The views of Chrysippus, the Stoic, opposed, 372, _et seq._ He and
the Stoics in general pervert the common conceptions, 373, 374. Do
they agree with Nature who make all natural things indifferent?
375. Natural things,—health, vigor, comfort, &c.,—are necessary,
if we would live according to Nature; but the Stoics deny this,
375. An intelligent and wise man will estimate every thing at its
true value, 376. When deprived of good things, a wise man feels
the loss, 377. It is a common experience that a man has joy in
exchanging a state of great evil for a state of great good; but the
Stoics do not admit this, 377. The Stoics do not admit that the
continuance of a good thing increases its value, contrary to the
common apprehension and belief, 378. They maintain that virtue and
happiness, when present, may not be perceived by him who enjoys
them; which is a great absurdity, 378, 379. Is the difference then
so small between health and sickness, wisdom and folly? 379. It is
repugnant to the common conception, that all men who are not wise
are equally foolish, wicked, and unjust; and yet the Stoics assert
this, 380. They say that a man possessing all good things may find it
convenient to commit suicide; and that a man destitute of all good
may find it fitting to live, 381, 382. Chrysippus inconsistent with
himself, 383. He maintains that vice is not wholly useless; that it
is indispensable to the existence of virtue, 384. Must we then pray
that wickedness may always continue? 385. God has no need of thieves,
murderers, and other evil-doers, nor is wickedness pleasing to him,
386. The Stoics say that prudence could not exist in the utter
absence of evil, 387. But good and evil do not exist that there may
be place and opportunity for prudence, 388. Suppose evil to cease
to exist: would any harm arise from the lack of prudence? 388. Our
taste would not be lost, if all bitter things were wanting, 389. If
good only existed, might there not be an apprehension of evil? 389.
If vice were absolutely necessary, might not a few examples suffice?
389. The Stoics say that no vicious man receives benefit from any
source; has no benefactors, and does not slight benefactors: of
course, then, he is never ungrateful, 391. What is utility?? 392.
According to the Stoics, it is a gathering and keeping of useless
and indifferent things, 393. To live virtuously and according to
nature is the true happiness, 394. The Stoics, in practice, sanction
this idea; but their philosophy rejects it, 394. The end is more
important and valuable than the means, though both may be good; but
the Stoics allow no good or evil thing to be greater or less than
another good or evil thing, 395. It is against common sense to say,
with Chrysippus, that there may be two ends or scopes proposed of
life, and that all we do is not to be referred to one, 396. That
which is first by nature is to be first chosen, 396. The Stoics say
that the obtaining of natural things is not the end of aiming after
them, 397. Chrysippus says a man may be indifferent to good and evil
before he understands the nature of good or evil: which is utterly
impossible, 398. The Stoics reason in a circle, 399, 400. Absurdities
of their philosophy, 402. It is self-contradictory, 403. According to
them the universe is nothing and nowhere, 404. Their conceptions of
God are confused and erroneous, 404. They believe none of the gods
to be immortal, but Jupiter alone, 405. They admit the providence of
God, but do not allow that he bestows good things, 406. They make
God the author of evil, 408. They hold a final conflagration, and an
absorption of all things into God, 405, 409. They say there is but
one quality in two substances, 410. They think that one body may mix
with another through its whole extent, so that a drop of wine may
extend through the whole Atlantic Ocean, 411, 412. Their philosophy
concerning the equality and inequality of bodies leads to absurdity,
412-416; and so when they say that nothing touches another, 416,
417. They also absurdly say that time may be past or future, but not
present, 418-420. They say that nothing can overtake another: a swift
horse cannot overtake a slow tortoise, because the interval between
can be divided into infinite spaces, 420. They say that every man has
two bodies precisely alike, one being substance, the other quality,
421, 422. They make the virtues and vices, the fancies, impulses, and
operations of the mind to be distinct bodies and animals, 423. They
make God himself to be an intellectual body, not incorporeal, 425.
They make qualities to be bodies, and yet say that matter is void of
quality, 426.