind chooses: which Chrysippus in one place calls an effect
without a cause, but in another place thinks there may be a hidden
cause, 452, 453. He highly commends Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,
for what they delivered on dialectics, and yet opposes their views,
454. He says that to have been happy a long time is to be no more
happy than to be happy only for a moment; and yet that momentary
happiness is worth nothing, 455. He allows ornament to be desirable
in a discourse, and yet says that blemishes and solecisms in speaking
are not to be regarded, 456. He applies to the gods terms of high
praise, but makes them the authors of slaughter and carnage, 460. If
the gods are the authors of war they are also the authors of vice and
wickedness, contrary to what Chrysippus says, 461. He says nothing
can be contrary to Nature, and even vicious practices are according
to Nature and the laws established by the Deity: yet he says God, and
man too, punishes vice, 462-464. He says all the gods are nourished
except Jupiter and the World; he also says the World is nourished,
466, 467. He contradicts himself in regard to the generation of the
soul; the nature and qualities of the air; a vacuum, &c., 468-473.
His doctrine of things possible is contrary to his doctrine of Fate,
473. Fate he declares to be an invincible, absolute cause; yet admits
that there are obstacles and hindrances to particular motions and
actions, 474-477.